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Global China's human touch? The internationalisation of Chinese NGOs

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Ying Wang

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Global China's Human Touch? The Internationalisation of Chinese NGOs

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Glossary

AIIB: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

BRI: Belt and Road Initiative

CBCGDF: China Biodiversity Conservation and Green Development Foundation

CFPA: China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation

CFPD: China Foundation for Peace and Development

CGCOC: CGC Overseas Construction

CIDCA: China International Development Cooperation Agency

CRCF: Chinese Red Cross Foundation

CNIE: China NGO Network for International Exchanges

CNPC: China National Petroleum Corporation

COP 23: 23rd Session of the Conference of the Parties

CSR: Corporate Social Responsibility

DAC: Development Assistance Committee

EIA: Environmental Impact Assessment

GEI: Global Environmental Institute

GHub: Greenovation Hub

GONGO: Government-organized NGOs

INGO: International Non-Governmental Organization

MNC: Multinational Enterprises

NGO: Non-Governmental Organizations

NN5: Nam Ngum 5 Power Company

NPO: Non-Profit Organization

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

ODA: Official Development Assistance

OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OOF: Other Official Funds

QCA: Qualitative Content Analysis

RDP: Resource Dependence Perspectives

SEICF: Shenzhen Foundation for International Exchange and Cooperation

SPIC: State Power Investment Corporation

SME: Small and Medium-sized Enterprise

SOE: State-Owned Companies

YINGOS: Yunnan International Non-Governmental Organization Society

Chapter 1 Introduction

“Is there any Chinese NGO around here?”. As a Chinese in the field of international development, this question has been on my mind since 2014 when I was working on a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project in Ghana. At the time, the answer to this question was a resounding and disappointing “no”. Years later, I joined an international non-governmental organisation (INGO) where I further expanded my experience in international development and in African countries. Whenever possible, I kept a close watch on the progress of Chinese foreign investment and spoke with Chinese individuals at the forefront of these efforts, including government officials in Chinese embassies, employees of state-owned enterprises and businessmen working for private Chinese companies. By around 2018, something had changed, and I began to meet workers from Chinese NGOs, although their numbers were significantly lower than those of Chinese working for Chinese companies and government-related institutions in African countries. The question of the presence and role of Chinese NGOs in development resurfaced in my mind, particularly against the backdrop of Xi Jinping’s strategic vision for enhancing global influence through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Does the BRI present an opportunity for Chinese NGOs to expand globally? Do Chinese NGOs play a role – or are they poised to play a role – in the realm of international development similar to that of their Western counterparts? Particularly, can Chinese NGOs change the landscape of China’s international development?

In this introductory chapter, I provide a comprehensive overview of the research background and research questions that have driven my years of inquiry. I also define key concepts, including Chinese NGOs, government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) and Chinese international development, laying the foundations for subsequent chapters. I then explain the primary approach that will guide this dissertation, namely, the relational approach, which will be used to address the central research question regarding the role of Chinese NGOs in the Chinese international development landscape. Finally, I conclude this chapter with a preview of the next chapters.

1.1 Background of the Research

The past two decades have seen a boom in the study of the globalisation of China, which has largely centred on the Chinese government and Chinese investments. Research on the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs only emerged in the early 2010s when few Chinese NGOs had gone international. Current studies on Chinese NGOs’ internationalisation suffer from several limitations. Early research on the issue is often descriptive and normative. Because Chinese NGOs’ international development activities were very limited in the early stages, the scholars who started to pay attention to Chinese NGOs’ internationalisation largely focused on the lessons learnt from international NGOs and their implications for the domestic activities of Chinese NGOs (e.g. Han, 2011; Huang, 2011; Lan et al., 2010). These researchers have provided evidence of the importance of internationalisation for Chinese NGOs and have

developed policy suggestions regarding how Chinese NGOs should undertake this (e.g. Deng and Wang, 2015; Huang et al., 2014). Some scholars have approached Chinese NGOs' internationalisation via a more theoretical approach. For example, Brenner (2012) adopted an organisational perspective adapted from Hsu's (2010) NGO–government framework to explain the varying interests and roles of GONGOs and NGOs in Sino–Africa relations. Hsu et al. (2016) examined the impact of different political contexts in aid-receiving countries on the entry of Chinese NGOs into these countries. However, the validity of these studies is constrained by the limited number of available cases. In recent studies, scholars have tried to map the overall development of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation (e.g. Deng, 2019; Li and Dong, 2018). Nonetheless, the findings of these projects are constrained by the methodologies they adopted. Li and Dong's (2018) conclusions are primarily based on secondary sources, while Deng's (2019) rely mostly on quantitative surveys from a limited number of Chinese foundations. Moreover, the existing literature has focused on the development of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation itself instead of putting it into a broader context and studying Chinese NGOs' role in the landscape of Chinese international development. In other words, what is missing in these analyses is a careful consideration of how Chinese NGOs contribute to the current state of the Chinese overseas development landscape, which is often characterised as state centric (e.g. Liu, 2021; Reeves, 2018; Ye, 2020) and driven by economic cooperation (e.g. Söderberg, 2010; Wolf et al., 2013). In sum, there is a significant gap in the knowledge about Chinese NGOs' internationalisation from both empirical and theoretical perspectives.

Moreover, the study of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation diversifies and enriches the research on Global China. The globalisation of Chinese civil society organisations is one form of Global China (Lee, 2017). Here, Global China (capitalised) does not merely indicate the study of global China but also refers to a broader theoretical approach to the study of China and its international engagement, an approach that rejects essentialist understandings of China and recognises it as a constitutive part of the world (Franceschini and Loubere, 2022). This study of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation contributes to the study of Global China through grounded empirical evidence, which is important for understanding the complexities and nuances of multiple actors in Global China. Moreover, the study of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation offers new insights into the examination of domestic China because, like Chinese overseas investments, which “are bound to have boomerang impacts on the home front” (Lee, 2017, p xiv).

1.2 Research Questions

This thesis aims at filling these gaps and providing a more systematic, structured, comprehensive and evidence-based view of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation and its role in Chinese international development. The central research questions of the thesis are:

What roles do Chinese NGOs play in Chinese international development? To what extent do the international development activities of Chinese NGOs constitute a major new form of engagement in Chinese international development, different and separate from those of the Chinese state and corporations?

To study the role of Chinese NGOs, I adopt a relational approach by conceptualising the NGOs' role in relations with key actors in Chinese international development, particularly the Chinese state and Chinese companies. My main research questions are further translated into four sub-questions, which are addressed in various chapters:

1. What is the current development of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation? (Chapter 3)
2. How much autonomy from the Chinese state do Chinese NGOs have in their internationalisation? (Chapter 4, 5, 6)
3. How do Chinese NGOs view their international development projects? (Chapter 6)
4. How do Chinese NGOs behave towards Chinese corporations and influence the social and environmental concerns of Chinese companies overseas, if any? (Chapter 7)

Given that the study of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation is new, systematic and reliable data is still lacking in existing studies. My first research question on the current state of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation aims at building a solid "infrastructure" (i.e. data foundation) for the subsequent inquiries in this thesis, which I hope will also help other scholars on Global China. My second research question focuses on the relationship between Chinese NGOs and the Chinese state. I examine the influence of the Chinese state over Chinese NGOs in their internationalisation and explore questions such as whether Chinese NGOs are pushed to go international by the Chinese state and how much autonomy they have in their internationalisation. My third research question concerns the development rationales and values that underpin Chinese NGOs' international development activities. My fourth research question looks into Chinese NGOs' relationships with Chinese companies, which are significant actors in Chinese international development.

1.3 Key Definitions and Scope

Defining Chinese NGOs and GONGOs

The first point that must be clarified is what constitutes an NGO in China. Whereas in other contexts, there is a more or less clear-cut distinction between NGOs and other types of organisations, in China's authoritarian context, it is difficult to precisely delineate the limits of the state and its influence. The terms "NGO" and "non-profit organisation" (NPO) are sometimes defined and used interchangeably in the academic setting, although "NPO" is often utilised in discussions of organisational characteristics in organisation and management studies, whereas "NGO" appears more frequently in the literature of international development. According to Salamon and Anheier (1992), NGO/NPO can be defined in several ways. From a legal/regulatory perspective, "non-profit" can be defined by the law or regulations of a country. For example, in the US, non-profit organisations are organisations that receive a tax exemption from the Internal Revenue Service per sections 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(7) of the Internal Revenue Code (Salamon and Anheier, 1992). From a financial/economic perspective, "non-profit" is defined by the source of income (Salamon and Anheier, 1992). By the measure of the United Nations System of National Accounts, which provides a set of recommendations for compiling measures of economic activity, the income of non-profit organisations comes from the dues and contributions of their supporters and members rather than the sale of goods and services. From a functional perspective, the non-profit sector is characterised based on the purpose of the organisations. For example, McCarthy et al. (as cited in Salamon and Anheier,

1992, p134) define the global non-profit sector as comprised of organisations whose functions are to “serve underserved or neglected populations, to expand the freedom of or to empower people, to engage in advocacy for social change, and to provide services”. From a structural/operational perspective, non-profit organisations are defined by their structural and operational features, which include being formal (institutionalised to some extent), private (institutionally separate from the government), non-profit distributing (not returning profits to owners or directors), self-governing (having internal procedures for governance and being able to control their own activities) and voluntary (involving some degree of voluntary participation) (Salamon and Anheier, 1992).

However, although NGOs exist in China, there is hardly any “NGO” corresponding exactly to the structural/operational definition mentioned above. Scholars generally adopt a much broader definition for Chinese NGOs. For example, Prof. Kang Xiaoguang, a prominent Chinese NGO scholar, suggests that a Chinese organisation can be considered an NGO as long as it is formally registered in accordance with the law, engages in non-profit activities, satisfies voluntary and charitable principles and has various degrees of independence and autonomy (Kang, 2001). Kang’s definition of Chinese NGOs has loosened the “private” and “self-governing” criteria suggested by Salamon and Anheier (1992) to account for the numerous government-organised and -influenced NGOs in China. This thesis will follow the tradition of the scholarship on Chinese NGOs, which includes the somewhat antithetically termed “government-organised NGOs” to maintain consistency with previous academic studies on the topic.

In China, although “NGO”, translated into Chinese as (*feizhengfu zuzhi*/非政府组织), is commonly used in the epistemic community and by some practitioners, especially those with international influences, it is not an official term recognised by the government. The most relevant concept in the Chinese official system is “*shehui zuzhi*/社会组织”, or, literally, “social organisations” in English. All social organisations must register in the system of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. There are three categories of social organisations: social groups (*shehui tuanti*/社会团体), foundations (*jijinhui*/基金会) and private non-enterprise units (*minban fei qiye*/民办非企业单位). In this thesis, I only study the Chinese organisations that are officially registered in the system of the Ministry of Civil Affairs given that they have clear a definition and scope and are solid enough as mainstream NGOs for an initial study on Chinese NGOs’ internationalisation. This means that organisations with a non-profit mission but registered as enterprises under the system of the Ministry of Commerce and organisations that are founded by Chinese but solely registered outside China are not considered.

In the study of Chinese NGOs, GONGOs (*guan ban feizhengfu zuzhi*/官办非政府组织) can hardly be avoided. The term itself is oxymoronic as it suggests that a non-governmental organisation is at the same time organised by the government. It is perplexing because GONGOs are a group of organisations that operate at the blurred boundary between the state and civil society. From a functional perspective, GONGOs are generally understood as organisations established by the government to address social problems, especially in authoritarian contexts (e.g. Deng et al., 2016; Hasmath et al., 2019). They act as a “transmission belt” between the state and civil society (Hasmath et al., 2019; Wu, 2003). In China, like the concept of NGOs, GONGO is not an official category recognised by the government but a term that is widely used in professional and academic circles. In most cases, these organisations register the same way as non-GONGOs with the Ministry of Civil Affairs and follow the same

regulations. Yet, Chinese GONGOs have several distinctive features. For example, they tend to have ease of registration, feature a strong bureaucratic culture and have political concerns over leadership appointment (Hasmath et al., 2019).

The landscape of Chinese GONGOs keeps evolving. Originally, after China embarked on its opening-up reforms, the state established GONGOs primarily to receive international assistance and resources from society to tackle emerging social problems (Wu, 2003). In 1998, a wave of new GONGOs were created to absorb government officials who are laid off due to the grand administrative reform of governments. In recent decades, the overall trend of GONGOs is “disentangling” (“*tuō gōu/脱钩*”) from the government, being self-sufficient financially and separating staff from the administrative system of governments. Given the variety of GONGOs and their changing organisational features, there is no absolute relationship between being a GONGO and the degree of organisational autonomy from the government in China. In addition, the fact that an organisation is defined as a GONGO does not necessarily imply less autonomy than that enjoyed by an independent NGO. There is also significant variation among independent NGOs (referring to non-GONGOs in the thesis). This thesis addresses the complexity of Chinese NGO–government relations, which transcends the mere division between GONGOs and independent NGOs. However, these two categories are kept in the research to gain analytical insights and connect with the academic debates on Chinese NGOs and GONGOs.

Defining the Internationalisation of Chinese NGOs

According to Anheier and Themudo (2005, p103), the process of internationalisation of NGOs takes place “when a national organization decides to expand into another country, either by setting up an affiliate or branch office or by collaborating financially or otherwise with an existing organization abroad”. This thesis will largely follow the definition proposed by Anheier and Themudo (2005) while paying special attention to the international aid activities conducted by Chinese NGOs in developing countries, including humanitarian and development aid. Some scholars refer to a process of Chinese NGOs “going out” to describe Chinese NGOs’ international aid-related activities in or towards developing countries as they are perceived as being a part of China’s “going out/going global” (“*zou chu qu/走出去*”) process (e.g. Hsu et al., 2016; Li and Dong, 2018). In this research, the concepts of Chinese NGOs’ “going out” or “Chinese NGOs’ internationalisation” will be used interchangeably.

Defining Chinese International Development

There are several concepts related to China’s strategies, visions, actions and practices on global development endeavours, particularly with developing countries, such as “Going Global/Going Out” (“*zou chu qu/走出去*”), “the Belt and Road Initiative” (“*yi dai yi lu/一带一路*”), “development cooperation” (“*fazhan hezuo/发展合作*”) and “overseas development finance” (“*haiwai fazhan rongzi/海外发展融资*”). These concepts are derived from different backgrounds and are sometimes vague and overlapping. The term “Chinese international development” is used to encompass all these concepts in this research.

The Chinese government has developed strategies to encourage Chinese enterprises to “go out” for decades. In 2000, China started its Going Out strategy under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, taking the importance of China’s international economic expansion and cooperation to a

strategic level. Under the Hu-Wen administration (2002–2012), the Going Out strategy was further consolidated and materialised through a series of supporting policies, such as the Procedures for Going Abroad for Service Personnel (2002), which ease the process of working abroad, the Notice on Giving Credit Support to Key Overseas Investment Projects Encouraged by the State (2004), which facilitates the lending for overseas investments, and the Measures for the Administration of Overseas Investment (2009), which simplifies the approval process for foreign investments and establishes a supervisory system for overseas investments. Since 2013, when the BRI was introduced as a Chinese global development strategy, President Xi has made China's Going Out strategy enter a new stage. The BRI is aimed at developing economic partnerships with other countries and establishing politically mutually trusted, economically integrated and culturally tolerated unity among countries. The BRI rests on five pillars: policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and connecting people. By mid-2022, China had signed partnerships with 149 countries within the framework of the BRI (Yidaiyilu, 2022).

One concept intertwined with China's Going Out is development cooperation, which is officially defined by Chinese governmental document as follows: “under the framework of South-South cooperation, China has carried out multilateral and bilateral international cooperation in the field of economic and social development, including humanitarian assistance, through foreign aid and other means” (CIDCA, 2021). According to China's official categorisation, the country's foreign aid includes grants, no-interest loans and concessional loans. Between 2013 and 2018, the total amount of China's aid reached 270.2 billion RMB, of which 48.52% was disbursed in concessional loans, mainly for constructing medium to large infrastructure projects and providing complete sets of equipment, machinery and other goods (CIDCA, 2021). Meanwhile, grants accounted for 47.3% of the total and were predominantly dedicated to small- to medium-sized social-welfare projects, human resources and technology cooperation, the provision of humanitarian assistance and the South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund. The remaining 4.18% consisted of no-interest loans, serving primarily for the construction of public facilities and social-welfare projects. These three categories are roughly equivalent to official development assistance (ODA) according to the standards of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

One important characteristic of Chinese global development is the significant amount of overseas development finance, which is usually not counted directly in China's development cooperation. Overseas development finance, which includes export-buyer credits, official loans offered by Chinese development-finance institutions at market rates and strategic lines of credit for Chinese companies, is generally considered to be other official funds (OOF) by OECD standards. OOF surpass ODA in China (Bräutigam, 2011a). Chinese policy banks, such as China EximBank and the China Development Bank, have played an important role in providing overseas development finance. According to China's Overseas Development Finance Database, these two banks supplied nearly half a trillion USD in development finance to foreign governments from 2008 to 2021 and have become influential forces in China's global development landscape (Global Development Policy Center, 2022).

In the key research questions for this study, I use the term “Chinese international development” to refer broadly to China's vision, strategy and actions in global development, particularly in developing countries. It is an all-encompassing concept that includes the above-mentioned interrelated concepts of Going Global/Going Out, the BRI, China's development cooperation

and China's overseas development finance. However, whenever necessary, I may choose to focus on specific terms, such as BRI, to emphasise particular aspects of China's global vision and strategies in the following chapters.

1.4 The Role of Chinese NGOs in Chinese International Development in a Relational Approach

The role of Chinese NGOs in Chinese international development can be examined in different ways. I adopt a relational approach, investigating the role of Chinese NGOs through their relationships with the other two major actors, the Chinese state and Chinese companies. The Chinese state dictates the high-level directions and policies, while Chinese companies are usually the main operators on the ground. As the process of "Going Out" relies on policies encouraging Chinese companies to internationalise, and as China's development cooperation and development finance often rely on Chinese companies to provide goods and services, Chinese companies have accumulated decades of experience in the overseas development landscape. Compared with Chinese companies, which are at a relatively mature stage of internationalisation, Chinese NGOs are just emerging in the scene.

One benefit of the relational approach adopted in this thesis is the possibility of connecting my findings to several prominent academic debates on Chinese NGOs and Global China. One such debate concerns the state's influence over Chinese actors in their internationalisation. The discussion regarding Chinese companies and the state has been going on for decades but a similar debate regarding Chinese NGOs has only recently emerged. Whether Chinese companies are strategically driven or economically driven has drawn significant academic interest. Many argue that Chinese investments are driven by the interests of the Chinese state (e.g. Bastholm and Kragelund, 2009; Klinck, 2012; Urban et al., 2013), especially those coming from Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which play a key role in China's overseas development finance and investments. On the contrary, some studies have shown that SOEs are to a large extent autonomous and essentially market driven (e.g. Gill and Reilly, 2007; Gonzalez-Vicente, 2012; Jones and Zou, 2017; Norris, 2016). Chinese NGOs have attracted similar debates as Chinese companies in their internationalisation. Chinese NGOs, particularly GONGOs, have been criticised for being part of the Chinese state's toolkit, representing state interests overseas and advancing the state's agendas (e.g. Walker, 2016; Hasmath et al., 2019). This criticism of GONGOs finds its parallel in the discussion of the role of Chinese SOEs in their internationalisation. The inherent connections of these organisations with the Chinese government, as reflected in their names as either "state-owned" for SOEs or "government-organised" for GONGOs, have created perceived liabilities to their organisational autonomy. However, the state's interests in these organisations cannot be summarised through a cursory examination. This thesis thus investigates the Chinese state's influence over Chinese NGOs in their internationalisation and pays particular attention to the diversity and complexity of the Chinese NGO sector as well as the nuances they have shown in their internationalisation.

The other debate centres on social and environmental concerns associated with Chinese overseas investments. Chinese overseas investments have generated much local confrontation and international criticism due to their sometimes negative impact on environments and local societies (e.g. Human Rights Watch, 2011; Tang-Lee, 2016). Over the years, investment setbacks resulting from social and environmental controversies have become learning

experiences for Chinese companies and made them gradually adopt a multi-stakeholder approach to corporate social responsibility (CSR) instead of focusing only on upward accountability (Tan-Mullins and Hofman, 2014; Zhang et al., 2019). As an important part of multi-stakeholder CSR governance, Chinese NGOs have become increasingly active regarding the social and environmental issues related to Chinese overseas investments. Thus, a discussion of the role of Chinese NGOs in Chinese international development would be incomplete without an examination of their relationships with Chinese companies and, in particular, the question of whether Chinese NGOs can play a transformative role in solving the social and environmental issues faced by Chinese companies in their overseas investments.

This is not to say that other relations, such as those between Chinese NGOs and local communities, international foundations and foreign governments, are not important. I believe that studying all these relationships can deepen our understanding of the role of Chinese NGOs in Chinese international development. However, given the constraints of external environment (particularly considering the COVID-19 pandemic), resource and time for a PhD study, I have strategized and prioritised Chinese NGOs' relationships with the Chinese state and corporations, which are fundamental actors in the landscape of Chinese international development. Thus, this research on the role of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation in Chinese international development has largely been translated into Chinese NGOs' relationships with the Chinese state and Chinese companies in the context of their internationalisation.

1.5 Mapping Chinese NGOs' Internationalisation

A thorough understanding of the current development of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation, including the development, scale and funding sources of the sector, is necessary for a deeper analysis of their relationships with the Chinese state and companies. However, there was no systematic sectoral information on the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs when I began to prepare this research in 2019. All I was able to find was sporadic information and data in publications from NGO practitioners and academic journals. Thus, my first task was to fill in the information gap on Chinese NGOs' internationalisation. To do so, I created a database, the Chinese NGO Internationalisation Database, based on several public sources. The database records 142 Chinese NGOs and their international development activities from January 2005 to December 2021.

With this database, I have been able to perform several analyses of the current development of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation. I find that many non-GONGOs (103 out of the 142 NGOs in the database) are involved in international development donations/projects, which largely contradicts the perception that Chinese NGOs' international activities are mostly conducted by GONGOs. The degree of international engagement varies significantly among Chinese NGOs, with most (56%) having engaged only in simple one-time international donations. At the other end of the spectrum, 11 Chinese NGOs engage in international development continuously and have established foreign offices. Chinese NGOs have shown great diversity in projects, though the most common area of concern of Chinese NGOs is humanitarian donations and assistance, donations to the fight against COVID-19 and donations and projects in the fields of education and healthcare. Southeast Asia, South Asia and East Africa are the top three regions that have attracted the most donations and projects from Chinese NGOs, excluding activities related to the impact of COVID-19. Taking the latter into consideration, Europe is also among the top

destinations for donations because a few Chinese foundations have made COVID-19-related donations to European countries. Based on the available data, I have estimated the scale of Chinese NGOs' international development activities to fall between 110 million RMB and 256 million RMB in 2019 (before the COVID-19 pandemic) and between 1.1 billion RMB and 2 billion RMB in 2020 (the large increase is due to COVID-19-related donations by large Chinese foundations). In any case, the scale of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation is far smaller than that of its Western counterparts, such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Canada. Chinese NGOs have financed their international development projects through diverse sources, among which government funding is only a limited channel. Corporate donations are likely to be the major funding source for Chinese NGOs' internationalisation, although they are skewed towards large foundations. Chapter 3 will provide more details on the mapping of Chinese NGO internationalisation. To the best of my knowledge, at the time of submitting this thesis, the mapping exercise is the first academic attempt to systematically represent the current development of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation. The main findings not only provide the foundations for the research in the remainder of the thesis but are also useful to scholars and professionals interested in the topic.

1.6 The State's Influence over Chinese NGOs' Internationalisation

Although there is variation among NGOs and contexts, many scholars believe that Chinese NGOs lack full autonomy as a sector (e.g. Hildebrandt, 2013; Ho, 2007; Howell, 1998; Howell et al., 2020; Lu, 2009; Shue, 1994). Both the large presence of GONGOs and China's strict registration and management system for NGOs have contributed to the concern over Chinese NGOs' autonomy. These concerns extend to their overseas endeavours (e.g. Hasmath et al., 2019; Hsu et al., 2016; Walker, 2016). One major objective of the present research is to examine the autonomy of Chinese NGOs in their internationalisation. How independent can they be from the Chinese state in their global endeavours? In other words, how have Chinese NGOs been influenced by the Chinese state?

Based on fieldwork, interviews and analysis of organizational discourses of NGOs, I found that the major characteristic of the autonomy of Chinese NGOs in their internationalisation is that the state's influence does not come directly from its intervention into the operations of Chinese NGOs as there is little direct policies, funding and other operational intervention from the Chinese government related to internationalisation. Rather, the state's influence is embedded in the existing regulatory system and in the sources of legitimacy and value for internationalisation, a phenomenon that I have dubbed as "embedded internationalisation". I find three layers of state's influence over Chinese NGOs' internationalisation, which vary in their sources, targets, types and impact of influences. Table 1 summarises the characteristics of these three layers of influence. The three-layer influence presents a complex and nuanced view of the autonomy of Chinese NGOs in their overseas endeavours.

The first layer is systemic regulatory influence, coming from the three Chinese systems of regulation and supervision of NGOs: the registration and supervision system, the national-security system and the foreign affairs system. Such regulatory influence arises especially from the registration and supervision system that has already existed for the domestic operations of Chinese NGOs rather than having been explicitly developed to regulate international operations. It results in the depoliticisation of development as Chinese NGOs avoid overstepping the

political boundary that is tacitly understood by both NGOs and the state in their overseas operations. The second layer of influence is operational influence, which reflects individualised governmental influence over Chinese NGOs' operations. The Chinese government has exerted diverse influences over the overseas operations of Chinese NGOs. So far, direct governmental influence over project initiation and financing is situational and limited. Some NGOs can be completely independent of direct government intervention in their overseas operations. In addition, there is no absolute relationship between governmental involvement and types of NGOs. Some GONGOs initiate, fund and manage their projects without direct governmental involvement. The diversity and nuances in this layer of influence have refuted the argument that Chinese NGOs are solely an extension of China's state-led model of development cooperation. The third layer of influence is ideational influence, which is evident in the organisational discourses of Chinese NGOs. Compared with the first and second layers of influence, ideational influence is implicit and internalised by Chinese NGOs. Chinese NGOs use soft charity discourses instead of critical discourses to avoid politicising any development problems and use discourses that diplomatise their international charity activities, in the sense that they discursively align their operations to the international goals of the Chinese state. This depoliticisation and diplomatisation of discourses show that even though the Chinese state does not intervene much in Chinese NGOs' international projects materially, the Chinese state exerts its influence implicitly by shaping the sources of legitimacy and value of Chinese NGO internationalisation. In this way, Chinese NGOs do not develop a discourse that is critical and independent of the Chinese state and play a role in promoting Chinese soft power even without direct requirements from the state.

Table 1: Three-Layer Chinese State's Influence on Chinese NGOs' Internationalisation

	First layer- Regulatory influence	Second layer- Operational influence	Third layer- Ideational influence
Sources	Regulatory and supervision systems	Direct governmental involvement in operations	Ideology: shaping the sources of legitimacy and value for internationalisation
Targets of Influence	Systemic (All NGOs)	Individualized (some NGOs)	Systemic (All NGOs)
Types of Influence	External (explicit)	External (explicit)	Internalized (implicit)
Impact of Influence (Chinese NGOs behavior)	Depoliticized actions	Diversified operations	Depoliticized and diplomatized discourses

The concept of embedded internationalisation and the three-layer framework will be provided in detail in Chapter 4, which summarizes and theorizes the main findings of state's influence from both Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Chapter 5 focuses on the explicit state's influence, the regulatory layer (the first layer) and the operational layer of influence (the second layer). The third layer of influence, the ideational influence comes from the findings of the discourse analysis in Chapter 6.

1.7 Chinese NGOs' Relationship with Chinese Companies

Could Chinese NGOs play a role in addressing the social and environmental issues associated with Chinese companies? What kind of relationships do Chinese NGOs maintain with companies overseas? Chinese NGOs have engaged with Chinese companies in various ways, and in this thesis I categorize the role of Chinese NGOs into different groups based on NGOs' attitudes towards corporations (cooperative, neutral or confrontational) and whether they interact directly or indirectly with and impact specific companies. The categories I have developed are: collaborators, supporters, communicators, researchers and policy advisors, provocateurs and educators. Except for one case that uses a confrontational approach, all Chinese NGOs identified in this research adopt either a neutral or a cooperative approach to Chinese companies.

The level of engagement in Chinese NGO–company cooperation remains limited to the basic, philanthropic stage through corporate donations to NGOs. A few Chinese NGOs have been able to develop a deeper level of collaboration with Chinese companies overseas by providing the resources needed by companies, such as local knowledge and expertise on certain social issues. More importantly, Chinese NGOs have enjoyed the “home NGO” advantage when cooperating the Chinese companies compared with foreign NGOs because Chinese companies find it easier to communicate with Chinese NGOs and have more trust in them.

However, Chinese NGOs can hardly play any transformative role in changing corporate behaviour or significantly addressing social and environmental issues. For one, the power balance in the cooperation between Chinese NGOs and companies is markedly asymmetrical, given that Chinese NGOs are highly dependent on Chinese companies for resources. This has confined Chinese NGOs to a technical, operational and facilitation role instead of being critical and strategic to Chinese companies. Chapter 7 provides a thorough study over the Chinese NGO-companies relationship in international contexts.

1.8 Implications and Significance

The thesis will conclude with a discussion on the role of Chinese NGOs in Chinese international development in Chapter 8 based on the findings from Chapter 3 to 7. In addition, it will show the implication of Chinese NGO internationalisation to Chinese civil society and global civil society. As the story of internationalisation unfolds through chapters, it will become clear that internationalisation has provided both opportunities and challenges to Chinese NGOs and global civil society.

Chapter 2 Methodology

This chapter will illustrate the methodology adopted for the present thesis, including the research design, data collection methods, the limitations of the research methods and the positionality of the researcher. Overall, the thesis employs a multi-method design with multiple-case studies. Different methods are used to target specific research sub-questions. The research begins with a basic quantitative analysis to present a comprehensive overview of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation (Chapter 3). Chapters 4, 5, 6 on Chinese NGOs' relationship with the Chinese state and Chapter 7 on Chinese NGOs' relationship with Chinese companies adopt a multiple-case study design. In addition to the multiple-case design, Chapter 6 includes a discourse analysis to examine the ideologic characteristics of Chinese NGOs in their internationalisation. The next sections in this chapter discuss the key methodological elements of the research and data collection methods utilised, followed by a discussion on the limitations and positionality of the research.

2.1 Research Design and Methodology

Qualitative Multiple-case Study

This thesis is primarily a qualitative research project, using a naturalistic and interpretative approach to study things in their natural settings and interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings that people give to them (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). Qualitative research is particularly relevant in the exploratory stage of studying a little-known issue and provides a foundation for future studies (Corbin and Strauss, 2015; Yin, 2014). Following an interpretive approach, it offers insights into how social actors interpret and make sense of a specific phenomenon in a specific context (Stake, 2010). The use of an interpretative approach as opposed to a positivist one prevents the simplification of research subjects into variables. It also limits the loss of interpretative power of the analysis at multiple levels to provide a better understanding of the process and dynamics of a phenomenon. As the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs is a relatively new phenomenon with scattered and limited quantitative data and the goal of the research is mainly to understand the relational interaction of multiple variables shaping these processes, an interpretative method is preferred to a positivist one.

This research is primarily based on multiple-case studies. Case studies are favoured when research questions are “how” and “why”, focus on contemporary events as opposed to purely historical events and do not require control over behavioural events (Yin, 2018). The present research fits all three of the above-mentioned criteria for case studies. Multiple cases instead of a single case study are used to leverage the various advantages of the multiple-case study design. Multiple-case studies are sometimes considered more compelling and regarded as more robust than single-case studies (e.g. Baxter and Jack, 2008; Herriott and Firestone, 1983). Researchers can understand the differences and similarities between the cases (Baxter and Jack, 2008; Stake, 1995) and perform analyses both within each situation and across situations (Yin, 2003). The multiple-case study technique can lower the possibility of an individual case study

being exceptional, increase validity, reduce bias and provide a better foundation for analytical generalisation (Small, 2009; Yin, 2014). Multiple-case studies can also help to develop a more compelling theory when the suggestions are more thoroughly supported by a variety of empirical data. Multiple-case studies thus enable a deeper exploration of research issues and the further advancement of theory (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).

Multiple-case Selection

The key units for this study are Chinese NGOs. At the beginning of the research, I created the Chinese NGO Internationalisation Database, which includes all Chinese NGOs that have engaged in international development projects and donations between 2005 and 2021. The database provided me with a sampling frame for the selection of cases. In total, the sampling frame consists of 142 Chinese NGOs.

Case selection is based on several criteria to ensure that the selected sample satisfies “symbolic representation”, having characteristics that are expected to exhibit salience and satisfy a high degree of diversity (Ritchie et al., 2003). Cases are selected and studied until saturation is reached, that is, the point of data collection when additional inputs no longer lead to new insights into the research topic (e.g. Aguboshim, 2021; Hennink and Kaiser, 2022). Saturation is a crucial sign that a sample is sufficient to examine the phenomenon under investigation, that the data collected have adequately captured the variety, depth and nuances of the issues at hand and that there is thus content validity (Francis et al., 2010).

The first criterion for case selection is the degree of international engagement of Chinese NGOs and is meant to ensure the salience of the case sample. According to the Chinese NGO Internationalisation Database, 79 of the 142 included Chinese NGOs (56%) have only engaged in one-time international donations or projects, whereas 47 (33%) have sporadic projects (more than one time) and donations, and 16 (11%) maintain a long-term continuous overseas presence. The research prioritises the Chinese NGOs with a relatively high degree of international engagement (i.e. long-term presence and sporadic projects/donations) over one-time projects and donations. This is because Chinese NGOs with a higher level of international engagement have accumulated more internationalisation experience relevant to the research topic.

The second criterion to satisfy is the diversity of the case sample. There are many dimensions to a Chinese NGO, such as governmental background (i.e. independent NGOs/GONGO), size, location, overseas presence and issues of concern. Given that it is impossible to include every dimension, I have prioritised those that are the most relevant to the research topic based on my own knowledge and the insights that I have gained from the fieldwork. The first dimension is Chinese NGOs’ governmental background. Studies have shown that Chinese NGOs’ governmental background (that is, whether they are GONGOs or independent NGOs) has an impact on their relationships with the state, and it has been one of the most used variables in the scholarship on Chinese NGO-state relationships (e.g. Hasmath et al. 2019; Lu, 2007; Spires, 2011; Spires et al, 2014; Salmenkari, 2014; Wu, 2003;). The second dimension is the issues of concern to Chinese NGOs. It is common practice to divide aid into humanitarian assistance and development aid in international development (e.g. Nomura et al., 2021; OECD, n.d; United Nations, n.d.) given their distinctive operational characteristics. NGOs are also sometimes discussed separately for their work in humanitarian assistance and development programmes (e.g. Hermann and Page, 2016; Heyse, 2007; Krause, 2014). According to the database, non-humanitarian development NGOs focus on a variety of issues, such as education, healthcare,

poverty alleviation, environmental protection and sustainability as well as volunteering. The sample for the present research will include Chinese NGOs covering the range of issues of concern highlighted above.

In practice, based on the first criterion, I began with the 16 Chinese NGOs that have long-term continuous overseas presence as my initial sample and gradually added more cases to increase the diversity of the sample until I judged that the data collection is saturated. The process of increasing the diversity of the sample was also constrained by the accessibility of NGOs. For example, between two similar NGOs, I prioritised the one that I was able to gain access to as a case study. After taking all the aforementioned factors into consideration, I selected 28 Chinese NGOs as the primary focus of the study. I managed to obtain primary information through interviews with 19 of the 28 Chinese NGOs in the sample. For the organisations that I could not access directly, I collected information from various channels, including interviews with people outside the NGO, informal communications, conferences and secondary sources to gain as much insight as possible. Table 2 below presents the list of the 28 Chinese NGOs studied in the present research as major cases.

These 28 organisations include all 16 Chinese NGOs with long-term continuous engagement in international development activities and 12 Chinese NGOs that carry out sporadic or one-time international development activities. Among the 16 Chinese NGOs, 11 have registered overseas offices. In terms of governmental background, eight of the 28 Chinese NGOs are GONGOs (here the categorization is mainly based on their organizational origins, if they were initiated by governmental agencies), and 20 are independent NGOs. As concerns the type of work, there are two Chinese NGOs under study that have only engaged in making COVID-related donations. For the rest of the NGOs, two are purely focused on humanitarian assistance, 20 focus on development activities and the remaining four engage in both development activities and humanitarian assistance. These Chinese NGOs have carried out a wide range of activities in areas such as humanitarian assistance, education, healthcare, poverty alleviation, volunteering, environmental protection and sustainability.

Table 2: List of Chinese NGOs in the Multiple-Case Studies

NGOs	Degree of engagement	Governmental Background	Issue of Concern	Major Areas of Concern
China NGO Network for International Exchanges	Long-term	GONGO	Development	Education, Healthcare, Poverty Alleviation, Communication
The Amity Foundation	Long-term (O)* *O= with overseas office	Independent	Humanitarian and Development	Education, Healthcare, Poverty Alleviation, humanitarian assistance
China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) ¹	Long-term (O)	GONGO	Humanitarian and Development	Education, Healthcare, Poverty Alleviation, humanitarian

¹ China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation was renamed as China Foundation for Rural Development. For consistency with other literature and convenience, the thesis will only use China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA).

				assistance, volunteering
China Foundation for Peace and Development (CFPD)	Long-term (O)	GONGO	Development	Education, Healthcare, Poverty Alleviation
Chinese Red Cross Foundation (CRCF)	Long-term	GONGO	Humanitarian and Development	Healthcare, humanitarian assistance
Global Environmental Institute (GEI)	Long-term (O)	Independent	Development	Environmental and Sustainability
Lunch for Children	Long-term	Independent	Development	Education
Peaceland Foundation	Long-term (O)	Independent	Humanitarian and Development	Environment and sustainability, Refugee care, humanitarian assistance
Rainbow Volunteer Club	Long-term (O)	Independent	Development	Education, Volunteering
RamUnion	Long-term (O)	Independent	Humanitarian	Humanitarian assistance
Shenzhen Foundation for International Exchange and Cooperation (SEICF)	Long-term	GONGO	Development	Healthcare, Poverty Alleviation
Yundi Behavior and Health Research Center (Yundi)	Long-term (O)	Independent	Development	Education, Healthcare, Poverty Alleviation, Volunteering
Youth Bridge Foundation (Common Future Project)	Long-term (O)	Independent	Development	Education, Refugee care, Volunteering
Sichuan Haihui	Long-term (O)	Independent	Development	Education, Healthcare
Ruili Women and Children Development Center	Long-term (O)	Independent	Development	Education, Healthcare
Kunming Zhi Gen Social Work Development Centre	Long-term	Independent	Development	Education, Healthcare
China Social Assistance Foundation (Increasing Love for Decreasing AIDS Fund)	Sporadic	GONGO	Development	Healthcare
Shenzhen Rescue Volunteers Federation	Sporadic	Independent	Humanitarian	Humanitarian assistance
The Paradise Foundation	Sporadic	Independent	Development	Environmental and Sustainability
Green Watershed	Sporadic	Independent	Development	Environmental and Sustainability
Yunnan International Non- Government Organization Society	Sporadic	GONGO	Development	Healthcare, Poverty Alleviation
SZ Long Yue Foundation	Sporadic	Independent	Development	Elderly care
Tibet Shan Yuan Foundation	Sporadic	Independent	Development	Education, Poverty Alleviation
China Council of Lions Clubs	Sporadic	Independent	Development	Healthcare, Volunteering

TCL Foundation	One-time	Independent	COVID donations	only Covid donation
BV Vocational School	One-time	Independent	Development	Education
Mammoth Foundation	One-time	Independent	COVID donations	only Covid donation
Yunnan Green Environment Development Foundation	One-time	GONGO	Development	Environmental and Sustainability

2.2 Data Collection and Analysis

Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis: Interviews and Fieldwork

The present research is primarily based on qualitative data that I have collected through primary sources, such as interviews, meetings and conferences, as well as secondary sources. Semi-structured interviews are the main method for data collection in this study. Interviews are one of the most common methods for gathering data in qualitative research, and the semi-structured format is among the most frequently used interviewing techniques (e.g. Creswell, 2013; Edwards and Holland, 2013). Semi-structured interviews help researchers to standardise the questions for different interviewees while allowing a certain degree of openness, which can be helpful to delve deeply into any answers (Wengraf, 2001).

However, semi-structured interviews have limitations, which lie in the subjectivity involved in the qualitative research process and the lack of a systematic model for decision-making (Belina, 2022). There is no single way to practice qualitative interviews, and it greatly depends on the circumstances of the research as well as the goals and abilities of the researcher (Brinkmann, 2013). Thus, the triangulation of the research findings based on interviews is highly recommended to increase the validity of the research (e.g. Belina, 2022; Dodge et al., 2012). Attending formal conferences related to the research, engaging in informal communication with insiders and collecting data from secondary sources are the methods I used for the triangulation of the information gathered through interviews.

Because of the outbreak of COVID-19, my fieldwork was limited to three provinces in China, namely, Yunnan, Guangdong and Beijing, and was carried out from August 2020 to August 2022. However, many of the interviews I have conducted and the conferences I attended were online. I attempted to gain access to the 16 Chinese NGOs with long-term continuous engagement in international development activities as much as possible through socialising at conferences and events. More opportunities for interviewing other NGOs and relevant institutions emerged through my inquiry into these 16 NGOs. In the end, the selection of NGOs to interview was based on the criteria for a reliable sample. For some NGOs with significant international activities, I conducted multiple interviews with people holding different positions in the organisation. In total, I carried out 43 interviews, covering 21 Chinese NGOs (19 of which belong to the list of 28 NGOs in Table 2), 2 international NGOs, 5 companies with overseas investments, 2 consulting firms and 6 academic institutions, think tanks and media. The complete list of the interviews conducted is provided below in Table 3.

Table 3: List of Interviews

Code	Institution	Position	Location	Date
Interview 1	Chinese NGO 1	Project Manager	Yunnan	Aug-20
Interview 2	Chinese NGO 2	leader	Yunnan	Aug-20
Interview 3	Chinese NGO 3	Project Manager	Yunnan	Sep-20
Interview 4	Chinese NGO 3	Director	Yunnan	Sep-20
Interview 5	Chinese NGO 4	Founder	Yunnan	Sep-20
Interview 6	Chinese NGO 5	Director	Yunnan	Sep-20
Interview 7	Academic Institution 1	Expert	Yunnan	Sep-20
Interview 8	Academic Institution 2	Expert	Yunnan	Sep-20
Interview 9	Chinese NGO 6	Staff	Shenzhen	Sep-20
Interview 10	Chinese NGO 7	Director	Shenzhen	Sep-20
Interview 11	Chinese NGO 8	Director	Shenzhen	Sep-20
Interview 12	Chinese NGO 9	Director	Shenzhen	Sep-20
Interview 13	Chinese NGO 10	Director	Shenzhen	Sep-20
Interview 14	Academic Institution 3	Expert	Beijing	Sep-20
Interview 15	Company with Overseas Investment 1	Project Manager	Online	Sep-20
Interview 16	Chinese NGO 11	Project Manager	Beijing	Oct-20
Interview 17	Chinese NGO 12	co-Founder	Beijing	Oct-20
Interview 18	Chinese NGO 13	co-Founder	Online	Oct-20
Interview 19	Chinese NGO 14	co-Founder	Online	Oct-20
Interview 20	Chinese NGO 15	Country director	Beijing	Nov-20
Interview 21	Chinese NGO 16	Country Director	Online	Nov-20
Interview 22	Academic Institution 4	Expert	Beijing	Nov-20
Interview 23	Chinese NGO 17	Project Manager	Beijing	Dec-20
Interview 24	Chinese NGO 18	Project Manager	Beijing	Mar-21

Interview 25	Chinese NGO 15	Country Director	Beijing	Apr-21
Interview 26	Chinese NGO 17	Project Manager	Beijing	Aug-21
Interview 27	Chinese NGO 19	Founder	Online	Mar-22
Interview 28	Chinese NGO 20	Project Manager	Online	Mar-22
Interview 29	International NGO 1	Director	Online	Mar-22
Interview 30	International NGO 2	Project Manager	Beijing	Mar-22
Interview 31	Media 1	Director	Beijing	Mar-22
Interview 32	CSR Consulting Firm 1	Project Manager	Beijing	Mar-22
Interview 33	Development Consulting Firm 1	co-Founder	Online	Mar-22
Interview 34	Chinese NGO 11	Project Manager	Beijing	Apr-22
Interview 35	Chinese NGO 21	Director	Online	Apr-22
Interview 36	Thinktank 1	Expert	Beijing	Apr-22
Interview 37	Company with Overseas Investment 2	Investment Manager	Beijing	Apr-22
Interview 38	Company with Overseas Investment 3	Investment Manager	Beijing	Apr-22
Interview 39	Company with Overseas Investment 4	Investment Manager	Beijing	Apr-22
Interview 40	Company with Interview Overseas Investment 5	Director	Online	Apr-22
Interview 41	Chinese NGO 15	Director	Beijing	Aug-22
Interview 42	Chinese NGO 15	Country Director	Beijing	Aug-22
Interview 43	Chinese NGO 15	Country Director	Beijing	Aug-22

Attending conferences related to Chinese NGOs' internationalisation also represented an important source of primary information. I have had numerous discussions with many experts and insiders at these events, which gave me important insights for the research. In total, I

attended 31 conferences from November 2019 to September 2022, many of which were held online as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic (see Table 4).

Table 4: List of Events Attended during the Fieldwork

ID	Date	Venue	Event Description
Conference 1	2019.11.11	Beijing	China Development Brief Forum 2019
Conference 2	2020.4.30	Online	“Value+” Series No.1: Chinese Social Organization Humanitarian Relief in Covid Pandemic
Conference 3	2020.5.27	Online	China Foundation Development Forum: the Prospects and Challenges of Chinese Foundations “Going Out”
Conference 4	2020.6.22	Online	China Charity Alliance Forum on International Cooperation
Conference 5	2020.6.24	Online	“Value+” Series No. 2: International Standards for International Humanitarian Relief
Conference 6	2020.7.9	Online	“Value+” Series No. 3: International Environment for NGOs to Conduct International Cooperation
Conference 7	2020.7.12	Online	China House Conference: Myanmar-China Cooperation After Covid-19
Conference 8	2020.7.23	Online	“Value+” Series No. 4: Practicing Framework in International Cooperation and International Discourse System
Conference 9	2020.8.6	Online	“Value+” Series No.5: Financial Source for International Aid and Project Management
Conference 10	2020.8.20	Online	“Value+” Series No.6: International Communication and Promotion
Conference 11	2020.9.9	Online	Volunteering Service Forum
Conference 12	2020.9.9	Online	Experience Sharing by Dream Building Service Association
Conference 13	2020.9.9	Online/Beijing	Conference on Chinese NGO networks for humanitarian relief
Conference 14	2020.9.18-20	Shenzhen	Shenzhen Charity Forum 2020, 3-day event regarding the development of Chinese charity
Conference 15	2020.10.29	Online	“Value+” Series No.7: How Corporations Exercise Social Responsibility in Overseas Investments
Conference 16	2020.11.25	Online	China Foundation Development Forum 2020 Annual Conference-sub meeting: on NGOs”Going Out”
Conference 17	2020.12.2	Online	China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation Nepal Office Five Year Anniversary Conference
Conference 18	2020.12.8	Online	China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation Myanmar Office Five Year Anniversary Conference

Conference 19	2020.12.9	Beijing	China Development Brief Forum 2020
Conference 20	2021.3.5	Beijing	TianXia Class: the Drivers and Current State of Chinese CSR in Myanmar
Conference 21	2021.6.28	Online	Conference on The Practice and Experience of NGOs to Protect and Fulfill the Right to Development
Conference 22	2021.8.18	Online	“Value+” Series No.8: The Logistics Problems in International Humanitarian Action
Conference 23	2021.9.8	Online	“Value+” Series No.9: International Communication By Leveraging International Conference
Conference 24	2021.10.13	Online	“Value+” Series No.10: SDGs and Social Organizations
Conference 25	2021.11.23	Online	China Charity Fair 2021, a conference related Chinese NGO development
Conference 26	2021.12.4	Online/Beijing	Conference on Foreign NGOs Engagement in International Aid and Their Implications for China
Conference 27	2022.3.22	Online/Beijing	CFPA International Panda Pack Project Three-Year Ceremony
Conference 28	2022.5.10	Online	China Association For NGO Cooperation Conference on China-South Korea Civil Society Dialogue
Conference 29	2022.7.6	Online	China Association For NGO Cooperation Conference on China-Japan Civil Society Dialogue
Conference 30	2022.9.15	Beijing	China Association For NGO Cooperation Conference on Chinese Social Enterprise “Going Out”
Conference 31	2022.9.16	Online	Roundtable on Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan from Chinese NGOs

In addition to these primary sources of information, secondary sources were also important to the present research. The main secondary sources I relied on are the official publications of NGOs and companies, including annual reports, public statements published on their websites and social media, and news from credible media, such as the *China Development Brief* and the *China Philanthropy Times*. Secondary sources form the basis for the critical discourse analysis in Chapter 6 and help triangulate and complete the information I have collected from the primary sources.

Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis: Discourse Analysis

Discourse is an inherent aspect of social events and is dialectically tied to other aspects. Conducting research using some form of discourse analysis can be an effective way to understand a social phenomenon (Fairclough, 2003). In addition to the primary sources that helped me understand the behaviour of Chinese NGOs, the organisational discourses of these organisations constitute an effective resource for studying their underlying values as concerns their internationalisation. In other words, analysing the discourses of Chinese NGOs is helpful

for determining what the NGOs “think” in addition to what they do. Particularly, Chapter 6, which examines the ideological underpinnings of Chinese NGOs in their internationalisation, uses qualitative content analysis to study the organisational discourses of these organisations. Qualitative content analysis, as “a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, p. 1278), helps to streamline, analyse and generate patterns from a large amount of data drawn from qualitative material.

There are two channels for collecting the necessary data. One is the official websites and official WeChat accounts of 16 Chinese NGOs (out of the 28 NGOs from Table 2, see Table 5), where documents such as annual reports and press releases are collected and studied. The other is public fundraising advertisements by Tencent Charity, the main Chinese online public fundraising platform for international projects. These 16 NGOs include 4 GONGOs and 12 independent NGOs; one humanitarian-only NGO, one NGO solely engaging in COVID donations and 14 NGOs with development activities. In total, 660 documents, which are enough to satisfy “symbolic representation”, were collected and studied through qualitative content analysis. In Chapter 6, I provide a detailed account of how I used qualitative content analysis to study the discourses of Chinese NGOs and the findings of this analysis.

Table 5: List of the 16 NGOs under the Discourse Analysis

Amity Foundation	Mammoth Foundation
BV Vocational School	Peaceland Foundation
China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation	Rainbow Volunteer Club
China Foundation for Peace and Development	RamUnion
Chinese Red Cross Foundation	SEICF
Global Environment Institute	Shenzhen Rescue Volunteers Federation
China Social Assistance Foundation (Increasing Love for Decreasing AIDS Fund)	The Paradise Foundation
Lunch For Children	Yundi Behavior and Health Research Center

Quantitative Data

In addition to qualitative analysis, I conducted a basic quantitative analysis (described in Chapter 3) to map the current state of Chinese NGOs’ internationalisation. To perform a quantitative analysis that can provide an overview of the landscape of Chinese NGOs’ internationalisation, I compiled information relevant to the topic through an intensive search of several online platforms related to Chinese NGOs, such as the China Foundation Center database, *China Development Brief* and *China Philanthropy Times*. The data collected was also triangulated with the official publications (e.g. annual reports and official social media accounts) of each NGO. After building the database, I was able to analyse the broad trends in Chinese NGOs’ internationalisation through a quantitative exploration of the data generated through the database. The details of the process of creating the database are presented in Chapter 3.

2.3 Research Design and Use of Data by Chapter

The research design, research objects and data sources used in different chapters are shown in Table 6. Chapter 3, which focuses on mapping Chinese NGOs' internationalisation, relies on a basic quantitative analysis of the data drawn from the Chinese NGO Internationalisation Database covering 142 Chinese NGOs. In addition, a comparative analysis was performed between the landscapes of international development NGOs in China and in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Canada. The findings in Chapter 4 to 7 are generally informed by multiple-case studies based on 28 NGOs. Particularly, Chapter 4 theorizes the autonomy of Chinese NGO internationalisation mainly based on evidence from Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Chapter 5 provides empirical evidence regarding the Chinese state's regulatory and operational influence over Chinese NGOs based on interviews and fieldwork. Chapter 6 specifically examines 660 documents of Chinese NGOs through the discourse analysis. Even though each chapter relies more on one method, it also benefits from the insights provided by other chapters. For example, the chapter that relies on quantitative analysis is also somewhat informed by my judgement based on the insights I gained through interviews; meanwhile, the chapters that concentrate on qualitative case studies are built on the foundations of solid background knowledge acquired through the quantitative analysis. Thus, the thesis as a whole is driven by a diverse but integrated approach.

Table 6: Research Design by Chapter

Chapters	Research Design	Research Objects	Data Source
Chapter 3: Mapping	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Basic quantitative analysis ● Comparative analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 142 Chinese NGOs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Chinese NGO Internationalisation Database which is collected through online public data
Chapter 4: Chinese NGO Autonomy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Multiple case study ● Theorization of Chinese NGOs Autonomy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 28 Chinese NGOs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Interviews ● Conferences and events ● Secondary sources
Chapter 5: State's Regulatory and Operational Influence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Multiple case study 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 28 Chinese NGOs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Interviews ● Conferences and events ● Secondary sources
Chapter 6: Discourse Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Multiple case study ● Qualitative content analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 660 Documents from Chinese NGOs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Official publication of Chinese NGOs ● Interviews
Chapter 7: Chinese NGO- company Relationship	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Multiple case study 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 28 Chinese NGOs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Interviews ● Conferences and events ● Secondary sources

2.4 Limitations of the Research

The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic

The main limitations of the research result from the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, which significantly impacted the realisation of the study. I began the research and completed my research proposal in late 2019, before the outbreak of COVID-19. My original plan was to conduct field research in China, Myanmar, Nepal, Kenya and Ethiopia in 2020 and 2021. However, the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted this plan because of the travel restrictions imposed by various countries. In addition, many Chinese NGOs suspended their activities overseas due to health concerns; therefore, had I been present on the ground, I may not have obtained access to their operations. As a result of the travel restrictions, my fieldwork was primarily conducted in China and online. Thus, the most significant limitation of the research is the lack of local perspectives from the communities in which Chinese NGOs operate, which I originally planned to include. On the other hand, my inability to travel to local communities also allowed me to allocate more time and resources to focus on the Chinese NGO-state relationship and Chinese NGO-company relationships and develop deeper engagement with Chinese NGOs in China.

Interview Accessibility

The accessibility of various Chinese NGOs, companies and other actors varies significantly. In general, Chinese NGOs, including independent NGOs and some GONGOs and academic experts, were easily accessible. Chinese companies with overseas investments were more difficult to reach, in particular because the fieldwork was limited to China. Through various efforts, I managed to interview five Chinese companies with overseas investments, a majority of which are large state-owned enterprises in the energy and infrastructure sectors. These companies have developed relationships with Chinese NGOs to various extents, from no relationship to deep collaboration, and are satisfactory representatives for obtaining the perspectives of companies on Chinese NGOs' internationalisation given access limitations. The most difficult actor to access was governmental agencies and some GONGOs closely connected to the government. According to my informants at the Ministry of Commerce, individuals who work directly with governmental agencies must go through a cumbersome process to obtain approval for interviews. Consequently, I was not able to conduct formal interviews with representatives of governmental agencies. However, I engaged in several informal conversations with some contacts who work in relevant governmental agencies, which provided me with some insights from a governmental perspective. Moreover, governmental officials are invited to many of the conferences and events that I attended. The knowledge I gained through these conferences largely compensated for the lack of direct interviews with representatives of governmental agencies.

Language Limitations

As a native Chinese speaker and a proficient English speaker, I did not face any difficulty in interviewing individuals from Chinese institutions (i.e. Chinese NGOs and Chinese companies) and Western institutions (e.g. INGOs). However, as most of my primary information is in Chinese, I had to translate it into English to write the present thesis. Some nuances may thus have been lost in translation, especially where there is no direct corresponding concept in

English. For example, as I illustrated in the introduction to the thesis, “NGO” is not an official concept in China. Although the term “NGO” is widely used by Chinese practitioners, there can be variations in its interpretation and the understanding of what can be considered an NGO in China. Under such circumstances, I relied on my judgement, taking into account the context of the information (e.g. the backgrounds of the interviewees and the topic of discussion) to interpret the meaning of specific concepts and translate them into English.

Another language barrier must be highlighted, which has to do with the fact that I do not speak the languages used in the countries where the Chinese NGOs under study operate. Thus, the information I collected is primarily based on Chinese- and English-language sources. I was not able to access the news and local feedback, which are produced in local languages rather than English or Chinese. For example, local media in Myanmar have produced news reports regarding the activities of Chinese NGOs. However, given the linguistic limitations acknowledged above, I could not collect this information directly through online searches and by reading local newspapers. Without this language barrier, I may have been able to gain a broader perspective on the behaviour of Chinese NGOs based on the perceptions of local communities.

2.5 Other Concerns

Positionality and Self-reflection

The positionality of the researcher refers to the stance or positioning of the researcher in relation to the social and political context of the study, that is, the community, the organisation or the participant group (SAGE Encyclopedia, 2014). This positionality is shaped by the researcher’s gender, race, nationality, ethnicity, educational background and other personal experiences. As a native Chinese female researcher working in a Western university, I am aware that my interactions with others in the course of the research may have been biased by my positionality, especially due to my nationality and educational affiliation.

On the one hand, as a Chinese studying a China-related phenomenon, I have easier access to Chinese sources through Chinese contacts. I may also be deemed more trustworthy by Chinese interviewees than foreign researchers because of our similar cultural and linguistic backgrounds. Moreover, I may be more sensitive to the political and cultural contexts in which my research subjects are located and may be better equipped to capture nuances in conversations with interviewees and observations during fieldwork. However, my sensitivity to political and cultural contexts may also lead me to make assumptions that prevent me from thinking “outside the box”.

On the other hand, my identity as a Chinese individual is complicated by my being a researcher at a Western university. Chinese communities, especially those connected to the Chinese official system, are more wary of speaking to foreign institutions because they are concerned that foreign media, NGOs and academia will misunderstand “Chinese characteristics” and blemish their reputation. This concern may have increased the distance with my interviewees, so that I may have received more curated information. The positive side of being affiliated with a Western university is that I am less prone to self-censorship as my research will be written in English and no Chinese institution is involved in the initiation, funding, supervision and publication of the research. Furthermore, I have made significant reflections on my

independence by fulfilling the requirements of the ethical committee of the Faculty of Humanities at Leiden University and have consciously continued to engage in such reflection throughout the research.

In all, my position as a Chinese and a researcher in Western academia may have had conflicting or off-setting effects, depending on the specific contexts encountered in the field. By critically reflecting on my positionality, notably by constantly challenging the assumptions underlying my questions and actions and triangulating information using different sources, I have done my best to minimise the bias caused by my positionality.

Ethical Codes

I have ensured that my research was conducted in accordance with the five principles of honesty, scrupulousness, transparency, independence and responsibility, follows the Netherlands Code of Conduct for Research Integrity and fulfils the ethical requirements of Leiden University.

Chapter 3 An Emerging Sector: Mapping the International Development Projects of Chinese NGOs

Before examining the role of Chinese NGOs in Chinese international development, it is important to have an understanding of the current state of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation. How many Chinese NGOs have "gone out"? Where? What types of international activities have they conducted? What are their main sources of funding? These questions are fundamental not only to the understanding of Chinese NGOs' relationships with the government and companies (to be addressed in the next four chapters) but also for scholars and practitioners who are interested in Chinese NGOs and Global China. Although Chinese NGOs' internationalisation has attracted growing interest, systematic studies on organisations that have "gone out" are scarce. To fill the gap and provide a comprehensive picture of the landscape of Chinese NGOs' international development activities, I have built a database referencing Chinese NGOs that are involved in international development activities, the Chinese NGO Internationalisation Database, by adopting a systematic approach. Looking systematically at the international development activities of Chinese NGOs will allow us to obtain sector-wide knowledge. This database provides a foundation for a richer and broader research agenda regarding Chinese NGOs' internationalisation in the future. (Note: The initial version of the database was published on the Belt and Road Research Platform of Leiden Asia Centre in 2020, <https://www.beltroadresearch.com/ngo-map/>)

This chapter begins with an introduction of the sectorial approach to the studies of NGOs working in international development, followed by a detailed explanation of the process of creating the NGO Internationalisation Database and the main findings drawn from the database. Several aspects of the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs will be presented, including the types of Chinese NGOs that have engaged in internationalisation, the degrees of engagement, the issue areas, the location of these organisations' international development activities, the size and scale of the sector and the major financial sources. Subsequently, I will put Chinese NGOs' internationalisation into perspective by comparing it with the situations in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Canada.

3.1 Sectorial Approach to Chinese NGO Internationalisation

Although studies on NGOs in international development are abundant, few analyses of the NGO sector are available (Banks et al., 2020). Anheier and Themudo (2005) defined and mapped INGOs as a global sector based on data from the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Project and the Union of International Associations. However, the study is now outdated as it relies mostly on data up to 2000. In addition, it is not specific to NGOs working in international development. One of the most notable academic contributions to sectorial approaches to development NGOs in recent years comes from the special issue published by *Development in Practice* in 2020, where sectorial perspectives on Northern NGOs engaging in international development, notably from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, are studied.

However, these few studies are insufficient to provide a complete picture of global development NGOs.

Case studies are dominant in research on development INGOs. As shown in the review conducted by Brass et al. (2018) based on 35 years of scholarship on NGOs and international development, 54% of articles are small-scale case studies of specific places or organisations. Studies tend to emphasise the relationships and positionings of INGOs with different stakeholders, such as donors and partners (e.g. Banks et al., 2015; Boyer et al., 2017) and tend to skew towards large-scale INGOs (Banks and Brockington, 2020). Sectoral perspectives can be very important when studying the diversity of one sector, and such perspectives cannot be obtained by merely combining individual case studies from several articles (Banks et al, 2020). Sectoral perspectives can show the size, scale and typology of NGOs as a sector, offering a macro view of the evolution of NGOs in international development instead of presenting biased findings based on a few “big names”. Moreover, the use of quantitative analysis in studies on development NGOs remains fairly rare. Only one-third of the articles published since 2010 and reviewed by Brass et al. (2018) were found to use only quantitative data or a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis.

Because Chinese international development NGOs form an emerging sector, sectoral approaches to their study are even more rare. Like studies of INGOs based in the Global North, most research in the Chinese context focuses on a selective few NGOs as case studies, such as the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation and the Global Environmental Institute (e.g. Brenner, 2012; GEI, 2016; Hsu et al., 2016). These case studies tend to concentrate on the most visible and largest organisations, which may produce misleading findings. There is a lack of studies from a macro and systematic perspective. As the sectoral studies published in the special issue of *Development in Practice* show, sectoral analysis is challenging to perform for at least two reasons: the definition of international development NGOs and the limitations of data collection. The questions of what kind of NGOs should be included in the study of international development and how to define international development activities are the most salient. Another issue is where to find these NGOs, especially the small-sized ones. Conducting a sectoral study of Chinese NGOs’ internationalisation faces similar constraints. Deng (2019) endeavoured to uncover the macro picture of Chinese NGOs “going out” through surveys, but his study is restricted to Chinese foundations and suffers from a low questionnaire-return rate (16.4% of 500 foundations). Therefore, the present study aims to fill this academic gap, remedy the lack of a sectoral approach to research on Chinese international development NGOs and provide a comprehensive picture of the landscape of Chinese NGOs’ international development activities by developing a systematic approach to collecting and analysing information on the topic.

3.2 Data collection Methodology

Definition and Criteria

The database includes any international donation or activity for humanitarian or global developmental causes involving an NGO originating in Mainland China and registered in the system of the Ministry of Civil Affairs in China. Consequently, the dataset excludes the following:

- International exchanges and communication in the fields of culture, economics, business, science and technology and sports. For example, a programme inviting a Pakistani delegation to visit China for cultural exchange and funding a Chinese delegation's visit to Pakistan for economic cooperation is not included.
- International conferences. For instance, an international conference on environmental protection in Malaysia is not included.
- International fundraising activities. Some Chinese NGOs conduct fundraising events overseas, especially in developed countries. These activities are not included.
- Projects conducted by NGOs and associations founded by overseas Chinese. For example, donations and activities conducted by local Overseas Chinese Chambers of Commerce are not included.
- Local projects involving NGOs founded by Chinese nationals but not registered in China.

The database includes Chinese NGOs that are involved in international development activities to various degrees. This means that the database features Chinese NGOs that have only conducted one international project or made a single donation to international development causes. The database does not differentiate between donations and projects from particular income sources, and projects of Chinese NGOs that are funded by international sources are included.

Data Collection

The database is the result of an intensive internet search relying on various sources. The first round of screening was performed using the search engine of the China Foundation Center's website (<http://www1.foundationcenter.org.cn/>), the most recognized information platform on Chinese foundations in China. It contains a comprehensive online database of over 7,000 legally registered foundations in China. Information about foundations, such as projects per year and description of projects, can be retrieved via the database's search engine. The primary source of the China Foundation Center database is NGOs' annual reports. I adopted a "search by country" (approximately 200 countries) approach instead of "search by NGO name" (more than 7,000 foundations) method to maximise effectiveness. I screened projects by typing the names of all sovereign countries in the search engine. This showed all projects reported by the foundations and media featuring the name of a particular country. For example, typing the word "Kenya" in Chinese returned all projects from the foundations in the database whose descriptions contain this word. I then took a closer look at the projects and selected only those that fulfil the previously defined criteria. As a second step, I went through all news releases from major NGO information platforms that are not included in the China Foundation Center's database, such as the *China Development Brief* (<http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/>), *China Philanthropy Times* (<http://www.gongyishibao.com/>), Charity and Philanthropy Forum and China Foundation Forum to identify news related to Chinese NGOs' internationalisation and add them to the database. The second step was especially important because it completed the database by adding information of non-foundation types of NGOs. In a third step, I triangulated the collected data with information from NGOs' official annual reports, official websites and official WeChat accounts as well as academic journals and policy reports. Most of the information gathered in the first step through the China Foundation Center's database could be verified by the official sources (e.g. press releases or annual reports) of the NGOs.

After conducting the above three steps, I completed the first version of the database in April 2020. This version provides a list of NGOs that are engaged in internationalisation. Over the course of my research, more international activities were carried out by Chinese NGOs, whose international donations for the fight against COVID-19 are especially notable. I continued to add to the database by searching for news updates in NGO-related media and the official publications of the NGOs already listed in the first version of the database. The fieldwork I have conducted in 2020 and 2021 has also helped me identify additional NGOs and projects to be added to the database. The finalised database includes 142 Chinese NGOs and the international development activities they conducted between January 2005 and December 2021. Their international activities are recorded per project or donation per country. Each donation/project in a country is recorded as one item. The database thus contains 840 items. A version of the complete database is attached in the Appendix 2, including all the 142 Chinese NGOs and their international development activities.

Limitation

The data collection presents several limitations and challenges. First, the method is likely to underestimate the activities of smaller private NGOs: because many do not disclose any public information, their information cannot be found through the search engine of the China Foundation Center's database or other media platforms. Second, the China Foundation Center and the China Social Organization Public Service Platform (the governmental platform for public information about NGOs) only provide annual reports published after 2014, and official information before 2014 is, therefore, more sporadic. However, as Chinese NGOs started to "go out" only in very recent years, the impact of the lack of information before 2014 is unlikely to be significant. Third, not every international donation or activity is disclosed in annual reports or in the media; this is especially true of smaller or less-significant ones and indirect donations. Chinese NGOs sometimes make international donations through third parties, and these donations are not thus shown as overseas donations in their annual reports. Despite these limitations, the database is, to the best of my knowledge, the most complete repository available on Chinese NGOs' international development activities.

3.3 Mapping Chinese NGOs' Internationalisation: Main Findings

Types of Chinese NGOs: Foundations and Non-GONGOs Dominate

Among the three types of Chinese social organisations and NGOs (i.e. foundations, non-profit enterprise units and social groups) registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, foundations, which make up 85% of the total number of Chinese NGOs, dominate the landscape of Chinese international development activities. They are followed almost evenly by social groups and private non-profit enterprise units (Figure 1). Foundations are the most financially resourceful type of social organisation and are thus more likely to make donations and carry out international activities than private non-profit enterprise units. Registering a foundation in China is subject to strict financial requirements. For example, the initial funding for a nationwide public fundraising foundation must exceed 8 million RMB. For local private foundations, the required funding is more than 2 million RMB. Nearly 40% of the foundations in the database are established by social groups or individuals. One-fourth of the foundations are GONGOs, and one-fifth are corporate foundations with strong financial connections to

corporations. One-tenth of the foundations have religious backgrounds, predominantly in Buddhism, followed by Christianity and Catholicism. The scale of Chinese private non-profit enterprise units (*minban fei qiye/民办非企业*) is comparatively limited. These organisations are encouraged to provide social services in the location where they are registered and are not allowed to set up branches. Five of the twelve private non-profit enterprise units in the database are located in the Yunnan province, neighbouring Myanmar and Laos. Although these NGOs are not sizable, they are more exposed to opportunities for international activities in neighbouring countries than NGOs located in other provinces. Social groups are member-based organisations addressing a specific topic. Because many are not charity organisations, they are less likely to be involved in international development activities. Two main types of social groups are represented in the Chinese NGO Internationalisation Database: GONGOs, which are established with the purpose of conducting international activities, and volunteering groups. For example, the Beijing People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, the China NGO Network for International Exchanges and the Beijing NGO Network for International Exchanges are all social groups that were initiated by governmental agencies to promote international exchanges. Conversely, the China Council of Lions Clubs, the China Young Volunteers Association and the Shenzhen Rescue Volunteers Federation are volunteer-based social groups that are occasionally involved in international volunteering.

The vast majority (103 out of 142) of Chinese NGOs engaged in international development activities are not GONGOs (see Figure 2). This contradicts the impression, expressed in the literature, that Chinese NGOs’ international activities are largely conducted by GONGOs. One reason is that some GONGOs are large and tend to attract journalists’ attention when they launch a new project. This publicity is likely to skew the public’s perception. Among these GONGOs, eight (20% of GONGOs) were established by Chinese governmental agencies with a primary mission to conduct international exchange activities. Most of these GONGOs focus on implementing exchange programmes and organising international meetings and conferences while carrying out international aid activities from time to time. Other GONGOs have international development activities on top of their primary domestic projects. Meanwhile, independent NGOs have diverse backgrounds as they may originate in social groups, individuals, corporations or religious institutions. They make up most of the Chinese NGOs involved in international development activities.

Figure 1: Distribution of Chinese NGOs Involved in International Development Activities by Registered Types





Figure 2: Distribution of Chinese NGOs Involved in International Development Activities by the Category of GONGO/Independent NGOs



Degree of Engagement: Still Very Limited

The degree of engagement in international development activities among the 142 NGOs varies greatly. I have divided the degree of Chinese NGOs' engagement into three levels (see Table 7). The first level includes those NGOs that have only performed a one-time project or donation internationally. The second level refers to NGOs that have implemented sporadic projects and donations. Finally, the third level, which represents the deepest level of engagement, concerns NGOs that have a long-term continuous presence overseas for conducting international development activities. The majority (56%) of the NGOs in the database were only involved in one-time activities.² Among them, 38% of one-time donations are humanitarian donations to help people in Nepal after the 2015 earthquake, and 32% of the one-time donations are directed at the global fight against COVID-19 in 2020 and 2021. In total, approximately 40% of the Chinese NGOs recorded in the database have not been involved in any international development activities other than donations for either the Nepal earthquake or COVID-19. In addition, 33% of the NGOs in the database have conducted sporadic development projects or made donations, and only 11% (16 NGOs) are continuously involved in international development activities. Among these 16 NGOs, 11 have overseas offices (see Table 8). The 16 Chinese NGOs are the China NGO Network for International Exchanges, the China Foundation for Peace and Development, the Chinese Red Cross Foundation, the China Foundation For Poverty Alleviation, Lunch for Children, the Shenzhen Foundation For International Exchange and Cooperation, the Rainbow Volunteer Club, the Yundi Behavior and Health Research Center, the Global Environmental Institute, the Youth Bridge Foundation (Common Future Project), Sichuan Haihui, RamUnion, the Peaceland Foundation, the Amity Foundation, the Ruili Women and Children Development Center and the Kunming Zhi Gen Social Work Development Centre. These NGOs are the most committed to international development

² Donations to multiple countries for the same cause at the same time are counted as one-time donations. For example, many Chinese NGOs made donations to several countries for the fight against COVID-19.

activities, and their engagement is not solely driven by emergencies such as the earthquake in Nepal or the COVID-19 pandemic.

Table 7: Distribution of Chinese NGOs by Degree of Engagement in International Development Activities

Degree of Engagement	Number of Chinese NGOs	% of Total NGOs
One-time project/donation	79	56%
Sporadic projects/donations	47	33%
Long-term continuous presence	16	11%
Total	142	100%

Table 8: Chinese NGOs and Their Registered Overseas Offices

NGOs	Overseas Offices
China Foundation for Peace and Development	Cambodia
China Foundation For Poverty Alleviation	Myanmar, Nepal, Ethiopia
Youth Bridge Foundation (Common Future Project)	Lebanon
Sichuan Haihui	Thailand
RamUnion	Ethiopia
Peaceland Foundation	Lebanon, Switzerland (Geneva)
The Amity Foundation	Kenya and Ethiopia
Ruili Women and Children Development Center	Myanmar
Yundi Behavior and Health Research Cente	Cambodia
Rainbow Volunteer Club	Nepal
Global Environmental Institute	Laos (closed)

As shown in Table 9, half of the NGOs in the database have only donated or conducted projects in a single country, whereas approximately one-third have access to three or more countries. However, there is 8% of all NGOs, whose multinational coverage is only due to donations related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Most NGOs present in a single country conduct only one-time or temporary activities; nonetheless, a few NGOs are present in only one country but exhibit a high degree of engagement. For example, the Ruili Women and Children Development Center, Sichuan Haihui and the Rainbow Volunteer Club are only present in Myanmar, Thailand and Nepal, respectively, but they have all established overseas offices and have long-term staff there for continuous contributions to local communities. Coincidentally, multinational reach does not necessarily imply that an NGO has a high degree of international engagement. Some NGOs implement one unified project (e.g. donating school bags and books) and make the same donations to multiple countries. They do not keep long-term staff in any of the recipient countries. Only 10 NGOs have both long-term continuous presence and multiple-country presence.

Table 9: Distribution of Chinese NGOs by Country Coverage

Country Coverage	Number of Chinese NGOs	% of Total NGOs
Single country	73	51%
Two countries	22	15%
Multiple countries	32	23%
Multiple countries (only for Covid donations)	11	8%
Non-specified/regional	4	3%
Total	142	100%

Issue Areas: Humanitarian and Emergency Causes Dominate, Followed by the Environment and Healthcare

As shown in Table 10, Humanitarian donations and assistance and donations for the fight against COVID-19, education and healthcare are the most common areas in which Chinese NGOs are involved. Almost half of the Chinese NGOs in the database have provided humanitarian donations and assistance, the majority of which are related to the earthquake in Nepal in 2015. The COVID-19 pandemic has stimulated another round of international donations from Chinese NGOs: one-third of Chinese NGOs in the database have made COVID-19-related donations.

Education and healthcare are the two most common areas for the Chinese NGOs' development activities. One-quarter of Chinese NGOs have conducted education-related development projects, and the same applies to healthcare-related development projects. Table 10 shows the complete distribution of the issue areas which Chinese NGOs have addressed, and Table 11 presents the distribution of sub-areas of each major issue area.

Table 10: Distribution of Chinese NGOs by Issue Areas

Issue Areas	Number of Chinese NGOs that have involved in	% of Total NGOs
Humanitarian Donations and Assistance	65	46%
Covid Donations	46	31%
Education	36	25%
Healthcare	33	23%
Poverty Alleviation	15	10%
Environmental Protection and Sustainability	12	9%
Volunteers	10	7%
Others	13	9%

Table 11: Distribution of Chinese NGOs by Issue Areas (sub-types)

<i>Activities</i>	<i>% of Chinese NGOs that are involved in</i>
<i>Education related activities</i>	
School infrastructure	8%
School goods	8%
Free meals delivery	5%
Vocational training	5%
General donations	4%
Teaching Chinese language	3%
Scholarship	3%
<i>Healthcare related activities</i>	
Cataract surgeries and eye care	9%
Water sanitation	6%
Medical service	6%
Medical equipment and goods	5%
Healthcare and medical training	3%
Healthcare infrastructure (hospital, clinic)	3%
<i>Poverty alleviation and livelihood related activities</i>	
Solar energy generation	4%
Improvement in agricultural productivity	3%
Biogas energy generation	1%
General donations	1%
Livelihood training	1%
<i>Environmental protection and sustainability related activities</i>	
Biodiversity	3%
Forest protection and timber governance	3%
Sustainable investments	3%
Anti-poaching	2%
<i>Others</i>	
Donation to disabled	3%
Entrepreneurship	2%
Donations (bicycles and TV)	2%
Refugee assistance	1%
Sports	1%
Others-unique projects	5%

Among education-related projects, the construction of school infrastructure (such as buildings and dormitories) and the delivery of school supplies (such as books, bags and stationery) are predominant, with 8% of the Chinese NGOs in the database having engaged in such activities. Delivering free meals to students and providing vocational training are also popular among Chinese NGOs and have attracted 5% of the Chinese NGOs in the database. Notably, 3% of

the referenced Chinese NGOs have made donations to support Chinese-language learning overseas.

Under the category of healthcare, the most popular project is called “Journey of Light” (“*guang ming xing*/光明行”) and provides free cataract surgeries and other eye-care services to patients abroad. Although several NGOs have their own projects providing free cataract surgeries, they all name them “Journey of Light” by custom. Nearly 10% of the Chinese NGOs in the database have implemented “Journey of Light” programmes overseas, which has been a popular charitable project domestically over the years. The second most popular healthcare project concerns water sanitation: 6% of the included Chinese NGOs have run sanitation-related projects, such as building toilets and water towers and delivering cleansing kits to local communities. In addition, 6% of Chinese NGOs have provided medical services other than cataract surgeries and eye care. These medical services include surgeries for children with congenital heart disease and free medical examinations. Further, 5% of NGOs have donated medical equipment and supplies, such as ambulances and disaster-relief family kits. Lastly, a few NGOs have provided medical and healthcare-related training to medical staff and local people, and a small number of large foundations have donated hospitals and clinics.

Among poverty-alleviation and livelihood-related projects, the donation of solar energy generation equipment is the most common activity, followed by the provision of technical assistance in agricultural productivity. Other activities featured include the construction of biogas energy-generating infrastructure, general donations to people living in poverty and livelihood training for local communities.

A few Chinese NGOs are involved in environmental protection and sustainability-related activities, the most common of which are the protection of wild animals for biodiversity, forest protection and timber governance, the promotion of sustainable investments and anti-poaching activities. Common activities in other areas include donations to the disabled, to promote entrepreneurship and to improve sports activities as well as projects related to refugee care. Interestingly, there are a wide range of other activities that are unique to a specific NGO (no similar projects conducted by other Chinese NGOs). Such unique projects include an overseas women protection project, an international child legal protection project, a monthly magazine in the host country project, a Chinese veteran project, an African governance project, a landmine detection project, a free meal to the homeless project. Although these projects are usually sporadic and small in scale, they represent a diverse range of issues and shown dynamics of the Chinese NGO internationalisation.

The analysis also shows that the Chinese NGOs in the database dominantly engage in the provision of basic forms of charity, either donating money, infrastructure or goods or offering charitable services. Some NGOs carry out modest advocacy work in the field of sustainable development, but these activities are insignificant when compared to other types of projects.

Geographical Distribution: Southeast Asia and South Asia are the Most Popular Regions

The geographical distribution was determined based on the number of projects or donations related to a specific country or region. It reflects the density of activities of Chinese NGOs in one specific area instead of the size of their activities. Excluding donations for COVID-19-related efforts, Southeast Asia, South Asia and East Africa are three regions that have received the most donations or projects from Chinese NGOs. Taking COVID-19-related donations into

consideration, the geographical distribution is more scattered, and Europe appears in the top 3, as shown in Figure 3. Given that COVID-19 triggered a pandemic that affects every country, some large Chinese foundations have donated globally. For instance, the Alibaba Foundation donated to more than 150 countries (Alibaba Foundation, n.d.), and the China Red Cross Foundation made donations to more than 40 countries (CRCF, 2020a). This is unprecedented because it is the first time that Chinese NGOs have donated to developed countries as well as developing countries. For example, some European countries (e.g. Italy) were affected strongly at the beginning of the pandemic and, thus, attracted numerous donations. However, these donations for the fight against COVID-19 are quite unique and largely one-time; consequently, they may distort our view of Chinese NGOs' core international development activities. Therefore, I perform one analysis disregarding COVID-19-related donations and one taking these donations into consideration. The five countries that have attracted the highest numbers of projects and donations are Nepal, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Ethiopia, both including and excluding COVID-19-related donations, as shown in Table 12.

Figure 3: Geographical Distribution of Chinese NGOs International Development Projects/Donations by Region




Table 12: Geographical Distribution of Chinese NGOs International Development Projects/Donations by Countries Ranking in the Top Five

Countries	% Total items of projects and donations	% Total items of projects and donations (excluding Covid donations)
Nepal	11%	18%
Myanmar	9%	14%
Cambodia	5%	7%
Laos	4%	6%
Ethiopia	3%	4%

Nepal takes first place, primarily due to the impact of the 2015 earthquake. This event triggered the first instance of a large number of Chinese NGOs conducting international relief activities and making international donations. Geographical proximity is one reason that contributed to the significant level of assistance from Chinese NGOs. The epicentre of the earthquake was located near the Chinese border, and the earthquake affected both Nepal and some parts of Tibet. Many Chinese felt connected to the event and wished to support the relief works as best they could. Geographical proximity also made international travel possible for humanitarian relief teams. More than 50 Chinese NGOs are recorded as having donated or provided humanitarian assistance to Nepal. A few Chinese NGOs remained in Nepal after the initial relief work and established a long-term presence, such as the Rainbow Volunteer Club and the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation.

Myanmar ranks second in the list of countries where Chinese NGOs have implemented the most activities. More than 30 Chinese NGOs have made donations to or carried out projects in Myanmar. A few of these have a long-term presence in the country, such as the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, the Yundi Behavior and Health Research Center and the Ruili Women and Children Development Center. Myanmar lies on the border with the Yunnan province and has therefore attracted many local NGOs from Yunnan. From a diplomatic perspective, Yunnan is at the frontline of China's relationship with Myanmar, and several GONGOs in the province perform public diplomatic roles and conduct aid activities in Myanmar. These include the Yunnan International Non-Government Organisation Society, the Yunnan Youth Development Foundation and the Yunnan Women and Children Development Association. From a social perspective, there are close connections between people in Yunnan and Myanmar. Some ethnic groups in Yunnan and Myanmar share the same roots, especially those living on the Myanmar–Yunnan border. Thus, cross-border activities are natural to some of the Yunnan NGOs. For example, the Ruili Women and Children Development Center is an NGO located in Ruili, a city bordering Myanmar. It has organically extended its activities to Myanmar given the high frequency of daily exchanges between the inhabitants of the Yunnan province and Burmese people.

The third- and fourth-highest recipients of Chinese NGO assistance are Cambodia and Laos. Cambodia is the only host country that possesses a special official mechanism for dealing with activities and donations from Chinese NGOs. The Cambodian Council of Ministers has established the Cambodia CSO Alliance Forum to receive funding from China and distribute it to Cambodian NGOs. The Cambodia CSO Alliance Forum has forged connections with the China NGO Network for International Exchanges, which is responsible for promoting and coordinating Chinese NGOs' international activities and has supported some Chinese NGOs in accessing opportunities in Cambodia. This suggests that political factors at the state level play a role in Chinese NGOs' choice of destinations for their activities and donations. If the host government paves the way and makes it easier for Chinese NGOs to engage, the country will likely attract more activities from Chinese NGOs. Like Myanmar, Laos borders the Yunnan province and has also hosted a few international activities from NGOs based in Yunnan. However, given the relatively small size of Laos in terms of population and economy, the country has not seen as many activities from Chinese NGOs as Myanmar. Overall, the three Southeast Asian countries of Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos make up the most popular region for Chinese NGOs' activities and donations. Geographical proximity is a factor that contributes

to the prosperity of Chinese NGOs' activities in the region. In addition, these countries are among the least costly for Chinese NGOs to conduct international projects in. Mature networks in these countries are another factor. There are significant exchanges between Chinese and local people in these three countries for business or for life, which have formed strong networks. These networks may enable Chinese NGOs to enter the market more easily. The last factor is the conditions in the host country. For example, Vietnam is also a neighbour to China but the presence of Chinese NGOs in the country is limited. One Chinese NGO that is active in both Myanmar and Cambodia explained that it once tried to conduct activities in Vietnam and registered there, in vain because local regulations regarding the activities of foreign NGOs are very strict (Interview 5).

Another notable country is Ethiopia, the only African country in the top 5. Ethiopia is not only a recipient of Chinese aid but also a strategic partner. The ideological affinity between the Ethiopian and Chinese governments and strong commercial ties between the two countries have fostered an appealing environment for Chinese NGOs to conduct activities (Hsu et al., 2016). Several large foundations, such as the China Red Cross Foundation, the Amity Foundation and the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation are all active in the country. In addition, a large corporate foundation, the ZTE Foundation, has implemented several projects in Ethiopia. Three NGOs, the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, the Amity Foundation and RamUnion have all registered in Ethiopia. However, fewer small-scale Chinese NGOs operate in Ethiopia than in Southeast Asian countries, partly because travel costs are significantly higher.

Although a systemic and detailed explanation of the rationales behind Chinese NGOs' choices of destinations for their activities and donations is beyond the scope of this chapter, this brief examination suggests that a combination of geographic, social, political and economic factors have affected these decisions.

Size and Scale: Limited

The total amount of Chinese NGOs' annual international expenditures is very difficult to determine due to limited data availability. Nonetheless, efforts to provide a broad view of the scale of Chinese NGOs' international development activities remain worthwhile. For this purpose, I consulted the annual reports of all the 35 Chinese NGOs that carried out international activities in 2019 recorded in the database. Among these, 15 (43%) NGOs specified their annual expenditure on international development activities, 12 did not provide precise information regarding their international activities, and eight did not publish annual reports online.³ The 15 NGOs that provide specific numbers for their international activities include seven of the nine foundations with long-term continuous engagement overseas. They cover the most sizable international projects carried out by Chinese NGOs. The total size of the international expenditure of these 15 Chinese NGOs in 2019 was 110 million RMB (15 million euros⁴). Given that the NGOs that do not provide details about their international activities or make their annual reports public tend to be small and that most are only involved sporadically in international activities, the average annual spending on international activities of the


³ In a few cases, Chinese NGOs only report total expenditure on international activities, which may include meetings and exchanges. Meanwhile, some international development activities are grouped with domestic activities and cannot be included specifically. These two effects are likely to cancel each other out.

⁴ 1 euro = 7.26 RMB.

remaining 20 NGOs is highly unlikely to be larger than that of these 15 Chinese NGOs. Applying the average of the 15 Chinese NGOs with available data to the remaining 20 NGOs, the total size of Chinese NGOs' international development activities in 2019 amounts to 256 million RMB (35 million euros). Thus, the real figure of Chinese NGOs' total annual international spending is likely to fall between 110 million RMB and 256 million RMB. Only three foundations reported annual foreign spending over 10 million RMB: the China Foundation For Poverty Alleviation (55 million RMB), the Chinese Red Cross Foundation (19 million RMB) and the China Foundation for Peace and Development (19 million RMB). However, international spending only represents a small portion of the total spending of the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (7%) and the China Red Cross Foundation (3%). The China Foundation for Peace and Development, which was founded to promote international exchange and development, is an exception in that most of its spending is on international activities.

I apply the same method to Chinese NGOs that conducted international development activities in 2020 and find that 22 out of 65 NGOs (34%) provide numbers for these activities, which amount to 1.39 billion RMB (192 million euros). The figures for 2020 are significantly higher than for 2019 because a few large foundations donated significant amounts to the fight against COVID-19. For example, the Alibaba Foundation and the Jack Ma Foundation together contributed 1.1 billion RMB (152 million euros) globally to anti-COVID-19 efforts, and the Tianjin Rockcheck Puji Foundation donated 1 million USD to UN Women to support women who suffer economically due to the COVID-19 pandemic. These single donations of such large sums are unprecedented. Applying the average of the amounts (excluding obvious outliers like the donations from the Alibaba Foundation and the Jack Ma Foundation) to the remaining 43 NGOs produces a total estimated amount of international spending of 2 billion RMB (278 million euros) in 2020. Thus, the exact sum representing Chinese NGOs' international development activities in 2020 is likely to fall between 1.1 billion RMB and 2 billion RMB. Considering the impact of COVID-19-related donations, expenditures are 10 times higher in 2020 than in 2019. However, the figure in 2021 is likely to decrease from that in 2020. At the time of the research, many NGOs had not published their 2021 annual reports. Those that have been made public suggest reduced spending by some large foundations in 2021 compared to 2020. For example, the Alibaba Foundation's total COVID-19-related donations (both in China and overseas) was 1.4 billion RMB in 2020 but decreased to 31 million RMB in 2021. The annual spending of some of the largest foundations on international activities in 2019–2021 is reported in Figure 4 to give an idea of the trend over the 2019–2021 period. Except for the China Foundation for Peace and Development, annual spending increased across the board in 2020 but decreased from 2020 to 2021. The peak of 2020 is largely due to the sizeable donations for the fight against COVID-19, and many NGOs have reduced their donations in this area in 2021 due to the normalisation of the situation in many countries. Excluding COVID-19-related donations, long-term development activities overseas are likely to be affected by the pandemic as indicated by the decrease in annual spending of the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation in 2021. COVID-19 donations are likely to be one-time events, and whether the pandemic can become an opportunity for more Chinese NGOs to engage in long-term international development activities remain to be seen.

Figure 4: Annual International Spending by Major Chinese NGOs from 2019 to 2021



Source: based on annual reports of respective NGOs

Source of Income: Influential Corporate Funding and Limited Governmental Funding

The overall scale of Chinese NGOs’ international development activities is difficult to assess, and determining the complete distribution of the sources of income is even more complex. Instead of compiling a complete profile of income distribution, I will analyse various aspects of the sources of income and combine pieces of information to provide as many insights as possible. NGOs usually have several sources of income: governmental funding, private-sourced funding (e.g. from corporations, founders), funding from the general public and international foundations. I will analyse them one by one.

First, governmental funding for Chinese NGOs’ international projects is very limited. Currently, the only two institutional official funding channels for Chinese NGOs to finance their overseas projects are the South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund at the central-government level and the official aid funds of the Department of Commerce in the Yunnan province. The South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund only began to give funding to Chinese NGOs in 2021. The Fund has only provided financing to two GONGOs, namely, the China Foundation for Peace and Development and the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, which received around one million RMB each by 2022 (Interview 42). The provincial aid fund of the Yunnan province is usually small-scale, granting between 200,000 and 400,000 RMB per project per NGO (Department of Commerce of Yunnan, 2021). According to an interviewee, approximately 10 projects from NGOs received such funds per year (Interview 5). Taking these two sources into account, funding from the open governmental funding channels amounts to 4-6 million RMB annually. In addition, some NGOs may receive governmental funding privately. For example, the Amity Foundation has received official funding worth 100,000 RMB from the Foreign Affairs Office of the Jiangsu province. This private-sourced

governmental funding is opaque, but it is not likely to be significant based on the knowledge I acquired during fieldwork. Another proof that governmental funding in general is almost insignificant is that the most sizable and involved foundations obtain only a very little portion of their funding from governments despite being GONGOs. The three Chinese NGOs whose annual international spending exceeds 10 million RMB are examples of this. The China Foundation for Peace and Development is a GONGO that was initiated and is supervised by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to carry out international exchange and development programmes. Yet, 99% of its revenues in 2018 and 2019 came from corporations (CFPD, 2019, 2020). In 2020 and 2021, although its source of income diversified, corporations and corporate foundations remain dominant (CFPD, 2021, 2022). In addition, the foundation received no funding from the government between 2018 and 2021. Another example is the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, 70% of whose annual spending (approximately 35 million RMB) was obtained for one project, the International Panda Pack project, which is funded through a strategic arrangement with the Alibaba Group through the Alibaba charity platform Gongyi Baobei. Consumers on Taobao, the largest Chinese online shopping platform of the Alibaba Group, automatically donate to projects listed in the Alibaba charity platform when they purchase goods from merchandisers who choose to participate in the initiative. The consumers themselves cannot choose which charity project to donate to as it is the merchandisers who select the projects. However, Alibaba can affect merchandisers' preferences by prioritising certain projects in the list presented on the charity platform. Through a strategic alliance with Alibaba, the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation is thus guaranteed 100 million RMB in funds raised via the Alibaba charity platform for the International Panda Pack project over 3 years (Interview 25, 41; Conference 27; Guo, 2022). Therefore, although the funding for the International Panda Pack project comes from consumers, Alibaba plays a major role in securing it. Meanwhile, the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation received governmental funding only sporadically, for instance, for a scholarship in Myanmar sponsored by the Chinese embassy in Myanmar in 2019 and the Smiling Children project in Nepal funded by the South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund between 2021 and 2022. The major funding source of the China Red Cross Foundation's flagship international programme, the Silk Road Funds, comes from 11 corporations (CRCF, 2020b). Based on the three examples above, corporations are likely to be leading the financial contributions to Chinese NGOs. However, my fieldwork indicates that corporate donations are limited to large foundations and smaller NGOs are less likely to attract donations from corporations. Instead, they usually rely on a variety of funding sources, such as the general public, international foundations and self-owned funds.

To get an idea of the size of the funds received from the general public, I calculated the total funds raised by Chinese NGOs for international development projects through the Tencent Charity and Alipay Charity, the top-two internet platforms for charitable online fundraising in China. According to the information available publicly on these two platforms, as of the end of 2020, the total funds raised for international humanitarian and development projects through these two channels was RMB 45 million. This amount was collected over several years and can thus hardly be compared to the annual international spending of the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation in 2019, for instance. This indicates that public funds make up only a small part of Chinese NGOs' funding.

Obtaining funding from international foundations is also common for some NGOs, especially in the environmental and sustainability sector. For example, several projects implemented by the Global Environmental Institute are funded by international foundations or organisations such as the Blue Moon Fund and the International Institute for Environment and Development.

In sum, governmental funding is largely insignificant in the landscape of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation, at least so far, and Chinese NGOs usually have diverse channels for funding. Given the size of the corporate donations to major Chinese foundations, corporations or corporate-influenced donations are likely to be the leading sources of income by far, although other funding sources such as the general public, international foundations and self-owned funds also exist. Taking COVID-19-related donations into account, the role of corporate donations is more prominent. Most of the leading foundations in terms of global COVID-19-related donations are large corporate foundations, such as the Alibaba Foundation, the Mammoth Foundation, the Fosun Foundation and the Tencent Foundation.

3.4 Comparative Perspectives

Lastly, to put the development of Chinese NGOs' international development activities into perspective, I compared Chinese NGOs with NGOs from countries in the Global North. Although there is significant literature on international NGOs, no study has specifically mapped the development of international NGOs focusing on international development activities on a global scale. The most suitable works for comparison are three separate studies that map international development NGOs in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Canada, respectively. I used the data and conclusions from these three studies to perform a comparison (see Table 13). However, given that these three studies were conducted separately, there is sometimes a lack of consistency in the categorisation. Nevertheless, these studies are the best benchmarks available to the best of my knowledge, and a comparative study may put the landscape of Chinese NGOs engaging in international development activities into perspective.

Banks and Brockington (2020) mapped the United Kingdom's international development NGO sector. They identified 895 British development NGOs, mainly through key international development networks in the country (e.g. BOND, Scotland's International Development Alliance, etc.), excluding organisations whose primary purposes are not international development, that are primarily grant-giving charities, that spent under 10,000 British pounds per annum on average between 2011 and 2015 and that are primarily religious NGOs. Schulpen and van Kempen (2020) mapped the international development NGO sector in the Netherlands, which is comprised of 366 Dutch INGOs. This list of Dutch INGOs was screened through the database of the Netherlands Fundraising Regulator, which includes a group of NGOs that are registered under the theme "international aid and human rights" and NGOs that describe themselves as working in developing countries. The researchers took a sample of 341 NGOs from the initial 773 that passed the screening process and further added 25 organisations through other sources. Davis (2019) compiled a database consisting of 991 Canadian international development charities, which he identified from a combination of data from the Canada Revenue Agency T3010, NGO websites and the Global Affairs Canada Statistical Report on International Assistance. The database only includes charities with a primary focus on international development which were operationally defined as having foreign expenditures

accounting for at least 40% of total expenses and/or with annual foreign expenditures exceeding 20,000 CAD.

