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Shobeiri, S.A.; Bietti, L.M.; Pogacar, M.

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## Photography and Memory



Ali Shobeiri

Centre for the Arts in Society (LUCAS), Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands

### Abstract

The affinity between photography and memory is rather axiomatic: We *take* photos to *preserve* our memories. This formulation considers photographs as *aide-mémoire* and photography as a *mnemotechnique*. Such a basic analogy, however, falls short in explaining the spatiotemporality and materiality of photography and overlooks the mediated aspects of memory in narrating the past. The difficulty with describing the conjunction of memory and photography lies in the fact that neither of them has a static essence: Both remembering and photography are inherently dynamic processes. While for some the photograph simply is a representational image that embodies past events, for others the photograph's materiality and social uses are equally crucial in the way it continually reshapes our memories. In addition, debates on "prosthetic memory," "post-memory," and trauma have already shown how photography plays a role in the disembodied, transgenerational, and retroactive operations of memory work. To classify diverse approaches toward memory and photography without ignoring the dynamic aspects

of either of them, this entry is divided into two parts: "conceiving photography through memory" and "perceiving memory through photography." While the first section explains how the medium of photography has been historically defined via its approaches to memory and remembrance, the second section shows how some salient views on memory are largely founded on photographic lexicons and metaphors. Among others, the first part draws on the work of thinkers such as Siegfried Kracauer, Roland Barthes, and Elizabeth Edwards, and the second part discusses the work of Sigmund Freud, Marianne Hirsch, and Ulrich Baer.

### Synonyms

Materiality; Memory; Photography; Postmemory; Spatiality; Temporality; Trauma

### Introduction

For our generation, the close affinity between memory and photography is rather axiomatic: We *take* photographs to *preserve* our memories. Such a putative belief equates the moment of capturing a photograph with the registration of lived experience as memory, so seeing the photograph corresponds to the act of remembrance. This logic considers the photograph to be an *aide-mémoire* that helps facilitate the intrinsically

ephemeral and fragmented process of remembering. Seeing photography as a mnemonic tool goes back to the advent of the medium when Oliver Wendell Holmes labeled the photograph as a “mirror with a memory” (1859). Not only did this metaphor entwine memory to photography but also suggested that memory was essentially a material property of the photograph (Shevchenko 2015). Maybe such a view would be reasonable in relation to the early daguerreotype photos, which laid emphasis on the physicality of photos due to their lack of reproducibility, but it does not pertain to the contemporary digital age. Whereas the photograph was once seen as a “memento from a life being lived” (Berger 2013: 53), it has now become a ubiquitous source of information about current events. Instead of capturing irreversible past experiences as “mementos,” photographs have now become “momentos” in the ongoing present (van Dijk 2007: 115). This means that besides their function as visual registrations of the past, photographs can also inform us about the continuous process of memory work in the age of instantaneous communication about the present.

But the difficulty with defining the conjunction of memory and photography lies in the fact that neither of them has a static essence: Both remembering and photography are inherently dynamic processes (Olick and Robbins 1998). While for some the photograph simply is a representational image that embodies past events, for others the photograph’s materiality and geographical specificities are equally crucial in how it continually reshapes our memories (Edwards and Hart 2004; Kuhn and McAllister 2006). Drawing on semantic roles of photographs in the act of remembrance, art critic Allan Sekula once noted that photographs are simultaneously “scientific” and “mystical,” “informative” and “affective” (1984), underscoring how photography can both originate and obscure remembering. In addition, while some scholars have mainly discussed photography in relation to specific tropes of memories (such as individual, collective, involuntary, prosthetic, or traumatic ones), theorists of photography have constantly been trying to establish an ontology of photography according to remembrance and/or forgetting.

To clarify and classify the diverse approaches toward memory and photography without ignoring the dynamic, fluid, and ever-shifting aspects of either of them, this entry is divided into two parts: “conceiving photography through memory” and “perceiving memory through photography.” While the first section explains how the medium of photography has been historically defined via its approaches to memory and remembrance, the second section shows how some salient views on memory are chiefly founded on photographic lexicons, methods, and metaphors. Among others, the first part draws on thinkers such as Siegfried Kracauer, Roland Barthes, and Elizabeth Edwards, and the second part discusses the thoughts of Sigmund Freud, Marianne Hirsch, and Ulrich Baer.

