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What drives the propensity to vote for ethnic-minority-interest parties?

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Abstract

In the study of ethnic-minorities' voting preferences it is evidenced that ethnic minorities have favoured social-democratic parties in most European countries. In the Netherlands, however, a part of them has divided from the social-democrats in 2017 and voted a new ethnic-minority-interest party into parliament. In the 2021 election, multiple ethnic-minority-interest parties arose in the Dutch political landscape, raising the question how they compete over ethnic-minority voters, who form an increasing share of the electorate but remain marginalized in politics. Using the Dutch Ethnic Minority Election Survey 2021, we shed light on the propensity to vote (PTV) for three ethnic-minority-interest parties: DENK, BIJ1 and NIDA. First, since the parties differ in which ethnic communities their candidates are rooted, we test ethnic community-based differences in their party preferences. Second, we disentangle the role of economic positions from the role of cultural (e.g., migration and group discrimination) and moral (e.g. religiosity and conservative-authoritarian) explanations. Our findings show that explanations of the PTVs for DENK and NIDA do not differ substantially and are higher among religious Muslim voters who support multiculturalism and who perceive discrimination. Among migrant-background citizens, the more radical BIJ1-party particularly scores higher among manual workers, those who have left-wing economic views and moral-progressive values. Strikingly, East-Asian-Dutch and Latin-American-Dutch (other than Surinamese-Dutch) hardly express a propensity to vote the ethnic-minority-interest parties.

Keywords Ethnic-minorities · Voting · Discrimination · Migration · Religiosity

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Introduction

In the mid-1990s the social-democrats were the largest party in many European countries, including the Netherlands. A coalition of working-class voters, higher educated voters and voters with a migration background supported them. Now 30 years later, the social-democratic coalition has broken-up, amongst other things, under the pressure of the politicization of immigration. Ethnic groups that often supported social-democrats have formed own parties, which we refer to as “ethnic-minority-interest parties”. In 2017, DENK was the first of such parties to win seats in a Western European national parliament. In the 2021 national elections, the Netherlands had another first. Three ethnic-minority-interest parties competed. NIDA, which had received already strong support in specific local elections, positioned itself as alternative to DENK but did not win seats, while DENK kept its 3 of 150 seats and newcomer and more radical BIJ1 obtained a seat as well. Against this background a new literature has developed that focuses on explaining support for ethnic-minority-interest parties (Otjes and Krouwel 2019; Van der Zwan et al. 2020; Vermeulen et al. 2020). We extend this literature by looking at three clusters of explanations of to what extent voters with a migration background consider voting for DENK, BIJ1 and NIDA (the Propensity To Vote), aligned with three axes of the Dutch political space: immigration, economy and morality. By including DENK and BIJ1 that have been electorally successful as well as NIDA which did not win sufficient votes for a seat, we additionally give insight into a party that failed to enter parliament, as the literature is focused strongly only on parties that do so.

The rise of these parties must be seen against the backdrop of immigration becoming politicized and radical right-wing parties mobilizing voters by their nativist opposition to immigration. This has caused a counter-reaction when established parties kept silent on this cultural agenda or adopted positions of the radical right (Immerzeel et al. 2016; Bale et al. 2010), creating space for parties that favour a multiculturalist agenda and support the interest of ethnic minorities. Indeed, Moroccan-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch voters supported DENK in the 2017 elections, particularly because of their more positive attitudes towards migration (Otjes and Krouwel 2019). With the expected growth of migration-background shares of the citizenry across Europe, understanding the voting for these parties in the Netherlands and beyond is important for understanding current and future political developments.

In this study, we extend on these immigration-related insights in two ways. First, we directly test the impact of perceptions of group-discrimination on support for ethnic-minority-interest parties, providing a more direct test of the politicization-of-migration logic. Secondly, the Dutch context and the data we employ allow us to test whether the mobilization argument holds beyond the case of DENK and the Moroccan-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch communities. More specifically, we test this for BIJ1 that ran with a manifesto that focuses more on Black citizens, and for NIDA that had an explicit Islamic inspiration.



A second line in the literature stresses that ethnic-minority communities tend to be working-class and that this has historically aligned them with social-democratic parties (Messina and Lahav 2006). This would mean that ethnic minority voters who have views on economic issues deviating from the social-democratic agenda are more likely to move away from social democratic parties, also becoming more likely to support ethnic-minority-interest parties (Otjes and Krouwel 2019). This study allows us to study the role of attitudes on income inequality to consider voting for ethnic-minority interest parties.

Finally, religion and traditional morality have been put forward as a third group of explanations for supporting ethnic-minority-interest parties (Otjes and Krouwel 2019). Ethnic communities tend to be more conservative and religious and their participation in religious networks could bind them to particular parties (Maliepaard and Alba 2016). So, while many of these voters tend to be supportive of ‘new’ cultural issues (i.e., open to globalization), they may be conservative on moral issues (e.g., opposed to euthanasia, supportive of capital punishment). With the rise of multiple ethnic-minority-interest parties, we can also contrast parties with different positions on moral issues, taking a perspective of a three-dimensional political space in electoral politics. Overall, we will answer the following research question: *To what extent do cultural, economic and moral positions explain the propensity to vote for one of the three ethnic-minority-interest parties that ran in the 2021 Dutch parliamentary elections?*

Our study of three small parties in a West European country is particularly, but is important to the wider literature for at least three reasons: firstly, immigrant voters form a growing share of the electorate and by forming separate parties they express that their concerns are not met by mainstream politics. Together with their enduring marginalization or (experienced) underrepresentation in political institutions (Spierings and Vermeulen 2023), we consider it highly relevant to obtain further insight in the party preferences of people with a migration background. Secondly, the Netherlands is a bell weather state: because of its low electoral threshold, developments show up there at higher levels than elsewhere in Europe. Regarding the focus of this contribution, over a dozen of ethnic-minority-interest parties exist in Europe (Appendix Table 2).¹ These parties include multiculturalist parties as well as Islamic parties, similar to the Dutch parties. The patterns we find, may apply to those cases and shed light on what is to come. Third, bringing these two arguments together, this study adds to understanding political space as three-dimensional with the classic progressive-conservative (or: GAL-TAN) dimension being unpacked further into a cosmopolitan and moral dimension.

Using the Dutch Ethnic Minority Election Survey 2021, an election year in which three ethnic-minority-interest parties competed (DENK, BIJ1, NIDA), we shed light on the preference for these parties. For providing evidence to what extent the eligible voters with a migration background evaluate these parties as an option to vote for, we focus on explaining of the propensity to vote for these parties. This provides

¹ Given the geographic concentration of the ethnic-minority electorate—these parties can win seats under a FPTP system, like RESPECT did.



a better understanding of the growing share of the electorate with a migration background, that seems to voice more explicitly their interest in the last years, but at the same time remains underrepresented in many institutions of many European democracies (Spierings and Vermeulen 2023; Van der Zwan et al. 2019).

Case background

The brief sketch below informs our expectations for the three specific ethnic-minority-interest parties that participated in the Dutch 2021 elections (see Table 1).

DENK split from the social-democratic Labour Party (PvdA) in 2015. Two Turkish-Dutch MPs left the party after a conflict with the social-democratic minister responsible for civic integration. They formed their own party DENK, which translates as ‘Think’ in Dutch and ‘Equal’ in Turkish. In the 2017 parliamentary elections they won three seats, in 2018 they won representation in 13 municipal councils, and in 2019 they won representation in four provincial councils.

DENK’s key policies are fighting discrimination and creating an inclusive, pluralistic society. It combines multicultural positions on questions of national identity with more conservative positions on moral issues. The party, for instance, opposes liberalizing euthanasia legislation. Its moral conservatism is most visible in positions on law and order, where it favours stronger punishments for murder and child molestation. On economic issues, it generally has a left-wing orientation.

In terms of linkages with different communities, the party used the strongly organized Turkish-Dutch social networks for its election campaign in 2017 (Fennema and Tillie 1999). On the 2021 party list, the plurality of candidates had a Turkish-Dutch background, but the party was led by Farid Azarkan, who has a Moroccan-Dutch background.

BIJ1 was split from DENK in 2016, which had recruited Sylvana Simons for the 2017 election. She was a well-known Surinamese-Dutch TV-presenter who turned into an anti-racism activist. She left the party before the 2017 elections, arguing she experienced a lack of response of DENK to racist threats she got. Simons founded a new party “Article 1” in reference to the ban on discrimination in the Dutch constitution, but this was later changed to BIJ1, because of legal issues. In 2017, the party won no seats, but in 2021 it won one.

