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Human trafficking in Nigeria 1960-2020: pattern, people, purpose and places

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Citation

Aweto, P., Carchedi, F., & Akinyoade, A. (2023). *Human trafficking in Nigeria 1960-2020: pattern, people, purpose and places*. Leiden: African Studies Centre Leiden (ASCL). Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3636703>

Version: Publisher's Version

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Human Trafficking in Nigeria 1960-2020 Pattern, People, Purpose and Places

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Human Trafficking in Nigeria 1960-2020

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Pattern, People, Purpose and Places

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**African Studies Centre Leiden
African Studies Collection, vol. 82**

[Colophon]

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Cover design: Akimoto | Gijsbert Raadgever

Interior design: Sjoukje Rienks

Cover photo: Catanzaro in Italy, one of the landing points of irregular migrants to Europe. Photograph Akinyinka Akinyoade

Printed by Ipskamp Printing, Enschede

ISSN: 1876-018x

ISBN: 978-90-5448-198-0

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Foreword

Nigerian migration to Europe has attracted considerable attention both from governments and the media. Not a day goes by without mention of immigration, human smuggling and trafficking in both printed and online media. This is partly because some elements of this migration flow are related to human trafficking and other criminal activities, but also because Nigerians have become prominent among sub-Saharan African asylum seekers in Europe. Several hundreds of thousands of Nigerians are spread throughout Europe, half of whom live in the United Kingdom. Italy is host to the second-largest group of Nigerians and is the most important destination for trafficking in persons from Nigeria.

Immigration, human smuggling and trafficking are overlapping concepts. Human smuggling refers to the facilitation of entry into a third country in violation of immigration regulations, in exchange for payment. Trafficking, on the contrary, by definition denotes that people are forced, tricked or threatened into situations in which they are exploited either sexually, financially or through forced labour. Both human smuggling and trafficking may be forms of organised crime, but not necessarily.

Poverty, crime, corruption and violence have been part of a vicious circle adversely affecting the development of Nigerian society, where violence is in part related to ethnic and religious differences and conflict. These conditions have contributed to a considerable emigration pressure. Corruption plays an important role in facilitating emigration in violation of Nigerian and European immigration policy and laws. For instance, rings of organised crime are specialised in forging travel documents and selling them to Nigerian citizens who themselves may not be aware of the existing legal procedures for the issuance of passports and visas.

The subjects of immigration, human smuggling and trafficking have been covered by several authors. However, it is pertinent to point out that the available information on Nigerian trafficking, is of doubtful quality. Media coverage often has a sensational character, and much of the investigations are done by groups or persons, who, though well-meaning and committed, often lack the professional competence required to adequately assess and analyse the source material. Therefore, an analysis of the socio-demographic determinants of migration and human trafficking within and across Nigeria is necessary in order to advance the understanding of the process and dynamics of recruitments, and to propose durable solutions. This book, titled *Human*

Trafficking in Nigeria 1960-2020: Pattern, People, Purpose and Places is greatly advanced by the valuable contributions of authors that are well versed in the subject matter.

The forms of Nigerian migration perceived as the most problematic in Europe are also the best documented, which made it possible to cover them in great depth in this book. This applies especially to emigration related to trafficking and prostitution. The overall purpose of this book is to offer an innovative and interdisciplinary insight into Nigerian migration and human trafficking through researched-based analysis rather than opinion-based assumption.

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1 Introduction

Akinyinka Akinyoade and Franca Attoh

Abstract

The subject of this enquiry is human trafficking in Nigeria, its manifestations, and how the institutional response as well as context of interventions has been in Nigeria in the period 1960-2020. This period is purposively chosen to coincide with the marking of the African year 2020 by Leiden University; specifically, it relates to the African Studies Centre of Leiden University's theme Africa 2020, specifically Reflecting on 60 Years of Independence. The perspective that we have chosen for dealing with/analysing this specific phenomenon takes due account of three main aspects – the definitional and the manifestations (forced labour, sexual exploitation, factors of internal displacements), the spatial or geographical dimensions (the domestic and international profile of Nigeria as source, transit, and destination context), and the institutional scopes of interventions (international conventions and protocols, related government departments and agencies, NGOs, international organisations) collaborating with Nigeria in relation to human trafficking.

Conventions and Definitions

The definition of human trafficking has its background in the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCTOC). The UNCTOC adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000 is the main international instrument in the fight against transnational organized crime. As of 26 July 2018, 190 countries and territories had become Parties to the Convention. The convention is further supplemented by three protocols, which target specific areas and manifestations of organized crime: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children; the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms and Ammunitions, their Parts and Components.¹

¹ <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html>.

The United Nations Protocol to Prevent Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol, 2000)².

The Palermo Protocol defines trafficking in human beings as:

- (a) ...the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power, or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery, or practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the removal of organs;³
- (b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in sub paragraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in sub-paragraph (a) have been used;
- (c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered «trafficking in persons» even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article.
- (d) 'Child' shall mean any person less than eighteen years of age.

This protocol is the primary international legal instrument that addresses human trafficking as a crime. The international community's choices when it developed its framework for combating human trafficking produced a narrow construct focused primarily on criminal law measures, thereby marginalizing other vital perspectives such as witness protection for victims of trafficking. Failure to adequately incorporate these other perspectives constitute hindrance to efforts aimed at combatting human trafficking. Despite the criticisms, the UN Trafficking Protocol is a legally binding instrument which serves as a useful template for developing regional and sub-regional protocols to deal with trafficking in persons.

² United Nations Protocol to Prevent Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 2000, Article 3.

³ Art. 3 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UN Convention against Trans-national Organized Crime (2000).

The other protocol supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, namely the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, defines 'smuggling of migrants' as:

the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefits, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.⁴

This definition opens the human trafficking discourse to concepts such as fraud, deception, false promise, or trickery, with implications for vulnerability of the victims. In a bid to understand the various points of convergence and divergence between the various Nigerian laws and the Palermo Protocol, Gbadamosi (2012) highlights how Nigeria's constitutional and legal frameworks and judicial system address the problems of trafficking for forced labour, and new forms of slavery or slavery.

The conceptualization of trafficking implies the possibility to estimate and understand the range and level of exploitation experienced by the victims. There is the debate about what conditions are necessary to be fulfilled in order for someone to be regarded as a victim of human trafficking (Taiwo & Akinyoade, 2015). There are four main elements of human trafficking: action (recruiting, luring, transporting, and receiving), means (deception, coercion, and the threat of the use of force), process (double-edged use of traditional and new forms of communication and transportation), and purpose (exploitation – servitude, forced labour, modern-day slavery, and trade in organs, pornography, and sex) (Wako, 2020). Combating each of the four main elements of human trafficking (actions, means, process, and purpose) is beset by challenges that require the use of both policy and legal instruments as well as financial and human resources.

Trafficking can occur within a state or across national frontiers. As a result of the multi-dimensional nature of these phenomena, efforts at curtailing and controlling the problems have also been multi-dimensional. Human trafficking for forced labour in Nigeria cannot be adequately addressed without reference to similar developments in the neighbouring countries of West and Central Africa, and the most frequently used destination countries in Europe and the Middle East. States, state parties, international organisations, and NGOs have played prominent roles in addressing the problems. Underlying factors for trafficking are many and complex;

4 Art. 3 of UN Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (2000).

these factors include problems of poverty, inequality, and discrimination. Perpetrators are driven by the pursuit of financial profit at the expense of the vulnerable, the unprotected, and the unorganized set of individuals being trafficked. Equally of significance is the role of the state especially as it relates to the failure of the social contract. This introduction captures it vividly as it provides the historical antecedents to human trafficking in Nigeria.

Post-independence Era (1960-1966)

The period during the attainment of independence in 1960 was characterized by the euphoria of helping the new nation attain economic independence. The three regions namely the north, the west and the east were in deep competition for economic development. The north focused on the production of groundnut and cotton while the east tried to develop its palm produce. In the west attention was on the growth of the cocoa industry which had produced enormous wealth to pay for free education and the development of infrastructure. The quest for development engendered some form of competition between the regional governments which benefited the people, since scholarships for education were freely provided and those with some form of education could get requisite employment. Thus, the phenomenon of human trafficking was not yet manifest, since young people with aspirations could actualise them through the instrumentality of the regional governments.

However, the political crisis which began in 1964 and culminated in the two coup d'états in January 1966 and July 1966 truncated the first republic and subsequently resulted in the civil war of 1967 to 1970.

The Second Republic, Military Regimes, and Human Trafficking (1970-90)

At the end of the civil war in 1970, the government at the centre had embarked on reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reintegration of the survivors of the 30 months civil war. Fortunately, the aftermath of the Arab/Israeli war had caused a hike in the price of crude oil resulting in a windfall for Nigeria. The period 1970-1979 could be considered the golden era for Nigeria, as the country was awash with Petro-dollars and was able to fulfil its obligations to the people. However, in 1979, the military handed power back to civilians whereupon commenced the second republic. The elections conducted in 1979 brought in the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) with Alhaji Shehu Shagari as President. Just as in the first republic, the second republic was fraught with numerous contradictions, as political parties were at loggerheads, and corruption had

become a national malaise, thus negating the basis of the social contract. The attendant disillusionment would lead to many professionals leaving the country. Once more, the military returned in December 1983 in order to stop the slide towards chaos. Many Nigerians welcomed the military in the hope that these contradictions would be resolved. However, a palace coup in 1985 overthrew the regime of General Muhammadu Buhari and brought in the regime of President Ibrahim Babangida. At its inception, the regime tried to reach a rapprochement with Nigerians by calling for a debate on whether to take the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan to restructure the economy which was experiencing macroeconomic imbalance (Attoh, 2009). Nigerians rejected the loan, but the regime went ahead in implementing other conditions identified by the IMF as the reasons for Nigeria's economic fragility. The national currency (Naira) depreciated by 1000 per cent (see Babawale, 2006), thus dislocating the formal economy. This served as the genesis of the mass exodus of Nigerians to different countries in Europe, as many people lost their jobs in the private sector and government parastatals. As with the first migratory wave, the second migratory wave began with doctors and other healthcare personnel, but gradually trafficking syndicates entered the picture with mouth-watering offers of jobs as nannies and hairdressers to young nubile Nigerian girls. Thus commenced the trafficking of young Nigerian girls into Europe (Attoh & Makanju, 2017). As the trade progressed, there was a need to bring in enforcers to ensure compliance with the rules of the syndicates, hence it became expedient to traffic young men luring them with job offers.

Internal and Spatial Displacements

Internal displacement is the sudden displacement of people from their homesteads and means of livelihood resulting in a humanitarian crisis.

The killing of Mallam Mohammed Yusuf (the founder of Boko Haram) by government forces in Maiduguri (capital of Borno state) served to radicalise the Boko Haram sect and was the genesis of the war of attrition between the government and members of the sect. The group which had its origin in Maiduguri was anchored in the repudiation of western education and culture (see Attoh, 2018). The escalation of the Boko Haram insurgency has created a huge population of internally displaced persons who are kept in internally displaced persons' camps in states such as Borno, Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe (north-east) of Nigeria. The dislocation of people from their homesteads and means of livelihood has provided trafficking syndicates with a pool of displaced persons eager to leave the IDPs for better environments.

