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The intertopian mode in the depiction of Turkey-originated migrants in European film

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2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: A BRIEF BACKGROUND ON MIGRATION TO/WITHIN EUROPE AND THEORISING EUROPEAN MIGRANT CINEMA

Migration has a long history, and it has become an increasingly powerful force in the contemporary world (Bauböck and Faist 2010; Cohen and Fischer 2018). Since the end of WWII, Europe has been emerging as a significant actor in migration as the flows of mass migration to Europe are transcending (Algan et al. 2012, 1).

To investigate the texts in the case studies, it is vital to comment on the sociocultural struggles experienced by the immigrants. To set the socio-political context for the arguments in this dissertation, this chapter starts with a brief background on migration within Europe while addressing the major concepts and parameters in relation to migration, then moves on to the subject of perceptions about Turkish immigrants in Europe. The next part of the chapter explores the definitions in migration cinema and introduces European migrant cinema with relevance to this study.

2.1 KEY CONCEPTS OF MIGRATION: PARAMETERS AND DEFINITIONS

Certain concepts about migration such as immigrant/migrant, asylum seeker, and diaspora will reappear in this study. There are conceptual problems inherent to the basic terminologies of migration due to changing migration trends. When defining the terms critical to the understanding of migration, this dissertation does not assume a static position. At times I consult literature that dates back as far as the 1950s. First, because the representation of migrants in the selected body of films includes Turkish migrants who moved to Europe as early as the 1960s; second, due to the legal and political features of migration and immigrants' legal status, the definitions of some basic concepts, such as asylum seeker date back to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol of the UN (UNESCO The United Nations' Convention on Migrants' Rights 2005; The International Convention on Migrant Workers and its Committee 2005). Migration is a historical and sociological phenomenon that has many implications; hence, the earlier literature provides valuable insights to read the status of first- and second-generation migrants who are now settled in their host countries.

There is generally agreement regarding the definition of migration. Daniela Berghahn and Claudia Sternberg definition of migration in *European Cinema in Motion: Migrant and Diasporic Film in Contemporary Europe* (2010) as “(from Latin *migrare*: ‘to change one’s residence or position, to move from place to place’) is generally used to refer to population movements either within nation states or across borders” (Berghahn and Sternberg 2010, 12). This definition of migration is in line with the analyses of the case studies in this dissertation and the Turkey-rooted communities are considered to be immigrants.

When a large number of people migrate from one nation-state to another, be it close-tied or not, in the receiving country, they form a diaspora (Faist 2010, 9). Diaspora often refers to a settled, permanent group of migrants – or immigrants – living outside of their home country (Safran 1991; Cohen 2008). Migrants are categorised as “postcolonial migrants, refugees or asylum seekers, labour migrants and family migrants [by policymakers, scholars, journalists and politicians]” (Schrover and Moloney 2013, 8), and terms such as economic migrants (expats), foreign national and international can also be heard in colloquial use.

An asylum seeker is “someone who has lodged an application for protection on the basis of the Refugee Convention or Article 3 of the ECHR” (Refugee Council Organization Glossary 2013). A migrant worker (economic migrant) on the other hand, is “a person who is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national” (UNESCO United Nations Convention on Migrants' Rights Information Kit 2005, 25). A refugee is “a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons

of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” (UNESCO United Nations Convention on Migrants’ Rights Information Kit 2005, 3).

Those who migrate need to be documented to have a legal status and depending on the legal status of the immigrant, different terms may apply which leads to differences in the usage of certain terms like asylum seeker and refugee. Except for exile (forced migration), many categories of migration can be voluntary and an intended journey of hope. Migrants move for safety, security, happiness, family unification, cultural and economic reasons (UNESCO United Nations Convention on Migrants’ Rights Information Kit 2005, 16). According to the same Information Kit based on the 1951 UN Convention, “the distinction between migrant workers and refugees is not always clear” (UNESCO United Nations Convention on Migrants’ Rights Information Kit 2005, 17) and “Asylum seekers may be ‘economic refugees’ because they flee economic difficulties rather than political circumstances. Migrants are sometimes incited to present themselves as asylum seekers because they have no other possibility of legally entering a country. Other migrants are in refugee-like situations but prefer to cross borders as migrant workers to avoid suspicion. The Convention only applies to migrant workers and not to refugees, whose situation is handled by the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its Protocol. However, the complexity of contemporary migratory flows challenges this distinction.” (UNESCO United Nations Convention on Migrants’ Rights Information Kit 2005, 17) The actual migrant experience is a mixture of expectations coming true or evoked fear, anxiety and concern when one moves to a new place. To gain a legal status is a top issue in migration (Schrover et. al 2008).

The above terms are the most observed terms regarding the rising tides of immigration in Europe in this study. Amongst these terms, economic migrant is the most immediately related to theories of hope and expectations because of the nature of their migration, and their reasons for migration not being a majorly life-threatening situation. The next sub-section looks at the contemporary migration to/within Europe from a historical overview.

2.2 MIGRATION IN EUROPE: A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Europe has experienced an influx of migration flows both within and from outside of Europe since the 1990s (UN Migrant Stock 2017 Table 1 2017). One main reason behind the gradual rise in migration is the increasing global political conflicts. Events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the breakup of Yugoslavia starting in 1989 marked the end of Cold War (Salomon 1991; Kusá 2009, 296; Sío-López and Tedeschi 2014, 143, 144; Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2016, 363) and millions of people fled their home countries. The Berlin Wall was a physical border dividing the East and the West and its collapse led to a blurring of cultural and virtual borders (Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo 2016, 60). The further expansions of the European Union and the nationality acts, which allow naturalisation, have also led to a rise in migration to and within Europe (Kraler 2006, 42-3; Van Mol and de Valk 2016, 31). Julie Vullnetari concludes that “(...) some migratory flows have taken on a rather regional character, re-establishing transnational ties which had existed before the Cold War” (Vullnetari 2013, 32).

