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Abstract

In migration studies, the focus usually is on global South- global North movements. As South-South migration constitutes a significant part of global movement, an important part of empirical reality remains understudied. Several scholars have asserted that this negligence in scholarly research is due to a tendency of migrations scholars to follow policy developments on migration in global North countries. This paper investigates this assumption by applying a systematic literature review, which focuses on empirical studies dealing with migration in a global South country: Morocco.[2] A hub for multiple migration flows and balancing demands coming from both its African and European neighbours, this North African kingdom forms an interesting case study for investigating whether the perspective of global North policy makers dictates the research agendas of empirical migration scholars. We argue that although the empirical literature on migration to Morocco is rich, the themes and population groups that form the core of empirical scrutiny largely follow questions of political relevance in global North countries.

Key words: Migration studies, policy-driven research, South-South migration, migrants, Morocco

[2] We solely focus on non-Moroccans residing in Morocco; the study of internal (rural-urban) migration of Moroccans is beyond the scope of our analysis.

Contents

Introduction

In migration studies, the focus usually is on global South-global North movements, despite the fact that most migration is South-South oriented (Alioua 2007; Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2013; de Haas and Frankema 2022; Natter 2018). When an important part of empirical reality escapes academic scrutiny, this has serious consequences for scholarly understandings of migration developments in different parts of the world, past and present (e.g. Castles 2003; FitzGerald and Arar 2018; Stock 2019). Several scholars have argued that most migration research, especially in the field of forced migration, is policy-driven, i.e., driven by questions of political relevance in, usually, global North countries. Consequently, scholars use concept that do not reflect migrants' actual experiences (Schapendonk 2012a; Stock 2019), and certain groups of migrants are neglected in research (e.g. Bakewell 2008; Castles 2003; Chimney 2009; Juntunen et al. 2014).[3] This, Bakewell says, "privileges the worldview of the policy makers in constructing the research, constraining the questions asked, the objects of study and the methodologies and analysis adopted" (2008, 432). If Bakewell and others are right, we would expect this to be reflected in the *themes*, *population groups*, and *geographical areas* studied.

This paper focuses on Morocco, a global South country located at the crossroads of Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. With approximately five out of its 35.5 million citizens living abroad (in 2017)[4] (Khrouz 2019, 62), emigration is bigger than immigration. In comparison, the approximately 150,000 migrants residing on its soil are relatively small in number,[5] but because of Morocco's geopolitical position nevertheless receive a great deal of media, political, and scholarly attention. Balancing various geopolitical interests, Morocco forms an interesting case study to assess whether most available migration literature is policy-driven, and, given that "…the field of migration studies is exceptionally western, Anglo-Saxon, and ethnocentric" (Hollifield 2020, 4), is Eurocentric.

If true, the available literature would predominantly deal with migration in Morocco from the perspective of European states, with a specific focus on security and border management policies

[3] For example self-settled forced migrants and migrants from the global North residing in the global South.
[4] This number includes second and third generations living outside Morocco. If we only count first generation, Moroccan-born, migrants, the number is significantly lower. In 2014, for example, it was 2.8 million out of 4 million inhabitants (de Bel-Air 2016).
[5] This number consists of approximately 84,000 registered migrants (Haute Commissariat au Plan 2017), 15,755 asylum seekers and refugees registered with UNHCR from more than 48 countries (UNHCR September 2021), and unregistered migrants, whose numbers are estimated to lie around 40,000. For more, see section 3.

trying to halt transit migration of sub-Saharan African men without status to Europe. This would exclude an analysis of the experiences of other, probably larger, migrant groups, such as the French and Algerians who, with 29.2 percent and 13.4 percent in 2012, form the largest groups of regular migrants in Morocco (de Bel-Air 2016, 4). It would also neglect Morocco's political, economic, and cultural/religious interests in Africa, their influence on Moroccan migration management and border control policies, as well as other issues, such as free settlement and integration of migrants in Moroccan society.[6] We want to find out whether a policy-driven and Eurocentric approach is prevalent among migration scholars with an empirical approach. Studies that focus on practice, it could be argued, are more likely to move beyond fixed institutional and policy-oriented categories and instead take the perspectives of migrants (and state actors) as a point of departure (see also Marcelino and Farahi 2011; Pian 2011, 159-160).

We use a systematic literature review to examine whether empirical scholarship on Morocco is policy-driven and Eurocentric. A systematic literature review is an evidence-focused type of literature review, which aims at reducing bias as much as possible in order to assess the evidence effectively, in this case the empirical literature dealing with migration in Morocco. We focus on the period between 1980 and 2019 during which two main Moroccan policies on migration were introduced: law 02/03 on the entry and residence of foreigners in Morocco and to irregular emigration and immigration in February 2003 (implemented in November 2003); and the migrant regularisation programmes of 2014 and 2017. Hence, we distinguish three different periods for our analysis: before the implementation of law 02/03 (1980 - November 2003); between the implementation of law 02/03 and the implementation of the first regularisation programme in January 2014 (December 2003-January 2014) and a third period following the implementation of the first regularisation programme (February 2014-December 2019). We selected 1980 as a starting point as it formed the beginning of a period of Moroccan political isolation from both Africa and Europe, as well as a period of economic and cultural cooperation between Morocco and various African states (Barre 1995, 19, 25; Wippel 2003). For example, the 1980s witnessed a growing presence of international students who came to study in Morocco on a Moroccan scholarship (e.g. Berriane 2009, 2012, 2015).

[6] According to Nzamba "…certaines catégories de ressortissants subsahariens sont écartées des recherches sur les migrations ou les présences étrangères au Maroc (étudiants, malades, chefs d'entreprise, etc.) au profit d'une catégorie englobante – les « migrants » - sur laquelle l'attention des hommes politiques, des citoyens et des médias est facilement focalisée" (2015,74). See also Berriane et al. (2010), Mohamed Berriane (2017, 2018), and Timera (2009).

This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we explain our methods. In section 3, we map the different migration flows to Morocco, both from the global South and the global North. Sections 4-6 are divided into 2 subsections. The first one maps Moroccan migration policy developments from 1980-November 2003 (section 4); December 2003-January 2014 (section 5); and February 2014-December 2019 (section 6). In the second subsection, we examine which themes, population groups and geographical areas are dominant in the literature published during the period in question.

Methods: Systematic Literature Review

A systematic literature review (hereafter: SLR) is a rigorous and evidence-focused type of literature review, which aims at reducing bias as much as possible in order to effectively assess the evidence (Hagen-Zanker and Mallet 2013, 1). It allows the researcher to critically review and analyse the available data in a comprehensive manner, thus producing a more objective analysis of the available literature on a certain topic and avoid biased results yielded by the internet searches' algorithms. Hagen-Zanker and Mallet designed a thorough, transparent and flexible protocol to retrieve and assess literature. We used their design as a starting point to make our own SLR protocol.

The first stage of an SLR is to find the right combination of the different aspects that lead to an effective data extraction. These aspects include formulating a suitable review question, selecting databases, keywords and search strings, and determining the inclusion and the exclusion criteria of the studies to be selected. We formulated the following review question: "what is the evidence on migration in Morocco from 1980 until 2019?" To answer it, we selected the following databases: Web of Science, Taylor & Francis, Jstor, Cairn, Africabib, Menalib, Karlsruhe Virtual Catalogue, and Leiden University Library Catalogue. It should be noted that we looked for databases based in the global South, including Morocco, in order to include several perspectives in our research, but, as far as we can tell, we could not find any.

Based on the SLR it seems many scholars from the global South working on migration in Morocco publish their work in international journals. Moreover, some of the literature published by Moroccan university presses is only available in print. Therefore, we did not have access to it. We tried to cover this bias by sending our bibliography to several academics who work in Morocco to suggest potentially missing literature.

As for the criteria of inclusion and exclusion, we included qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods studies from 1980 until 2019, in either Arabic, Dutch, English, French or German, the languages we read well. Given that most of the research on the topic is published in English and French, we were able to cover many sources and, hence, minimise bias.

Sources with small or aside references to the review question were excluded as well as sources that were not available as a digital source. The latter likely means a significant number of theses (BA; MA; PhD) published in Morocco and other countries falls outside the scope of our review, and the same applies to studies published in Arabic.

The second stage of a SLR is data extraction. Based on our criteria of selection and the type of databases we had access to, we included English and French sources. In total, we screened over 6000 sources. We noted that most of the academic literature on migration as it relates to Morocco addresses Moroccan migrants in Europe, and Morocco as a sending country with an emphasis on remittances, diaspora management, and the effect of the diaspora on Moroccan society (see also Berriane and Aderghal 2008, 3). This observation is not surprising given that Morocco is one of the world's leading countries of emigration. We excluded these sources, as we were interested in migration of non-Moroccans in Morocco, not of Moroccans out of Morocco. We also found a large body of literature dealing with migration agreements and policies concluded between Morocco and the EU. The fact that despite the relatively low percentage of incoming migrants in Morocco, the literature on EU-Moroccan migration agreements and policies is huge is a strong indicator of scholarly research being policy-influenced and Eurocentric. We excluded these sources, as they did not contain an empirical component. In August 2022, we repeated our queries to control for the selected sources and added another 10 sources. In total, our SLR is based on 111 academic sources. The inclusion of both English (47) and French (64) sources results in a comprehensive and rare analysis of Anglophone and Francophone studies on migration to and in Morocco.

Finally, the third stage of a SLR is the assessment, which is a deeper analysis of the sources, involving two steps. While the first one examines the individual source, the second step compares all the various sources with each other to search for patterns and trends. In making the assessment, we investigated the number of sources published in each of the three periods under investigation, and the themes, population groups and geographical areas that appeared in each source.

Overview of migration flows to Morocco

Providing a numerical overview of immigration in Morocco is difficult for two main reasons. First, exact data on the number of immigrants residing in Morocco is hard to obtain. This is caused by a significant part of the migrant population (both from the global North and the global South, see below) having no formal authorisation to stay in the country. Poor statistical record keeping also plays a role, as clearly testified by the website of the African Union. Announcing the introduction of the African Migration Observatory in Rabat in December 2020, it states in its first sentence, "The shortcomings and scarcity of data on migration have limited the capacity of the African Union (AU) Member States to conceive coherent migration policies."[7]

The second difficulty arises from the role of academics in the (re)production of (policy) categories, which does not always do justice to the complexity of situations and identities.[8] For example, regular migration can turn into irregular migration and vice versa, depending on, for example, changes in national laws and policies. In addition, do we call all people who "chercher la vie"[9] migrants or only those from the global South? (See also Escoffier 2008, 16). Keeping these two limitations in mind, we now present a numerical overview of migration in Morocco based on region of origin.