Many of the IDPs become victims of traffickers and have been trafficked to the Middle East. Similarly, the Boko Haram sect participates in the trafficking of persons, as they abduct young girls for marriage to sect members, and those who refuse to be married off are sold to traffickers as slaves (Attoh, 2016). Up until the moment of writing, many of those abducted in Chibok in 2014 (276 girls) and those abducted in Dapchi (110 girls) in 2018 cannot be accounted for. Even though the federal government had negotiated with Boko Haram for the return of the girls, many are still missing.

The Boko Haram conflict has spilled into neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Niger, and the Lake Chad basin, destroying infrastructure and agriculture, resulting in more complex forms of dislocation. Livestock farming, fishery, and sundry economic activities have been destroyed. The consequence has been a fluid movement of people across the states, which creates more vulnerability for a female child. During such movements more people are abducted and trafficked across international boundaries to engage in forced labour. Unfortunately, the dearth of statistics has not helped in this regard, as states do not have figures for such movements across these borders.

Human Trafficking for Forced Labour

Despite the allure of seeking routes to greener economic pastures, human trafficking is rife with severe consequences and deprivations, which include physical violence, sexual abuse, restriction of victim's movement, false imprisonment, withholding of wages, seizure of personal identity documents to discourage the victim from fleeing, and entanglement of the victim in fraudulent debt from which they or their families cannot escape. These outcomes are observed also in the examination of forced labour. Forced labour is regarded as a consequence of human trafficking, human smuggling, slavery, forced prostitution (Akinyoade & Oyeniyi, 2012). It can also be the motive or an important component of any or all of these. Article 2 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Forced Labour Convention (No. 29) conceptualizes forced labour as one of the direct consequences of human trafficking, human smuggling, slavery, and forced prostitution. In the literature, most trafficked persons are documented as living and working in bondage-like situations, comparable to slavery and practices similar to the slave trade. Its elements include 'debt bondage', 'serfdom', 'forced marriage',

and ‘child labour’, which are clearly evident in today’s human trafficking, forced prostitution, forced labour, and irregular migration transactions.⁵

But, forced labour need not necessarily occur where there is irregular migration, prostitution, human trafficking, and smuggling of migrants. For instance, like all specialised agencies of the UN, ILO discusses forced labour as integral to irregular migration, prostitution, human trafficking, and the smuggling of migrants. For example, it is held that industrialized countries harbour an estimated 3% of all forced labour victims, three-quarters of whom have been trafficked (ILO, 2009). The ILO estimated as far back as 2005 that the annual profits generated from trafficked forced labourers amounted to USD31.6 billion. Half of these profits are earned in industrialized countries (ILO, 2005).

In the ILO (2007) 96th Session, human trafficking for forced labour was described as the ‘underside of globalization that has taken on new forms and dimensions, linked to recent developments in technology, transportation and transitional organized crime’. Countries with advanced economies remain the destination of choice for trafficked persons, ironically the victims are sometimes held by authorities as illegal aliens. Within countries, it is relatively more difficult to directly define who are victims of trafficking (or what conditions might constitute forced labour) due to the absence of internal border controls, incomplete vital registration systems (birth certificates and other forms of citizen’s registration such as proof of address, national identity cards, and other pertinent civil documentation), and the metamorphosis of local forms of child fostering to servitude. ‘The stubborn survival – and often the transmutation – of traditional forms of servitude’ is also seen to signal the emergence of newer forms of forced labour linked to globalization, migration and human trafficking’ (ILO, 2007). Forced labour may occur where there are no incidences of irregular migration, prostitution, human trafficking, and human smuggling. This has not only skewed our understanding of the phenomenon but also militated against the development of nuanced policy frameworks and programmes that are geared directly at forced labour and that are capable of curtailing its spread.

Understanding human trafficking comes with some confusion as to the varying degrees of intensity. There is the puzzle of the linkage of human trafficking to forced labour. In a similar fashion, there is often a thin line separating human trafficking and legal migration. Thus, within the human

5 Art. 1 of the Slavery Convention (1926), p. 32.

trafficking continuum, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between coercion, extortion, or consent. There is no neat distinction between human trafficking, illegal migration, and forced labour (modern-day slavery, bondage labour).

The legalistic definition of human trafficking does not recognize the material foundations that compel people to embark on irregular migration or to be trafficked (either voluntarily or with consent). The declining socioeconomic and environmental conditions within which human trafficking occurs are often divorced from ambitious policy plans and considerations. While counter trafficking initiatives aspire to granting victims freedom and emancipation, such programmes must be linked to freeing the human capital of victims from neediness, poverty, and unemployment, and the other socioeconomic and material causes of trafficking. For both academic and relative research, a more inclusive analysis of human trafficking should explore the concepts of vulnerability and exploitation. Victims' peculiarities are such that they are compelled by more than one factor, while some factors are better understood when viewed in reference to other factors.

Slavery and bondage

In contemporary studies of human trafficking, the term modern-day slavery is a business of trading in people, locally and globally. But trafficked persons may fall into conditions of labour bondage or debt that reduce their status to that of deep dependency and lack of agency, which effectively transmutes into slavery.

Slavery and forced labour

Trafficked persons can end up in a condition of forced labour or become identifiable with modern-day slavery as a form of human exploitation that thrives on vulnerability and exploitation (Akinyoade & Carchedi, 2012).

Therefore, in the following subsections, we will attempt to frame human trafficking-related concepts as they are presented in the literature.

Human Trafficking and Human Smuggling

UNODC presents trafficking as a situation in which, on the one hand, the subjects are often fully aware and initially not coerced or defrauded into migrating.⁶ However, at various stages of the process, the subjects often end up in other countries or in another (undesired, exploitative) job. On the other, smuggling of migrants is defined as the procurement to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of illegal entry of a person into a state party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident. On the basis that the smuggled person is paying for illegal (transportation and or facilitation) services, this oddly enough puts the smuggled person theoretically in control of the process. In Wako's (2020) work in Ethiopia, it was found that the 'urge and desperation to migrate often push youth, the arms of traffickers and recruiters, in the hope that they can escape poverty and become part of the actors in the human trafficking process.'

Trust and dependence

Various forms of human trafficking are in existence, each worthy of contextual assessment of the conceptualization, which also necessitates new thinking about the conditions and outcomes of trafficking in Nigeria. Emerging evidence indicates human trafficking entails both physical and psychological dependence. Before the journey, physical dependence is manifest when a trust relation is built between the potential victim and local-level recruiter (as well as parents and formal recruiting agents where necessary); at different stages of the trafficking (between the victim and the facilitator and transporters); and at early stage at destination (accommodation, settling-in). Psychological dependence is incremental in nature; the trust relations that ensue between the trafficker (or recruiting agency) and the potential victim, which increases as each stage of the journey leads the victim to believe that reaching the green pasture is closer than ever; the dependency may also occur in a workplace situation, especially when handlers and/or employers demand more commitment to work (without commensurate wage and the reassurance of health and safety). This last context is a huge causal factor for the slavery-like exploitation situation that victims of trafficking experience for the fear of losing not only their livelihoods but also their lives. Unfortunately, this submission is sometimes misunderstood as a willing acceptance of a work situation that is simply slavery.

6 UNODC 2009.

Vulnerability and exploitation

Arising from the definition and collation of institutional as well as individual experiences of human trafficking are two main concepts: vulnerability and exploitation. Vulnerability is defined as “a situation in which the person concerned has no real or acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse⁷. According to Daniel-Wrabetz and Penedo (2015), the dimensions of vulnerability factor include: personal (youth or old age, gender, belief, family situation), situational (legal status in one given territory or social, cultural, or linguistic isolation), and circumstantial (unemployment or economic situation). The context of exploitation was made more explicit by the EU (2011),⁸ in its broader definition of human trafficking, taken as:

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or reception of persons, including the exchange or transfer of control over those persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person.⁹

Taken together, this definition incorporates features of human smuggling, modern-day slavery, and forced labour, which involve the control of persons in situations of vulnerability for exploitation or applying coercion and deception to lure vulnerable persons into situations where they can be controlled, irrespective of their willingness. Thus, the EU (2011) definition improves on the UN (2000) protocol, as it tries to make clearer the fine line between human trafficking and other forms of human exploitation such as modern-day slavery and forced labour.

For the conceptualization of human trafficking, questions that often arise include: in what ways can human trafficking be distinguished from other forms of human exploitation (for example, human smuggling, modern-day slavery/forced labour); what challenges does the distinction between different forms of human exploitation pose to practitioners? In this book, various contributors attempt to examine how policy and institutional frameworks

7 Council Directive 2011/36/EU, Article 2.2:6. Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA [2011] OJ L101/1.

8 *ibid.*

9 *ibid.*

deal with the overlaps, and what it means to the overall effort to combat trafficking.

Prevention and protection

Prevention mechanisms mainly focus on addressing root causes of vulnerability, often referred to as push/pull factors, usually identified as sociocultural, economic, and political insecurities. The long-run success of prevention programmes depends on the extent to which the conditions of vulnerability in trafficking-endemic areas is reduced in terms of ideas and ideals of improved lives in the home country. Thus, effectiveness of prevention strategies to remedy conditions of poverty, underdevelopment, underemployment, and lack of equal opportunity (UN 2000) are put in place for the improvement of the lives of potential victims.

The protection of victims is aimed at the provision of government assistance – services and rehabilitation facilities – to victims of human trafficking. State authorities have the duty of care to provide human-rights protection and support to victims of trafficking. Such provisions must prevent re-victimization by agents of state and society, and prevent re-trafficking by limiting their exposure to traffickers.

Prosecution

The responsibility of investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of offenses related to human trafficking is the responsibility of state parties. This is mandated by international law; countries and sub-administrative units within countries have found ways of domesticating the laws and protocols. This can be found in the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (OHCHR) on the involvement of children in armed conflict. This was adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by General Assembly resolution A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000, with entry into force on 12 February 2002.

The Trafficking Process

The human trafficking process is an interplay between trafficked persons, recruiters, agents, and benefactors and the socioeconomic and cultural context within which trafficking takes place.

Chibba (2013) identified four elements in the trafficking process. Firstly, one notes the 'actions' of the recruitment, luring, transportation, and receipt or final processing of persons trafficked. Secondly, the 'means' is highlighted, which is the use of deception, coercion, and threat and/or force. Thirdly, there is the 'process', which is the use of both the traditional and the new forms of communication, partly driven by technology and internet-facilitated human trafficking procedures (for example, supporting cyber-sex exploitation. Lastly, there is the 'purpose', which is exploitation, in the form of pornography, prostitution, forced labour, servitude, slavery, and sale of organs.