Almost all countries in Europe receive external and interregional migration⁵⁹ – with Spain, Portugal, Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, the UK, France, Italy, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium often being the top receivers of migration (UN Migrant Stock 2017 Table 1 2017). Britain has been witnessing postcolonial mass migration from South Asia, the Caribbean, and the Middle East since 1960s, France has observed migration from North Africa, Germany received millions of guestworkers (referred to as the *Gastarbeiter* in Germany) from different parts of Europe and Turkey in the 1970s. The end of WWII led to labour shortages in Europe. Many governments in Europe agreed on mass immigrations of workers to alleviate labour shortages after WWII. Consequently, several European countries, mainly Germany and Britain, experienced labour migration especially from Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy, and Tunisia. These labour migrations have “dramatically changed the social and cultural composition of European societies” (Robins 2006, 262).

The Cold War was also a period of binary propositions and oppositions – one’s dream was the other’s nightmare; the distinctions between the East and the West, between communism and capitalism, and different religious groups were significant (Van Mol and de Valk 2016, 33). With the rise of neoliberalism and globalisation, other migration flows have been observed. Another reason was the introduction of the 1985 Schengen Agreement which

⁵⁹ Intra-EU mobility is the “Action of persons (EU nationals or legally resident third-country nationals) undertaking their right to free movement by moving from one EU Member State to another.” (EMN Glossary).

was influential in the increase the intra-EU mobility between 2000-2011 (Van Mol and de Valk 2016, 42).

Not only did migration substantially increase in the mid-1990s, but it also became more diversified as more nationalities were involved (UN Migrant Stock 2017 Table 1 2017). Before the 1990s, colonial immigrants were more common in Europe. With more people becoming displaced, more immigrants started to arrive in Europe (Van Mol and de Valk 2016, 40).

Europe also experienced increased volumes of immigration including family-linked migration (Trends in International Migration 2001). The new border regime in Europe during the post-Cold War year led to new issues with migration – even if the spectrum of migration into Europe had diversified, socio-political poles have not been resolved. Ewa Mazierska and Laura Rascaroli call these migration flows from 1989 “new migration” (Mazierska and Rascaroli 2006: 140), arguing that the origin and destination countries, reasons for migration (fleeing ethnic cleansing, short-term and transit, etc.), and wide range of migrants make this distinct. Politicians, leaders, and many scholars call the period after 2004 “new Europe” (Barroso 2007; Lahav 2004; Doal McNeill 2014) after the largest enlargement of the EU in 2004.

The migration to Europe includes the mobilizations of the labour force due to labour agreements, emigration, and asylum. With the newer enlargement of the EU, migration between the member states intensified. The free movement of EU citizens inside the EU started in 2004 and granted the citizens of the EU the right to work and live freely in other EU countries than their home country (King and Collyer 2016, 167). Klaus J. Bade’s comprehensive work, *Migration in European History* (2003), deals with the history and trends of migration in Europe. He classifies the migration trends in Europe as “After the major labour migrations were cut off by the recruitment bans and immigration restrictions of the early to mid-1970s, there were basically three types of transnational migration to and within Europe – apart from elite, training and betterment migrations and labour migration between EC countries, which are not affected by restrictions” (Bade 2003, 263).

The naturalization processes affected the demographic structures of the immigrants in Europe. With a few exceptions, migrants from non-European parts of the world outnumbered European immigrants in the 1980s (Bolsker-Schlicht 1987, 76-94; Henkes 1995 cited in Bade 2003, 233).

Europe has continued to be a home continent for migration from all across the globe (UN Migrant Stock 2017 Table 1 2017) especially due to the internal political and financial crises unfolding in several Middle Eastern and African countries. The aftermath of 9/11 marked

an increase in scepticism towards migration from Muslim countries. (Mügge and van der Haar 2016, 78; Van Ewijk and Nijenhuis 2016, 130.)

After the 2008 financial crisis, the 2011 Civil War in Syria, and other political conflicts happening across the globe, migration flows have continued changing the socio-cultural and economic parameters in contemporary Europe. In 2015, Europe experienced an unexpected rise in non-EU migrants. This period is often referred to as the European refugee crisis (Collyer and King 2016, 1). The next subsection will tackle Turkish migration to Europe.

2.3 TURKISH IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE AND THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT

Because this study focuses on the period after the 1960s, it will not provide a detailed background on the migration to Europe from Turkey before that time period. Migration from Turkey or the Ottoman Empire to parts of Europe existed before the 1960s but these flows were never too large nor followed a particular trend, such as the labour flows brought by the labour agreements of the 1960s-70s or the family unifications of more recent years. The earlier migrations were often the results of war – leading to involuntary migration from Anatolia to the Balkans (Christian communities living in the Ottoman Empire) or the Balkans to Anatolia (Muslim communities) (Hecker 2006).

Certain Turkish-rooted groups of the old Ottoman Empire communities from the Balkans and Eastern Europe have been migrating to Europe even before the 1960s. For example, Turkish Cypriots have been migrating to Britain since the 1920s (Sonyel 2000, 147), especially after the political turmoil in 1964, from the Middle East (for example, Algeria (Lucassen 2005, 175); Iraq, Lebanon, Syria (UN Migrant Stock 2017 Table 1) (İçduygu 2012, 11)) yet these were “persons with non-Turkish or non-Islamic background” (İçduygu 2012, 11).

This study focuses on the representation of the migrants who have moved to Europe from modern day Turkey, or the Republic of Turkey. The first-generation Turkish immigrants moved to Germany in 1961 after the signing of the labour recruitment agreement between Germany and Turkey (İçduygu 2012, 12). The initial idea shared by both parties was that the emigration would be temporary (Bilgili and Siegel 2013, 279) – for two years – yet the Turkish migrants exercised the right to settle with the introduction of new policies and were able to bring their families with the Family Reunification laws in 1974 (Akgündüz 2008), after the initial labour recruitment agreement was halted in 1974 due to the oil crisis. Most Turkish workers did not leave Germany and brought their families (Bilgili and Siegel 2013, 279).

Belgium (Timmermann and Wetts 2011, 69), the Netherlands, Austria (all three in 1964 – Bilgili and Siegel 2013, 279; Sert and Yıldız 2016, 60), France (in 1965) and Sweden (in 1967), along with other European countries, also signed labour agreements with Turkey. In all these cases, the initial strategy was to allow the Turkish workers to work for a year and then they were expected to return to Turkey. However, as in the case of Germany, many Turkish workers wanted to stay in their host countries as well as their employers encouraging their stay because of their familiarity with their work. In the meanwhile, the number of Turkish immigrants in Europe and especially in Germany substantially increased (Sert and Yıldız 2016,

61). Besides the family reunifications, migration flows diversified, and “Kurdish refugees and asylum seekers” migrated to Europe (Bilgili and Siegel 2013, 279-280).