## Conceiving Photography Through Memory

The camera saves a set of appearances from the otherwise inevitable supersession of further appearances. It holds them unchanging. And before the invention of the camera nothing could do this, except, the mind’s eye, the faculty of memory (John Berger, *Uses of Photography*).

Several thinkers defined the medium of photography according to the way it would preserve our memories; that is, by immortalizing the space and time exposed to the camera’s lens. In relation to this thought, the most contentious debate was the supposed automatic nature of the camera in capturing reality, which implies the reduction of human agency in the act. The belief in the automation of photography was to the extent that film critic André Bazin called the photographic camera a “nonliving agent,” since it could in some sense mold time and space, and hence their memories, in the form of a photograph (1967). If the photographic camera could become a so-called “mold machine” (Cavell 1979), then the quasiautomatic registration of events would suggest a closer relationship between physical reality and its representation in the photograph. In contrast to painting, which implied the direct intervention of the human subject, photography was celebrated for

its removal (or at least reduction) of human involvement in registration of memories. As others have put it, photography could “slice out” a moment in time (Sontag 1977) or “cut out” a piece of space (Metz 2003) in order to affix the memory of an event onto the two-dimensional space of a photograph. Thanks to the “immediate and unconstructed” operation of the camera, for art critic John Berger the photograph was “indeed like a *trace*” (2002: 51, italics in the original): an indexical proof that would substantiate a connection between lived experiences and their memories. While paintings are putatively seen as iconic signs, since they refer to an emulation of the physical world, photographs are seen as indexical signs, since they imply a causal relationship between what the camera captures and what the spectator sees in the frame. This logic puts forward that the memories instigated by photographs are more cohesive and thorough compared to those conveyed by paintings. Thus, the automation and completeness of photography not only suggests that the memories captured by photographs are more accurate than paintings, but also that they encompass more information and details when recollecting the past. For theorist Tom Gunning, it is precisely the “nearly inexhaustible visual richness” of the photograph that defines the essence of the medium of photography (2004: 47). However, the ability of photography to capture events with an excessive visual accuracy does not necessarily guarantee a closer affinity between photographic registration and recollection, for remembering is essentially a discontinuous process. That is why for philosopher Siegfried Kracauer photography and memory images are inherently at odds with each other, because the completeness and cohesiveness of photography opposes the selective and arbitrary nature of memory flow. As he puts forward:

While photography grasps what is given as a spatial (or temporal) continuum, memory images preserve the given in so far as it means something. Since what is meant is disclosed just as little in the purely spatial context as it is in the purely temporal one, memory images are out of kilter with photographic reproduction. If they seem to be a fragment from the point of view of photography (...) from the viewpoint of memory images, photography seems a

jumble of things made up in part of detritus. (2014: 31)

If memory images and photographic images are incompatible with each other, it is because, unlike the all-encompassing tendency of photography in capturing time and space, memory images summon up the temporal and spatial elements only if they had significance in the past. In other words, while for photography the spatial and temporal aspects of the subject matter become its meaning, for memory images meaning is created through the assemblage of a set of disparate, fragmented, and elusive recollections. This means, contrary to what Bazin had celebrated, for Kracauer the automaticity of photography in freezing space and time does not guarantee that it can emulate memory work. In that, unlike photography, “memory incorporates neither the total spatial nature of a state of affairs nor its total temporal course. Its recordings are, compared to photography, full of gaps” (30). While photography prides itself on its completeness and clarity, Kracauer argues that memory operates through cracks and discontinuities, since without such dispositions it would no longer be of the past.

Despite its visual exactitude in capturing events, photography can imitate the incompleteness of memory by allowing the viewer to extend time and thereby project a mental image onto the photograph. Such a mental projection, however, depends on the types of photographic images that are used in recollections. Drawing on time and memory, art critic Thierry de Duve distinguishes between two kinds of photographs: photographs as “events” (or snapshot photos) and photographs as “pictures” (or time exposure photos). While the photograph as an “event” makes us aware that it is only a fragment of reality, since life is continuing outside the frame, the photograph as a “picture” becomes a self-enclosed reality, thereby representing the real as a “frozen gestalt” (1978: 113). For example, while news and sport photographs are seen as event photos, since they appear to be fragments of life, staged portraits and landscape photos are seen as picture photos, since they claim that they have encapsulated an entire life within them. For de Duve, it is the photograph as

picture that is “congenial with the ebb and flow of memory,” for it does not limit the viewer to the time in which the photograph was taken, “but allows the imaginary reconstruction of any moment of the life of the portrayed person” (123). Seeing photographs as pictures, particularly portrait photographs, reveals the incompleteness of photography in recollection; for, to remember a person does not mean to recall the slice of time captured in the frame but to project the entire life of the person onto the photograph – as did cultural theorist Roland Barthes in *Camera Lucida* (2000).