The Trafficker

The term trafficker has several meanings, and distinguishing the role different types of traffickers play in the trafficking process further diffuses clarity of the concept (IOM, 2011). For example, the increasing level of collaboration and dependencies between legal agents, illegal job agencies, and the textbook trafficker makes clarification difficult. From an administrative viewpoint, about five types of traffickers, almost appearing as a chain of interconnected agents, can be distinguished. In the trafficking continuum, agents exist and function from the place of origin of the victims of trafficking, through the country (national), extending up to the international or place of destination. The transnational network begins at the village; village-level agents are located at the lowest-most echelon of the traffickers' chain. These individual agents identify and recruit potential local victims at the community level. Paradoxically, many community level agents do not possess the requisite knowledge about the official process of migration, but they exploit their closeness to victims and their families to gain trust. Despite some knowledge of potentially harmful outcomes weighing more heavily than pictures painted of material gains to potentially new recruits, agents have no inhibition or hesitation in doing the job because it is their own means of livelihood (Wako, 2020).

At the second level in the chain there are still in-country agents located in bigger urban agglomerations. They have contacts with agents based in foreign countries and, often times after the completion of all the requirements, they facilitate the travel process. These agents specialize in the provision of services required during the preparation for travel period and are active in the domestic phase of the international journey for transporting, protecting, and smuggling the victims (all within national borders).

Another group are operators of employment agencies, which can be found both in the places of origin and destination. They operate without valid license from national authorities.

At the fourth level are the nationally licensed employment agents. In Ethiopia, it is legally enshrined in the Ethiopian Overseas Employment Proclamation 923/2016 that an overseas agency must have a business registration certificate and obtain a license from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.¹⁰ However, where such agencies operate outside national laws and cooperate with unlicensed employment agents for the recruitment of peoples opens up an avenue for exploitation and to further maximise the returns gained by employment agents.

The fifth-level agents have international clout and are located at the victims' overseas destination. These agents use the vulnerability of the victims when they are outside their countries as an opportunity to exploit them. Fifth-level agents can also be from the same country of origin as the victim and are representing job placement agencies of the place of origin of the victims; they sometimes sponsor the trip, provide initial rental accommodation, and facilitate the employment of new arrivals.

Human Trafficking in Nigeria 1990-2020: What Do We Know?

It is documented that human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Nigeria, and traffickers exploit victims from Nigeria abroad. In Nigeria, victims of trafficking are more often than not recruited from the rural areas of the country's southern zones. Gender distribution of victims shows that women and girls are bound in domestic servitude and sex trafficking, while "the boys are victims of forced and bonded labour in street vending, domestic service, mining, stone quarrying, agriculture, textile manufacturing, and begging" (USDS, 2019, p. 357). In the latter category, approximately 10 million boys studying under the Quranic school system, commonly referred to as Almajirai (a more comprehensive explanation is given in latter parts of this chapters), are often times subjected to forced begging. Media reports also investigate and expose how some traffickers operate 'baby factories', particularly in south-eastern parts of Nigeria.

10 See Wako (2020) op cit. and https://www.lawethiopia.com/images/federal_proclamation/proclamations_by_number/923.pdf.

Internationally, Nigerian women and children are trafficked to Mali, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Cabo Verde, and South Africa; they are also recruited and transported to Libya, Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates, and parts of Central Asia where they are exploited for forced labour and sex trafficking. In Europe, female victims of trafficking from Nigeria are found in Italy, Spain, Austria, the Netherlands, and Russia. Particularly in Italy, it is estimated that 80% of all female Nigerian migrants are or will become sex-trafficking victims. Nigeria is also a transit point for women trafficked from other West African countries. Within Nigeria, West African children have been found to be subjected to forced labour as domestic servants and in Nigeria's granite and gold mines.

Historically, the majority of Nigerian trafficking victims in Europe are from Edo State, many of which transit via Libya. The USDS (2019) cited an internal report of a foreign government that, in 2015, Nigerian nationals were the most common trafficking victims in the EU, with the exception of internal trafficking within the EU. More recently, the relaxed visa requirements for the 2018 World Cup staged in Russia created an opportunity for traffickers to fraudulently recruit Nigerian women for jobs in Russia. After the World Cup event, in the first quarter of 2019, 1863 Nigerians were recorded to have remained in Russia without travel documents; a sizeable proportion of these eventually became victims of sex trafficking.

Exact numbers of the victims of trafficking are hard to obtain owing to several factors. For instance, real data of trafficked women could only be obtained if the women themselves or their family reported that they were returnees; sometimes, the reporting is done only if the returnees or the families feel that they would receive some kind of support from the government (See Wako, 2020). Wako's research on trafficking in the Arsi administrative zones of Oromiya National Regional State in Ethiopia shows that even those who reported to the local authorities that they were victims of human trafficking are less willing to respond to requests from a researcher mainly because they fear the consequences of exposing the (criminal) practices. For research, this has implications for delineating the size and boundaries of the pool of potential research subjects, and/or the 'sampling frame'.

In March 2018, the King of Benin City in Nigeria's Edo State, in a bid to bring trafficking to a halt, exercised his powerful religious authority to invoke a curse on sex traffickers and revoked all juju spells that some local priests administer on victims to bind them to their traffickers. There is a trust in the potency of the invocation made by the King, and a lull was recorded in

trafficking-related activities. However, in order to circumvent this, some traffickers are alleged to have relocated to the neighbouring Delta State to continue their juju performance on would-be victims. Also in Italy, during a conference held at Catanzaro, I came across two anti-trafficking activists who claimed that traffickers of Nigerian origin transferred the 'administration' of girls in their network to gangs of European origin in an effort to dilute the effect of the King's curse on traffickers. This transfer deepened the victims' fears and strengthened the hold of traffickers on the victims. Many sex trafficking victims continue to work indirectly for their traffickers in exchange for leaving sex trafficking. Though, Nigerian sex traffickers are known to operate in highly organized criminal webs throughout Europe, it also appears that there exists a decentralized and sometimes independent functioning system of traffickers: once a Nigerian girl or woman becomes free of her debt to traffickers, she also graduates to the level of 'madam' who in turn starts her own ring or network to seduce Nigerians to Europe where they would be exploited.

The instability caused by the Boko Haram and ISIS-WA has resulted in the abduction of women and girls in the northern region of Nigeria, some of whom they subject to domestic servitude and forced labour. In this fragile zone, media reports indicate that some fraudulent officials of IDP (formal and informal) camps exploit girls in sex trafficking. According to the USDS (2019), "[M]edia and an international organization reported Cameroonian soldiers coerced Nigerian female refugees in a Cameroon refugee camp to have sex in exchange for food or protection from deportation."

Contemporary research shows a greater range of industrial occupations where evidence of trafficking for labour exploitation is detected. These include agriculture, food processing, construction, textile and garment enterprises, retail, manufacturing, logging, mining, and restaurants. Risks increase when companies have lengthy supply chains, particularly in industries with complex chains of subcontracting, which may involve recruitment agents whose activities may be poorly monitored. Moreover, there are sectors which may not directly impose forced labour and trafficking but can still be tainted by it unless adequate safeguards are adopted. Such 'invisible' sectors such as domestic work, hospitality and entertainment industries, airlines and other transport companies, visa and travel agencies, or internet operators, all of which have to constantly guard against human trafficking.

The Chapters

Therefore, reflecting on Nigeria's sixty years of independence, contributors to this publication examine the national, institutional, and victims' connections to human trafficking. These studies are by no means exhaustive, but they do present a wide range of scope through which the phenomenon has received scholarly inquiry in and for the country. Sequentially, this study is presented in the next five chapters; the authors of these chapters and their specialisation are described hereafter. The international conventions and protocols as well as conceptual definitions including the typology of traffickers are presented in the first chapter by Akinyinka Akinyoade and Adewale Adeduntan. This sets the tone for examining the trajectory of human trafficking in Nigeria from independence (1960) up to the present date (2020). This is followed by the chapter of Toyese Agbaje, Eugenia Appiah, and Daniel Fagorusi on Nigeria's human trafficking profile and the institutional scopes of interventions (governmental departments and agencies, NGOs, international organisations collaborating with Nigeria) in relation to human trafficking. This second chapter highlights how, in addition to conventions and regulations on the elimination of trafficking, a number of policies and programmes have also been developed by state parties, international organizations, and NGOs in an effort to rid the world of the menace of trafficking. The third chapter by Godwin Morka, Adewale Adeduntan, and Akinyinka Akinyoade zeroes in on NAPTIP, the national institutional context for combatting human trafficking in Nigeria. Here, the responsibilities and functions of the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) are critically reviewed, its successes and challenges are revealed, while the way forward for practice and partnerships is discussed.

The spatial or geographical dimensions – that is, the domestic and international profile of Nigeria as source, transit, and destination area, and the manifestations (forced labour, sexual exploitation, factors of internal displacements) in Nigeria and experienced by Nigerians elsewhere constitute the next batch of chapter contributions. The international dimensions of the human trafficking experience of Nigerians are presented in three main contributions, the first of which is by Kristin Kastner. Seemingly innocent potential migrants who may eventually become victims of trafficking, who currently just 'want to travel' are enjoined to read about *[T]he complex bonds, imaginations and realities in Nigerian female migration to Europe*. This chapter is followed by the contribution of Francesco Carchedi's work on how lives of trafficked and sexually exploited Nigerian women and minors have been turned upside down in Italy. Other issues, which have not been

factored in the consciousness of potential migrants, is the exposé by Carrie Pemberton Ford who investigated Domestic Violence and Abuse within the African Churches.

The domestic dimensions of human trafficking form the next batch of chapters. This begins with Mukther Sadiq's examination of the trends, patterns, and drivers of *Internal Forced Migration in Northern Nigeria*. Data for that study were obtained from the United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM Nigeria) tagged Digital Tracking Matrix (DTM). Following this is attempt by Aisha Umar and Safiya Yero to distinguish between fact, fiction, and creative imagination in conditions of *Insecurity, Female Vulnerability in War, and Conflict Situations in Nigeria*. This work is a reflective histo-literary interrogation of the Nigerian woman during the Nigeria civil war and fifty years thereafter. It showcases how the female remains vulnerable to other crises such as social, religious, communal, cultural, identity, and marital crises, among others. The study also discusses current insecurity trends such as the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria and women as victims. Furthermore, human trafficking is a product of combined social, economic, and environmental factors, including poverty, unemployment, gender inequality, land degradation, and social alienation, as illustrated in the Kwara State case study authored by Sheu-Usman Akanbi, Mercy Salami, and Olanrewaju Adetunji.