Exact official numbers are not present due to the complexity of migration and the determination of ethnicities and country of origin, however, there are estimates about the number of Turkey-rooted immigrants in Europe which is around 5.5 million in Western Europe (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021). Being so large a group of immigrants (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013a, 626), Turkish immigrants play an important role in the socio-political and economic life in Europe.

After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, starting with the German Unification, many Turkish immigrants naturalised. What Ostergaard-Nielsen notes is important in providing a background on the legal status of Turkish immigrants in Germany. She notes that the Germany-born children of Turkish citizens did not qualify for German citizenship (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003, 3).

Nils Witte’s research provides nuanced insights into the Turkish populations in Germany, stating that Turkish naturalisation rose during the 1990s, but their annual naturalization rates remained low overall (Witte 2014, 1). The trend of little interest in naturalisation shown by Turkish immigrants in Germany reversed in more recent years, and later showed different trends. Besides the large number and further naturalisations, Ostergaard-Nielsen also mentions Turkey’s EU candidacy as one of the important reasons why Turkish immigrants have an impact on transnational politics (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003, 3). Turkish immigrants in Europe are a significant part of the socio-cultural diversity of Europe and some take on roles as decision-makers in their societies, yet there is an increasingly negative image of Turkish immigrants in Europe as well as of other non-European immigrants. Policymakers and media at times use negative stereotypes of immigrants in their discourse (Taras 2008, 91, 139).

2.4 THE IMAGE OF TURKISH IMMIGRANTS IN THE HOST SOCIETIES

When people migrate from a particular place to another, their lives, dreams, and hopes to undergo positive and negative changes. Because this aspect of migration encourages a reading of the *intertopian* mode, this subsection addresses the perceptions of home and host societies with specific focus on the Turkish migrants. There is more research on Turkish immigrants in Germany than in other European countries where Turkish communities live, because they are one of the largest immigrant groups in Germany and overall, in Europe.

The struggles of immigrants to gain a legal and permanent status in Germany and the socio-cultural differences between host and home societies make the topic an important subject for cinema through migration films (*Journey of Hope* (Koller, 1990); *Dirty Pretty Things* (Frears, 2002); *Geschwister* (Arslan, 1996); *Aprilkinder* (Yavuz, 1998)). The integration or the assimilation of the immigrants in the receiving societies is highly debated. While the perceptions about immigrants vary, there have been trends regarding the views on immigrants in Europe. The overall perceptions are prone to change due to the following:

- a. Cultural differences between home and host societies: the cultural differences between Western civilization and Orthodox-Muslim civilization in Europe (Taras 2008, 65-6; Annual Report of 2005 ECRI). “Rather than being part of their national founding or ongoing nation-making myths, immigration in Europe has historically been perceived as exceptional to the normal state of things – a disturbance or even a threat” (Weinar, Bonjour and Zhyznomirska 2018). The earlier expectations that the migrant workers would stay only temporarily and leave the receiving country eventually (*Anwerbestopp* 1973) caused some of the tensions present in the case studies.
- b. Sonja Fransen and Kim Caarls refer to the 2016 Official Development Assistance (ODA) – OECD concluding “Refugee flows in Europe have diversified over the last decades, not only in terms of origin countries, but also with respect to educational backgrounds, family situations, skills and resources (OECD, 2016)” (Fransen and Caarls 2018). There are also various specific conditions in all receiving countries (Witte 2014). Differences between first, second or third generations of immigrants (King, Connell and White 1995, 40; Schiffauer 1999; Witte 2014, 9; Witte 2015, 115) play a role as well.

The migrant workers, including Turkey-rooted ones, in countries like Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden, remained in their host societies, and some of them started to have families there. The children of the first-generation immigrants are often called second generation immigrants, born to parents from Turkey, and their grandchildren, the children of

the second-generation immigrants, are called third generation immigrants. When the host countries realised that a high number of migrants intended to stay longer, they introduced cultural integration programmes, though, “Turkey is against an assimilationist perspective” (Bilgili and Siegel 2013, 284).

The cultural differences between the native community and the immigrants can at times be pronounced (Schans 2009, 1179). Culture shock on the migrants’ side and the perception of migrants as a threat for their job prospects by the locals are quite common. According to Lena Nekby, “Negative attitudes towards immigration may stem less from the economic implications of immigration and more from the perceived threats of immigration to social and cultural institutions (Card et al. 2005; Dustmann and Preston, 2007 cited in Nekby 2012, 172). Yet, it would not be entirely possible to note all the reasons for the misperceptions or negative perceptions about the migrants without going into the details of psychology, which is not within the limitation of this research. Overall, the apathetic attitude toward immigrants exists in all societies across the globe, however, the same type of attitude can at times be systematic, leading to xenophobia.

The host societies of Europe changed their laws according to the migration and settlement trends at different periods. The modern migration trends were not always anticipated, hence, the need to amend laws⁶⁰.

The immigration and naturalisation laws vary from country to country (Witte 2014) – and state to state depending on the political system of the country. Yann Algan, Alberto Bisin, Alan Manning, and Thierry Verdier argue that the reason for the various rates of integration might be related to naturalisation laws and “In part, better inclusion may be linked to the naturalization laws, as acquiring the citizenship of the country of residence gives a sense of security of status, and a sense of belonging” (Algan et.al 2013, 328).

This may be related to having the rights to have an equal start in life, which makes the native-born feel like a member of the society, for instance a German Turk or a Turkish German, a Dutch Turk, or a Turkish-Swedish individual. The image of immigrants may change depending on the level of integration, and the more a second or third-generation immigrant

⁶⁰ Eleonore Kofman states: “The change in the German government in 1998 had led initially to the promise of further major change in Germany’s citizenship laws to enable third country nationals, especially the large Turkish population, to become citizens after eight years of residence. As a result of a setback in the regional elections in September 1998, the SPD–Green government has backtracked. Children will have to choose between nationalities at the age of 23 which means that once again dual nationality is not permitted. It is thought this is one of the most significant factors dissuading the Turkish population from taking up citizenship. According to research conducted by the Turkish Research Centre in Germany, half of German Turks would take out German citizenship if they could retain their Turkish citizenship (JCWI 1999: 12) (Kofman 2000, 98).

feels at home, hence, not an immigrant themselves but of migrant origin, or born to migrant families, the better the image.