The party subscribes to a so-called intersectional agenda, which foregrounds combatting the multiplicity of, interrelated forms of, oppression (e.g., race, gender and class). It is anti-racist, feminist and anti-capitalist and its agenda encompasses worker self-management and the nationalization of crucial economic sectors; on moral issues, the party favours further liberalization of abortion, euthanasia and gender identity legislation, and the creation of ‘open’ prisons.

The party had candidates from many different ethnicities on its list, but the plurality of these had a Surinamese-Dutch background. The list of candidates also includes explicitly LGBT+ candidates.

NIDA was formed in 2013 in Rotterdam. It recruited a former GreenLeft local councillor, Nouridin El Ouali, to lead the party’s local list in Rotterdam in 2014,



Table 1 Three ethnic minority parties

Name (original)	DENK	BIJ1	NIDA
Name (translation)	Think (in Dutch) Equal (in Turkish)	As 1 ^a	Appeal (in Arabic)
Ideology	Multicultural	Intersectional (including feminism, anti-racism and anti-capitalism)	Islamic Democrat ^b
Votes 2017 (share)/seats	216.147 (2.06%)/3	28.700 (0.27%)/0	NA
Votes 2021 (share)/seats	211.237 (2.03%)/3	87.238 (0.84%)/1	33.834 (0.32%)/0
Leader 2021	Farid Azarkan (Dutch-Moroccan)	Sylvana Simons (Dutch-Surinamese)	Nourdin El Ouali (Dutch-Moroccan)
Subnational representatives	In 13 municipal councils and 3 provincial councils	In 1 municipal council	In 2 municipal councils
<i>Positions</i>			
Economic	Centre Left	Far Left	Left
Moral	Moderate	Progressive	Conservative
Cultural	Progressive	Progressive	Progressive
<i>Candidates (% of list, by approximation)^c</i>			
Dutch-Surinamese	24%	39%	6%
Former Dutch Antilles	5%	17%	0%
Dutch-Moroccan	29%	0%	31%
Dutch-Turkish	38%	6%	23%
Other ethnic-minority backgrounds ^c	5%	22%	34%
<i>N</i>	21	18	31

^aWith the one referring to the principle of non-discrimination;

^bThe letters N.I.D.A. do not have an independent meaning, except that NIDA is a combination of Islamic inspiration and super diverse DNA.” <https://nida.nl/wij/geschiedenis/> accessed October 25th 2021. [Translation by authors]

^cNo other ethnicity scores beyond 15% of a candidate list; with 13% in NIDA Pakistani-Dutch are the largest group, but this groups cannot be distinguished among our respondents. Bold indicates most candidates of this group of the three parties; *italics* indicates largest group of candidates within the specific party



winning multiple seats in the Rotterdam council. It expanded to the council of The Hague in 2018. El Ouali also served as the list puller in the 2021 national elections.

NIDA's program has an Islamic foundation. In a nod to Islam, its manifesto is structured in five pillars: human dignity, care for people and the environment, equal chances, fair distribution of wealth and seeing humanity as one family. On economic matters, the party stands in-between BIJ1 and DENK. On moral matters, it is more conservative than both these parties: it wants to limit abortion policy, opposes liberalizing euthanasia legislation and favours higher punishment for child molestation. On cultural issues, the party is also opposed to discrimination but adds a spiritual layer to this advocating for a greater role for belief in society.

The party has listed candidates with many different backgrounds. The majority of these, including El Ouali, are Moroccan-Dutch.

Theoretical background and expectations

The international literature on party preference by citizens with a migration background primarily focuses on their support for social-democratic parties (Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013; Anwar 2001; Bergh and Bjørklund 2011; Michon and Tillie 2011). This literature is rooted in two approaches: the ethnic approach and the class-based approach (Bird et al. 2011; Bloemraad and Vermeulen 2014). We seek to extend this literature in two ways: firstly, by discussing all three core axes of the political space (economic, cultural and moral) that structure European politics (Aarts and Thomassen 2006; Kriesi et al. 2006). Secondly, by explicitly distinguishing between identification with particular groups (e.g. ethnicity, class, religion) and the policy positions related to the politicization of those identities.

Ethnicity and the cultural axis

The ethnic approach proposes that the political participation of citizens with a migration background is a function of the political culture of their ethnic group (Bird et al. 2011). Bicultural citizens are often embedded in networks of organizations that socialize them into a specific set of civic virtues (Bergh and Bjørklund 2011). An important notion in this literature is that voters use a 'racial utility heuristic' (Bird et al. 2011). The interest of the group serves as a proxy for the own individual interest. Central in this perspective is in-group solidarity (Fisher et al. 2015; Martin 2016; Kranendonk et al. 2017), which is amongst others reflected in the observation that citizens with a migration background often vote for candidates of their own migration background (Fisher et al. 2015; Van Heelsum et al. 2016; Van der Zwan et al. 2020).

The racial heuristic has helped to explain why citizens with a migration background support social-democratic parties (Messina and Lahav 2006; Van der Zwan et al. 2019), but we argue it also helps to explain the development of



ethnic-minority-interest parties, which present themselves as ‘the real’ representatives of migrant communities: their lists have many candidates from ethnic-minority communities and their manifestos echo the specific demands of these communities.

A majority of the candidates for both DENK and NIDA are from the Turkish and Moroccan-Dutch community. BIJ1 had a list with more than half of the candidates being Surinamese-Dutch or Caribbean-Dutch. We therefore expect that DENK and NIDA are supported foremost by Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch voters and that BIJ1 is foremost supported by Dutch with a background in Surinam and the former Dutch colonized Caribbean region (Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao, Saba, St. Eustatius and St. Maarten).

1. Ethnicity Hypothesis A: Among voters with a migration background, citizens with a Turkish-Dutch or Moroccan-Dutch background have a higher propensity to vote for DENK and NIDA than citizens with another immigrant background have.
2. Ethnicity Hypothesis B: Among voters with a migration background, citizens with a Surinamese-Dutch and Caribbean-Dutch background have a higher propensity to vote BIJ1 than citizens with another immigrant background have.

Regarding ethnicity and the cultural axis, the presence of ethnic minorities and their inclusion into Dutch society is highly politicized. Issues around civic integration, immigration and national identity have become wrapped up in what has been labelled the cultural dimension (Kriesi et al. 2006). This cultural dimension divides those who favour further globalization from those who favour nationalism. Ethnic-minority-interest parties advocate globalization issues such as pro-migration positions and multiculturalism, and their voters are also likely to fall on that side of this division as well (Vermeulen et al. 2020; Otjes and Krouwel 2019), although research has shown variation on these issues among migrant-background voters (Van der Zwan et al. 2017).

3. Multiculturalism Hypothesis: Among voters with a migration background those who support multiculturalism more have a higher propensity to vote for ethnic-minority-interest parties.

Extending the reasoning above, we furthermore argue that more specific perceptions of exclusion matter for ethnic-minority citizens’ propensity to vote. Discrimination impacts the lives of people with a migration background and the perception of discrimination has a strong effect on the mobilization and political preferences of citizens with a migration background (Bird et al. 2011; Cain et al. 1991; See Lim et al. 2006; Spierings and Vermeulen 2023). Because ethnic-minority-interest parties politicize anti-discrimination policies, we expect that the perception of discrimination of people with a minority background makes them more likely to support ethnic-minority-interest parties.



4. Discrimination Hypothesis: Among voters with a migration background those who perceive more group-discrimination have a higher propensity to vote for ethnic-minority-interest parties.

Class and the economic axis

The second approach in the literature focusses on the social-economic status of citizens with a migration background (Bergh and Bjørklund 2011; Michon and Tillie 2011). On average, people with a migration background have a weaker social-economic position, and are expected to more often identify as working class, blue-collar laborers. This explains why they voted for social-democratic parties, as social democrats are (or, at least, were) the strongest defenders of working-class citizens in most European party systems. One would expect that working-class voters, irrespective of a migration background, prefer social-democrats. While the ethnic-minority interest parties are positioned economically left-wing as well, they seem to emphasize that position less than the promotion of ethnic minority's cultural issues, except for BIJ1. Based on this observation and the historical connection of classic left-wing parties to migrant-background voters, we derive that working-class voters are more likely to disregard other parties than the social-democratic or socialist parties, including ethnic-minority-interest parties.

