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## Empirical analysis of social insurance, work incentives and employment outcomes

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Empirical Analysis of Social Insurance,  
Work Incentives and Employment Outcomes



# Empirical Analysis of Social Insurance, Work Incentives and Employment Outcomes

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# Preface

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