Unlike the three databases of international development NGOs in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Canada, I adopted the broadest definition of international development NGOs to be included in the database. Even so, the number of Chinese NGOs engaged in international development activities is still far below those observed in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Canada. Counting only Chinese NGOs with international development as their primary purpose, following Banks and Brockington’s definition of United Kingdom development NGOs, the total number of Chinese NGOs would be less than 10. In addition, the total size of international spending from Chinese NGOs is around 100 times lower than that of the Netherlands and Canada each and represents an even smaller fraction of that of the United Kingdom. The average spending per NGO in China is approximately 10 to 100 times lower than that of NGOs in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Canada. In these three countries, international spending by NGOs is a comparable source of aid to official development assistance (ODA) spending as it is equivalent to approximately 46%, 40% and 60% of the ODA provided by their home countries, respectively. In contrast, Chinese NGOs, whose spending is equivalent to less than 1% of Chinese ODA, have not yet become an influential source of aid.

The sources of income vary across the four countries. Contrary to what may be expected, neither funding from the general public, which is the leading source of income for NGOs in the United Kingdom, nor governmental funding, which is the primary source of funding for NGOs in the Netherlands, are likely to be the main funding channel for Chinese NGOs. Instead, corporations are likely to be Chinese NGOs’ leading source of income, although further research is needed to confirm this finding.

Table 13: Comparative Analysis of International Development NGOs in Four Countries

	China	UK	Netherlands	Canada
Studies for Comparison	Chinese NGO Internationalisation Database	Banks and Brockington (2020)	Schulpen and van Kempen (2020)	Davis (2019)
Filtering criteria	As long as an NGO that has conducted one international development activity	NGOs with primary purposes of international development; > 10000 pounds of annual spending	NGOs identify themselves as “international aid and human rights” NGOs and working in developing countries	NGOs with primary purposes of international development; > CAD 20000 of annual foreign spending
Total NGOs included	142	895	366	991
Total annual international spending (local currency)	110 million to 256 million RMB (2019)	6.96 billion pounds (2015)	2.1 billion Euro yearly on average (2010-2017)	CAD 3.4 billion yearly on average (2011-2015)

Total annual international spending (Euro)	Between 15 and 35 million (2019)	7.93 billion (2015)	2.1 billion (2010-2017)	2.47 billion (2011-2015)
Annual spending per NGO (Euro)	0.1-0.2 million	8.9 million	5.7 million	2.5 million
Total annual spending as equivalent of % ODA that year	<1% of China official aid ⁵	Around 46% of British ODA ⁶	Around 40% of Dutch ODA ⁷	Around 60% of Canadian ODA ⁸
Source of income	Corporate funding is likely to be the leader source; limited governmental funding; limited public funding	Public (40%) UK government (18%) Nonprofits (16%) Overseas government (15%) Business sector (7%)	Government (41%) Own funding (e.g. general public, corporate donations) (36.2%) Others (e.g. income from sales off products and service) (22.5%)	Federal government (9%) Privately sourced (91%)

3.5 Conclusion

The research on Chinese NGOs' internationalisation tends to be either normative or focus on a few case studies. As a result, there is a lack of systematic sector-wide analysis. This chapter is an effort to fill this gap by mapping the landscape of the Chinese international development NGO sector based on a systematically collected and developed database, the Chinese NGO Internationalisation Database, which features 142 Chinese NGOs. The mapping exercise reveals several characteristics of the development of Chinese NGOs. First, the majority of Chinese NGOs in the sector are not GONGOs, which contradicts the perceptions of several scholars. Second, Chinese NGOs are still in the early stages of internationalisation, as evidenced by their size and scale as well as their level and ways of engagement. The annual international spending of Chinese NGOs is far below that of major countries in the Global North, such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Canada. Chinese NGOs have not yet become a force comparable to Chinese official aid, unlike NGOs in the three aforementioned countries. Most Chinese NGOs engage in one-time or sporadic donations and projects, and

⁵ Based on year average Chinese official aid from 2010-2012 from the <http://yws.mofcom.gov.cn/article/m/policies/201412/20141200822172.shtml>

⁶ Calculated using UK ODA in 2015, from <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/ff4da321-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/ff4da321-en>

⁷ Calculated using the average Netherlands ODA from 2011 to 2017, <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/2faea623-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/2faea623-en>

⁸ Calculated using the average Canadian ODA from 2011 to 2015, <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/aa7e3298-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/aa7e3298-en>

only 16 Chinese NGOs commit to continuous efforts in local communities in the host countries. Most one-time donations are triggered by natural disasters, such as the earthquake in Nepal in 2015 and the COVID-19 pandemic beginning in 2020. Chinese NGOs have mostly engaged in the areas of humanitarian relief, education and health care with the majority of the projects being simple charitable activities. However, it's notable that Chinese NGOs have shown a wide diversity of projects even though the sector as a whole has not matured. Third, Southeast Asia is the most popular destination for Chinese NGOs, with Nepal topping the ranking due to the impact of the 2015 earthquake. Fourth, governmental funding is not significant to Chinese NGOs' internationalisation as a sector, and corporate donations, including corporate-influenced donations, are likely to be the leading source of income.

Chapter 4 Embedded Internationalisation: The Autonomy of Chinese NGO Internationalisation

There have been huge academic interests in the relationship between Chinese NGO-government over decades (e.g. Hasmath and Hsu, 2014; Ho, 2007; Ma, 2002; Saich, 2000; Spires, 2011; Unger and Chan, 1995; White et al., 1996). Since the development of NGOs is one of indicators for the robustness of civil society and democracy, academic interests have been drawn to Chinese NGOs for their implications to Chinese society and political system. Chinese NGOs which are born and developed in an authoritarian context are often seen as different as NGOs in liberal democracies (e.g. Howell et al., 2020). The autonomy of Chinese NGOs has been constrained by strict regulations. The Regulation on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations promulgated in 1989 (which was further amended in 1998 and 2006) has strengthened the state's regulation over Chinese reviving civil society after the decade-long political liberation after the Cultural Revolution and defined some of the major characteristics of the requirements for groups to register as NGOs, such as the exclusion and dual supervision. The exclusion clause stipulates that only one social organization is allowed to register in one administrative area. Such clause gives room for regulatory bodies to refuse the unwanted registration applications and curbs the growth of NGOs. The dual supervision requires that for an NGO to be registered under the system of Ministry of Civil Affairs, an NGO needs to find a governmental agency to act as its professional management unit that supervises its operations to make sure there is no illegal or anti-governmental activities undergoing. All these requirements have become major hurdles for NGOs to register and expand. In recent years, Chinese NGOs in the areas of industry and commerce, science and technology, public welfare and charity, and services for urban and rural communities have been allowed to register directly with civil affairs departments without a professional management unit as supervisor. However, registration continues to be the biggest obstacle for many civil organizations. The existence of GONGOS, as introduced in Chapter 1, has further complicated the state-NGO relationship and the development of Chinese NGOs. Given these contexts, the autonomy of Chinese NGOs is often questioned (Hildebrandt, 2013; Ho, 2007; Howell 1998; Howell et al, 2020; Lu, 2009; Shue, 1994). Such concern over Chinese NGOs' independence has been extended to their global endeavors. What are the motivations of Chinese NGOs going international? Are they requested by the Chinese state to do so? How does the Chinese state control or influence the internationalisation of Chinese NGO? How do Chinese NGOs react to the influence of Chinese state?

Based on the empirical evidence from my fieldwork, interviews, and discourse analysis of NGOs' publications, this study has found that there are three distinctive layers of state's influence over the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs: one is the regulatory influence, one is operational influence and the last one is the ideational influence. The internationalisation of Chinese NGOs as a sector is not directly state-led, as there is very little policy-oriented and material mobilization except for some rhetoric encouragement. However, the way Chinese NGOs behave in their global endeavors has shown signs of state's influence through domestic regulatory and supervision system and through shaping what is legitimate for

internationalisation and value behind internationalisation, a phenomenon that I have dubbed as “embedded internationalisation”, a concept that is derived from “embedded environmentalism”, developed by Ho (2007, 2008a, 2008b) and Ho and Edwards (2007), to explain the environmental activism in China. This chapter consolidates and theorizes the empirical findings regarding the autonomy of Chinese NGOs in their internationalisation to be presented in the next two chapters. (Note: The majority of the contents in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 have been published in the article “Embedded Beyond Borders: Examining the Autonomy of Chinese NGOs in Their Global Endeavours” *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, Volume 52, Issue 1)

4.1 State-led Internationalisation of Chinese NGOs?

Chinese state is considered as the dominant actor in China’s international aid and development cooperation, providing aid to developing countries mainly through Government-to-Government channels. This state-led and state-centric approach is often criticized by DAC (OECD Development Assistance Committee, responsible for setting development cooperation standards and monitor official development assistance for its OECD countries), as it does not comply to the Global North’s recently preferred mode of non-governmental giving (Harvey, 2009, as cited in Reeves, 2019). The internationalisation of Chinese NGOs is not unanimously seen as promising an alternative to China’s approach to aid. Instead, critics have raised concerns over these NGOs’ roles as independent actors in international issues, especially in the rising presence of Chinese GONGOs in international affairs (Hasmath et al., 2019). GONGOs are criticized for being part of the Chinese state’s toolkit representing state interests overseas (Walker, 2016), and being exploited for the Chinese government’s global strategic advantage (Hasmath et al., 2019). In recent years, the BRI has been a boosting factor for the development of Chinese NGO internationalisation, which has provided an encouraging policy environment for Chinese NGOs to go international. Chinese NGOs have been addressed in the “Action Plan of People-to-People Bond in One Belt One Road for Chinese Social Organizations (2017–2020)” (*zhongguo shehui zuzhi tuidong “yidaiyilu” minxin xiangtong xingdong jihua (2017-2020)*/ 中国社会组织推动“一带一路”民心相通行动计划 (2017-2020)), which brings up the strategic role that Chinese NGOs can play in building the “People-to-People Bond” (“*min xin xiang tong*”/“民心相通”) within Belt and Road countries. The influence of the Chinese state over Chinese NGO internationalisation through the BRI has further reinforced the concern over Chinese NGOs’ autonomy overseas.

However, the view that Chinese NGOs’ internationalisation is state-centric simplifies the fact that independent Chinese NGOs (non-GONGOs) play an important role in this process. For example, among very few Chinese NGOs which have registered overseas, many of them are not GONGOs, such as Yundi (Yundi Behavior and Health Research Center) registered in Cambodia, RamUnion registered in Ethiopia, and Rainbow Volunteer Club registered in Nepal. Many independent NGOs may not be as sizable as the GONGOs, but they do show their strong presence by bringing diversity into the scene. Some of the most eye-catching projects are carried by independent NGOs, such as the demining project in Cambodia initiated by Peaceland Foundation, the refugee care project in Lebanon operated by Common Future.

Meanwhile, the criticism over the GONGOs overlooks the complexity within GONGOs, as different GONGOs can have different levels of autonomy from the government. GONGOs are

generally understood as those established by government for addressing social problems (Deng et al., 2016). However, there is large variation among the GONGOs, as shown in Wu (2003)'s illustration on the diversity of Chinese environmental GONGOs which have different levels of closeness between their leadership and the government, organizational capacity, and access to international resources. GONGO's governmental ties should be seen as lying on a spectrum rather than absolutely defined (Hasmath et al., 2019). Being a GONGO does not necessarily mean having less autonomy than being a non-GONGO (Lu, 2007). Therefore, the autonomy of Chinese NGOs can not be explained simply by being GONGO or not. This study aims to provide a more nuanced framework to explain how Chinese NGOs are influenced by the state.

4.2 Chinese NGO-State Relationship and Embeddedness

There is a substantial body of literature on China's NGO-state relationship in the domestic setting, centered on the traditional debate between a civil society approach and a corporatist approach. The civil society approach follows the Tocquevillian tradition, emphasizing the emergence of voluntary associations, the independence of the social arena from the state, and NGOs' role in fostering democracy (e.g. Saich, 2000; White et al., 1996; Yang, 2005). However, as many have become disillusioned by the apparent ineffectiveness of Chinese NGOs as agents of democratization, many scholars have turned to the corporatist framework to analyse the NGO-state relationship in contemporary China. Scholars holding a corporatist approach reject the civil society approach as an appropriate analytical framework because "it assumes too much independence in associational life" (Unger and Chan, 1995). Instead, the corporatist approach emphasizes the state's control over NGOs. Under Chinese corporatism, the state grants some autonomy to social organizations, on the understanding that they will moderate their demands and activities in accordance with government wishes (Unger and Chan, 1995).

In recent years, scholars have found that Chinese NGOs are neither idealistic agencies carrying the democratic hope of society nor robotic machines fully controlled by governments. Instead, a "contingent approach" emerged in the study of Chinese NGOs, which considers the relationship between the government and Chinese NGOs under specific contexts (Wang et al., 2015). Some examples of the contingent approach include Ma (2002)'s arguments emphasizing the importance of China's unique economic, political, and cultural history to analyse Chinese NGOs instead of making analysis purely based on western theories and concepts such as civil society and corporatism; Ho (2007, 2008a, 2008b)'s "embedded social activism" to demonstrate how Chinese political system is restrictive yet conducive for green activism; Lu (2009)'s "dependent autonomy" to explain how some Chinese NGOs enjoy *de facto* autonomy though they are generally dependent on states; and Anthony Spires (2011)' "contingent symbiosis" to illustrate that illegal grassroots NGOs can only survive in China when they limit any democratic claims making and contribute positively to official social welfare goals. These concepts argue that the characteristics of Chinese NGOs are the result of the mutual adaptation and co-evolution of the state and society in their respective contexts (Wang et al., 2015). This study continues the tradition of the contingent approach by analysing the autonomy of Chinese NGOs through the concept of embeddedness.

Embeddedness was originally posited by Polanyi (1957) and developed by Granovetter (1985) to describe how the economy relies on social relations and institutions from which markets are

inseparable. In organizational studies, “embeddedness” is employed as a measure of the autonomy of civic organizations from the state (Ho and Edmonds, 2007). Ho (2007, 2008a, 2008b) and Ho and Edmonds (2007) have introduced embeddedness into the Chinese NGO-state relationship literature by explaining how Chinese environmental NGOs perform activism in China. They explain that Chinese civil society cannot be simply characterized as state-led or corporatist, as such characterization fails to account for the dynamic strategies that Chinese NGOs have adopted to adapt the state’s influence. Instead, they use the concept “embedded social activism” or “embedded environmentalism” to show that Chinese NGOs consciously moved away “from possible confrontations with the national government through ‘depolitised politics’ and ‘self-imposed censorship’” (Ho and Edmonds, 2007, p336), while they tried to gain political leverage and “resourcefully adapted to, rather than opposed, the political conditions of its era” (Ho and Edmonds, 2007, p331). Chinese environmental activism is not traditional social movement that involves mass mobilization and structural transformation of society. Instead, it is “fragmentary, highly localized, and nonconfrontational” (Ho and Edmonds, 2007), which is largely the result of a limited political space for civil participation in a semi-authoritarian regime. However, it does not mean that Chinese environmental NGOs are completely docile that they could make no impact in effecting change. In a way, embeddedness is response from Chinese environmental NGOs for surviving and making incremental changes (Ho and Edwards, 2007; Ho, 2008a). They are adept at making informal and diffuse networks with government and international organizations and leveraging political opportunities (e.g. policies and governmental interests) to achieve their own objectives (Ho and Edwards, 2007; Ho, 2008a). The Chinese semiauthoritarian contexts being both restrictive and conducive form the essence of embedded activism (Ho, 2007). Embeddedness framework has effectively captured both the constraints that NGOs face and the agency that NGOs have under such constraints. Over the years, scholars have further developed the concept of “embeddedness”. Yang and Alpermann (2014) introduce “embeddedness versus marginalization”, which goes beyond the common dichotomy of registered and unregistered groups and takes into account three separate indicators of embeddedness: formal registration, informal ties with public authorities, and the political economy of NGO-government relations. Yuen (2018) argues that an NGO’s embeddedness in the state is useful for service activism, and successful advocacy depends on the NGO’s degree of institutional embeddedness in its respective local state partner as well as the nature of adopted strategies. Yew (2018) further argues that embedded activism can be confrontational by using legal activism.

4.3 Embedded Internationalisation

Based on my fieldwork, interviews and discourse analysis, I find that Chinese NGOs’ internationalisation shares some characteristics with the way Chinese environmental NGOs conduct activism, as shown by Ho (2007, 2008a, 2008b) and Ho and Edwards (2007).

First, the argument that Chinese NGOs’ internationalisation is state-led fails to capture the dynamics and diversity of the phenomenon. Chinese NGOs have shown great diversity in their “going out”. As illustrated in Chapter 3, more than 70% of Chinese NGOs that carry out international development activities are not GONGOs. Most Chinese NGOs, including many GONGOs, are not required by the Chinese government to go international. In addition, Chinese NGOs have exhibited great operational diversity. As laid out in Chapter 3, most Chinese NGOs

only engage in simple charitable events such as school bag donations and medical services. However, we should not ignore the large variety of activities, such as landmine detection, women protection and refugee care, even though these activities are fragmented and small in scale. Ho and Edwards (2007) and Ho (2007, 2008a, 2008b) have refuted similar arguments regarding China's green activism, according to which Chinese civil society is state led and there lacking in activism.

Second, similar to Chinese environmental NGOs' activism, which is largely nonconfrontational, Chinese NGOs' internationalisation avoids politically sensitive issues. There is no evidence that the extended geographical distance from the Chinese government provides more space for Chinese NGOs to engage in confrontational behaviour. There is self-imposed censorship in how they conduct activities and how they present themselves through their discourses.

Third, Chinese NGOs are not passive in the face of the state's influence on both environmental activism and internationalisation. Instead, they try to adapt to the political environment and leverage political resources to achieve their objectives. Internationalisation is similar to environmental activism in that Chinese NGOs challenge the status quo, ask for changes and need to justify making these changes. However, unlike Chinese NGOs engaged in green activism, which often demands social and political changes, the change from internationalisation is in itself that deviates from NGOs' routine and ordinary domestic activities. This is especially salient in the current stage when internationalisation is an emerging phenomenon in Chinese society, only accounting for a small part of NGO activities, and many NGOs need to justify their internationalisation to the Chinese stakeholders (e.g. corporations, the public and the state) as it is still a fresh and unfamiliar concept to many. Similar to environmental activism, where NGOs leverage political resources to make changes, Chinese NGOs have developed a set of strategies for using political resources to gain legitimacy in their international activities. This includes using official discourses to justify their internationalisation, complementing government policies and crediting governmental officials for their support.

Given these similarities, I found that embeddedness can be applied to explain the autonomy of Chinese NGOs in their internationalisation in a similar way to environmental activism in China, which perfectly illustrates both the constraints that Chinese NGOs face in this process and the space for operational autonomy. Thus, I put forward the concept of "embedded internationalisation" to explain the autonomy of Chinese NGOs in their global endeavours.

4.4 Framework of Three-layer State's Influence

Organisational embeddedness can be the outcome of several mechanisms operating at different levels and cumulatively affecting it (Dacin et al., 1999). In the context of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation, I developed a three-layer framework of state's influence that characterises the autonomy of Chinese NGOs: the first layer is regulatory influence, showing how the Chinese state exerts its influence through regulations; the second layer is operational influence, representing how the Chinese state exerts its influence through direct intervention in the international operations of NGOs; the third layer is ideational influence, delineating how the Chinese state exerts its influence by shaping the discursive practices of Chinese NGOs. These

three layers of state’s influence have distinctive characteristics and have the analytical power to explain how the Chinese state’s influences Chinese NGOs and how Chinese NGOs are embedded in the state’s influence.

First, the three layers of state’s influence have different sources. The first layer (regulatory influence) locates influence in the regulatory and supervision system, the second layer (operational influence) in direct governmental involvement in NGOs’ overseas operations and the third layer (ideational influence) in the state’s influence over NGOs’ sources of legitimacy and value for internationalisation. Second, the three layers of state’s influence have different targets. The first and third layers are systemic and structural, meaning that they target Chinese NGOs at the sectoral level instead of the individual NGO level. Conversely, the second layer is aimed at individual NGOs, and there is thus significant variation among NGOs in terms of how affected they are by the state’s influence. The third dimension of state’s influence concerns how the state’s influence reflects on Chinese NGOs. The first and second layers relate to external or explicit influences on Chinese NGOs; they are material and tangible influences that affect NGOs’ behaviours, regardless of state regulations or direct state intervention. Comparatively, ideational influence is internalised and implicit. For example, the Chinese state does not regulate directly how NGOs should use their discourses, although their discursive practices have shown state’s influence, which is internalised in Chinese NGOs. The fourth dimension is the impact of state’s influence. The two systemic layers of influence – the first and third layers – result in depoliticised actions and discourses, with a tendency for NGOs to diplomatise their international projects, while the second layer enables the operational improvisation of NGOs and leads to operational diversity.

Table 14: Three-Layer Chinese State’s Influence on Chinese NGOs’ Internationalisation (the same as Table 1 in Chapter 1)

	First layer- Regulatory influence	Second layer- Operational influence	Third layer- Ideational influence
Sources	Regulatory and supervision systems	Direct governmental involvement in operations	Ideology: shaping the sources of legitimacy and value for internationalisation
Targets of Influence	Systemic (All NGOs)	Individualized (some NGOs)	Systemic (All NGOs)
Types of Influence	External (explicit)	External (explicit)	Internalized (implicit)
Impact of Influence (Chinese NGOs behavior)	Depoliticized actions	Diversified operations	Depoliticized and diplomatized discourses

The state’s limited operational influence (the second layer) contributes to the diversity of Chinese NGOs’ operations. The Chinese state has only engaged in limited direct intervention in the operations of Chinese NGOs. Very few Chinese NGOs are required by the state to go international; most make the decision to internationalise on their own. Governmental funding for international projects is also scarce, meaning that very few NGOs have gained financial support from the state. Although some Chinese NGOs, especially GONGOs, tend to connect

with local partners through Chinese governmental referrals, many Chinese NGOs implement their projects directly with local partners and communities, bypassing any involvement of the Chinese government. The diversity evident in Chinese NGOs' internationalisation refutes the view that Chinese NGOs are mainly state-led. In parallel, Chinese NGOs adopt non-confrontational approaches and depoliticise their actions and discourses in their internationalisation. This behaviour can be explained by the first layer (regulatory influence) and the third layer (ideational influence). They both constitute systemic influence that affects Chinese NGOs at the sectoral level. Chinese NGOs avoid delegitimising themselves by steering clear of politically sensitive behaviours and critical discourses. Even though direct regulations or policies regarding NGOs' internationalisation are scant, the existing regulation and supervision system for Chinese NGOs is powerful enough for them to self-censor and self-limit their behaviour overseas. In addition, Chinese NGOs have internalised the state's influence, as evidenced by their discursive practices, including the use of official discourses and the promotion of state-endorsed values. The three-layer state-influence framework characterises embedded internationalisation, in which Chinese NGOs are not directly state-led; instead, the state's influence has mainly affected Chinese NGOs through their embeddedness in the existing domestic regulatory system and society, where values and legitimacy are strongly shaped by the Chinese state.

The next two chapters will provide a detailed account of these three layers of influence. Chapter 5 will examine explicit state's influence, namely, the regulatory layer and the operational layer, and Chapter 6 will examine how Chinese NGOs "think" through an analysis of their organisational discourses, showing how implicit state's influence, that is, the third layer, manifests in the case of Chinese NGOs.

4.5 Strategies of Chinese NGOs

Embedded internationalisation does not only account for how government deals with Chinese NGOs, but also how Chinese NGOs react and adapt to the regulative and political environments. To survive and prosper, Chinese NGOs have acquired a set of tactics to accommodate this regulatory and administrative environment, such as avoiding confrontational approaches and political risks, complementing government policies, and giving credit to government officials. Some of these tactics are used even by NGOs with no governmental involvement in their operations.

One key to avoiding a negative state response is for NGOs to avoid confrontational approaches. Chinese NGOs are much more likely to behave as service providers than advocates for society (Hildebrandt, 2013). Even for NGOs promoting advocacy, China's authoritarian context forces activists to abandon any radical, confrontational, and mass mobilization tactics to achieve political objectives (Ho and Edmonds, 2007). This feature has also extended overseas. Most Chinese NGOs' international projects are service-oriented. These NGOs are often considered the First (relief and welfare) and Second (community development) generations of development NGOs instead of the Third (sustainable systems development) and Fourth (people's movements) generations that play a more catalytic role rather than a mere operational role to enable changes in development, based on Korten (1987, 1990)'s categorization for development NGOs when he calls for NGOs' leadership in addressing policy and institutional changes supportive of a people-centered development. There are few Chinese NGOs involved

in sustainable system development, though their advocacy approaches are milder than their international peers. For example, one NGO involved in sustainable development advocacy to the Asian Development Bank said that they would never go to protests, like many Southeast Asian NGOs do, by sitting and protesting in front of the Asian Development Bank. As indicated by one project manager from a Chinese sustainable development NGO regarding the sensitivities of international advocacy, “it’s the same as for domestic projects and what you can not do domestically are also not allowed overseas” (Interview 16). The room for advocacy does not expand for international projects. The non-confrontational approaches taken by Chinese NGOs have made boomerang effects in transnational network advocacy (making domestic changes through the international community) less likely in the Chinese context. Another example shows that Chinese NGOs have carefully self-managed political risks when they go international. This NGO is engaged in international humanitarian rescue and explains how it makes decision: “Overall, Chinese governments do not prevent us from participating in international rescue. We have close communication with the Chinese national rescue team and judge the political sensitivity of location and situations based on such (informal) communications” (Interview 10). These examples all have illustrated that Chinese NGOs have strategically avoided crossing the boundaries.

Another common tactic is to gain political legitimacy by complementing government policies (Hildebrandt, 2013). Chinese NGOs usually conform to official ideology and support official policies. This goes beyond a minimalist position of not violating political standards and demonstrates active support of the state’s goals (Lu, 2007). Especially, the discourse that the international projects are to follow the BRI has become a panacea for many Chinese NGOs dealing with government officials in meetings, conferences, funding applications and administrative approvals (e.g. Interview 3, 5, 16, 17, 28), including both GONGOs and independent NGOs. The following three excerpts from interviews have shown that BRI has been used strategically to gain political legitimacy in front of the domestic stakeholders, especially Chinese governmental agencies.

“We only use BRI in front of Chinese stakeholders, not in front of our donors (international foundations) when we apply for funds.” (Interview 16)

“If there is controversy (domestically), I will just respond that the project is to follow BRI. However, when I am overseas, I won’t mention BRI” (Interview 17)

“When dealing with Chinese officials, I will mention BRI. However, when I am in the host country, because my partners don’t know much about BRI, I won’t mention it. Rather, I will use SDG, because it is a more familiar concept there” (Interview 28)

It’s notable that some NGOs avoid referencing the BRI in front of foreign donors and stakeholders in recipient countries, while positioning their projects as relevant to BRI domestically (as shown in Interview 16 and 28). This particularly shows that the BRI is sometimes used intentionally as a marketing strategy for gaining political and public trust in China. Chinese NGOs need legitimacy in the eyes of the state, but also in society, which often depends on the state as well (Lu, 2007). As shown in the excerpt of Interview 17 above, the interviewee told me that he used to spend much time explaining to donors and the Chinese public why he carries out international projects when there are still many social problems domestically. Now he can simply explain that these projects benefit the BRI and the state. In

addition to BRI, official discourses, such as “A Community with a Shared Future for Mankind” (“*renlei mingyun gongtongti/人类命运共同体*”), “People-to-People Bond” (“*minxin xiangtong/民心相通*”), are commonly used in their publications when they explain the contexts and motivations of their internationalisation (more details in Chapter 6).

Another prevalent tactic is to credit relevant government officials for their support. One NGO leader (Interview 5) mentioned that he would credit all his international achievements to relevant government officials to maintain a supportive relationship with the government. In the media, NGOs would always credit their governmental partners, even if these partners did not play a substantive role.

The government trusts most Chinese NGOs, as they are deeply embedded through regulative and supervising systems. This trust has earned Chinese NGOs more operational autonomy overseas. Lu (2007) illustrates the importance of governmental trust by arguing that trust in their leaders, who are usually former officials from supervisory agencies, is one of the major reasons why some GONGOs have even greater autonomy than independent NGOs. Similarly, in the context of internationalisation, the established trust between these Chinese NGOs and the government makes those overseas operations less precarious. This balance and trust are achieved when the Chinese state believes that a group’s existence both helps the state with a pressing need and does not pose a threat to its monopoly on political power (Hildebrandt, 2013).

4.6 Conclusion

The concerns of the autonomy of Chinese NGOs have been extended to their internationalisation from domestic activities. Chinese NGOs are concerned to simply represent the Chinese state in their global endeavours, especially in the presence of GONGOs. This study examines this concern and develops the concept of “embedded internationalisation” to decipher the autonomy of Chinese NGOs. Embedded internationalisation is adapted from “embedded environmentalism” which is used to describe how Chinese environmental NGOs conduct green activism. The way Chinese NGOs internationalise has shared similarities to the way Chinese environmental NGOs conduct green activism. In both scenarios, Chinese NGOs are constrained by limited political space, yet they actively and strategically engage in the existing system to gain legitimacy and achieve their objectives instead of solely being led by the state. Furthermore, the study has found three different layers of state’s influence that characterizes the autonomy of Chinese NGOs: the regulatory influence (the first layer), the operational influence (the second layer) and the ideational influence (the third layer). The internationalisation is not directly led by the Chinese state as there is limited governmental intervention in the operations of Chinese NGOs, in terms of how they initiate their internationalisation and how they finance and implement their projects. Such lack of state’s direct mobilization and intervention leaves room for Chinese NGOs to develop a variety of projects and to implement projects in different ways. However, such diversity has a boundary which is self-imposed by the Chinese NGOs. They avoid being confrontational and using critical discourses. Meanwhile, they strategically leverage political resources to gain legitimacy. The state’s influence over Chinese NGOs is embedded in the regulatory system and the source that shapes the legitimacy of Chinese NGOs for internationalisation.

Chapter 5 The Reach of the State: Regulatory and Operational Influence

As introduced in the previous chapter, there are three layers of governmental influence over Chinese NGOs in their internationalisation: the regulatory influence (the first layer), the operational influence (the second layer) and the ideational influence (the third layer). Among the three layers of influence, regulatory and operational influence are external and explicit influence compared with the ideational influence that is internalized in Chinese NGOs. The explicit influence, including the regulatory influence and the operational influence, is studied through interviews, policies and the actions of Chinese NGOs in this chapter, while the implicit influence is shown from the discourse analysis of Chinese NGOs coming in the next chapter.

The internationalisation of Chinese NGOs is variegated rather than solely state-led. The state is not closely involved in much of the internationalisation processes of most Chinese NGOs. However, all Chinese NGOs with overseas operations avoid overstepping a political boundary that is tacitly understood by both NGOs and the state. Such duality of both uniformity and diversity among Chinese NGOs can be explained by the regulatory layer and operational layer of influence respectively. The regulatory influence reflects the structural governmental sources that affect every Chinese NGO, while the operational layer of influence reflects the individualized governmental sources that create variations in Chinese NGOs' autonomy. All Chinese NGOs could not avoid the governmental influence from the regulatory layer while there is room for some Chinese NGOs to exercise agencies to avoid all or some direct governmental influences in the operational layer. The major structural governmental influence comes from regulatory and supervision systems, while the individualized governmental influence comes from the direct governmental involvement in NGOs' operations. In this research, such direct governmental involvement is examined through the lens of three-phase NGO project cycle including project initiation, financing and implementation, which is adapted from the Project Management Cycle Guideline proposed by EU for aid projects in development agencies including civil organizations (ECHO, 2003; Papadimitrov and Nikolovski, 2017). Different layers of governmental influence will have different dimensions of impact on Chinese NGOs. For example, the regulatory layer of influence will impact on Chinese NGOs' approaches towards their work while the operational layer of influence will impact on key operational decisions, such as decisions to go international or not, decisions on financing.

5.1 The First Layer: The Regulatory Influence

One major question regarding the autonomy of Chinese NGOs in their internationalisation is that if their political limits extend overseas or they have larger room for autonomy, e.g. adopting more confrontational approach, involving in more politically sensitive issues. Based on the cases under study, all Chinese NGOs that go abroad understand the political boundaries set up by domestic systems and structures. In other words, the limits to Chinese NGOs' autonomy, especially their political autonomy, cannot be expanded, since their ties in domestic

society extends overseas. In an embedded, semi-authoritarian context, the rules of engagement are negotiable, but it is the state that ultimately sets the limits (Ho, 2008b). Any potential threat to the Chinese state's monopoly on political power is constrained. Ultimately, internationalized Chinese NGOs are still Chinese NGOs, which cannot avoid the management and supervision of the Chinese state.

The case of JX (pseudonym) illustrates how political autonomy cannot be expanded overseas. JX is an environmental NGO actively involved in the empowerment of local communities affected by unsustainable investments in China and Southeast Asia. JX conducted several workshops to train local NGOs on self-protection against investments (not only Chinese investments) with negative environmental and social consequences. Once a Chinese governmental agency related to international affairs recognized that JX conducted international activities, it went to JX and opened an enquiry into these activities. Although there were no direct consequences to this ad hoc examination, the case demonstrates that the Chinese state does respond to cases it deems untrustworthy and open to potential risk. JX was closed in recent years as the incumbent supervisory agency showed no interest in extending its supervision, and JX could not find an alternative supervisory body. JX's suspension was mainly due to its rights-based and participatory approaches to sustainable development within China. Although their international activities were not specifically prohibited by the Chinese state, they may not have been encouraged either. When asked about a potential expansion of their international activities when JX was still carrying out activities in Southeast Asia years ago, one of JX's leaders, who has been testing political boundaries for years highlighted that "If the international activities we are doing become bigger, they will get more government attention and be banned for sure" (Interview 2). However, JX is an exceptional case, since most Chinese NGOs have non-confrontational approaches to delivering basic social welfare overseas. NGOs with a non-confrontational approach do not face any interference from the government, and many of them have indeed been praised by the government for their international activities. A stable mode of interaction has been established between Chinese NGOs and the Chinese state over the years as the Chinese government establishes boundaries and Chinese NGOs become embedded in these regulatory environments to gain governmental trust.

Regulation and Supervision Systems

The regulatory and supervision environments of Chinese NGOs internationalisation include three systems: the registration and supervision systems through civil affair offices and NGOs' supervision bodies, applying to every registered Chinese NGOs; the national security system that is particularly active in the supervision of suspicious NGOs' activities, many of which are internationally connected; and the foreign affairs system that deals with the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs.

The first layer of regulatory influence is largely exercised through registration and supervision systems. Through the registration system, the state has constructed the concept of what an NGO is, defined its legitimate scope of activity, and limited its autonomy (Hildebrandt, 2013). The key feature of NGO registration is the dual surveillance system established by the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations (*shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli/社会团体登记管理条例*) in 1989 (revised in 1998), a system that requires Chinese organizations to seek approval by a government-related body as the "professional management unit" ("yewu zhuguan danwei/业务主管单位") to supervise its daily operation, before

registration in the civil affairs system. This requirement becomes a major challenge for organizations to be officially registered under the civil affairs system, as it's challenging to find such professional management unit that has enough incentives to become the supervisor. In recent years, organizations in the fields of industry and commerce, science and technology, public welfare and charity, and services for urban and rural communities can register directly with civil affairs departments without a professional management unit, but registration remains the greatest challenge for many civil groups. An NGO needs to follow routine supervision by its professional management unit and annual checks by civil affairs offices once it is formally registered. If a registered NGO fails to comply with registration and routine supervisory measures, the relevant civil affairs office can force the NGO to correct its wrongdoings by issuing a warning, suspending the NGOs' activities, asking the NGO to replace culpable leaders, confiscating illegal income, collecting fines, and revoking the NGO's registration (Ru and Ortolano, 2008). Currently, there is no regulation for groups registering an organization solely for international development purposes in China. A nonprofit entrepreneur cannot simply go to the civil affairs offices and register an NGO to provide education to children outside China. Strictly speaking, there are no Western-style international NGOs that are set up solely for international development and primarily operate internationally. The projects of Chinese NGOs are primarily domestic, and international projects are a "nice to have" addition instead of a "must have". Furthermore, international activities are not worth the risk of affecting domestic operations. A nonprofit entrepreneur may choose another route for international projects, such as affiliating its international project with an established domestic foundation. For example, the Common Future, established to address issues facing Syrian refugees, was once affiliated with the China Children and Teenagers' Fund. This affiliation legitimized the group for official recognition and public fundraising. However, through registration or affiliation, these organizations are enmeshed in a social and regulatory network that limits their behaviour.

In addition to the civil affairs system that an NGO usually needs to face, the national security system, including public and state security agencies, also plays an important role in supervising Chinese NGOs (Kang and Han, 2008; Wu and Chan, 2012). The international actions of NGOs, from either international or Chinese NGOs, can be particularly sensitive. Effective since 2017, China's Foreign NGO Law mandates that foreign NGOs must register with public security agencies, officialising the role of the national security system in NGO management. The shift of management to public security agencies shows that the leadership of China views that international NGOs can be sources of threats to national security (Lang, 2018). At least two leaders of the NGOs researched for this study, including both GONGOs and independent NGOs, have been investigated by these security systems for their accidental or indirect involvement with suspicious international forces.

In addition to the civil affairs and national security systems, Chinese NGOs sometimes need to interact with the foreign affairs system when carrying out international activities. Currently, the government has not installed any regulation related to NGOs' internationalisation and overseas activities in any of the existing NGO regulations. There are no regulatory bodies specifically supervising all Chinese NGOs' international activities. However, lack of clear and specific regulations does not mean that the government turns a complete blind eye on Chinese NGOs' international activities. The China NGO Network for International Exchanges (CNIE), founded by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party

(zhonggong zhongyang duiwai lianluo bu/中共中央对外联络部) to coordinate Chinese NGOs going abroad and promote cooperation between Chinese and foreign NGOs, plays a tacit role in watching the international activities of Chinese NGOs by collecting information from Chinese NGOs and organizing international activities for them. Local foreign affairs offices may also need to be informed if the NGOs involve in government-related projects or establish overseas offices. However, as there is no clear regulation in the roles of foreign affairs offices, different NGOs behave differently when they interact with the foreign affairs system. Some NGOs will inform their local foreign affairs offices about their international activities while some NGOs bypass the step and conduct international activities directly.

It is in 2016 that the government started to issue some specific guidance specifically on the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs. In the “Opinion on Reforming the NGO Management System to Promote Healthy and Orderly NGO Development” (“*guanyu gaige shehui zuzhi guanli zhidu cujin shehui zuzhi jiankang youxue fazhan de yijian/ 关于改革社会组织管理制度促进社会组织健康有序发展的意见*”), some regulatory ideas were suggested that approval must be obtained from the professional management unit or the foreign affairs administration if Chinese NGOs need to establish overseas offices. Since the publication of this document, relevant government agencies have adopted more stringent measures over overseas registration. It now takes longer time for NGOs to register overseas as they need to obtain regulatory “approval” (“*pizhun/ 批准*”) instead of simply “inform” (“*baobei/ 报备*”) relevant authorities (Interview 20). Though most Chinese NGOs are not affected by the Opinion document, as they have not or will not register overseas, it does show that the government tries to formalize and manage the internationalisation process, if Chinese NGOs want to make significant moves.

5.2 The Second Layer: Operational Influence

The previous section has shown how the state influences over Chinese NGOs through regulation and supervision, which sets the boundaries of Chinese NGOs’ autonomy. This section will illustrate how the state influences over Chinese NGOs through involvement into their operations. In general, Chinese NGOs have expressed that they have sufficient operational autonomy in their internationalisation, as shown in the following two examples, the first one from an independent NGO and the second one from a GONGO.

“There is a lot of autonomy. In most situations, there is tacit understanding between us and the government. We have been verbally praised by the civil affairs agencies and foreign affairs agencies, though there is not much real support. Well, they (the governmental agencies) do not limit us either.”
(Interview 17)

*“The foreign affairs agencies have told us ‘Just do it yourself’. They don’t have a concrete idea on how Chinese NGOs should go international. We are all ‘figuring out as one goes’ (‘*mo zhe shitou guohe/ 摸着石头过河*’)(Interview 13)*

Such operational space, even for GONGOs (as shown in the excerpt from Interview 13) is largely due to lack of direct policies and regulations on internationalisation. Governmental agencies are in their learning stage the same as Chinese NGOs, as internationalisation is new

to most of them. Overall, governmental involvement in international operations from a sectoral perspective remains limited. Although there is governmental involvement in the international operations of Chinese NGOs here and there, it should not be taken as default.

There is great variation among Chinese NGOs in terms of governmental influence in operations and this section is to examine such variation. It illustrates the specific operational links between each Chinese NGO and the Chinese government through three stages of project cycle: initiation, financing, and implementation. The analysis below will show how diverse these NGO-government links can be during the three stages of internationalisation. Some NGOs have strong operational links with governments that they have links with the Chinese government in all three stages while some NGOs have weak influence from the government that none of direct governmental involvement is found.

Initiation

Chinese NGOs go international for a variety of reasons, and only a few of the NGOs interviewed attribute their direct motivation to the leadership of the Chinese state. The empirical findings of my study serve to categorize Chinese NGOs based on the original drivers of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation in relation to the Chinese state into: Obligators, which are directly asked by the government to go international, Opportunists, which are indirectly influenced by the government and Independents, which base their internationalisation decisions on factors independent of the state.

Obligators are NGOs whose international projects are directly influenced by the Chinese government. These NGOs are usually founded by governmental bodies for the purposes of international exchange, cooperation, and assistance. I label them as Obligators because they have to be involved in international activities, as they are directly asked by the government to carry out international projects. Obligators are usually created through a top-down approach with a public diplomacy purpose. Their projects primarily focus on international exchange and traditional forms of aid, such as holding conferences for international exchanges or building education and healthcare infrastructure and facilities. Obligators are usually set up within three official Chinese systems related to international affairs: one from the party through the Communist Party of China's international department and its affiliates, one from the state through the foreign affairs departments, and the last from the state through commerce departments. For example, China NGO Network for International Exchanges (CNIE), founded by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party to coordinate between Chinese and foreign NGOs, is a regular participant in international conferences and frequent organizer of international exchange and development programs. The Shenzhen Foundation for International Exchange and Cooperation (SFIEC) is founded and supervised by the Foreign Affairs Office of Shenzhen to conduct international exchange programs and promote Shenzhen's international image. Its projects on knowledge sharing and charitable donations under the 'Shenzhen x Lancang-Mekong Initiative' are meant to respond to China's national strategy in the Lancang-Mekong region and connect Shenzhen to international partners. The China Association for NGO Cooperation and Yunnan International Non-Governmental Organization Society (YINGOS) are examples associated with the ministry or departments of commerce. They are responsible for cooperation between domestic and international NGOs, promoting international exchanges, and conducting international projects.

Opportunists refer to Chinese NGOs that decide to go international under the indirect influence of the state with the motivation to leverage governmental resources, usually financial or political. For these NGOs, an international component is nice to have in addition to domestic operations if external opportunities are available and the government is supportive of international expansion. A supportive policy environment, for example when NGOs were officially recognized as agents to promote the “People-to-People Bond” in the BRI, and governmental funds can attract NGOs to go international. Unlike Obligators, Opportunists are not directly asked by the government. Instead, they choose to seize opportunities provided by the government and go international. For example, a Yunnan-based NGO initiated its first international project after it recognized that the Department of Commerce of Yunnan allocated part of its budget to aid through NGOs. The South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund (*nannan hezuo yuanzhu jijin*/南南合作援助基金) established in 2015 to support post-2015 sustainable development goals and managed by China International Development Cooperation Agency, part of which will be allocated to Chinese NGOs for internationalisation, has received applications from NGOs that lacked previous international experience. This is a clear indication that some NGOs are motivated by available governmental resources. It can be expected that as the official financial channel for NGO internationalisation scales up, more Opportunists will emerge.

Up to now, most of the Chinese NGOs’ international aid projects are not requested by Chinese government, nor created solely to gain governmental resources. They are Independents in terms of the decision over the internationalisation. Among the Independents, there are notable three variations based on their different intentions for internationalisation, coined as Organic Growers, Strategists and Occasionalists. Organic Growers refer to NGOs with missions which are cross-border or global in nature. For Organic Growers, internationalisation follows an internal development logic, which often relates to the issues that NGOs are addressing. For example, the Shenzhen Long Yue Foundation helps overseas Chinese veterans, many of whom are located in Myanmar, to return home to China. The Ruili Women and Children Development Centre, located in Ruili on the border of Myanmar and China, supports Burmese children both in China and Myanmar. Global Environmental Institute, an independent NGO working on sustainable investment and environmental issues, started to work in Myanmar after following the case of illegal logging and its associated trade between China and Myanmar. These NGOs are termed Organic Growers because they do not intentionally go global. Instead, their international behaviour is organic, given that their areas of concern are cross-border. Strategists refer to NGOs that have made internationalisation an organizational strategy and actively seek diverse opportunities for international expansion. Strategists usually show strong motivation for internationalisation by constantly initiating a variety of international projects across various countries. Many of them are registered overseas. Their first international project is usually self-initiated without any official financial resources, and their willingness to go international is independent of governmental funding opportunities. For example, China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) started to make international donations to tsunami disaster areas in Indonesia through Mercy Corps instead of the Chinese government, which became the first step in its internationalisation trajectory (Deng, 2019). Over the years, CFPA’s international presence has developed from simple international donations to the establishment of permanent offices in Nepal, Myanmar, and Ethiopia. CFPA, with the mission of alleviating poverty in China, has made internationalisation a long-term strategy, as its leaders recognize that the future of the organization would gradually shift from domestic to international affairs as China

eventually puts an end to extreme poverty. Occasionalists refer to Chinese NGOs that occasionally contribute international donations or conduct international projects. They usually donate once per humanitarian objective or conduct sporadic projects. For example, there are many NGOs whose international involvement is limited to international donations to Nepal in 2015, with no follow-ups or consistent international activity. Because the international presence of these NGOs is sporadic and temporary, Occasionalists are less visible internationally than other NGO types.

Except for Obligators, Chinese NGOs have gone international via their own paths. Obligators only include GONGOs, while the other categories include both GONGOs and independent NGOs. A GONGO can decide to go international on its own, as shown by CFPA. Most independent NGOs fall under the categories of Organic Growers, Strategists, and Occasionalists,

Financing

Financial sources are critical for the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs. There is very limited financing from governmental sources for Chinese NGOs, as analyzed in Chapter 3. Most of NGOs interviewed have confirmed that they do not rely on governmental financial sources. Instead, they finance through a diverse range of channels, e.g. private funds, companies, international foundations, public and government. Though governmental funding is limited in scale, its variation is noticeable. There are four types of financial links between Chinese NGOs and the government: directly through official aid, indirectly through official aid, through supervisory bodies, and through non-aid governmental projects.

The first type is official aid budgeted directly for NGOs. This has been such a widespread practice in OECD countries that twenty billion USD was funded to or through development civil society organizations in 2017 (OECD-DAC, 2019), accounting for approximately 14 per cent of the total official aid in the same year. Currently, the only official aid funding channel in China at the central government level is through the South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund, which just started and allocated around one million RMB to each of two GONGOs, the China Foundation for Peace and Development and the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation in 2022 (Interview 42). Only trustworthy Chinese NGOs can be short-listed for the funding of South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund. For example, one independent NGO mentioned that it needed endorsement from local foreign affairs office to be short-listed for the fund (Interview 5). At the provincial level, the Department of Commerce of Yunnan has specific funding for NGOs as part of provincial official aid through public application process with between 200,000 and 400,000 RMB per project per NGO (Department of Commerce of Yunnan, 2021). The official aid funding from Yunnan province is preferably awarded to, but not only allocated to, GONGOs. For example, Yundi, as an independent NGO, has received funding from the Department of Commerce of Yunnan for several of its projects. This donor-recipient relationship between the government and NGOs follows a classic principal-agent relationship. In such cases, an NGO's autonomy may be compromised as it faces constant pressure to please donors and pursue policy goals in order to maintain funding (e.g. Cooley and Ron, 2002; Gent et al., 2015).

The second is the official aid budget for international projects in which NGOs act as sub-contractors. Currently, China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) does not include NGOs as contractors when implementing Chinese official aid. However, some

Chinese NGOs participate in official aid projects as sub-contractors to the contractors appointed by CIDCA. One example is the Tibet Shan Yuan Foundation working as a sub-contractor to Tibet University, which has contracted a training project for Nepalese professionals from CIDCA. Under such a scenario, Chinese NGOs work indirectly as part of the official aid program.