Europe

Historically, European immigration to Morocco was not uncommon. Spanish Jews sought shelter in Morocco after the Spanish Inquisition in the fifteenth century. During the Spanish civil war (1936-1939), a small number of Republicans fled to Algeria and, to a lesser extent, Morocco (Bachoud 2009, 11), and in the periods surrounding the French and Spanish protectorates (1912-1956), many Spanish and especially French nationals were living in Morocco. In 1950, their numbers were approximately 300,000 and 150,000, respectively (Natter 2019, 79). In 1956, when Morocco became independent, the number of departures exceeded the number of arrivals for a

[7] https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20201218/official-inauguration-morocco-african-migration-observatory, accessed 13 August 2022.

[8] See for more: Andersson 2014; Bakewell 2008; Brubaker 2002; Dahinden 2016; Pian 2009a; Schapendonk 2012a; Timera 2012.

[9] "Chercher la vie" literally means looking for life. The phrase is used by sub-Saharan African migrants who search for a better life and personal growth through, for example, higher education and employment abroad. The phrase could be applied to any person who migrates to improve his/her living conditions, such as the Dutch student who is going to study in the UK.

first time (Therrien and Pellegrini 2015, 607).[10] In 1960, the number of immigrants was 394,340. It declined to 223,034 in 1965 and to its lowest number in 1995 (50,360).[11] The number of Moroccan emigrants quickly increased and in 1962 Morocco already had a crude migration rate of -239,800,[12] turning it into a world leading country of emigration.[13] The declining immigration rate was largely caused by 75 percent of French and Spanish nationals leaving Morocco in the period following independence (Holborn 1975, 1003).[14]

Despite the decline, Europeans, French nationals in particular, are still the largest group of regular migrants residing in Morocco (de Bel-Air 2016, 4). The growing number of French nationals who have registered at the French consulate is significant: from 34.097 in 2007 to 46.995 in 2013 (Terrazzoni 2015, 20). Le Bigot (2015); Terrazzoni (2015); and Therrien and Pellegrini (2015) also point to another phenomenon: a significant number of French nationals who do not register at the consulate and who live in Morocco on a tourist visa. In fact, both French and Moroccan officials suggest adding an additional 25.000 to 30.000 people to the number of registered French nationals (Terrazzoni 2015, 22). Just like their Moroccan and sub-Saharan African counterparts, these French migrants are "sans papiers." They have papers (e.g. valid passport, tourist visa), but not the papers that authorise permanent residence. Some work as small entrepreneurs, others buy up dilapidated houses in the old centre of towns, such as Marrakech and Essaouira, and turn them into tourist accommodation. There is also a growing number of European retirees who live in areas, such as Agadir (Desse 2010; Le Bigot 2015) as well as a small number of Spanish (and France) nationals who migrated to Morocco in search of work after the global economic crisis in 2008 led to high unemployment in Spain (Juntunen et al. 2014; Kruk 2013).

North Africa and the Middle East

Morocco also hosts a significant population of people from the Middle East and North Africa (hereafter: MENA). In fact, after the French (29.2 percent), Algerians are the largest number of regular migrants in Morocco (13. 4 percent of all regular migrants in 2012). Not much is known

[10] For an extensive overview of the demographic and historical French presence in Morocco, see Pellegrini (2016b).
[11] It was 88,511 in 2015. See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.TOTL?locations=MA, accessed 13 August 2022. Spread sheets on file with authors.
[12] See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.TOTL?locations=MA, accessed 13 August 2022. Spread sheets on file with authors.
[13] Labour recruitment agreements were signed with France (1963), West Germany (1963), Belgium (1964) and The Netherlands (1969).
[14] According to Pellegrini, the number of French nationals in Morocco went from 287,500 in 1957 to 185,000 in 1960, hence a decline of 64 percent (2016b, 47).

about their lives in Morocco. During the war of independence (1954-1962), between 80,000 and 110,000 Algerians sought refuge in Morocco (Holborn 1975, 1005; Natter 2019, 80). To deal with the arrival of Algerian refugees, the Moroccan government passed ordinance no. 2.57.1256 of 29 August 1957, which promulgated domestic legislation governing refugee affairs and established the Bureau of Refugees and Stateless Persons (Bureau des Réfugiés et des Apatrides) (Lindstrom 2002, 12). With hundreds of border villages bombed or destroyed by the French, most Algerian refugees settled among the local inhabitants in the immediate border areas (Holborn 1975, 965-966). The UNHCR was responsible for the repatriation operation of Algerian refugees from Morocco (and Tunisia) in 1962 (ibid. 1017-1022), and an honorary UNHCR representation was established in Casablanca in 1965 (Li Rosi and Ryan 2010, 15).

Syrians probably constitute the second largest group of MENA residents in Morocco, the majority of them having arrived after the onset of the civil war in 2011. They currently form the largest group of refugees recognised by the UNHCR (UNHCR September 2021), although there are also 5250 Syrians who "benefitted" from the regularisation campaigns of 2014 (Yachoulti 2017, 216). To avoid antagonising the Syrian government (the granting of asylum contains an explicit or implicit critique of the refugee's state of origin),[15] Moroccan authorities preferred to treat Syrians as migrants rather than recognised refugees (see also Benjelloun 2021, 886) and give them temporary residency permits instead of more permanent ones.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Since the 1970s, Morocco has invested financial resources into the training and education of people from sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Barre 1995). In 1986, the Moroccan Agency for International Cooperation (l'Agence marocaine de coopération internationale, AMCI) was established to train international students in Morocco's institutions of higher education (Nzamba 2015, 71). Most international students are from sub-Saharan African countries, although there are also scholarships for a small number of Asian students (Laouali and Meyer 2012, 117). Over the years, the sub-Saharan African student population has grown from approximately 1040 students in 1994 to 4477 in 2000; over 10,000 (both public and private) in 2009 (Berriane 2009, electronic page 1);[16]

[15] See for more Cherti and Collyer (2015).

[16] Based on AMCI-statistics, Infantino counts 5961 sub-Saharan African students (both with and without scholarship) for the academic year 2009-2010 (2011b, 102). Laouali and Meyer mention similar numbers as Johara Berriane for the school year 1998-1999 (2508 international students in public schools and 1120 in private schools), but higher numbers for the school year 2010-2011 (11,577 international students in public schools and 4000 in private schools) (2012, 116), but they count all international students, not sub-Saharan African students only.

12,000 in 2014; and 18,000 in 2017, studying on a Moroccan scholarship or in private universities (Paillard 2019). These students play an important role in the development of African countries and Morocco's influence on it (Bamba 2015; Berriane 2012; Nzamba 2015, 71; Paillard 2019): "Dans une certaine mesure, ils participent à la transformation du Maroc en pays d'immigration" (To a certain extent, they participate in the transformation of Morocco into a country of immigration) (Berriane 2009, electronic page 21). It should be noted that while nationals from many ECOWAS[17] member states can enter Morocco visa-free, students from other countries need a visa, and an undetermined number of them overstay their visa and become unauthorised stayers (Goldschmidt 2002),[18] or ask for asylum (Lindstrom 2002, 15). Religious formation also forms part of sub-Saharan African migration to Morocco (e.g. Demba Fall 2003; Lahlou 2003, 125; Timera 2009, 2011). In colonial times, religious pilgrimage and formation were even essential to a continuation of Senegalese-Moroccan trade (Marfaing 2003) and Morocco has always witnessed waves of students from large maraboutic families in especially Sousse, Fes and Marrakech (Demba Fall 2003, 278). However, compared to secular formation, the number of religious students has significantly decreased (ibid.).

In Morocco, 41.6 percent (34,966) of all regularly residing foreigners in Morocco in 2014 was African, with 22,545 (64.5 percent) persons of sub-Saharan African origin (Haute Commissariat au Plan 2017). Due to its proximity to Europe, Morocco also functions as a transit country for people looking for work, adventure and self-realisation, and with the eruption of political instability in West Africa in the 1990s, asylum in Europe. With the creation of the Schengen Area in 1985 and its implementation in 1995, entry to Europe became restricted and people ended up staying in Morocco for longer periods. It is difficult to estimate the number of migrants without status residing in Morocco, because of the unauthorised nature of their stay and because information is scattered across sources. According to Goldschmidt (2006) there were between 10 and 40,000 sub-Saharan African persons without status in 2006. Other authors mention lower numbers: 10,000 in 2006 (Freedman 2012, 41); 10-15,000 in 2007 (Feliu Martinez 2009, electronic page 2); 4,500-10,000 around 2008 (Stock 2012, 1578); 10,000-15,000 in the late 2010s (Cherti and Collyer 2015, 594). In the context of the regularisation programmes of 2014 and 2017, the Ministry of Interior was ready to regularise almost all irregular migrants and it expected their numbers to

[17] The Economic Community of West African States is an economic and political union of fifteen countries in West Africa.

[18] On purpose or against their will. For example, after the Taliban took power in the summer of 2021, Afghan students in Morocco faced many difficulties extending their student visa or renewing their passports (interview with Afghan student, March 2022, Rabat).

hover around 40,000 (Benjelloun 2021, 886).[19] The final figures of the regularisation campaign of 2014 offer a minimum: of the 27,332 applications filed, around 80 percent (21,500 demands) concerned citizens of non-Arab African countries (de Bel-Air 2016, 3).

Asia

We found very little information about Asians residing in Morocco.[20] Pian makes an aside on Senegalese traders in Casablanca facing increasing competition from "Dragons d'Asie" (Asian dragons) (2005, 169). Berriane et al. also mention the growing presence of Chinese traders in Moroccan cities (2015). De Bel-Air counted 1319 regularly residing Chinese in Morocco in 2012 (2016, 4). According to Taing, there were 3000 Chinese residents in Morocco in the late 2010s, consisting of persons who work in diplomacy and bilateral relations as well as small traders (2015, 37). Morocco is also used as a transit point for Asian migrants wishing to enter Europe clandestinely (Carling 2007, 19-20). Collyer mentions the presence of a large minority of South Asians registered in the detention centre in Ceuta who reported that they had travelled through Morocco with smugglers (2010, 281). Demba Fall interviewed Senegalese migrants in Morocco who told him that the route to Europe through the Spanish enclaves is also an Asian drugs route controlled by Indonesians and Nigerians (2003, 284).