5. Social Class-identification Hypothesis: Among voters with a migration background those who do identify as working class have a lower propensity to vote for ethnic-minority-interest parties DENK and NIDA than those who do not identify so.

Economic politics is not just about class. It is also reflected in economic policy preferences. Our argument for ideological preferences runs parallel to our argument about class: given the social-democratic legacy, it is likely that citizens who place themselves close to the left-wing economic position of social democrats are likely to favour them; ideological proximity is an important driver of party choice, for established and new parties (Van de Wardt and Otjes 2021). Accordingly, earlier research showed that more right-wing economic preferences among migrant voters increased the likelihood to vote for DENK (Otjes and Krouwel 2019). This is not to say that DENK is an economic right-wing party; it is economically centre-left. However, economically-motivated left-wing voters will consider DENK a less viable option, as they are more likely to support social democrats or other parties with a clear economic platform. Among these parties we include BIJ1 that has an explicit anti-capitalist program. Voters with more (far) left-wing views are likely to express a higher propensity to vote for this party specifically.

6. Economic Preference Hypothesis: Among voters with a migration background those who are in favour to reduce income inequality have a lower propensity to vote for DENK and a higher propensity to vote for BIJ1.



Religion and the moral axis

During the 20st and twenty-first century, the moral dimension has played an important role in Dutch electoral politics (Middendorp 1978; Aarts and Thomasen 2008). It concerns issues like euthanasia, abortion, emancipation and views on death penalty, with progressives advocating for individual choice, privacy and equal treatment and conservatives advocating for harsh punishments for those who transgress laws and moral or religious norms. Indeed, large parts of the predominantly Muslim Moroccan-Dutch and the Turkish-Dutch communities and substantial groups among the religiously diverse Surinamese-Dutch² and the Caribbean-Dutch communities are shown to be on average relatively conservative on this dimension (Spierings 2018). As social-democratic parties are progressive on these issues, citizens with a more conservative moral views are likely to move away from them and be attracted more by conservative ethnic-minority-interest parties (Vermeulen et al. 2020). However, this is unlikely to be the case for BIJ1, given its ultraprogressive program. The issue of law & order, and more specifically punishment, which strongly divides DENK and NIDA from BIJ1, is our focus.

7. Moral Dimension Hypothesis: Among voters with a migration background those who are more conservative on moral issues, particularly death penalty, have a higher propensity to vote for DENK or NIDA and a lower propensity to vote for BIJ1.

Next to this preference-based approach to the role of morality, we draw from the participation and identification literatures (Jamal 2005; Kranendonk et al. 2020), to stress that moral conservatism is just one mechanism via which religion matters. As DENK and, particularly, NIDA mobilize the Muslim community, partly via mosques and therewith evidencing the role of socio-religious infrastructures (Fennema and Tillie 1999), we can expect that identification with Islam plays an independent role more generally.

8. Religion Hypothesis: Among voters with a migration background those who identify as Muslim and those who consider themselves as more religious, have a higher propensity to vote for DENK or NIDA and a lower propensity to vote for BIJ1.

² The Surinamese-Dutch community in the Netherlands is diverse: 37% are Afro-Surinamese (often Christian; their ancestors were brought to America as slaves), 27% are Hindustani (often Hindu; their ancestors immigrated from India as indentured labourers) and 16% are Javanese (often Muslim; their ancestors immigrated from Indonesia as indentured labourers) Source: CIA world factbook.



Methods

Dutch ethnic minority election survey

We use the Dutch Ethnic Minority Election Survey (DEMES) (Lubbers et al. 2021), a sample of Dutch citizens with a so-called ‘migration background’ that were at the time categorized as ‘non-Western’ by Statistics Netherlands and who were eligible to vote in the 2021 elections. Statistics Netherlands used the government definition of these categories, which is a political construct. Concretely, this means that the sample consists of people as either being born outside of the Netherlands or being born to parents at least one of whom is born outside of the Netherlands, whereby ‘outside of the Netherlands’ refers to Asia (except Japan or Indonesia but including Turkey), Africa or South America.³

The group demarcated by these criteria make up a bit over 10% of the Dutch electorate. Two-thirds has a migration background in the Dutch Caribbean, Surinam, Morocco or Turkey. These groups are studied most often in the Netherlands. Next to these four most surveyed groups, DEMES distinguishes between eligible voters with a background from other Middle Eastern and North-African countries (MENA), sub-Saharan Africa, East-Asian countries and other Latin-American countries. The sample was approached before the parliamentary elections of March 2021; moreover, respondents who participated before the elections were invited to fill out a post-election questionnaire after the elections. The surveys were self-administered online (push-to-web contact), reducing the risk of socially desirable answers. The language of the questionnaire was Dutch, which was considered optimal considering that only people with the right to vote were sampled.⁴

Response and non-response bias

As broadly acknowledged, the response rates of migration-background populations in surveys tend to be low (Kappelhof 2015; Sobolewska et al. 2022). Rates below 20 percent are no exception, (Kappelhof 2015, p.15). For DEMES, the response rate was 22% (Sipma et al. 2021). Given our push-to-web survey, this response rate is within the range of what could have been expected (Sobolewska et al. 2022).⁵

³ Indonesia and Japan are noteworthy excluded. This was geopolitical with Japan being an industrialized capitalist country and ally of ‘the West’, and Indonesian migrants are mainly descendants of Dutch colonial settlers who migrated back after Indonesia’s independence (Yanow and Van der Haar, 2013).

⁴ The right to vote in national elections comes with Dutch nationality, which can generally be obtained after having lived for five years in the country.

⁵ For comparison, the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Survey had a total response rate of 23% after a face-to-face survey (49%), followed by their mail back questionnaire (Howat et al., 2011).



Low response is not per se a problem beyond statistical power issues; further bias depends on non-response bias, some of which is observable. First, it is likely that certain demographic groups are underrepresented, such as the first-generation Moroccan-Dutch in our data.⁶ Demographic disbalances are corrected by weighting the data as population figures are available. We employed weights for descriptive findings, accounting for age, gender, municipality's degree of urbanization, region (i.e., North, South, West, and East-Netherlands), marital status as well as country of origin, first- or second-generation migrants (Sipma et al. 2021).

Second, unobserved (and thus uncorrected) non-response bias will likely play a role too. For instance, it is likely that political interest is relatively high in our sample compared to the population we drew the sample from, and this biases descriptive estimates as we know that the very interested respondents are more likely to know the smaller less visible parties. However, such bias might be counteracted by us undersampling respondents that are stronger entrenched in ethnic communities –which are reached less by push-to-web survey (Sobolewska et al. 2022) – as they might be more likely to favour our parties of interest due to subcommunity integration (Fennema and Tillie 1999). Extrapolating DEMES data regarding vote choice to the elections results, the votes share for BIJ1 and NIDA seem in line with the elections results,⁷ whereas the DENK votes are somewhat underrepresented in our data.

Given these complications, we also control for political interest, both in Dutch politics and country-of-origin politics. At the same time, non-response bias linked to *the associations* we are interested in is challenging. For instance, the questionnaires were in Dutch only, which might lead to lower responses among those that are likely to prefer an ethnic-minority interest party, while strongly favouring 'keeping own culture' and belonging to the working class. This selection effect might lead to underestimating the expected relationships. This issue cannot be resolved data-wise, but we will take these considerations into account when discussing the results.

Propensity to vote

As dependent variables we use propensity to vote (PTV): the self-reported likelihood that a voter might vote for a certain party, which taps into the extent to which voters consider voting for a party. Specifically, respondents are asked whether they could indicate on a scale from 1 (never) to 10 (certainly) how probable it is that they would ever vote for each party. Here, this variable is particularly useful as a limited number of respondents report to (intend to) vote for BIJ1 and NIDA. An option 'I don't know the party' was also given.

PTV is an often-used, fine-grained measure of voting intention. It has been used in Dutch electoral studies since 1982 (Niemöller and Van der Eijk 1984). The

⁶ Beyond this there is good representation of respondents based on ethnic background; see Appendix Table 3. There is however an underrepresentation of the first generation. It makes up 61% of the migrant-background population eligible to vote and 55% of the data.