In his eloquent yet poignant work on photography, Barthes asserts that: “not only is the Photograph never, in essence, a memory (whose grammatical expression would be the perfect tense, whereas the tense of the photograph is aorist), but it actually blocks memory, quickly becoming a counter-memory” (91). If Barthes views the photograph as a “countermemory,” something that inherently resists temporal completion, it is because the photograph contains two kinds of temporalities: “this-has-been” and “this-will-be.” While the former refers to the physical presence of the photographed subject in front of the lens, the latter refers to the imminent death and/or disappearance of the subject in time. Following this logic, while confronting the past life of a person in the present time of viewing a photograph, the spectator simultaneously *announces* and *renounces* the possibility of resuming the past via recollection. On the one hand, seeing the portraits of deceased people in the present may prompt us to project their lives onto the photograph; on the other hand, the sheer knowledge of photography’s pastness occludes this photographic resurrection of time. For Barthes, this paradoxical state of remembering through photographs was essentially the defining feature of photography. In a sense, all photographs can do regarding memory “is to attest that a ‘now’ in the past existed” (Wigoder 2001: 33). That is why throughout *Camera Lucida* Barthes develops a specific method for explaining how photographs can instigate remembrance. Drawing mostly on documentary and personal photographs, he introduces two

terms to directly address memory work in photography: *studium* and *punctum*.

While the *studium* is a matter of cultural reading of photographs, resulting in an “average affect” or “docile interest” in the viewer, the *punctum* is the detail or element that “pricks” and “bruises” the viewer (Barthes 2000: 26–28). To a certain extent, while the *studium* constitutes the intentional and communal facet of memory, the *punctum* refers to the unintentional and personal aspect of memory. That is to say, while the *studium* summons memories collectively and at will, the *punctum* conjures up memories individually and without the viewer’s cooperation. That is why, according to scholar David Bate, the Barthesian concepts of *studium* and *punctum* parallel with Proustian concepts of “voluntary” and “involuntary memory” (2010). As Bate has put forward, the *studium* refers to the “cultural associations (that) can be consciously recalled” and the *punctum* refers to the “inexplicable” and “random” recollections that come to us involuntarily. Like the work of human memory, when using photography as a conduit of remembrance

we can no longer verify the original experience or sensation of the photograph, but the image provides a scene in which we may bring voluntary (*studium*) and involuntary (*punctum*) memories to bear upon it. Voluntary memory is like the work of history, but involuntary memory belongs to personal *affect*. These are both interwoven in complex ways. (Bate 2010: 254, italics in the original)

Accordingly, whereas the notion of *studium* (voluntary memory) refers to the collective, objective, and social aspects of memory, the notion of *punctum* (involuntary memory) refers to the personal, subjective, and affective elements of remembering. If photography can instigate involuntary memories, which may exceed the intentionality of the photographer and representationality of the photograph, it is because the conjunction of memory and photography is not only ocular, but also oral and tactile. This means that we do not only recall things, places, and people by *seeing* them in/as photos, but also by engaging with the materiality and hapticity of photographs.

As visual anthropologist Elizabeth Edwards has stressed over the past decade, to fully understand the significance of photography for memory work one needs to look beyond the two-dimensional frame of the photograph (2001, 2006). To understand photographs as mnemonic tools capable of instigating involuntary memories one needs to deem them as “objects of affect” with dynamic biographies and histories: “They are reframed, replaced, rearranged; negative becomes print, prints become lantern slides or postcards, ID photographs become family treasures, private photographs become archives, analog objects become electronic digital code” (Edwards 2012: 225). If one considers the wide spectrum of mutations that photographs can undergo, either in analog or digital form, then it becomes possible to say that photos can “touch” the viewer’s emotion and feelings (Olin 2002), resulting in the divulgence of memories that may or may not be visible on the surface of the photo. For Edwards, the key to understanding photographs as unique instruments of memory lies in the unlimited spatial and temporal possibilities that their materiality can offer. For instance, while one can recall a loved one by shortly glancing over their single ID photo, the same image would have conjured up different associations, affects, and modes of remembrance if it had been juxtaposed alongside other photos, placed in a photo album, and viewed for a longer period of time. The materiality of a photo album does not simply induce recollection, but, as Edwards explains:

the album *retemporalizes*, it constructs a narrative of history, not merely in the juxtaposition of separate images but in the way that the viewer activates the temporality and narrative through the physical action of holding the object and turning the pages. The viewer is in control of the temporal relationship with those images. Each viewer will have his or her own track through the physical album, those pages lingered over, those skipped over, investing the object with narrative and memory (...) The album also *respatializes*: disconnected points offer glimpses of possible pasts. They are transformed not into an experienced spatiality but with an imaginative and ambiguous space which the past inhabits, collected and co-located, they transform history into space. Blank spaces in an album suggest memory lost. (2009: 337)

The two practices of “retemporalization” and “respatialization” of photographs lay bare that memories are not simply fixed in photos, as the early theoreticians of photography had envisaged, but *mediated* through them: a process that is as much space bound as it is time dependent. As media studies scholar José van Dijck notes: “memories are made as much as they are recalled from photographs; our recollections never remain the same, even if the photograph appears to represent a fixed image of the past” (2008: 8). Even in our contemporary “post-photographic era” (Mitchel 1992) in which photographs are mainly created, transmitted, and preserved in digital formats, re-temporalization and re-spatialization remain as inherent potentials embedded in each photograph. Although digital photography was once seen as a threat to memory retention due to the absence of physical substance for the image (Trachtenberg 2008), photography’s function as a mnemonic device is equally vibrant in the digital era. Instead of seeing digitization as a means of disembodiment and dematerialization of memories, van Dijck suggests that we need to consider “the coded layer of digital data as an additional type of materiality, one that is endlessly pliable and can easily be ‘remediated’ into different physical formats” (2007: 19). In this light, it becomes possible to argue that all types of memories prompted by photography are essentially “mediated memories,” capable of re-temporalization and re-spatialization, both in the analogue era and the contemporary digital age.

Whereas the scholars of photography have been establishing the major features of the medium according to how it deals with memory, other scholars have taken an opposite route: They have attempted to understand the internal mechanisms of memory by comparing it to photographic operations. This means, instead of considering photographs as mnemonic tools and photography as a *mnemotechnique*, they have deemed memory to be essentially photographic.



## Perceiving Memory Through Photography

I read the photograph not as the parceling-out and preservation of time but as an access to another kind of experience that is explosive, instantaneous, distinct—a chance to see in a photograph not narrative, not history, but possibly trauma (Ulrich Baer, *Spectral Evidence*).

While photography aficionados were trying to find the essence of the medium in how it captures memories, psychologists, philosophers, and literary theorists have used the process of photo production as an allegory for how memories, especially traumatic ones, are registered and recalled. Among such examples are the early writings of Sigmund Freud, who used the metaphor of the camera as a place wherein unconscious thoughts and emotions are stored in a latent state. Using an abundance of photographic terminologies to explain the inner mechanisms of the unconscious in his article entitled “The Mystic Writing Pad,” Freud distinguished between two types of memories: “natural memory” and “artificial memory” (1925). The former category referred to the unaided human ability for remembering the past and the latter category considered diverse manufactured devices used as aids in memory inscription. For Freud, all kinds of “auxiliary apparatuses” that humans have invented to enhance their memories, such as photographic cameras or voice recording devices, “are built on the same model as the sense organs themselves” (1925: 430). Whether they were a camera or a gramophone, all the devices used in recollection were, for him, imitating the invisible operations of the “natural memory.” By distinguishing between the “natural” and the “artificial” memory, Freud was exposing the fact that human memory was becoming increasingly reliant on synthetic devices such as the photographic camera. As he writes elsewhere:

With every tool man is perfecting his own organs, whether motor or sensory, or is removing the limits to their functioning (...) by means of spectacles he corrects defects in the lens of his own eye; by means of telescope he sees into the far distance and by means of microscope he overcomes the limits of visibility set by the structure of his retina. In the

photographic camera he has created an instrument which retains the fleeting visual impressions, just as a gramophone disc retains the equally fleeting auditory ones; both are at bottom materialization of the power he possessed of recollection, his memory. (1930: 279)