The mapping of migration trends in Europe, the demographic profiles of Turkish immigrants in Europe and the perceptions about them have allowed me to set the scene for the analysis of the case studies in this dissertation. These sections have established that the Turkish communities in Europe have varied legal statuses (such as short-term visa holders, asylum seekers, citizens, long-term residents with indefinite leave to remain), followed different migratory trends, had different reasons to migrate and are of different socio-cultural backgrounds; there are also various perceptions about Turkish immigrants in their host societies. The next section contextualises the area of European migrant cinema by providing the major concepts and theories in European migrant cinema as well as a brief history with examples. By doing so, it also links the social contexts about migration while preparing for the discussion of utopianism and *intertopian* mode in film.

2.5 THEORISING EUROPEAN MIGRANT CINEMA

The historical context described earlier in this chapter, and the cultural ties between European countries have led to an increase in the production of transnational films. In addition, due to globalisation and the changes in the conjuncture across the globe, examples of migrant cinema in Europe and the representations of migrants in European films have increased proportionally.

While the representation of migrants has assumed a more prominent position in the cinemas of Europe, the issues with the conceptualization and definitions have not diminished. The conceptualisation of film in national cinemas has its limitations and these limitations have brought the need for new concepts to understand the changes in production and distribution of films. There have been various attempts to define cinema dealing with migration. Diasporic cinema (Naficy 2001; Desai 2004; Berghahn and Sternberg 2010), accented cinema (Naficy 2001), third cinema⁶¹ (Bordwell and Thompson 2003; Stam 2003), transnational cinema (Ezra and Rowden 2006; Higbee and Lim 2010), cinema of double occupancy (Elsaesser 2005) and migrant cinema (Berghahn and Sternberg 2010), are some of the terms used in Film Studies to describe cinemas that are not entirely national, that have representations of immigrants, or have been made by filmmakers who are immigrants themselves and who show a professional interest in minority cultures and touch upon the subject of migration in their films.

This section explores the definitions of migration and cinema in Europe. It starts with the agreed upon definitions, sets out to define appropriate terms used in this dissertation, and moves on to consider the theoretical discussions in European migrant cinema.

2.5.1 Key Concepts and Discussions

The terms described here are often not directly linked to mainstream cinema or national cinema and have been entitled to reflect the differences between mainstream cinema and alternative cinemas. There are more common and major concepts such as migrant cinema, accented cinema, and transnational cinema, which describe the cinema in respect of the migrant's position in the society or their legal, socio-cultural status. There are also less commonly used terms or terms that belong to the literature in a certain language, which may or may not have any correspondence in other languages.

⁶¹ Third cinema (Solanas and Getino 1969) or third world cinema is the name given to films made outside of Hollywood and Europe. It can be said to have begun as a counter-cinema (Solanas and Getino 1969) in Latin America and Africa at the end of 1960s (Stam 2003, 41-42).

Terms in relation to national cinemas and Hollywood

Key concepts in migrant cinema, including the term migrant cinema itself, are often defined with reference to mainstream (popular Hollywood or Bollywood films) or national cinemas (“the choice of making an auteur cinema represent the nation, rather than the stars-and-genre commercial cinema of a given country” (Elsaesser 2005, 23) such as French film, Portuguese film). Mainstream cinema has been hard to unanimously define, although the general understanding is that it consists of films produced and distributed by the major film studios in Hollywood or their equivalents in other territories, whereas the films that are produced and distributed by independent producers or the filmmakers themselves are indie films (King, Molloy, Tzioumakis 2012, 2). Other definitions concentrate on the commercial quality of mainstream films in opposition to the artistic quality of the indie films (Bagella and Becchetti 1999; Baumann 2002). In this research, I make the same distinction between European mainstream or national films and European migrant films. By mainstream films, I mean popular and populist films often made by big studios, as in the Hollywood context. Geoff King (2002, 2) argues that some independent films “operate at a distance from the mainstream in all three respects: they are produced in an ultra-low-budget world a million miles from that of the Hollywood blockbuster; they adopt formal strategies that disrupt or abandon the smoothly flowing conventions associated with the mainstream Hollywood style; and they offer challenging perspectives on social issues, a rarity in Hollywood”. Michael Z. Newman (2011, 5) considers ““mainstream” to be a category that niche cultures or subcultures construct to have something against which to define themselves and generate their cultural or subcultural capital”. The definitions of Hollywood, mainstream, popular, independent, and indie film have changed over time (Tzioumakis 2006) and vary. For instance, King bases his arguments on the industrial location, the kinds of formal/aesthetic strategies the films adopt and their relationship to the broader social, cultural, political, or ideological landscape (King 2002, 2). These arguments are important here because European cinema has frequently been defined in relation to Hollywood. Thomas Elsaesser (2005, 13) argues in *European Cinema: Face to Face with Hollywood* that “the years from 1945 to the 1980s were the years of the different national cinemas”, which was a period when “national (art) cinemas and individual auteurs made up a shifting set of references that defined what was meant by European cinema.” European cinema is a part of world cinema while including national cinemas within it (Elsaesser 2005, 28). In his later work, he comments that the European art/auteur cinema “(and by extension, world

cinema) has always defined itself against Hollywood on the basis of its greater realism” (Elsaesser 2009, 3).

Hence, the European cinema after World War II was a cinema of auteurs and national identities: a political cinema that was defined by the auteurs’ aesthetic styles and choice of themes. In his recent book *European Cinema and Continental Philosophy* Elsaesser contends that “it is difficult to argue that European cinema exists, other than as a bureaucratic dream” and the “European cinema today, whether considered as counter-Hollywood, as avant-garde or auteur cinema is best subsumed under the umbrella categories of ‘world cinema’, ‘global art cinema’ or ‘international festival cinema’” (Elsaesser 2019, 164). His reason for this argument is, first of all, the funding schemes obliging the filmmakers to enter into transnational co-productions, and second, the fact that national film movements emerge from European film festivals and not the national film cultures (Elsaesser 2005, 70, 120, 263).