⁷ Extrapolating to vote shares among DEMES for BIJ1 show a lower vote share, but BIJ1 also taps the progressive part of the ethnic-majority population and part of the Black Dutch-Caribbean community is not categorized having a migrant background in the Dutch government's classification scheme as Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba were considered Dutch until 2020, when they became a separate country for migration statistics.



question was specifically designed to assess the utility that respondents would derive from voting for that party. Because words like utility are not often used by voters, political scientists measure this with a question that relates to voting for this party in an undefined future (Van der Eijk et al. 2006). While the question may seem to imply future-predicting powers of the respondent, the responses are meant to reflect the electoral utilities that a voter at that point in time derives from voting for that party (Niemöller and Van der Eijk 1984; Van der Eijk et al. 2006). It is a particularly relevant measure to assess voting utilities in complex, competitive multiparty systems where voters consider multiple parties. The validity of this measure is well established (Van der Eijk et al. 2006) and it has been shown to correlate strongly to actual party vote: more than 90% of respondents voted for the party that they gave the highest PTV in the 1998 DPES, a pattern which has been replicated all over Europe and in other years. Moreover, other parties that voters considered voting for (when asked about this directly) also score high on the PTV (Van der Eijk et al. 2006). In our analysis we set the option ‘I don’t know this party’ as missing. In a robustness analysis, this option was set to 1 (never will vote for the party).

Measurement of the independent variables

To test our ethnicity hypotheses, we used information on the specific migration background of respondents and their parents. When the parents were born in different countries, respondents were asked with which country they identified strongest. Whereas Moroccan-Dutch, Turkish-Dutch, Suriname-Dutch and Caribbean-Dutch could be separated as such, others were grouped into regions, because of limited number of respondents in other specific countries: Sub-Saharan-African-Dutch; East-Asian-Dutch; other MENA-Dutch and other Latin-American Dutch.

To test the multiculturalism hypothesis, respondents were asked whether they think that people with a migration background should be able to live in the Netherlands while preserving their own cultures or whether they should fully adapt to Dutch culture. Respondents could position themselves on a seven-point scale between these extremes. Given the relatively large share of missing values (22%), we differentiate between three groups of respondents: 1) those who are in favour of ‘Keeping the own culture’ (who chose one, two or three) 2) those who chose another number and 3) those with a missing. This trichotomization strategy, with a third separate dummy variable for respondents with missing values is also used for other variables to minimize the loss of respondents in the analyses.

The discrimination hypothesis is tested with a measurement of perceptions of group discrimination. This is measured as the extent to which the respondent perceived discrimination of people who shared the country of origin background of the respondent. Respondents could indicate whether they thought this happened very often or often, which were combined and contrasted to respondents who indicated that this happened ‘now and then’, ‘almost never’ and ‘never’. A question on personally experienced discrimination is used for a robustness test.

To test the social class-identification hypothesis, we measured working-class identification by subjective social class. Respondents who identified as ‘working



	DENK	NIDA	BIJ1	PvdA	SP	GL	D66	CDA	CU	VVD	PVV
(a) Dutch-Caribbean	2.52	2.36	2.34	5.80	3.77	5.55	5.32	3.84	3.58	4.65	2.70
Suriname	3.22	2.77	3.23	6.35	5.63	5.98	5.95	5.32	4.32	5.21	3.13
Morocco	6.81	6.24	4.05	6.00	5.72	6.59	5.97	3.85	3.55	3.82	1.52
Turkey	4.97	3.88	3.22	5.69	5.17	6.14	5.59	3.65	3.00	4.63	1.63
Other Asia	2.16	2.16	2.17	5.66	4.94	5.22	5.87	5.60	4.08	6.25	2.92
Other MENA	3.45	3.64	2.09	6.62	5.23	6.81	5.98	4.27	3.69	5.23	2.24
Other Africa	3.35	3.14	4.58	5.76	5.28	6.25	5.48	3.76	4.10	3.73	2.91
Other Latin-America	2.11	1.58	2.10	4.99	4.80	4.96	5.12	3.83	3.50	4.95	3.16
(b) Dutch-Caribbean	0.03	0.04	0.10	0.37	0.15	0.31	0.35	0.15	0.10	0.27	0.11
Suriname	0.10	0.08	0.13	0.42	0.28	0.37	0.28	0.21	0.16	0.28	0.15
Morocco	0.50	0.44	0.18	0.34	0.30	0.44	0.34	0.11	0.08	0.18	0.03
Turkey	0.35	0.19	0.11	0.31	0.25	0.40	0.29	0.08	0.06	0.22	0.04
Other Asia	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.30	0.30	0.16	0.41	0.11
Other MENA	0.14	0.20	0.03	0.44	0.23	0.44	0.32	0.14	0.11	0.28	0.08
Other Africa	0.16	0.06	0.23	0.30	0.28	0.44	0.32	0.12	0.17	0.15	0.17
Other Latin-America	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.26	0.21	0.29	0.27	0.10	0.11	0.30	0.21

Fig. 1 Propensities to vote (PTVs) for different parties by country of origin-background (weighted). **b** Proportions of propensities to vote (PTVs) with an 8 or higher for different parties by country of origin-background (weighted)

class’ and ‘upper working class’ are subsumed as working-class respondents and contrasted to respondents who identified as a member of another class.

To test the economic preference hypothesis, we measured the ideological position on the economic dimension with the seven-point scale question whether respondents thought that income inequalities in the Netherlands should increase or should decrease. Values one to three, indicating support for reducing income inequality are contrasted to those with values four to seven.

We included a measurement of agreement with the introduction of death penalty to test the moral dimension hypothesis. Respondents who agreed are contrasted to respondents who disagreed or were neutral on the item. This measurement of moral conservatism is imperfect, but no positions on issues like euthanasia were included in the pre-election survey. It was part of the post-election questionnaire which far fewer respondents partook in. We add a robustness check on this smaller group of respondents, to test whether the inclusion of a euthanasia measurement alters the effects of the measurement on death penalty.

To test the religion hypothesis, we included whether respondents consider themselves as member of a particular religious community (no is the reference category) and if so which one: Christian, Muslim and other religions. Moreover, we included a measurement of degree of religiosity. Respondents could indicate on a 10-points scale how religious they perceive themselves to be. The values of 7 and higher were subsumed into the category of ‘strongly religious’ and contrasted to the rest.

We controlled for migrant generation (first versus second), whether one of the parents was born in the Netherlands, self-identified gender, age, and education level. The latter variable contrasts those with and without a degree from a university (including university of applied sciences). Finally, we controlled for political interest in Dutch politics and political interest in country-of-origin politics. Appendix Table 4 gives the descriptives for the full sample and for each of the PTV outcomes separately.






Fig. 2 PTVs' regression parameters (unweighted) on ethnicity related predictors, with their confidence intervals at $p < .05$. (1247 observations nested in 558 respondents). *Squares* represent effects on PTV BIJ1, *Triangles* represent effects on PTV NIDA, *Circles* represent effects on PTV DENK. Effect parameters from dummy variables representing missing values are not included in the Figure

Modelling strategy

A multilevel multivariate regression model is estimated with the three PTV responses nested in respondents. The main effects are estimated for the PTV of DENK, and interaction effects show the deviation in the effects for the PTVs for NIDA and BIJ1 (see Appendix Table 5). This model can deal with different numbers of missing values per evaluated party. We present full models with both identification and attitudinal predictors. Attitudinal variables might mediate the initial differences in identification, but a model without the attitudinal variables did not lead to different conclusions. The findings from our analyses are summarized in Figs. 2 and 3, showing the main effects and standard errors on each of the PTVs (based on switched reference category in the multilevel multivariate analyses). For reasons of parsimoniousness, we only present the findings in which Moroccan-Dutch form the reference category, because the group turned out to have the highest PTV on each of the three parties. We start with presenting descriptives of the PTVs.



Results

The mean propensity to vote on the 10-point-scale for DENK was 4.1, for NIDA 3.9 and for BIJ1 3.1. Specifically, among the Dutch with (other) Asian, MENA or Latin-American backgrounds, the PTVs for the parties were very low (see Fig. 1). To contextualize this, the PTV for DENK in the general population was measured too (Jacobs et al. 2021), which was 1.7. At the same time, among our respondents, most major political (left-wing) parties received a higher average PTV, while the Christian and radical right parties have lower PTVs. The liberal-right-wing VVD scored higher than each of the minority-interest parties, except among the Moroccan-Dutch, Turkish-Dutch and sub-Sahara-African Dutch. DENK and NIDA scored higher than a five only among the Moroccan-Dutch. BIJ1 scored highest among respondents with an ‘other African origin’, with 4.6. A similar pattern emerges from Fig. 1b in which the proportions of respondents who gave the parties a PTV of 8 or higher are presented.