The third type of financial link between the government and Chinese NGOs is when NGOs' international projects are funded directly by their supervisory bodies through non-transparent channels. For example, CNIE's projects are exclusively funded by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, which concurrently functions as the supervisor of CNIE (Brenner, 2012). In this context, Chinese NGOs work more like an extension of the government beyond a simple principle-agent relationship, as these NGOs tend to be the types of GONGOs that have very close ties with the government.

The fourth type comprises international projects that are funded as part of governmental programs (not as official aid through commerce departments or CIDCA). For example, GEI was funded through a contract with the National Development and Reform Commission for a project on the evaluation of the governmental donation of clean energy products to six countries.

However, government funding in all the above four categories is still very limited in terms of funding opportunities and funding sizes. Most Chinese NGOs are funded through non-governmental channels, even GONGOs, for international aid projects. For example, as shown in Chapter 3, international projects for both CFPA and the China Red Cross Foundation are predominantly funded by corporations. Many of the GONGOs interviewed for this study have concerns over financial resources and would like to receive more financial support from society and diversify their financial resources instead of relying on existing governmental funding (e.g. Interview 4; Interview 6; Interview 13).

In addition to the direct governmental funding, the government can also intervene Chinese NGOs' financing indirectly through public fundraising. For example, only a few public foundations are allowed to publish fund raising advertisement online after the Covid-19 outbreak as the government considers it necessary to consolidate fundraising channels to control risk during unstable and sensitive times.

Implementation

In the implementation stage, the Chinese governmental influence mainly involves making connections for local partnerships. Finding partnership through governmental connection is common for GONGOs. For example, through governmental referral, CFPA established a partnership with the Pakistan Red Crescent Society, which supports the distribution of CFPA's school bags in Pakistan. Local partners reached by official Chinese sources are often government-related as well. For example, in Cambodia, Chinese NGOs, usually through the introduction of CNIE, work directly with the Cambodia CSO Alliance Forum, established by the Council of Ministers in Cambodia to receive funding from China and distribute the funds to Cambodian NGOs. As both the Chinese and host government are directly involved in channelling Chinese NGOs' funds and projects, this approach can sometimes be seen as quasi-government-to-government aid. One characteristic of the top-down approach is that governmental officials from both China and the recipient country participate in the project's opening ceremony and the mainstream media publicize the event. This may contribute to the

skewed attention towards government-influenced projects. On the other hand, some Chinese NGOs directly access local civil society, bypassing any major official involvement in either China or the host country. This path does not include any governmental interference. For example, GEI is in partnership with four local civic organizations in Myanmar to promote sustainable projects in local communities.

Though GONGOs tend to rely more on governmental referrals, not all of them do. Some GONGOs work directly with civil society and communities in host countries. For example, the Shenzhen Foundation for International Exchange and Cooperation implemented a project in Myanmar through a partnership with a local NGO referred by Diinsider, an independent development enterprise, instead of through any governmental referrals, such as through the Chinese embassy, as sometimes it can be more efficient to go through an independent connection than a more bureaucratic official channel. This case also shows that a GONGO whose projects may be initiated for certain official causes does not need to rely on the official system to operate and conduct projects overseas. Sometimes, a GONGO can make decisions based on its own evaluation of what is best for a project’s implementation. On the other hand, not all independent NGOs work directly with their host community. For example, Yundi and Peaceland Foundation both work directly with the CSO Alliance Forum to carry out projects in Cambodia.

Table 15 are some examples showing the diversity of state and non-state influences. Various combinations of the state’s influence over Chinese NGOs internationalisation can be found, from absent of state’s influence (shown in the example of Myanmar Forest Protection Community Demonstration Project by GEI) to full involvement of the state (shown in the example of China-Myanmar Friendship Scholarship by CFPA). These examples also show that the state’s influence in project initiation, financing, and implementation can be completely independent of each other. From the perspective of Chinese NGOs, most of them except Obligators are free to make their own decision on whether to go international. Their financial sources and implementation methods are diverse. Usually, an NGO’s financial resources and local implementation depend on the resources most accessible to them. Access to governmental financial resources and connections may not be synchronous. CFPA, a strategic pioneer in establishing local offices overseas, usually depends on inter-governmental connections for local implementation, even though most of its projects are not government-funded. Any generalization of state’s influence ignores the agency and diversity of Chinese NGOs, even within GONGOs.

Table 15: Examples on the State and Non-State Influence at the Project Level

Examples	Is the project influenced by the Chinese state (either directly or indirectly)?		
	Initiation	Financing	Implementation
Smiling Children conducted by CFPA in Ethiopia: Self-initiated; sponsored by corporations, NGOs, and the public; implemented through inter-governmental connections.	No	No	Yes

Community Development of Myitsone Dam Affected Area by Yundi in Myanmar: Self-initiated, funded by the Department of Commerce of Yunnan, and implemented through two local NGOs, the Metta Foundation and Airavati Foundation.	No	Yes	No
Mekong River Sunlight Village Project by SFIEC: Initiated under the framework of Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, sponsored by Vanke Foundation and a photovoltaic company, implemented directly through independent and local partners.	Yes	No	No
Myanmar Forest Protection Community Demonstration Project by GEI: Self-initiated, funded by the Blue Moon Fund, and implemented by four local NGOs in Myanmar.	No	No	No
China-Myanmar Friendship Scholarship by CFPA: Initiated and funded by the Chinese embassy in Myanmar, implemented by the CFPA in partnership with the Ministry of Education in Myanmar.	Yes	Yes	Yes
One Temple One TV project by YINGOS: Initiated and financed under the Department of Commerce of Yunnan to promote international exchange and implemented by the Yangon Noble Language Centre.	Yes	Yes	No
The Silk Road Fraternity Fund by the China Red Cross Foundation: Initiated to assist with the construction of the Belt and Road Initiative, funded mainly by corporations, implemented through inter-governmental connections.	Yes	No	Yes
Post-surgery service for children with congenital heart disease in Cambodia by Yundi: Self-initiated, funded by the Department of Commerce of Yunnan, and implemented through inter-governmental connections.	No	Yes	Yes

5.3 Discussion

The framework of initiation, financing, and implementation shows the variety of ways Chinese NGOs internationalize and challenge the traditional view that Chinese NGOs internationalize primarily for state interests. As this analysis unfolds, it becomes apparent that the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs is hardly uniform. The state wields influence mainly over Obligators, who by definition need to fulfil governmental goals when conducting international activities, and through officially funded NGOs, some of which are Opportunists. Some GONGOs conduct international projects by adopting a top-down approach to find local partners, an approach which bears similarities to the government-to-government mode of aid. However, the widespread presence of other non-state influenced motivations, financial sources, and paths to local communities is also important to understanding the vibrant complexity of Chinese NGO internationalisation. The lack of widespread governmental involvement in the process of internationalisation leaves room for many Chinese NGOs to exercise agencies and enjoy autonomy at a level that is satisfactory to themselves. To many Chinese NGOs, the constraints due to lack of human resources and financial resources are much more urgent challenges than constraints from Chinese government in the process of internationalisation (e.g. Interview 17, Interview 10).

The research shows that being GONGO or not alone does not indicate the exact NGO-government link in the internationalisation process and GONGOs are not necessarily more tied to government than independent NGOs, though the Obligators only consist of GONGOs and GONGOs tend to rely more on the governmental referrals for implementation in the host countries. Among NGOs focusing on different types of issues, humanitarian NGOs and sustainable development NGOs do have certain characteristics. For example, no Obligators are established solely for humanitarian assistance purpose and humanitarian NGOs need to rely mostly on non-governmental sources for fund-raising. In the implementation stage, humanitarian NGOs rely more on local connections, e.g. local Chinese business association, than Chinese governmental referrals for implementation but they usually notify Chinese embassies in the host country for their actions. Sustainable development NGOs tend to attract more funding from international foundations or organizations. Thus, they usually can work more independently from Chinese government, but they are never close to adopting a confrontational approach towards government.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has provided a comprehensive empirical account of how the state exerts its external influence through regulatory and supervision system and its intervention into operations of Chinese NGOs. The major structural state's influence comes from the regulation and supervision systems consisting of civil affairs, national security and foreign affairs systems, while the governmental influence can also be exerted through direct governmental involvement in NGOs' three-phase operations including initiation, financing and implementation. In the first layer, the regulatory layer of influence, structural forces imposed by the Chinese government have contoured Chinese NGOs' behavior while in the second layer, the operational layer of influence, Chinese NGOs exhibit diversity in their interactions with Chinese government. The first layer emphasizes on the structural forces from regulations imposed by the government while the second layer is more dominated by

the agencies of Chinese NGOs. The diversity of Chinese NGO-government links in the second layer shown in the research is against the claim that Chinese NGOs are sole extension of China's state-led model of development cooperation. Most Chinese NGOs are not fully state-led in terms of their project initiation, financing and implementation, even for GONGOs.

In addition to presenting the current state of Chinese NGOs' autonomy in internationalisation, this research can be considered as the initial step providing preliminary explanation to the diverse degrees of autonomy. For example, the current research shows that the variable of being a GONGO or independent NGO alone does not explain the complexity and degree of Chinese NGOs' autonomy. More future research can be done to explore different variables that cause such diverse interactions between Chinese NGOs and government. For example, international factors, such as international NGOs, which are important intermediaries in China's "going out" strategy (Farid and Li, 2021), can balance some Chinese NGOs' reliance on government as indicated in this research by sustainable development NGOs and host country specific contexts may play a role in affecting Chinese NGOs' relationship with government, as indicated in this research that it's more likely for Chinese NGOs to rely on governmental referrals for local implementation in some countries than others.

Chapter 6 The Shadow of the State: Depoliticisation and Diplomatisation

NGOs are not only potential agents of change on the ground, but also generators and carriers of norms, ideology, and cultural knowledge about global development (e.g. Dogra, 2012). The previous chapter has examined the autonomy of Chinese NGOs through explicit state's influence and the non-discursive behavior of NGOs, while this chapter is going to study the discourses of Chinese NGO, through which the ideological underpinnings of Chinese NGO internationalisation can be found. In other words, Chapter 5 is an examination of how Chinese NGOs act while this chapter is about what and how they "think". Through the analysis of NGOs' organizational discourses, I try to understand how Chinese NGOs view their internationalisation and explore their motivations behind their internationalisation which can hardly be detected by their explicit behaviours and interviews. I will also make analysis over the social contexts that influence the construction of their discourse. Particularly, I will demonstrate how the developmental imaginary and rationales of the Chinese state have an important impact on Chinese NGOs' discourses, while other international imaginaries are to a large extent absent from the discourse of Chinese NGOs overseas. The study shows that the Chinese state exerts its influence over the Chinese NGOs not only explicitly, as shown in the previous chapter, but also implicitly through shaping the sources of legitimacy and value for internationalisation.

Discourse is an inseparable part of social events and dialectically tied to other aspects of social events and doing research using some forms of discourse analysis can be effective way to understand social phenomenon (Fairclough, 2003). Particularly, discourses are influenced by the power of social structure and social practices (Fairclough, 2003). The influence coming from social structures and contexts over an organization can be studied through careful examination of organizational discourses. I will rely on two discursive analytical tools, one is qualitative content analysis and one is the discursive legitimation framework developed by Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999), to decipher the implicit meanings behind the Chinese NGOs' representation of their international development projects. The study finds that Chinese NGOs have shown depoliticised discourses and diplomatic discourses, either explicitly or implicitly, in their representation of their internationalisation. These discourses help Chinese NGOs achieve legitimation through four discursive legitimation strategies: avoidance, authority, rationalization and moralization. The underpinnings of these legitimation strategies have been largely influenced by the Chinese state. Thus, it shows that even though in most cases that the Chinese state does not influence directly over Chinese NGOs' international projects through material support (as illustrated in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5), its influence can still be exerted through being sources of legitimacy and value for Chinese NGOs.

This chapter begins with an introduction of studying NGOs' role by using discourse analysis, followed by an inductive analytical framework which contains two layers of discourse analysis, one layer adopting the qualitative content analysis to show what patterns or characteristics in the discourses of Chinese NGOs regarding their international development projects are, the other layer going one step further to examine how these discursive characteristics help Chinese NGOs achieve legitimacy based on Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999)'s discursive legitimation

framework. Both layers of analysis are to examine the underpinnings of Chinese NGOs' discursive practices. It then shows the main findings from the two-layer discourse analysis that Chinese NGOs have shown traits of depoliticisation and diplomatisation in their discourses and these traits help Chinese NGOs to achieve legitimacy through four discursive legitimisation strategies. Last, the article discusses and concludes how the Chinese state influences Chinese NGOs' behavior without explicit intervention but through influencing the sources of legitimacy and value for Chinese NGOs in their internationalisation.

6.1 Studying the Role of NGOs through Discourses and Representation

The study of the discourses and representation of NGOs is an important means of examining their role in international development, given that discourses could identify “appropriate and legitimate ways of practicing development as well as speaking and thinking about it” (Grillo and Stirrat, 1997, p12). One major group of such research centres on examining NGOs' representation of the Global South, which is done primarily through lens of post-colonialism. Authors like Escobar argue that development discourses “has created an extremely efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World” (Escobar, 1995, p9). The post-colonial lens has extended to the analysis of Northern NGOs. These NGOs are often criticized for their uncritical and decontextualized representations of the Global South. These representations ignore the diversity and complexity of the Global South and use Northern standards to define and measure “development”, reinforcing the understanding of the South through performances of poverty and victimization (Keenaghan and Reilly, 2017). They fail to critically unpack root causes of poverty and underdevelopment, which have their root in a colonial legacy of Northern hegemony. As analyzed by Dogra (2012) through 88 INGOs based in UK, INGOs remain complicit with colonial way of seeing in their messages by depoliticizing and dehistoricising lives in the South and portraying non-westerners as backward and westerners as advanced, reproducing the colonial perception of the South.

The second major group of research studying NGOs' discourses scatters around NGOs' development practices, such as NGOs' relationship with local partners, relationship with donors, and advocacy strategy. In other words, the first group of research studying NGOs' representation of the Global South represents a distinctive area of research in the study of NGO discourses, while the second group can be considered as studies other than this distinctive group that covers a variety of studies on NGO practices through the analysis of NGO discourses. The media of discourse and representation under study also covers a wide variety, including NGO annual reports, funding application forms, and interviews of NGO leaders. Some examples of this group of study include that, Schöneberg (2017) shows a narrative of trickle-down pressures with NGOs having to position themselves as intermediaries in the development system through a discourse analysis of the interactions of INGOs and Haitian local organisations. Duval and Gendron (2020) show how an INGO engages in an alternative discourse through dynamic adaptation and creates participatory discourses despite the increased dominance of neoliberal ideas. Duval et al. (2015) show how funders exert a framing influence on NGOs through an arrangement of the information required by the Canadian International Development Agency in grant applications and limit NGOs' role as performers that deliver aid technically and narrowly. These studies show that the study of NGO discourses has the analytical power to address major debates related to NGOs and development. This research falls under the second

group, focusing on NGOs' discourses and representation of their own behavior instead of how they represent the Global South.

6.2 Analysing the Discourses of Chinese NGOs: Two-level Analytical Framework

This study adopts a two-layer analysis over the discourses of Chinese NGOs. The first layer answers what patterns or characteristics are shown in the discourses of Chinese NGOs regarding their international development projects, particularly, if there is any sign of state's influence. The second question goes one layer further to examine how these discursive characteristics help Chinese NGOs achieve legitimacy. Both layers of analysis are to examine the underpinning of Chinese NGOs' discursive practices. I have adopted qualitative content analysis (QCA) as the method to approach the first layer "what" question and the discursive legitimation framework created by Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) to approach the second layer "how" question.

The first layer of analysis is aimed at finding out the characteristics of the discourses of Chinese NGOs from numerous public documents of Chinese NGOs. QCA, "a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns" (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, p1278), is adopted in the study. QCA can condense large amount of data and identify core consistencies and meanings that are generated from a volume of qualitative materials (Patton, 2002, p453). QCA can be applied to a wide range of materials such as interview transcripts, websites, advertisements, news articles and it can be applied to both verbal and visual materials (Schreier, 2012).

The discourses under study of QCA are organizational discourses published in the public documents of Chinese NGOs. Organisational discourse is "structured collections of texts embodied in the practices of talking and writing that bring organisationally related objects into being as these texts are produced, disseminated and consumed" (Grant et al., 2004, p3). In this study, organisational discourses are collected through two channels. One is from public statements published on official websites, via the major Chinese social media - WeChat public accounts, and in official documents (e.g. annual reports) from 16 major Chinese NGOs that are active in internationalisation; the other channel is from all international fundraising advertisements of Tencent Charity, a major Chinese public fundraising website for international projects. In total, there are 660 documents (each press release, article in WeChat or annual report is considered a single document), including 91 English-language documents (some are mere translations of the Chinese version) from the 2015–2021 from 45 Chinese NGOs (most of them are only studied through the second channel, the fundraising advertisements). This represents nearly one third of Chinese NGOs with international projects, based on the NGO Internationalisation Database. The 16 Chinese NGOs studied in depth represent a large variety of Chinese NGOs with international development projects (see the list of the 16 NGOs in Table 5 in Chapter 2). They include 4 GONGOs and 12 independent NGOs; one humanitarian-only NGO, one NGO solely engaging in COVID donations and 14 NGOs with development activities.

The unit of analysis of QCA is each NGO instead of each publication of NGO. A variety of publications from Chinese NGOs are used and they cannot be directly comparable with each other. For example, it's hard to directly compare an annual report from NGO A to a press release of NGO B. Therefore, the first step of the analysis is to streamline data and make each unit of analysis comparable. Based on the content of Chinese NGOs' public statements and

documents, I have categorized all texts and images from each document into one of four topic groups: purpose (Why do Chinese NGOs do international projects?), issues (What are the issues that concern them? What is the background of these issues?), action (What do they do and how do they accomplish it?), and outcomes (What do they aim to achieve?). These four topic groups are basic elements of an NGO's project and can be widely applicable to the contents from different documents and across diverse range of NGOs. This process streamlines and describes the large amount of data, providing an analytical foundation for pattern tracing across discourses first in each of the group and then across the four groups. Table 16 shows an example of how I put different texts from different publications from Amity Foundation into the four topic groups.

After this process, I start to identify and code meaning units, which are the smallest units that contain constellation of words, sentences or paragraphs containing aspects related to each other and helping to answer the research questions (Catanzaro, 1988). I then condense these meaning units for simplicity. I categorize the condensed meaning units into categories and different themes according to the standards of Graneheim and Lundman (2004), which states that QCA can be applied to both manifest and latent contents and the terms "category" and "theme" should be used to denote manifest and latent contents respectively with "theme" showing a deeper level of interpretation and higher level of abstraction than "category". I have generated three exclusive categories from the meaning units, soft charity discourses, explicit diplomatic discourses and implicit diplomatic discourses and further generate two themes from the three categories, which are depoliticisation and diplomatisation. Figure 5 shows an example of how some of the texts from Amity Foundation shown in Table 16 were analysed. The same process applies to all other NGOs and to images if they are shown in the documents.

Table 16: Examples of Categorizing Texts into Four Topic Groups

Four Topic Groups	Examples of Categorization of Texts
Purpose	<p>Therefore, the Amity Foundation immediately launched the Amity Ethiopia "Huo Shui Xing" disaster relief operation, aiming to effectively alleviate the local disaster situation, avoid the health related crisis that may be caused by it, and further enhance the friendly cooperation and friendship between the people of China and Egypt. More importantly, this action also shows that Amity, being a member of Chinese social organizations, actively responds to the Chinese government's "One Belt One Road" development strategy, accumulates experience for Chinese social organizations to “go out” through actions, and tries to realize the goal of achieving the charity objectives and building people-to-people bonds in "One Belt One Road".</p> <p>--From press release “The Amity Foundation went to Ethiopia to carry out the "Living Water Walk" disaster relief operation” (“爱德基金会赴埃塞俄比亚进行“活水行”赈灾行动”)</p> <p>In order to promote the friendly exchanges and resource sharing between Chinese and African people, promote the development of African society, and improve the service quality of Amity to African customers, on July 1, 2015, Amity Africa Office and Amity Printing Africa Customer Service Center opened in the capital of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, officially.</p> <p>--From press release “Amity landed in Africa and started the process of internationalisation” (“爱德落地非洲，开启国际化进程”)</p>
Issue	<p>“Days of torrential rain have caused the worst flooding in 14 years in central and southern Sri Lanka. Floods and landslides have killed more than 200 people and left 96 missing.”</p> <p>--From press release “Level I Response! Amity International Rescue Medical Team went to Sri Lanka to carry out flood relief” (“I 级响应！爱德国际救援医疗队赴斯里兰卡开展洪灾救援”)</p> <p>Africa is suffering from severe drought: In 2016, the drought caused by the El Niño phenomenon swept across the entire sub-Saharan African region. The rainy season in this area was seriously insufficient, which led to serious water and food security crises.</p> <p>--From press release “Please support Africa's Ethiopian drought emergency relief efforts” (“请支持非洲埃塞俄比亚旱灾紧急救援工作”)</p>
Action	<p>In order to gain a deeper understanding of the disaster situation and urgent needs of the victims from the mountains, the Amity Foundation rescue team selected two people to form two research teams working with the Nepal Office of the International Disaster</p>

Relief Alliance, facing the risks of aftershocks and secondary disasters that may occur at any time. They went to Gorkha District, the epicentre of Kathmandu, and Sindhupalchok, the hardest-hit area, the day before yesterday and yesterday respectively, to conduct research work on the local demands.

--from press release “Amity and “Ni” being together—the 6th Issue of Rescue Brief” “爱德和 “尼” 在一起救灾简讯第六期”

On the afternoon of July 7th, Amity disaster relief working group composed of 4 people, He Wen, Deputy Secretary-General of Amity Foundation, Zheng Wei, Director of Amity Africa Office, Zhang Zhengdong, Permanent Representative of Amity Africa Office, and Wei Wei, Project Director of Amity Africa Office, set off from the Nanjing headquarters of the Amity Foundation to Ethiopia for conducting water disaster relief activities.”

--from press release “The Amity Foundation went to Ethiopia to carry out the "Living Water Walk" disaster relief operation” “爱德基金会赴埃塞俄比亚进行 “活水行” 赈灾行动”

Outcome


On the one-year anniversary of the earthquake in Nepal, we are back again in Nepal, to the communities we have rebuilt. All three communities have established multiple women's development groups, the largest group has 72 members and the smallest also has 32 members.

--from press release “Support across borders, full disclosure on the first anniversary of the Nepal earthquake” “跨越国界的支援尼泊尔地震一周年全披露”

Sumina Shrestha told Amity staff about her dream while laughing “I hear China is very big, very beautiful, and I hope I can go there to study someday” (Amity Foundation, 2015)

--from press release “Amity and “Ni” being together—the 4th Issue of Rescue Brief” “爱德和 “尼” 在一起救灾简讯第四期”

Figure 5: Example of Process of Qualitative Content Analysis



Through an inductive process of QCA, I have identified the two themes (major characteristics) of Chinese NGOs' discourses in relation to the Chinese development cooperation as depoliticisation and diplomatisation. Here depoliticisation refers to actions that avoid discussing political causes and providing political solutions to the problem in international development. Chinese NGOs usually focus on the symptoms of underdevelopment instead of giving a critical reflection, e.g. avoiding addressing political issues such as inequality and social justice. Moreover, Chinese NGOs "diplomatised" their roles in international projects, presenting themselves as friendship ambassadors for China. The tendency of depoliticisation and diplomatisation is evident in all four topic groups (see a summary in Table 17). In the following two sections, I will illustrate how discourses under each topic group are characterised by depoliticisation and diplomatisation respectively. Only translated English texts (Texts 1-24) will be shown in the main contexts of this chapter, while the original Chinese texts are attached in Appendix 1.

Table 17: Four-Group Analytical Framework of Discourse Analysis and Examples Shown by Chinese NGOs under Each Group

Theme/ Characteristics	The Purpose	The Issue	The Action	The Outcome
De-politicisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Positive connotation: "to make something better" (Lack of attention on (in)equality or (in)justice) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Constructing problems as a series of "lacks" (Lack of deep reflection on causes) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Images of official support (Avoiding negative attitudes towards all stakeholders) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Outcomes based on quantifiable and immediate results (lack of results addressing systematic problems)
Diplomatisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Using explicit diplomatic discourses that are often used by the Chinese state, such as "BRI", "promote China's image" 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Introducing Chinese state action in the background ● When explaining why the issue matters - China's responsibility to help ● When describing the recipient country - China being the neighbour of the recipient country 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Goods with Chinese cultural symbols ● Displaying the Chinese flag onsite 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Showing appreciation to China/the Chinese people

In the second-layer analysis, I go further from showing what discursive characteristics are shown from Chinese NGOs to explaining how these characteristics help Chinese NGOs legitimise themselves in internationalisation by relying on the discursive legitimisation framework of Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999). According to Suchman (1995), legitimacy is "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions". Suchman (1995) also acknowledges that legitimisation is a process that rests heavily on communication and involves both actions and discourses. To survive and sustain themselves, NGOs must communicate in a particular way that is perceived appropriate to a social and political system. The analysis of how NGOs legitimize themselves through discourses could provide insights into how social structure and social contexts, which are "the totality of conditions under which discourse is being produced, circulated and interpreted" (Blommaert,

2005, p251), make an impact on Chinese NGOs' behaviour, particularly, how the Chinese state as an important part of the social contexts influence the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs.

I rely on the discursive legitimation framework of Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999), which links discourses to social contexts through legitimacy, to examine how Chinese NGOs legitimise themselves through discourses. Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) identified four major categories of discursive legitimation strategies – authorisation (legitimation by reference to the authority), rationalisation (legitimation by reference to the goals and uses of institutionalized social action and to the knowledge society has constructed to endow them with cognitive validity), moralisation (legitimation by reference to value systems), and mythopoesis (legitimation conveyed through narratives whose outcomes reward legitimate actions and punish non-legitimate actions). This analytical framework has been widely applied and adapted to analyse different discursive practices (e.g. Fairclough, 2003; Joutsenvirta, 2013; Mackay, 2015; Reyes, 2011; Vaara et al., 2006; Vaara, 2014) and the elements of the framework can be used either separately or in combination. In this study, I have particularly identified authority, rationalisation and moralisation from the framework as three discursive legitimation strategies for Chinese NGOs to gain legitimacy. However, Van Leeuwen and Wodak's framework has only looked at what discourses have been constructed. I will extend their framework by adding another discursive strategy, “avoidance”, to take into account the discourses that have not been created. Avoided discourses can also contribute to gaining legitimacy through avoiding de-legitimacy. In sum, I have identified avoidance, authority, rationalisation, and moralisation as four ways that Chinese NGOs have made to achieve legitimacy and avoid de-legitimacy.

6.3 Depoliticisation of Development through Soft Charity Discourses

The discussion of depoliticisation in development has been brought up to attention since the influential analysis done by Ferguson on the Thaba-Tseka Development Project in Lesotho (Ferguson, 1994). Ferguson argues that the “development” apparatus in Lesotho, becoming an “anti-politics machine”, depoliticises the problems of poverty and deprivation and acts only as a practical and technical tool for the solutions, while in the end, almost unnoticed, it expands the bureaucratic state power. Ever since, depoliticisation has been discussed extensively in different contexts. For example, Harriss (2002) argues that the idea of “social capital”, prevalent in World Bank, is an additional weapon in the armory of the “anti-politics machine” that is mystified to depoliticise the problems of poverty and social justice. Chhotray (2007) illustrates the complexity behind governmental attempts to depoliticise India's national watershed development programme. Hunsmann (2016)'s study on international AIDS control in Tanzania illustrates how political causes of the conflict in global health practices are neglected.

NGOs have also been criticized as new attachments to the “anti-politics machine” (e.g. Harriss, 2002). NGOs are instrumentalized by development bureaucracies to solve problems that should be addressed through political solutions. Their political roles, loaded with potentials to challenge the status-quo and politicise issues, are coopted into the large bureaucratic “development” apparatus. The reliance of NGOs on foreign aid and government funding is a deciding cause for their depoliticising, as illustrated by Atia and Herrold (2018) through examination of the NGO sectors in both Pakistan and Morocco. They find that the dominant funding from both foreign aid and/or government to NGOs has enabled a patron-grantee relationship, resulting in increased upward accountability and the depoliticisation of NGO agendas which diluted activism and prioritized service provision.

Considering the compromised autonomy that Chinese NGOs usually have in a regulatory environment that requires them to be cautious about political issues, one may not be optimistic about Chinese NGOs on their potential to (re)politicise development. The discourse analysis confirms this hypothesis that Chinese NGOs have rarely used any discourse that address the systematic causes behind underdevelopment or touched upon political issues such as inequality and social injustice. Chinese NGOs' discourses in their representation are largely "soft charity discourses", a concept that I have derived from Andreotti (2014)'s work on global citizenship education, where she introduces the "soft understanding" of development, a view that focuses on symptoms of underdevelopment instead of a critical view that reflects upon global power relations that cause injustice, the so-called "critical understanding" of development in global citizenship education. The texts analyzed unveil that the soft charity discourses of Chinese NGOs are constituted throughout the four topic groups, purpose, issue, process, and outcome as shown in Table 17.

Purpose

The purpose statements of Chinese NGOs usually have a positive connotation, the construction of which are often in the simple form of "to make something better" or "to provide something", such as "to promote students' overall development", "to promote the improvement of the production and livelihood in the areas with poverty" "to make children free of AIDS", "to provide food for the children in hunger" "to promote awareness for wildlife protection in Africa". There is no single NGO under study that has vocabularies related to (in)equality and (in)justice in their purpose statements. The statement of "to make something better" idealizes the charity work and distracts readers' attention from thinking about deeper questions on distributional injustice or inequality, which are important to make fundamental changes.

Issues

When Chinese NGOs describe the issues or the background for requiring actions, they usually construct the problems based on a series of statements showing what the recipients lack and use statistics to show severity of the problems, as shown in Text 1, an excerpt of an online fundraising advertisement from China Charities and Foundation for Children describing why the NGO needs to fundraise. Text 1 uses several statistics to show that children in Nigeria lack schools and education. People in the recipient countries are described in dire situations that they lack education, electricity, water, food, medical service among others. However, there is little thought-provoking discourses of the causes to these problems. Causes are mentioned briefly in simple phrases, such as "years of economic sanctions and political turmoil" in Text 2, which has no further elaboration on what kind of economic sanctions and political turmoil and how they lead to poverty in Myanmar. One of the most frequent cited causes are natural disasters, such as the Covid pandemic and locust plague in Text 4, and conflicts and wars, as shown in Text 3, 4, 5. The advent of natural disasters is often seen as something beyond human control so no stakeholder should be responsible for it, while conflicts mentioned alone without any reflection on the causes of conflicts may mask other more profound and systematic reasons for the suffering. All the problems are illustrated as something that occurs naturally, and NGOs simply take them from where they are now. There is no reflection over any system nor criticism over any agencies that may be held accountable.

Text 1:

Local education situation: Nigerian primary school enrollment fees are high (10,000-40,000 RMB), and school-aged children cannot go to school; There are

300+ ethnic minorities and 200+ languages in Nigeria, and there is an urgent need to establish schools; Nigeria has 12 million children out of school, the most in the world. (China Charities and Foundation for Children n.d)

Text 2:

Due to years of **economic sanctions and political turmoil**, Myanmar's economic development has stagnated and its infrastructure, especially electricity, is seriously lacking. The national poverty rate is 37.5%, and low-income people with a per capita daily income of less than 1.25 US dollars (about 8 yuan) account for 40% of the total population, making it one of the poorest countries in Asia. (GEI, 2016)

Text 3:

Syria has been **at war for more than six years since its civil war** broke out in 2011. In what has been called the "worst humanitarian disaster in the 21st century", more than 520,000 people lost their lives, 12 million were displaced, and 6 million depended on humanitarian aid. Among them, more than 2.3 million children became refugees and struggled on the edge of death. (Suzhou Love Zone Charity Foundation, 2017)

Text 4:

China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation decided to launch the Smiling Children project providing free meals to schools in Ethiopia's Addis Ababa City. As 2020 begins, the situation becomes more severe.

1) **Covid pandemic:** The epidemic has not yet ended in Ethiopia. There are 26,070 confirmed cases. At present, about 1,000 new cases are being diagnosed every day. This already reaches the highest capacity of Ethiopia's daily testing.

2) **Locust plague:** A swarm of locusts covering one square kilometer of land can eat the equivalent of 35,000 people's food a day. Ethiopia, as the center of the locust plague, already has more than 40% of the country's population suffering from malnutrition.

3) **Violent conflicts:** 100,000 people have been displaced by conflict in northern Ethiopia and 1.1 million may be trapped in hardship.

4) **Hunger:** The World Food Programme states in the "State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2021" that a total of 720 million to 811 million people in the world will face hunger in 2020. By taking the median value which is 768 million, the number of hungry people in 2020 will increase compared to 2019 by about 118 million. (CFPA, 2021a)

Text 5:

Since the late 1970s of the 20th century, the unrest in Central Asia has profoundly affected the world. Some 2.7 million Afghans have been forcibly displaced **by war, conflict and violence**. Neighboring Pakistan, which is also a developing country, tolerated and accommodated 1.4 million of them. The

sudden influx of people exacerbates the shortage of natural resources. In (refugee) receiving communities, life can be fraught with hardship: villages are often far apart, and limited locations for water collection require residents to walk hundreds of meters every day to collect water. When the weather is hot, there is no power supply and electrical appliances to store and preserve food and medicine. People can only cook with fire, but firewood is expensive. Nonetheless, over the past four decades, Pakistan has made great efforts to resettle and protect Afghan refugees and support the maintenance of regional peace.

(China Biodiversity Conservation and Green Development Foundation, 2021)

Action

When Chinese NGOs describe how they conduct their programs, the discourses avoid negative attitude towards all kinds of stakeholders including any kind of governments or institutions. In some cases, they explicitly show discourses and images about governmental support. As shown in Text 6, a Chinese civil rescue team Shenzhen Rescue Volunteers Federation has shown positive attitude towards the Iranian government which provided support to their disaster relief work. Another notable phenomenon is to show images with the presence of officials in the launching ceremonies, either from the Chinese side or from the host country or both, such as Figure 6 and 7. It shows that Chinese NGOs take officials' role as an integrated part of their programs, which indicates that their actions are within what officials allow. They take authority's support as a source of legitimacy, staying within the approaches allowed by governments instead of trying to be critical of government agencies' role in development.

Text 6:

The Iranian national government and the local government expressed their gratitude to the civil rescue forces from various countries in the disaster area and provided the necessary conditions for carrying out rescue work... (Shenzhen Rescue Volunteers Federation, 2018)

Figure 6. Local Education Director in Myanmar Attends the Launching Ceremony of An Educational Development Project (Yundi, 2017a)



Figure 7. Chinese Officials and Ethiopian Officials Attended the Project Launch Ceremony of Water Sanitation Program in Ethiopia (Amity Foundation, 2017a)



Outcome

Then, Chinese NGOs construct outcomes based on immediate impact. From school stationaries, food bags to solar lighting equipment, Chinese NGOs usually illustrate outcomes or expected outcomes based on tangible and often quantifiable and immediate results, as illustrated in Text 7 and Text 8, where “158 food bags”, “390 students”, “12 teachers” are all tangible, quantifiable and immediate results. These outcomes often have a linear relationship with the amount of donation. One more donation can lead to one more set of goods donated and one more person benefited. This is nothing new in fundraising, as such immediate quantifiable results tend to be more attractive to donors because they can see the results of charity more readily (Bush, 2015). However, the quantification prevents the more underlying and systematic problems being exposed, challenged and discussed.

Overall, there is lack of reflective, critical and transformative understanding on global development issues shown in the discourses and representation of Chinese NGOs. Chinese NGOs use soft charity discourses, phrasing the purpose of the projects without addressing inequality or injustice, constructing the development issues as a set of specific lacks, showing images and positive gesture towards government officials, and presenting the solutions with a quick and quantifiable goods and services. They present a simplistic view of global development, instead of making critical reflections on systematic causes of global problems and taking political attempts to address global injustice.

Text 7:

*The International Free Lunch Project delivered **158 food bags to 150 students and 8 teachers** at Recada Primary School in Masare, the second largest slum in Nairobi, Kenya (Lunch For Children, 2020a).*

Text 8:

*The project will directly benefit **390 students and 12 teachers**, and indirectly benefit residents living near the school. A school with **280 students and 10 teachers** will be directly benefited from the construction of new school buildings and the addition of classroom supplies, and a school with **110 students and 2 teachers** will be directly benefited from the distribution of learning supplies.(Amity Foundation, 2017b)*

6.4 Diplomatisation of International Charities

It is notable that Chinese NGO representation exceeds mere charity. Whether explicitly or implicitly, Chinese NGOs “diplomatisation” their roles by, presenting themselves as friendship ambassadors for China. Unlike many large international NGOs, which do not explicitly show the national identity of their origin, Chinese NGOs show strong national identity. Their international projects are often concerned with China’s relations with other nations, especially regarding how these actions can positively promote China’s image and foreign relations.

Purpose

Some Chinese NGOs explicitly employ discourses often used in Chinese foreign affairs, such as “responding to the national Belt and Road Initiative”, “help build A Community with a Shared Future for Mankind (*renlei mingyun gongtongti/人类命运共同体*)”, “promote People-to-People Bond (*minxin xiangtong/民心相通*)” (as shown in Text 9). It is not surprising to see Chinese NGOs using the term “Belt and Road initiative”, as it has become a buzzword used in many occasions related to international issues in China. The roles of Chinese NGOs in building people-to-people bonds in BRI countries have been officially referenced in the Action Plan for People-to-People Bond in the Belt and Road Initiative for Chinese Social Organisations (2017–20), thus “People-to-People Bond” is often referred to by Chinese NGOs. “Community with Shared Future for Mankind” is another archetypal phrase in the Chinese official discourse, which was firstly introduced in the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012 and since then has been frequently cited in President Xi’s key domestic and international speeches, a manifestation of the Chinese government’s rhetoric of mutual and peaceful development and cooperation. By referring to “Community with Shared Future for Mankind”, Chinese NGOs show no hesitation to present themselves as peace-loving friendship ambassadors of the Chinese nation. The above-mentioned phrases are commonly used in combinations to emphasize their congruousness with the top official guidance.

Some Chinese NGOs may not use any official diplomatic discourses as discussed above. Instead, they simply use straightforward discourses such as “promoting China-X country friendship”. Such examples can be seen in the project objective of Yundi’s children’s project in Myanmar (as shown in Text 10) and program description of Rainbow Volunteers for their volunteering project in Nepal (as shown in Text 11). Yundi states explicitly that its educational project in the refugee camp in northern Myanmar is to contribute to the China and Myanmar relationship, while the last sentence of Rainbow Volunteer Club’s project description explicitly states that the project is not only for humanitarian reasons but also for the relationship between China and Nepal. One thing to note that Rainbow Volunteer Club is a relatively independent Chinese NGO with no governmental background and funding. Rainbow Volunteer does not state BRI or other official diplomatic terms in any of its public presentation, but still shows diplomatic intention. It shows that diplomatization is not only specific to GONGO, from which more official diplomatic phrases are used though. Discourses about promoting China’s image is another example of how Chinese NGOs show explicit diplomatic intention. As shown in Text 12, China Biodiversity Conservation and Green Development Foundation (CBCGDF) shows a responsibility to reverse China’s image by participating in the issues that Chinese are often blamed for. By presenting a cause to its involvement in international wildlife

conservation being to improve China's image, the Chinese NGO shows its intention to contribute to the soft power of China.

Of the 16 NGOs in this study, 8 have adopted such language at least once in stating the purpose or meaning of their projects. Such discourses with diplomatic connotations are almost never used in isolation and are always used in addition to discourses about charity. Text 9, an excerpt from CFPA's Panda Pack project, shows that the diplomatic discourses "extend the friendship of the Chinese people" and "promote People-to-People Bond" are stated following discourses relating to the charitable or humanitarian purposes of the NGO's projects – "to improve the learning conditions of needy primary school students" – signalling that the diplomatic meaning of the development projects exceeds basic humanitarian causes and is grander and more dignified.

The diplomatisation is often explicit when it references official Chinese diplomatic or strategic discourses such as "A Community with a Shared Future for Mankind", "the BRI", and "to promote China's relationship with other countries". GONGOs tend to more likely to use explicit diplomatisation. All 4 GONGOs in the study have used explicit diplomatic discourses in their purpose statements, though such use of explicit diplomatisation is not only limited to GONGOs. On the other hand, diplomatisation can be more subtle and implicit in the other three topics, issues, action and outcomes. 14 out of the 16 NGOs under in-depth study have exhibited at least one sign of diplomatisation through implicit diplomatic discourses, including with their use of images, showing the prevalence of diplomatisation across both GONGOs and non-GONGOs. Such implicit discourses often have a strong national identity subtly connoting the promotion of China.

Text 9:

*The project is a specific action to **respond to the national 'Belt and Road Initiative'** and help build **A Community with a Shared Future for Mankind**. It aims to improve the learning conditions of needy primary school students in developing countries along the 'Belt and Road' route, promote the overall development of students, and **extend the friendship of the Chinese people, promote People-to-People Bond, and build the bridge of friendship**. (CFPA, 2020)*

Text 10:

*Overall goal: To train Burmese teachers, improve educational facilities, help children obtain education, cultivate a good community and support environment, and contribute **to the long-term friendship and peace between China and Myanmar**. (Yundi, 2017)*

Text 11:

*In January, Rainbow Volunteer Club's second volunteer trip to Nepal was launched. Through exchanges of volunteers, more friends have gained a deep and objective understanding of a country, expanded their own horizons and created more possibilities for the future from different perspectives such as culture, economy, society, national development and future challenges, through the role of front-line volunteering. At the same time, Chinese and Nepalese volunteers and social workers **are building friendship between the peoples of***

the two countries while promoting the spirit of humanity. (Rainbow Volunteer Club, 2019)

Text 12:

*Internationally, when people talk about the protection of African elephants, the Chinese are always criticized - after all, they are a major country in the ivory trade and large amount of ivory trade naturally boost the killing of elephant by poachers. But China has pledged to completely ban the processing and sale of ivory for commercial use by the end of 2017. Together with our efforts, we will work with all parties to **gradually reverse the image of the Chinese in Africa** as an international wildlife conservationist. Chinese people can also be heroes to protect African elephants! (China Biodiversity Conservation and Green Development Foundation (CBCGDF), 2017)*

Issues

When Chinese NGOs present the background of an issue, they often bring China or the Chinese state into the discourse. One way they do this is to mention the Chinese state's contribution to resolving the issue before introducing what the NGO itself has planned or accomplished. Text 13, an excerpt from the press release of RamUnion's disaster relief action in Mozambique, introduces the Chinese state-led national rescue team's actions at the beginning of the press release.

When introducing why the NGO is working on an issue, some NGOs mention that it's China's responsibility to help international society, as shown in Text 14, an excerpt from a fundraising advertisement from Lingshan Charity Foundation. Such statements imply that one reason for an NGO to pursue international projects is to help fulfil China's international responsibilities.

When introducing the country where their project is located, some NGOs use language that describes these countries as China's neighbours, even if they are not geographically proximate. Through the concept of "neighbourhood", Chinese NGOs elevate the discourse from an organisational to a national level, as a neighbourhood refers to a relationship between China and other countries and typically indicates a close relationship or friendship. Text 15 from the Rainbow Volunteer Club describes China and Nepal as neighbours and Text 16 from Yundi describes China and Myanmar as neighbours, which are literally the cases, while Text 17 from Lunch For Children uses "neighbourhood" to metaphorically describe the relationship between Kenya and China, two countries quite distant from each other. The sentence "*xiangzhi wu yuanjin, wanli shang wei lin/相知无远近,万里尚为邻*" (Mutual understanding disregards distance; neighbors can live even thousands of miles apart)" is derived from a traditional Chinese poem. It signifies that as long as there is sufficient mutual understanding and trust, a relationship can be as close as neighbours despite the distance.

Text 13:

*At the request of the Mozambican government, a group of 65 people with supplies **from the Chinese National Rescue Team** took a chartered plane and arrived at the area struck by the hurricane, Beira, Mozambique, on March 25. This is also the first time that the National Emergency Management Department has sent emergency humanitarian relief operations overseas in the name of the country. (RamUnion, 2019a)*

Text 14:

*In the past, we **used to be a recipient country**, having received donations and aid from the world's developed countries and various international organisations. Today, as China grows strong, **it's our time to take international responsibility for the international community**. (Lingshan Charity Foundation, 2015)*

Text 15:

*It has been hard to get to the top of the mountain where the primary school is. **When looking up, one can see China on the other side**. (Rainbow Volunteer Club, 2015)*

Text 16:

*The Yunnan-Myanmar border is 1997 kilometers long. The second special zone of Kachin State (Mai Ja Yang) of Myanmar **is connected by mountains and rivers with Longchuan County**, Yunnan Province. Both sides of the border are of Jingpo ethnic group. (Yundi, 2017b)*

Text 17:

*Mutual understanding disregards distance; **neighbors** can live even thousands of miles apart [...] Thank you to all of you who have supported the international free lunch project and sent them lunch. Because of you, we have been able to establish such a beautiful friendship with children thousands of miles away. (Lunch For Children, 2020b)*

Action

Diplomatisation is commonly presented through the promotion of Chinese culture as part of the projects. Figures 8–10 demonstrate that some Chinese NGOs present Chinese culture as part of a donation: gifts imprinted with images of dragons, Peking opera, or pandas exhibit a message that exceeds the cause of charity. These gifts have a strong Chinese identity that reminds the recipients that the gifts are not merely from the organisation but also from the country of China. Besides the culture promoting messages sent from the pictures, some Chinese NGOs show straightforward intention for culture promotion through texts. As shown in Text 18, the deputy director of Amity Foundation spoke of the hope that more children in its educational program in Cambodia could learn Chinese and have more understanding of China, while as shown in Text 19, Yundi shows similar intention in its own educational program in Cambodia. To Chinese NGOs, promoting Chinese culture and donating goods are two positive things that can be combined. These organisations consider Chinese culture valuable and take it as a means of showing friendliness. Particularly, as seen in all the above examples, cultural promotion is commonly seen in projects related to children, who are generally more acceptable to new things and are seen as the future. These Chinese NGOs try to generate a positive attitude towards China among the young generations by making them interested in the Chinese culture through charity programs.

Figure 8-9. T-shirts Donated to Nepalese Children (Rainbow Volunteer Club, 2016)



Figure 10. A School Bag and Stationary Set Donated to Children Overseas (CFPA,2020)



Text 18:

*At the launching ceremony of the project, Ms. Yu Hongyu, Deputy Secretary-General of Amity Foundation, said that children are the future and hope of the world, and the future and development of children determine the future and development of the world. She hopes that **through reading and learning Chinese**, children can have broad vision, gaining more knowledge and imagination in this era of rapid development of information. She **also hopes that the children can learn Chinese well and understand China's splendid civilization**, magnificent rivers and mountains and enthusiastic people. (Amity Foundation, 2019)*

Text 19:

*The overall objective: through the introduction of modern Chinese educational concepts and methods, the conditions for teaching and cultural and sports activities in campus will be improved, **the exchange of Chinese and Cambodian cultures among the next generation in Cambodia will be promoted, and Cambodian children will be more recognized and yearned for the Chinese culture**. At the same time, a group of volunteers who are close to*

the people and China are cultivated. The promotion of Chinese language and Chinese culture will enable Yunnan's foreign aid projects to be recognized and to have long-term and far-reaching influence in the recipient countries, and promote the bond between the people of China and Cambodia. (Yundi, 2018)

Another route of diplomatisation is through displaying Chinese national flags when the NGOs conduct activities in a host country. Some NGOs present the national flags of China and the host country in project launching ceremony (as shown in Figure 7). Such ceremonies are often attended by officials from both countries. Sometimes Chinese NGOs show Chinese flag on site, as shown in Figure 11. Displaying the Chinese national flag sends a strong diplomatic message as if the project were endorsed by the Chinese government in order to promote the relationship between China and the host country. Though this occurs more frequently with GONGOs, some independent NGOs do show similar behaviour. Especially, when humanitarian assistance is provided, some Chinese NGOs (though not GONGOs) display the national flag onsite (see Figure 12); this runs contrary to the international practice of NGOs often deliberately not displaying national flags when overseas on humanitarian operations (Calhoun, 2017). Such displays muddle the pure humanitarian incentive with diplomatic motivations, which may lead people to mistakenly believe a project represents official Chinese aid.