Before going into the details about debates on the existence of a European cinema, I would like to describe what migrant cinema is. Daniela Berghahn uses the German term *Migrantenkino* for migrant cinema and describes it as “films made by migrant or diasporic filmmakers” (Berghahn 2008). She states that, in the German context, the term is usually associated with Turkish-German cinema, but it includes other films made by migrant or diasporic filmmakers in any country (Berghahn 2008). She also refers to migrant cinema as *Migrationsfilm*, as it issued in German and provides a similar description: “films made by migrant or diasporic filmmakers” (Berghahn 2008).

However, in their *European Cinema in Motion: Migrant and Diasporic Film in Contemporary Europe* (2010), Berghahn and Sternberg use ‘migrant film’ to refer to the films made by first generation immigrant filmmakers. Berghahn and Claudia Sternberg classify the different terms in European migrant cinema as:

(...) subtexts of social categorisation (*Migrantenkino*), racial or—ethno-national emphases (*90ngage du métissage*, black and Asian British film,—French *beur* cinema), linguistic or spatial concepts (accented cinema, *banlieue*—films, cinema of double occupancy) and transnational approaches (Third—Cinema, black film, cinema of the South Asian diaspora) (Berghahn and Sternberg 2010, 12).

All these subcategories exist under the main branch of migrant cinema. The different migrant cinemas in different countries have their specific names as described above, however, they tend to follow similar aesthetic and thematic approaches.

For the sake of argument in this dissertation, migrant film or cinema is used interchangeably and encompasses all subcategories of migrant cinema, including the examples

made by diasporic or exilic filmmakers as well as first and second-generation filmmakers. This study employs migrant cinema as the umbrella term for films about or by migrants – be it first, second or third generation migrants or exilic filmmakers. Georg Seeßlen (2000) employs the term *cinéma du métissage* synonymously with ‘the cinema of inbetween’ or with *Kino der doppelten Kulturen*, meaning “cinema of two cultures”. Seeßlen makes a distinction between *Kino der Fremdheit*, translated as “cinema of alterity,” to refer to the films made by first generation migrants, and he prefers the term *Kino der doppelten Kulturen* for the films made by younger migrant generations (Seeßlen 2000).

European cinema has produced several examples with representations of minorities including the diasporic communities. The previous chapter defined diaspora as the community of immigrants who live away from their home country. Similarly, diasporic cinema refers to the films made by diasporic individuals. It is at times interchangeably used with accented cinema, migrant cinema, and minority cinema. The term can be limiting because of the nature of diasporas – having a strong association and bond with the home country. The other issue inherited in this category is also related to the common characteristics of diasporic communities. Diaspora is often thought to be a large community of people living abroad (Shain and Barth 2003); and they usually gather, organize events together, follow the traditions of their home country, and live in the same neighbourhoods as in the examples of Turkish communities Kreuzberg in Berlin, Germany or Chinese communities in Chinatown in New York, USA.

Yet, not all diasporic communities live in the same neighbourhoods or districts and diasporic communities may include subcategories such as individuals in exile, and economic migrants. In their work called “Diasporas and International Relations Theory” (2003) published in *International Organization*, Yossi Shain and Aaron Barth define diaspora “as a people with a common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland-whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under foreign control.” (Safran 1991; Shain and Barth 2003, 452) Depending on the filmmakers’ origin and relationship to these categories, there are different theories or classifications in migrant cinema.

Naficy suggests a distinction between ‘exilic,’ ‘diasporic’ and ‘postcolonial ethnic identity’ filmmakers (Naficy 2001, 11). He talks about these subcategories under the general concept of accented cinema, which also emphasises the significance of migrant cinema in understanding the phenomenon of migration.

Naficy sets out a framework for understanding migrant film and filmmakers by making a distinction between the backgrounds of migrant filmmakers in terms of their relationship with their host and home societies. He proposes that “the distinction between the sub-categories of exilic, diasporic and postcolonial ethnic films is ‘based chiefly on the varied relationship of the films and their makers to existing or imagined homeplaces’” (Naficy 2001, 21).

Although there is a distinction between the sub-categories of accented cinema, Naficy argues (2001, 22) that their common ground is the ‘double consciousness’ shared by their filmmakers. This double consciousness stems from the filmmakers being exposed to two or more cultures and creates aesthetic, stylistic, and production-related differences compared to mainstream and especially classical and new Hollywood cinema (Naficy 2001, 24).

When dealing with the subject of migration, most migrant filmmakers do not repeat the customs of patriarchy. According to Naficy (2001, 10), films produced by exilic and diasporic filmmakers demonstrate similarities in terms of production, whereby he comes up with the term accented cinema. The majority of cinemas, particularly universal and national cinemas are not accented, and the diasporic filmmakers make accented films:

Naficy (2010, 6) argues that these films “are in dialogue with the home and host societies and their respective national cinemas, as well as with audiences, many of whom are similarly transnational, whose desires, aspirations, and fears they express.” He also distinguishes between exilic, diasporic, and post-colonial ethnic filmmakers:

exilic cinema is dominated by its focus on there and then in the homeland, diasporic cinema by its vertical relationship to the homeland and by its lateral relationship to the diaspora communities and experiences, and post-colonial ethnic and identity cinema by the exigencies of life here and now in the country in which the filmmakers reside (Naficy 2001, 15).

In the same manner, Elsaesser’s “double occupancy” is useful for reading the case studies here. This term reflects the changing societies in a world of globalism. Elsaesser (2005, 118) argues that the ‘hyphenated members of [a] nation’ are global citizens – or globally mobile citizens who set trends with their hyphenated identities that have drifted away from the nation-state. According to Elsaesser, *beur* and Turkish-German cinema are examples of cinema of double occupancy. He concludes that filmmakers of double occupancy can identify with two different cultures:

Also sub-nation in their allegiance are sections of the second-generation diaspora who, while sharing the language and possessing the skills to navigate their society, none the less do not feel they have a stake in maintaining the social fabric, sensing themselves to be excluded or knowing themselves to be discriminated against, while also having become estranged from the nation of their parents. In the best of cases, where they have

found the spaces that allow them to negotiate difference, they are what might be called hyphenated members of the nation, or hyphenated nationals, meaning that their identity can come from a double occupancy which here functions as a divided allegiance: the nation-state into which they were born, and to the homeland from which (one or both of) their parents came (Elsaesser 2005, 118).