By drawing a parallel between human (or natural) and machine (or artificial) memory, Freud was not only declaring their dependance, but also predicting their inevitable entanglement in the future – the predicament that has been recently explored by photography historians (Batchen 1997; Silverman 2000). Around the same time as Freud, Walter Benjamin, too, coined the term “optical unconscious” in his article entitled “A Small History of Photography” (1999 [1931]): referring to the way in which the camera could capture that which hitherto was invisible to the naked eye. Without discussing memory therein, Benjamin foresaw “stop motion” and “close-up” as inherent abilities of photography to register a kind of memory that was essentially produced mechanically. Explaining the operations of the optical unconscious, Benjamin writes:

For it is another nature which speaks to the camera rather than to the eye: ‘other’ above all in the sense that a space informed by human consciousness gives way to a space informed by the unconscious. Whereas it is a common place that, for example, we have some idea what is involved in the act of walking (if only in general terms), we have no idea at all what happens during the fraction of a second when a person actually takes a step. (1999 [1931]: 510)

Thanks to the new ways of seeing offered by photography, humans could not only see events in slow motion and close-up, but also register and recall them via the aid of photographic apparatuses. If the camera could capture a walking person in slow motion or divulge the textures of an animal’s skin in detail, then it could also inscribe those technologically produced experiences as memories.

Whereas for Freud and Benjamin photographically produced memories were seen as “artificial” or augmented, in our contemporary digital age they have become the building blocks of what memory studies scholar Alison Landsberg refers to as “prosthetic memories” (1995). In the same way in which we can possess a photographically

mediated memory without being able to experience it firsthand, such as the image of an extreme close-up or a slow motion of a waterdrop, prosthetic memories “do not come from a person’s lived experience in any strict sense” (1995: 175). Such memories are inherently distanced from human corporeal experiences in the phenomenal work, since they are formed as alienated, yet vivid, recollections that are not our own. In our contemporary “prosthetic culture” (Ceila 1997) in which the medium of photography plays a vital role, such disembodied memories can be instantaneously transmitted across different times and places. For example, while watching a movie showing a warzone far away from where one lives, the viewers can prosthetically internalize the seen footages as their own, as if they have corporeally lived through those disturbing situations. Without needing to experience events directly, in the age of new media technologies we cannot only recollect memories that have not been experienced through our bodies, but also adopt and internalize the memories of other generations via photographic means. This potential of photography for projection, adoption, and hence identification with the memories of the earlier generation is precisely what grants photography a privileged status as a medium of “postmemory” (2012). Formulated by Marianne Hirsch, the concept of “postmemory” refers to the experiences of those whose lives have been dominated by narratives that preceded their birth, “whose own belated stories are displaced by the powerful stories of the previous generation” (2001: 12). According to Hirsch, marked by “displacement,” “belatedness,” and “vicariousness,”

postmemory most specifically describes the relationship of children of survivors of cultural and collective trauma to the experiences of their parents, experiences that they ‘remember’ only as the narrative and images with which they grew up, but that are so powerful, so monumental, as to constitute memories in their own rights. (2001: 9)

Next to oral stories, written testimonies, and video footages, Hirsch considers photographs to be an exemplary means of narrating postmemory for two reasons: firstly, due to the “evidential force” of photographs as traces of what has been once

experienced in the past (or what Roland Barthes called the “that-has-been” of photography); and secondly, owing to the unique temporality that is activated when one looks at photographs (2001: 14). While looking at a photograph one does not deal with “narrative memory” that requires a strategy of emplotment to be animated (White 1978). Instead, the sheer act of looking at the photo creates a “living context” during which the photographed subject can continue to exist in time (Berger 2013). In relation to postmemory, Hirsch explains:

Photography does not mediate the process of individual and collective memory but brings the past back in the form of a ghostly *revenant*, emphasizing, at the same time, its immutable and irreversible pastness and irretrievability. The encounter with the photograph is the encounter between two presents, one of which, already past, can be reanimated in the act of looking. (2001: 21)

Consequently, what makes photography an apt medium for the characterization of postmemory is that it allows the later generation to work through the traumas of the earlier ones by reanimating the past. If trauma is an “unclaimed experience” that has happened “too soon” and “too unexpectedly” to be fully registered (Caruth 2016), Hirsch then suggests that the medium of photography can resolve this incomplete recognition by creating a retroactive experience of the past. It is this unique temporality of photography that enables the second generation to vicariously respond to the traumatic experiences of the previous ones. That is why Hirsch succinctly defines postmemory in relation to photography as a “retrospective witnessing by adoption” (2001: 10), since photography can provide the viewer with a somewhat *ex post facto* mode of witnessing.