Figure 11. Staff Distributed Food Packs to Local Recipients (CFPA, n.d.a)



Figure 12. Humanitarian Action in Mozambique (RamUnion, 2019b)



Outcomes

To show outcomes, it is common for Chinese NGOs to use local recipient testimonies that are filled with admiration for and gratitude to China. As shown in Texts 20-22 about feedback from local communities, all three NGOs use China or Chinese related complements to show the satisfaction of the recipients. By including feedback associated with China in public presentations, Chinese NGOs emphasise their national identity over their organisational identity, as if one of the organisation's most significant achievements was bolstering China's image.

Apart from the local recipient testimonies, local cheering messages to China during the COVID-19 are commonly shown in the official publications of Chinese NGOs, as shown in Text 23-24 and Figure 13-14. These local blessing to China during the Covid outbreak have clearly shown that Chinese NGOs identify themselves more than a mere charity organization, but a bridge of friendship between China and the world.

Text 20:

"I hear China is very big, very beautiful, and I hope I can go there to study someday"(Amity Foundation, 2015)

Text 21:

"Today, as a beneficiary, Nazhu received the love of the Chinese people"
(CFPA, 2021b)

Text 22:

"With the support of China, I have the confidence to build our school better... I also want to let children know more about China and the world through the Internet. I really thank China for giving her and the students so much help"
(Yundi, 2018)

Text 23:

The mountains and rivers are different, the wind and the moon are in the same sky. Please receive the same piece of love from the same piece of sky. After hearing about the novel coronavirus pneumonia in China, the lovely Nepalese children and Nepalese colleagues, at the Rainbow School in Kathmandu, spontaneously prayed for China and cheered for China together! (Rainbow Volunteer Club, 2020)

Text 24:

Two days later, in the Masare community, there is loud cheering for China and Wuhan. Thousands of teachers and students from 10 elementary schools walked through the main roads of the community with posters made by themselves, blessing all the way to China and Wuhan. (Lunch for Children, 2020b)

Figure 13-14 Nepalese Children Sending Prayers to China (Rainbow Volunteer Club, 2020)



6.5 Discursive Legitimation Strategies

Avoidance

Avoidance is a type of discursive strategies that certain discourses are absent to avoid risking legitimacy. As illustrated in the previous section, Chinese NGOs have avoided using critical discourses related to inequality and injustice and avoided challenging any governmental agencies when they describe their purposes, elucidate the issue of concerns, and illustrate their actions and outcomes. Such discursive practice avoids the risks of de-legitimation from the major stakeholders, including from the Chinese state. Though the Chinese state does not have comprehensive regulation or control specifically over the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs yet, the existing regulations governing Chinese NGOs have been enough to constrain the behaviour of Chinese NGOs. As shown in Chapter 4 and 5, to avoid a negative response from the state, Chinese NGOs avoid confrontational approaches and behave like charity service providers overseas. Their discourses also avoid sensitive topics and are uncritical about social issues, which is consistent with the refrained activities Chinese NGOs engage in overseas.

Authorisation

Authorisation is legitimation by reference to authority (Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999), that is, anyone in whom institutional authority has been vested, such as a parent, official, or expert, or impersonally, regulations, laws, or policies. It means that a certain activity is legitimised because an authority approves it. Here, in Chinese NGOs' case, authority refers in particular to state authority, the connection with which could earn Chinese NGOs' legitimacy both in front of various governmental bodies and Chinese public. More specifically, I have identified three subtypes that are common in the discourse of Chinese NGOs under this authorisation: conformity, normalisation, and confirmation.

Conformity refers to Chinese NGOs' frequent use of official discourses like "BRI" and "A Community with Shared Future for Mankind". These discourses are to gain legitimacy by signalling that the international endeavours of Chinese NGOs conform to national strategies. By responding to high-level strategy and messages and addressing politically correct concepts like harmony, connectivity, and friendliness in international affairs, Chinese NGOs could gain a green light for various regulatory processes and respond to various challenges by both the authorities and the public. By stating that a major purpose of an international project is "to respond to the BRI", Chinese NGOs have gained advantages in front of potential challenges, assuming that national strategies like the BRI have unchallengeable authority, at least openly.

Normalisation is a type of legitimacy strategy that seeks to render something legitimate by exemplarity (Vaara et al., 2006), that is, that something is normal or natural because another agent has performed the action. Some Chinese NGOs illustrate what others, especially the Chinese government, have done before describing what an NGO itself is doing (see Text 13). Chinese NGOs legitimise themselves by simply exemplifying the state's action, which is deemed unquestionable and legitimate.

Confirmation is a legitimisation strategy that renders Chinese NGOs' activities legitimate through formal or informal recognition and endorsement (see Figures 6–7). This common legitimisation strategy can come in the form of government delegations, awards, or financial and/or in-kind support (Howell et al., 2020), and recognition can come from either the Chinese state or recipient country. Images like Figures 6–7 send a strong message of authority, particularly when officials appear in the image. Regardless of whether the government is involved with a project, the presence of government officials implies their support and recognition.

Rationalisation

Rationalisation is legitimisation by reference to the utility of a social practice (Vaara et al., 2006; Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999), especially, in this context, “instrumental rationalisation”, which provides rationally justifies practices based on the purpose they serve, the needs they fulfil, or the positive outcome they will have (Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). In order to serve as a legitimisation, these purposes or effects related discursive constructions must contain an element of moralisation (Van Leeuwen, 2007; Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999), which usually triggers positive values based on certain moral standards valued by the target audience. The three most common types of purposes for Chinese NGOs' international projects that connote a diplomatic meaning are promoting China's relationship with other countries, promoting China's image, and promoting Chinese culture. The outcomes are usually presented through beneficiaries' messages of recognition of and appreciation for China, as shown in Text 20–22. These messages are offered as a proof of a Chinese NGO's success at promoting China's international relations and images.

The submerged value behind either the purposes or the outcomes is nationalist ideology, namely, that actions benefitting national interests are valued and justified. National interest becomes a crucial part of rationalisation as it serves as a benchmark, if not the most important benchmark, for evaluating the utility of an activity. Tang and Darr (2012) compared surveys from 35 countries and regions, and they found that China showed one of the highest levels of popular nationalism globally. Cheng and Smyth's (2016) study suggests that in China nationalistic sentiment is an important determinant of public support for international aid, which may be based on the belief that providing foreign aid improves the image of the donor and furthers nationalist interests. The nationalistic justification for international aid activities evinced in the discourses of Chinese NGOs corresponds well to popular nationalistic sentiments. Although Chinese popular nationalism is not completely determined by the Chinese state, it is the Chinese state that mainly defines how the space for popular nationalism should be opened (Pang and Thomas, 2017). The justification behind Chinese cultural promotion is associated with national interests as well. Patriotic and nationalistic values are strongly held in areas of China's culture and history (Pang and Thomas, 2017). Cultural representation overseas is encouraged by the Chinese state as the traditional Chinese culture with Confucianism as its core is being revived as a new nationalist discourse by the Chinese state (Cheung, 2012), which is evident in the global establishment of Confucius Institutes with their mission of spreading Chinese culture and language overseas.

Moralisation

The final legitimisation strategy is moralisation – legitimisation based on moral values (Van Leeuwen, 2007). Compared with rationalisation, the moral values of this strategy are explicit rather than being implicit in an initiative’s purposes and outcomes. Some common moral values in this regard are reciprocity (see Text 14) and helping one’s neighbours (see Texts 15–17). When used in an international relations context, reciprocity implies a level of moral duty for China to give back internationally, to show gratitude for the help it received during its own development. Such discourses alleviate some of the public controversy concerning aid being prioritised for foreigners when domestic demand exists. According to Ruan’s (2021) study of the relationship between aid framing and public attitudes demonstrates that framing aid as reciprocity has the largest positive effect on people compared to other frames employed by the Chinese government. Thus, Chinese NGOs could acquire strong moral legitimacy by stressing the value of reciprocity.

Concerning helping one’s neighbour, which is a virtue in many cultures including Chinese culture. Geographical proximity imposes some level of moral duty to help one’s neighbour out of troubles. The importance of the relationship with one’s neighbours is recognised at both the individual and state levels. Such value is evident in the famous passages in Chinese classics like *Zuo Zhuan*/左传, “*qin ren shan lin, guo zhi bao y*/亲仁善邻，国之宝也 (it is highly valuable for a country to be close with and benevolent to its neighbours)” and “*zjiuzai xulin, dao y*/救灾恤邻，道也 (providing disaster relief and helping one’s neighbours is virtuous) ”.

Though reciprocity and helping one’s neighbour are cross-cultural values, such values are phrased by Chinese NGOs via passages from traditional Chinese texts: “*Dishui Zhi En, Dang Yongquan Xiangbao* /滴水之恩，当涌泉相报 (I received drops of water when in need; I shall return the kindness with a spring) ” and “*Xiangzhi Wu Yuanjin, Wanli Shang Weilin*/相知无远近，万里尚为邻 (Mutual understanding disregards distance; neighbors can live even thousands of miles apart) ”. In such way, Chinese NGOs could better correspond to the custom of their Chinese audience. These traditional phrases are also frequently used by Chinese leaders or diplomatic officials in public speeches, as they are a major discursive source for Chinese-ness and China’s soft power (Cheung, 2012). For example, “*Xiangzhi Wu Yuanjin, Wanli Shang Weilin*/相知无远近，万里尚为邻” was cited by President Xi in a diplomatic speech given in Peru in 2016 (Xi, 2016), and “*Dishui Zhi En, Dang Yongquan Xiangbao* /滴水之恩，当涌泉相报” was quoted by Chinese spokesperson Zhao Lijian in a press conference about the situation of COVID-19 pandemic (People.cn, 2020). By using these traditional Chinese terms, Chinese NGOs do not only legitimize themselves through moralization, but also through authorization by the Chinese state.

6.6 Discussion

Charity or Diplomacy?

There are a variety of ways showing that Chinese NGOs diplomatise their international projects, though the degree and goals of diplomatisation may differ sharply between NGOs. For NGOs with clear diplomatic intentions, identifying the promotion of international cooperation and friendship are major goals. Such NGOs are usually GONGOs founded by governmental bodies for the purposes of international exchange and public diplomacy. China Foundation for Peace and Development, for example, was founded for the purpose of “to promote peaceful

development and common prosperity of the world” (CFPD, n.d.). For this group of Chinese NGOs, the core purpose of international charity projects, no matter their form – be it a school donation project or a free eye surgery program – is to show China’s benevolence in the function of public diplomacy. As diplomacy dominates charity, these Chinese NGOs are characterised as “diplomacy with charity”.

Both explicit and implicit diplomatic discourses are often used simultaneously by these NGOs. However, some Chinese NGOs are not directly initiated by the government for diplomatic purposes and do not explicitly express their diplomatic intentions; instead, their role and connection are implicitly expressed primarily through cultural promotion and national recognition in the program testimonies. I name such a group as “charity with diplomacy” to indicate that diplomacy is only implicitly attached to their primary role as cross-border charities. Many non-GONGOs are in this category, and unlike NGOs in the “diplomacy with charity” category, they do not employ explicit official diplomatic discourses like “BRI” or “promote China’s foreign relations” in their presentations. Rainbow Volunteer Club is a good example of this category; it has no governmental background and does not cite “BRI” or other official diplomatic terms in any of its public presentations. However, its diplomatic intention can still be observed through implicit messages and Chinese culture promotion (see Figure 8-9). There are also situations between “diplomacy with charity” and “charity with diplomacy” where it is hard to tell whether the diplomatic intention dominates. The CFPA is a good example. The CFPA is a GONGO, which frequently uses “BRI” and other official terms as part of their motivation in public statements, invites Chinese officials to attend project launch ceremony, and adopts multiple Chinese elements in their program designs. However, its internationalisation was initiated by its own leadership instead by governmental mandate. Most of its international projects are not government-funded. Over a decade, largely by itself, it has developed a wide variety of projects (e.g. on education, sanitation, healthcare) with a diverse range of funders (e.g. corporations, public, international organizations, governments) in multiple countries in Asia and Africa. It would be reckless to conclude that diplomatic incentive dominates its internationalisation when such self-driven commitments exist. In the case of CFPA and some other Chinese NGOs, their charitable contribution to society co-exists with symbolic diplomatic gestures and it is hard to distinguish which one dominates.

Strategic or Genuine Diplomatization?

The discursive legitimation strategies discussed above are analysis at the discursive level instead of organizational level. The way discourses are constructed can tell what the writer/NGO considers as legitimate, regardless of the writer/NGO intentionally writing it or unconsciously writing it for legitimation. A writer/NGO may not write something in mind that this sentence is to gain legitimacy, however what the writer constructs can result in showing legitimacy. Thus, although diplomatic discourses can legitimatise international projects, they may not be constructed intentionally. However, a lot of evidence does show that Chinese NGOs do use diplomatic discourses, especially those explicit diplomatic discourses, strategically to gain legitimacy from Chinese stakeholders. For example, the CFPA has listed its Smiling Children, a project delivering free food to children in Ethiopia, on both the Chinese online fundraising platform Tencent Charity, which mediates in Chinese and targets a Chinese audience, and the global online fundraising platform Global Giving, which mediates in English and targets a Western audience. Its Chinese fundraising advertisements emphasise the role of NGOs in supporting China (CFPA, 2021a) while avoiding China-related discourses in its

global fundraising advertisements (CFPA, n.d.b). Instead, the concept of sustainable development goals is stressed, which is prevalent in global development discourses and widely recognised by the global community. Another example illustrates how diplomatisation can be a deliberate ploy for legitimacy, especially to donors. One project of Yundi (Yundi Behavior and Health Research Center), a Yunnan-based NGO focusing on supporting marginalized community, was to help children in the Ma Ja Yang refugee camp in Myanmar from February 2017 to January 2018. It was funded by the Department of Commerce of Yunnan Province. After Yundi completed the project, it successfully applied for funding from the New Zealand Embassy to China for a similar project in the same area, though the project changed from providing education to providing sanitation facilities. Through discourses such as “to contribute to long-term friendship and peace between China and Myanmar (利于中缅长期友好和平)” and “to implement the Belt and Road through specific activities (通过具体活动落实一带一路)”, the intention of promoting China-Myanmar relations is evident in the project funded by the Department of Commerce (Yundi, 2017b). Yet, no mention is made of China-Myanmar relations in the project review of the project funded by the New Zealand Embassy; Yundi positions itself as more of a professional organisation that provides charitable services and has a global vision rather than as a friendship ambassador to Myanmar (Yundi, 2018b). Both examples show that diplomatisation is an intentional strategy to convey legitimacy in front of Chinese donors and stakeholders. Such strategic use of official diplomatic discourses has also been confirmed by several interviews that mention they will use “BRI” only to domestic stakeholders as shown in the “Strategies of Chinese NGOs” section in Chapter 4.

However, within some NGOs, especially in those classed as “charity with diplomacy” with less explicit diplomatised representation, the possibility that they play the diplomatic role unintentionally to gain legitimacy can not be fully excluded. They may simply be driven by strong national identification, which can an important factor in the formation of organisational identity (e.g. Jack and Lorbiecki, 2007). Their diplomatisation, based on strong national identification, is concerned with a “state of mind which gives ‘national’ messages, memories and images a preferred status in social communication and a greater weight in the making of decisions” (Alter 1994, as cited in Lu 2020, p13). Such a state of mind is ubiquitous in the organisational introductions, newsletters, and project reports of Chinese NGOs, which introduce themselves as the “first”, “biggest”, or “only” Chinese NGOs that have done certain things. For NGOs whose founders have significance influence over the operations of the NGOs, the strong national identity of an organisation can be an extension of their leaders’ nationalistic sentiments. In a meeting, the director of an independent Chinese NGO described one of the challenges that Chinese NGOs face with internationalisation is the lack of capable human resources: “(the requirements for such international position are high) because once you go international, you become a diplomat”, adding that it was difficult to find talent who can run a project and are a competent diplomat (Conference 24). This NGO has implicitly promoted China’s image in the press releases of its wildlife preservation project. The intention to promote China’s image seems more genuine as it springs from the director’s own patriotism and the strong national identity of the organisation, rather being a strategy to please Chinese authorities as the NGO has strategically avoided government funding to remain more autonomous (Interview 17). In addition, such genuine diplomatisation is reflected in the words of the leader of the NGO.

“I wish to establish something like MSF, a true international NGO. However, it must be built by Chinese...Chinese should take international responsibilities. One initial motivation of internationalisation is to improve the image of China, but I dislike making it as a Chinese political symbol” (Interview 17)

In all, multiple evidence has shown that the use of explicit diplomatic discourses, which half of the NGOs under study has used, is the strategy of Chinese NGOs to gain legitimacy, while the true motivation behind implicit diplomatisation can be more complex.

The Implicit Influence of Chinese State

The state's influence is clearly shown behind Chinese NGOs' tendencies of depoliticisation and diplomatisation through the discursive legitimisation process. Evident in the “avoidance” strategy, Chinese NGOs avoid using discourses that are critical and sensitive which might result in de-legitimizing themselves in front of the state. The “authorization” strategies have directly shown that the Chinese state has influenced the discourses of Chinese NGOs by being a major source for legitimacy. Using official discourses, exemplifying the state's action and showing recognition from the state discursively have become major means for Chinese NGOs to achieve legitimacy. The state's influence through “rationalization” and “moralization” discursive strategies are also evident, though in a more nebulous way. The nationalist ideologies underpinning some of the diplomatic discourses and moral values used to justify international aid activities, such as reciprocity and “helping your neighbor”, are not solely determined by the Chinese state given these values are often shaped by complex historical, cultural and political processes. However, the Chinese state plays a key role in defining the space for nationalist ideologies and shaping moral values that are acceptable in society. Particularly, Chinese NGOs sometimes justify their international aid activities by using values at the state level that states should show reciprocity and states should help their neighbors. Such state-level discursive construction is consistent with the values that are endorsed by the Chinese state and with the way how the Chinese state shows these values, evident in the use of terms like e.g. “*Dishui Zhi En, Dang Yongquan Xiangbao/滴水之恩，当涌泉相报*” and “*Xiangzhi Wu Yuanjin, Wanli Shang Weilin/相知无远近，万里尚为邻*”. Thus, though it is not possible to conclude that the state is the only source of influence over these values shown behind the diplomatisation of Chinese NGOs, it shows that state is an important source over such values. Chinese NGOs have exhibited strong consistency with the Chinese state in the values that contribute to legitimacy in society and the Chinese state has exerted influence, either directly or subtly, over the Chinese NGOs' choice of discourses to represent those values. By using the state-endorsed discourses, Chinese NGOs have reproduced the state discourses and risked themselves to become agents of state propaganda.

Northern NGOs are often criticised for being “too close to donors” that they lose their independence from large donor states and multinational organisations and are unable to provide development solutions that are different from the mainstream apparatus (e.g. Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Banks et al. 2015). Unlike Western donor states, the Chinese state is no large donor to NGOs. The link between the Chinese state and Chinese NGOs in their internationalisation is not straightforward through material resources, rather the link is that Chinese state is a major source for legitimacy and for shaping what is legitimate or not in society. The major donors of Chinese NGOs for their international projects, primarily being Chinese corporations, organisations and individuals, are also influenced by values endorsed by the state. Chinese NGOs avoid any risk of delegitimizing themselves by discursive depoliticisation and gain legitimacy in the eyes of Chinese society by diplomatisation. By more or less diplomatising their international projects, Chinese NGOs have strategic tendencies that

go beyond providing mere international charity. Chinese NGOs are more of a complement than an alternative to the state-led Chinese development cooperation in terms of their function of promoting soft power, which is at least evident to their Chinese audience.

6.7 Conclusion

This study aims at examining how Chinese NGOs “think” in their internationalisation and their motivations behind it. By leveraging qualitative content analysis and the discursive legitimation framework developed by Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999), the study finds that Chinese NGOs only use soft charity discourses instead of critical discourses that avoid politicizing any development problems and use discourses that explicitly or/and implicitly diplomatise their international charity. These discourses help Chinese NGOs achieve legitimacy and avoid de-legitimacy through four discursive legitimation strategies: avoidance, authority, rationalization and moralization. Even though the Chinese state does not intervene much with Chinese NGOs in their international projects materially as shown in the previous chapters, the Chinese state exerts its influence implicitly through shaping the sources of legitimacy and value for internationalisation. In such way, Chinese NGOs do not develop a critical and independent discourse from the Chinese state. They tend to use discourses and representation that are aligned with the “People-to-People Bond” positioning held by the Chinese state on NGOs. Such tendency does not only apply to GONGOs, which tend to use both explicit and implicit diplomatic discourses but also non-GONGOs, which tend to use more implicit ones. Chinese NGOs complement the current Chinese overseas development landscape by promoting China’s soft power, at least in front of a Chinese audience. The Chinese state does not need to explicitly require Chinese NGOs to promote soft power, but they already do so by themselves, intentionally or unintentionally. The study has one major limitation: it does not sufficiently reflect the local perspectives of the host countries. Most Chinese NGOs’ publications are in Chinese and target Chinese readers, so further research is needed concerning how Chinese NGOs represent themselves to locals, which may require an ethnographic approach. In the current study, Chinese symbols displayed on goods donated to locals and Chinese national flags displayed onsite indicate that at least on some occasions, Chinese NGOs do send strong diplomatic messages to locals, though how exactly they communicate with locals, how they differ their communication between local officials and local communities, requires further research. Moreover, as shown in the analysis nationalist sentiments are strong in Chinese NGOs, further study is required to study how nationalism and patriotism affects Chinese NGOs in their decisions for internationalisation.

Chapter 7 When Charity Meets Capital: Chinese NGOs and Chinese Overseas Investments

As Chinese NGOs go global, they have become increasingly active in the social and environmental issues of Chinese companies for their overseas investments. This chapter examines the role of Chinese NGOs in relation to the overseas investments of Chinese companies. It analyses the relationship between Chinese NGOs and corporations, how Chinese NGOs become involved in the social and environmental issues associated with Chinese companies and whether they could become a transformative force to improve the social and environmental impact of Chinese companies overseas.

Chinese companies and their overseas investments are an important part of Chinese international development landscape. With the support of China's development finance, Chinese companies, especially SOEs, have been expanding rapidly in the developing world over the past decade, notably in the energy sector, natural resources and infrastructure. However, some Chinese overseas investments have generated significant international criticism and scrutiny due to their negative impact on local societies and the environment. Some Chinese investments have faced strong local resistance, resulting in project suspensions and cancellations, significant financial losses and reputational damage (e.g. Green Peace, 2019; Shi, 2021; Tang-Lee, 2016). For example, local communities and environmental activists have successfully filed a lawsuit against a mining project backed by three Chinese SOEs in Lamu, Kenya, leading to the final cancellation of the project. The large Myitsone dam project has been on hold for more than a decade since 2011 when then-President Thein Sein announced the suspension of the investment due to strong local opposition (Fuller, 2011).

Controversies about Chinese corporations' social and environmental impact overseas arise due to several reasons. First, Chinese companies' corporate and social responsibility (CSR) vision differs from that of their Western counterparts. In their understanding, their business itself, which contributes to local economic growth, and their compliance with local regulations are an important part of CSR (Illgallogging.info, 2007, as cited in Tan-Mullins and Hofman, 2014; Tang-Lee, 2016). Additional efforts beyond compliance with local regulations and contribution to economic growth tend to focus on philanthropy, such as donations to build schools, hospitals and other public infrastructure, instead of showing transparency and accountability, emphasising public engagement and ensuring the equity of investments for local communities (Tan-Mullins and Hofman, 2014). This perception of Chinese companies is partly due to the state-centric approach to Chinese CSR, which prioritises state guidance and requirements over other external stakeholders. The general principle of the government's requirements on Chinese overseas investments is to meet local legal and environmental standards; therefore, many Chinese companies only do what is minimally required by the government. However, the situation is gradually improving as more and more guidelines (e.g. the Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investments of 2018 and the Opinions on Promoting the Green Development of "One Belt One Road" published in 2022) encourage companies to adopt international standards. Another reason behind the controversies is that Chinese companies are

inexperienced in dealing with civil society. Within China, where CSR activities are state centric and public participation and protest are constrained, Chinese companies usually face less direct confrontation with civil society (Ho, 2013). However, Chinese companies are forced to deal with social and environmental problems overseas, especially where civil society is robust (Tan-Mullins and Mohan, 2013).

Numerous investment setbacks due to social and environmental controversies have become learning experiences for Chinese companies and have pushed them to develop adaptive CSR strategies overseas. They are gradually switching from a model of state-led CSR governance to multi-stakeholder CSR governance, which requires accountability towards multiple stakeholders instead of focusing solely on upward accountability (Tan-Mullins and Hofman, 2014; Zhang et al., 2019; Parsa et al., 2016, as cited in Tan-Mullins, 2020). NGOs are an important part of multi-stakeholder CSR governance.


In this chapter, I first introduce the analytical framework, which consists of four levels of analysis and follows my inductive inquiry into the relationships between Chinese NGOs and companies. Then, I present the main findings level by level and conclude the chapter with a discussion of the transformative potential of Chinese NGOs in relation to overseas corporate behaviour. This study indicates that Chinese NGOs are mostly collaborative rather than confrontational when dealing with companies. However, the collaborative aspects usually do not develop at a very deep level, and the partnerships between Chinese NGOs and companies are limited. Chinese NGOs are constrained by their own organisational development and resources and have shown much greater concern about their access to the resources of companies than about their independence in their collaboration from companies. The role of Chinese NGOs is unlikely to be transformative as concerns Chinese overseas investments, although they do have unique advantages when collaborating with Chinese companies, such as the “home NGO” advantage.

7.1 Analysing Chinese NGO-Company Relationships

Four-level Inquiries into Chinese NGO–Company Relationships

My investigation of how Chinese NGOs are involved with companies for overseas investments follows an inductive process (see Figure 15). I start with one general question (level one): what types of Chinese NGO–company relationships can be distinguished in the overseas setting? I find that Chinese NGOs and companies are primarily collaborative rather than confrontational. I then take a closer look at the degrees of collaboration between Chinese NGOs and companies (level two). The deepest level of Chinese NGO–company collaboration is Chinese NGO–company partnerships. I explore why some Chinese NGOs can establish partnerships with Chinese companies whereas others cannot (level three) and how much autonomy Chinese NGOs have in their partnerships with corporations (level four). Through the level-by-level analytical process, the research explores the transformative potential of Chinese NGOs with regard to the social and environmental concerns linked to Chinese investments.

Figure 15: Four-Level Analytical Framework of Chinese NGO-Company Relationships



The level-one analysis will answer the basic questions regarding the types of relationships between Chinese NGOs and companies in the context of Chinese overseas investments. NGO–corporate relations are diverse and wide-ranging. NGOs employ a variety of tactics and strategies to advance their goals. One of the most common ways to analyse NGO–company relationships is through the engagement/collaboration–confrontation spectrum (e.g. Winston, 2002; van Huijstee and Glasbergen, 2010; Molina-Gallart, 2014). The collaboration–confrontation spectrum describes NGOs’ attitudes towards corporations. To gain a more nuanced understanding of Chinese NGOs’ role in Chinese overseas investments, I further developed the collaboration–confrontation spectrum into a matrix by adding another dimension, namely, whether NGOs interact with and impact specific companies directly or indirectly. Based on these two dimensions, I classified Chinese NGOs’ behaviour in influencing Chinese companies with regard to their overseas investments into six groups (Table 18): collaborators, supporters, communicators, researchers and policy advisors, provocateurs and capacity builders. Detailed explanations and examples will be given in the next section.

Table 18: Types of Chinese NGO-Company Relationships in terms of NGOs' Roles

	Direct influence	Indirect influence
Collaborative	<p>Collaborators</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Donations ● CSR projects 	<p>Supporters</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Charity in communities affected by Chinese investments
Neutral	<p>Communicators</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Knowledge sharing and capacity building to companies ● Intermediary 	<p>Researchers and policy advisors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Research ● Policy advice
Confrontational	<p>Provocateurs?*</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Protest ● Legal action 	<p>Capacity builders</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Capacity training in local communities
	*no particular evidence from Chinese NGOs	

The level-two analysis will focus on the collaborative side of Chinese NGO–company relationships, the most common type of relationship in Chinese NGO–company interactions in the context of Chinese NGOs’ internationalisation. Particularly, it will examine the degree of Chinese NGO–company collaboration based on the NGO–company collaboration continuum proposed by Austin (2000) and Austin and Seitanidi (2012), dividing collaboration into four stages: philanthropic, transactional, integrative and transformative. The level-three analysis will determine why some NGOs can collaborate with companies at a deeper level through partnerships whereas others cannot and what factors contribute to these partnerships. The level-four analysis will further explore Chinese NGO–company collaboration by examining the autonomy of Chinese NGOs in their partnerships. Resource-dependence perspectives (RDP) (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) will be used as the major theoretical underpinnings for explaining the behaviour of both Chinese NGOs and companies, given their analytical power to explain organisational behaviour.

Resource Dependence Perspectives and NGO–Company Relationships

This section will explain how RDP can be applied to Chinese NGO–company relationships and, thus, used in the level-three and level-four analyses. The analytical framework of RDP, created by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), has been widely used in organisational studies, including on inter-organisational relationships. RDP explains how organisational behaviour is affected by external resources. To survive and succeed, organisations must obtain and maintain resources, for which they depend on external environments. Uncertainty in the supply of key resources sometimes encourages organisations to engage in exchanges and transactions with other organisations to acquire key resources. Such exchanges may involve material resources, information or legitimacy. Once an organisation relies on another for a particular resource,

dependence is inevitable. Organisations are bound by a network of interdependencies with other organisations in the process of obtaining and exchanging resources. Nonetheless, organisations are not equally dependent on each other, and asymmetry exists. This asymmetry produces power for the less dependent organisations. According to RDP, three critical factors determine the dependence of one organisation on another. The first is the significance of the resource, that is, the extent to which the organisation needs it to ensure sustainable operations. The more important a resource is, the more dependent the organisation is. The second is the extent to which focus organisations have discretion over the resource. Control over resources includes possession, access, use and allocation, the ability to make rules to regulate these and the enforcement of regulations. Organisations that have less control over resources are more dependent. The third critical factor is the availability of alternatives for obtaining the required resources. The more alternative resources exist, the less dependent an organisation is.

A few scholars have examined NGO–company relationships from RDP (e.g. Lalzai, 2020; Lambell et al., 2008; Poret, 2014). Both NGOs and companies are viewed as strategic actors whose behaviours are affected by the availability of the resources required for their operations. The relationships between NGOs and companies can be theorised as one organisation affecting the other organisation’s demand, access and management of external resources. When NGOs and companies can provide complementary resources to each other, they are likely to enter into a collaborative relationship. Development NGOs are dependent on at least three forms of resources: organisational legitimacy, funding and access to information and knowledge (Yanacopulos, 2005). Companies, especially when operating in foreign countries, face a series of challenges and uncertainty, such as political instability, institutional voids and social illegitimacy. When external situations are uncertain and problematic, organisations make efforts to establish linkages with actors in their environment and use these linkages to access resources, stabilise outcomes and avert environmental control (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In certain circumstances, NGOs and companies can provide resources needed by the other side and, thus, form alliances to manage uncertainty and instability together, generating interdependence. However, such interdependence can be particularly problematic for the organisations that are more dependent, which, in NGO–company relationships, are predominantly the NGOs (e.g. Al-Tabbaa et al, 2014; Poret, 2014). To attract and maintain relationships with corporations, NGOs may be coopted by companies and moderate their standards and behaviours.

This research uses RDP as its theoretical underpinning to understand various behaviours of Chinese NGOs and companies in their relationships as it provides a powerful theoretical foundation for addressing questions such as what kind of resources matter for Chinese NGO–company partnerships and whether there is resource dependency and power asymmetry in these relationships. The level-three and level-four analyses will answer these questions.

7.2 Level One: Types of Chinese NGO–Company Relationships

I classify Chinese NGOs’ behaviours in influencing Chinese companies with regard to their overseas investments based on two dimensions: how Chinese NGOs approach companies (i.e. whether they are collaborative, neutral or confrontational) and how they influence companies (i.e. directly or indirectly). I identify six groups (Table 18): collaborators, supporters, communicators, researchers and policy advisors, provocateurs and capacity builders.

Collaborators

Collaborators are NGOs that collaborate with companies directly on CSR functions. Collaborators usually engage in direct resource exchanges with companies. The most common form of collaboration consists in companies providing financial resources and NGOs offering non-financial resources, such as access to recipients, knowledge and expertise in social issues, social recognition and human resources. This is the most common type of relationship between Chinese NGOs and companies. At least 60% of the 28 Chinese NGOs (excluding two corporate foundations) under study maintain some level of collaboration with Chinese companies. NGO–company collaborative relationships will be studied in depth in subsequent sections given their predominance among all relationships between Chinese NGOs and companies.

Supporters

Supporters are NGOs that are aligned with the interests of corporations and show support for the companies' behaviour although they do not work directly with them. Yundi is a typical case. Yundi took the initiative to communicate and partner with the Ayeyarwady Foundation and Metta Foundation, two local NGOs in Myanmar criticising the construction of the Myitsone dam and carried out educational and healthcare projects in the relocating communities affected by the Chinese investments (Yundi, 2019). Yundi's charitable projects in the affected communities were conducted in the hope of improving the local image of Chinese investments. Yundi's projects were sponsored by the Department of Commerce of Yunnan instead of the Chinese company. It has shown indirect support for Chinese investments in local communities.

Communicators

Communicators either share their knowledge with companies directly or communicate with companies as intermediaries. Unlike collaborators, communicators do not exchange material resources with companies. Communicators usually hold a neutral position vis-à-vis companies. One aim of communicators is to share expertise and knowledge on sustainable investments. For example, GEI has shared its knowledge and expertise in community development by providing a community development guidebook to Chinese corporations in Africa. Another way to engage is by acting as an intermediary between Chinese corporations and other stakeholders. For example, Green Camel Bell has invited local experts and organised workshops on the outlook of renewable energy in Southeast Asia to provide Chinese private corporations with the latest market information on renewable energy. GEI has organised workshops with multiple stakeholders from both Myanmar and China to promote communication between State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC) and local stakeholders over the Myitsone dam conflict.

Apart from organising conferences and workshops for different stakeholders to communicate, Chinese NGOs sometimes serve as intermediaries between foreign NGOs and Chinese corporations. Local NGOs and INGOs cannot access Chinese corporations easily and may ask Chinese NGOs to act as a bridge for approaching and communicating with Chinese corporations (Interviews 1, 16 and 27). This is because they speak the same language as Chinese corporations, understand the Chinese corporate culture and discourses, have easier access to the companies and win their trust more easily.

Researchers and Policy Advisors

Researchers and policy advisors are NGOs involved in research and policy advice on sustainable investments. They provide knowledge and expertise in a specific topic, but unlike communicators, they usually address the topic at the sectoral level instead of advising specific companies. Their research and policy recommendations usually target policy makers or the general audience. NGOs produce research and policy recommendations in three main ways: by participating in a research effort requested by governmental departments, by performing independent research or by organising and participating in conferences and workshops. As China has shown growing interest in building a “green BRI” (“*lv se yidaiyilu*/绿色一带一路”), there is increasing demand from governmental agencies for expert input on the sustainability aspects of China’s infrastructural campaigns overseas. For example, Greenovation Hub (GHub) participated in the drafting of the Action Guidelines for the Environmental and Social Risk Management of Overseas Investments Financed by the Chinese Financial Institutions along with the China Banking Association, under the guidance of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (GHub, 2021a).

However, governmental agencies are more likely to solicit expert opinions from Chinese research institutions and large international NGOs than from Chinese NGOs. Governmental agencies routinely seek consultation from domestic experts as a standard part of policy making (Shen, 2017; Teets, 2013). These domestic experts usually come from government-affiliated think tanks, research institutions and universities, such as the Energy Research Institute under the National Development and Reform Commission, the National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International cooperation under the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, the Chinese Academy of Engineering, the Chinese Academy of Science, Tsinghua University and Fudan University. INGOs and international think tanks also play an active policy advisory role in the green BRI because the Chinese government has opened several mechanisms specifically to request international actors’ opinions. These include the Belt and Road Construction and Promotion Center housed by the National Development and Reform Commission, the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development and the BRI International Green Development Coalition at the Ministry of Ecology and Environment. Chinese NGOs do not have an edge over Chinese research institutions, which have a designated policy advisory role with China’s decision-makers, nor over INGOs, which can bring international voices directly to governmental agencies through formalised governmental mechanisms.

Instead of direct policy advice to governmental agencies, Chinese NGOs more commonly conduct research independently and publish it openly to raise awareness. This is the case with GEI’s research on China’s overseas coal-fired power investments and Chinese timber investments in Africa (GEI, 2017; n.d.a.), GHub’s research on the opportunities and challenges of Chinese overseas renewable investments (GHub, 2020) and Social Resource Institute’s research on the environmental and social risks of Chinese investments in Myanmar. Importantly, most independent studies conducted by Chinese NGOs are financed by INGOs.

Last but not least, the most common way for Chinese environmental NGOs to promote sustainable investments and green BRI governance is to organise and participate in conferences, seminars and workshops to share their research findings and policy recommendations, which are addressed to a wider audience including domestic and international scholars, journalists and professionals. For example, 14 Chinese NGOs, INGOs, media and think tanks have formed the Belt and Road Green Development Platform with the coordination of GHub in 2016. They

include notable Chinese environmental NGOs such as the All-China Environmental Federation, the China Green Carbon Foundation and GEI (GHub, n.d.). The platform has facilitated communication within epistemic communities and coordinated international partnerships on the issue of the green BRI and climate change by organising conferences and seminars (Fürst, 2020), such as side conferences at the 23rd session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 23) in Bonn on the topic of the green BRI and climate governance (GHub, 2017) and a webinar on green and low-carbon cooperation between energy-intensive industries in China and BRI countries in the post-COVID-19 era (GHub, 2021b). Another example is GEI's advocacy with Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Export-Import Bank of China for the adoption of green finance policies by organising open seminars on sustainable finance and attending the meetings of the Aarhus Convention, AIIB and C20 (GEI, n.d.b).

Provocateurs

Provocateurs are NGOs that directly confront certain companies, for instance by protesting against specific unwelcoming investments. No Chinese NGO in this study fits in this category. However, many local NGOs in host countries have displayed such attitudes, being major forces fighting against Chinese investments that affect local communities. For example, one local NGO in Kenya, Save Lamu, along with other local groups, filed a legal case against the construction of the China-financed coal power plant in Lamu, resulting in the cancellation of the project (Shi, 2021). Another Kenyan NGO, Friends of Lake Turkana, organised a protest after failing to get a satisfactory response from the Chinese embassy on the controversial financing of a turbine for the Gibe III dam, which would have a destructive environmental and social impact. Civil society groups in Myanmar play a vital role in mobilising protests against Chinese investments, achieving suspensions as in the case of the Mytson dam and the Letpadaung copper mine. Some INGOs, especially those specialising in environmental activism, also use confrontational tactics to pressure Chinese stakeholders. For example, International Rivers wrote directly to China's Sinohydro Corporation, a major Chinese dam builder, urging it to follow leading international standards. During discussions with Sinohydro, International Rivers made it clear that it would publicly campaign against the company if it went forward with projects with environmental consequences (International Rivers, 2012). However, Chinese NGOs are absent from the frontline of confrontation with particular unwelcome investments.

Capacity Builders

Capacity builders are NGOs that provide capacity building to local communities for communicating with and confrontation companies when necessary. Chinese NGOs very rarely confront companies, even indirectly. Only one NGO in this study has engaged in indirect confrontation by providing capacity building to local communities affected by investments from China and multinational financial institutions. This Chinese NGO introduced relevant policies related to Chinese investments to local communities, taught them communication skills for dealing with Chinese stakeholders and provided training on how to monitor investments with environmental and social consequences and mobilise resources for confrontation. This is the only case in which a Chinese NGO prioritised the interests of local communities by teaching them knowledge and tools for bargaining with Chinese companies. However, the local capacity-building projects carried out by this NGO were only temporary and implemented years ago, and this Chinese NGO has been dissolved. This case remains

exceptional rather than representative. This is the same case anonymised as JX mentioned in Chapter 5.

In a nutshell, most Chinese NGOs that are involved with Chinese companies act as collaborators, followed by researchers and policy advisors and communicators. Confrontational approaches are very rare. One major reason that Chinese NGOs are non-confrontational is to avoid losing social legitimacy, a fundamental resource for organisational survival. Chinese NGOs avoid using confrontational approaches with Chinese companies as they do with governments. In the landscape of Chinese overseas investments, SOEs, representing a mix of economic and strategic state interests, are predominant. Confrontation with large investments by Chinese SOEs is viewed as a threat to state interests that delegitimises Chinese NGOs for stakeholders embedded in Chinese society, such as their supervisory units and funding agencies. Such delegitimation affects Chinese NGOs' ability to obtain sustainable resources for their operations. Considering that Chinese NGO–company relationships concentrate on collaboration, the next sections will delve into Chinese NGO–company collaboration in developing countries, examining the varieties of collaboration, the factors affecting it and Chinese NGOs' autonomy in the collaboration.

7.3 Level Two: Degree of Cooperation

There are different varieties and degrees of NGO–company collaboration. Based on the collaboration continuum put forward by Austin (2000) and Austin and Seitanidi (2012), NGO–company collaborations go through four stages: philanthropic, transactional, integrative and transformative. The level of engagement between NGOs and businesses deepens along the continuum, the magnitude of resources exchanged increases, and the type of resources changes from money dominant to core-competencies dominant (Austin and Seitanidi, 2012). The rudimentary level of collaboration is observed at the philanthropic stage, which is largely a unilateral transfer of material resources from companies to NGOs in the form of philanthropic donations. At the next level of engagement, the transactional stage, corporations and NGOs start to exchange resources focusing on specific activities, such as event sponsorships, contractual service arrangements, cause-related marketing and other specific projects with clear objectives and shared responsibilities. At the third level of engagement, the integrative stage, corporations and NGOs begin to merge their activities, missions and human resources, usually in the form of joint ventures. The most advanced collaborative stage, the transformational stage, is characterised by shared learning and the intention to create disruptive social innovations and deliver transformational benefits to society at large, although this stage is more of a conceptual and ideal stage (Austin and Seitanidi, 2012).

Most collaborations between Chinese companies and NGOs stay at the first level of collaboration through corporate philanthropic donations to NGOs. Corporate donations are major sources of philanthropy in China. In 2020, 58% (122 billion RMB) of total charity donations in China came from corporations (GMW, 2021). Corporate donations and sponsorships are also major funding sources for large international projects carried out by Chinese NGOs, as analysed in Chapter 3. Alibaba donated 100 million RMB over three years to CFPA for its international Panda Pack project, which is the largest publicly recorded international project conducted by a Chinese NGO. Another example is CFPD, whose main financing source is Chinese companies. For instance, it received 10 million RMB from two

Chinese companies each for its general pool of funds for international projects and another 1 million RMB from another company for the Silk Road Sunshine Fund, a specialised fund for the BRI (CFPD, 2020, 2021). However, corporate donations, especially large ones, are skewed towards bigger NGOs, usually GONGOs, while small NGOs have a hard time accessing corporate donations. One reason for this is that large GONGOs can help corporations to gain political legitimacy, which is an important motivation for corporate philanthropy (Wang and Qian, 2011; Zhang et al., 2016). Through sponsoring GONGOs, which usually have close ties with the government and organise their activities around national strategies, corporations can acquire political legitimacy indirectly. For example, since the establishment of the BRI, GONGOs have tended to package their international projects around the BRI, as evident in the names “Silk Road Fraternity Fund” of the CRCF and “Silk Road Sunshine Fund” of the CFPD. By sponsoring such funds, corporations can show that their objectives are desirable and consistent with political values. However, it is much harder for smaller and independent NGOs to solicit funding from corporations, as lamented by several interviewees (e.g. Interviews 5, 10, 18, 19 and 28). NGOs with leaders who were once in business and with good business connections are also likely to receive corporate donations. For example, the founders of the Peaceland Foundation have a corporate background, which helps the organisation to raise funds from several corporations through the founders’ connections to business associations and networks (Conference 31). Except for some large monetary donations to notable GONGOs, corporations are more willing to donate goods that they produce or services that are part of their business activities than to donate money directly. For example, LiaoYuan Ruye preferred to donate goods, namely, milk powder instead of monetary donations for children in Afghanistan through the Peaceland Foundation (Conference 31). A Chinese company provided free logistic services to a Chinese NGO by freely transporting to Malawi a batch of donated musical instruments along with its own goods (Interview 35).

At the second stage, that of transactional collaborations, resource flows shift from unilateral to bilateral, and there is an explicit exchange of resources and reciprocity for value creation. The results tend to be more quantifiable and more direct for the organisations (Austin and Seitanidi, 2012; Googins and Rochlin, 2000). Nonetheless, as the associational relationship between corporations and NGOs tightens, the risks increase an issue arises (Wymer and Samu, 2003, as cited in Austin and Seitanidi, 2012). Therefore, organisational fit and trust between the two sides become more important at this stage. NGOs usually partner with corporations for their CSR programmes, which are designed and coordinated together by the partners, instead of just receiving donations from corporations. The next stage, integrative collaborations, features more integrated collaboration between the companies and the NGOs. Both partners increasingly use more of their key assets and core competencies to contribute to the collaboration (Austin and Seitanidi, 2012). Meanwhile, generating societal value becomes more important to the partnership. The most advanced stage, the transformational stage, creates even greater value for society through collective action in social innovation and transformation.

There are a few cases of second- and third-stage collaboration between Chinese NGOs and companies (the categorisation between second and third- stage is sometimes not clear-cut), but I have found no evidence of collaboration corresponding to the fourth transformational stage. Even at the second and third stages of collaboration, the format of Chinese NGO–company engagement is straightforward, with the Chinese NGO acting as the implementer of corporate CSR. I did not find any example that replicates the way some northern NGOs have moved

towards more complex partnerships, for example, collaborations to improve value chains and cause-related marketing (Molina-Gallart, 2014). For clarity, I will use the term “Chinese NGO–company partnerships” to refer to the second and third levels of collaboration in the analysis. Overall, Chinese corporations tend to make donations instead of carrying out more sophisticated CSR projects. Additionally, many of their CSR projects are conducted by the corporations themselves or subcontracted to other companies that can provide professional services such as public relations and environmental and social impact evaluation, instead of partnering with NGOs. The recognition of NGOs by Chinese companies is limited, especially in overseas contexts, as evidenced by interviews with overseas investment managers of large SOEs who had never thought about collaborating with Chinese NGOs due to their lack of knowledge about the Chinese NGO sector (Interviews 37 and 39). The situation improves when Chinese NGOs have established offices overseas, which helps them to socialise with Chinese companies. As the number, scale and depth of Chinese NGOs undergoing internationalisation are still limited, cases of Chinese NGO–company collaboration at the transactional and integrative stages are few. Only 3 of the 21 NGOs interviewed for this thesis collaborate with Chinese companies at the transnational and integrative stages. Nevertheless, these few cases, which I illustrate in the next paragraphs, are worthy starting points for exploring the rationale behind Chinese NGO–company partnerships overseas and whether Chinese NGOs could play a role in alleviating the social and environmental issues associated with Chinese companies.

Five cases of Chinese NGO-company partnerships

Case 1: GEI–Sinohydro collaboration in Laos

In December 2010, GEI and Nam Ngum 5 Power Company (NN5), a subsidiary of Sinohydro, a large Chinese state-owned hydropower engineering and construction company, formed a partnership for a community development programme based on biogas technology in the communities affected by the dam constructed by NN5 in Luang Prabang, Laos. It is one of the earliest collaborations between a Chinese corporation and a Chinese NGO overseas.

GEI had an established record of working in Laos before the collaboration. In 2008, GEI formed a partnership with the Lao government for the “Lao-China Cooperation Center for Sustainable Land and Natural Resources Management” project, which included capacity building for the Lao government and support in establishing regulations on land and resource management (GEI, 2008). In 2009, GEI opened a local office with long-term staff in Laos. Prior experience and the office in Laos became a foundation for GEI’s subsequent collaboration with Sinohydro. Hydropower investments are usually under close scrutiny by international environmental groups, such as International Rivers, for their potential damage to the local community and ecosystem. GEI began to connect with Sinohydro through a trip to Sinohydro at International Rivers’ invitation. GEI then made proposals to Sinohydro on how to support the local communities affected by NN5. The process of making Sinohydro accept the partnership proposal was not easy. It took three years of efforts and included countless back-and-forth communications. The key challenge was to familiarise Sinohydro with GEI, make it aware of the importance of environmental and social responsibility and persuade it of what GEI could offer to the project.

GEI had years of experience in biogas technology–based community development in China. It aimed to transfer its domestic experience to villages in Laos to help the villagers meet their daily energy needs and improve their standards of living while protecting the ecosystem.