Elsaesser (2019, 14) argues that cinema had proved the ideal mode of expression for second-generation immigrants and several hyphenated filmmakers have emerged, such as Albanian-Italian and Turkish-German. In other words, certain films transcend nations. Transnational cinema is a term introduced to refer to films that are not products of a single nation. According to Elizabeth Ezra and Terry Rowden “the transnational comprises both globalization – in cinematic terms, Hollywood’s domination of world film markets – and the counterhegemonic responses of filmmakers from former colonial and Third World countries” (Ezra and Rowden 2006, 1).

The transnational differs from the mainstream cinema in terms of its production. Ezra and Rowden (2006, 2) continue that “the performance of Americanness is increasingly becoming a “universal” characteristic in world cinema.”

It is worth noting that there is no unanimous opinion about the term transnational cinema. Will Higbee first proposes the term “cinema of transvergence” instead of transnational, arguing that “both postcolonial and diasporic cinemas function not only across borders, nations and culture but also within them” (Higbee 2007). Later, in “Concepts of Transnational Cinema: Towards a Critical Transnationalism in Film Studies,” Higbee and Song Hwee Lim analyse the meanings of transnational cinema (Higbee and Lim 2010). Another suggestion is the term minority cinema, which is a commonly used term, yet there is no account of the first use of it in academia. Cristina Johnston’s *French Minority Cinema* (2010) and Gerd Gemünden’s *Hollywood in Altona: Minority Cinema and the Transnational Imagination in German Pop Culture* (2004) are two prominent works of migrant cinema that mention French and German minority cinemas. This term is employed interchangeably with migrant cinema.

Similar to the previously discussed terms, intercultural cinema is a type of film that does not belong to a single culture and or any national cinemas. Laura Marks (2000, 6-7) proposed this term in *The Skin of the Film* (2000) and she argues against the other terms dominating academia including hybrid or Third cinema. Intercultural film:

is not the property of any single culture but mediates in at least two directions. It accounts for the encounter between different cultural organizations of knowledge, which is one of the sources of intercultural cinema’s synthesis of new forms of expression and new kinds of knowledge.

Marks (2000, 188) argues that being in-between cultures allows the filmmakers to embrace proximal senses such as smell, taste, and touch to cultivate memory. She says that due to being away from their homeland, emotions and processes such as longing are translated by proximal senses unlike the dominant visual experiences of the West, pointing out the different aesthetic practices in migrant cinema like Naficy (2001). Marks' general conception is helpful in defining *intertopian* mode in this dissertation because it refers to the in-betweenness of the experience.

Postcolonial film (Weaver-Hightower and Hulme 2014) is another commonly used and significant term in migrant cinema – postcolonial film is a product of postcolonial theory (Stam 2003) and deals with the impact of colonialism. Postcolonial hybrid (Shohat and Stam 2014, 42; Weaver-Hightower 2014), diasporic hybrid (Shohat and Stam 2014, 28) and transnational (Prime 2014) are other terms labelled by scholars, yet their meanings are similar to the descriptions above.

Subgroups

Besides the general terms, there are specific subgroups in migrant cinema that refer to particular communities and their films. A notable one is *banlieue* cinema. According to Carrie Tarr:

Banlieue filmmaking refers to the work of directors aiming to represent life in the deprived housing estates on the outskirts of big French cities. Cinéma de banlieue emerged within French film criticism in the mid-1990s as a way of categorising a series of independently released films set in the rundown multi-ethnic working-class estates (the cités) on the periphery of France's major cities (the banlieues), the most significant of which was Mathieu Kassovitz's *La Haine* (1995) (Tarr 2005, 2).

The French banlieue films deal with issues of the migrant filmmakers and their subjects. Similarly, *beur* cinema (*Cinéma beur*) is a French minority cinema. *Beur* is thought to be the result of Parisian verlan/backslang for the word Arab (*arabe* in French) (Naficy 2001, 96) and it was used to describe the films of filmmakers of Maghrebi descent who grew up in France. Its first use was in the special July 1985 issue of *Cinématographe* (*Cinématographe* 112 1985). Tarr defines *beur* cinema in her work *Reframing Difference: Beur and Banlieue Filmmaking in France*:

The term cinéma beur was first coined in a special issue of *Cinématographe* in July 1985 to describe a set of independently released films by and about the beurs, that is, second-generation generation filmmakers of Maghrebi descent (Tarr 2005, 2).

Some filmmakers who produce examples of *beur* cinema are Mehdi Charef, Rachid Bouchareb, Karim Dridi, Malik Chibane, Yamina Benguigui, and Mahmoud Zemmouri.

Another important sub-area of migrant film study is the British Asian cinema. Filmmakers of South Asian origin have been making films in the UK for several decades. However, the term is not used only to refer to the films made by filmmakers of South Asian descent who have grown up in Britain but also by those who have told their stories in their films:

British Asian Cinema can also refer to films not necessarily produced by a British-Asian or wholly centered on a British-Asian subject. For example, one of the most critically-discussed British Asian films is *My Beautiful Launderette* (Dir: Stephen Frears, 1985). Although written by a British-Pakistani (Hanif Kureishi), it also has an English director and is centered on the character of Johnny played by the English-born, Daniel Day Lewis (Malik 2006).

While British Asian Cinema and Black British Cinema are different sub cinemas of the British film or migrant film, not all film scholars make a difference between the generations of filmmakers in defining these sub-categories (Korte and Sternberg 2004). Although not as big as the British Asian or *beur* cinemas, Turkish–German cinema refers to the films made by German born or raised filmmakers of a Turkish descent (Hake and Mennel 2012). Like the *beur* and *banlieu* cinema and British Asian and Black British cinemas, Turkish-German cinema is a prominent sub-domain of European cinema⁶².