The available literature on migration in Morocco: 1980-November 2003

Moroccan Migration Policy

After a period of simmering tension, Morocco left the African Union in 1984 after the recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic by the latter. Despite this break and a period of relative isolation from African politics, bilateral cooperation to protect its economic and political interest in the region continued (e.g. Barre 1995, 25; Marfaing 2003), even when, from the 2000s, it signed agreements with the EU as part of the European externalisation policy in the field of border control and migration. A good example forms Morocco's active education policy of attracting students from sub-Saharan Africa to study in Morocco on a Moroccan scholarship. This policy,

[19] It should be noted that some sources refer to irregular migrants in general and some to sub-Saharan African migrants specifically.
[20] However, see Uden, van, who focuses in the *Living on the Other Side* research project on the ways in which migrants from Asia and the MENA deal with the formal and informal aspects of major life events (forthcoming).

which had started in the 1970s, continued to develop (Berriane 2015). Another example concerns the arrival of Nigerians in the early 1990s who, organised in powerful networks, benefitted from the significant commercial exchange between Nigeria and Morocco (Goldschmidt 2006). Under then king Hassan II, Morocco also signed a number of important international treaties. In the context of migration, the Convention on the protection of the rights of all migrant workers and members of their families (MWC) is important.[21] It was signed to protect the interests of Moroccan citizens living and working abroad rather than those of migrant workers residing on its soil (e.g. Feliu Martinez 2009, electronic page 14). When Moroccan king Muhammad VI ascended the throne in 1999, he started a so-called return to the African continent. This included a renewal of the ties with sub-Saharan African neighbours; the remission of debts of the least developed African countries in 2000; and abolition of all trade barriers to their exports, soon after enshrined in the budget law of 2001. He even proposed a "Marshall plan" for the development of the African continent (Wippel 2003, 33).

In the middle of the 1990s, the significance of Morocco as a transit country for sub-Saharan African nationals increased (e.g. Diallo 2018, 147-148), due to political instability in West-and Central Africa (Lahlou 2002, 11-13) and the closure of the Libyan border for sub-Saharan African labour migration (de Haas 2006). Until the twenty-first century, the Moroccan authorities ignored transit migration, which, while often irregular, was insignificant in number and not an issue of public concern (Natter 2014, 15). This changed with the implementation of the Schengen Area in March 1995, which ushered in a process of externalisation of the EU borders, i.e. a process where the EU is outsourcing the responsibility for preventing irregular migration to so-called transit states.

In February 1996, the EU and Morocco signed an Association Agreement, which lays out the legal framework of bilateral relations.[22] The main purpose of the agreement was to define Morocco's economic relations with the EU, access of Moroccan agricultural products to the EU market in particular (Damis 1998, 107). While migration can hardly be said to form the core of the agreement, the agreement was signed in a context of increased public concern in the EU over security issues, such as irregular migration and international crime (ibid. 96), providing a prelude of what was to come.

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[21] The Convention was adopted in New York on 18 December 1990. Morocco signed the convention on 15 August 1991 and ratified it on 21 June 1993. https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-13&chapter=4&clang=_en

[22] See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/euro-mediterranean-association-agreement-between-the-eu-and-morocco.html.

During a meeting of the European Council in October 1999 in Tampere, Finland, the Tampere plan of Action "Working towards a 'union of freedom, security and justice,'" was formulated. The plan aimed at strengthening the common foreign and security policy of the EU, including the development of common policies on asylum and immigration, "while taking into account the need for a consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration and to combat those who organise it…" (Tampere European Council 1999). The plan also included "the idea of transforming Morocco into a buffer zone to reduce migratory pressures at the EU's southern border" (Goldschmidt 2006). Morocco resisted. In particular, it considered the proposed readmission of Moroccan nationals and nationals of third countries to be a step too far. Of the four Maghreb countries, Morocco is the only one with a consistent policy of encouraging migration in order to manage unemployment (Baldwin-Edwards 2006, 4). In addition, as noted, Morocco had signed numerous bilateral agreements with its sub-Saharan African neighbours in the field of trade, politics, and education (Barre 1995), and free movement of people was part of these agreements.

In 2000, the EU-Moroccan Association Agreement entered into force. According to many scholars and pundits, it contributed to the presentation to the parliament in February 2003 of a strict Moroccan law on migration, its passing in June 2003, and its implementation in November 2003,[23] as did the Casablanca terrorist attacks of 16 May 2003. The attacks changed the political climate, and the framing of sub-Saharan African emigration as a national security threat facilitated the passing of a security-driven draft law on migration (e.g. Belguendouz 2003, 2005; Elmadmad 2004).

Apart from increased criminalisation of migration, the early 2000s were also a period of growing attention in Morocco for the rights of women and children, of which migrant women and children reaped the benefits at least in theory. For example, the provision that irregular migrants should be escorted back to the border (art. 29) does not apply to pregnant women and minors (unless art. 27 applies) (Feliu Martinez 2009). The implementation of women- and child-friendly legislation should be seen in the light of the Kingdom's desire to safeguard another geopolitical interest: apart from staying close to Europe, it also wanted to enhance its moderate and progressive image on the international scene.

[23] Officially called 'Law 02/03 relative to the entry and residence of foreigners in Morocco and to irregular emigration and immigration.' For an analysis of content of the law, see Elmadmad (2004).

Studies on migration to and in Morocco: 1980-November 2003

Out of 111 academic sources screened, we found that in a period covering 24 years only eight empirical sources were published on migrants in Morocco, of which seven were in French and one in English. We found one source explicitly dealing with reception of asylum seekers in Morocco (Lindstrom 2002), despite the fact that, first, in the 1990s, civil wars in West-Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) led to a significant increase in migration to the Maghreb countries, including Morocco;[24] and, second, Morocco is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention; its 1967 Protocol; and the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.[25] The fact that the number of registered asylum seekers and refugees was low might explain this lack of attention to forced migration.[26] The other seven sources focus on sub-Saharan African migration in Morocco, with four paying exclusive attention to Morocco as a transit country (i.e. Escoffier 2003; Goldschmidt 2002, 2003; Lahlou 2003).

In an article on migrants from Congo Kinshasa and Congo Brazzaville, Goldschmidt states "…the desire to leave results more from personal motives, such as self-realisation, than from a need to enter a family economic development program. The desire to 'broaden horizons', the temptation to go and 'learn elsewhere what is not taught at home', exoticism ('whiteness'), or even the questioning of identity from colonial history, are the main motives evoked by migrants to explain their departure [to Europe]" (2002, 219).[27] In contrast, Lahlou and Escoffier (2002) show that "changer d'air" motivates persons from relatively stable countries, such as Cameroon, Gabon, and the Gambia while their counterparts from the two Congo's flee civil war and the same applies to nationals from Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone (15-16, 21). Based on a survey in 2000 among 66, mainly Christian, sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco, Lahlou and Escoffier conclude that major reasons for departure are war and conflict, unemployment, poverty, drought and individual or family misery (2002, 16. See also Lahlou 2003, 115-124).

[24] See, for example, de Haas (2006) and Lahlou (2002, 11-13).
[25] Morocco succeeded to the Refugee Convention on 7 November 1956 and acceded to its 1967 Protocol on 20 April 1971. The 1969 OAU Convention was adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its Sixth Ordinary Session, Addis-Ababa, on 10 September 1969.
[26] From 1987 until 1998, their number hovered around 300, then increased to 901 in 1999 and 2105 in 2000 (Lindstrom 2002, 14). Until 2004, UNHCR recognised refugees were not automatically recognised by the BRA. This slowly changed after a headquarter agreement was signed with Morocco in 2007 (e.g. Valluy 2007b).
[27] But see Pian (2008a, 12) and Stock (2019, 117) who claim that Congolese see themselves as asylum seekers and do not like the term "aventurier" being applied to them.

The introduction of the Schengen Area in 1995 changed migration trajectories in Africa, with people starting to cross the continent in steps leading to prolonged stays in, among other countries, Morocco (Goldschmidt 2002; Lahlou and Escoffier 2002), where transit migrants' paths crossed with those of Congolese youth already studying in Morocco (Goldschmidt 2003).[28] The latter observation shows that between 1980 and 2003 Morocco was more than merely a transit country. This is seconded by Lahlou, who states that migratory movements have always existed between the four Maghreb countries and the countries of the Sahel (2003, 125),[29] and by Lahlou and Escoffier, who show that a significant number of DRC respondents want to study in Morocco. Others want to go to Europe, but in case of failure do not mind starting a life in Morocco (2002, 22), despite increasing racism (Goldschmidt 2002).

In her overview of Senegalese traders in Mauritania and Morocco from colonial times until the early 2000s, Marfaing pays attention to the role of women. Through their business with Morocco, even Italy and Dubai, Senegalese female traders have not only found a space where their husbands leave them alone (because the latter consider Morocco a "good" Muslim country) but also a way to enhance their social status (2003, 271-272), an observation seconded by Demba Fall (2003, 285). Demba Fall outlines how Islamic religion, the Tijaniyya order in particular,[30] has served as a motor of exchanges between the two countries in the past, with Senegalese pilgrims visiting the shrine of Ahmad al-Tijani in Fes and students heading for Morocco for religious study. Although religious education has declined in importance, pilgrimage to Fes (whether or not as a stopover on the way to Mecca) is still important, as is secular education in Morocco; trade between Senegal and Morocco, in the majority performed by Senegalese women; and irregular migration to Europe (2003, 282-286).

In summary, between 1980 and November 2003, only eight sources out of 111 dealt with migrants in Morocco, and of these sources, none was published before the introduction of the Schengen area in 1995. Both findings show that between 1980 and 1995 no empirical literature on migration in Morocco is available, because irregular migration was not a topic of concern for either the Moroccan authorities or the EU. This literature starts to increase after the introduction of the

[28] For more on sub-Saharan African students in Morocco, see Bamba (2015); Berriane (2009; 2015); Niandou (2015); Nzamba (2015).
[29] After the discovery of oil in the south of Algeria and Libya, both countries became important migratory countries for citizens from sub-Saharan Africa whose aim was to earn enough money to build a future in their country of origin (Lahlou 2003, 125). See also de Haas (2006).
[30] The founder of the Tijaniyya order, Sidi Ahmad Al-Tijani, was born in Algeria in 1737. He received his religious education in Fes, where he died in 1815. The Tijaniyya order is widespread in West Africa.