Meanwhile, Sinohydro was new to the Lao market and did not have deep connections with local communities. Thanks to its continuous communication efforts and its expertise in community development, GEI persuaded Sinohydro to form the collaboration.

Both GEI and NN5 provided financial sources to the project, with 30% coming from GEI and 70% from NN5. GEI was the primary manager of the project, conducting a feasibility study at the initial stage based on the feedback of local villagers, designing the project, raising awareness of biogas energy among villagers, hiring Chinese companies to construct the biogas ponds and training local technical staff on biogas construction and usage. In the framework of the project, 32 biogas ponds were constructed, many of which were still operating several years later.

Case 2: CFPA–CGCOC collaboration in Ethiopia

In 2017, CFPA collaborated with CGC Overseas Construction (CGCOC), a SOE focusing on overseas engineering construction and operations, on a women-empowerment project in Ethiopia. CFPA started its operations in Ethiopia in 2015 and carried out a variety of projects, such as free food donations and the construction of water sanitary facilities. CFPA took the initiative to seek a potential partnership with CGCOC when the latter was also exploring opportunities for social-responsibility programmes. Both parties participated in the design of the project. They both recognised the problem of limited opportunities for local women and agreed to develop a CSR project focusing on women, especially those living in remote areas. By teaching them skills that may earn them a living, such as grass weaving and wood carving, the project aimed to empower women and improve their economic situation. CGCOC financed the project, while CFPA was responsible for implementation. Through its own network, CFPA partnered with a local NGO, the Centre for Accelerated Women’s Economic Empowerment, which served as the final on-site implementor of the project (People’s Daily, 2022).

CGCOC had been operating in Ethiopia for decades and had conducted many CSR programmes on its own before partnering up with CFPA in Ethiopia, notably donating to schools. Compared with its own CSR programmes, CGCOC received more recognition from local communities and better publicity from both local and Chinese media for its project with CFPA. Since the partnership on this project, CGCOC and CFPA have maintained good relationships and developed the collaboration in more areas, such as school-bag donations. CGCOC also showed its support to CFPA by attending the opening ceremony of its Ethiopian office in 2019 (CGCOC, 2019).

Case 3: CFPA–CNPC collaboration in Sudan

In 2010, CFPA and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) formed a collaboration, upgrading the Sudan-China Abu Ushar Friendship Hospital in Sudan and providing medical training to the staff of the hospital. CNPC had a long presence in Sudan before the collaboration. With increasing international criticism over the Chinese model of development based on resource extraction, CNPC was on the lookout for more social responsibility programmes. At the time, CFPA had little international experience (e.g. donations to Indonesia for disaster relief). However, the NGO had internationalisation as one of its organisational strategies and

was exploring possibilities for conducting international charity projects in Sudan. Some leaders of CNPC and CFPA, being acquaintances, happened to know the situations of each side and began exploring the possibility of cooperation in Sudan.

Before the partnership was officially formed, to develop a project that was feasible and sustainable, CFPA performed a field study in Sudan to understand the healthcare system and philanthropic system. Combining the results of its fieldwork and its knowledge based on the Maternal and Infant Health Project in China, CFPA produced a project proposal titled “Demonstration Project for Aiding Sudan Construct a Maternal and Child Health Care System” (Li and Yang, 2014). After several rounds of discussion between CNPC and CFPA and suggestions from the Chinese embassy in Sudan, both parties decided to support the upgrading of the Sudan-China Abu Ushar Friendship Hospital, a hospital focusing on maternity and childcare originally donated by the Chinese government but in a rough condition.

The majority of the financial resources (about 600,000 USD) came from CNPC, while CFPA, the Chinese embassy and a local partner in Sudan all contributed. The CFPA was the main coordinator of the project, responsible for project management. It coordinated construction companies for hospital upgrading and partnered with a local NGO, the Birr and Tawasul Organization led by the wife of Sudan’s then-vice president, for local logistics and implementation. The CFPA did not have an office in the country and instead sent two employees from China to Sudan to coordinate and oversee the project on a full-time basis. The project was completed in mid-2011. After the construction, CFPA made a follow-up donation and sent medical volunteers to the hospital in 2012 (Wang, 2012; Song, 2013).

Case 4: CFPA–XCMG collaboration in Ethiopia

The CFPA has collaborated with XCMG on water-cellar projects in Ethiopia since 2016. XCMG donated 750,000 RMB to CFPA to build 50 water cellars in schools, providing safe water to more than 4,000 students and villagers (XCMG, 2016). Major local and Chinese media, including Ethiopia TV station, Xinhua News and CCTV, reported on the launching ceremony. XCMG is a state-owned heavy-machinery manufacturing and sales company whose machinery-sale networks cover more than 180 countries (XCMG, n.d.). It has local offices in Ethiopia but no dedicated local human resources for CSR. XCMG’s motivation for collaboration was a desire to shape a public image as a responsible multinational corporation. XCMG had collaborated with CFPA domestically and built up trust in the NGOs, which extended to their overseas collaboration. The CFPA was responsible for project implementation in Ethiopia. One of the challenges of the water-cellar project was to obtain approval of the environmental impact assessment (EIA). It took CFPA more than half a year to find the most cost-effective solution. It found a local organisation through the recommendation of a Chinese research institution that had collaborated with this local organisation before. The local organisation managed to get through the EIA process. The collaboration between XCMG and CFPA on water-cellar construction in Ethiopia continues years after its inception.

Case 5: BV Vocational School–CITIC collaboration in Angola

In 2014, CITIC Angola collaborated with the BV Vocational School to establish the CITIC BV Vocational School, which provides vocational training in construction engineering, mechanical engineering and hotel management (among others) to local people in Angola. CITIC entered Angola in 2007 and had trained thousands of its local employees since then. It wanted to help more young people in Angola to find jobs and, thus, initiated the project. At the time, the BV Vocational School, despite being the first non-profit vocational school in China, had not yet gone international. CITIC found that it shared a similar mission with the BV Vocational School and appreciated its training-class model. Therefore, it decided to form a partnership with it. The project was financed by CITIC as part of its CSR and mainly managed by CITIC, while the BV Vocational School provided strategic guidance in school management and course design. The school operates according to the framework of the standard guidebook of the BV Vocational School, but it also makes adjustments to its management and courses to satisfy local needs. At the initial stage, the BV Vocational School sent several teachers to Angola for half a year to teach its key vocational-training concepts and modules to the full-time staff of the vocational school. The management team of the school maintained autonomy for decision-making in daily operations most of the time, although it kept regular communication with the BV Vocational School headquarters in China about the situation of the school in Angola.

These five cases will be used as the foundation for level-three and level-four analyses of Chinese NGO–company partnerships, which will answer the following questions: why do Chinese NGOs and corporations form partnerships? What are the comparative advantages of Chinese NGOs? How independent are Chinese NGOs in these partnerships?

7.4 Level Three: Factors Affecting Partnerships

In this section, I analyse the reasons behind NGO–company partnerships and how they apply to the Chinese case. This study focuses especially on the collaboration between NGOs and multinational enterprises (MNCs), which face multiple challenges in foreign countries, particularly in developing countries.

According to RDP, for any organisational alliance to be established, resources must be exchanged. What resources can NGOs and companies exchange with each other? Many NGOs are chronically under-resourced, and their most prominent reason for cooperating with companies is to seek financial resources (e.g. Evans, 2007; Ottaway, 2001; Poret, 2014). My interviews have confirmed that financial shortages are among the top challenges of NGO development (e.g. Interviews 5, 6, 10, 19, 27 and 28). Most of the Chinese NGOs interviewed have expressed interest in attracting corporations for donations and/or partnerships (e.g. Interviews 1, 6, 10, 16, 18 and 19). In addition to financial resources, NGOs can leverage the operational scale, managerial and marketing expertise of MNCs to improve performance and create more social value for their beneficiaries (Dahan et al., 2010). For example, CFPA has collaborated with COSCO Shipping through its corporate foundation COSCO Shipping Charity Foundation to deliver Hello bicycles to Cambodia by making use of the company's global logistic network. Another motive for NGOs to cooperate with MNCs is to sensitise corporations to their causes to strengthen their reputation and influence (Selsky and Parker, 2005). Thus, NGOs are especially interested in large companies with good public reputations. This is evident in the collaboration between GEI and Sinohydro. The mission of GEI is to promote sustainable development. By initiating a community-development project with one of

the largest Chinese power companies, it increased the company's awareness of local-community development in addition to improving the conditions of the local community.

By far, there isn't any regulation or policy that encourage Chinese NGO-corporation overseas engagement and whether Chinese NGOs could play an important role in the social and environmental issues of Chinese overseas investment is largely dependent on if Chinese NGOs' capability could match the demand of the Chinese companies. Thus, it is also important to establish why companies enter into partnerships with NGOs. Companies, especially MNCs, face multiple challenges in developing countries. First, MNCs have to deal with complex social issues, such as poverty reduction, environmental protection and minority rights, but few have the necessary knowledge and expertise to address them (Poret, 2014). Second, in emerging markets, MNCs face local contexts that are different and usually significantly more challenging than in their home country. These challenges, which are caused by the institutional conditions and idiosyncratic environments of developing countries, have been widely documented (e.g. Khanna and Palepu, 1997, 2000). Cultural and norm differences, distinctive regulatory requirements, the liabilities of foreignness and institutional voids all pose difficulties to MNCs operating in developing countries. Third, there are growing societal demands on MNCs to be more socially responsible. Especially in emerging markets, where foreign multinationals are often viewed with suspicion and scepticism, MNCs must attain social legitimacy (Dahan et al., 2010). Companies seek to obtain resources that can be uniquely provided by NGOs to tackle these challenges. These resources include expertise and knowledge on certain social issues, access to the local market and community and social legitimacy. These resources are commonly demanded by MNCs, including Chinese companies. In addition, it is also crucial for Chinese companies to avoid delegitimisation risks. As a company enters into a collaboration with an NGO, it cedes some control to it. Chinese companies require a high degree of trust before launching any formal partnership. Compared with INGOs and local NGOs, Chinese NGOs have the "home NGO" advantage, which may allow them to access Chinese companies and earn their trust more easily.

Expertise and Knowledge on Social Issues

NGOs usually have a better understanding of particular social issues, which could help corporations to better design projects that fulfil their goals (Kramer and Kania, 2006). The cases of GEI and Sinohydro and the BV Vocational School and CITIC are two examples. GEI had accumulated expertise in community development through biogas technology to improve the livelihoods of local villagers, and the BV Vocational School had a mature system for guiding vocational schools to increase the accessibility of education in poverty-stricken areas. The expertise of NGOs in specific social issues can help companies to develop programmes beyond simple donations, which can easily be made by the companies alone.

Local Market and Community Access

NGOs usually have more first-hand experience in dealing with local communities and markets, which can help MNCs access local institutions (Dahan et al., 2010). As shown in cases 1, 2 and 3, Chinese NGOs either hire local staff or partner up with local NGOs to implement projects. In case 1, GEI established an office in Laos and trained local staff to conduct the projects. In cases 2 and 3, CFPA chose to collaborate with local NGOs (the Centre for Accelerated Women's Economic Empowerment and Birr and Tawasul Organization in Ethiopia and Sudan, respectively) for project implementation. Chinese NGOs do not possess the rich local

knowledge and connections of local NGOs, but they show their competencies by selecting the right local partners to implement the project. These competencies usually come from their prior experiences working in the host countries. Therefore, Chinese NGOs with a long-term and continuous presence in the host countries have an advantage over those that lack on-the-ground experience.

Social Legitimacy

NGOs could help corporations gain social legitimacy and increase their credibility (Prahalad and Hart, 2002; Berger et al., 2004). NGOs have strong legitimacy and public trust and are influential forces in the community (Al-Tabbaa et al., 2014). Many consider NGOs to be more trustworthy than corporations. According to a survey about trust in institutions, NGOs have consistently ranked highest among institutions including the United Nations, religious groups, large local companies, national governments, the press and media and global companies since 2001 (Poret, 2014). Moreover, stakeholders often consider NGOs primary actors in the development of CSR (Arenas et al., 2009). Especially when companies receive criticism, associating with a charity can counterbalance bad publicity to some extent (Rundall, 2000). By simply collaborating with NGOs, corporations can enjoy a reputation that it does not usually have. This is what Austin and Seitanidi (2012) calls the “associational value” provided by NGOs to corporations. In case 2, CGCOC showed that partnering with CFPA was more welcomed by local communities than conducting CSR alone in Ethiopia.

“Home NGO” Advantages

The MNC–NGO collaboration literature often focuses on collaborations between MNCs and local NGOs or INGOs. Each can bring its unique resources to the collaboration with MNCs. The role of local NGOs is especially prominent in helping MNCs acquire local social legitimacy given their expertise in local cultures, norms, regulations, communities and institutions (Marano and Tashman, 2012), and they serve as a bridge between MNCs and local networks (Millar et al., 2004). Some INGOs, such as Médecins Sans Frontières and Oxfam have been operating in developing countries for a long time and have thus accumulated knowledge about the local culture, norms and regulations. They can play a role similar to that of local NGOs helping MNEs to connect with local communities. However, there are things that only INGOs can offer to companies. INGOs, especially those with a global scale and strong international credentials, can assist MNCs in developing strategies targeting audiences at the global level because they possess in-depth knowledge of global social norms and cultural patterns (Marano and Tashman, 2012). INGOs can help MNCs address global societal concerns in a manner that is consistent across countries and help relieve the negative impact of local subsidiaries on the overall social legitimacy of the parent company (Marano and Tashman, 2012).

Chinese NGOs are a special case, neither fitting neatly into the category of INGOs nor into that of local NGOs. Chinese NGOs do not currently have the scale that is often seen in large Global North NGOs. Only very few Chinese NGOs have registered overseas or have a long-term presence across several countries. The CFPA, which has only registered in three countries (Myanmar, Ethiopia and Nepal), is already the most notable example. In addition, Chinese NGOs also lack the global reputation and influence in shaping global norms unlike notable INGOs. Chinese NGOs are not local NGOs either. They cannot play the same role as local NGOs, and they generally need to rely on their local partners for implementation. However,

Chinese NGOs have advantages and unique characteristics in collaborating with Chinese corporations. Many of these advantages come from the fact that Chinese NGOs are considered “home NGOs” by Chinese companies. As “home NGOs”, they can win Chinese companies’ trust more easily than local NGOs and INGOs. Trust is critical to a successful collaboration (Oetzel and Doh, 2009); without it, a successful collaboration can hardly be established even when both parties have great resource complementarity.

Compared with foreign NGOs, Chinese companies have displayed more trust in Chinese NGOs (Interviews 37 and 40), which are highly regulated and supervised in China. The strict supervision systems ensure that Chinese NGOs do not take stances far from the Chinese government’s and state-backed decisions and make them appear more reliable to Chinese corporations. Especially, Chinese companies are reassured when cooperating with large GONGOs, which are strongly endorsed by the government, as indicated by one investment manager when he illustrates the company chooses NGO partners:

“We will do due diligence. We will first check and have an understanding of the NGO through initial meetings and we will also see if there is any official support (guanfang beishu/官方背书). In principle, we want to partner with an NGO that is beneficial for the local community while at least having no negative impact on corporate image” (Interview 40)

Chinese NGOs, especially GONGOs, gain advantages to earn trust from companies by having the official support. This also shows that why Chinese NGOs see a need to leverage official resources and discourses as studied in Chapter 6. Moreover, it is easier to conduct due diligence on Chinese NGOs than on local or international NGOs through publicly available data in Chinese and personal connections. Among the five case studies, except for GEI, the Chinese companies all knew the Chinese NGOs through either their visibility in China or personal connections at the leadership level before forming partnerships with them. In the case of GEI, which lacked governmental endorsement or direct personal connections to Sinohydro, it took the NGO years of communication with Sinohydro to build trust before establishing the formal collaboration.

Some collaboration between Chinese companies and foreign local NGOs can be found. In such cases, Chinese companies tend to rely on recommendations from governments, notably through Chinese embassies, or their local business partners to build trust in the first place. For example, several Chinese SOEs have donated to a local foundation in Myanmar on the recommendation of the local Chinese embassy. One rare case of collaboration between Chinese companies and local NGOs was established through the business partner of a Chinese company. CNOOC Uganda and a local NGO named Safe Way Right Way in Uganda collaborated to provide road-safety education to local communities around the Kingfiser Oil project in Uganda. Safe Way Right Way was founded as a collaboration between the World Bank’s Global Road Safety Partnerships and TotalEnergies to improve road safety in Uganda. TotalEnergies was one of the co-investors in the Kingfisher oil field with CNOOC, a connection that was key to CNOOC’s collaboration with Safe Way Right Way.

Another advantage of Chinese NGOs is that they understand the discourses and culture of Chinese companies better than their foreign counterparts so that Chinese companies consider it easier to communicate with Chinese NGOs. Cultural fit or compatibility is a key determinant of successful partnerships between NGOs and MNCs (Dahan et al, 2010; Millar et al., 2004).

Chinese NGOs speak the same language as Chinese companies, so that the communication cost for Chinese companies to speak with Chinese NGOs is much lower than with foreign NGOs. More importantly, Chinese NGOs are usually familiar with the style of discourse used by Chinese SOEs. For example, SOEs and GONGOs both often address the importance of their projects in contributing to the BRI. Even Chinese NGOs that do not explicitly address the BRI or Chinese national strategies publicly are familiar with related discourses because they are embedded in their environment in the form of policy documents, meetings and conferences. This understanding lays the foundations for collaboration between SOEs and Chinese NGOs.

Lastly, partnering with Chinese NGOs, particularly with GONGOs, can help Chinese companies to attract more media attention. Chinese GONGOs often host governmental officials at their project-launch ceremonies and draw attention from both local and Chinese media. As shown in cases 2 and 4, CGCOC and XCMG's partnerships with CFPA have garnered attention from both Chinese and local media. The reason why projects with CFPA attract local media has partially to do with the fact that the organisation has close governmental connections with the Chinese and Ethiopian governments, and local media perceive its projects as semi-public/diplomatic events worth reporting on. Meanwhile, partnerships with Chinese NGOs also enhance companies' legitimacy with the Chinese audience through the Chinese media.

Despite these advantages of Chinese NGOs, partnerships between Chinese NGOs and SOEs are rare. The head start that easier communication and access to Chinese companies gives to Chinese NGOs does not always translate into a solid collaboration. In the end, whether a partnership can be realised or not depends on resource complementarity: the higher the level of resource complementarity, the more likely a collaboration between companies and NGOs is to be formed (Austin and Seitanidi, 2012). One of the biggest challenges to collaboration between Chinese NGOs and Chinese companies is that many Chinese NGOs do not possess the key resources, or core competencies, that would meet the needs of Chinese companies yet.

7.5 Level Four: NGOs' Autonomy

According to RDP, resource exchange between organisations inevitably leads to interdependence; when the exchange is asymmetrical, the less dependent organisation accrues net power. Power imbalances can lead to instability in the relationship and prevent the skills and resources of the weaker party from being fully recognised (Berger et al., 2004). The relative dependence between two organisations depends on the relative significance of the resources, the ability to control them and the availability of alternative resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In NGO–MNC collaborations, MNCs are generally considered the dominant organisation and have more power given that they are structurally stronger (Al-Tabbaa et al., 2014). Though CSR is very important to companies, it is not the core business of MNCs, whereas for many NGOs, collaborative projects with companies are part of their core business and main funding sources. Additionally, NGOs and MNCs may vary greatly in size (companies are usually larger) so that what is a large proportion of an NGO's operations is a small proportion of the MNC's. Meanwhile, MNCs have various alternatives for conducting CSR, such as in-house departments, professional firms and other NGOs, especially for basic charitable projects. Notably, smaller NGOs are more likely to be dependent on corporations in NGO–company collaborations (Al-Tabbaa et al., 2014). Organisations either accept dependence or avoid it through various tactics (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). One major way for

NGOs to avoid being co-opted by companies is to set up evaluation mechanisms with external audits and establish relationships with other business partners (Poret, 2014).

In the case of Chinese NGOs and corporations, the power is visibly skewed towards the latter given the unbalanced demands for collaboration. The relationship between Chinese NGOs and corporations is one-sided that Chinese NGOs are the only side that is passionately seeking collaboration. Most NGOs took the initiative to communicate with companies that they could access, whereas it remains rare for companies to pursue Chinese NGOs for collaboration. Most Chinese NGOs are chronically under-resourced and eager to find resources; conversely, for Chinese corporations, what Chinese NGOs can provide is usually an addition to their CSR operations rather than a necessity. Therefore, the power balance is already tilted towards the company before a company and an NGO enter into a collaboration.

Interestingly, none of the Chinese NGOs interviewed expressed concern about their autonomy in their relations with companies. Their main concern was the difficulty of attracting interest from companies, even for some of the largest Chinese NGOs. Most efforts of Chinese NGOs are dedicated to pitching their ideas to companies rather than making plans evaluating the potential risk of loss of independence in a collaboration with Chinese companies, which is supposed to be an important organisational strategy before entering into a collaboration (Al-Tabbaa et al., 2014; Poret, 2014). Another reason that Chinese NGOs are generally unconcerned about their autonomy is that what they want from companies does not conflict with the interests of companies. Power issues can be serious in situations where organisational self-interests and the collective goals of the collaboration are not congruent (Das and Teng, 2001). However, in most partnerships, Chinese NGOs are CSR implementers for Chinese companies, a role that is more technical than strategic. Such collaboration does not require NGOs to substantially divert from their core values and show power imbalances (Gallart, 2014).

Even though Chinese NGOs do not engage in direct conflict and sacrifice when collaborating with Chinese companies, choosing to collaborate and associate with them in itself entails losing some control over the external environment. For some NGOs, associating with businesses alone can produce substantial backlash from core supporters (Westley and Vredenburg, 1991). According to RDP, there are times when compliance, although important for maintaining an immediately critical exchange relationship, may not be in the long-term interest of the organisation (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Moreover, if the companies they cooperate with are targeted by accusations, for instance, of greenwashing, these may spill over to the NGOs, further affecting their reliability. NGOs that carry out independent research, policy advice and advocacy should be particularly vigilant when collaborating with companies because they may lose their independence and credibility if the association is too close. Two Chinese NGOs under study are involved in both research on sustainable investments and collaboration with companies. Neither of them has expressed concerns about potential conflicts of interest and the risk of losing credibility, which is especially important for independent research and policy advice. However, even before collaborating directly with companies, they avoided confrontational remarks about specific companies and therefore do not consider these collaborations a risk because there is nothing significant to sacrifice.

7.6 Discussion

Can Chinese NGOs play a transformative role in changing the behaviour of Chinese companies on social and environmental issues and make a significant impact then? NGOs can be transformative in all kinds of relationships with corporations along the collaboration–confrontation spectrum. Whether their impact can make a difference also depends on the degree and scale of involvement.

In NGO–company collaborations, NGOs can be transformative if they can collaborate with companies to create disruptive social innovations and help the end beneficiaries take a more active role in the transformation process (Austin and Seitanidi, 2012). Most Chinese NGOs are on the collaborative side of engagement, but few NGOs can develop a partnership with companies. Even in partnerships, their involvement is mostly limited to the role of CSR implementers instead of more complex collaborations. These collaborations are far from the transformative stage introduced by Austin and Seitanidi (2012). There are significant limitations to Chinese NGO–company collaborations, which are constrained to peaceful situations in which corporations do not face severe local confrontation. As described by a leader of a Chinese NGO, at this stage, Chinese NGOs can play a role in “preventive” CSR at most, and they do not have the capability for dealing with “curative” CSR (Interview 41). “Curative” CSR refers to activities that Chinese companies conduct to improve a situation after problems have already occurred, such as protests from the local community, which requires NGOs to be equipped with more advanced skills than charity projects. Two Chinese investments in Myanmar, SPIC’s Myitsone dam and Wanbao’s Letpadaung copper mine, illustrate the constraints of Chinese NGOs. These two companies face severe local backlash about their investments, but neither collaborates with Chinese NGOs even though they are both in close contact with some of the largest Chinese NGOs in Myanmar. Wanbao has carried out a series of CSR activities, such as building public infrastructure and creating an SME (small and medium-sized enterprise) to generate jobs, to solve these conflicts. However, its approaches favoured elite engagement over public engagement, informing the local communities to ensure compliance rather than seeking to include public opinions before making key decisions (Tang-Lee, 2016). Wanbao held a discussion with one of the largest Chinese NGOs in Myanmar and explored the possibility of cooperation after the conflicts intensified, only to find out that the Chinese NGO could not offer anything that the company could not do by itself (Conference 23). This Chinese NGO does not have any experience in conflict resolution and public engagement in conflicts. Similarly, in the case of the Myitsone dam, SPIC communicated with several Chinese NGOs in Myanmar, but this did not develop into any formal collaboration. The cases of Wanbao and SPIC in Myanmar clearly show the limitations of Chinese NGOs, which manifest when corporations face complex and serious situations in which the NGOs cannot provide more than traditional philanthropic projects, which are hardly transformative.

Research and policy recommendations can also be transformative if they translate into significant policy changes. As stated in section 7.2 (“Level One: Types of Chinese NGO–Company Relationships”), a few Chinese NGOs are engaged in research and policy advice. However, their impact is hard to evaluate. The Chinese government has made progress on policies regarding green investments and financing in the BRI in recent years, publishing a series of guidelines and opinions (e.g. Green Finance Guidelines for Banking and Insurance Industry, 2022; Opinions on promoting the green development of “One Belt One Road”, 2022; Guidelines for Ecological Environmental Protection of Foreign Investment Cooperation and

Construction Projects, 2022). Nonetheless, it is difficult to determine how much of these new policies can be attributed to the efforts of Chinese NGOs as opposed to other factors, such as international pressure from states and INGOs and domestic think tanks and leadership in China. According to several interviews with INGOs and NGOs involved in promoting sustainable overseas investment, their policy recommendations are most likely to be heard when the government seek out advice (Interview 16, 30). This means that their advice is more welcome when there is a demand from policymakers, although this demand for policy change can arise from complex factors other than the voices of Chinese NGOs. Chinese NGOs certainly play a positive role in promoting overseas green investments, but it would be excessive to characterise it as transformative.

Even though both collaboration and policy advice can modify corporate behaviour, confronting corporations through public stigmatisation is probably the most common way of directly changing corporate behaviour on environmental and social issues because companies take immediate action to respond to damage to their reputations (Winston, 2002). There are virtually no confrontational Chinese NGOs in China. Some Chinese NGOs have been involved in the successful campaign to stop dam construction in China (e.g. the campaign against hydro-dams over the Nu Jiang River in the Yunnan province), but these cases are rare and their success depends on many unique factors. No comparable confrontational case has emerged for Chinese overseas investments so far. The resource constraints of grassroots environmental NGOs and the increasingly stringent environment for civil activism in recent years may explain this. Local NGOs and INGOs in the host countries, not Chinese NGOs, are currently the main forces behind the cancellation of several overseas Chinese investments. Therefore, Chinese NGOs do not play a transformative role in Chinese overseas investments by being confrontational.

7.7 Conclusion

This chapter has examined Chinese NGOs' role in Chinese corporations' overseas investments through an inductive process, successively investigating the types of Chinese NGO–company relationships, the degrees of Chinese NGO–company collaboration, the factors affecting these partnerships and Chinese NGOs' autonomy in their interactions with companies. This research has not only provided an empirical analysis of the roles of Chinese NGOs with regard to Chinese overseas investments but also extends the current literature on NGO–company relationships by proposing a new matrix of types of NGO–company relationships. Additionally, it introduces the “home NGO” advantage as one possible resource that NGOs can contribute to NGO–company collaboration.

NGOs can be categorised into six types based on their attitudes towards corporations and whether interact with and impact them directly or indirectly: collaborators, supporters, communicators, researchers and policy advisors, provocateurs and capacity builders. Most Chinese NGOs adopt either cooperative or neutral attitudes towards corporations and fall into the categories of collaborators, communicators and researchers and policy advisors. Only one NGO in the study has engaged in indirect confrontation with Chinese overseas investments.

Chinese NGO–company collaborations most commonly remain at the basic level, namely, the philanthropic stage, through corporate donations to NGOs. A few Chinese NGOs have had concrete partnerships with Chinese companies. Most Chinese NGOs would like to cooperate

with Chinese companies to seek financial resources; therefore, whether partnerships can be formed is largely dependent on whether Chinese NGOs can satisfy the demands of Chinese companies. The general resources that NGOs can provide to companies include expertise and knowledge of certain social issues, access to local markets and communities and social legitimacy, as is evident in existing Chinese NGO–company partnerships. What is unique about Chinese NGOs is their “home NGO” advantage over foreign NGOs in communicating with and earning the trust of Chinese companies.

Resource exchanges between Chinese NGOs and companies are asymmetrical, which leads to power imbalances. Such power imbalances are structural, but there are few opportunities to abuse them given that Chinese NGOs mainly play a technical role rather than a strategic one for Chinese companies. Chinese NGOs express greater concern about their access to the resources of companies than about their independence in collaborations with companies. In addition, they do not have much conflict with Chinese companies in the first place, which means that they do not have to sacrifice their autonomy significantly.

NGOs can be transformative along the collaboration–confrontation spectrum. However, so far, Chinese NGOs have not been so. They mainly play the role of facilitators for companies and CSR implementers and are incapable of solving complex conflicts faced by Chinese companies. In addition, they do not engage in direct confrontation with problematic investments to be transformative. Chinese NGOs involved in research and policy advice struggle to achieve full credibility due to potential conflicts of interest with their more cooperative roles with companies. Overall, the role of Chinese NGOs is still limited and hardly transformative in influencing the environmental and social issues faced by Chinese companies.

Chapter 8 Conclusion

As a previous NGO practitioner in development and a researcher on Global China, I still vividly remember the time I found out that a few Chinese NGOs had entered the field of international development years ago. I could not stop thinking about the opportunities that Chinese NGOs, as new blood, could bring to the scene of Global China and global civil society in general. However, after the initial excitement faded away, I became concerned about the potential constraints that Chinese NGOs might face in their journey of internationalisation. My concerns did not arise from nowhere. For decades, scholars have studied Chinese NGOs' autonomy from the state, searching for signs of a democratic change in China, more often than not finding that the development of Chinese NGOs reflects the constraints on civil society in an authoritarian regime instead of being a force strong enough to counterbalance the power exercised by the Chinese party-state. The autonomy of Chinese NGOs and the tension between them and the Chinese state are constantly studied and contested. These concerns stay with Chinese NGOs when they go international. Why are they "going out"? Are they required by the Chinese state to do so? Do they represent the strategic interests of the Chinese state, or can they become autonomous, offering an alternative to the state-centric form of global development promoted by the Chinese state? In addition, discussions have arisen regarding Chinese NGOs' role in social and environmental issues of Chinese companies. How have Chinese NGOs dealt with the overseas operations of these companies?

This thesis has addressed these questions through a thorough examination of 28 Chinese NGOs which have gone international, featuring a wide range of organisational characteristics. Step by step, I have used multiple methods and focused on several aspects to approach these questions. My answer has begun with a thorough look at the current state of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation in Chapter 3. Then, I have studied the autonomy of Chinese NGOs (Chapter 4, 5, 6) and the ideological underpinnings of their global endeavours through a discourse analysis (Chapter 6). In Chapter 7, I have conducted a comprehensive study on the relationship between Chinese NGOs and companies regarding their overseas social and environmental concerns. The studies in these five chapters served as the foundation for addressing the key concerns about Chinese NGOs and their potential roles in Chinese international development. In the next sections of this concluding chapter, I consolidate my findings and respond to broader concerns and questions. In addition, I discuss the implications and limitations of the research and the future prospects of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation.

8.1 An Alternative Form of Chinese International Development?

The overarching research questions in this thesis are: what roles do Chinese NGOs play in Chinese international development? To what extent do the international development activities of Chinese NGOs constitute a major new form of engagement in Chinese international development, different and separate from those of the Chinese state and corporations? In other

words, are Chinese NGOs likely to provide an alternative form of international development alternative to those of the Chinese state and the corporations?

The role of NGOs in international development as alternatives to the mainstream donor state-led model has long been discussed. Being flexible, innovative and non-governmental, they are expected to provide development practices that can engage and empower local communities and produce transformative changes on the ground, in ways that cannot easily be matched by the state and the mainstream development system (e.g. Lewis and Kanji, 2009). Studying whether NGOs can provide an alternative form of Chinese international development implies identifying a development paradigm that is influential and different enough from the mainstream model led by the Chinese state and corporations. The key factors for an alternative role lie in the scale and independence of NGO activities. Only projects that are large and autonomous enough can become truly influential and unique to represent an alternative to the mainstream. Based on the criteria of scale and independence, I have demonstrated that Chinese NGOs can hardly be considered an alternative form of international development that is influential enough and distinctive enough to be separated from the state and corporations. Instead, I argue that the role of internationalised NGOs is complementary to the mainstream Chinese international development landscape.

First, this thesis has demonstrated that the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs is still in an emerging stage and its current size and scale remain limited. As shown in Chapter 3 through a comprehensive study of all Chinese NGO projects overseas, the scale of the sector in terms of annual international spending is less than 1% of that of its Western counterparts in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Canada (the average of the three). The size of Chinese NGOs' international development spending also corresponds to less than 1% of China's official aid, which suggests the volume of spending is hardly large and influential enough to make NGOs an alternative. Most Chinese NGOs have only made temporary international donations or projects, and those that aim to establish long-term continuous international projects have yet to fully institutionalize their practices. Although it is worthwhile to monitor the development of the sector in the future, the current scale of the sector is too limited to substantiate claims that NGOs can wield sufficient influence to challenge the mainstream.

Second, the thesis has shown that the process of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation is not sufficiently autonomous from the influence of the Chinese state and corporations and, thus, cannot offer a viable alternative. The independence of internationalising Chinese NGOs can be explored by examining three aspects: the agents, methods and values of development. These three aspects are often referred to as the key elements of an alternative approach to development (Pieterse, 2002).

The first sphere focuses on the "agents" who conduct international development activities. NGOs can be considered "alternative" given that they are one of the three sectors that are distinct from the state and the market. However, in the case of Chinese NGOs, the existence of GONGOs blurs the line between the NGO and the state. This research has presented a nuanced understanding of the distinction between GONGOs and independent NGOs in internationalisation. As demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 5, many independent NGOs have "gone out". As shown in Chapter 5, the GONGO status or lack thereof does not determine the exact NGO-government link in the internationalisation process, and GONGOs are not necessarily more tied to the government than independent NGOs. Yet, it is true that some

GONGOs are set up specifically for international affairs, and, overall, GONGOs tend to rely more on governmental referrals for implementation in host countries. Such nuances complicate the distinction between GONGOs and independent NGOs in the study of internationalisation and make the angle of “agents” alone an insufficiently clear indicator of whether Chinese NGOs could represent an alternative or not.

The second sphere is that of “methods”, which can be understood as what has been conducted and how. Chinese NGOs are engaged in an embedded form of internationalisation. As shown in Chapter 5, the Chinese state adopts a relatively hands-off approach to the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs, considering that rules and policies specifically encouraging or regulating the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs are largely absent, except for a few indicative guidelines. Governmental funding for Chinese NGOs’ internationalisation is very limited, in contrast to what may be expected considering the presence of GONGOs. The reality is that even for GONGOs, governmental funding is scarce. Based on direct state intervention, the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs cannot be characterised as directly state-led and targeting strategic interests. Chinese NGOs have autonomy in initiating, designing and implementing their projects, and they have exhibited a wide range of organisational behaviours in terms of project operations. Nevertheless, there is no significant evidence that Chinese NGOs have carried out activities that are more critical and confrontational than their domestic projects since they are influenced by the state in many ways other than direct intervention on internationalisation. The state’s influence is embedded in the domestic regulatory system for Chinese NGOs (shown in Chapter 5) and in the sources of legitimacy and value for Chinese NGOs to internationalise (shown in Chapter 6). Such indirect state’s influence is strong enough to make Chinese NGOs behave in a self-limiting way by avoiding confrontation with the Chinese state and any other critical stakeholders. Their approaches to development issues are largely non-critical, non-confrontational and based on traditional charity, donating goods and providing services. Moreover, as shown in Chapter 7, Chinese NGOs’ approach to Chinese companies on social and environmental issues is also non-confrontational and hardly transformative. Chinese NGOs are generally more dependent on companies for resources and are in imbalanced power relationships with the companies. Overall, the self-constrained and non-transformative behaviour of Chinese NGOs cannot be considered to constitute an alternative to the mainstream.

The third sphere is that of “values”, that is, NGOs’ views on their international projects and development issues. As illustrated in Chapter 6, the values held by Chinese NGOs are implicitly influenced by the Chinese state, as evidenced by the fact that Chinese NGOs are unable to develop discourses that are independent of the Chinese state. Instead, I have demonstrated how their discourses are characterised by depoliticisation and diplomatisation. Chinese NGOs have a depoliticised view of development. Development problems are presented as a given, and there is no reflection on the global power structure underlying them. Their projects are viewed as immediate solutions to these uncritically defined problems. Part of the reason behind such depoliticisation is to avoid delegitimisation, especially from the Chinese state. Meanwhile, Chinese NGOs commonly diplomatised their activities by referring to the Chinese state’s discourses and actions, which can help legitimise their international projects. Thus, Chinese NGOs are hardly completely independent of the state’s influence.

However, although Chinese NGOs are unlikely to serve as an alternative to China’s mainstream state- and investment-led international development, they have played a complementary role,

as demonstrated in the following aspects. First, Chinese NGOs have enriched the varieties of Global China's aid and development cooperation. Although Chinese NGOs are mostly engaged in humanitarian donations and traditional charity projects in healthcare and education, they have extended their activities to a host of social issues, such as anti-poaching activities, demining and refugees, which are seldomly addressed by state-led international development programmes. Although these projects are usually small in scale, they are complementary to China's official foreign aid system. In addition to broadening issue areas, Chinese NGOs have also diversified the ways of connecting with local people. China's development cooperation is largely state-led and top-down; thus, the aid recipient is usually the local government or governmental organisations. As shown in Chapter 5, Chinese NGOs sometimes implement projects directly with local NGOs and local communities. In doing so, direct society-to-society links are built that are complementary to government-to-government links. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 6, Chinese NGOs tend to diplomatised themselves and become Chinese soft power promoters. This role fits the people-to-people connecting role expected by the Chinese state, which indicates a certain subordination to state goals. Chinese NGOs have thus largely complemented the state's efforts to promote China's image in developing countries. Lastly, Chinese NGOs can be complementary to Chinese companies' efforts in dealing with the environmental and social issues associated with their overseas investments. They are often considered more trustworthy than non-Chinese organisations by Chinese companies, and they can act as a bridge between Chinese companies and the local/international society.

These findings have enriched the studies on China's global engagements, which have focused on the Chinese state and Chinese investments (e.g. Bräutigam, 2011b; Eichenauer et al., 2021; Shapiro et al., 2018; Wolf et al., 2013). The research shows that Chinese NGOs, as social actors, are largely complementary to the interests of the Chinese state and companies. Notably, Chinese NGOs are now complementary in a way that differs from many Northern NGOs, which act as contractors for donor agencies to provide aid services in developing countries. The complementarity of Chinese NGOs is largely based on their own behaviour and value instead of direct contractual links with the Chinese government.

8.2 The Future of Chinese NGOs' Internationalisation

The development of INGOs is driven by different political, economic, social, environmental, and technical factors (Davies, 2014). Similarly, when we look at the future development of Chinese NGO internationalisation, it's important to look at a variety of drivers. One type of drivers is organic (as opposed to the factors that are intentionally imposed on internationalisation) and conditional, such as international natural disaster and humanitarian crisis. The 2015 Nepal earthquake and Covid-19 pandemic have shown that large-scale international humanitarian crisis could stimulate the international activities of Chinese NGOs. Another type of drivers is organic and systemic, such as economic development and change of social values. The emergence and current development of Chinese NGO internationalisation has benefited from the strong economic development in China in the past two decades, which has freed up resources used domestically and internationally. The future development of the Chinese economy will continue to have an impact on Chinese NGO internationalisation. Currently, international donations, especially international donations for non-humanitarian causes are still a nascent concept among the Chinese public. Cosmopolitanism and religious

value, which are some of the common underlying values for international donations, are not widely present among the Chinese public. This is partly the reason why marketing international projects for their diplomatic value is appealing to Chinese stakeholders. The change of social value is a complicated and lengthy process and whether the Chinese public can be more acceptable to cosmopolitan value and willing to make international donations is unclear. However, one thing is certain that if nationalism become more rampant in China, it will become more complex for Chinese NGO to gain public support unless they make even more efforts underlying the national interests to justify their international projects. Lastly, there is a type of drivers that are top-down and can make an immediate impact: the governmental policies. I will illustrate how different scenarios of governmental policies make an impact on the future development of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation.

In the coming decades, Chinese NGOs operating overseas may follow different trajectories, depending in particular on the attitudes of the Chinese state towards their internationalisation. In this section, I propose three potential future trajectories for Chinese NGOs, dependent on three possible directions of Chinese governmental policies regarding Chinese NGOs' internationalisation: supportive, restrictive and hands-off. Within the "supportive" direction, a particular policy regarding official funding for Chinese NGOs' international development projects must be discussed separately given its potential significance to the development of the sector. Different directions will have a different impact on the development of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation, particularly on the dimensions of scale and diversity, as shown in Table 19.

The most notable development to watch is official funding for Chinese NGOs' internationalisation. The South-South Cooperative Assistance Fund began to provide official aid funds to two Chinese GONGOs in 2022. The fund can become a major platform for the Chinese government to support Chinese NGOs' internationalisation. As this platform scales up, a window of opportunity for Chinese NGOs to expand their overseas operations will arise. However, official aid funds are most likely to be allocated to large GONGOs with trustworthy backgrounds and a stable track record of international projects. With the scale-up of the impact of these governmental funds, many Chinese NGOs will eventually be subjected to the state's preference in terms of the location and issue areas of the international projects. The diversity and robustness of the sector may be compromised. Too much governmental mobilisation can have the opposite effect in terms of global impact, as the example of the Confucius Institute shows (e.g. Yuan et al., 2016). How Chinese NGO internationalisation will be affected will largely be dependent on how governmental funding is designed and allocated. Too many restrictions on governmental funding will lead to the consolidation of the sector in which only a few NGOs benefit from the funding and will decrease diversity.

The other direction of supportive governmental intervention is the adoption of policies providing a favourable environment for Chinese NGOs to "go out". Unlike awarding official funds to a few NGOs, such policies will benefit the sector, including various kinds of NGOs with an interest in "going out". For example, the government could create specific channels for Chinese NGOs to address logistic and operational issues for their international activities. Chinese NGOs have often complained about the inconveniences they have faced in their international operations. They frequently encounter considerable speculation from commercial banks when making international money transfers due to the lack of specific rules on the topic and commercial banks' unfamiliarity with their intentions and international operations.

Chinese NGOs have also faced challenges in auditing their international expenses as international receipts are not recognised by supervision units. The Chinese government could gradually develop supportive policies to address these operational challenges and improve the operational infrastructure necessary for Chinese NGOs to go international and do so more efficiently. Such supportive policies could benefit all Chinese NGOs, large or small, and help the sector to scale up. Because supportive policies are not direct governmental interventions, the diversity of the sector will not suffer. By far such supportive policies are largely absent, though there is rising pressure on governmental agencies to make relevant supportive policies as the more Chinese NGOs internationalise and some operational challenges become systematic and sectoral problems.

However, the Chinese government can choose the opposite direction and impose more stringent restrictions on the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs. The 2016 Opinion (Opinion on Reforming the NGO Management System to Promote Healthy and Orderly NGO Development) requiring Chinese NGOs to get approval from either their supervisory unit or foreign affairs offices is one example of this. In addition, the Chinese government has authorised only a few Chinese foundations to raise funds publicly for international donations to the fight against COVID-19. This authorisation was imposed to control the risk of misbehaviour in the face of large amounts of international donations. Although this control is temporary and applies to a special occasion, it illustrates the possibility that as Chinese NGOs start to grow, the Chinese government may intervene and impose more regulations when their impact becomes more significant. Such restrictions tend to control the development of the sector and make the sector less vibrant.

The last scenario is that the Chinese state maintains the current, relatively hands-off approach, where official funds for Chinese NGOs remain limited and specific policy support for or restrictions to Chinese NGOs' internationalisation are scarce. In this scenario, the development of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation will largely be bottom-up and dependent on other factors, such as public opinion and the support of the international community and companies. The Chinese government will not have a significant impact on the growth of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation, and an increase in diversity can be expected from the bottom-up growth.

Table 19: Future Scenarios of Governmental Influence and Their Implications

	Mobilization/Fund	Policy support	Policy restriction	Hands-off Approach
Scale	Positive	Positive	Negative	No impact
Diversity	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive

8.3 Implications for Chinese Civil Society

To many Chinese NGOs, internationalisation, as an emerging field, provides new opportunities for organisational development. As shown in the case of both GONGOs (e.g. CFPA) and independent NGOs (e.g. Yundi, Peaceland Foundation), internationalisation can be an effective organisational development strategy. Internationalisation offers opportunities for geographical expansion. For example, according to Provisional Regulations on the Registration and Management of Private Non-enterprise Units (*minban feiqiye danwei dengji guanli zanxing tiaoli*/民办非企业单位登记管理暂行条例), private non-enterprise units cannot have

branches in China and thus their work is limited to the administrative area where they are registered. By crossing borders, they have significantly more freedom to choose where to operate as there are no rules to guide or regulate their international destinations. In addition to additional geographical opportunities, the variety of issues that Chinese NGOs address has increased. For example, Peaceland Foundation has conducted projects in Syrian refugee relief and landmines detection in Cambodia. These projects are very specific to the international setting and non-existent domestically. Moreover, Chinese NGOs could extend their funding sources by going international. In China, an NGO can only raise funds from the domestic public if it possesses a public fundraising license or is partnered with a foundation that does. By going overseas, a Chinese NGO can expand its fund-raising activities to overseas audiences, as shown in the case of CFPA, which raised funds through Global Giving, an online platform mainly targeting international public donors, and Lunch for Children, which partially raises funds from the US to support its operations in Africa. Whether these geographical, operational and financing opportunities can be seized is mainly constrained by organisational capacity and resources and the international environment rather than the current Chinese policies on internationalisation, which are largely absent. However, as discussed in the previous section, the regulatory environment can change, which could easily affect the operational spaces of Chinese NGOs.

Chinese NGOs also face numerous operational challenges, such as a lack of financial resources and human resources. In particular, the human resource challenge, ranked as a top hurdle in internationalisation by a few NGOs (e.g. Interview 17, 28, 41), is very specific to internationalisation. The human resources required for international projects are different from those needed for domestic projects. People who master foreign languages, can handle international affairs and are willing to relocate to foreign countries for the long term are very rare. The uncompetitive salaries offered by Chinese NGOs compared with other international development organisations make it even harder for Chinese NGOs to hire the right people.

Apart from operational challenges, Chinese NGOs face a potential legitimacy crisis. These challenges can become more apparent when Chinese NGOs grow in size and acquire more visibility in the international development landscape. International development NGOs must gain multi-faceted legitimacy, and stakeholders can have conflicting requirements for legitimacy (Lister, 2003). Such conflicts have led to a legitimacy crisis for Northern development NGOs (e.g. Sogge, 1996; Deloffre and Schmitz, 2019). Donors in the North and beneficiaries in the South pose structural challenges to the legitimacy of Northern NGOs (Saxby, 1996). In many cases, the supposed beneficiaries in the South are not the priority compared with the donors in the North (Atack, 1999). Chinese NGOs also face such structural legitimacy tension between fulfilling donor interests and the demands of local constituencies. However, the legitimacy crisis of Chinese NGOs goes beyond the tension between donors and beneficiaries. It also results from the different requirements of domestic and international stakeholders. Notably, while leveraging political discourses and resources can help Chinese NGOs gain legitimacy with the Chinese domestic audience, it poses a threat to their legitimacy with international communities, who perceive closeness with the Chinese government as a liability rather than an asset. Some Chinese NGO has already been challenged about their relationship with the Chinese government when attending international conferences and trying to establish international networks (Interview 23). As shown in Chapters 4 and 6, referencing official discourses, complementing national strategies and giving credit to government officials

are common strategies of Chinese NGOs to gain the approval of the Chinese state and other domestic stakeholders. These practices, which are also common in their domestic projects, are unproblematic when they only target domestic stakeholders, but they risk hurting Chinese NGOs' image with international stakeholders. Some Chinese NGOs are already aware of this risk, as evidenced by CFPA's purposeful removal of the term "BRI" and other Chinese official rhetoric from their fundraising advertisement on Global Giving, which mainly targets the Western audience. Even though, in some specific contexts, Chinese NGOs can strategically avoid using Chinese official discourses, the tension resulting from the difference between legitimacy for domestic stakeholders and for international stakeholders does not disappear. For example, when CFPA presents its general motivation and purposes, it often uses both Chinese official discourses (e.g. "BRI"), which reflects a diplomatic intent and a tendency to gain political resources, and "love without borders" ("*da ai wu jiang*/大爱无疆"), which refers to cosmopolitan values, as if it is a safe package that can be tailored to different contexts. Nonetheless, these two positions can be fundamentally incompatible when there is a conflict of interests between the Chinese state and local communities. Association with the interests of the Chinese state may harm Chinese NGOs' representativeness of the local community, which is also deemed an important dimension of INGO legitimacy (Atack, 1999). Chinese NGOs must think carefully about their priority when such conflicts of interest exist. This is also true when Chinese NGOs work with Chinese companies on controversial social and environmental issues. Working too closely with these companies can jeopardize Chinese NGOs' legitimacy with the international and local communities. Internationalisation has provided a crucial opportunity for Chinese NGOs to reflect on their normalised practices and rethink the motivations behind their operations.

