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Peaceful alternatives to asymmetric conflict

Reddmann, L.H.

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Curriculum Vitae Lennart Reddmann

Lennart Reddmann was born on 10th April 1988 in Solingen, Germany. In 2008, he received his Abitur from the August-Dicke-Gymnasium in Solingen. After completing his civilian service, Lennart went on to study Psychology in Groningen, Netherlands, and received his Bachelor's degree in 2013. He then had a brief stint as a consultant for an Executive Search firm in Berlin, Germany. In 2015, he returned to the Netherlands to pursue his Master's studies in Social & Organisational Psychology at the University of Leiden, obtaining his degree in 2017. From 2017 to 2018, he worked as a research assistant with various researchers in the Social, Economic, and Organisational Psychology Department at Leiden University. In 2018, he began his PhD under the supervision of prof.dr. Carsten de Dreu and prof.dr. Jörg Gross, investigating peaceful alternatives in asymmetrical conflict situations, and completed his dissertation in 2023.