To further readers' appreciation of the connections of human trafficking to other world events are tangential studies by Pauline Aweto in her *Human Trafficking, Modern Day Slavery, and Global Public Health: Impact of the Covid 19 Pandemic and the New Normal*. Using the vantage point of the dramatic arts, Ogungbemi Akinola contributed a chapter on the use of *Theatre as Intervention against Human Trafficking in Nigeria*. This entails theatre performances aimed at the oppressed. It depicts how situations of impaired livelihood conditions or unmet aspirations, along with conflict, constitute the complex background that sparks the search for a better life, to join what the better-off victims of trafficking refer to as the 'good life'. This chapter is followed by Abisuga-Oyekunle and Oluwayemisi Adebola's examination of immigration and xenophobic violence in South Africa: *Xenophobic Violence: The Case of Black Africa Migrants in South Africa*. Olufemi Abodunrin employed the more poetic form of literature to present the human migration experience with the chapter on *The Location of Cultures: Multiculturalism and Migration*. It is an examination of patterns of figuration/signification of migrant poetry from South Africa vis-à-vis the whole notion of globalisation/fragmentation and migration/multiculturalism. In the same vein is Andrew

Onwudinjo and Anthony Okeregbe's chapter entitled *Migrating Africans and the Brickwall of European Borders: A Cosmopolitanist Evaluation of Hardin's Lifeboat Ethics*. This is a critical evaluation of Hardin's lifeboat ethics from a cosmopolitanist standpoint. Using his lifeboat metaphor, Hardin argues that more affluent countries should curb migrants' influx from poorer countries so that their (the affluent) carrying capacities will not be exceeded thereby subjecting the latter to the poverty state of migrants.

The themes examined in the chapters of this book mostly adopt descriptive methodologies in their examination of root causes, pervasiveness, and consequences, as well as institutional response to human trafficking in Nigeria. Those that focused on the domestic scene in Nigeria adopted exploratory methodology in order to seek new insights and assess the human trafficking phenomenon in a new light.

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2

Human trafficking context and profile in Nigeria: Updated literature 2012-2020

Toyese Agbaje, Eugenia Appiah, and Daniel Fagorusi

Abstract

This chapter is desk-research describing the human trafficking profile of Nigeria as well as the country's bilateral and multilateral cooperation with other countries for combatting trafficking in persons. Additional attention is given to the duty of care of international organisations, local non-governmental organisations, and the main national agency, National Agency for Prohibition of Traffic in Persons & Other Related Matters (NAPTIP) that are active in Nigeria and cooperate to stem the tide of trafficking and give assistance to victims of trafficking.

Introduction

The Nigerian government was said to be in denial of the existence of human trafficking until the late 1990s. However, in the 1990s, news about the deportation of many Nigerian girls from Italy began to emerge in the media. Specifically, in 1997, the attention of the Nigerian Government was drawn to the menace of trafficking in women, when the Nigerian Ambassador to Italy, Judith Attah, made mention of it to the Nigerian delegation at the 63rd Interpol General Assembly (Okojie et al., 2004). Since then, a number of studies have been conducted to show the prevalence of the phenomena, and to outline their processes, dynamics, victims, and perpetrators. The dimensions of human trafficking in Nigeria can be understood, first in terms of the country's significance as source, transit, and destination for trafficked persons in-country and within West African sub-region (notably Benin Republic, Mali, and Togo). Secondly, Nigerians are trafficked to countries outside the West Africa sub-region to North and Central Africa and outside the continent to Europe, the United States of America, and the Middle East. For both dimensions, the outcomes for victims of trafficking are similar:

commercial sexual exploitation and forced labour.¹¹ The different categories of victims of trafficking in Nigeria include young women and children. For the children, trafficking is sometimes confused with child fostering, a traditional practice where the responsibility for a child's upbringing is entrusted to a relative. It used to exist in the confines of the extended family, but the practice has metamorphosed into situations where intermediaries source for children, often pre-teen or early teens from rural areas, and supply them in exchange for money to non-relatives in urban areas to become domestic workers and market traders (Akinyoade, 2012). There is a dearth of data on the extent of domestic trafficking, and this has skewed our understanding of its incidence. Domestic trafficking is at the very worst, denied and, at the very best, accepted with resigned acknowledgment when accounts are laced with various forms of justification for why it exists. This further worsens the situations of victims.

Trafficking Profile Nigeria

It is documented that human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Nigeria, and traffickers exploit victims from Nigeria abroad. In Nigeria, victims of trafficking are more often than not recruited from rural areas of the country's southern zones. Edo State is recorded as one of the trafficking-endemic zones. Also peculiar to the southern zones, media reports investigate and expose how some traffickers operate 'baby factories.' These are 'often disguised as orphanages, maternity homes, or religious centres – where women are sometimes held against their will, raped, and forced to carry and deliver a child... with the intent to exploit them in forced labour and sex trafficking (USDS, 2017).' Baby factories are defined as buildings, hospitals, or orphanages, places for young girls and women to give birth to children for sale in the black market, often to childless couples, or into trafficking rings (Makinde et al., 2017). There are four main actors depending on the context: the landlord, the girls, the men or boys who impregnate them, and the buyers of newly born babies. As Makinde (2015) and Omeire and colleagues (2015) described, the phenomenon reared its head in Nigerian society around 2006, and the system within which it occurs promotes child trafficking and is a conducive condition for exploiting young girls with undesirable conception. In terms of public awareness, baby factories are negatively perceived, yet it persists in shadowy operations. Attached to it is the stigma of undesirable conception by teenagers, wherein their poor economic status exposes

11 Department of State, USA. Trafficking Persons Report June 2019. Available at www.state.gov/j/tip.

them to exploitation for little financial gain (Makinde et al., 2017). Societal expectations for married couples to have children adds to the pressure (Omeire et al., 2015).

Gender distribution of victims shows that women and girls are bound in domestic servitude and sex trafficking, while ‘the boys are victims of forced and bonded labour in street vending, domestic service, mining, stone quarrying, agriculture, textile manufacturing, and begging’ (USDS, 2019; 357). In the latter category are approximately 10 million boys studying under the Quranic school system, commonly referred to as *almajirai*, who are often times subjected to forced begging.

Unaccompanied migrant children are a common feature of migration in West Africa. These children are often at risk of abuse, exploitation, or trafficking (IOM, 2020). It is in this context that many of the children of northern Nigeria have come to be understood. Some studies have also shown that girls in northern areas of Nigeria are married off at a tender age, in pre-teen years. Their problems are compounded by emotional and physical immaturity, and they are expected to cater for themselves. Their male counterparts, the *almajirai*, are also left to the whims and caprices of unscrupulous teachers who instead of giving adequate education, turn them into street beggars.

The *almajirai* (singular *almajiri*) is a local Hausa word derived from the Arabic word *al-Muhajirun*, or emigrant. *Almajirai* were originally students of Koranic schools but appear to have been turned into street urchins by their mentors (Agbonifo, 2012). The *almajiri* (singular) is a boy sent to a Koranic teacher to receive education, but they are often forced by their teachers to beg for alms and deliver the money collected to the teacher. The total population of these children is not known, but at the beginning of the second quarter of 2020, Kaduna state indicated that it had repatriated 30,000 from Kano State. The *almajirai*-based Koranic schools have for several decades been part of the Islamic education system in Nigeria’s mainly Muslim north. They are mostly children from poor homes who go to a boarding-house style setting to memorise the Koran under a teacher (*mallam*), living there up to 10 years. According to Sheikh Abdullahi Garangamawa, the chief imam of the Jafar Adam Mosque in Kano, northern Nigeria’s main city, ‘the *almajiri* system, as it is today, is nothing but slavery.’¹²

12 BBC NEWS. Coronavirus in Nigeria: The child beggars at the heart of the outbreak. Retrieved 16 May 2020, from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52617551>.

The *almajirai*-based schools admit children from age 5 years to acquire Koranic education, but they are instructed by their teachers to deliver a token sum of 100 naira (EUR 0.23) every Wednesday (the weekend for pupils is Thursdays and Fridays). The *mallams* claim that the monies are not pocketed but that it is for running the schools. An inherent problem is the fact that most *almajirai* have no means of paying, and therefore resort to begging on the streets to get the money (Olateru-Olagbegi, 2006). Sometimes they carry out menial jobs for families, in exchange for food or clothes. Some of the *mallams* are also poor, with no training, delivering unregulated services. They tend to teach, and use the *almajirai* for subsistence farming.

Also, in this northern region, the instability caused by the Boko Haram and ISIS-WA has caused the abduction of women and girls in the northern region of Nigeria, some of whom are subjected to domestic servitude and forced labour. The United States Department of Labor (USDOL, 2016) in 2017 notes that children ‘as young as age 8 are recruited, and sometimes forced, to participate in armed conflict with various groups, including ethnic militia organizations, criminal gangs, extremist groups, and partisan political organizations, such as party youth wings.’ In this fragile zone, media reports indicate that some fraudulent officials of IDP (formal and informal) camps exploit girls in sex trafficking. In 2019, the United States Department of State (USDS) further expanded that ‘[M]edia and an international organization reported Cameroonian soldiers coerced Nigerian female refugees in a Cameroon refugee camp to have sex in exchange for food or protection from deportation.’

The involvement of Boko Haram in human trafficking has been highlighted by other organisations such as the Freedom House (2017): ‘Nigerian organised crime groups are heavily involved in human trafficking. Boko Haram has subjected children to forced labour and sex slavery. Both Boko Haram and a civilian vigilante group that opposes the militants have forcibly recruited child soldiers, according to USDOS. Meanwhile, as of the end of 2016, several states in Nigeria had not implemented the 2003 Child Rights Act, which protects children from discrimination based on sex, ethnicity, and other factors’ (Freedom House, January 2017, Section G).

The USDOL indicated ‘that children were recruited to participate in combat operations and act as spies, porters, and cooks. There was an increase in the use of young girls to carry out suicide bombings. The terrorist group also subjected girls to forced labour and sexual servitude. The Nigerian military also conducted on-the-ground coordination with elements of the Borno state

government-funded Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), a non-state self-defence militia involved in fighting Boko Haram... and... The Government of Nigeria has officially prohibited the recruitment and use of child soldiers' (USDOL, 30 September 2017, p. 2).

Nigeria is also a transit point for women trafficked from other West African countries. Within Nigeria, West African children have been found to be subjected to forced labour as domestic servants and in Nigeria's granite and gold mines (Akinyoade, 2012). Internationally, Nigerian women and children are trafficked to Mali, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Cabo Verde, and South Africa; they are also recruited and transported to Libya, Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates, and parts of Central Asia where they are exploited for forced labour and sex trafficking. In Europe, female victims of trafficking from Nigeria are found in Italy, Spain, Austria, the Netherlands, and Russia. Particularly in Italy, it is estimated that 80% of all female Nigerian migrants are or will become sex-trafficking victims (Esselmont, 2016).

Focusing on Europe, the majority of victims of trafficking from Nigeria have come from Edo State, many of which transit via Libya. The USDS (2019) cited an internal report of a foreign government that, in 2015, Nigerian nationals were the most common victims of trafficking in the EU, with the exception of internal trafficking within the EU. More recently, the relaxed visa requirements for the 2018 World Cup staged in Russia created an opportunity for traffickers to fraudulently recruit Nigerian women for jobs in Russia. After the World Cup event, in the first quarter of 2019, 1863 Nigerians were recorded to have remained in Russia without travel documents; a sizeable proportion of these eventually became victims of sex trafficking.