Schengen area in 1995. In terms of themes, population groups and geographical areas studied, we see that except for one source dealing with asylum seekers and refugees, the other sources focus on sub-Saharan African nationals, excluding migrants from Europe, the MENA, and Asia from empirical scrutiny. With two sources out of eight paying attention to female Senegalese traders, a gender perspective seems to be emerging. Although the sources mainly portray sub-Saharan African migration in Morocco as transit migration to Europe, there is also attention paid to sub-Saharan African students and (female) merchants in Morocco, past and present, and, hence, for geographical areas, such as Casablanca, Rabat, and Fes, which are not EU-border areas.

The available literature on migration in Morocco: December 2003-January 2014

Moroccan Migration Policy

To give concrete meaning to the 2000 Association Agreement, the EU and Morocco signed in 2004 a so-called Action Plan in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),[31] which, upon reform in nine fields,[32] would lead to a special status for Morocco in 2008 (Kausch 2009). Priority was placed on "the effective management of migratory flows, including the signing of a readmission agreement with the European Community" (Feliu Martinez 2009, electronic page 8). The implementation of the Action Plan was financed by Meda II (2001-2006), the principal financial instrument of the EU-Mediterranean Partnership. Hence, one year after the adoption of law 02/03, the EU announced the release of 40 million euros for the "management of border controls" within the framework of the Meda II programme (e.g. Feliu Martinez 2009, electronic page 8; Kitmun 2011, 29). Europe's 2002– 2004 National Indicative Programme (NIP) committed 115 million euros to migration-related projects (Natter 2014, 18), and 654 million euros for the period 2007-2010 (Feliu Martinez 2009).

Externalisation of EU border control also led to externalisation of the asylum process (Valluy 2007a; Feliu Martinez 2009; Kitmun 2011). Morocco, however, lacked and still lacks a legislative and institutional domestic framework in relation to asylum and refugee protection (e.g. Valluy 2007b). In her 2004 report on Morocco, the United Nations special rapporteur on the human rights of

[31] The ENP was launched in 2003.

[32] They are: legislative reform and international human rights standards ; counter-terrorism; trade liberalisation; creation of a favourable investment climate; poverty reduction; education and training; migration; transport; and energy (Kausch 2009, 170-171).

migrants, Gabriela Rodriguez Pizarro, stated that many sub-Saharan Africans live in deplorable conditions, and while many are fleeing countries at war, they do not even have the possibility of having their asylum applications examined before being deported. The special rapporteur requested that the UN put an end to the dichotomy between what Morocco asks for its migrants abroad, in terms of protection and assistance, and the treatment it offers to immigrants in Morocco (Belguendouz 2003; Feliu Martinez 2009). Shortly after, the UNHCR office in Casablanca, staffed by three Moroccans (director, assistant, and chauffeur) (Valluy 2007b), was closed and a new headquarter with an international delegation was opened in Rabat, even before a headquarters agreement was signed (Valluy 2007c). The upgrade was resented by many civil society organisations, and they refused cooperation with UNHCR, which they viewed as carrying out the European migration agenda (ibid. Valluy 2007c).

In September and October 2005, hundreds of migrants tried to climb the fences of Ceuta and Melilla. Eleven were alleged to have died at the hands of Moroccan and Spanish border guards. In the wake of these incidents, a series of raids throughout the country led to external deportation of sub-Saharan Africans to the desert of Algeria, including UNHCR recognised refugees. These two developments caused international outcry and led to the emergence of a strong civil society in Morocco, increasingly organised by migrants themselves and supported by international actors, such as Human Rights Watch.[33] Worried about its African interests being harmed, the Moroccan government seized the opportunity to present itself as an indispensable actor in African-European migration management (Natter 2014, 23). Morocco organised the first Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development on 10 and 11 July 2006 in Rabat (ibid. 24) in collaboration with France and Spain. It signalled Morocco's ambition to be a regional leader (Üstübici 2015, 48). Morocco also signed a headquarter agreement with the IOM in July 2006 for the latter to organise assisted voluntary return of migrants from Morocco to their countries of origin (Valluy 2007b, 6), and a headquarters agreement with UNHCR in July 2007. In the same year, Morocco's national strategy was updated. Although in practice its impact remained limited, the new "National Strategy on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings" now included protective and preventive components (Natter 2014, 22).

During the seventh EU-Morocco Association Council in October 2008, Morocco was the first Mediterranean country to move from the status of ordinary associate of the EU to that of advanced associate, allowing, at least theoretically, for deeper integration into the EU political

[33] For an overview, see Valluy (2007b).

and economic space (Martín 2009). In return, Morocco was pressured to protect its borders and to seriously implement the 1992 agreement with Spain, and accept back Moroccans and third country nationals without status intercepted on Spanish soil (ibid. electronic page 11).

The Arab uprisings of 2010 and 2011 brought political instability and vulnerability. The Moroccan king responded by announcing the enactment of a new constitution in July 2011. It affirmed the primacy of international conventions over domestic legislations (preamble) and states that "Foreigners under [Moroccan] jurisdiction enjoy the fundamental freedoms recognised to Moroccan citizens [feminine] and citizens [masculine], in accordance with the law" (art. 30).[34] In the same year, a new national human rights institution was established: the Conseil National des Droits de l'Homme (CNHD).[35]

Morocco signed a European Mobility Partnership in June 2013 in return for significant financial aid for a democratic transition (Limam and Del Sarto 2015). The partnership provides for initiatives to ensure proper management of the movement of people. These include facilitating visa procedures for certain groups of Moroccan citizens, such as students, researchers, and businesswomen and men; and resuming negotiations on readmission agreements of migrants without status (European Commission 2013). It deepened Morocco's alignment with European border priorities, but Morocco's reputation as Europe's policeman and its absence from the African Union compromised its ambition to be a power in Africa (Benjelloun 2021, 878) and tarnished its progressive image abroad.

Meanwhile, pressure from civil society was building up. In 2013, the Groupe Antiraciste de D ḍense et d'Accompagnement des Ḛtrangers et Migrants (GADEM) published a report on migrants' rights in Morocco. This highly critical report formed the basis for a submission to the Moroccan parliament by the newly formed Conseil National des Droits de l'Homme (CNHD) in the same year. CNHD also presented this report in Geneva on 10 and 11 September 2013, at the 19th session of the Implementation Monitoring Committee of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members, to which Morocco was a signatory. Eager to

[34] Article 31 of the Moroccan Constitution of 1972 stipulates that all ratified international conventions become part of the Moroccan legal system and take precedence over other laws. That is, international law must be applied to domestic law; it need not be passed as national legislation before it can take effect (Elmadmad 2002, 32). According to Fornalé, it is not clear whether international law prevails over national law (2013, 183). For an overview on the Moroccan debate and the way the Supreme Court tries to find a compromise, see Fornalé (2013, 183-188).

[35] The CNDH was established in 2011 by Royal Decree to "…protect and promote human rights, but also to enrich thoughts and debate on human rights and democracy issues" (CNDH 2013).

present a progressive image abroad as well as appease its sub-Saharan African neighbours, on 10 September, the Moroccan king announced a national strategy on migration and asylum (Stratégie Nationale d'Immigration et d'Asile). To incorporate the strategy into domestic legislation, the King announced the introduction of three new laws on asylum, immigration, and human trafficking. The new strategy also included an exceptional regularisation programme, allowing migrants without status to obtain a one-year residency permit upon meeting six conditions. By accepting that it had become a country of residence and transit, Morocco became the first country in the region to reform its migration policy substantially (Alioua and Ferrié 2017, 9). It should be noted, however, that the regularisation programme was explicitly presented as exceptional, and based on a circular.[36] Today, a comprehensive law on immigration and asylum is still pending.

Studies on Migration to and in Morocco: December 2003-January 2014

We found 42 sources for this period, a significant increase compared to the period from 1980 until November 2003 where we counted eight sources. Thirty-one sources were in French, eleven in English. The sources were evenly distributed over the years, with the exception of 2004 for which we did not find sources and a peak in 2009 and 2011. Similar to the previous period, all sources deal with sub-Saharan Africans, with three exceptions: Desse (2010) presents an overview of different forms of tourism in Agadir, including long-term residence of various groups of Europeans (surfers, motorhome owners, and retirees) in Agadir; Laoula and Meyer focus on international students in Morocco (2012); and Berriane et al. (2013) study the lifestyles of sub-Saharan Africans and Europeans in Fes. While this finding would confirm that studies on migration to and in Morocco are largely policy driven, based on our SLR, however, we see that scholars present a nuanced picture of variation within categories of migrants (regular/irregular; student/aventurier; men/ women), thereby showing that, first, sub-Saharan African migration is not solely portrayed as EU oriented, and, second, that the security-approach of the Moroccan authorities during this period is not completely EU-imposed.

To be sure, some scholars focus exclusively on sub-Saharan African transit migration to Europe (e.g. Charef and Cebrián 2009; Collyer 2007; Escoffier 2009; Freedman 2012; Pian 2008a;, 2011; Schapendonk 2012b), and/or the influence of the EU's migration regime on the lives of migrants in Morocco, such as prolonged stay in Morocco (e.g. Escoffier 2008; Marcelino and Farahi 2011;

[36] Circular n° 8303 organising the 2014 exceptional regularisation campaign. Circulars provide guidance to lower authorities on interpretation and implementation of administrative regulations.

Pickerill 2011; Timera 2012; Valluy 2009), and the creation of new identificatory categories, such as sub-Saharan and *azi* (implies black, slave), to shape otherness in Morocco (Timera 2012). Under the pretext of fighting international terrorism (Goldschmidt 2006; Valluy 2007a), scholars point out the human right violations the implementation of this regime creates (e.g. Charef and Cebriánwe 2009; Marcelino and Farahi 2011; Valluy 2007a, 2007c, 2009), for women (Escoffier 2008; Freedman 2012), and for refugees, especially after the storming of the fences by migrants in the autumn of 2005 (e.g. Goldschmidt 2006; Traoré 2006) when even UNHCR recognised refugees were deported to the border of the Algerian desert (Valluy 2007a, 2007b, 2007c).