The findings of the explanatory multilevel regression analyses are summarized in Figs. 2 and 3. Appendix Table 5 contains the effect parameters (the effects for DENK and deviation thereof for NIDA and BIJ1). In the intercept only model including the dummies for the parties, 63% of the variance in the PTVs is at the between-respondent level and 37% of the variance at the within-respondent level. In the full model, 42% of the between-respondent variance is explained and 25% of the within-respondent variance.

The first hypothesis we discuss concerns ethnicity, proposing that the ethnic-minority communities most prevalent on the party lists are most likely to vote for that party. The analyses of the three propensities to vote showed that there were major differences by ethnic background, often, but not always, in line with the hypotheses. As expected, Moroccan-Dutch had the highest PTV for DENK and NIDA. However, we did not anticipate a significant difference with the Turkish-Dutch, while they had significant lower PTVs for both DENK and NIDA. All other origin groups showed significantly lower PTVs for these parties, as expected. And although the Surinamese-Dutch expressed a higher PTV for BIJ1 than for DENK and NIDA, they did not differ significantly in the PTV for BIJ1 from Dutch with a background from sub-Sahara Africa, Moroccan-Dutch or Turkish-Dutch. Also, in contrast to our hypothesis, Caribbean-Dutch citizens did not express a higher PTV for BIJ1 than other groups.

The Multiculturalism Hypothesis was largely supported: we found that those who were in favour of multiculturalism gave DENK a higher PTV, and that effect on the PTV for NIDA and BIJ1 did not differ significantly (Appendix Table 5). The results are also in line with the Discrimination Hypothesis: the perception of group discrimination is linked to a significantly higher PTV for DENK and no significant deviation in that effect for NIDA and BIJ1 is found (Appendix Table 5). Our findings, however, also showed that the effect of perception of group discrimination was not significant for the PTV for NIDA ($0.05 < p < 0.10$) and BIJ1, as the confidence intervals include the value of zero (Fig. 2). As the effect size differences between the parties were small, this suggests an issue of power. However, we have to conclude that the effect is less sizable than expected. The robustness analyses with personal experienced discrimination (Appendix Table 6) showed an even stronger effect for perceived group






Fig. 3 PTVs' regression parameters (unweighted) on economy and morally-related predictors, with their confidence intervals at $p < .05$. (1247 observations nested in 558 respondents). *Squares* represent effects on PTV BIJ1, *Triangles* represent effects on PTV NIDA, *Circles* represent effects on PTV DENK. Effect parameters from dummy variables representing missing values are not included in the Figure

discrimination on DENK, and comparable ones for NIDA and BIJ1. As for personal experienced discrimination, the effect is *negative* on the PTV for DENK. This effect is significantly different for the PTVs of NIDA and BIJ1; however, these positive effects from personal experienced discrimination on the PTVs for NIDA and BIJ1 did not reach significance either.

As for the Social Class-identification Hypothesis, we found no significant working-class identification effect on the PTV for DENK (Fig. 3). It is significantly different for the other parties and working-class identification went together significantly with a higher PTV for BIJ1. A roughly similar economic divide was found in line with the Economic Preference Hypothesis: the attitude on income inequality had no significant effect on the PTV for DENK whereas those who favour smaller income inequality exhibited a greater PTV for NIDA and BIJ1.

To test the Moral Dimension Hypothesis, we included positions of respondents concerning the death penalty. Support for introduction of death penalty does not predict the PTV for DENK and the effect for NIDA did not deviate significantly from that, which undermines the hypothesis. It had a significant deviating and significant reversed effect on the PTV for BIJ1, partly supporting the hypothesis. For



the findings including a measurement of euthanasia as moral issue (only available in the post-election survey, greatly reducing the N), we refer to Appendix Table 7. Opponents of euthanasia have a substantial higher PTV for DENK; the effects of euthanasia are smaller for the other parties, but not significantly so. The effects of the opinion of death penalty remain largely as they were.

In terms of religious background, we found that Muslims have a higher PTV for DENK and NIDA, as expected. This effect exists in addition to ethnic background effects. In line with the effects from religious denomination, the strength of religious self-identification increased the PTV for DENK and for NIDA too. These patterns were significantly different and, in terms of impact on PTV, absent for BIJ1; in our hypotheses we predicted a negative effect of religiosity on the PTV for BIJ1, which we could not support. The effects of religiosity remain similar after including the euthanasia indicator.

The effects of the controls (see Appendix Table 5) show that respondents from the second generation have a higher PTV for DENK and NIDA than first-generation respondents. Moreover, if one of the parents of the respondent was born in the Netherlands, the respondent's PTV for DENK and NIDA was lower. Political interest in Dutch politics decreased the PTV for DENK, whereas interest in politics of the country of origin from the ethnic background increased the PTV for DENK. For NIDA and BIJ1, only the role of interest in Dutch politics was significantly different from that effect on the PTV for DENK. It was less negative and did not affect the PTVs for these parties.

As a robustness check, we compared the results above with those setting PTVs of respondents who don't know a party to the lowest value of one (see Appendix Table 8). As the group has specific characteristics, this changes the findings in some respects. For NIDA, for example, this makes the migration background differences even more pronounced, underscoring that Moroccan-Dutch respondents know NIDA better *and* assign the party a higher score. For BIJ1, the situation is somewhat different, as it makes the explanatory power of the included predictors weaker than they already were.

As two additional robustness checks, we also analysed whether the identified set of predictors returned the same effects on the highest PTVs only (score 8, 9 and 10 compared to those lower) and on the self-reported vote choice for one of these parties in the 2017 or 2021 elections or the intended vote for these parties in the 2021 elections (Appendix Tables 9 and 10). Overall, the same patterns surfaced, albeit with notable differences. In particular perceived group discrimination had a stronger effect on the high PTV and vote for BIJ1 than on the BIJ1 PTV-scale. And it showed that voters with a Surinamese-Dutch or Sub-Saharan-Dutch background were more likely to vote BIJ1, also compared to Moroccan-Dutch, the latter which we did not find with respect to the PTV for BIJ1. Contrarily, the social class and income-levelling attitude we found to affect the PTV for BIJ1 was not replicated in these robustness check-models.

Conclusions

In the 2021 elections three ethnic-minority-interest parties with different profiles competed for votes: the multiculturalist DENK, the Islamic-democratic NIDA and the intersectional anti-capitalist, anti-racist and feminist BIJ1. We examined the



support for these parties with information from a cross-section of Dutch eligible voters with a background from Africa, Asia and Latin-America. We found rather different profiles among the voters of DENK and NIDA on the one side and BIJ1 on the other.

DENK and NIDA defend the way of life of an ethnic and religious minority in the Netherlands against secularism and against the call for greater integration into Dutch society. These parties have higher propensities to vote among voters from these specific ethnic and religious communities. We can see that these parties do well within the Moroccan-Dutch community, even after taking socio-political positions into account, signalling a form of ethnic-similarity support. DENK scores also relatively well among the Turkish-Dutch community. Moreover, we replicate earlier findings that Muslims and individuals who are strongly religious support these parties (Otjes and Krouwel 2019; Vermeulen et al. 2020). Where it comes to their views on cultural issues, we show that perceived group-discrimination makes a difference and contributes in the preference for these parties in addition to their support for multiculturalist government policies.

The results reflect that the position of the Labour Party on the politics of immigration, integration and inclusion has become ambiguous, which created space for the parties, a pattern that holds for social-democrats and the broader centre left across Western Europe (Bale et al. 2010). The Labour Party sometimes moved towards more restrictive migration and integration policies, not in the last place to remain able to compete over the ethnic-majority working-class vote. At the same time, the Labour Party and many other left-wing parties have embraced more progressive stances on the moral dimensions and are critical of the role of religion in society. This has opened up the opportunity for a new divide; for parties that combine a more radical position to defend the multicultural position with a conservative, religiously-inspired position on moral issues. The lack of success of NIDA seems to stem from its inability to distinguish itself from DENK which was already represented by three MPs. That people in support of income levelling assigned NIDA a higher PTV, was not sufficient to get them a seat.