The act of photography, according to literary theorist Gerhard Richter (not to be confused with the visual artist with the same name), can essentially be understood as an interplay between “the moment of witnessing,” which is singular and linked to the past, and the universal “act of bearing witness,” which is collective and takes place in the future. He clarifies this point as follows:

to appreciate this interplay between singularity and universality in the space of photography, we may



think of the photographic image as a technically mediated *moment of witnessing*, in which the inscription with light cannot be separated from an *act of bearing witness*, which, by definition, always must be addressed to the logic and unpredictable movements of a reception that is irreducible to the act itself. (2010: 73, emphasis added)

If photography is well suited for the mediation of postmemory, it is because it can entangle the “moment of witnessing” an event with the “act of bearing witness” to that moment in the photograph. It is this trait of photography, which allows the viewer of photographs to vicariously witness the photographed site/people, that allows postmemory to become the vehicle of transmission of cultural trauma. Such a particular temporality, as others have argued, is in fact pertinent to the structure of traumatic experience itself. Like photographs that can mechanically or artificially repeat the past through reanimation, not having been consciously registered at the time of their occurrence, traumatic events keep returning to the survivors belatedly. Trauma, writes literary theorist Cathy Caruth, “is not locatable in the simple violent or original event in an individual’s past, but rather in the way that its very unassimilated nature—the way it was precisely *not known* in the first instance—returns to haunt the survivor later on” (2016: 4). The “unassimilated nature” of trauma, which comes belatedly but repeatedly to haunt the survivor in the future, goes against the singular logic of “moment of witnessing,” which suggests a direct inscription of memories as events take place. Instead, it suggests that the very possibility of experiencing a traumatic experience is provided through the “act of bearing witness,” which is inherently retroactive and irreducible to the event itself. That is why literary theorist Ulrich Baer claims that photography and trauma essentially have the same structure, in that both deal with the blockage of experience. As he notes:

Because trauma blocks routine mental processes from converting an experience into memory or forgetting, it parallels the defining structure of photography, which also traps an event during its occurrence while blocking its transformation into memory (. . .) Normally an event becomes an experience once it is integrated into consciousness.

Some events, however, register in the psyche—like negatives captured on films for later development—without being integrated into the larger contexts provided by consciousness, memory, or the act of forgetting. (2005: 9)

Baer not only sees the possibility of some photographs, specifically aftermath or late photographs, conveying the experience of trauma, but he goes further proposing that photographic narration of time inherently parallels with the registration of traumatic memories in the psyche. Just as trauma requires a belated response to an unassimilated experience, photography works through a late identification with something that may or may not have been fully experienced. What photography and trauma have in common then is the displacement of events, delayed recognition, and the possibility of retroactive witnessing. If Freud and Benjamin prophesied photographic qualities in memory work, Baer essentially argues that trauma and photography have the same architecture. To put it differently, if prosthetic memories allow disembodied experience and postmemory allows vicarious experience, the temporality of trauma suggests that photographic procedures and memory work are of comparable fabrics. As such, instead of conceiving an ontology of photography through the way it encapsulates memories, as Barthes and Kracauer did, prosthetic memory, postmemory, and traumatic memories are examples of perceiving memory through photography. Despite this change of direction, what both approaches have in common is their dependance on temporal and spatial lexicons, without which neither memory nor photography would exist.

## Conclusion

This entry has shown that the conjunction of memory and photography can be explored via two directions: conceiving photography through memory and perceiving memory through photography. While the first approach has been *ontologizing* photography as the preserver of memories, the second approach has been *concretizing* memory work through photographic terminologies. The thinkers in the first category have

shown how the photograph as a mnemonic device encapsulates time and space. For Siegfried Kracauer and Roland Barthes such spatial and temporal features are eternalized as “spatial continuum” and “punctum,” whereas for Elizabeth Edwards such traits can be remediated through re-spatialization and re-temporalization, made possible through the conduit of materiality. The thinkers in the second category have explored how the processes of memorization and recollection could be understood as photographic procedures. While for Freud and Benjamin photography could only constitute an “artificial memory” or an enhanced memory, the concepts of “prosthetic memory,” “postmemory,” and the trauma discourse have shown how disembodiment, belatedness, retroactive witnessing, and delayed recognition are essentially photographic dispositions. Despite their different directions, both approaches have shown the interdependence of photography theories and memory studies on spatiotemporal lexicons and metaphors to understand how memory *works* and what photography *is*.

## Cross-References

- [Media Memory](#)
- [Postmemory](#)
- [Time](#)
- [Trauma](#)

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