Relatedly, scholars started analysing the emerging political activism of sub-Saharan Africans in the context of what Pain calls a "vide juridique," a legal void in which not even the rights of asylum seekers and UNHCR recognised refugees are respected (2009). This void, Escoffier says, is filled by the formation of 'communauté d'itinérance" (roaming communities) (2009). These communities are not based on blood ties, but on members sharing the same goal (to reach Europe) and experience (traveling irregularly) (ibid.), creating a collective history in the process (Alioua 2008, 2009).[37] With strong social organisation already in place, the step to political organisation for the protection of human rights is small (Alioua 2009). In this way, Alioua argues, migrant organisations counterbalance the power of the state (ibid.). In other cases, solidarity networks allow individuals, such as Senegalese domestic workers, to demand their rights vis-à-vis non-state actors, such as employers who do not respect their rights (Lanza 2011, 127-129).

Other scholars show that the domestic, regional, and international interests of the Moroccan state prevent a rigid implementation of the migration law (e.g. Escoffier 2008, 37-38; Marcelino and Farahi 2011, 901), in part because irregular Europe-oriented migratory flows are used by sub-Saharan African and Moroccan nationals alike (Alioua 2007).[38]

Pian (2005) shows that stricter border controls between Morocco and Spain do not impede freedom of movement between Morocco and Senegal, something which both the established Senegalese trading community in Morocco and Senegalese "aventuriers" (whose attempts to enter Europe failed) use to their advantage. In this and other studies, Pian argues in favour of a historical approach to understand how old and new migration patterns of Senegalese migration to and in Morocco intersect, creating novel, unpredictable, and sometimes favourable conditions

[37] In a study on affectionate relationships between Moroccan men and French women, Cauvin Verner mentions the emergence of a "third community." In this community, mixed couples create a normative pattern for interracial sexuality (2016. See also section 6).
[38] See also Belguendouz (2005) and Peraldi and Rahmi (2009).

(2005; 2008b; 2010; 2011. See also Timera 2009). Edogué Ntang and Peraldi (2011) too show that not all sub-Saharan African movement is directed towards Europe: sub-Saharan Africans frequently travel between Morocco and their country of origin to visit family, to attend a wedding, to reconnect with amorous relationships, to consult a marabout, or to engage in so-called suitcase trade. While traders take the plane, others cross the desert again, equipped with knowledge gained through earlier crossings (2011, 47-48).

Among the studies that do not focus on sub-Saharan Africans without status, the study of sub-Saharan African students in Morocco is most frequent (e.g. Laouali and Meyer 2012). Berriane (2009) and Timera (2009) critically point out how they have become a forgotten group, due to scholars' excessive focus on irregular migration to Europe. Morocco, Johara Berriane says, has been able to position itself as one of the main international destinations for sub-Saharan students, even placing itself, for some of them, in second position after France. Morocco thus plays a leading role in the formation of an African elite that can contribute to the deployment of Moroccan soft power on the continent (2012, electronic pages 1-3. See also Infantino 2011b, 103). Paradoxically, however, sub-Saharan African students in Rabat put themselves at greater distance from Moroccan society than their counterparts without status who live among Moroccans in lower-class neighbourhoods (Infantino 2011b, 117-119). The former fear that mingling with co-nationals without status will lead to problems with the Moroccan authorities, and even refoulement (ibid. See also Berriane 2012).

The study of religion slowly emerges during this period. Escoffier mentions that the Moroccan king in his role as commander of the faithful has a religious duty to protect transmigrants on Moroccan soil (2008, 36). With priests praying for the wellbeing of those who want to cross and often acting as essential links between transmigrants in Morocco and those who have already reached Europe, religion not only becomes a resource for mobility but also leads to the making of the "communauté d'itinérance" (roaming communities) (ibid. 169-187). Timera analyses what role Islamic religion plays in the relationship between Senegalese migrants and Moroccans. Irrespective of their legal status, Senegalese pilgrims, merchants as well as aventuriers use Islamic religion as a way to stress communality with Moroccans. In daily interactions tainted by racism and old memories of slavery, religion is also used to draw a boundary between good (Senegalese) and less good (Moroccans) believers (2011). Marcelino and Farahi show that "Islamic notions of humanitarianism… provides the moral basis for informal incorporation of sub-Saharans by locals…" (2011, 894-895). Both studies are a strong reminder that migration in Morocco encompasses more than just irregular sub-Saharan African migration to Europe. Besides, says Schapendonk (2012a), migrants often move in and out of scholarly categories (from being a transit

migrant to becoming a settled migrant and vice versa); their experiences in transit differ (from uprooted waiting conditions to quite settled lives); and, even in transit, they can be quite mobile (e.g. living in Oujda but working in the Algerian town Magnia). In addition, not all migrants heading north are moving to the EU (ibid. 582). Schapendonk's analysis makes clear that the concept of transit migration needs to include all of these developments too (see also Marcelino and Farahi 2011; Stock 2012).

Compared to the first period, there is more attention on asylum seekers and refugees in the scholarly literature, partly because of an increased focus on the experiences of women migrants. Women are mostly unaware of the possibility of making an asylum claim, and the need to pay smugglers during the journey has even led to a normalisation of forced sexual relations (Freedman 2012). The heightened focus on refugees is also related to the events at Ceuta and Melilla in 2005 as well as the changed legal status of the UNHCR, giving it an institutionalised role in the refugee status determination process. This new role, Valluy claims, is not related to rising refugee numbers, but to the externalisation of the EU's asylum procedure (2007a; 2007c; 2009). This is seconded by Collyer who says that while the 2007 agreement between Morocco and UNHCR led to greater respect for UNHCR-issued documentation (2010, 274), the Moroccan government remains resistant to giving ground to what it sees as a European-sponsored agenda that is only in the European interest (ibid. 291).[39] In contrast, Marcelino and Farahi claim that it is in the interest of the EU to conflate irregular sub-Saharan African migration with economic migration to conceal a reality in which many migrants without status are *de facto* refugees (2011, 893).

The sources presented above show that the Moroccan authorities try to find a balance between adherence to Europe's anti-immigration agenda; pursuing their own emigration agenda; protecting the Kingdom's cultural, economic and political interests in sub-Saharan Africa; and living up to the international conventions it has signed. Albeit usually implicit, scholars' analyses demonstrate that Moroccan migration history did not begin after the EU closed its external borders.

The sources also reveal a growing interest among scholars for the class aspects of irregular migration (Marcelino and Farahi 2011) and, with approximately 20-30 percent of sub-Saharan African migrants being women (Stock 2012, 1578), gender. In her socio-anthropological study of

[39] See also Caron (2017).

African transmigrants, Escoffier devotes an entire section (5 chapters) to transmigrants (2008, 55-117). Where in 2002 Goldschmidt solely focused on "les aventuriers," in the late 2010s the term "les aventurières" emerges. Both l'aventurier and l'aventurière are presented as sub-Saharan Africans without status who want to go to Europe, but for different reasons. Men look for social prestige, self-realisation and adventure (Alioua 2008; Charef and Cebrián 2009; Marcelino and Farahi 2011; Pian 2005, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b; Timera 2009). Women are trying to escape the stigmatisation of divorce (Pian 2010; Stock 2012); rape and sexual violence (Freedman 2012); sorcery (Escoffier 2008); or join husbands already living in Morocco (Stock 2012), or look for economic opportunities (Escoffier 2008; Freedman 2012; Stock 2012), such as Senegalese women involved in small trade or domestic work (Lanza 2011; Pian 2008, 2010).

With regard to the geographical areas studied, we find studies dealing with sub-Saharan Africans in areas bordering Europe, such as Tanger, Nador, Ceuta, Melilla, and Laayoune (e.g. Alioua 2008; Oudada 2009; Pian 2008a), and Algeria (Valluy 2007a), but also studies in which scholars propose a more balanced approach with more attention given to migrants who have settled in urban centres away from the border, for shorter or longer periods, voluntarily or involuntarily (e.g. Escoffier 2008, 2009; Pian 2008b, 2010; Timera 2009), to employ economic activities in, for example, Rabat and Casablanca (Edogué Ntang and Peraldi 2011; Pian 2010; Pickerill 2011), in Fes (Berriane et al. 2013), or in Laayoune. Laayoune, Oudada claims, is attractive for migrants because of its proximity to the Canary Islands, as well as the economic dynamism of the region, which attracts sub-Saharans who consider settlement in Morocco should their attempt to reach Europe fail (2009, 174). With African migration increasingly taking place in steps more studies on stopovers on the way to or in Morocco emerge (e.g. Collyer 2007; Escoffier 2008; Pickerill 2011; Schapendonk 2012a, 2012b) and, relatedly, scholarly attention for forms of migrant organisation, including aspects of informal law making (e.g. Edogué Ntang and Peraldi 2011; Escoffier 2009; Pian 2008a, 2011); political activism (e.g. Alioua 2008, 2009; Pian 2009c); and integration.

Scholars present different accounts of integration. In contrast to the unimpeded "well-being" or "lifestyle" migration of Europeans in Agadir (Desse 2010) and Fes (Berriane et al. 2013), stands the forced settlement of sub-Saharan Africans. With Western countries having put up "rideau de fer" (iron curtains), countries on the periphery of the Western world, such as Morocco, have become countries of immigration against their will (Valluy 2009). This, Valluy says, also affects processes of integration, and xenophobia is more likely to occur in "forced" countries of immigration than in "classical" countries of immigration (see also Edogué Ntang and Peraldi 2011). Marcelino and Farahi examine the interaction between locals and "the other" in Morocco (and Cape Verde) (2011, 891). The result of periods of "elongated liminality," these interactions are characterised by

"informal civility:" "the recognition by locals of a degree of social equality, inspired by respect for the migratory experience (inclusion); and the parallel recognition of the relatively lower social position occupied by migrants in the host community (exclusion)" (2011, 896. See also Escoffier 2008, 102-103). For example, where sub-Saharan African women are seen as morally loose, local women also admire them for their emancipation and autonomy, and sometimes copy this behaviour by marrying an adventurer despite family resistance (Escoffier 2008, 103). While matrimonial alliances between sub-Saharan Africans and Moroccans in working-class neighbourhoods are becoming increasingly frequent, sub-Saharan African men are simultaneously seen as "second chance husbands" for divorced or abandoned Moroccan working-class women (Edogué Ntang and Peraldi 2011, 51-52). This, Oudada says, is different in Laayoune, the largest city of the disputed territory of Western Sahara, home to many different ethnic groups, with strong inter-group ties (a remnant of the era of the caravan trade), sub-Saharans feel more welcome in Laayoune than in the north of Morocco where racism is not uncommon (2009, 176).