As expected, BIJ1 speaks to different voters, but the story is somewhat less clear-cut than expected. The PTV for the party is not very high among any group except for voters with a background in Sub-Saharan Africa. We do find that BIJ1 supporters share the left-wing and morally progressive agenda of the party: their supporters are more often working class, more often favour an egalitarian distribution of income, and do not support death penalty. If anything, it is clear from the analyses that BIJ1's supporters are different from NIDA's and DENK's, in particular in terms of being less religious. At the same time, we should note the lack of familiarity that many citizens had with this party, which can partly explain somewhat more mixed results on the PTV. Noteworthy is that the small group of respondents voting for this party were characterized more explicitly by their background origin in Surinam and Sub-Sahara Africa and relatively strong perceptions of group discrimination, this was less the case for the PTV for BIJ1.

Across the board, it should also be noted that these parties do not appeal to all ethnic-minority communities in the Netherlands. Particularly voters with a



background in East Asia and Latin America showed lower propensities to vote for these parties than for the established (left-wing and liberal-right) parties. This mirrors the share the ethnic-minority-interest parties have mobilized in the elections: whereas Asian-, African- and Latin-American-Dutch eligible voters make up just over 10% of the whole electorate, the three studied parties together received just over 3% of the votes. Including all voters with an immigrant background and not only those from the four largest immigrant communities, showed this diversity. Simultaneously, we should also acknowledge that the number of respondents from some origins were rather small and that there is a trade-off between sampling from specific origins and from the whole ethnic-minority population. Selective non-response remains another issue relevant to address in further research: Moroccan-Dutch respondents turned out to have the highest PTV for all of the three parties, but at the same time, the group turned out to be strongest underrepresented in the data, and those who are oriented less to the Netherlands, with less interest in Dutch politics, may have been underrepresented. Selection bias on political interest may therefore have affected the results. Controlling for it showed that orientation to the country of origin, increased the PTV for DENK, raising a research agenda how our findings relate to questions on transnationalism and home-country voting behaviour (Ognibene and Paulis 2021).

Three observations stand out as take-away message also outside the studied context. Like with many electoral trends, the Netherlands due to its low electoral threshold is a canary in the coal mines. We see electoral trends here sooner than elsewhere. Other parties with a base in ethnic-minority communities in other European countries have only been successful in municipal elections (see Appendix Table 2). As ethnic-minority communities grow and social-democrats continue to struggle with migration issues (Bale et al. 2010), the traditional bond between social-democrats and ethnic-minority voters that takes such a central place in the literature (Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013), may weaken and allow for the flourishing of ethnic-minority parties where the electoral system allows it. Secondly, our study showed that the same dimensions that matter for the ethnic-majority population, also matter for ethnic-minority voters: cultural issues, economic issues, and moral issues play distinct roles in voting among the ethnic majority in the Netherlands and they also play an important role in understanding how ethnic-minority voters prefer parties, and we further unpacked how exactly (Otjes and Krouwel 2018). Thirdly and this is an element where these voters do differ from the ethnic-majority voters is the role of group discrimination. The levels of perceived group discrimination are high. Our study corroborates and refines earlier findings about the effect of perceived group discrimination on voting from the United States (Cain et al. 1991; See Lim et al. 2006), suggesting it directs voters to newcomer ethnic-minority interest parties, and it raises questions what the impact of these parties is on experiencing political inclusion.

Appendix

See Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.



**Table 2** Ethnic-minority-interest parties in Western Europe

Party name	English			Profile	Results			
	Native language	English	Profile	Seats	Votes	Level	Entity	Year
<i>Die Gsiberger</i>		The Gsiberger	Joint list of far left and Islamic conservative	0	1.7%	State	Vorarlberg	2009
<i>Gemeinsam für Wien</i>		Together for Vienna	Islamic conservative	0	0.9%	State	Vienna	2015
<i>Soziales Österreich der Zukunft^a</i>		Social Austria for the Future	Multiculturalist	0	1.2%	State	Vienna	2020
<i>Resist</i>		Resist	Joint list of far left and Islamic conservative	0	0.2%	National	Belgium	2003
<i>BeOne</i>			Anti-racist	0	0.1%	State	Brussel	2019
<i>Minoritetspartiet</i>		Minority Party	Anti-racist	0	0.3%	National	Denmark	2005
<i>Frre Grønna</i>		Free Greens	Anti-racist	0	0.9%	National	Denmark	2022
<i>20Bündnis für Innovation und Gerechtigkeit</i>		Alliance for Innovation and Justice	Islamic conservative	0	<0.1%	National	Germany	2013
<i>Alliance Deutscher Demokraten</i>		Alliance of German Democrats	Islamic conservative	0	0.2%	State	NRW	2017
<i>ÖkoLinX-Antirassistische Liste</i>		EcoLeft-Antiracist List	Anti-racist	2	1.8%	Municipal	Frankfurt am Main	2021
<i>Die Urbane, ein HipHop Partei</i>		The Urbans, a hiphop party	Anti-racist	0	<0.1%	National	Germany	2021
<i>Islam Demokraten</i>		Islamic Democrats	Islamic conservative	1	2.3%	Municipal	The Hague	2018
<i>Partij voor de Eenheid</i>		Unity Party	Islamic conservative	1	2.1%	Municipal	The Hague	2018
<i>BIJ1</i>		AsOne	Intersectional feminist	1	0.8%	National	Netherlands	2021
<i>DENK</i>		Think/Equal	Multiculturalist	3	2.1%	National	Netherlands	2021
<i>NIDA</i>		Voice	Islamic democrat	0	0.3%	National	Netherlands	2021
<i>Ubuntu Connected Front</i>			Ubuntu	0	<0.1%	National	Netherlands	2021
<i>Respect</i>			Far-left and anti-racist	1	0.2%	National	UK	2005
<i>Nyans</i>		Nuance	Multiculturalist	0	0.4%	National	Sweden	2022

Table 3 Sample and population composition by background

Background	% DEMES	Approx % Eligible population ^a	Average weight in the data
Former Dutch Caribbean	7	9	1.21
Surinamese-Dutch	23	21	0.88
Moroccan-Dutch	14	18	1.36
Turkish-Dutch	17	19	1.05
Other MENA-Dutch	13	9	0.95
Other Asian-Dutch	10	11	0.80
Other African-Dutch	8	8	0.89
Other Latin American-Dutch	6	4	0.85

^aOwn calculations based Lubbers (2021)**Table 4** Descriptives table (weighted)

		Full sample (includ- ing missing on PTVs) <i>n</i> = 736	PTV DENK <i>n</i> = 550	PTV NIDA <i>n</i> = 354	PTV BIJ1 <i>n</i> = 347
PTV DENK	1–10		4.14		
PTV NIDA	1–10			3.88	
PTV BIJ1	1–10				3.11
Ethnic background: Moroccan-Dutch	0–1	0.19 (143)	0.20 (112)	0.26 (92)	0.19 (67)
Former Dutch Caribbean	0–1	0.09 (67)	0.09 (50)	0.08 (28)	0.10 (36)
Surinamese-Dutch	0–1	0.20 (150)	0.20 (110)	0.20 (70)	0.21 (73)
Turkish-Dutch	0–1	0.18 (135)	0.20 (108)	0.18 (62)	0.16 (56)
Other Asian-Dutch	0–1	0.08 (60)	0.07 (38)	0.05 (19)	0.07 (23)
MENA-Dutch	0–1	0.12 (91)	0.12 (64)	0.13 (46)	0.13 (44)
Sub-Sahara African-Dutch	0–1	0.07 (55)	0.07 (39)	0.06 (21)	0.08 (26)
Latin-American-Dutch	0–1	0.05 (37)	0.05 (29)	0.04 (16)	0.06 (22)
Integration: Keep culture	0–1	0.37	0.43	0.47	0.42
Integration: Missing	0–1	0.22	0.11	0.12	0.12
Discrimination: often	0–1	0.40	0.44	0.47	0.45
Discrimination: missing	0–1	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.04
Social class: working	0–1	0.19	0.20	0.18	0.19
Social class: missing	0–1	0.19	0.14	0.13	0.11
Income inequality: reduced	0–1	0.41	0.49	0.47	0.49
Income inequality: missing	0–1	0.33	0.21	0.21	0.18
Religion: None (=ref)	0–1	0.21	0.23	0.19	0.24
Religion: Christian	0–1	0.24	0.24	0.21	0.24
Religion: Muslim	0–1	0.32	0.35	0.41	0.32
Religion: Other	0–1	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02
Religion: missing	0–1	0.13	0.08	0.08	0.08



Table 4 (continued)