Data from an IOM (2017) publication highlighted the plight of Nigerian minors and adolescents that arrived in Italy in 2016. In the first instance, '... most migrants arriving in Italy by sea were from Nigeria, with a particular increase of women and unaccompanied children (respectively, 11,009 and 3,040 in 2016, compared to about 5,000 women and 900 unaccompanied children in 2015). [...] Considering the exponential increase in women and children of Nigerian nationality who characterized the flows of 2016, it is clear that the number of potential victims of this transnational crime has more than doubled compared to 2015.' Save the Children Italia Onlus, a non-governmental organisation (NGO) promoting children's rights further corroborated the staggering 2016 statistics in its report. 'The number of girls and young women at high risk of exploitation arriving in Italy is constantly increasing: in the first six months of 2016, 3,529 Nigerian women, all of them

very young, and 814 unaccompanied Nigerian children, with a significant presence of young girls, arrived on our coast. This clearly shows a growing trend of Nigerian girl arrivals in our country, which reached 300 per cent between 2014 and 2015. Most of them are adolescents aged 15-17 years, with an increasing number of 13-year-old girls.'

IOM indicated that '...many young Nigerians, although declaring themselves adults, are actually children or adolescents who comply with traffickers' instructions by falsely declaring themselves older so to avoid the child protection pathway, which might become an obstacle for traffickers. As a result, girls are transferred to adult facilities, where it will be easier to contact their traffickers who will pick them up without any difficulties' (IOM, 2017, p. 10). Some of the minors find themselves in unexpected situations as they found they were lured into recruitment with a meaning given to prostitution that: 'prostitution means to become engaged to white men, who, in their imagination, are generally very rich and will be able to help them repay any debt incurred for the journey to Europe. In some cases, they think that prostitution entails working at nightclubs as dancers' (IOM, 2017, p. 24).

Women control women in Nigerian (trafficking) networks (Baarda, 2015). The 'madam' is a female pimp, a former prostitute who actively recruits new victims. 'She pays for the recruitment and transportation of the girl. The possibility of earning a good income as a "madam" in the future may be one of the incentives for victims to comply in an exploitative situation.' The 'madam' owns the girl until her 'debt' is repaid. Deutsche Welle (DW),¹³ Germany's public international broadcaster, put it more succinctly in 2016 that a 'Nigerian host in Italy is referred to as "Madam", she is at the top of a smaller trafficking network. The madam we found lived in a suburb of Florence and one victim made serious accusations against her: "She has been beating us and forced us into prostitution," the victim said' (DW, 14 March 2016).

In Spain 2016, the British Broadcasting Corporation distinguished between two ranks of madams: the lower-ranking and the higher-ranking. 'Lower-ranking madams prowl the streets – many on la Rambla, the main tourist strip in the centre of Barcelona – constantly texting and calling their girls to check on their whereabouts. Girls are told to earn about 500 euros (GBP 370) a night to stay in the madam's good books. [...] Higher-ranking madams collect money from their subordinates to pass on to local SEC [Supreme

13 Deutsche Welle: Tracking Nigeria's human traffickers. Retrieved 14 March 2016, from <http://www.dw.com/overlay/media/en/tracking-nigerias-human-traffickers/19114918/39821250>.

Eiye Confraternity] leaders known as *ibakkas*. Always men, the *ibakkas* run the whole operation. They facilitate payment through the hawala system – a form of money transfer based on trust and one that is difficult to trace. *Ibakkas* make sure that if any of their girls step out of line, their families back home are threatened. Family members have been known to be abducted and “disappeared” when girls refuse to pay their madams’ (BBC News, 27 January 2016).¹⁴

Trafficked victims are forced into prostitution in order to pay the debt to the exploiter, but the amount increases yet further because girls are compelled to pay a rent both for their housing and for the street location where they are forced to work. The latter costs around 100 and 250 euros per month. Moreover, exploiters set up their own sanction mechanism, by ‘fining’ girls when they break their rules, thereby increasing the debt. Therefore, girls are forced into prostitution, at very low prices, and to even accept unprotected sexual activity in order to earn more, with the consequence that they often have to resort to the voluntary termination of a pregnancy, often illegally, and to risk sexually transmitted diseases. In order to endure this kind of life, many young girls start using narcotics and psychotropic substances, induced by their traffickers’ (Save the Children Italia Onlus, September 2016, p. 7). Thus, many sex trafficking victims continue to work indirectly for their traffickers in exchange for leaving sex trafficking.

Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation Between Nigeria and Other Countries on Combating Human Trafficking in Nigeria

International dimensions of trafficking in persons, which usually results in victims experiencing conditions of forced labour, became a catalyst for Nigeria to engage in international cooperation to fight the scourge of trafficking. Trafficking in persons is a crime that is often committed across international borders; it requires efficient cooperation, coordination, and collaboration to combating the crime. At the policy level, formal responses to the need for close cooperation between countries include the development of bilateral cooperation agreements (UNICEF, 2003).

¹⁴ BBC News: The world of Nigeria’s sex-trafficking ‘Air Lords’. Retrieved 27 January 2016, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35244148>.

The following are examples of such bilateral agreements:

- Memorandum of Understanding between International Labour Organization and Government of Nigeria (2000);
- Niger-Nigeria bilateral agreement;
- Agreement on Immigration Matters between the Governments of Nigeria and Ireland (2001);
- Agreement on migration matters between Nigeria and Spain (2001);
- Agreement on migration matters between Nigeria and South Africa (2002);
- Memorandum of Understanding Between Nigeria and Italy (2003);
- Memorandum of Understanding between Benin and Nigeria (2003);
- Memorandum of Understanding between Nigeria and the United Kingdom (2004);
- Memorandum of Understanding between IOM and NAPTIP (2004);
- ECOWAS and ECCAS Multilateral Cooperation Agreement to Combat Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children in West and Central Africa (2006);
- Cooperation agreement between the Governments of the Switzerland and Federal Republic of Nigeria (2008).

Both informal and formal law enforcement cooperation have been hampered at the international level by a number of problems, which according to Gbadamosi (2012) include:

- Diversity of legal systems;
- Diversity of law enforcement structures;
- Absence of channels of communication for the exchange, for example, of basic information and criminal intelligence;
- Diversity in approaches and priorities;
- Lack of trust.

International Organizations Providing Assistance to Victims in Nigeria

The following international organizations and intergovernmental agencies aid social integration of victims in Nigeria.

International Labour Organization (ILO)

The ILO is a specialized UN agency. In 1975, the ILO adopted the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions No. 143) Convention in recognition of the vulnerability of workers (especially migrant workers) to work-place

abuses and the prevalence of cheap labour. This was the first Convention adopted by the ILO with specific provisions on trafficking (Articles 2 and 3 to prevent and eliminate illicit or clandestine movement of migrants). It commits member states to prosecute labour-related trafficking and abuses irrespective of 'whatever the country from which they exercise their activities' and to 'systematically seek to determine whether there are illegally employed migrant workers' and the circumstances of these labour migrants 'are subjected during their journey, on arrival or during their period of residence and employment to conditions contravening relevant international multilateral or bilateral instruments or agreements.'¹⁵ Another related convention of the ILO is on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (Convention No. 182 of 1989), which enjoins member states to take immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour as a matter of urgency (UNICEF, 2002). This convention was ratified by Nigeria in 2002. These conventions have a specific application to human trafficking, human smuggling, prostitution, and forced labour, especially in situations involving women and children.

ILO's direct actions aimed at addressing human trafficking are being carried out through the projects in Nigeria, for example, the project on elimination of child trafficking in West Africa conducted in conjunction with NAPTIP and the Ministry of Women Affairs (Nigeria). In Nigeria, the ILO has also embarked on building on the ECOWAS initiative to eliminate human trafficking and forced labour in West Africa. It has also partnered with governments, social partners, and NGOs in Nigeria and Ghana to adopt and implement national plans of action against trafficking and forced labour. Action research on labour migration, trafficking, and forced labour has been encouraged in order to raise awareness in the regions of origin of trafficked victims so as to highlight the precautions to be taken and to rehabilitate returnees or rescued victims.

International Organisation for Migration (IOM)

The IOM, as an international organisation concerned with migration, conducts and supports research designed to guide and inform migration policy and practice. IOM has a human trafficking database, and its information is obtained directly from trafficked persons (IOM, 2008) and the organization contributes to the discourse on human trafficking and its associated issues in

¹⁵ International Labour Organization, *Combatting Forced Labour*, Q & A, Geneva: ILO (undated).

prominent publications such as the *World Migration Report*, the *International Dialogue on Migration Series* (IDM), *Migration Research Series* (MRS), *International Migration Law Series* (IML), and *International Migration*. In 2002, the IOM signed a Cooperation Agreement with the federal government of Nigeria for the joint implementation of programmes and projects related to migration of persons and counter measures on human trafficking and child slavery, migration, and health services. The organisation has also been involved in turning the migration sector into a means of national policy relevance in the following areas: mainstreaming migration into the Nigeria Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS) framework; mainstreaming the migration sector in the national implementation plan of Nigeria's Vision 20:2020; and managing the Counter Trafficking Initiative (CTI 2009-2011) jointly funded by the governments of the Netherlands, Italy, and Norway, and partnered with the United Nations Office on Drug and Crimes (UNODC) and United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) to curb forced prostitution, especially given the negative reporting about Nigerian female immigrants, majority of whom are believed to be victims of human trafficking in Europe, Asia, and the United States.¹⁶

The Counter Trafficking Program (2001-2005) and The Counter Trafficking Initiative (2008-2011)

The latter was jointly implemented by IOM and NAPTIP with funds donated by Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway to support the sustained development of integrated referral service delivery systems of social protection, socio-economic reintegration for victims of trafficking, and provide visible primary prevention services in endemic source areas in Edo and Lagos States. Also, in the programme, two research observatories were established in the University of Lagos and the University of Benin for the sustainable monitoring and evaluation of the referral network.

The World Bank

The World Bank underscores the fact that the costs of human trafficking in terms of human capital and development are probably impossible to quantify, but the Bank's conservative estimate in 2009 was that the cost of trafficking in terms of underpayment of wages and recruiting fees are over USD 20 billion (The World Bank, 2009). The World Bank has contributed

¹⁶ Jorgen Carling, *Migration, Human Smuggling and Trafficking from Nigeria to Europe*, IOM, Geneva.

to the fight against human trafficking and forced labour in areas such as monitoring, improvement of analyses, advocacy, and the integration of all anti-human trafficking protocols, conventions, as well as programmes of the United Nations programmes featured in the World Bank's programmes. Emphasis has been put on poverty assessments which are useful barometers for identifying, assessing, determining, and monitoring social groups that are vulnerable to human trafficking, since poverty is intricately tied to human trafficking (ILO, 2007). With this recognition, the World Bank has integrated anti-human trafficking components in some of its programmes and interventions (De Haas, 2006). However, challenges still remain as to how to close existing gaps and loopholes in legal frameworks, data collection, legislation, training, and capacity building among law enforcement authorities and service providers, and to implement better prevention and protection of vulnerable groups at risk of human trafficking.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The UNODC (2009) considers forced labour as an integral part of human trafficking. According to UNODC, whether trafficking is for sexual exploitation or for other forms of economic exploitation, national actors must be prompted to key into global efforts to prevent and combat forced and exploitative labour. Thus the Government of Nigeria collaborates with the Global Program Against Trafficking in Human Beings of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to strengthen anti-trafficking efforts.¹⁷ The UN Office is providing technical assistance in areas such as strengthening judicial capacity and integrity, law enforcement training, and the creation of regional anti-trafficking networks.¹⁸ In 2014, the UNODC and the EU contributed to the development of the Guidelines on National Referral Mechanism for Protection and Assistance to Trafficked Persons in Nigeria for NAPTIP.