8.4 Implications for Global Civil Society

The emergence of Chinese NGOs on the international scene also has implications for global civil society. First, it has pluralised the norms and values of global civil society. As argued by Hasmath and Hsu (2021), the rise of Chinese NGOs in international development will ultimately challenge the contemporary understanding of global civil society, which is often considered to support and strengthen democratic institutions and values, and instead legitimise global social processes that compete with Western norms. This thesis has provided further evidence to support these claims. Chinese NGOs are distinct from the associations that broadly hold liberal, democratic and cosmopolitan values. From a liberal perspective, an important role of NGOs is that of a "troublemaker" for their capability to represent local interests and challenge the mainstream. Conversely, Chinese NGOs have taken up the role of "peacemakers". They have restrained themselves and are being restrained from expressing values inconsistent with the authoritarian regime. As shown in Chapter 6, except for the basic humanitarian values that underlie charitable work, Chinese NGOs hardly promote any liberal and democratic norms explicitly. Instead, they have intentionally or unintentionally positioned themselves as friendship messengers, endorsing peace, solidarity and non-interference, which are also the attitudes advocated by the Chinese state in international affairs. These values show respect for diversity while avoiding judgment, confrontation and transformation. Ironically, the Chinese identity reflected in this role has actually strengthened the difference between Chinese NGOs and others, which can be counter-productive to the solidarity and unity in the state's slogan "A Community with a Shared Future for Mankind" (*ren lei mingyun gongtong ti*/人类

命运共同体)。Furthermore, the strong Chinese national identity shown in the Chinese NGOs has differentiated Chinese NGOs from others and prevented them from consolidating into the current structure of global civil society. Such national identity is already prevalent among Chinese NGOs without concrete and material governmental mobilization. It will be even stronger if the Chinese state starts to mobilise more resources to scale up the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs.

Second, the inability of Chinese NGOs to develop a complete action and discourse independent of the Chinese state has inevitably brought the Chinese state's influence into global civil society, although the degree can vary significantly among Chinese NGOs. One appealing characteristic of NGOs, as the major associational institutions in global civil society, is their stance as representing the bottom-up interests of people and their capability to hold government and institutions that have malign practices accountable (e.g. Kenny and Germain, 2006). However, many scholars have shown that these aspirations have romanticised the role of NGOs (see, e.g. Smith, 2010; Mohan, 2002). Particularly, NGOs are mainstreamed into the New Liberal agenda and are criticised as too close to donor states (Hulme, 1997; Banks et al., 2015). The presence of Chinese NGOs has further complicated the NGO–state relationship. Even though this thesis has shown that most GONGOs are not required and financed by the Chinese state to go international, the very presence of GONGOs, with their organisational characteristics distinct from NGOs, already blurs the line between the state and civil society. As GONGOs go international, their paradoxical nature will also cross borders. The internationalisation of Chinese NGOs has also diversified the types of state's influence on global civil society. The Chinese case demonstrates that states' influence over global civil society does not necessarily come from straightforward financing, as exemplified by the donor-states' influence on NGOs in the Global North. The state's influence is already institutionalised in Chinese NGOs through domestic regulation and supervision system and internalised in Chinese NGOs through legitimacy for and value behind internationalisation. When Chinese NGOs go international, the state's influence follows them. This kind of influence goes beyond GONGOs.

Chinese NGOs are complementary rather than an alternative to China's mainstream international development landscape, even though most of their internationalisation is not initiated and managed by the Chinese state, unlike China's global media campaign to improve China's image and the Confucius Institute to promote Chinese culture. Does it matter whether these are state initiatives or not if they inevitably exhibit state-influenced characteristics, such as self-limited behaviours and promoting China's image? To various degrees, Chinese NGOs have become part of the “authoritarianism goes global” machine even if they do not intend to be (see the concept in *Authoritarianism Goes Global*, Diamond et al., 2016). Moreover, they have shown that not only top-down initiatives, as often noticed, but also bottom-up initiatives can become part of this machine. Based on liberal and democratic standards, is there a way for Chinese NGOs to rid themselves of the “original sin” of arising from an authoritarian context? The empirical evidence by and large points to a negative answer. The emergence of Chinese NGOs in international space will eventually stimulate new rounds of debates that challenge the clear division of three sectors, the role of NGOs and the constraints of NGOs in global civil society.

8.5 Contributions, Limitations and Future Studies

This thesis has made several major contributions. First, it has filled the data gap on Chinese NGOs' internationalisation. The Chinese NGO Internationalisation Database is the first database comprehensively and systematically collecting data about Chinese NGOs' international development activities. It has provided a comprehensive picture of Chinese NGOs' global endeavours and the informational infrastructure for the field of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation. The database has already attracted attention from scholars, NGO practitioners and policy makers. Second, the thesis has significantly extended the range of case studies from a few popularly studied cases, such as the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation and the Global Environmental Institute, to more than 20 Chinese NGOs with a variety of organisational characteristics, including GONGOs and independent NGOs and organisations with various degree and areas of international engagement. Particularly, 20 independent NGOs are examined, which have often been under-studied given their relative invisibility compared with large GONGOs. This rich and diversified selection of case studies has substantiated the findings of the research and provided a much more comprehensive view of the study of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation. Third, the thesis has applied a multiple-layer approach to the autonomy of Chinese NGOs, further enriching the continuing academic discussion on Chinese NGO–state relationships and the autonomy of Chinese NGOs. The internationalisation of Chinese NGOs has revealed the complexity of these organisations' autonomy. There is no simple answer to the question of whether Chinese NGOs are autonomous or independent or not. Instead, the research has explained how Chinese NGOs are influenced by the state by applying the concept of embeddedness and using different layers of analysis. Fourth, this thesis is the first attempt to systematically examine the role of Chinese NGOs in Chinese international development, contributing to not only the literature on Chinese NGOs but also on Global China. It has followed the Global China approach which avoids essentializing China and brought Chinese NGOs, as emerging actors, to the debates in Global China. Fifth, the thesis has further enriched the discussions on global civil society by presenting an emerging player in international development – Chinese NGOs – and analysing the implications of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation for global civil society.

As discussed in Chapter 2, a major limitation of this thesis is the inability to conduct comprehensive fieldwork in the host countries where Chinese NGOs operate due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This has resulted in a limited number of interviews with mainly Chinese stakeholders and a lack of direct perspectives from local communities. However, this research has paved the way for further studies including local perspectives. The future study of Chinese NGO–local community relationships could help us understand how local communities perceive Chinese NGOs and evaluate the impact of these organisations. Such local perspectives could also deepen our understanding of Chinese NGO–state. Particularly, it will be significant in addressing questions such as: how do local recipients and local partners perceive Chinese NGOs' independence of the Chinese state? Do they perceive Chinese NGOs as a mere extension of the Chinese state? How does their perception on Chinese state's influence differ from the governmental influence studied in Chapter 5? Do local communities consider Chinese NGOs to play a role in improving China's image? In other words, does the soft power promotion function of Chinese NGOs discussed in Chapter 6 work in local communities? Moreover, do local communities have a better image of Chinese NGOs than of Chinese companies, as discussed in Chapter 7?

In addition to local perspectives, there are several other directions for further research. One is to study Chinese public opinion on international donations by NGOs. As shown in Chapter 3, public fundraising is one funding source for Chinese NGOs, although its scale is still limited. Chapter 6 has revealed that Chinese NGOs use nationalist discourses in public reports and advertisements for fundraising and that cosmopolitan and humanitarian values alone are not sufficient to mobilise public funds. It would be very meaningful to study public opinion and behaviour, such as the questions of which demographics are more likely to make international donations in China, what factors have motivated public donors and what kind of NGOs these public donors are most likely to donate to. These studies could help us further understand whether the Chinese public could become a major source of income for Chinese NGOs' internationalisation in the future. The rise of public donations may increase Chinese NGOs' autonomy from other donors, such as companies and the state.

Another direction for research is the role of INGOs in Chinese NGOs' internationalisation. Trilateral cooperation with China by OECD countries has been on the rise in recent years. Apart from the state level, such trilateral cooperation has also occurred at the non-state level. INGOs and foundations, such as the Asia Foundation and the Ford Foundation in China, have shown interest in Chinese NGOs' internationalisation and have funded relevant projects. Further research can be conducted to examine the interactions between international foundations, Chinese NGOs and local communities/NGOs in recipient countries and their implications.

The final avenue for research is to study the potential relationship between Chinese NGOs' international presence and Chinese overseas investments, and, in particular, whether the choice of location for Chinese NGOs and activity intensity is correlated with Chinese overseas investments. Such research could help us understand whether the presence and density of Chinese investments influence the destinations of Chinese NGOs. I have explored the possibility of performing a regression analysis of Chinese NGOs based on the Chinese NGO Internationalisation Database and Chinese overseas investments based on relevant data; however, given that Chinese NGOs are still in their emerging phase, the scale and quality of data are not yet strong enough to support it. In the future, as more data on Chinese NGOs' internationalisation is accumulated, such quantitative research may be feasible.

8.6 “Doing What You Can Do, Even For A Little Bit”

Although I am not optimistic about the potential of Chinese NGOs' internationalisation to evolve into a fully autonomous space that can provide opportunities for them to engage in alternative activities to the mainstream Chinese development apparatus at a structural and sectoral level, I recognise it as a growing sphere for individuals or groups that are truly passionate about effecting changes and making an impact beyond borders. Over the past four years, I have had the opportunity to meet numerous passionate and enterprising Chinese citizens who work tirelessly to carry out charitable activities overseas. As I conclude my four-year journey, many memories arise, be it an NGO leader vividly explaining his aspiration to initiate a charitable cruise providing free medical services (a project already in preparation as far as I am aware), a group of volunteers anxiously exploring possible channels for donating medical goods overseas at the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic or a veteran in international development, who I knew before beginning my PhD, sharing her excitement, aspirations and ambitions for her new position in a Chinese NGO in Ethiopia. These individuals represent

something new in contemporary China: they are guided not solely by the pursuit of profit or state orders but rather by a true desire to aid vulnerable populations beyond the country's borders. They may face many operational and political constraints and are not ambitious enough to make fundamental and transformative changes, but they are making efforts to “do what you can do, even for a little bit” (“*Neng Zuo Yidian Shi Yidian*”/ “能做一点是一点”), a phrase I heard frequently in my interactions with them. The state and the nation continue to cast a long shadow, explicitly or implicitly, over Chinese NGOs' projects. Yet, this should not detract from the efforts of the many Chinese people who, despite numerous constraints, are taking small but meaningful steps towards engaging with the world and supporting their own vision of development in faraway lands. It is the existence of these people that opens possibilities for Chinese participation in global civil society.

To many Chinese NGO practitioners, autonomy is not the priority. Their ambitions are to ensure that charitable donations are successfully delivered and development projects are completed smoothly. Their daily work is ripe with various kinds of operational challenges, and their concerns and priorities differ significantly from those of many NGO and Global China scholars. This thesis, as an academic study, aims first and foremost at creating a dialogue with scholars in academic circles. However, I want to express my deepest respect and gratitude to all NGO practitioners, who are genuinely good-willed and compassionate and make internationalisation happen. Without them, this thesis would not exist.

Appendix

Appendix 1: Texts 1-24 in Chinese (original) and English (translation)

Texts	Original Texts (in Chinese)	Translated Texts (in English)
Text 1	当地教育情况:尼日利亚小学入学费用高(¥10,000-¥40,000),适龄儿童上不了学;尼日利亚本土有300+少数民族200+语言,急需建立学校;尼日利亚未入学儿童达1200万人,为世界之最。	Local education situation: Nigerian primary school enrollment fees are high (10,000-40,000 RMB), and school-aged children cannot go to school; There are 300+ ethnic minorities and 200+ languages in Nigeria, and there is an urgent need to establish schools; Nigeria has 12 million children out of school, the most in the world.
Text 2	由于多年的经济制裁和政局动荡,缅甸经济发展停滞,基础设施,特别是电力设施严重匮乏。全国贫困率为37.5%,人均日收入不足1.25美元(约8元人民币)的低收入人群占总人口的40%,是亚洲最贫困的国家之一。	Due to years of economic sanctions and political turmoil, Myanmar's economic development has stagnated and its infrastructure, especially electricity, is seriously lacking. The national poverty rate is 37.5%, and low-income people with a per capita daily income of less than 1.25 US dollars (about 8 yuan) account for 40% of the total population, making it one of the poorest countries in Asia.
Text 3	2011年叙利亚爆发内战以来,叙利亚处于战火中已经六年多了。这场被人们斥为“21世纪最严重的人道主义灾难”中,52万余人丧生,1200万人颠沛流离,600万人依靠人道主义援助,其中230多万儿童沦为难民在死亡边缘挣扎。	Syria has been at war for more than six years since its civil war broke out in 2011. In what has been called the "worst humanitarian disaster in the 21st century", more than 520,000 people lost their lives, 12 million were displaced, and 6 million depended on humanitarian aid. Among them, more than 2.3 million children became refugees and struggled on the edge of death.
Text 4	中国扶贫基金会决定在埃塞亚的斯亚贝巴市开展微笑儿童学校供餐项目。2020年开始,情况愈加严峻。 (一) 新冠疫情:疫情在埃塞俄比亚仍未结束,现存确诊26070例,目前每天都在新增确诊一千例左右,而这只是目前埃塞每日检测的最高能力。 (二) 蝗虫灾害:覆盖一平方公里土地的蝗虫群一天能吃掉相当于35000人的食物,而作为蝗灾中心的埃塞俄比亚,该国已有40%以上的人口出现了营养不良。 (三) 暴力冲突:埃塞俄比亚北部冲突导致10万人流离失所,110万人或陷入困境。	China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation decided to launch the Smiling Children project providing free meals to schools in Ethiopia's Addis Ababa City. As 2020 begins, the situation becomes more severe. 1) Covid pandemic: The epidemic has not yet ended in Ethiopia. There are 26,070 confirmed cases. At present, about 1,000 new cases are being diagnosed every day. This already reaches the highest capacity of Ethiopia's daily testing. 2) Locust plague: A swarm of locusts covering one square kilometer of land can eat the equivalent of 35,000 people's food a day. Ethiopia, as the center of the locust plague, already has more than 40% of the country's population suffering from malnutrition.

(四) 饥饿危机: 世界粮食计划署在《2021 年世界粮食安全和营养状况》表示, 2020 年全球共有 7.2 亿至 8.11 亿人口面临饥饿, 如取中间值 7.68 亿, 那么 2020 年饥饿人口数比 2019 年增加约 1.18 亿。

3) Violent conflicts: 100,000 people have been displaced by conflict in northern Ethiopia and 1.1 million may be trapped in hardship.

4) Hunger: The World Food Programme states in the "State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2021" that a total of 720 million to 811 million people in the world will face hunger in 2020. By taking the median value which is 768 million, the number of hungry people in 2020 will increase compared to 2019 by about 118 million.

Text 5 从 20 世纪 70 年代末开始, 中亚地区的动荡深刻影响地区和世界的变化。约 270 万阿富汗人因战争、冲突和暴力被迫流离失所。同为发展中国家的邻国巴基斯坦包容、接纳了其中 140 万人。突然涌入的人口加剧了自然资源的短缺。在接收社区, 生活可能充满窘迫: 村落之间往往相隔较远, 有限的取水点要求居民每天步行数百米前往取水。天气炎热时, 没有电源电器贮藏、保鲜食品药品。人们只能烧火做饭, 然而木柴价格昂贵。尽管如此, 在过去四十年中, 为了安置保护阿富汗难民和支持维护地区和平, 巴基斯坦付出了巨大努力。

Since the late 1970s of the 20th century, the unrest in Central Asia has profoundly affected the world. Some 2.7 million Afghans have been forcibly displaced by war, conflict and violence. Neighboring Pakistan, which is also a developing country, tolerated and accommodated 1.4 million of them. The sudden influx of people exacerbates the shortage of natural resources. In (refugee) receiving communities, life can be fraught with hardship: villages are often far apart, and limited locations for water collection require residents to walk hundreds of meters every day to collect water. When the weather is hot, there is no power supply and electrical appliances to store and preserve food and medicine. People can only cook with fire, but firewood is expensive. Nonetheless, over the past four decades, Pakistan has made great efforts to resettle and protect Afghan refugees and support the maintenance of regional peace.

Text 6 伊朗国家政府和当地政府对于到达灾区的各国民间救援力量表示感谢并提供了开展救援工作的必要条件...

The Iranian national government and the local government expressed their gratitude to the civil rescue forces from various countries in the disaster area and provided the necessary conditions for carrying out rescue work...

Text 7 国际免费午餐项目为肯尼亚内罗毕第二大贫民窟马萨雷的 Recada 小学送去了 158 个粮食包, 发放给 150 名学生及 8 名老师。

The International Free Lunch Project delivered 158 food bags to 150 students and 8 teachers at Recada Primary School in Masare, the second largest slum in Nairobi, Kenya.

Text 8 该项目将直接惠及 390 名学生和 12 名教师, 居住在学校附近的居民也会间接受益。兴建新校舍及添置教室用具将直接惠及一所共有 280 名学生和 10 名教师的学校, 另外, 派发学习用具将直接惠及一所共有 110 名学生和 2 名教师的学校。

The project will directly benefit 390 students and 12 teachers, and indirectly benefit residents living near the school. A school with 280 students and 10 teachers will be directly benefited from the construction of new school buildings and the addition of classroom supplies, and a school with 110 students and 2 teachers will be directly benefited from the distribution of learning supplies.

Text 9 项目是响应国家‘一带一路’倡议和助力构建人类命运共同体的一项具体行动, 旨

The project is a specific action to respond to the national 'Belt and Road Initiative' and help build A Community with a Shared Future for Mankind. It

	在提高‘一带一路’沿线发展中国家有需求的小学生的学习条件，促进学生的全面发展，传递中国人民的情谊，促进民心相通，搭建友谊之桥。	aims to improve the learning conditions of needy primary school students in developing countries along the ‘Belt and Road’ route, promote the overall development of students, and extend the friendship of the Chinese people, promote People-to-People Bond, and build the bridge of friendship.
Text 10	总目标：培训缅甸教师资、改善教育设施条件，帮助儿童获得教育，培育良好社区及支持环境，利于中缅长期友好和平。	Overall goal: To train Burmese teachers, improve educational facilities, help children obtain education, cultivate a good community and support environment, and contribute to the long-term friendship and peace between China and Myanmar.
Text 11	一月，彩虹第二次义工尼泊尔行启动，通过志愿者交流方式更多朋友以一线志愿者服务角色切入，从文化、经济、社会到国家发展与未来挑战等不同角度，深度又客观的认识一个国家，开拓自己的视野，也为未来创造更多可能性。同时，中尼两国志愿者和社工在弘扬人道精神的同时也在构建两国人民的友谊。	In January, Rainbow Volunteer Club's second volunteer trip to Nepal was launched. Through exchanges of volunteers, more friends have gained a deep and objective understanding of a country, expanded their own horizons and created more possibilities for the future from different perspectives such as culture, economy, society, national development and future challenges, through the role of front-line volunteering. At the same time, Chinese and Nepalese volunteers and social workers are building friendship between the peoples of the two countries while promoting the spirit of humanity.
Text 12	在国际上，当大家提到非洲大象保护，中国人总是备受责难——毕竟是象牙交易大国，大量象牙贸易无形中助长盗猎分子杀害大象的行为。但中国已经做出承诺，将于2017年底全面禁止商业用途的象牙加工及销售。再加上我们的努力，同各方一道，逐渐扭转中国人在非洲的国际野保形象。中国人，也可以是保护非洲大象的英雄！	Internationally, when people talk about the protection of African elephants, the Chinese are always criticized - after all, they are a major country in the ivory trade and large amount of ivory trade naturally boost the killing of elephant by poachers. But China has pledged to completely ban the processing and sale of ivory for commercial use by the end of 2017. Together with our efforts, we will work with all parties to gradually reverse the image of the Chinese in Africa as an international wildlife conservationist. Chinese people can also be heroes to protect African elephants!
Text 13	应莫桑比克政府请求，中国国家救援队一行65人及物资搭乘专机，于3月25日到达了此次遭受飓风重创的灾区：莫桑比克贝拉市。这也是国家应急管理部成立以后首次以国家名义向海外派遣紧急人道主义救援的行动。	At the request of the Mozambican government, a group of 65 people with supplies from the Chinese National Rescue Team took a chartered plane and arrived at the area struck by the hurricane, Beira, Mozambique, on March 25. This is also the first time that the National Emergency Management Department has sent emergency humanitarian relief operations overseas in the name of the country.
Text 14	过去我们是受援国，接受过来自世界主要发达国家和各种国际组织的捐赠与援助，	In the past, we used to be a recipient country, having received donations and aid from the world's developed countries and various international organisations. Today, as China grows strong, it's

	而今天，我们也开始有条件采取行动，承担起我们对国际社会的责任。	our time to take international responsibility for the international community.
Text 15	一路颠簸终于来到山尖上的学校，在这里抬头一望，对面就是中国。	It has been hard to get to the top of the mountain where the primary school is. When looking up, one can see China on the other side.
Text 16	云南与缅甸边境线长 1997 公里，缅甸克钦邦第二特区（迈扎央）与云南省陇川县山水相连，边境双侧同为景颇族。	The Yunnan-Myanmar border is 1997 kilometers long. The second special zone of Kachin State (Mai Ja Yang) of Myanmar is connected by mountains and rivers with Longchuan County, Yunnan Province. Both sides of the border are of Jingpo ethnic group.
Text 17	相知无远近，万里尚为邻…感谢所有曾经支持国际免费午餐项目，为他们送去午餐的你们。因为有你们，我们才能与远隔万里的孩子们建立如此美好的友谊。	Mutual understanding disregards distance; neighbors can live even thousands of miles apart [...] Thank you to all of you who have supported the international free lunch project and sent them lunch. Because of you, we have been able to establish such a beautiful friendship with children thousands of miles away.
Text 18	在项目启动仪式上，爱德基金会副秘书长余红玉女士表示，孩子是世界的未来和希望，孩子的未来与发展决定着世界的未来与发展，她希望通过阅读和学习汉语，孩子们能够拥有广阔的视野，在这个信息飞速发展的年代里，更多地获取知识、插上想象的翅膀。她也希望孩子们能够学好汉语，了解中国灿烂的文明、壮丽的河山与热情的人民。	At the launching ceremony of the project, Ms. Yu Hongyu, Deputy Secretary-General of Amity Foundation, said that children are the future and hope of the world, and the future and development of children determine the future and development of the world. She hopes that through reading and learning Chinese, children can have broad vision, gaining more knowledge and imagination in this era of rapid development of information. She also hopes that the children can learn Chinese well and understand China's splendid civilization, magnificent rivers and mountains and enthusiastic people.
Text 19	总目标：通过引入中国现代化教育理念方法，改善校园教学及文体活动条件，促进中柬文化在柬埔寨下一代中得到交流，提高柬埔寨儿童对中华文化认同及向往。同时培养一批亲民亲华的志愿者队伍。结果输出中文与中华文化，让云南援外项目在受援国得到认同及长期深远影响，促进了中柬民心相通。	The overall objective: through the introduction of modern Chinese educational concepts and methods, the conditions for teaching and cultural and sports activities in campus will be improved, the exchange of Chinese and Cambodian cultures among the next generation in Cambodia will be promoted, and Cambodian children will be more recognized and yearned for the Chinese culture. At the same time, a group of volunteers who are close to the people and China are cultivated. The promotion of Chinese language and Chinese culture will enable Yunnan's foreign aid projects to be recognized and to have long-term and far-reaching influence in the recipient countries, and promote the bond between the people of China and Cambodia.
Text 20	“听说中国特别大，特别漂亮，希望以后我有机会去那里读书”	“I hear China is very big, very beautiful, and I hope I can go there to study someday”

Text 21	“今天我们那柱作为受益人收到来自中国人民地爱心”	“Today, as a beneficiary, Nazhu received the love of the Chinese people”
Text 22	“有了中国的支持，我有信心把我们的学校建设得更好…也想通过互联网让孩子们更多的了解中国和世界，真的感谢中国给予她和学生这么多的帮助”	“With the support of China, I have the confidence to build our school better... I also want to let children know more about China and the world through the Internet. I really thank China for giving her and the students so much help”
Text 23	山川异域，风月同天。请查收来自同一片天空下的同一片爱。在听闻中国发生了新型冠状病毒肺炎后，可爱的尼泊尔的孩子们和尼泊尔同事们，在加德满都的彩虹学校，自发地为中国祈福，一起为中国加油！	The mountains and rivers are different, the wind and the moon are in the same sky. Please receive the same piece of love from the same piece of sky. After hearing about the novel coronavirus pneumonia in China, the lovely Nepalese children and Nepalese colleagues, at the Rainbow School in Kathmandu, spontaneously prayed for China and cheered for China together!
Text 24	两天后的马萨雷社区里，中国加油，武汉加油的呐喊声响成一片。10所小学的上千名师生手持自己制作的海报，穿行在社区的主干道上，一路高喊着中国加油，武汉加油。	Two days later, in the Masare community, there is loud cheering for China and Wuhan. Thousands of teachers and students from 10 elementary schools walked through the main roads of the community with posters made by themselves, blessing all the way to China and Wuhan.

Appendix 2 List of Chinese NGOs and Their Projects in the Chinese NGO Internationalisation Database

NGO Name	Project	Country	Time	Description
Alibaba Foundation 阿里巴巴公益基金会	African Ranger Awards	Africa	2017-now	10 African front-line wildlife rangers will be officially recognized each year. Each winner and his/her team will be awarded US\$10,000 in total. From 2017, the project will last for 10 years
	Post-disaster Resettlement	Nepal	2015	Provided funds of 750,000 USD to support transitional housing post the earthquake through Chaudhary Foundation
	Humanitarian Donation (Japan tsunami)	Japan	2011	Donated 3 million RMB through Red Cross of China
	Humanitarian donation (Haiti earthquake)	Haiti	2010	Donated 2 million RMB through international Red Cross
	The Africa Netpreneur Prize Initiative	Africa	2019-2021	Provided \$10 million grant to identify, spotlight and award 100 Africa's Business Heroes across Africa over the next 10 years.
	Donation for Covid-19	Global	2020	Made donation to 150+ countries, together with Jack Ma Foundation
	Hunger Map Live	World Food Organization	2019	Partnering with WFO to develop world hunger map to increase global food safety
Anhui Charity Foundation 安徽仁爱公益基金会	Heart for UK - Donation for Covid-19	UK	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Baidu Charitable Foundation 北京百度公益基金会	Humanitarian Donation (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Donated 630,000 RMB through UNDP
Beihai Tianning Charity Foundation 北海天宁慈善基金会	Humanitarian Donation (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided donation

Beijing Blue Butterfly Foundation 北京蓝蝶公益基金会	Humanitarian donation (hurricane)	US	2017	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian donation (flood)	Sri Lanka	2017	Provided humanitarian assistance
Beijing Children's Legal Aid and Research Center 北京青少年法律援助与研究 中心	International Child Protection Lawyer	Burundi, Kenya, Liberia, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, India, Philippines	2021	Supported local lawyers to provide free legal service in child protection
Beijing Ci Ai Charity Foundation 北京慈爱公益基金会	Post-disaster Donation	Nepal	2016	Donated 300 mountain bikes
	Solar Light Donation	Nepal, Cambodia	2018	Donated goods, e.g. solar light, books about Chinese culture, rain coats with panda pattern
Beijing Cifu Philanthropy Foundation 北京慈福基金会	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance and goods worth of 1.6 million RMB
	Post-disaster School Reconstruction	Nepal	2016	Provided funds for school reconstruction
Beijing Entrepreneur Environmental Protection Foundation 北京市企业家环保基金会	Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Beijing Great Wall Foundation For Public Health	Education Development Project	Thailand	2014	Sent volunteers to villages in northern Thailand to support establishment of internet in computer rooms and Chinese language and culture related courses.

北京健康长城 公益基金会				
	Health Development Project	Thailand	2014- 2015	Provided medical services to communities in northern Thailand
Beijing Hai Ling Charity Foundation 北京海凌公益 基金会	Psychological Counseling	Thailand	2018	Provided psychological consultation to people affected by shipwreck accident in Phuket
Beijing Lianci Health and Poverty Reduction Foundation 北京联慈健康 扶贫基金会	Journey of light along Five Mekong Countries	Cambodia	2016	Provided cataract surgeries
Beijing MW Foundation 北京中道公益 基金会	Books Donation	Myanmar	2020	Donated books, stationary, materials for study
	Books Donation	Tajikistan	2019	Donated books, stationary, materials for study
	Books Donation	Kyrgyzstan	2019	Donated books, stationary, materials for study
	Books Donation	Rwanda	2018	Donated books, stationary, materials for study
	Books Donation	Laos	2017	Donated books, stationary, materials for study
	Books Donation	Papua New Guinea	2018	Donated books, stationary, materials for study
	Books Donation	Cambodia	2016	Donated books, stationary, materials for study
	Lan-Mei Books Donation	Cambodia	2021	Donated books and set up reading room
	Lan-Mei Books Donation	Laos	2021	Donated books and set up reading room
	Lan-Mei Books Donation	Thailand	2021	Donated books and set up reading room
Beijing NGO Network for International Exchanges	Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies

北京市民间组织国际交流促进会				
	Donation for Covid-19	Thailand	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Senegal	2021	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Beijing People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries 北京市人民对外友好协会	Donation for Covid-19	Senegal	2021	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Thailand	2020-2021	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Beijing Philantropreneur Foundation 北京益行者公益基金会	Overseas Women Protection Project	Global (started in Belgium)	2020-now	Launched by the Social Responsibility Practitioners (under the Beijing Philantropreneur Foundation), is a long-term volunteer project that has vulnerable overseas Chinese women as its main target of assistance.
	Philippines UMI forest recovery program	Philippines	2020-now	Carried out forest recovery projects, encourage the planting and processing of cash crops and develop the tourist economy
Beijing Toread Chairty Foundation 北京探路者公益基金会	Humanitarian Donation (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Donated 500,000 RMB through China Population Welfare Foundation
Beijing Venustech Charitable Foundation 北京启明星辰慈善公益基金会	Humanitarian Donation (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided 200,000 RMB to Arya Tara School and DINAN Hospital
Beijing Volunteer Service Fund 北京志愿服务基金会	Volunteers	Kenya, Thailand, Cambodia	2018	Sent volunteers for various issues

	Volunteers for humanitarian assistance	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance by volunteers
Blue Sky Rescue 蓝天救援队	Humanitarian Assistance (Myanmar flood)	Myanmar	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Philippines typhoon)	Philippines	2013	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Sri Lanka flood)	Sri Lanka	2017	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Laos flood)	Laos	2018	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Covid-19 Assistance	Cambodia	2020	Disinfected public spaces, provided training and made donation for covid-19
BN Vocational School 百年职校	CITIC BN Vocational School (Angola)	Angola	2014	Expanded free vocational education model to Angola and established CITIC BN Vocational School in Angola
Caixin Foundation 广东省财新公益基金会	Sponsorship for Media Coverage	Nepal	2015	Funded media coverage for Nepal earthquake
Chengmei Charity Foundation 海南成美慈善基金会	Fighting Ebola	Guinea	2018-2019	Supported medical staff of Guinea, which greatly affected by Ebola outbreak, to come to China to study
China Biodiversity Conservation and the Green Development Foundation 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会	Pangolin Conversation Program	Vietnam	2017-now	Worked on pangolin rescue, rehabilitation and release

	Pangolin Conversation Program	Nigeria	2020	Worked on pangolin rescue, rehabilitation and release
China Charity Alliance 中国慈善联合会	"Journey of Light" for Five Mekong Countries	Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand	2016	Provided free cataract surgeries in five countries along the Mekong river
China Charity Federation 中华慈善总会	Aid to Children with Congenital Heart Disease	Myanmar	2017-2018, 2020	Provided free screening and surgeries for children with congenital heart disease
	Humanitarian Assistance (earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Donation for Covid-19	Myanmar	2021	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Liberia	2021	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Humanitarian Donation	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance and donation
China Council of Lions Clubs 中国狮子联合会	Journey of Light in Africa	Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia	2011	Provided free cataract surgeries
	Journey of Light in Africa	Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa	2014-2018	Together with China Foundation for Disabled Persons, sponsored IPC-Agitos Foundation to support disabled African athletes to engage in sports and rehabilitation projects
China Cultural Heritage Foundation 中国华夏文化遗产基金会	Training for Medical Staff	Pakistan	2015	Sponsored medical training for 60 medical staff
	Journey of Light	Sri Lanka	2019	Provided free diagnosis and cataract surgeries
China Development Research Foundation 中国发展研究基金会	Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies

China Environmental Protection Foundation 中华环境保护基金会	Donation for Covid-19	Greece	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
China Foundation for Disabled Persons 中国残疾人福利基金会	Support for Disabled African Athletes	Africa	2014-2018	Together with China Council of Lions Clubs, sponsored IPC-Agitos Foundation to support disabled African athletes to engage in sports and rehabilitation projects
	Cataract Surgeries	Laos	2016	Provided 89 free cataract surgeries
	Lions Club Going to Africa	Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Sao Tome and Principe	2019	Donated sportswear
	Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
China Foundation for Peace and Development 中国和平发展基金会	Donation to Afghan Red Crescent Society	Afghanistan	2019	Donated goods worth of \$120,000 to three refugee camps through Afghan Red Crescent Society
	China-Pakistan Faqeer Government Middle School Faqeer Colony Gwadar	Pakistan	2019	An extension of the Faqeer Project in 2016
	China-Pakistan Faqeer Primary School Project	Pakistan	2016	Provided funds to build China-Pakistan Faqeer Primary School
	China-Pakistan Friendship Scholarship	Pakistan	2012	Provided funds for around 700 qualified young people to attend three-month career skill training, e.g. technicians
	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Talent Training Center	Pakistan	2018	Provided funds for a talent training center, in partnership with University of Information Management in Balochistan Pakistan
	China-Philippines Friendship Water Pump Stations	Philippines	2018	Provided funds of 200,000 USD for a water pump station for three villages in Davao
	China-Philippines Friendship Southville 3A	Philippines	2019	Provided funds for a new 4-storey teaching-building with 8 classrooms at

	National High School			the Southville 3A NHS campus in San Antonio, Laguna province
	China-Philippines Friendship Bolton Central Elementary School	Philippines	2019	Provided funds for a standardized 3-storey teaching-building on the original site of the School in Davao City
	China-Cambodia Friendship Village Project For Poverty Reduction	Cambodia	2019	Project will be conducted in Tanom Village in Takeo province for 3 years, include building infrastructure, medical center and providing agricultural livelihood related training
	China-Cambodia "Friends on the Silk Road" Two-school Project	Cambodia	2018-2020	Provided funds of 500,000 USD for two schools located in the Takeo province of Cambodia
	China-Cambodia "Friends on the Silk Road" Five-school Project	Cambodia	2017-2019	Provided funds of 400,000 USD for five schools located in the Sihanoukville province of Cambodia
	The "Friends on the Silk Road" Happy Spring Project	Cambodia	2018-2019	Provided funds of 440,000 USD for a livelihood-improvement project, building two hundred deep water wells in Bati District and Borei Chulsar District of Takeo Province
	Sok An Tonleap High School Building Project	Cambodia	2018	Provided funds of 200,000 USD for a second-floor teaching building in Sok An Tonleap High School
	Livelihood-improvement Projects in Takeo Cambodia	Cambodia	2016-2017	Provided funds of 150,000 USD for an agricultural irrigation and drainage pumping station in the Takeo province
	The Angkor High School Teaching Building Project	Cambodia	2017	Provided funds of 450,000 USD for a teaching building
	China-Cambodia Friendship Indradevi High School	Cambodia	2013-2015	Provided funds for school building of Indradevi High School in Phnom Penh
	China-Cambodia Friendship Center Hospital	Cambodia	2012-2013	Provided funds for a clinic building in Sengkang District, donating medical van and equipment, providing medical training and organizing free clinical exams
	China-Cambodia Cooperation for Free Medical Service in Villages	Cambodia	2014-2015	Provided funds for two medical buses for China-Cambodia Friendship Center Hospital and supporting medical staff to provide free diagnosis
	China-Laos "Friends on the Silk	Laos	2019	Provided funds of 100,000 USD for building a multi-media library in 11 schools

	Road" Smart Campus			
	China-Laos Friendship "Friends on Silk Road" Five Primary Schools	Laos	2018	Provided funds of 500,000 USD for building five primary schools in villages in Laos
	China-Laos "Friends on Silk Road" Four Primary Schools	Laos	2015-2016	Provided funds of 400,000 USD for four primary schools
	China-Laos Friendship Menno School in Vientiane	Laos	2017	Provided funds of 450,000 USD for constructing school building in Menno School in Vientiane
	Laos-China Friendship Secondary School	Laos	2013-2015	Provided funds of 450,000 USD for constructing of middle school in Pansai village (潘塞村), Luang Prabang
	China-Laos Primary School	Laos	2012-2013	Provided funds for constructing of school building in nongbing villiage (农冰村)
	China-Mongolia Children's Clinic in Khan-Uul District	Mongolia	2019	Provided funds of 500,000 USD for building a children's clinic, and another 150,000 USD for medical equipment
	China-Mongolia Children's Clinic in the Bayanzurkh District	Mongolia	2018-2019	Provided funds of 500,000 USD for building a children's clinic in the Bayanzurkh District
	The Children's Clinic in the Nalaikh District	Mongolia	2017	Provided funds 500,000 USD for building a children's clinic in the Nalaikh District of Ulaanbaatar, another 150,000 USD for medical equipment
	China-Mongolia Friendship Kindergarten in Zuumod	Mongolia	2016	Provided funds of 500,000 USD for building a kindergarten in Zuumod, Mongolia
	China-Mongolia Friendship Children's Clinic in the Chingeltei District	Mongolia	2014-2015	Provided funds of 500,000 USD for building a children's clinic and 200,000 USD for medical equipment
	China-Mongolia Friendship Career Skill Training Center	Mongolia	2012-2013	Provided funds for supporting 100 youth to receive career skill training and funding 200,000 USD for building a career skill center
	China-Mongolia Friendship "Journey of Light"	Mongolia	2011	Provided free diagnosis and cataract surgeries, 92 patients examined and 49 patients under surgeries
	China-Myanmar "Friends on Silk Road" Ten Schools	Myanmar	2017-2019	Provided funds of 300,000 USD for building 10 schools around Yangon

	Daw Khin Kyi Women Hospital Renovation Project	Myanmar	2017	Provided funds of 440,000 USD for Daw Khin Kyi Women Hospital renovation and maintenance
	Myanmar-China "Friends on Silk Road" Six Schools	Myanmar	2015-2017	Provided funds of 300,000 USD for building 6 primary schools around Yangon
	Shwedagon Primary School in Hmawbi Township Yangon	Myanmar	2016-2017	Provided funds of 60,000 USD for building Shwedagon Primary School in Hmawbi Township Yangon
	Chinese Medical Team Medical Assistance to Myanmar	Myanmar	2015	Provided funds of medical training, free eye diagnosis, free medical goods in five villages
	"Journey of Light"	Myanmar	2011-2015	Provided funds of free cataract surgery for 977 patients carried out by four batches of Chinese medical teams
	China-Myanmar International Eye Center	Myanmar	2012-2014	Provided funds for China-Myanmar International Eye Center and providing medical training
	"Friends on Silk Road" Nepal-China Education Project	Nepal	2014-2016	Provided funds of 1,000,000 RMB for building e-reading rooms in two secondary schools
	China-Nepal Friendship Water Project	Nepal	2014	Donated 2000 sets of equipment for water pipeline and well
	China-Nepal Friendship Welfare Project	Nepal	2016	Provided funds for renovation of Nepal-China Cultural Exchange Center and Medical Center
	The Sino-Sudan Friendship Women's High School	Sudan	2014-2016	Provided funds of 500,000 USD for school building
	Humanitarian Donation (Sudan flood)	Sudan	2012	Donated medical and humanitarian goods through Sanad Charity Foundation
	Multi-media Room in Tajikistan	Tajikistan	2014-2015	Provided funds for three multi-media classrooms in university
	China-Tajikstan Multi-media Cooperation	Tajikistan	2013	Provided funds for three multi-media equipment in No.1 Secondary School in Dushanbe, including 11 electronic white board and 30 tablet PC
	Smart Campus in Tajikstan	Tajikistan	2018	Provided funds for wireless network, big-data center, and online study system
	China-Zambia Friendship Career Skill Training Center	Zambia	2014	Donated two vans, 30 computer sets and founding Zambia-China Friendship Career Skill Computer Room

	China-Zambia Friendship Career Skill Training	Zambia	2013	Provided career skill training (four types of skills: processing, construction, electrician and computer operation) for 501 people for three months
	China-Tanzania Friendship Career Skill Training Center Expansion	Tanzania	2017	Provided funds of 300,000 USD to expand career skill training center in Tanzania
	Light Up Africa	Tanzania	2019	Donated 500 sets of mobile energy equipment across Africa, Tanzania being the first stop
	Humanitarian donation to North Korea	North Korea	2016	Donated medical and humanitarian goods worth of 80,000 USD
	Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Spain	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Cambodia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Laos	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Mongolia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Pakistan	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Myanmar	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Nepal	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Japan	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	South Africa	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Ethiopia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Afghanistan	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Cuba	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Uganda	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Vanuatu	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Tonga	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Micronesia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies

	Donation for Covid-19	Samoa	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	PNG	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Iran	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Thailand	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Suriname	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Cambodia	2021	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Kit of Love Project	Across Africa and neighboring countries	2021	Donated healthcare related goods
	China-Cambodia Poverty Alleviation Demonstration Project	Cambodia	2021	Provided funds to build poverty alleviation demonstrative village
	The Children's Clinic in the Nalaikh District	Mongolia	2020	Provided funds for constructing children's clinic in the 2nd Central Hospital of Mongolia
China Foundation For Poverty Alleviation 中国扶贫基金会	Scholarships for Students in Myanmar	Myanmar	2015 to 2019	Funded scholarship to university students, by 2019, the scholarship covers 14 universities in 4 provinces for 1400 college students.
	China-Myanmar Friendship Scholarship	Myanmar	2017 to 2019, ongoing	Funded scholarship to university students, initiated by Chinese embassy in Myanmar, CFPA operates the project
	Donation in Shan State	Myanmar	2017	Donated goods in Shan state
	Water Purification Project	Myanmar	2018	Provided water purification system in schools
	Bicycle Donation	Myanmar	2019 to now	Provided 1000 free bicycles together with Less Walk organization in Myanmar
	Computer Classrooms Project	Myanmar	2017	Established a teaching room with 40 computers in university
	International Volunteers	Myanmar	2017	Sent Chinese volunteers to provide various services, e.g. teaching Chinese, managing poverty reduction project, providing IT service in universities
	Smiling Children	Myanmar	2019 to now	Provided free food packages

	Post-disaster School Reconstruction	Nepal	2017-2019	Funded three schools post the earthquake, one is Yuba school, one is MAV school, one is Anadakuti school
	Career Support for Women	Nepal	2018 to 2019	Provided microfinance to 75 women to carry out activities, e.g. plantation, breeding and small businesses
	WASH	Nepal	2016-2022	Provided toilets, water tower and cleaning kits to communities and training on water sanitation for women and children
	Career Training for Youth	Nepal	2019-2022	Provided career skills training for three months, e.g. plumber designing, electrician for 75 young people every year from 2019 to 2022, in partnership with SSN
	Smiling Children	Nepal	2018 to now	Provided free food packages
	Hepatitis B Screening Project	Nepal	2015-2017	Provided hepatitis B screening and related healthcare education
	International Volunteers	Nepal	2017	Sent Chinese volunteers
	Post-disaster Psychological Consultation	Nepal	2016-2017	Provided psychological consultation to students in three secondary schools
	Computer Classrooms Project	Nepal	2016	Provided classrooms with computers and seven career centers for the disabled
	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Sanitary Station for Covid-19 Prevention	Nepal	2020	Established stations for washing hands, promoted epidemic prevention knowledge
	Smiling Children	Ethiopia	2015 to now	Provided free food packages
	International Water Cellars	Ethiopia	2017-2018	Built water cellars
	Career Training for Women	Ethiopia	2017	Provided career training for women
	Refugee Self-reliance	Uganda	2018	Promoted self-reliance of refugees through cash distribution, agriculture training and commercial training
	Free Nutritious Meals Project	Cambodia	2016-2017, 2019	Provided free nutritious meals worth of 618 million RMB
	Smiling Children	Cambodia	2018 to now	Provided free food packages
	Humanitarian Assistance (North Korea flood)	North Korea	2017	Provided humanitarian assistance

	Computer Donation to Khartoum Primary School	Sudan	2017	Provided free computers to primary schools in Khartoum
	Free Nutritious Meals Project	Ghana	2016-2017	Provided free nutritious meals
	Humanitarian Assistance (Ecuador earthquake)	Ecuador	2016	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Haiti hurricane)	Haiti	2016	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Panda Pack Project	Nepal, Myanmar, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Laos, Pakistan, Mongolia, Namibia, Uganda, Zimbabwe	2019 to now	Provided school packs for primary school students
	Donation for Maternal Care	Guinea-Bissau	2011	Together with Care Action Macao, donated medical equipment worth of 3.5 million RMB to help mothers and children
	"Maternal and Child Care Action 120"	Guinea-Bissau	2007	Together with Care Action Macao, donated medical equipment worth of 4 million RMB to help mothers and children
	Humanitarian Donation (Myanmar hurricane)	Myanmar	2008	Donated 330,000 RMB through World Food Program
	Humanitarian Donation (Haiti earthquake)	Haiti	2010	Donated 2.56 million RMB through World Food Program
	Humanitarian Donation (Chile earthquake)	Chile	2010	Donated 400,000 RMB through Embassy of Chile in China
	Goods Donation	Sudan	2010	Donated goods worth of 388,000 RMB, including medical equipment for women's health and solar radio sets
	Donation to Partner in Sudan	Sudan	2010	Donated office equipment worth of 62200 RMB to local partner AL Birr & AL-Tawasul Organization
	The Sudan-China Abu Ushar Friendship Hospital	Sudan	2011	Built The Sudan-China Abu Ushar Friendship Hospital (sponsored US\$ 1.1m by China National Petroleum Corporation)

	Humanitarian Donation (Japan tsunami)	Japan	2011	Donated 100,000 RMB through World Food Program
	Smiling Children	Sudan	2017	Provided free food packages
	Humanitarian Donation (Indonesia tsunami)	Indonesia	2005	Together with Mercy Corps, donated medicine (equivalent to 44 million yuan) to areas affected by the Indonesian tsunami
	Humanitarian Donation (Pakistan earthquake)	Pakistan	2005	Donated emergency goods worth of 300,000 RMB
	Donation for Covid-19	Myanmar, Sudan, Ethiopia, Laos	2020	Donated protective clothing for Covid-19 prevention
	Scholarships for Students	Myanmar	2020	Provided scholarship to 100 university students from University of Yangon
	Oxygen for Covid in Nepal community	Nepal	2021	Provided oxygen cylinder and personal equipment for Covid protection
China Friendship Foundation for Peace and Development 中国友好和平发展基金会	Medical Goods Donation	Monaco	2018	Donated a set of gamma knife equipment to Lalla Salma Foundation
	Donation to School For Special Children in Namibia	Namibia	2011	Donated 15000 USD to school of special children
	Donation to First Lady's Foundation in Cameroon	Cameroon	2011	Donated goods, e.g. rice, edible oil, footballs, radio, textbooks, worth of 210,000 RMB to Cameroon First Lady's foundation
	Donation of Wheelchairs	Botswana	2012	Donated 200 sets of wheelchairs to Botswana-China Friendship Association
	Donation to School in Uganda	Uganda	2012	Donated 200,000 RMB to local school
	E-classroom in Côte d'Ivoire	Côte d'Ivoire	2014	Provided funds for an e-classroom in technician school
	Donation to Foundation in Senegal	Senegal	2014	Donated to foundation in Senegal
	Humanitarian Donation	Vanuatu	2015	Donated to help victims affected by hurricane in Vanuatu
	Donation for Covid-19	Fiji	2021	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies

	Donation for Covid-19	Pakistan	2021	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies and money
	Donation for Covid-19	Sri Lanka	2020	Donated Covid-19 related funds worth of US\$5000
	Donation for Covid-19	Iran	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
China Green Carbon Foundation 中国绿色碳汇基金会	Clean Energy Advocacy	Myanmar	2015-2017	Promoted forest protection based on clean energy technology (GEI model)
China Merchants Group Foundation 招商局慈善基金会	Donation for Covid-19	Djibouti	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Belarus	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Angola teenager basketball support program	Angola	2019	Donated basketball related equipment and provided support to promising young basketball players
	Football training facility improvement program	Belarus	2019	Provided donation to improve football training facilities
	Donation for reconstruction post storm in Minsk	Belarus	2016	Humanitarian donation for reconstruction post storm in Minsk
	Donation for road construction	Belarus	2017	Donated \$113,000 to construct roads in village
	Promotion of Chinese language	Belarus	2017	Donated \$300,000 to Confucius Institute in Belarus to promote Chinese language
	Donation of fruit and vegetable plantation	Belarus	2018	Donated seeds of fruit and vegetable plantation worth of \$60,000
	Journey of Light	Sri Lanka	2015-2017	Provided free diagnosis and cataract surgeries
China NGO Network for International Exchanges 中国民间组织国际交流促进会	Kit of Love Project	Across Africa and neighboring countries	2021	Donated healthcare related goods

	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Iran	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Belgium	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	France	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Kenya	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Ukraine	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Mexico	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Pakistan	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Bahrain	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Serbia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Bulgaria	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Sri Lanka	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Russia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Argentina	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Poland	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Bangladesh	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies

	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	UN-Habitat	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
China Population Welfare Foundation 中国人口福利基金会	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian donation worth of 10 million RMB
China Siyuan Foundation For Poverty Alleviation 中华思源工程扶贫基金会	School Assistance Project	Cambodia	2017-2018	Provided funds of six million USD (sponsored by China Minsheng Investment Group) to build 35 schools and 24 dorms for teachers
	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance
China Social Assistance Foundation 中华社会救助基金会 (Including Increasing Love for Decreasing AIDS Fund)	Support for AIDS Projects in Africa	Africa	2015-now	Sponsored several AIDS related foundations and projects in Africa through the coordination of UNAIDS, e.g. donating 300,000 USD to OAFLA, 20,000 USD for Friends for Life, 10,000 USD to OAFLA-Burundi, 10,000 USD to Beautify Malawi Trust
China Social Welfare Foundation 中国社会福利基金会 (Including Lunch for Children project)	Free Lunch	Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, Nigeria	2018 - now	Managed issues in China for International Free Lunch project
	Donation for Disabled Syrian	Syria	2018-2019,2021	Donated to disabled children and for training provided by local prosthetics technicians and therapists for recovery
	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance and donation (through Blue Leopard Rescue)
	Donation for poverty alleviation	Syria	2020	Donated to Basmet Shabab Souria worth of 700,000 RMB for help poor families

China Volunteer Service Foundation 中国志愿服务基金会	International Volunteers	Nepal, Myanmar	2017	In partnership with China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, sent volunteers to Nepal and Myanmar for various voluntary services for one year
China Women's Development Foundation 中国妇女发展基金会	Embroidery Training for Women	Tunis	2018	Provided embroidery training for women
	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance, e.g. providing six vans, water purification system for water cellars
China Young Volunteers Association 中国青年志愿者协会	Volunteers	Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand	2017 to now	Sent volunteers (usually for one year) for various services, e.g. teaching Chinese, teaching sports, healthcare, social development
	Volunteers	Myanmar	2017 to now	Sent volunteers (usually for one year) for various services, e.g. teaching Chinese, teaching sports, healthcare, social development
	Volunteers	Laos	2017 to now	Sent volunteers (usually for one year) for various services, e.g. teaching Chinese, teaching sports, healthcare, social development
	Volunteers	Pakistan	2012	Sent volunteers to teach Chinese for a year
China Youth Development Foundation 中国青少年发展基金会	Project Hope for Africa	Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Namibia	2011-2015	Sponsored China-Africa Hope Primary school
	Project Hope in Nepal	Nepal	2015	Sponsored Hope Primary School after earthquake
	Book and Shelves Donation to Kenya Project Hope School	Kenya	2017	Donated books and shelves to Hope Primary School in Kenya
Chinese Cultural Heritage Protection Foundation	School Renovation	Nepal	2016	Donated equipment worth of 160,000 RMB to a primary school

北京民族文化 遗产保护基金 会				
Chinese Language and Culture Education Foundation of China 中国华文教育 基金会	School Construction in Northern Thailand	Thailand	2020	Donated to construct school building
	Donation to improve school equipment in Muse	Myanmar	2020	Provided support to improve school equipment in Muse
Chinese People's Association For Peace and Disarmament 中国人民争取 和平与裁军协 会	“A Ray of Sunshine” Welfare Project	Africa	2016	Donated solar lights or distributed photovoltaic power generators across Africa
Chinese Red Cross Foundation 中国红十字基 金会	Disaster-Relief Family Package	Nepal	2015	Donated 5000 "Disaster-relief family package” to people affected by earthquake
	Disaster-Relief Family Package	Myanmar	2014	Donated "Disaster-relief family package“
	The China-Pakistan Life Rescue Corridor Project	Pakistan	2017- 2019	The project includes first aid posts, ambulances, first aid personnel and an information system. The first China- Pakistan Fraternity Emergency Care Center was established in Gwadar
	Chinese Red Cross Medical Team	Pakistan	2017- 2021	Sent Chinese Red Cross Medical Team to conduct humanitarian and emergency medical service in Gwadar
	The Angel’s Journey -- Belt &Road Humanitarian Rescue Plan	Afghanistan	2017- 2019	Provided two phases of aid for children (first phase 100 children, second phase 84) with congenital heart disease have been completed in Afghanistan by the end of 2019
	The Angel’s Journey -- Belt &Road	Mongolia	2017- 2019	Provided two phases of aid for children (first phase 100 children, second phase 25) with congenital heart disease have

	Humanitarian Rescue Plan			been completed in Mongolia by the end of 2019
	Bangladesh Red Crescent Society Hemodialysis Center Project	Bangladesh	2017	Funded to build one China-Bangladesh Fraternity Hemodialysis Center, including eight sets of hemodialysis machines, and providing medical training
	“Volunteers on Wheels” Project	Mongolia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Vietnam, Myanmar, Indonesia, North Korea	2019	Delivered 2,975 fraternity bikes to Red Cross in nine countries
	“Volunteers on Wheels” Project	10 countries including Italy, Mongolia and Tajikistan	2018	Delivered 2,775 fraternity bikes to ten countries
	“Volunteers on Wheels” Project	Malaysia	2017	Delivered 500 fraternity bikes to Malaysian Red Crescent Society
	Free Lunch Project	Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, Ethiopia	2018-now	Delivered free lunches to more than 10,000 people in 2018 and 2019 in all six African countries (Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, Ethiopia)
	Overseas Fraternity Home	Ethiopia, Uganda and Nepal	2018	Established communities that have disaster prevention and relief capacity
	Free Toilet Project	Ethiopia, Uganda	2018	Set up free toilets in Fraternity Homes
	Medical Assistance to Syria	Syria	2018	Provided several large mobile hospitals
	Vaccines Donation to Syria	Syria	2018	Donated Polio, meningitis and hepatitis vaccines to Syria
	Aid to Disabled Syrian Children	Syria	2018	Launched the “USD 1 Save Syrian Children” internet crowdfunding to provide humanitarian services such as prosthesis installation, replacement and rehabilitation to Syrian children. Also donated 100,000 USD to two prosthetic rehabilitation centers in Syria respectively.
	Humanitarian Aid to Iraq	Iraq	2019	Provided one set of large mobile hospital, composed of two medical buses and two ambulances

	Red Society of Emergency Center in Myanmar	Myanmar	2017	Assisted to build the Red Society of Emergency Center in Myanmar
	Red Cross Clinic and Blood Bank in Indonesia	Indonesia	2017	Assisted to build Indonesia Red Cross Clinic and blood bank
	Local Emergency Rescue Services	Cambodia, Laos	2017	Donated five ambulances in Cambodia and Laos to provide local emergency rescue services.
	Cambodian Community Health Development Project	Cambodia	2015	Provided funds of 800,000 RMB to improve water system and latrines and to provide maternal and child health training in 6 communities of Cambodia's Svay Rieng and Siem Reap province
	“Journey of Light”	Mongolia	2019	Performed free operations for 310 Mongolian patients with cataract
	Donation for Covid-19	Global	2020-2021	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Overseas Fraternity Home	Nepal	2021	Established communities that have disaster prevention and relief capacity
Chongqing Sincere Charity Foundation 重庆协信公益基金会	Humanitarian Donation (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Donated 600,000 RMB to Lumpini University
COSCO Shipping Charity Foundation 中远海运慈善基金会	Donation to Disabled Athletes in Greece	Greece	2018-2019	Donated 100,000 euro to support disabled athletes to prepare for Beijing Winter Olympic Games in 2022
	Transportation of Medical goods for Chinese Red Cross Foundation	Cambodia, Laos, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan	2018	Provided transportation service for Chinese Red Cross Foundation to transport medical goods
	Humanitarian Donation (Japan tsunami)	Japan	2011	Provided humanitarian donation worth of 20 million yen
	Humanitarian Donation (US hurricane)	US	2012	Provided humanitarian donation worth of 1.24 million RMB
	Donation to Children in Greece	Greece	2019	Donated 500,000 Euros to Red Cross of Greece to improve the lives of children and teenagers from poor families
	Shipping medical goods for China Red Cross	India	2021	Shipped medical goods for China Red Cross Federation to India

Dragon Design Foundation 北京光华设计发展基金会	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Iran	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Belgium	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	France	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Kenya	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Ukraine	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Mexico	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Pakistan	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Bahrain	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Serbia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Bulgaria	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Sri Lanka	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Russia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Argentina	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Poland	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies

	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	Bangladesh	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Green Ribbon - Donation for Covid-19	UN-Habitat	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Heart for UK - Donation for Covid-19	UK	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Dunhe Foundation 浙江敦和慈善 基金会	Orphanage Reconstruction	Nepal	2016	Donated 200,000 RMB to support Poor and Orphan Children Relief Center
Enlai Foundation 北京大鸾翔宇 慈善基金会	Andanda Kuti School Renovation	Nepal	2018	Renovated "building of sympathy" in Andanda Kuti School after earthquake
Eye Care Foundation 爱眼公益基金 会	Donation for Covid-19	Iran	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Philippines	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Malaysia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Spain	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Germany	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Singapore	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Journey of Light	Cambodia	2019- 2020	Provided free diagnosis and cataract surgeries
	Journey of Light	Laos	2019	Provided free diagnosis and cataract surgeries
Fosun Foundation 复星基金会	Donation for Covid-19	Brazil	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Belarus	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Belgium	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies

	Donation for Covid-19	Germany	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	France	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Burkina Faso	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	DRC	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Côte d'Ivoire	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Kenya	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Mali	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Nigeria	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Uganda	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	South Korea	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Romania	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Malaysia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	US	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Mexico	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Portugal	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Japan	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Switzerland	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Tajikistan	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Spain	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Indonesia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	India	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	UK	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Philippines	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies

	Donation for Covid-19	Armenia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Senegal	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Bangladesh	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Kazakhstan	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Pakistan	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Azerbaijan	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Afghanistan	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Fushun Public Welfare Foundation of Shenzhen 深圳市福顺公益基金会	Humanitarian Assistance (Laos flood)	Laos	2018	Provided humanitarian assistance and donation
	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance and donation
Fuzhou Kai Yuan Zhi Ye Culture and Education Charity Foundation 福州开元志业文教慈善基金会	Humanitarian Donation (Sri Lanka flood)	Sri Lanka	2016	Donated 97440 RMB to Legalle district in Sri Lanka
Global Environmental Institute 全球环境研究所	Biogas Project in Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka	2007-2009	Provided a series of training on biogas construction for 23 local technicians in 5 provinces and constructed 56 biogas digester
	China-Myanmar Timber Governance	Myanmar	2015	Through a series of activities to effectively prohibit illegal timber harvesting and trade along the China-Myanmar border
	Myitsone Dam Stakeholder	Myanmar	2010-2015	After the Myitsone Dam project was suspended, GEI provided an informal

	Communication and Community Development			communication platform for various stakeholders and suggestions for the economic development of the migrant community caused by the dam
	Community Development in Area with Biodiversity	Myanmar	2015-now	Demonstrated best practices in communities around areas with biodiversity concerns for sustainable development
	China-Africa Cooperation and Promotion on Forestry Governance	Cameroon, DRC, Uganda, Mozambique	2016-now	Promoted China-Africa cooperation on forestry investment and improved the legitimacy and sustainability of investment and trade in other forestry-related industries (including mining, agriculture, and infrastructure)
	Sustainable Utilization and Market Oriented Management of National Land Resources in Lao PDR	Laos	2009-2010	Facilitated National Land Management Authority for capacity building and making policies for sustainable development in Laos
	Donation for Covid-19	Myanmar	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Indonesia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Green Boat Emergency Rescue 绿舟应急救援促进中心	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance
Green Watershed 绿色流域	Training on Social and Environmental Impacts	Myanmar	2012-2016	Provided training for local NGOs on social and environmental impact evaluation and investment and social policies of China “going out”
Guangdong Chen Cun Li Cheng Charitable Foundation 广东省陈村丽成慈善基金会	Humanitarian Donation (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Donated 100,000 RMB through Red Cross Society of China
Guangdong Chimelong Flora and Fauna	Indonesia Gibbon Protection	Indonesia	2018	Donated 40,000 USD to protect gibbon in Indonesia

Conservation Foundation 广东省长隆动植物保护基金会				
Guangdong Liao Bingxiong Art Foundation 广东省廖冰兄人文艺术基金会	Post disaster relief	Nepal	2015	Donated to provide safe water in Nepal
Guangdong Tian Zhu Charity Foundation 广东省天柱慈善基金会	Humanitarian Assistance (Laos flood)	Laos	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance
Guangxi Overseas Chinese Kind Foundation 广西华侨爱心基金会	Donation for Covid-19	US	2020	Donated health packs (e.g. masks, Lianhua-qingwen)
	Donation for Covid-19	Canada	2020	Donated health packs (e.g. masks, Lianhua-qingwen)
	Donation for Covid-19	Spain	2020	Donated health packs (e.g. masks, Lianhua-qingwen)
	Donation for Covid-19	Germany	2020	Donated health packs (e.g. masks, Lianhua-qingwen)
Guangzhou Jinke Support Traditional Culture Development Foundation 广州市金珂扶持传统文化发展基金会	Donation to Orphanage	Bangladesh	2016	Provided donation to 526 orphans and disabled in orphanage
Sichuan Haihui 四川海惠助贫服务中心	Belt and Road Charity Park	Thailand	2018-now	Established an international network for NGOs

	Language training to teachers in Chinese school	Thailand	2020	Provided language training for teachers from Chinese schools in Northern Thailand
	Sanitation project in Northern Thailand	Thailand	2019	Donated and built 28 public washrooms in four districts located in Northern Thailand
Hainan Liberation Commonweal Foundation 海南慈航公益基金会	Bodhnath Stupa Renovation	Nepal	2015	Donated 3 million RMB for Bodhnath Stupa Renovation, the use of donation was managed by Shenzhen Wisdom and Orient Charitable Foundation
Hangzhou Yunlin Charity Foundation 杭州云林公益基金会	Humanitarian Donation (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided donation
Harmony Community Foundation 千禾社区基金会	Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Hebei Buddhist Charity Foundation 河北省佛教慈善基金会	Humanitarian Donation (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Donated around 100,000 RMB
	Humanitarian Donation (Sri Lanka flood)	Sri Lanka	2017	Provided humanitarian donation
Hebei Ci Shi Foundation 河北慈氏基金会	Humanitarian Donation (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Donated 50 tents
Hebei Sanbao Buddhist Charity Foundation 河北省三宝佛教慈善基金会	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2016	Donated 100,000 RMB

Heren Charitable Foundation 河仁慈善基金会	Post-disaster Reconstruction	Nepal	2015	Donated 10 million RMB through Nepal Embassy for post-disaster reconstruction
	Donation for Covid-19	US	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Germany	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Japan	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Heungkong Charitable Foundation 香江社会救助基金会	Reading Room	Myanmar	n/a	Funded libraries
Huamin Charity Foundation 华仁慈善基金会	Donation for Covid-19	Philippines	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	US	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Brazil	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Mexico	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Ethiopia		Donated medical goods for Covid-19
Hunan Fo Ci Foundation 湖南省佛慈基金会	Humanitarian Donation (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Donated 250,000 RMB
Jack Ma Foundation 马云公益基金会	Donation to Queen Rania Foundation	Jordan	2018	Donated 3 million USD to Queen Rania Foundation to support its program on online learning for Arabic children
	The Africa Netpreneur Prize Initiative	Africa	2019-2021	Provided \$10 million grant to identify, spotlight and award 100 Africa's Business Heroes across Africa over the next 10 years.
	Donation for Covid-19	Global	2020	Made donation to 150+ countries, together with Jack Ma Foundation

Jackie Chan Charitable Foundation Beijing 北京成龙慈善基金会	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Donated 1 million RMB and provided humanitarian assistance with China Red Cross Foundation by delivering "disaster-relief family package"
Jianhui Foundation 深圳市建辉慈善基金会	Donation for Covid-19	US	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Jinde Charities 河北进德公益基金会	Humanitarian Assistance (Guatemala volcano eruption)	Guatemala	2018	Provided humanitarian donation through Caritas Germany
	Humanitarian Assistance (Indonesia tsunami)	Indonesia	2018	Provided humanitarian donation through Caritas
	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian donation (192,069,00 RMB)
	Donation to Hospital and School in North Korea	North Korea	2016	Donated a set of ultrasound machine worth of 27,700 RMB to a hospital and cement to a school worth 30,000 RMB
	Donation for Covid-19	Germany	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	South Korea	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Kunming Zhi Gen Social Work Development Centre 昆明植根社会工作发展中心	Healthcare and Woman program	Myanmar	2021	Supported local clinics to improve healthcare and organized vocational training workshop for local women
	Assistance to children living on the Myanmar-China border	Myanmar	2021	Provided assistance to children living on the Myanmar-China border
	Sanitation and water safety program	Myanmar	2020	Provided sanitation facility and clinical services in Rakhine State

Lao Niu Foundation 内蒙古老牛慈善基金会	Africa Governance Initiative	Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea	2016	Supported economic recovery of Ebola affected countries, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea through donation to Tony Blair Africa Governance Initiative
	Post-earthquake Reconstruction	Nepal	2016	Together with One Foundation, funded 15 service stations and playgrounds for children
	Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated for Covid-19
Liaoning Zhou Yan Charity Foundation 辽宁省周延慈善基金会	Humanitarian Donation (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Donated 40,000 RMB through Red Cross Society of China
Lingshan Charity Foundation 灵山慈善基金会	Chinese Teachers Support	Thailand	2015-2021	Sponsored Chinese school teachers in northern Thailand
	Volunteers to Northern Thailand	Thailand	2018	Sent volunteers to teach Chinese in northern Thailand
	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Smiling Children	Ethiopia	2015-2017	Provided free breakfast and lunch
Lovezone Charity Foundation 苏州乐助慈善基金会	Aid to Disabled Syrian Children	Syria	2017-2019	Conduct online fundraising for Syrian children to install prosthesis
	Donation for Covid-19	Nepal	2021	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Syria	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Mammoth Foundation 猛犸基金会	Fire Eye' Lab Donation for Covid-19	Greece	2020	Donated 'Fire Eye' lab core testing equipment for Covid-19
	Fire Eye' Lab Donation for Covid-19	France	2020	Donated 'Fire Eye' lab core testing equipment for Covid-19
	Fire Eye' Lab Donation for Covid-19	Serbia	2020	Donated 'Fire Eye' lab core testing equipment for Covid-19

	Fire Eye' Lab Donation for Covid-19	Canada	2020	Donated 'Fire Eye' lab core testing equipment for Covid-19
	Fire Eye' Lab Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated 'Fire Eye' lab core testing equipment for Covid-19
	Fire Eye' Lab Donation for Covid-19	Latvia	2020	Donated 'Fire Eye' lab core testing equipment for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Angola	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Peru	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Brunei	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Argentina	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Latvia	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Japan	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Philippines	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Serbia	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Malaysia	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Panama	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Trinidad and Tobago	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Albania	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Colombia	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Egypt	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Tunis	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Panama	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Uganda	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	South Africa	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Ethiopia	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19

	Donation for Covid-19	Benin	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Burkina Faso	2020	Donated tests kits for Covid-19
More Love Foundation 增爱公益基金会	Psychological Consultation in Africa	Kenya	2016-2017	Together with Psychological Consultation Center of Chinese Academy of Sciences, sent one psychologist and one orthopedist of Chinese medicine to conduct psychological consultation, medical service and training in Kenya
Narada Foundation 南都公益基金会	Sponsorship for Media Coverage	Nepal	2015	Supported journalists to go to the frontline to cover the earthquake
National Council of YWCAs of China 中华基督教女青年会全国协会	Donation for Covid-19	Japan	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
New Sunshine Charity Foundation 北京新阳光慈善基金会	Donation for Covid-19	UK	2020	Donated medical equipment and testing kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Indonesia	2020	Donated medical equipment and testing kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Afghanistan	2020	Donated medical equipment and testing kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Iran	2020	Donated medical equipment and testing kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	US	2020	Donated medical equipment and testing kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Germany	2020	Donated medical equipment and testing kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Serbia	2020	Donated medical equipment and testing kits for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Nepal	2021	Donated medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	India	2021	Donated medical supplies

One Foundation 深圳壹基金公益基金会	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance and emergency supply worth of 2.5 million RMB and set up 32 service station for children in partnership with Save the Children
Overseas Chinese Charity Foundation of China 中国华侨公益基金会	"Journey of Light"	Cambodia, Laos	2018	Provided free eye exams, eye health education and free eyeglasses
	"Journey of Light"	Myanmar	2016-2017	Provided free cataract surgeries for more than 600 local patients
	Kindergarten in Serbia	Serbia	2016	Together with Yihai Group, sponsored 330,000 euro to build Pora kindergarten
	Donation for Covid-19	Philippines	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Spain	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Serbia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Germany	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Myanmar	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Laos	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Russia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Kyrgyzstan	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	South Korea	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Iran	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Laos	2021	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Solar Power Generating Project	Myanmar	2020	Donated equipment for solar power generation
	Donation for Covid-19	Philippines	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Myanmar	2021	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Cambodia	2021	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies

	Donation for Covid-19	Thailand	2021	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Peaceland Foundation 平澜基金会	Mine Detection and Clearance	Cambodia	2019-2020	Carried out mine detection and clearance
	Anti-poaching	Zimbabwe	2015-now	Carried out anti-poaching activities in Mana pools park
	Humanitarian Assistance (football team trapped in cave)	Thailand	2018	Provided humanitarian assistance to save cave-trapped football team
	Humanitarian Assistance (Iran flood)	Iran	2019	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (terror attack in Sri Lanka)	Sri Lanka	2019	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (war in Syria)	Syria	2018-now	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Cyclone Idai)	Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe	2019	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Djibouti flood)	Djibouti	2019	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Ecuador earthquake)	Ecuador	2016	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Haiti hurricane)	Haiti	2016	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal flood)	Nepal	2019	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (North Korea flood)	North Korea	2016	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Beirut explosion)	Lebanon	2020	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Donation to refugees	Lebanon	2020	Delivered aid package (food, disinfectant) to refugees
	Donation for Covid-19	Iran	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Humanitarian Assistance	Afghanistan	2021	Provided humanitarian assistance by distributing free food

	Donation for Covid-19	Nepal	2021	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	India	2021	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Zimbabwe	2021	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Public Advancement Foundation 北京益公公益基金会	School Sponsorship	Cambodia	2016	Sponsored children to go to school
Rainbow Volunteer Club 彩虹公益社	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance
	School and Community Reconstruction	Nepal	2016	Provided post-disaster reconstruction support, e.g. established BODE post-disaster shelter
	Voluntary Services	Nepal	2015-2019	Sent Chinese volunteers for various services, e.g. teaching in school
	Humanitarian Assistance (landslide and flood)	Nepal	2020	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Free Meal	Nepal	2020-2021	Provided free meal to people on the street
RamUnion 杭州市公羊会公益基金会	Humanitarian Assistance (Laos flood)	Laos	2018	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian assistance (Mexico earthquake)	Mexico	2018	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Cyclone Idai)	Mozambique	2019	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Indonesia earthquake)	Indonesia	2016	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Italy earthquake)	Italy	2016	Provided humanitarian assistance

	Humanitarian Assistance (Ecuador earthquake)	Ecuador	2016	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Beirut explosion)	Lebanon	2020	Provided humanitarian assistance
Ri Shan Foundation 日善基金会	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2018	Provided volunteering service, health exams, goods and organize activities to help the disabled. The project is initiated by Ri Shan Foundation and operated and managed by China Red Cross Foundation
Ruili Women and Children Development Center 瑞丽市妇女儿童发展中心	Scholarship	Myanmar	2017	Provided scholarship to students
	Orphanage Support	Myanmar	2014 to now	Donated books and organized various activities for orphanage
	Hospital Support	Myanmar	2016	Donated medical equipment to hospital and organized training for medical staff in obstetrics department
	Nutritious Meal	Myanmar	2016	Provided free meals to children
	Donation for Covid-19	Myanmar	2020	Donated medical goods worth of 330820RMB to Myanmar
	Computer Skills Training	Myanmar	2019	Provided computer training to 25 teachers
	Vocational Training for Women	Myanmar	2019	Provided vocational training to 66 women
	Life and Healthcare Education	Myanmar	2019	Provided lessons on life and health to 35 middle school students
	Safe Drinking Water Project	Myanmar	2017	Assisted middle schools to access safe water
SF Foundation 顺丰公益基金会	Humanitarian Support for World Vision	Nepal	2015	Sponsored World Vision for transporting donation to Nepal after earthquake
Shanghai Charity Foundation 上海市慈善基金会	Donation to School	Nepal	2017	Donation to School

Shanghai Da Cheng Charity Foundation 上海大成慈善基金会	Donation to Orphans and Students	Indonesia	2016	Donated T-shirts and pens to orphans and students in Malang
Shanghai DACI Foundation 上海大慈公益基金会	Humanitarian Donation (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Donated around 1.18 million RMB through Shanghai Red Cross
Shanghai Jue Qun Cultural & Educational Foundation 上海觉群文教基金会	Donation to Orphans	Nepal	2015	Provided 1.6 million RMB to sponsor orphans to go to school post-earthquake through local organization "Star of Hope"
Shenzhen Charity Federation 深圳慈善会	Donation for Covid-19	Germany	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Shenzhen Foundation For International Exchange and Cooperation 深圳市国际交流合作基金会	Shenzhen x Lancang-Mekong Initiative- "Mekong River Solar Village"	Cambodia, Myanmar	2018-2020	Introduced distributed photovoltaic power generation technology and applications
	Shenzhen x Lancang-Mekong Initiative- "Mekong River Journey of Light"	Cambodia	2018	Supported Yupengnian Charity Foundation to providing eye exams and cataract surgeries
	Donation for Covid-19	Brazil	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Netherlands	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Myanmar	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies

	Donation for Covid-19	Cambodia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Japan	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	South Korea	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Switzerland	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Indonesia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Shenzhen Hong Fa Temple Charity Foundation 深圳市弘法寺慈善功德基金会	Journey of Light in Colombo	Sri Lanka	2015	Provided cataract surgeries for 200 patients and donated 380,000 RMB
Shenzhen Rescue Volunteers Federation 深圳市公益救援志愿者联合会	Humanitarian Assistance (Indonesia earthquake)	Indonesia	2018	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Laos flood)	Laos	2018	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Iran earthquake)	Iran	2017	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Sri Lanka flood)	Sri Lanka	2017	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance
Shenzhen Wisdom and Orient Charitable Foundation	Bodhnath Stupa Renovation	Nepal	2016	Hainai Liberation and Commonwealth Foundation donated 3 million RMB for Bodhnath Stupa Renovation, the use of donation was managed by Shenzhen Wisdom and Orient Charitable Foundation

深圳市智慧东方公益基金会				
Shenzhen Women and Children's Development Foundation 深圳市妇女儿童发展基金会	Donation for Covid-19	Switzerland	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Sichuan Tianze Charity Foundation 四川天泽慈善基金会	Humanitarian Donation (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided donation
State Grid Public Welfare Foundation 国家电网公益基金会	Support for Electricity Recovery	Myanmar	2016	Donated 4 million RMB to support for electricity recovery after disaster
Suzhou He He Cultural Foundation 苏州和合文化基金会	Humanitarian Donation (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015 and 2016	In 2015, donated 300,000 RMB to areas affected by earthquake in Tibet and Nepal through the Buddhist Association of China; in 2016, donated another 200,000 RMB to Nepal through nunnery foundation
Suzhou Hong Hua Charity Foundation 苏州弘化社慈善基金会	Post disaster school construction	Nepal	2016	Donated to China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation to construct 7 schools
Swe Charity Foundation 深圳市盛荟慈善基金会	Humanitarian Assistance (Child Refugee)	Myanmar	2018	Provided humanitarian assistance to child refugee
	Donation to School	Myanmar	2018	Donated materials for school and daily life, worth of 300,000 RMB

SZ Long Yue Foundation 深圳市龙越慈善基金会	Chinese veteran project and school sponsorship	Myanmar	2018	Donated materials for school and daily life, worth of 300,000 RMB
Taikang Yicai Foundation 泰康溢彩基金会	Donation for Covid-19	South Korea	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
		Iran	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
		Italy	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
TCL Foundation TCL 基金会	Donation for Covid-19	Kenya	2020	Provided donation to UN-Habitat in Kenya
Tencent Foundation 腾讯公益慈善基金会	Donation for Covid-19	Global	2020-2021	Provided funds to other Chinese NGOs for fighting Covid globally
	Humanitarian Donation (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Donated 2 million RMB, and sponsored 100,000 RMB for Beijing Blue Sky Rescue
The Amity Foundation 爱德基金会	Little School Bags	Ethiopia	2018	Delivered school supplies
	Water Shortage and Sanitation Aid	Ethiopia	2017	Donated 4 million RMB to provide drinkable water, water purifier, and hygiene kit for local people
	Humanitarian Assistance (Ethiopia drought)	Ethiopia	2017	Provided humanitarian assistance and donation
	Livelihood Recovery Project	Sri Lanka	2018	Provided support for livelihood recovery
	Humanitarian Assistance (Sri Lanka flood)	Sri Lanka	2017	Provided humanitarian assistance and donation
	Humanitarian Assistance (Philippines typhoon)	Philippines	2018	Provided humanitarian assistance and donation
	Humanitarian Assistance	Philippines	2009	Provided humanitarian assistance and donation

	(Philippines typhoon)			
	Humanitarian Assistance (hunger in Africa)	Kenya	2011	Sponsored for a local project " Work for Food" to solve water supply shortage
	Biogas Energy Technical Support	Madagascar	2011	Provided technical assistance on biogas
	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance and donation worth of 3 million RMB and 5.846 million HKD
	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal flood)	Nepal	2019	Sponsored 3 million HKD for humanitarian assistance and donation
	Reconstruction and Livelihood Development Project	Nepal	2015 to now	Provided post-disaster reconstruction projects, such as building reconstruction, livelihood improvement, capacity building, and education sponsorship
	Water Shortage and Sanitation	Nepal	2019	Increased the safety of water sanitation
	Humanitarian Assistance (Ecuador earthquake)	Ecuador	2016	Provided humanitarian assistance and donation
	Education Development Project	Cambodia	2019	Donated books and book shelves to primary schools and supporting Chinese education and facility renovation
	Donation for Covid-19	Ethiopia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Kenya	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Madagascar	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Angola	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Namibia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Japan	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Spain	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Germany	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Iran	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Philippines	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies

	Donation for Covid-19	Sri Lanka	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Water Shortage and Sanitation	Myanmar	2019	Provided drinkable water, water purifier, and hygiene kit for local people
	Amity Torch Program	Nepal, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Philippines, Thailand, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda	2021	Provided assistance to students in education, community development and solar system construction
The Paradise International Foundation 桃花源基金会	The Greater Maasai Mara Program	Kenya	2018-2019	Carried out anti-poaching patrol to monitor and study elephant activities in Maasai Mara
	Virunga Bamboo Charcoal Program	DRC	2017-2019	Established a bamboo charcoal factory to encourage local people to plant bamboo and produce bamboo charcoal to replace fuelwood to combat the deforestation
	Ranger Support Plan	Africa	2019	Together with Alibaba Foundation, provided financial support for the families of rangers, who have given their lives in the line of duty
	African Ranger Awards	Africa	2017-now	10 African front-line wildlife rangers will be officially recognized each year. Each winner and his/her team will be awarded US\$10,000 in total. From 2017, the project will last for 10 years
Tianjin Rockcheck Puji Foundation 天津荣程普济公益基金会	Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	South Korea	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Japan	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Indonesia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Elephant Orphanage	Sri Lanka	2017	Sponsored the establishment of elephant orphanage in Sri Lanka
	Donation for Covid-19	UN Women	2020	Donated 1 million USD to UN Women to support recovery of women entrepreneurs and staff

Tibet Shan Yuan Foundation 西藏善缘基金会	Career Skill Training for Women	Nepal	2018	Provided career skill training for women
	Career Skill Training for Youth	Nepal	2018-2020	Provided career skill training for youth, e.g. computer skills
	Donation for Covid-19	Nepal	2020, 2021	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Goods Donation	Nepal	2018	Donation to help Raute ethnic in Nepal
Tsing Shan Charity Foundation 青山慈善基金会	Donation for Covid-19	Indonesia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Tsinghua University Education Foundation 清华大学教育基金会	Donation for Covid-19	Spain	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Japan	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Vanke Foundation 万科公益基金会	Humanitarian Assistance (Indonesia earthquake)	Indonesia	2018	Provided humanitarian donation to support Shenzhen Charity Rescue Team
	Mekong River Solar Village	Cambodia, Myanmar	2018	Funded Shenzhen x Lancang-Mekong Initiative- "Mekong River Solar Village" first and second periods
Xinglin Medical Assistance Foundation 杏林医疗救助基金会	Donation to Chinese Red Cross Foundation	Iraq	2018	Donated ambulances to Chinese Red Cross Foundation

Youth Bridge Foundation 北京青之桥公益基金会 (Including Common Future)	Volunteering for Refugees	Turkey	2017 to now	Sent volunteers to provide various services to Syrian refugees, e.g. psychological consultation, education
	Livelihood for Women Refugees	Turkey	2019	Helped women refugees to sell their handcrafts online to increase their income
	Volunteering for Refugees	Lebanon	2018 to now	Sent volunteers to provide various services to Syrian refugees, e.g. psychological consultation, education
	Volunteering for Refugees	Jordan	2018 to now	Sent volunteers to provide various services to Syrian refugees, e.g. psychological consultation, education
	Donation for Covid-19	Lebanon	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Yunan Women and Children Development Association 云南省妇女儿童工作发展促进会	Training for Women and Children's Health	Myanmar	2019	Provided sexual health education to students in secondary schools and universities
	Training for Women and Children's Health	Laos	2019	Provided sexual health education to students in secondary schools and universities
Yundi Behavior and Health Research Center 云迪行为与健康研究中心	Support for Migrant Children Affected by Myitsone Dam	Myanmar	2018-2019	In partnership with Airavati Foundation, provided education and basic healthcare for migrant women and children affected by the Myitsone Dam
	Sanitation Improvement in Northern Myanmar	Myanmar	2017-2018	Improved water sanitation and renovate public toilets in poor communities in Northern Myanmar
	Education for Children in Refugee Camps in Maija Yang	Myanmar	2017	Improved education facility and provided training for local teachers
	Post-surgery service for children with congenital heart disease	Myanmar	2019	Provided service for Burmese children who have had surgery for congenital heart disease through China's official aid

	Post-surgery service for children with congenital heart disease	Cambodia	2019	Provided service for Cambodian children who have had surgery for congenital heart disease through China's official aid
	Humanitarian Donation (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Donated emergency supplies
	Children Education and Volunteer Training	Cambodia	2018	Established multi-media and entertainment rooms for children and provided training for local people to prepare them for providing services, e.g. translation, coordination, social work for Chinese projects in Cambodia
	Donation for Covid-19	Cambodia	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Laos	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Myanmar	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Establish pauk-phaw monthly magazine	Myanmar	2020-now	
	Training for Covid-19 prevention	Myanmar	2020	Provided training on prevention of Covid-19 in local communities
	Assistance on education and agriculture in Wa State	Myanmar	2019-2020	Provided assistance on education, agricultural productivity and Covid prevention
	Assistance to girls	Bangladesh	2020	Provided assistance to girls in education, food and healthcare
	Training for Covid-19 prevention	Laos	2020	Provided training on prevention of Covid-19 in local communities
	Training for Covid-19 prevention	Nepal	2020	Provided training on prevention of Covid-19 in local communities
Yunnan Foundation For International Friendship and Exchange 云南民间国际友好交流基金会	Journey of Light	Myanmar	2013-2019	Provided free cataract surgeries in Myanmar
	Journey of Light	Laos	2013-2019	Provided free cataract surgeries in Laos
Yunnan Green Environment	Cross-Border Asian Elephant Protection	Laos	2020	Built reservoir, installed solar street lights, delivered energy-saving stove, and

Development Foundation 云南省绿色环境发展基金会	and Ethnic Minority Village Ecological Demonstration Project			organized patrol team for Asian elephants protection
Yunnan International Non-Government Organization Society 云南省国际民间组织合作促进会	"One Temple One TV"	Myanmar	2017-2019	Donated TVs for more than 100 temples and SKYNET satellite service for three years
	Rural Health Development in Muse district	Myanmar	2017-2018	Provided medical training and medical equipment worth of 1,590,000 RMB and providing free meals for 800 students in No.1 High School in Muse for a year
	Road Administration Training	Laos	2017	Provided training for government officials related to road public administration
Yunnan Overseas Chinese Charity Foundation 云南华商公益基金会	Free Medical Exam in Wa State	Myanmar	2015	Donated 300,000 RMB to provide free medical exams and medicine in Wa state in Myanmar
	Computer Donation	Myanmar	2015	Donated computers to Yunhua normal college (云华师范学院) in Mandalay
Yunnan Youth Development Foundation 云南省青少年发展基金会	Aid to Myanmar	Myanmar	2019	Sponsored space for sports and study packages for students
Yupengnian Charity Foundation 余彭年慈善基金会	Pengyunian Journey of Light	Cambodia	2018, 2019	Provided eye exams and cataract surgeries in Takeo province of Cambodia

	Agriculture Technical Assistance	North Korea	2019	Provided technical assistance for agriculture project
Zall Foundation 卓尔公益基金会	Donation for Covid-19	Singapore	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Nigeria	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Mali	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Burkina Faso	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Niger	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Cameroon	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	DRC	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Czech	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Peru	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	France	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Ecuador	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Japan	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Cambodia	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
	Donation for Covid-19	Indonesia	2020	Donated medical goods for Covid-19
Zhejiang Zhiai Foundation 浙江至爱公益基金会	Donation for Covid-19	US	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	South Korea	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Russia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Iran	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Greece	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies

	Donation for Covid-19	Republic of Congo	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Italy	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Chile	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Kenya	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
	Donation for Covid-19	Serbia	2020	Donated Covid-19 medical supplies
Zhenro Foundation 正荣公益基金会	Humanitarian Assistance (Myanmar Kokang water sanitation)	Myanmar	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance
	Humanitarian Assistance (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian assistance
ZJ Wonder Foundation 浙江文德公益基金会	IBBA School for Girls	South Sudan	2016-2019	Provided funds of 400,000 USD for IBBA school for girls
ZTE Foundation 中兴通讯公益基金会	Telecommunication Equipment Donation	Ethiopia	2006	Donated telecommunication equipment worth of 10 million USD and providing training for 1000 telecommunication engineers
	Donation to AbebechGobena Children Center	Ethiopia	2008	Donated 10,000 USD to AbebechGobena Children Center
	Free Lunch to Elderly and Students	Ethiopia	2012	Provided 30 free lunch to elderly care center and students every day
	Tree Plantation	Ethiopia	2013	Planted trees in the suburb of Addis Ababa
	ICT Innovation Competition	Ethiopia	2015	Funded 15000 USD for title sponsorship of ICT innovation competition
	Sponsorship to Ethiopia-China Friendly School	Ethiopia	2016	Funded 120,000 USD to build Ethiopia-China Friendship School in Edja Wreda
	Sponsorship to School in Yewaheniye	Ethiopia	2018	Funded to build school in Yewaheniye
	Stationary Donation	South Sudan	2014	Donated 1 million pencils worth of 300,000 RMB

	Humanitarian Donation (Nepal earthquake)	Nepal	2015	Provided humanitarian donation worth of 200,000 RMB
	Chinese Veteran Care	Myanmar	2016	Visited Chinese veteran in Myitkyina and made donation

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Summary

This thesis aims to provide a systematic, structured and evidence-based view of the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs, and to examine their role in Chinese international development cooperation. To do this it adopts a relational approach, focusing on the relations between NGOs and key actors in Chinese international development cooperation, particularly the Chinese state and Chinese companies.

The thesis starts with an overview of the current state of Chinese NGO internationalisation, based on a database that I have built up that includes all Chinese NGOs that conducted international development projects from 2005 to 2021. The database shows that fewer government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) than non-GONGOs - that is, civil society organizations of a more “grassroots” character - are engaged in international development projects, and that Chinese NGOs have shown great diversity in their international operations. However, the scale of Chinese NGOs' international activities is far smaller than that of their counterparts in Western countries such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Canada. One reason for this is that state funding for such activities, an important source of finance for many Western NGOs despite their independence in other respects from the government, is limited in China, where NGOs have to pay for their overseas projects mostly from non-official sources.

Drawing on the results of fieldwork, interviews, and analysis of the organizational discourses of 28 selected NGOs, the thesis goes on to investigate to what degree the international operations of Chinese NGOs take place independently of the Chinese state. The main finding is that while state influence is strong, it does not come from policies, interventions, or funding relating specifically to NGO internationalisation. Rather, state influence is embedded in the more general regulatory system governing NGO registration and supervision, and in the way NGOs themselves appeal to official discourses on international relations in order to valorise and legitimise their activities. This phenomenon I have called “embedded internationalisation”. Chinese NGOs are not capable of developing strategies and discourses completely independent from those of the Chinese state. They tend to act as promoters of Chinese “soft power” even without any official instruction to that effect. Neither do they seem capable of playing any transformative role when it comes to influencing corporate behaviour for social and environmental issues. However, compared with foreign NGOs they do have “home NGO advantage” when cooperating with Chinese companies, which find it easier to communicate with them and have more trust in them.

With such limited practical autonomy, Chinese NGOs clearly cannot offer a genuine *alternative* to China's mainstream international development landscape, even though most of their internationalisation is not directly initiated and managed by the Chinese state. Instead, they have played a *complementary* role, enriching the diversity of China's aid and development cooperation initiatives and helping to promote its soft power. Whereas NGOs in Western countries complement their governments' international aid efforts mainly by acting as contractors for state donor agencies, the complementarity of China's NGOs vis-à-vis government is based on their behaviour, discourses and values rather than their contractual relations with the state. The inability of Chinese NGOs to develop programmes and discourses independent of the state has inevitably brought the Chinese government's influence into global civil society, although the degree to which this happens varies significantly between Chinese NGOs. I hope that with these findings my study has enriched the existing scholarship on China's global engagements, which has focused mainly on the Chinese state and Chinese investments, and contributed also to the literature on global civil society, which up to now has primarily been concerned with Western NGOs.

Samenvatting:

Met dit proefschrift wordt ernaar gestreefd om een systematisch, gestructureerd en op feiten gebaseerd beeld te geven van de internationalisering van Chinese ngo's en om hun rol in de Chinese internationale ontwikkelingssamenwerking te onderzoeken. Daartoe hanteert het een relationele aanpak, waarbij de nadruk komt te liggen op de relaties tussen ngo's en sleutelactoren in de Chinese internationale ontwikkelingssamenwerking, met name de Chinese staat en Chinese bedrijven.

Het proefschrift begint met een overzicht van de huidige stand van zaken van de internationalisering van Chinese ngo's, gebaseerd op een database die ik heb gecreëerd en waarin alle Chinese ngo's zijn opgenomen die tussen 2005 en 2021 internationale ontwikkelingsprojecten hebben uitgevoerd. Uit de database blijkt dat er minder door de overheid georganiseerde ngo's (gonggo's) dan niet-gonggo's – dat wil zeggen maatschappelijke organisaties met een meer fundamenteel karakter – betrokken zijn bij internationale ontwikkelingsprojecten, en dat Chinese ngo's blijken te geven van een grote diversiteit in hun internationale operaties. De omvang van de internationale activiteiten van Chinese ngo's is echter veel kleiner dan die van hun tegenhangers in westerse landen als Groot-Brittannië, Nederland en Canada. Eén reden hiervoor is dat de staatsfinanciering voor dergelijke activiteiten, een belangrijke financieringsbron voor vele westerse ngo's ondanks hun onafhankelijkheid van de overheid op andere vlakken, beperkt is in China, waar ngo's hun overzeese projecten grotendeels moeten betalen uit niet-officiële bronnen.

Op basis van de resultaten van veldwerk, interviews en analyse van de organisatorische discoursen van 28 geselecteerde ngo's, wordt in het proefschrift verder onderzocht in welke mate de internationale activiteiten van Chinese ngo's onafhankelijk van de Chinese staat gebeuren. De belangrijkste bevinding is dat, hoewel de staatsinvloed sterk is, deze niet voortkomt uit beleid, interventies of financiering die specifiek verband houden met de internationalisering van ngo's. In plaats daarvan is de staatsinvloed ingebed in het meer algemene regelgevingssysteem dat de registratie van en het toezicht op ngo's regelt, en in de manier waarop ngo's zelf een beroep doen op officiële discoursen over internationale betrekkingen om hun activiteiten te valoriseren en legitimeren. Dit fenomeen heb ik “ingebede internationalisering” genoemd. Chinese ngo's zijn niet in staat om strategieën en discoursen te ontwikkelen die volledig onafhankelijk zijn van die van de Chinese staat. Ze zijn geneigd om op te treden als promotors van de Chinese ‘zachte macht’, zelfs zonder enige officiële instructie daartoe. Ze lijken ook niet in staat om een transformerende rol te spelen als het gaat om het beïnvloeden van het gedrag van bedrijven met betrekking tot sociale en milieukwesties. Vergeleken met buitenlandse ngo's hebben ze echter wel een thuisvoordeel, wanneer ze samenwerken met Chinese bedrijven, die gemakkelijker met hen kunnen communiceren en meer vertrouwen in hen hebben.

Met zo'n beperkte praktische autonomie kunnen Chinese ngo's duidelijk geen echt *alternatief* bieden voor het reguliere internationale ontwikkelingslandschap van China, ook al wordt het grootste deel van hun internationalisering niet rechtstreeks geïnitieerd en beheerd door de Chinese staat. In plaats daarvan spelen ze een *complementaire* rol, door de diversiteit van de Chinese hulp- en ontwikkelingssamenwerkingsinitiatieven te verrijken en zijn zachte macht te helpen bevorderen. Terwijl ngo's in westerse landen de internationale hulpinspanningen van hun overheden voornamelijk aanvullen door op te treden als contractanten voor staatsdonoragentschappen, is de complementariteit van Chinese ngo's ten opzichte van de overheid gebaseerd op hun gedrag, discours en waarden en niet op hun contractuele relaties met de staat. Het onvermogen van Chinese ngo's om onafhankelijk van de staat programma's en discoursen te ontwikkelen loodst onvermijdelijk de invloed van de Chinese regering binnen de mondiale civiele samenleving, hoewel de mate waarin dit gebeurt aanzienlijk varieert onder Chinese ngo's. Ik hoop dat mijn onderzoek met deze bevindingen de bestaande wetenschap over de mondiale betrokkenheid van China heeft verrijkt, welke zich voornamelijk heeft gericht op de Chinese staat en Chinese investeringen, en eveneens heeft bijgedragen aan de literatuur over de mondiale civiele samenleving, die zich tot nu toe vooral bezighield met Westerse ngo's.

CV

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