		Full sample (including missing on PTVs)	PTV DENK	PTV NIDA	PTV BIJ1
		<i>n</i> = 736	<i>n</i> = 550	<i>n</i> = 354	<i>n</i> = 347
Religiosity: strongly religious	0–1	0.43	0.44	0.48	0.43
Religiosity: missing	0–1	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.05
Death Penalty: in support of	0–1	0.27	0.27	0.32	0.29
Second generation	0–1	0.41	0.46	0.47	0.45
One parent born in the Netherlands	0–1	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.19
Men	0–1	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.49
Age: 18–30	0–1	0.28	0.30	0.29	0.28
Age: 31–45	0–1	0.29	0.30	0.30	0.30
Aged 46–64	0–1	0.29	0.27	0.30	0.30
Aged 65plus	0–1	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.08
Age missing	0–1	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03
Education: high	0–1	0.49	0.53	0.50	0.53
Education: missing	0–1	0.11	0.09	0.09	0.09
Interest in Dutch Politics: not (=ref)	0–1	0.29	0.26	0.28	0.25
Interest in Dutch Politics: moderate	0–1	0.46	0.49	0.44	0.46
Interest in Dutch Politics: much	0–1	0.21	0.23	0.26	0.26
Interest in Dutch Politics: missing	0–1	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02
Interest in CO Politics: not (=ref)	0–1	0.59	0.61	0.60	0.59
Interest in CO Politics: moderate	0–1	0.25	0.26	0.26	0.27
Interest in CO Politics: much	0–1	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11
Interest in CO Politics: missing	0–1	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.03



Table 5 Predictions of the propensity to vote (PTV) for DENK, NIDA and BIJ1(unweighted) (1247 observations nested in 558 respondents)

	DENK (main effect)		NIDA (interaction effect)		BIJ1 (interaction effect)	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Intercept	3.67	0.65***	− 1.60	0.63*	− 1.14	0.63 ~
Ethnic background: Moroccan-Dutch						
Former Dutch Caribbean	− 1.79	0.60**	0.78	0.66	0.78	0.66
Surinamese-Dutch	− 1.75	0.46***	0.26	0.50	1.12	0.52*
Turkish-Dutch	− 1.10	0.41**	− 0.95	0.44*	0.77	0.47
Other Asian-Dutch	− 2.32	0.57***	0.38	0.64	0.90	0.64
MENA-Dutch	− 1.56	0.49**	0.62	0.52	− 0.29	0.54
Sub-Sahara African-Dutch	− 1.55	0.56**	0.33	0.63	1.78	0.63**
Latin-American-Dutch	− 2.22	0.62***	0.10	0.71	0.30	0.67
Integration: Keep culture	0.72	0.26**	0.04	0.28	− 0.21	0.28
(Missing)	0.14	0.39				
Discrimination: often	0.52	0.24*	0.01	0.28	− 0.10	0.27
(Missing)	0.08	0.63				
Social class: working (versus other classes)	− 0.46	0.30	0.68	0.34*	1.23	0.34***
(Missing)	− 0.30	0.34				
Income inequality: reduced	0.06	0.26	0.64	0.26*	0.71	0.27**
(Missing)	0.95	0.33**				
Death Penalty: in support of	− 0.02	0.27	0.21	0.29	− 0.59	0.29*
(Missing)	1.60	0.44***				
Religion: None (=ref)						
Religion: Christian	− 0.16	0.33	0.04	0.37	0.08	0.36
Religion: Muslim	1.55	0.40***	− 0.01	0.44	− 1.75	0.45***
Religion: Other	− 0.76	0.88	1.04	0.91	1.26	0.91
(Missing)	0.47	0.44				
Religion: strongly religious	0.97	0.29***	0.16	0.33	− 0.69	0.33*
(Missing)	0.92	0.55 ~				
Second generation	0.73	0.31*	0.05	0.35	− 0.63	0.35 ~
One parent born in NL	− 0.73	0.33*	− 0.08	0.40	0.21	0.39
Men	0.08	0.24*	− 0.03	0.26	− 0.28	0.27
Aged 18–28 (=ref)						
Aged 31–45	0.19	0.30	− 0.33	0.33	− 0.37	0.33
Aged 46–64	− 0.56	0.37	0.47	0.40	0.33	0.39
Aged 65plus	− 0.07	0.55	0.29	0.64	− 0.27	0.63
(Missing)	1.09	0.60 ~				
Education: high	− 0.18	0.26	0.10	0.28	0.45	0.28
(Missing)	0.42	0.40				
Interest in Dutch Politics: not (=ref)						
Interest in Dutch Politics: moderate	− 0.48	0.30	0.66	0.33*	0.72	0.33*
Interest in Dutch Politics: much	− 0.72	0.37 ~	0.54	0.39	1.20	0.40**

Table 5 (continued)

	DENK (main effect)		NIDA (interaction effect)		BIJ1 (interaction effect)	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
(Missing)	– 0.33	0.93				
Interest in CO Politics: not (= ref)						
Interest in CO Politics: moderate	0.73	0.28*	– 0.14	0.32	– 0.56	0.32~
Interest in CO Politics: much	1.38	0.43**	– 0.54	0.47	– 0.13	0.48
(Missing)	0.53	0.73				

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; ~ $p < 0.10$

Table 6 Effects from perceived group discrimination and personal experienced discrimination on PTVs, when the latter added to Appendix 5

	DENK (main effect)		NIDA (interaction effect)		BIJ1 (interaction effect)	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Perceived group discrimination: often	0.71	0.26**	– 0.28	0.30	– 0.33	0.30
(Missing)	0.60	0.83				
Experienced personal discrimination: often	– 0.58	0.32~	0.81	0.36**	0.66	0.37~
(Missing)	0.08	0.63				

All other estimated IVs and controls excluded from this Table

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; ~ $p < 0.10$

Table 7 Effects from moral dimension on PTVs, when estimated on selection of respondents who participated in the post-election questionnaire and including a measurement of euthanasia (unweighted)(733 observations nested in 328 respondents)

	DENK (main effect)		NIDA (inter- action effect)		BIJ1 (inter- action effect)	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>B</i>	SE
Death penalty: in support of	– 0.08	0.33	0.44	0.37	– 0.58	0.38
(Missing)	1.02	0.67				
Religion: none (=ref)						
Religion: Christian	– 0.62	0.41	0.51	0.48	0.49	0.46
Religion: Muslim	1.07	0.49*	0.85	0.55	– 1.05	0.54~
Religion: other	– 1.11	1.07	2.42	1.14*	2.09	1.12~
(Missing)	0.44	0.60				
Religion: strongly religious	1.28	0.35***	– 0.01	0.43	– 1.09	0.41**
(Missing)	2.47	1.38				
Euthanasia: opposed to	1.13	0.43**	– 0.59	0.46	– 0.34	0.48
(Missing)	– 0.44	0.38				

All other estimated IVs and controls excluded from this Table

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; ~ $p < 0.10$

Table 8 Predictions of the Propensity to Vote (PTV) for DENK, NIDA and BIJ1 with don't know answers as missing versus don't know answers coded as 1. (1690 observations nested in 600 respondents)