Integration in the labour market is also a new topic of scholarly attention. In a context where "savoir-attendre" (knowing how to wait) matters as much as "savoir-circuler," (knowing how to move) Escoffier shows that where some women are able to set up small businesses, many others feel frustrated and bored in Morocco where there are few economic opportunities, and where contact with local women is limited because the latter do not speak French (2008, 881-84). Kettani and Peraldi demonstrate how bilateral agreements, signed between Morocco and sub-Saharan African partners in the years following independence,[40] allow "old" migrants and students to occupy positions in the formal labour market, in contrast to co-nationals who arrived later (2011). Infantino shows that Casablanca witnesses the formation of transnational business in the music, nightlife and restaurant scene that operates *outside* the world of bilateral agreements or religious ties (e.g. brotherhoods), and which is embedded in local and transnational networks instead (2011a). Similarly, Escoffier states that it is not so much the ethnic community but the "communauté d'itinérance," (roaming community) which plays an important role in the integration of its members in the receiving society (2008, 152-153).

In conclusion, the scholarly landscape on migration in Morocco has changed in several ways. First, the period December 2003-January 2014 witnessed a stark increase in the number of publications from eight in 24 years to 42 in ten years. Second, except for three, all sources focus on sub-Saharan

[40] Mostly, Senegal, Ivory Coast, DRC and Guinee Konakry.

African migrants. Third, the most prominent themes are externalisation of border surveillance and its consequences: human right violations, long periods of waiting in Morocco, and integration processes. These developments demonstrate that the empirical literature on migration to and in Morocco follows a development in EU migration policy that aims at preventing and controlling sub-Saharan African irregular migration to the EU. Although many scholars also show the variety within sub-Saharan African populations in terms of gender, legal status, and place of residence in Morocco, the nearly exclusive focus on sub-Saharan Africans in Morocco, makes it look as if the Moroccan migrant population is homogeneous in terms of region of origin.

The available literature on migration in Morocco: February 2014-December 2019

Moroccan Migration Policy

The introduction of a new Moroccan policy on migration on 10 September 2013 constituted a shift from a migration policy that until then had been security based (e.g. Elmadmad 2014) to one in which Morocco's king admitted Morocco had become a country of immigration. In its concluding observations of 13 September 2013, the UN Committee on the Rights of Migrant Workers positively refers to the initiative of the Moroccan king to introduce a new policy on migration management, but urges the Moroccan authorities to implement the reforms truly (CMW 13 September 2013). On the legal level, Morocco adopted law 27/14 on human trafficking in 2016. The other two draft laws on asylum (26/14) and immigration, however, are still pending, because the presence of Syrians in Morocco is sensitive from a security perspective (Yachoulti 2017, 217).

On the level of implementation arrangements, the BRA (Bureau des Réfugiés et des Apatrides) was reopened on 25 September 2013 and in October 2013 a ministerial department was established that is responsible for Moroccans living abroad and migrants on Moroccan territory (le Ministère Chargé des Marocains Résidant à l'Étranger et des Affaires de la Migration). Under the new 2013 policy, the RBA took over the process of refugee status determination. Where Moroccan authorities usually did not recognise the refugee status conferred to forced migrants by the UNHCR office in Rabat, after 2013 most refugees were given residence permits (UNHCR 8 October 2013). Still, McKanders notes that women and forced migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are marginalised; while the Moroccan government collectively categorised Syrians as refugees, forced migrants from sub-Saharan African countries, such as Ivory Coast and the DCR, need to submit individual asylum requests (2018, 205). The Minister of Interior and the Minister in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad and Migration Affairs co-signed on 16 December 2013 circular no.

8303 organising the 2014 exceptional regularisation campaign. “Despite the rigidity of the circular, it was ultimately of benefit to 92% of the applicants in 2014, according to the National Human Rights Council” (Benjelloun 2021, 886).

During an “African tour” in February and March 2014, the Moroccan king visited several African countries (Nzamba 2015, 70). It led to renewed ties with African leaders and a new positioning within the continent, and forced Moroccan authorities to treat citizens from neighbouring African countries who live in or transit through Morocco with more respect (Benbih 2015, 225, 227).[41] Avoiding international shaming by co-opting civil society in the migration policy implementation process also played a role (Norman 2019). For example, on 12 December 2016, the second phase of the regularisation campaign was suddenly announced, at a time when Algeria was organising the deportation of sub-Saharan Africans to Niger (Benjelloun 2021, 881). Royal African tours and the regularisation programmes contributed to Morocco being accepted back into the African Union in January 2017 (ibid. 882). The 2016 reform was key to Morocco’s aim to re-join the African Union and become a migration leader on the African continent (ibid. 881-882; Abourabi 2022). At the Intergovernmental Conference on Migration held in Marrakech in December 2018, to which all UN state actors were invited, the royal speech confirmed this position:

Migration is not a security issue – nor should it become one. A repressive migration policy will not be a deterrent. Through some perverse effect, repression deflects migratory dynamics, but does not stop them. Migrants’ rights cannot be ignored simply because there are security concerns. Their rights are inalienable. The side of the border on which a migrant stands does not make him or her more or less human. Addressing security concerns should go hand in hand with socio-economic development policies, which tackle the root causes of risky migration. Finally, security concerns should not be invoked to deny mobility. In fact, the latter can be turned into a lever of sustainable development, at a time when the international community is seeking to implement the 2030 Agenda (Abourabi 2022, 9).

During the summit, the Moroccan King also suggested the establishment of an African migration observatory to better monitor migration trends on the continent and formulate clear and realistic migration policies and programmes. In January 2019, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union announced the establishment of the African Migration Observatory in Morocco’s capital Rabat.

[41] See also Jiménez-Alvarez et al. 2021.

Studies on Migration to and in Morocco: 2014-2019

We found 61 sources for this period, as compared to eight for the period from 1980 until November 2003 and 42 for the period December 2003-January 2014. This is a significant increase, given that the third period spans five years in contrast to the preceding periods, which cover 24 and ten years respectively. For the first time, the number of English sources exceeded the French sources, by 35 to 26. The sources were evenly distributed over the years, with a peak in 2015, when two edited volumes were published (Berriane et al. 2015; Khrouz and Lanza 2015). In terms of population groups, the sources still predominantly focus on sub-Saharan Africans, although studies on other population groups are increasing. For example, the edited volumes by Berriane et al. (2015); Khrouz and Lanza (2015); and Therrien (2016) include contributions on migration of Europeans (mostly French), Asians and Syrians to Morocco. Similar to the previous period, the most prominent themes are externalisation of border surveillance; long periods of waiting in Morocco; and integration.

Externalisation of border surveillance and longer periods of stay

Most migration studies outside the "Western liberal-democratic" sphere focus on emigration and diaspora policies or look at policy-making in the context of "externalisation" (Natter 2018, 5).[42] Indeed, despite the introduction of the regularisation programme, few scholars use it as a focus of analysis (but see Benbih 2015; Buehler and Han 2019a; Üstübici 2015), instead still focusing on irregular sub-Saharan migration in the context of the EU's externalisation of border surveillance (e.g. Alexander 2019b; Andersson 2014; Gazzotti 2019; Robin 2014; Tyszler 2018, 2019) or, as Johnson puts it, the global system of migration control (2014).

Externalisation leads to increased periods of waiting and stay in Morocco (e.g. Alioua 2014; Johara Berriane 2017; Stock 2019; Thorsen 2017) and severe issues such as sexual violence (Keygnaert et al. 2014; Tyszler 2018, 2019), discriminatory treatment of forced migrants based on skin colour (Alexander 2019b; Andersson 2014);[43] and death (Dialo 2018; Gazzotti 2019; Kobelinsky 2017, 2019; Perl 2016; Pian 2017). Scheel and Ratfish (2014) argue that Morocco's migration policy is dictated by intense EU pressure (see also Keygnaert et al. 2014; Üstübici 2018). In facilitating a national

[42] See also Berriane et al. who claim that migration scholarship is still Eurocentric because it portrays Morocco as being Europe's policeman, ignoring the domestic, regional, and international interests of the Moroccan state (2015, 517).
[43] See also McKanders (2018).

asylum system, for example, the kingdom was heavily pressured by the EU to grant diplomatic status to the UNHCR in 2007 (Scheel and Ratfish 2014).

Other scholars find this perspective Eurocentric. After all, Madrisotti says, due to its political stability and economic growth, Morocco has become a hub for sub-Saharans and increasingly also for Europeans and Asians (2018, 318). During his fieldwork in Tanger, Madrisotti noticed that the longer he spent time with interlocutors without status, the more he discovered a gap between the way they presented themselves to him (and other researchers, journalists, and civil society actors) and their everyday lives, in which they were not powerless but owners of their destinies (ibid.). Similar to the previous period, many scholars point out the strategic geopolitical position of Morocco and the way in which the authorities walk a tight rope between staying in favour with African governments and the EU (e.g. Benbih 2015; Sidi Hida 2015; Üstübici 2015), often using it to their advantage (e.g. Ahouga and Kunz 2017; Berriane 2015; Cherti and Collyer 2015; Norman 2019). This, Andersson says, applies not only to Moroccan authorities but also to their counterparts in third countries, such as Senegal, Mauretania and Mali (2014).

Norman (2019) speaks of a policy of indifference, which means the Moroccan state leaves the actual work of providing basic services to migrants and refugees to international organisations and civil society actors (see also Gazzotti 2019; Sow et al. 2016, 298). This creates in-between spaces where human rights are violated without any party assuming responsibility (Alexander 2019b; Stock 2019); where international humanitarian workers need to find out for themselves how to give concrete meaning to issues such as the integration of sub-Saharan African children without status in Moroccan schools (Barrière 2015); and where little effort is made to identify dead border-crossers (Diallo 2018; Kobelinsky 2019; Perl 2016). However, Üstübici argues, one unintended consequence of Morocco's engagement with the human rights of its diaspora is that interviewed Moroccan migration officials reflect more on the treatment of migrants without status in Morocco (2015).