Some other organisations that have contributed immensely to the discourse and advocacy on human trafficking, forced and exploitative labour, and prostitution programmes in Nigeria include the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United Nations International Children Education Fund (UNICEF).

¹⁷ <http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/tda/tda2003/Nigeria.pdf>.

¹⁸ Project funds from Canada, France, and Norway. See UN Office on Drugs and Crime, *Pilot Projects*.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) considers human trafficking in the same light as commercial sexual exploitation, forced labour, child soldiers, and persons who are compelled to work in unusual situations. Similar to the World Bank, USAID argues that poverty is a leading cause of trafficking, especially of children, for forced labour. 'Poor families, unable to support their children, may be induced to sell them or hire them out; girls and young women tend to be the first to be given away for (commercial sexual exploitation or labour exploitation) and, thus, are very likely to be trafficked for this purpose (USDS, 2005).' In setting minimum standards for curbing trafficking, the US established the United States Trafficking Victims Protection Act. Countries are ranked according to their adherence to this instrument. Thus, the US Department of State annually compiles a Trafficking in Persons report (TIP Report) that ranks each country according to a three-tier system (Tier 2, however, has a Special Watch List category apart from the regular Tier 2) (USDS, 2005).

USAID also set up the USAID/Africa Bureau Trafficking in Persons Funds (USAID TIP Fund), which in 2003 started programmes aimed at the prevention of trafficking, the protection of trafficked victims, the prosecution of traffickers, and raising public awareness of the dangers of trafficking, especially for children and young women. It provided psychosocial support, medical assistance, skills training, and improvement of job opportunities for trafficking victims. The TIP Fund, managed in Washington DC and disbursed through the various USAID missions in Africa, has benefitted countries like Benin, the DRC, Ethiopia, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, and Uganda (USAID, 2007).

United Nations Children Education Fund (UNICEF)

UNICEF projects on combating human trafficking in Nigeria include: supporting the publication and dissemination of the Anti-Trafficking Act to the public in 2003; raising awareness on the existence of NAPTIP; and conducting sensitization workshops for 11 endemic states in the South. In addition, UNICEF donated office equipment and materials for registered shelters established for victims of trafficking, supported data/information gathering and dissemination; conducted training programmes for NAPTIP Zonal Heads and Operational Heads, law enforcement training for newly recruited NAPTIP investigators, police, and immigration officers; training of social workers, police and immigration officers; sensitization workshop for judges, magistrates, and prosecutors; and rescue, repatriation, and reintegration of victims of child trafficking within and from outside Nigeria.

United States Department of Justice: in 2005, the United States Department of Justice supported the training of NAPTIP Investigators and Prosecutors, while officials of the Counselling and Rehabilitation Unit of the Agency also gained skills training for providing recovery services to trafficked children through programmes organised by UNICEF.

Other international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) at the forefront of campaigns against human trafficking, collaborating local NGOs in Nigeria include: The Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women (GAATW); Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW); Stop-Traffic: Terre des Hommes; Human Rights Watch (HRW); and TAMPEP.

Nigerian Government Agencies

The National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIP) Nigeria

As one of the first countries in sub-Saharan Africa to suffer negative international exposure on trafficking, forced prostitution, and forced labour, Nigeria is also one of the first nations in Africa to pass specific laws to address these problematic issues. Besides being a signatory to many international conventions, protocols, and legislation, which prohibit and punish the crime of forced labour, human trafficking, and other related human rights abuses, Nigerian government has charged some ministries and specialised agencies with monitoring the implementation of domestic laws.

In July 2003, the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act was passed. The Act established a national agency to enforce the Act and coordinate counter-trafficking work. In Section 11, the Act stipulates life prison terms for traffickers; and also provides prison terms for any persons who procure, either for themselves or others, any children under the age of 18, either for prostitution or any form of forced and exploitative labour. Thus, NAPTIP was established in 2003 as a government agency to combat trafficking in persons. It is the national focal point in all activities to prevent trafficking, prosecute offenders, sensitise the populace, as well as provide immediate succour in terms of making available shelter, legal support, vocational training, and all other services pertaining to successful reintegration of victims of trafficking. The agency has a comprehensive database for knowledge and information sharing on the number of victims and assistance provided, which has also received substantial support within the Counter Trafficking Initiative (CTI) Project mandate. Also, with the

passage of the Act, all states where human trafficking, forced labour, and prostitution are endemic immediately set up special anti-trafficking police units.

The Action Against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants in Nigeria (ATIPSOM)

This program is designed to reduce trafficking in persons (TIP) and smuggling of migrants (SOM) at the national and regional level with specific emphasis on women and children. ATIPSOM commenced in 2018 through an agreement between the European Union Delegation (EUD) and the Government of Nigeria. A Delegation Agreement was signed in June 2018 between the European Union and FIIAPP, which is the coordinating unit managing the bulk of the program (see <https://atipsom.com/about-us/>).

The Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS)

The 2015 Immigration Act updated and clarified the responsibilities of the NIS, which includes border management and patrol, issuance of travel documents, enforcement of relevant laws and regulations, and certain para-military duties within and outside Nigeria, and, as such, plays a leading role in the fight against TIPSOM (see <https://atipsom.com/partners/>).

Nigeria Police Force (NPF)

This is an agency under the Federal Ministry of Interior, and a key stakeholder in the fight against TIPSOM, collaborating with other law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in the detection and arrest of traffickers as well as the identification and referral of Victims of Trafficking (VOTs) to NAPTIP and NACTAL CSOs. The Anti-Human Trafficking Unit under the Criminal Investigation Department and the Force Gender Unit, set up in 2012 to address the high rate of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV), is particularly relevant for the purposes of this project. The NPF will benefit from capacity building activities, particularly in terms of strengthening investigation on trafficking/smuggling crimes, and intelligence sharing and collaboration with NAPTIP, NIS and other LEAs (See <https://atipsom.com/partners/>).

Other relevant MDAs that are working on this issue based on their mandate include:

- Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development
- Ministry of Information and Orientation
- Ministry of Justice
- Ministry of Youth and Sports.

Local NGOs Based in Nigeria

In Nigeria, some of the following prominent non-governmental organisations are engaged in the campaign against human trafficking:

Women Trafficking and Child Labour Eradication Foundation (WOTCLEF), Abuja

WOTCLEF contributed extensively to the enactment of the Trafficking in Persons Law Enforcement Act by the federal government, and its focus areas of intervention are: Trafficking in Persons (TIP) also referred to as Human Trafficking, Child Labour, and Abuse; Protection of the Rights of Women, Children, and Youth; and Reproductive Health/HIV/AIDS (See <https://wotclef.org.ng/index.aspx>).

Network of Civil Society Organization Against Child Trafficking, Abuse, and Labour (NACTAL)

This is a civil society network gathering some 70 CSOs working against child labour and trafficking spread all over the entire national territory by geographical areas. In May 2012, NACTAL signed a Memorandum of Understanding with NAPTIP to effectively stem child labour and trafficking in Nigeria. NACTAL members' have a strong commitment to THB and SOM prevention and victim protection, and actively collaborate with NIS and NAPTIP on these areas, but its impact is still limited due to irregular access to resources and limited institutional capacities (See <https://atipsom.com/partners/>).

Women's Consortium of Nigeria (WOCON), Lagos

WOCON holds a United Nations Special Consultative Status, is non-governmental, and it is a not-for-profit, non-partisan, and non-religious organization committed to the enforcement of women and children's rights and the attainment of equality, development, and peace. WOCON pioneered the launch of the campaign against trafficking of women on March 8 1997 in Lagos and has since engaged in sensitisation, awareness, and advocacy

campaigns on the international, regional and sub-regional and national levels. (<https://www.womenconsortiumofnigeria.org/?q=focus-area/human-trafficking>).

Women Advocates Research and Documentation Centre (WARDC), Lagos

WARDC is a non-profit established in 2000 to promote respect for human rights, gender equality, equity, rule of law, accountability, and social justice in Nigeria. WARDC was an implementing partner of the CTI (2009- 2011). It is operational in 20 out of 36 of Nigeria's states and it has provided over 3000 free legal services for women, children, and people with disabilities since inception in the year 2000 (See <https://wardcnigeria.org>).

Rehoboth Shelter, Lagos

Rehoboth Shelter works to protect and rehabilitate victims of trafficking. It was engaged as an implementing partner for the provision of temporary housing and assistance to victims of trafficking under the CTI (2009-2011) project.

Network for Justice and Democracy (NJD), Benin City

This is registered as a non-governmental, non-political, non-religious, and voluntary organization that provides legal aid, advocacy, counselling, and support to widows, victims of human trafficking, rape, HIV/AIDs, and other reproductive rights abuses (See <http://www.justiceanddemocracy.org>). NJD was involved in the Counter Trafficking Initiative for the provision of legal aid/resource referral hub assistance to victims of trafficking (2009-2011).

Girls' Power Initiative, Benin City

This is a registered non-governmental organisation, non-sectarian, not-for-profit, youth development organization founded in 1993 to intervene in the socialization of girls for the realisation of a society where women are visible and valued actors (See <https://www.gpinigeria.org>). GPI contributes to studies examining why girls are more vulnerable to trafficking than boys and to reduce the incidence of trafficking of girls. GPI has another office in Uyo, Akwa Ibom State.

Committee for the Support of the Dignity of Women (COSUDOW), Benin City

COSUDOW is a non-governmental organisation in Benin City, Edo-State, Nigeria. COSUDOW is a leading organization in preventing, protecting, rehabilitating and reintegrating, and reconciling and monitoring victims of trafficking (VOT), giving them hope of recovery and self-reliance with rediscovery (see <http://www.ncwr.org.ng/committee-for-the-support-of-the-dignity-of-woman.html>). It works in collaboration with other NGOs both within and outside Nigeria for the rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees from Italy, Spain, Germany, and other European countries, and domestically in Nigeria. COSUDOW was a local implementing partner during the Counter Trafficking Initiative, providing legal aid and resource referral hub assistance to victims of trafficking (2009-2011).

Idia Renaissance, Benin City

Established on 8 July 1999, Idia Renaissance is a personal initiative of Mrs. Eki Igbiniedion to combat human trafficking, prostitution, maternal mortality, drug abuse, cultism, youth restiveness, HIV/AIDS, and other social and health problems prevalent especially among children, youth, and women in the society. It is the first NGO to establish a “shelter” for returnees and other survivors of human trafficking in Nigeria in collaboration with the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Edo State Coalition Against Trafficking in Persons (ENCATIP)

This is comprised of six Edo State NGOs that have been working in the area of human trafficking/modern-day slavery in Edo State since 2003. The NGOs are:

- African Women Empowerment Guild (AWEG)
- Committee for Support of the Dignity of Women (COSUDOW)
- Girls Power Initiative (GPI)
- Idia Renaissance
- International Reproductive Rights Research Action Group (IRRRAG)
- Women Action Initiative (WAI).