Certain terms in migrant cinema that are used less often or are not immediately related to the arguments in this study can, nevertheless, be related to social issues covered in the migrant cinema or terms in German language. One of these terms is cinema of duty, which was first coined by Cameron Bailey. Sarita Malik also employed it later. Bailey argued that this cinema is ‘firmly responsible in intention – [it] positions its subjects in direct relation to social crisis and attempts to articulate ‘problems’ and ‘solutions to problems’ within a framework of centre and margin, white and non-white communities’ (Bailey cited in Malik 1996, 203-204) such as *Pressure* (1975, dir. Horace Ov ) and *Step Forward Youth* (1977, dir. Menelik Shabazz) The examples of this cinema offer ‘an alternative view of the diasporic experience’ (Malik 1996, 204).

Cinema of the affected, Rob Burns’ contribution to migrant cinema (Burns 2006, 128) means the cinema that deals with the oppression of Turkish women in Germany. Tevfik Ba er’s *40 Quadratmeter Deutschland* and *Abschied vom falschen Paradies* are representative

⁶² To date, the literature does not argue for the inclusion of it in national Turkish cinema.

examples. Other terms exist in other languages, yet they are mostly direct translations of minority cinema or migrant cinema in the respective language.

One of the major theories this study employs is Naficy's theorization of accented cinema, whose style he defines as "an accented style that encompasses characteristics common to the works of differently situated filmmakers involved in varied decentered social formations and cinematic practices across the globe—all of whom are presumed to share the fact of displacement and deterritorialization" (Naficy 2001, 21). However, this study considers the case studies under the overarching term migrant cinema rather than making a major distinction between the exilic and diasporic films. It investigates the impact of the filmmakers' backgrounds on the styles, aesthetics, and themes of the case studies.

I do not make a difference between first, second, and third generation filmmakers, or expat filmmakers; rather I consider migrant film as a general term for films that deal with themes related to migration or reflect the migrant filmmakers' own experiences. While the duration of stay in a host society can have a large impact on someone's experience, all immigrants from all cultures can also share similar experiences related to adaptation and change. Migrant film has started to shed light on the conditions of the modern migrant with its themes, production modes and aesthetics. It usually represents a shift from mainstream cinema and evokes the issues of identity. It also differs from films with very few representations of migrants. A migrant film usually features first degree representations of migrants or deals centrally with migrant's lives.

2.6 EUROPEAN MIGRANT CINEMA

The invention and growth of cinema (1888 to 1914) in Europe and across the globe as an art and business coincided with major events in world history that led to mass migration (1914, the start of the WWI). Historically, there is a vast number of national cinemas in Europe (Elsaesser 2005, 9, 13). Global and local migration flows have led to the foundation of hybrid cinemas, in production, aesthetics, themes, and other characteristics. The increase of global migration and advancements in technology concurred. The advent of digital cinema, leaving the mainstream use of 35 mm film, has also allowed for this change. The means of production and distribution, the aesthetics of migrant cinema, and the meanings were influenced by the meeting of different localities and the transformation of multiple cultures (Mennel 2008, 11-12).

European migrant cinema is often seen as in opposition or as a critical response to Hollywood, national or mainstream cinemas. These films differ from mainstream cinema with their narration (such as the use of different narrative techniques), themes (for instance; migration, socio-cultural issues, and minorities), style of authorship (often realism and auteur's signature aesthetic style) and production (unlike the national cinemas, migrant films are usually co or multi-productions especially thanks to the bilateral agreements between certain EU countries). Elsaesser (2005, 23) argues that national cinemas, new wave, and auteur cinema were dominant in European cinema from the 1940s until the 1980s. Changes were first observed in the changing climate of the 1960s and, with the end of the Cold War, European cinema experienced more distinct shifts (Elsaesser 2005, 9, 13-14; Iordanova 2010, 50; Claydon 2008, 26). Funding bodies such as EURIMAGES (1989) and MEDIA (1992) were established, which encouraged new filmmakers to make films outside of the dominant national cinemas.

Some of the first films that portrayed minorities were often documentary footage of the minorities (Such as *Empire Series* dating 1925, and *African Native Tribe*, made in 1931 that had footage of Africa). The 1970s marked the first feature films featuring immigrants or made by immigrants (Ogidi 2013). It is noteworthy to mention some examples of Black British, British Asian, and French migrant films. Horace Ové's *Pressure* (1975) is considered to be the first Black British feature film (Clark 2018). *Black Joy* (1977), *Babylon* (1980), *Majdhar* (1985), *Ama* (1991), *Dog Eat Dog* (2002) are later examples. The 1990s saw the rise in British-Asian films such as Ayub Khan Din's *East is East* (1999) and Udayan Prasad's *Brothers in Trouble* (1996) (Alexander 2000; Desai 2008).

According to Higbee, French immigrant cinema also had different stages: militant immigrant cinema was prominent in the 1970s, and “*beur* and *banlieue* cinema in the 1980s and 1990s”, have tended to focus on protagonists, politics, and narratives of Maghrebi immigrants in France. Meanwhile, “since 2000, French film professionals of North African descent have nonetheless begun adopting a broader range of modes of production and genres and assuming a greater variety of roles on both sides of the camera.” (Higbee 2014, 10).

European migrant cinema is located in world cinema, especially since the 2010s, because of the instability of national cinemas in Europe (Higson 2013). Berghahn and Sternberg comment on this change with the following: “Over the past thirty years European cinema has been transformed as a result of the increased visibility of filmmakers with a migratory background and a growing interest in the facets and dynamics of postmodern multiculturalism. Representations of migrant and diasporic experiences and cross-cultural encounters have assumed a prominent position in cinematic narratives” (Berghahn and Sternberg 2010, 2).

While the Turkish-German film is more prominent than many ethnic cinemas in Europe, European cinema has many examples with portrayals of Turkish immigrants. Because of the position of Turkish-German cinema in European cinema, it is useful to trace a brief history of it.

German cinema saw a change in general between 1962 and 1989, with a cinema supported by the Federal Republic of Germany – at the same time independent films emerged (Davidson 1999, 1). Entering the new decade of the 1990s, the official support for New German Cinema ended. New German Cinema is important because “It is a cinema which foregrounds the struggle over an embattled national identity in the way in which the filmmakers negotiated the past, not as a heritage to be preserved, but as a site for investigation and excavation, and for reconstructing history as histories and her-stories” (Sieglohr in Hill 1998, 470).