According to Coyault, increasing migratory movements between sub-Saharan Africa and Morocco are not only due to political, economic and social push factors in countries of origin, but also a result of the Kingdom's policy with regard to its African neighbours and the many bilateral agreements concluded (2015), resulting, among others, in a form of Moroccan religious diplomacy in which Sufism plays an important role (Lanza 2015). Üstübici argues that the introduction of the regularisation programme in 2013 was not only the result of closer ties with African neighbours but also of political mobilisation of sub-Saharan Africans in Morocco. "The involvement of civil society actors as stakeholders in this process has been relatively overlooked" and sub-Saharan

African migrant associations were important stakeholders (2016, 308; 2018. See also Natter 2019, 91). Scheel and Ratfish show that many Moroccan NGOs and other civil society actors refuse to participate in EU-funded UNHCR workshops that aim at making them committed to refugee protection. NGOs do not want to be instrumentalised and exploited for externalising refugee protection from EU member states to Morocco (2014, 931).

The relative freedom of civil society in Morocco allowed sub-Saharan African organisations to closely cooperate with Moroccan and transnational civil society organisations (Alioua 2014, 95-96; Üstübici 2016, 312; 2018), a finding confirmed by Bava for the religious dimension (2016) and by Sow et al. (2016) for West-African fishermen, who moved to Morocco due to climate change. Based on ethnographic research among men without status from West and Central Africa, Bachelet (2018) shows that their political activism is geared both towards further integration in Morocco and onward migration to Europe. This is not a contradiction but a reflection of how migrants deal with uncertainty in Morocco; the communities that secure onward migration simultaneously provide cultural and social roots in the place of forced immobility (see also Johara Berriane 2017; Stock 2019). Similarly, Stock shows how chairmen of sub-Saharan African (religious) community networks provide support and a sense of community while simultaneously taxing migrants in return for arranging activities, from football tournaments to crossings to Europe (2019, chapter 6).[44] Coyault shows that the religious practices of Christian, mostly DRC, migrants are oriented toward tackling everyday challenges in Rabat (securing health care, food, housing, security) as well as facilitating passage to Europe (2015. See also Stock 2019, 119 for a Nigerian Pentecostal church community in Rabat).

In analysing the political activism of sub-Saharan Africans without status who "chercher la vie," Bachelet warns against perceiving them as a homogeneous group. Even though they themselves often say they are all one, people only trust others with the right mentality, that is to say, those whom they know will persevere and help them reaching the objective (chercher la vie). Hindering another person from reaching this objective can have violent repercussions (2019). In the context of border deaths, Kobelinsky speaks of "activisme de la douleur;" (literally: activism of pain) in commemorating the death of fellow migrants, migrants set up the dead as symbols of the contemporary border regime (2019, 12).

"Chercher la vie," waiting, and law

[44] See also Escoffier (2008) and Pian (2008b) for the previous period.

In his speech referred to above, the King states that addressing security concerns should go hand in hand with socio-economic development policies, which tackle the root causes of risky migration. Similar to Goldschmidt earlier (2002), scholars, however, repeatedly show that migration scholarship should not only view migration in terms of push-full dynamics caused by conflict, poverty and underdevelopment but also as being an intrinsic part of social change and personal development (e.g. Bachelet 2018, 2019; Johara Berriane 2018; Dessertine 2015; Madrisotti 2018; Richter 2016; Thorsen 2017). This applies as much for sub-Saharan Africans without status as for sub-Saharan African students (Berriane 2015, 580) and Europeans (e.g. Juntunen et al. 2014; Pellegrini 2016a; Therrien 2016).[45] Juntunen et al. demonstrate that neo-liberal states undergoing financial crisis "push" people, both from the global North and South, to adopt mobile lifestyles that are neither entirely forced nor voluntarily (2014). The desire to improve one's life is expressed differently by respondents, from "devenir quelqu'un" (to become someone) and "chercher la vie" to "refaire [s]a vie" (start a new life) (Pellegrini 2016a, 84) and "nouveau départ" (new start) (Cauvin Verner 2016, 154-155).

For sub-Saharan Africans without status, becoming somebody (devenir quelqu'un), implies as much fighting a war at the border, and male migrants frequently name themselves "warriors," "soldiers" or "commandos" (Tyszler 2018. See also Kobelinsky 2019, 5), as it entails long moments of waiting and confinement. These moments of waiting, Dessertine says, should not be overlooked because they contribute to the building of networks (2015). Thorsen speaks of "active waiting," which is influenced by tempo (how long you think things will take) and duration (chronological time). The tempo of individual pathways affects migrants' preparedness for waiting (2017, 356). Stock (2016) takes a more critical approach arguing that for young sub-Saharan persons without status relations with family back home are severely disturbed, sometimes due to a lack of technological devices to connect with family and friends, but also by unfulfilled expectations of upward economic and social mobility. Instead, "forced immobility" (Stock 2016, 2019), "permanent liminality" or "limbo" (Richter 2016), and "permanent temporariness" (Johnson 2014) lead to financial dependence on family members. Persons in limbo, Richter claims, are neither recognised legally nor socially (2016, 78).

"Becoming someone" has gendered aspects (Alioua 2014; Bachelet 2019; Kobelinsky 2017; Madrisotti 2018; Pian 2017; Richter 2016; Thorsen 2017), with sub-Saharan women often motivated to migrate for fear of losing their status as mothers and wives while men use migration as a

[45] See also Desse (2010) and Berriane et al. (2013) for the previous period.

strategy for becoming someone important in public life, that is to say, a person who contributes to the status of his family and kin (Stock 2019, 42). Migrants call themselves adventurers who are on an epic journey (Bachelet 2019, 854). Their journey is a rite de passage: "Illustrating the shortcomings of the prevailing terminology which divides countries according to origin, transit or destination, my informants [...] were keen to stress that the 'objective' entailed improving their lives ('being comfortable') and not a specific location" (ibid. 855. See also Stock 2019, 45). Forced immobility and limbo prevent aventuriers from achieving their objective: "becoming someone." In this context, several scholars speak of social death (e.g. Kobelinsky 2017; Pian 2017).

Related is the emergence of a new theme: physical death. Interviewed sub-Saharans are not afraid of dying but of their bodies disappearing (Kobelinsky 2017, 2019). Death is always situated at the border (i.e. Diallo 2018; Gazzotti 2019; Kobelinsky 2017, 2019; Perl 2016; Pian 2017),[46] in contrast to studies on the lived experiences of sub-Saharan Africans, which no longer focus on border areas only.[47] Despite the existence of medical identification technologies, authorities rarely inform relatives of migrants' deaths, leading to what Perl calls the "absence of the certainty of death" (2016, 198). Migrant organisations have come to play an important role in the identification of dead migrants by mediating between Moroccan authorities and sub-Saharan African embassies, the latter often refusing to accept a dead person as a citizen (Diallo 2018; Kobelinsky 2017, 2019).

Scholars present different accounts of the ways in which migrants, mostly sub-Saharans without status, but also French migrants (Pellegrini 2016a; Zeghbib and Therrien 2016), deal with laws and regulatory forces on the way to Morocco (Stock 2019) and in Morocco (Bachelet 2016; Eba Nguemba 2015; Khrouz 2019). For example, Stock (ibid.) emphasises that a narrative of legality on paper makes room for confusion in practice, because laws are arbitrary and time and place dependent (see also Keygnaert et al. 2014; Natter 2018, 2019), but, says Diallo, also because sub-Saharans without status often lie about their name, religion and nationality when stopped by the police. Consequently, new identities are formed in the electronic databases of the Moroccan authorities, leading to confusion (when a dead body is related to a false identity) and refusal by embassies to confer citizenship to the dead (2018). Legal uncertainly leads to dependence on family, friends, and smugglers for continuation of a journey, whom most started out of a desire to

[46] For a theoretical analysis of the production of statistics on "deaths at the border" in the euro-Mediterranean region, see Heller and Pécoud (2017).
[47] In the research, project *Living on the Other Side: A Multidisciplinary Analysis of Migration and Family Law in Morocco*, Heddane, Sonneveld, and van Uden focus on non-border deaths.

change their social status and "become someone," but which they lose control over (Stock 2019). Encounters with the informal laws of migrant communities add to confusion, violence, and exploitation while simultaneously providing a means for integration and onward mobility (Bachelet 2019; Richter 2016; Stock 2019). Stock claims that migrants "…do not question such regulatory authorities as legitimate or illegitimate but rather perceive them as facts of life and part of their daily reality" (ibid. 61). Similar to the previous period, other scholars, however, demonstrate that sub-Saharans resist infringement of their human rights by establishing associations that are embedded in national and international human rights' networks (e.g. Bachelet 2018). Concurrently, human right discourses utilised to protect Moroccan emigrants abroad are becoming a tool to reflect on the situation of immigrants in Morocco, both by Moroccan migration officials (Üstübici 2015) and civil society organisations for the rights of Moroccans living abroad, the latter even supporting demands for the regularisation of migrants in Morocco (Üstübici 2016, 314). Eba Nguemba notes a difference between law on paper and implementation in practice: strict legal provisions concerning employment, marriage and religion are not strictly enforced in practice (2015. See also Norman 2019). French small entrepreneurs in Marrakech find Moroccan (labour) law less strict and complex than French law, a perception that played an important role in their decision to start a business in Morocco (Pellegrini 2016a).

Other scholars focus on the absence of law. In cases of cross-border death, Perl says, "…cross border agreements and procedures to identify and return the dead are not developed. This contrasts with the well-established cooperation between Spain and Morocco as well as Spain and West African countries to tighten border control and to prevent people from crossing" (2016, 204), a form of "n dž ro-violence" (Kobelinsky 2019, 5). Similarly, Natter notes that liberal migration policies (such as the regularisation programme) in Morocco often do not spill over into a general liberalisation of immigration and immigrant integration (2018). This "illiberal paradox" (ibid.) leads to a "policy of indifference" (Norman 2019).[48]

Integration

Similar to the previous period, integration is a prominent theme in the literature. While most studies focus on sub-Saharan Africans' integration in Moroccan society (e.g. Benbih 2015; Johara Berriane 2017; El Kirat El Allame et al. 2014; Karibi 2015; Niandou 2015; Stock 2019), there is growing

[48] As well as regulation by decree rather than by law.

attention for the integration of European winter tourists (hivernants) (Le Bigot 2015); international NGO workers (Boudarssa 2015); and French nationals (Beck 2015; Cauvin Verner 2016; Harrami 2016; Pellegrini 2016a; Terrazzoni 2015; Therrien 2016; Therrien and Pellegrini 2015).