They have been in the forefront on issues of modern-day slavery in the state. They partner actively with NAPTIP and International Organisation and have received foreign aid to fight modern-day slavery.

Women's Aid Collective (WACOL), Enugu

This organisation was established in 1997 with the vision of Nigeria as a democratic society free from violence and abuse, where the human rights of all, in particular women and young people, are recognized in law and practice (see <https://wacolnigeria.org>). It has provided over 2000 free legal-aid and support services to women and young people whose rights are threatened and/or have been denied, and who are abused physically, mentally, and/or sexually.

Campaigns Against Trafficking and Forced Labour in Nigeria

Nigeria and international partners have been campaigning for the elimination of trafficking for forced labour since the return to democracy in 1999. Despite being a long-standing member of the ILO, the country only became a member of ILO-IPEC in 2000 and began to design clear-cut national programmes to eliminate forced labour, prostitution, human trafficking, and irregular migration (ILO-IPEC, 2001). Nigeria's Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Youth Development (2000) developed a National Plan of Action on child trafficking, forced labour, and exploitation. The country also adopted the Economic Community of West African States' Plan of Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings in December 2001.¹⁹

In order to bring knowledge on forced labour, human trafficking, and prostitution to the grassroots, the government supports the different NGOs and their programmes in setting up school-based child rights clubs. Also, through the human trafficking unit of the Nigerian Immigration Service, the government also sponsors information campaigns on trafficking, currently through NAPTIP (UNODC, 2004). Several programmes aimed at curbing trafficking in forced labour are being carried out by the government of Nigeria and its partners; yet, human trafficking has still not abated.

¹⁹ See also, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Pilot Projects, http://www.odccp.org/odccp/trafficking_projects.htmlhttp://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/trafficking/Minimum_Plano_CEDEAO.pdf.

Concluding Remarks

Despite the gains made by Nigeria since interventions began after 40 years of independence, socioeconomic interventions to prevent potential victims from being trafficked are still lacking, compared to interventions offered for the rehabilitation of rescued victims. Some trade-local practices that foster trafficking in forced labour still exist in Nigeria. Some children of poor parents or children from rural communities are sent to their rich relatives for education and upbringing. However, this practice has deviated from its original purpose of poverty alleviation, apprenticeship, and training, as some parents today are either giving up or virtually selling their children to known people or complete strangers with or without any inclination as to where the children are being taken or the form of labour the children will be subjected to. Most of these children, as a number of studies have shown, are transported to cities or across borders and placed in exploitative labour such as domestic servitude, thereby turning the practice into human trafficking. In almost all instances, rather than educating or teaching these children skills that will economically empower them in the future, these children suffer various forms of physical, mental, and sexual abuse which leave them traumatized and unable to meet future challenges or change the poor economic conditions of themselves or their families. Nigeria has ratified various protocols which committed the country to enact legislation to make trafficking in human beings a criminal offence, but progress in reducing the incidence of trafficking has been slow. The net result of all these agreements has been no more than a handful of prosecutions as will be shown in subsequent chapters. Prosecution, identification of victims, and even prevention are lagging behind.

3

NAPTIP: Nigeria's Institutional Response to Human Trafficking

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Adewale Adeduntan*

Abstract

This is an examination of the Nigerian government's main institutional response to the human trafficking conundrum. This is done through the lens of the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP). Here we present the responsibilities and functions of the national agency and critically review how it operationalises its mandate, taking care to lay bare its achievements, challenges, and the way forward for policy, practice, and partnerships for success over the scourge of human trafficking.

Introduction

Nigeria's National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) was created on 14 July 2003 with its legal foundation in the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act 2003. This Act in itself was an outcome of a private member bill sponsored at the National Assembly by the Women Trafficking and Child Labour Eradication Foundation (WOTCLEF).²⁰ The Bill was passed by the National Assembly on 7 July 2003 and Presidential Assent was given on 14 July 2003. Thus, NAPTIP was created by law as Nigeria's focal institution to combat trafficking in persons using a four-prong approach: Prevention, Protection, Prosecution, and Partnership. The agency was further strengthened in 2005 when the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act 2003 was amended. In the ensuing years, the crime of trafficking in persons evolved, which has led to the enactment of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition), Enforcement and Administration Act (26 March 2015) for further strengthening of the institutional framework.

²⁰ Descriptions of WOTCLEF is given in Chapter 2 of this book.

The Functions and Powers of the Agency

NAPTIP has explicitly stated and publicized twenty-three (23) functions.²¹ Prominent among these and pertinent to this chapter are to:

- Investigate all cases of trafficking in persons including forced labour, child labour, forced prostitution, exploitative labour and other forms of exploitation, slavery and slavery-like activities, bonded labour, removal of organs, illegal smuggling of migrants, and the sale and purchase of persons.
- Conduct research and strengthen effective legal means of international cooperation in suppressing trafficking in persons.
- Deal with matters connected with the extradition and deportation of persons involved in trafficking in persons and other mutual legal assistance between Nigeria and any other country in trafficking in persons, subject to the supervision of the minister in charge.

The Agency also has the power to:

- Investigate whether any person, body, or entity has committed an offence under this Act or the offence of trafficking under any other law (see website²² for Powers of the Agency).

The Context of Human Trafficking in Nigeria

The context of human trafficking in Nigeria can be traced in a trajectory spanning decades of military regimes and severe political, social, and economic crises as fundamental contributory factors to the emergence of the phenomenon (UNESCO, 2006). Firstly, although Nigeria is rich in natural resources, political instability and widespread corruption have facilitated trafficking in persons and hampered the progress towards reducing poverty. A 2015 report by Human Rights Watch noted that ‘endemic public sector corruption continued to undermine the enjoyment of social and economic rights in Nigeria’ (HRW, 2015). Corruption facilitates trafficking; for instance, it eases the transportation of victims within countries and across borders without detection or requests for paperwork. Economically disempowered and impoverished families, aiming to escape poor conditions of living, are vulnerable to traffickers. Women and young girls, owing to the feminization of poverty and discriminatory cultural practices, are even more exposed to the tactics of traffickers. Secondly, the political system, characterized by

21 NAPTIP. Functions of the Agency. <https://www.naptip.gov.ng/about-naptip-2/>.

22 NAPTIP. Powers of the Agency. <https://www.naptip.gov.ng/about-naptip-2/>.

institutional weakness and fragility, has created fertile ground for organized criminal groups to thrive (Osumah & Sylvester, 2012). According to the 2015 United States Trafficking in Persons Report, 'EUROPOL has identified Nigerian organized crime related to trafficking in persons as one of the greatest law enforcement challenges to European governments.' Finally, as a background for all this are the oil boom-and-bust cycles of the 1970s and 1980s, which impacted on opportunities for migration, both within and outside the country; bust cycles created avenues for exploitation and exposure of would-be travellers to international trafficking.

The drivers of human trafficking in Nigeria are multi-faceted, complex, and they often overlap. The myth and realities of the successes and/or failures of 'travellers' and the increasing scale of human trafficking in the past two decades has made human trafficking a critical subject of investigation by researchers, and it has spurred the creation of agencies, and the modification of budgets and laws by Nigerian governments at national and state levels. Expertise has been developed in terms of academic research, security apparatus, international collaboration with specialized UN agencies, international financial institutions, and host countries of victims of trafficking from Nigeria. Statistically, the magnitude of trafficking continues to prove hard to estimate. Difficulties exist in trying to obtain accurate statistics on the number of trafficked victims. Despite the uncertainty of the numbers, actors collaborating in combatting human trafficking contend that trafficking in persons has increased drastically, perhaps outpacing interventions (Avellino, 2012, p. 22; Gekht, 2008, pp. 31-32).

The Route Out of Nigeria


Nigeria shares land borders with the Republic of Benin in the west, Chad and Cameroon in the east, and Niger in the north. Its coast lies on the Gulf of Guinea in the south and it border Lake Chad to the north-east. Nigeria has international land borders of about 4470 kilometres (2513 miles) with Chad, Cameroon, Benin, and Niger, and a coastline of 774 kilometres (480 miles), all of which are largely unmanned. According to Adeyeye (2020), out of about 1500 identified land border crossings into Nigeria, only 114, covering about 4000 square kilometres, has approved control posts manned by immigration officials and other security agencies. There are over 1400 illegal routes into Nigeria, 1316 more than the approved number of border control posts, and this, coupled with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) free trade movement, is making it more difficult to control the flow in and out in Nigeria. The president of the European Commission stated

that there is an upsurge in the number of Nigerians languishing in the Sahara Desert and on the Mediterranean Sea in their desperate bid to get to the bright lights of Europe. He noted that ‘between 2011 and 2016, over 630,000 irregular migrant and refugees were rescued or disembarked in Italy’ (EPSC Strategic Notes/EU, 2017).

NAPTIP works on the premise that the Central Mediterranean remains the most preferred route to Europe. Routes such as the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkan have also seen an upsurge in numbers. Pozzallo Port in the Province of Regusa, Sicily, is a gateway to Italy through the Mediterranean Sea. This is one of the geographical corridors between Italy and other parts of Africa, given its close proximity to Tunis in Tunisia and Tripoli in Libya.

NAPTIP Database

NAPTIP publishes annual reports on the outcomes of the performance of its functions. These include descriptions of the cases reported to and investigated by the Agency, gender profiles of traffickers, prosecutions and convictions the Agency has secured, as well as the other socioeconomic backgrounds of rescued victims of trafficking. In Figure 1 below, we present the characteristics of cases of human trafficking received and processed by NAPTIP.



Source: NAPTIP, Research and Programme Development Department. Annual Reports 2012-2019

The number of cases of human trafficking obtained by NAPTIP grew from 400 in 2012 to 1076 in 2018. However, the raw numbers show a decline in

investigations conducted by NAPTIP over the same period. In the beginning, NAPTIP investigated three-quarters of the cases it obtained in 2012. By 2018, investigations have been drastically reduced to approximately 20% of all cases. This is reflective of a lack of commensurate growth in human resource capacity at the disposal of NAPTIP, despite the ability to increasingly spot cases of human trafficking.

Table 3.1

Profiling the cases of human trafficking received by NAPTIP 2012-2019

Cases	Year							
	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012
Proportion investigated (% all cases)	***	19.1	16.9	54.0	35.6	49.4	65.4	75.3
Proportion investigated (% external)	29.1	65.0	***	31.4	71.4	56.7	36.1	24.6

Source: NAPTIP, Research and Programme Development Department. Annual Reports 2012-2019

Data obtained from NAPTIP records also indicate that the proportion of cases investigated internationally have steadily increased in the same period (see Table 1). This is reflective of the collaboration the Agency has with foreign governments as part of its mandate in fighting the problem. It is also reflective of the relatively lower level of attention given to the domestic dimensions of trafficking. Reasons for this are provided in latter parts of this chapter.