As discussed earlier in this chapter, Germany has hosted the greatest number of Turkish immigrants in Europe since 1961. Although the Turkish or Turkey-rooted (Kurdish or immigrants from Cyprus) communities in Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, France, the UK, and Belgium are significant in number (the estimates vary from source to source such as the *Statistische Jahrbuch* and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkish Republic, due to the difference in calculation criteria; some include all Turkey-rooted communities whereas others only include the labour workers who migrated to Europe from Turkey from 1960s on), it is not possible to talk about a Turkish-Swedish or Dutch-Turkish cinema. For Sabine Hake and Barbara Menzel, who have both made immense contributions to European and migrant Film

Studies, there are three distinct historical phases and cultural paradigms in Turkish German cinema (Hake and Mennel 2012, 5):

1. (The end of the 1960s included) 1970s through the 1980s: This is the social realist phase, also known as the cinema of duty (Göktürk 1999), with a mission of telling the stories of Turkish migrants. It is the part of the “New German Cinema” of ethnic stereotypes, social worker perspective, and mute victims of the *Gastarbeiter* (the guestworker). Turkish-German films made after the 1980s, such as Başer’s *40 qm Deutschland* and Hark Bohm’s *Yasemin* (1988) adopt a “social worker approach”, according to Deniz Göktürk (Göktürk 2000, 68). This is also the era that started to challenge the European dream of a united Europe.
2. 1990s through the 2000s: This phase is self-reflexive (self-reflexive appropriation) and features films about second generation immigrants often made by themselves. Hake and Mennel describe this period as “unseen images produced by Turkish Germans of the second generation brought a fundamental change in the modes of representation and enunciation” and:

Gone were the exploited guestworkers and their suffering wives and oppressed daughters. The majority of these emerging filmmakers was born in Germany or Turkey and grew up with one or two parents with migration background. (Hake and Mennel 2012, 6-7)

They argue that these films offer “self-confident responses to lived experiences often in conflict with the parent generation” and are open to the stories of the other minorities such as other immigrant or refugee groups or LGBTQI+ groups. “In the process, they leave behind old dogmas of privileging politics over aesthetics, realism over fantasy, suffering over pleasure, and an aesthetic of estrangement over emotional engagement” (Hake and Mennel 2012, 6-7).

3. 2000s: This phase employs critical engagement with questions of migration and immigration beyond Germany, interweaving the cultural elements of both German and Turkish cultures. Eric Rentschler calls this phase the ‘cinema of consensus’ (Rentschler 2000). The representations do not cling to patriarchal stereotypes. As Hake and Mennel debate:

Ayşe Polat’s youth drama *Luks Glück* (Luk’s Luck, 2010), Feo Aladag’s melodrama *Die Fremde* (When We Leave, 2010), Fatih Akin’s comedy *Soul Kitchen* (2009), and Thomas Arslan’s Berlin neo-noir *Im Schatten* (In the Shadows, 2010) share a subtle sensitivity vis-à-vis assumed ethnic or national identities and an embrace of genre conventions, at times playful. They overcome the traditional split between genre cinema

with its commitment to popular entertainment and the kind of auteur cinema or cinema engage often aligned with ethnic or political minorities (Hake and Mennel 2012, 7).

The Turkish influence in the New German Cinema is inevitable, partially because Germany was home to 2.4 million Turks (Berghahn 2009), the majority of whom had moved there between 1961 and 1973 as *Gastarbeiters*.

The 1970s saw a drop in the number of moviegoers watching German films in Germany (Brockmann 2010, 297). Unhappy with this, a new movement was initiated in the German cinema by a group of filmmakers which grew out of the Oberhausen Manifesto issued in 1962 (Reimer and Reimer 2008, 20). They accepted a *Nouvelle Vague* approach to cinema (Schick 2010) and made films concentrating on identity and sociocultural problems. Even though the death of Werner Fassbinder on June 10th, 1982, is considered the end of New German Cinema (Elsaesser 1996, 19; Reimer and Reimer 2008, xxx), several filmmakers such as Yüksel Yavuz, Ayşe Polat, and Thomas Arslan produced works that have much in common with New German Cinema in terms of their creation, production, and distribution processes. Indeed, Berghahn calls the period after the 2000, ‘the revival of German cinema’ (Berghahn 2011, 239). The works of the Turkish-German filmmakers chronicle the same attitudes towards German and Turkish societies and, thus, constitute an important element of this work. With the self-representations of Turkish immigrants in films mostly made by filmmakers of Turkish origin, the ‘cinema-of-duty’ was left behind. The New German Cinema ended the binarism, reflected conflict with dominant values, and expanded identities (Hake and Mennel 2012, 6). This new era troubled the national filmmaking models and reflected the modified German Nationality Act of 2000 (Göktürk, Gramling and Kaes 2007), which allowed for foreign nationals in Germany to acquire German citizenship more easily than before, as discussed in the previous chapter.

As previously discussed, migrant cinemas across the globe and particularly in Europe witnessed a change in trends, productions, and aesthetics. While the different minority cinemas in Europe share common features such as themes and aesthetics, critics such as Katja Nicodemus who writes in *Die Zeit* argue that “unlike the banlieue films from France, the focus of the young Turkish German filmmakers is (...) much broader and defined by a focus on pluralism and hybridity which, in a globalized world of migration, has become entirely normal.” (Nicodemus cited in Machtans 2012, 155). Similarly, as a point of departure from the oppression-themed cinema, Burns (2006) argues that Turkish-German cinema is becoming more transnational rather than focusing on a single identity.

Finally, European cinema has been evolving to be “more fluid” (Elsaesser 2005, 72) and the filmmakers have “evolved into a new group of *auteurs*” (Berghahn and Sternberg 2010, 40). With the historical and socio-cultural context set out in the previous chapter in mind, and as the scholars such as Elsaesser (2005, 2019) point out, it can be said that European cinema is changing from the early national cinemas to a more inclusive cinema with the addition of migrant filmmakers’ films and migrant films in Europe. Accordingly, the next chapter will be devoted to the readings of the case studies.