	DENK (don't know missing)			DENK (don't know at 1)			NIDA (don't know missing)			NIDA (don't know at 1)			BIJ1 (don't know missing)			BIJ1 (don't know at 1)		
	<i>b</i>	SE		<i>b</i>	SE		<i>b</i>	SE		<i>b</i>	SE		<i>b</i>	SE		<i>b</i>	SE	
Intercept	3.67	0.65***		3.90	0.58		2.07	0.73**		2.18***	0.60***		2.53	0.74***		1.80	0.60***	
Ethnic background:																		
Moroccan-Dutch																		
Former Dutch Caribbean	- 1.79	0.60**		- 1.88	0.55		- 1.01	0.71		- 1.64**	0.58**		- 1.01	0.70		- 0.58	0.57	
Surinamese-Dutch	- 1.75	0.46***		- 1.85	0.42		- 1.48	0.54**		- 2.23***	0.44***		- 0.63	0.56		- 0.46	0.44	
Turkish-Dutch	- 1.10	0.41**		- 1.07	0.38		- 2.05	0.47***		- 2.36***	0.39***		- 0.33	0.50		- 0.41	0.40	
Other Asian-Dutch	- 2.32	0.57***		- 2.61	0.52		- 1.94	0.69**		- 2.15***	0.53***		- 1.42	0.69*		- 0.87	0.53	
MENA-Dutch	- 1.56	0.49**		- 1.68	0.45***		- 0.95	0.55 ~		- 1.34	0.46**		- 1.85	0.58***		- 1.03	0.46*	
Sub-Saharan African-Dutch	- 1.55	0.56**		- 1.67	0.52**		- 1.23	0.66 ~		- 1.96***	0.53		0.22	0.66		0.47	0.54	
Latin-American-Dutch	- 2.22	0.62***		- 2.47	0.56***		- 2.12	0.75**		- 2.37***	0.58***		- 1.92	0.71**		- 1.14	0.57*	
Integration: Keep culture	0.72	0.26**		0.77	0.23***		0.76	0.31**		0.83***	0.24***		0.51	0.30 ~		0.42	0.24	
(missing)	0.14	0.39		0.25	0.31													
Discrimination: often	0.52	0.24*		0.56	0.22*		0.52	0.29 ~		0.56	0.23*		0.41	0.29		0.30	0.23	
(missing)	0.08	0.63		0.46	0.52													
Social class: working (versus other classes)	- 0.46	0.30		- 0.56	0.27*		0.22	0.36		- 0.22	0.28		0.76	0.36*		0.24	0.28	
(missing)	- 0.30	0.34		- 0.37	0.27													
Income inequality: reduced	0.06	0.26		- 0.05	0.24		0.71	0.30*		0.53	0.24*		0.77	0.30**		0.53	0.24*	

Table 8 (continued)

	DENK (don't know missing)		DENK (don't know at 1)		NIDA (don't know missing)		NIDA (don't know at 1)		BIJ1 (don't know missing)		BIJ1 (don't know at 1)	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
(missing)	0.95	0.33	0.43	0.26								
Death Penalty: in support of	-0.02	0.27	0.06	0.24	0.19	0.30	0.53	0.25*	-0.61	0.31*	-0.23	0.25
(missing)	1.60	0.44***	1.17	0.35***								
Religion: None (=ref)												
Religion: Christian	-0.16	0.33	-0.22	0.30	-0.12	0.39	-0.29	0.31	-0.09	0.38	-0.05	0.31
Religion: Muslim	1.55	0.40***	1.48	0.37***	1.55	0.48**	1.02	0.38**	-0.19	0.50	-0.29	0.39
Religion: Other	-0.76	0.88	-0.76	0.80	0.28	0.97	0.21	0.80	0.50	0.96	0.77	0.83
(missing)	0.47	0.44	0.25	0.35								
Religion: strongly religious	0.97	0.29***	0.93	0.26***	1.14	0.35***	1.05	0.27***	0.47	0.44	0.25	0.35
(missing)	0.92	0.55~	0.54	0.45								
Second generation	0.73	0.31*	0.78	0.29***	0.79	0.37*	0.71	0.29**	0.10	0.37	0.09	0.29
One parent born in NL	-0.73	0.33*	-0.68	0.31*	-0.81	0.42~	-0.40	0.32	-0.52	0.41	-0.23	0.32
Men	0.08	0.24	0.06	0.22	0.05	0.28	0.24	0.22	-0.20	0.28	-0.01	0.22
Aged 18-28 (=ref)												
Aged 31-45	0.19	0.30	0.10	0.28	-0.14	0.36	0.09	0.28	-0.18	0.36	-0.06	0.28
Aged 46-64	-0.56	0.37	-0.63	0.33~	-0.09	0.43	0.16	0.34	-0.23	0.42	-0.05	0.34
Aged 65plus	-0.07	0.55	-0.14	0.50	0.21	0.67	0.15	0.53	-0.34	0.66	-0.35	0.53
(missing)	1.09	0.60~	0.63	0.49								
Education: high	-0.18	0.26	-0.12	0.23	-0.08	0.30	-0.04	0.24	0.27	0.30	0.14	0.24
(missing)	0.42	0.40	0.38	0.33								





Table 8 (continued)

	DENK (don't know missing)		DENK (don't know at 1)		NIDA (don't know missing)		NIDA (don't know at 1)		BIJ1 (don't know missing)		BIJ1 (don't know at 1)	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Interest in Dutch Politics: not (=ref)												
Interest in Dutch Politics: moderate	-0.48	0.30	-0.54	0.27*	0.18	0.35	-0.29	0.28	0.25	0.36	0.03	0.28
Interest in Dutch Politics: much (missing)	-0.72	0.37~	-0.72	0.34*	-0.17	0.42	-0.19	0.34	0.48	0.43	0.69	0.34*
Interest in CO Politics: not (=ref)	-0.33	0.93	-0.81	0.70								
Interest in CO Politics: moderate	0.73	0.28*	0.74	0.26**	0.59	0.33~	0.48	0.26~	0.18	0.33	0.23	0.26
Interest in CO Politics: much (missing)	1.38	0.43**	1.35	0.40***	0.84	0.49~	0.49	0.41	1.26	0.50**	0.73	0.41~
	0.53	0.73	0.38	0.54								

Estimated parameters for missing value categories and other controls excluded from the Table

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; ~ $p < 0.10$

Table 9 Likelihood to have a PTV of 8 or higher (unweighted)

	DENK (<i>n</i> = 552)		NIDA (<i>n</i> = 347)		BIJ1 (<i>n</i> = 348)	
	<i>B</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Ethnic background: Moroccan-Dutch						
Former Dutch Caribbean	– 1.95	1.01 ~	– 1.51	1.19	– 1.54	0.97
Surinamese-Dutch	– 1.29	0.50*	– 2.04	0.76**	– 1.31	0.86
Turkish-Dutch	– 0.38	0.36	– 1.42	0.53**	– 0.83	0.73
Other Asian-Dutch	– 0.81	0.78	– 1.28	1.24	– 1.50	1.28
MENA-Dutch	– 0.77	0.53	0.09	0.63	– 2.72	1.21*
Sub-Sahara African-Dutch	– 0.58	0.62	– 2.21	1.14 ~	– 1.10	0.92
Latin-American-Dutch	– 1.31	1.09	– 0.50	1.21	– 2.24	1.22
Integration: Keep culture	0.52	0.32	0.52	0.46	0.40	0.50
Discrimination: often	0.28	0.28	0.51	0.39	1.17	0.46*
Social class: working class	– 0.42	0.35	0.28	0.47	0.93	0.53 ~
Income inequality: reduced	0.36	0.34	1.09	0.45*	0.81	0.54
Religion: Muslim	1.01	0.48*	– 0.05	0.72	– 1.16	0.81
Religion: strongly religious	1.14	0.33***	2.13	0.55***	– 0.23	0.50
In support of death penalty	0.33	0.30	0.64	0.41	– 0.87	0.61
Education: high	– 0.18	0.30	– 0.57	0.41	1.15	0.54*
Intercept	– 4.45	0.82	– 5.13	1.14	– 3.84	1.29

Estimated parameters for missing value categories and other controls excluded from the Table

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $pp < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; ~ $p < 0.10$

Table 10 Likelihood to have ever expressed a vote (intention) for DENK, NIDA and BIJ1 (unweighted) (*n* = 735)

	DENK (12%)		NIDA (3%)		BIJ1 (4%)	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Ethnic background (other = ref)						
Moroccan-Dutch	1.90	0.47***	3.34	1.09**	–	
Turkish-Dutch	1.95	0.46***	–		–	
Other MENA-Dutch	–		2.62	1.15*	–	
Surinamese-Dutch	–		–		1.36	0.52**
Sub-Sahara African-Dutch	–		–		1.67	0.64**
Integration: Keep culture	1.05	0.39**	1.32	0.80 ~	0.53	0.48
Discrimination: often	0.67	0.29*	– 0.14	0.57	1.75	0.57**
Social class: working class	– 0.37	0.36	– 0.45	0.77	0.41	0.52
Income inequality: reduced	– 0.28	0.37	0.08	0.65	1.14	0.69 ~
Religion: Muslim	1.11	0.48*	1.57	1.19	– 2.00	0.98*
Religion: strongly religious	0.97	0.35**	2.22	1.03*	0.35	0.47
In support of death penalty	0.22	0.31	– 0.37	0.65	0.23	0.55
Education: high	– 0.41	0.31	0.61	0.60	1.17	0.55*
Intercept	– 5.10	0.59	– 9.13	1.68	– 6.96	1.09

Estimated parameters for missing value categories and other controls excluded from the Table

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; ~ $p < 0.10$



Declarations

Conflict of interest On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest.

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