Alexander (2019a) studies the integration of sub-Saharans through the lens of race, concluding that heightened racism affects both working-class Moroccan citizens who identify as "black" and upper class foreign exchange students who identify as "African." With blackness having become a sign of illegality (Andersson 2014), both groups use class and culture to distinguish themselves from sub-Saharan Africans without status (Alexander 2019a), while the latter dress like tourists to pass as documented visitors (Andersson 2014, 141).[49] Similar to Alioua (2014); Benbih (2015); Johara Berriane (2014, 2015, 2017); and Buehler and Han (2019b), Alexander portrays the neighbourhood as a relatively safe place where people can be themselves, and this also applies to Moroccans who identify as black (or are identified as black) (2019a).

Benbih (2015); Buehler and Han (2019b); and El Kirat El Allame et al. (2014)[50] explore citizens' attitude towards newcomers. While studies on integration in Western cultures show that cultural differences drive opposition to migrants, said scholars found that material issues, such as labour market competition and internal security, underlie opposition. Much more than racial attitudes, this explains why there exists greater bias against African migrants, also by black Moroccans (Buehler and Han 2019a, 2019b), who are assumed (often mistakenly) to have fewer financial resources than Arab migrants do. Nevertheless, Sidi Hida shows that while Moroccans generally sympathise with Syrian forced migrants, mistrust emerges when Syrians start occupying jobs Moroccans could have had (2015). French migrants, who work as teachers in Morocco do not often experience discrimination and rejection (Beck 2015), and small French entrepreneurs in Morocco frequently experience positive discrimination by Moroccan employers (Pellegrini 2016a, 91). Generally, the perception of Moroccans towards French residents in Morocco is positive (Harrami 2016), although sometimes Moroccans mistrust the largescale acquisition of old riads by French nationals in cities such as Marrakech (Mouna 2016).

Given the high unemployment rate in the country, specifically among the "chomeurs diplom dž," (unemployed graduates) the Moroccan government tries to keep the number of foreign workers low by giving jobs to Moroccan nationals first. Call centres hire non-Moroccans anyway, because

[49] Similarly, Berriane (2012, 2015, 584); Karibi (2015, 137), Niandou (2015), and Thorsen (2017) show that sub-Saharan African students try to avoid being mistaken for migrants without legal status.
[50] It should be noted that El Kirat El Allame et al.'s study (2014) does not mention how many respondents were interviewed, making the conclusions the authors draw less convincing.

Moroccans do not consider work in the call centre a respectable way of breadwinning, but also because many a Moroccan lacks fluency in French, a prerequisite for being hired in the call centre. Hence, despite difficult labour conditions, Weyel asks whether this specificity of the French language leads to positive stigmatisation of sub-Saharans (2015). Juntunen et al. (2014) and Madrisotti (2018) explore how migrants from, respectively, Europe and sub-Saharan Africa with precarious financial situations, develop economic strategies to continue their search for a better life. This search, Juntunen et al. (2014) argue leads to "peripatetic nomadism."

Sub-Saharan Africans face significant challenges securing housing in Moroccan cities, where landlords commonly refuse to rent to sub-Saharan tenants (Alexander 2019b), although Benbih shows that in Inezgane, a town of approximately 130,000 inhabitants, 9 kilometres away from Agadir, the local population started to rent out houses to sub-Saharan Africans after the introduction of the regularisation programme (2015, 226). This constituted a significant change from earlier times when property owners in Casablanca tried to ban rental to Africans with the posting of signs in buildings saying "Interdiction de louer aux Africains" (ban on renting to Africans) (Karibi 2015, 136). The possibility of marrying a sub-Saharan African person is firmly rejected by most Moroccan respondents (El Kirat El Allame 2014, 198), although in actuality longer stays lead to more intense social ties with locals (Johara Berriane 2017) and mixed marriages (Alioua 2014).

There is an increase in studies dealing with religion. According to Beck, integration of French migrants in Morocco is difficult because national cohesion based on religious affiliation with the King as Commander of the Faithful, does not leave place for foreigners to integrate, and French migrants in mixed marriages usually marry a non-practicing spouse (2015. See also Cauvin Verner 2016). In contrast, sub-Saharan men in lower-class neighbourhoods frequently convert to Islam to marry a Moroccan woman (Alioua 2014). Sub-Saharan African students, both Muslims and Christians, are astonished to find that Morocco is not the highly religious society they had expected it to be (Berriane 2015, 580-582). Bava (2016) analyses the establishment of a Christian theological institute in Rabat. Its leaders, in consultation with Muslim leaders to avoid accusations of proselytism, develop what she calls a "theology of migration," which embraces different Christian denominations and prevents uprooted youth from turning to fundamentalism. The informal recognition of the institute by the Moroccan authorities and the presence of Moroccan officials at its opening, also show, Bava says, that Morocco investigates its religious diversity in the context of a return to the African continent (2016). Official recognition of churches should also prevent the establishment of (mostly Congolese) illegal churches that are difficult to control (Coyault 2015). Meanwhile, Robin argues that the difficulties Christian associations, such as

Caritas, face in Morocco, are not so much related to religion; similar to non-confessional associations, Christian associations have to balance a focus on charity, which gains them the trust and support of the Moroccan authorities, with a mission to fight for the rights and dignity of migrants, which could lead to withdrawal of that support (2014. See also Gazzotti 2019).

Alexander claims that a common religion (Islam) does not overshadow racial hierarchies between black and Arab Muslims in Morocco (2019b). Analysing the strong religious ties between Morocco and Senegal, Lanza nevertheless shows that while the presence of Senegalese pilgrims in Fes, to visit the mosque and shrine of Ahmad al-Tijanni, does not radically alter the perception that Moroccans have of sub-Saharan Africans, it does complexify it (2015). Lanza also notes that Senegalese tour operators deliberately keep Senegalese pilgrims away from the difficult circumstances co-nationalists without status live in (ibid.). More than a sacred place, the mosque and shrine of Ahmad al-Tijanni represent the connection with Africa for sub-Saharan Africans, be them Tiyaniyya or not, Muslim or Christian (Berriane 2014).

In conclusion, an analysis of the literature published between 2014 and 2019 demonstrates that there is again a significant increase, both absolute and relative, in empirical scholarship on migration in Morocco. While many scholars focus on integration of migrants in Morocco, they seldom examine integration in relation to the recent regularisation programmes, but rather in relation to EU externalisation policies. It demonstrates that empirical scholars, be them Moroccan or not, are still influenced by EU migration policies. However, the overwhelming focus on sub-Saharan Africans without status of the earlier two periods is slowly making room for studies on integration of African students and Europeans, especially in the area of the labour market, religion, and migrant-host society interactions. What is new is a more explicit focus on Christianity in Moroccan society and politics as well as studies dealing with death.

Conclusion

In this paper, we asked whether empirical scholarship on migration is policy-driven and Eurocentric. Our test case was Morocco, an important global South country at the crossroads of Africa, the Middle East and Europe. Over the past 20 years, Morocco has introduced law 02/03 on migration (2003) and a national policy on asylum and migration, including two exceptional regularisation programmes (2014 and 2017), the first of their kind in the MENA region. To provide an answer to the main question, we conducted a systematic literature review (SLR) to analyse the themes, population groups and geographical areas studied by empirical migration scholars. We included 111 academic sources in our SLR and divided them into three periods: before the

implementation of law 02/03 (1980-November 2003); between the implementation of law 02/03 and the first regularisation programme (December 2003-January 2014); and between the implementation of the regularisation programme (February 2014) until 2019.

We found a significant increase in the number of publications: from eight in the first period to 42 in the second and 61 in the third (and shortest) period. In all periods under investigation, scholars almost exclusively focused on sub-Saharan African migration in Morocco. These two findings show that in constructing the themes, population groups, and geographical areas studied, empirical migration scholarship on Morocco follows the themes considered important in EU migration policy: prevention and control of irregular African migration to Europe through a policy of externalisation of border management.

What also testifies to this EU-oriented scholarly approach is that empirical scholars hardly analysed integration in the context of the most recent developments in Moroccan migration policy: the official recognition of Morocco as a destination country in 2013 and the implementation of two regularisation programmes in 2014 and 2017. Instead, throughout the period 1980-2019, scholars' frame of reference was the implementation of the Schengen Area in 1995 and the externalisation of EU border management. This observation, it might be argued, shows that empirical migration scholarship on Morocco is not only policy-driven, but also Eurocentric.

Yet, two developments nuance this conclusion. First, the period 2014-2019 shows a notable increase in studies dealing with Europeans and Asians residing in Morocco. This is a significant finding given that research on European migration to Morocco is not part of the Moroccan political agenda (Therrien and Pellegrini 2015, 2), nor of the EU agenda. Second, despite the policy-driven approach of many empirical scholars, the SLR simultaneously demonstrates the importance of empirical research; already in the early 2000s, scholars showed that sub-Saharan African migration in Morocco is diverse in terms of gender, legal status, and region of settlement in Morocco.

Our SLR has shown that it is not easy to distinguish between binary classifications such as regular/irregular and forced/voluntary migration. Studies on peripatetic nomadism of European migrants (Juntunen et al. 2014) compel us to reconsider dominant understandings of forced migration, and the same applies to prevalent understandings of regular/irregular migration. After all, the selective processes of monitoring and controlling the movement of people who "chercher la vie" forces many a sub-Saharan African to embark on dangerous journeys through the desert while their European counterparts can move in and out of Morocco freely.

Questionable binary classifications do not relieve us from the obligation to ask why the refugee dimension is given little scholarly attention in Moroccan migration research, and why few scholars critically assess the impact of the regularisation programmes on the lives of migrants in Morocco, be them from the global South or the global North. After all, the regularisation programmes were exceptional and governed by non-binding legal documents. The fact that the laws on migration and asylum are still pending shows that Moroccan migration policy is based, at least partly, on rule by decree. Rule by decree, Arendt (1951) says, is the intentional use of ambiguous language to evade accountability and to secure power, in this case over immigration. Rule by decree enables authorities to adapt migration policy in an ad hoc manner depending on geostrategic interests, that is to say, on the way relations with European, African and international partners develop. By moving away from a policy-driven and Eurocentric approach, empirical scholars on Moroccan migration can make much needed contributions to our understanding of the mutual influence of migration management regimes and the lives of people on the move, be them from the global South or the global North.

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