Earlier data collection by the agency showed that in the period 2004 and 2010, NAPTIP received over 2900 referrals,²³ a large proportion of these were women. Some of the background characteristics of victims of trafficking are presented according to age groups; for example, women aged 18-30 years were trafficked to Europe for sexual exploitation; both males and females aged 6-17 years were trafficked within Nigeria for domestic labour; and Nigeria remains the destination point of pre-teens and early teens aged 7-14 years trafficked to work as domestic servants from neighbouring countries such as the Benin Republic. Data collection has since been improved and expanded to provide a better understanding of the structure and composition of victims of trafficking, and to highlight the strengths and challenges encountered by NAPTIP in the fulfilment of its institutional mandates.

²³ Channels of referrals range from repatriated victims picked up from Lagos International Airport by NGOs, IOM and NAPTIP, to victims picked up following investigation of reports in other countries.

Court convictions are also presented to shed some light on the justiciability of the law on forced labour and trafficking. These are contributing to estimating and understanding the range of trafficking in Nigeria. The gender distribution of traffickers and the results of legal proceedings instituted against them by NAPTIP is summarized in Table 2.

Table 3.2

Profile of human traffickers arrested and convicted by NAPTIP 2012-2019

Cases	Year							
	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012
Total traffickers arrested	701	823	641	519	432	276	293	332
Total traffickers male	365	*	363	257	219	124	134	147
Proportion male traffickers	52.1	0.0	56.6	49.5	50.7	44.9	45.7	44.3
Number of traffickers convicted	25	50	26	31	23	39	44	25
Male traffickers convicted	14	29	18	19	15	22	22	12
Female traffickers convicted	11	21	8	12	8	17	22	13
Proportion male traffickers convicted	56.0	58.0	69.2	61.3	65.2	56.4	50.0	48.0


Source: NAPTIP, Research and Programme Development Department. Annual Reports 2012-2019

The numbers of traffickers arrested by NAPTIP more than doubled from 332 in 2012 to 701 in 2019. At the beginning of the reporting period, there were fewer male traffickers apprehended. By 2017, more than half of traffickers arrested were males and have since remained so. Generally, while total number of traffickers arrested were in the high hundreds, the number of traffickers eventually convicted are in the low tens. This is also indicative of the limited prosecuting ability of NAPTIP, perhaps reflective of a shortage of personnel. The budgetary requirements and financial strength of NAPTIP will be discussed later in this chapter. Also, despite the fact of data showing that more female traffickers were arrested at the early stages of the reporting period, NAPTIP has shown more success in securing conviction for more male than female traffickers, and this is consistent over the reporting period.

Federally, the Trafficking in Persons Law Enforcement and Administration Act, as amended in 2015, criminalized sex trafficking and labour trafficking and prescribed a minimum penalty of two years' imprisonment and a fine of 250,000 naira (USD693) for both sex and labour trafficking; the minimum penalty for sex trafficking increased to seven years' imprisonment and a fine of 1 million naira (USD2,770) if the case involved a child victim. In Edo State, the government in May 2018 approved a state-level anti-trafficking

law that criminalized sex trafficking and labour trafficking and prescribed a minimum penalty of five years' imprisonment and a fine of one million naira (USD2,770) fine for both sex and labour trafficking; the minimum penalty for sex trafficking increased to seven years' imprisonment and a fine of one million naira (USD2,770) if the case involved a child victim. All these penalties were deemed sufficiently stringent by the US Government and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as kidnapping (See USDS 2019; 354).

The gender distribution of victims of trafficking and their locations of rescue by NAPTIP is presented below in Figure 2.



Source: NAPTIP, Research and Programme Development Department. Annual Reports 2012-2019

The total number of victims of trafficking that have been rescued by NAPTIP increased from 749 to 1152 in the reporting period 2012-2019. A big spike in the number rescued is observed in 2017. Overall, females constitute the larger proportion of rescued victims across board (see Table 3 below).

Table 3.3

Profile of victims of human trafficking rescued by NAPTIP 2012-2019

Cases	Year							
	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012
Proportion of female victims	80.6	83.8	75.3	80.6	76.2	59.5	52.3	80.0
Proportion females rescued (external)	51.9	24.3	47.8	***	***	***	***	***

The gender profile of rescued victims is consistent with worldwide data that shows women being more often victims of human trafficking than men. Also, the successes of the international collaborative efforts of NAPTIP are further underscored by the sizable proportion of Nigerian victims of trafficking that were rescued in foreign lands. From 2017, NAPTIP began to document information on the number of victims it rescued outside Nigeria, and these numbers amount to about half of all the victims that were rescued. These would not have been possible without foreign cooperation.

Care for Victims

Up until 2019, each of NAPTIP's 10 zonal commands (including the Abuja headquarters) operated a shelter for victims of trafficking. NAPTIP shelters offered six weeks of initial care. Extended care in NAPTIP shelters was dependent on cooperation with law enforcement investigations; if a victim needed to remain in a shelter beyond the six-week period but did not want to participate in the law enforcement investigation or prosecution, NAPTIP referred the victim to NGOs for care. In the 2017 to 2018 reporting period, a foreign donor funded the renovation and expansion of NAPTIP's Lagos shelter; after the expansion, NAPTIP's 10 shelters increased from 315 to a total capacity of 334. Although the law mandated NAPTIP to care solely for victims of crimes under the 2015 anti-trafficking law, victims of other crimes were often referred to NAPTIP by sister agencies of government. This may signify that NAPTIP is doing something right about care for victims, but it has reduced the agency's capacity to care specifically for victims of trafficking, which is its mandate.

NAPTIP's Budget

As contained in the USDS (2019; 355) report, NAPTIP's budget in 2018 was 4.3 billion naira (USD11.91 million), an increase from 3.1 billion naira (USD8.59 million) in 2017. But the agency received just about 60.5% of the promised budget (approximately 2.6 billion naira or USD7.2 million) in the reporting period. This affected its capacity to carry out sufficient proactive anti-trafficking operations; and the agency's operatives were often

concentrated in state capitals, which hindered identification and investigation of trafficking in rural areas.

An area where NAPTIP has made domestic gains has been in stepping up efforts at combatting domestic trafficking and its outcomes, especially in north-eastern Nigeria. According to the USDS (2019), ‘in response to continued reports of sexual exploitation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the North-east, NAPTIP continued partnering with an international organization to implement a screening and sensitization campaign to identify sex trafficking victims in IDP camps in Bama and other areas near Maiduguri.’ However, as the security situation deteriorated, NAPTIP activities were generally restricted to areas in and around Maiduguri (the capital and the largest city of Borno State in north-eastern Nigeria).

Reporting

There are various forms of reporting tools developed by the Agency which allow the general public, government agencies, and other relevant stakeholders to send in information against traffickers. Just like the **proactive approach**, which is described as victim-free investigation involving the deployment of intelligence and intrusive human and technical surveillance and other range of basic investigative step, the **reactive approach** is one of the most common methods of investigation through complaints used to locate and arrest offenders, rescue victims and obtain witness interviews, interrogation of suspects, and execution of search warrants including body searches and search of premises. The **National Referral Mechanism (NRM)**, which is a policy document, is used by law enforcement in Nigeria for referring victims of human trafficking to the appropriate channel. Some of the actors in the NRM include: NAPTIP, Nigeria Police, Nigeria Immigrations Service (NIS), National Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), and other ministries, departments, and agencies (MDA's) working on human trafficking issues in Nigeria, UN agencies, NGO's, embassies, high commissions, and international agencies working on human trafficking and related issues.

Reintegration

This involves concerted efforts to integrate victims back into their communities and society at large. They are assisted in achieving socioeconomic independence through community-based vocational skills acquisition and education; this is followed by empowerment to undertake economic activities in such a way as to reduce their vulnerability to being

re-trafficked. From NAPTIP's record, well over 14,207 victims of human trafficking have been rescued and rehabilitated; some have been empowered and re-integrated with vocational skills and formal education, including five who have obtained their bachelor's degree due to the Agency's sponsorship, three out of whom have been employed by the Agency.

Dependence, Dynamics, Spiritual Connectivity

Spiritual connectivity

This is a control mechanism and can have a serious impact on the psychological well-being of those victims for whom their religion, cultural affiliation, and belief is an important part of their lives. Spiritual connections mean that the victims are controlled by voodoo. In many reported cases, young females recruited for sexual exploitation in Europe and other parts of the world are taken to fetish shrines where they are forced to take an oath before departure.

- *Oath of Loyalty*: this is to ensure victims remain loyal to his or her trafficker to pay the amount of money that is charged and never to run away.
- *Lucky Charm*: the fetish oaths taken also perform the function of a lucky charm for the victims. They are rooted in traditional belief systems. It is believed that they have the power to protect the victim and attract rich clients for the victim especially those who work in the sex industry.
- *Oath items*: these oaths are mostly administered in shrines and the process of administration varies from shrine to shrine. It involves incantations and pronouncement of some adverse consequences in the event of the victims failing to keep the terms of the oaths. Some of the items include: native chalk, dry gin, human blood, animal blood, used menstrual pads, pubic and arm-pit hairs for female victims, toes and finger nails, and various types of creams and concoctions (especially for lucky charms).

Protection

Other data indicates a decrease in the number of identified victims of forced labour (126 in 2018 compared to 188 in 2017) and of potential victims of trafficking (1028 in 2018 compared to 1121 in 2017). According to the USDS (2019), these data were outcomes of a decrease in government efforts. A possible explanation is found in the discussion of NAPTIP's annual budget, which shows that the agency realized only 60% of its budget outlay. Despite difficulties in budgetary appropriation, NAPTIP conducted some fact-finding missions to Mali to investigate reports of Nigerian sex trafficking

victims in Mali and in January 2019, NAPTIP announced there were 20,000 Nigerian trafficking victims in Mali. International organizations, NGOs, and other observers have not been able to corroborate this estimate. However, it is on the record that the Nigerian government also participated in the forced return of Nigerian refugees from Cameroon, including populations vulnerable to trafficking; the government created an inter-ministerial committee to facilitate repatriation and resettlement in Nigeria for large number of Nigerian migrants (including victims of trafficking stranded in Libya). Between April and November 2018, 3160 Nigerians were repatriated from North Africa in a collaborative effort between the Nigerian government and an international organisation. These returnees overwhelmed the shelter and service system, including NAPTIP facilities, which the agency had to open up to returnees that were not strictly victims of trafficking.

Several studies have shown that Edo State is a human-trafficking endemic area. In May 2018, the Governor of Edo State signed the Edo state anti-trafficking law, which codified the Edo State Task Force (ESTF) and provided a legal framework for state-level anti-trafficking efforts. The ESTF is headed by the state's attorney general; its mandate covers the combat of transnational trafficking of Nigerians to Europe. The mandate also includes investigation and prosecution of trafficking cases, working alongside NAPTIP to coordinate national and international actors' protection and reintegration efforts for returning victims of trafficking. A sum of 242 million naira (USD 670,360) was allocated to the ESTF in support of its activities in 2018. A victims' trust fund, financed primarily through confiscated assets of convicted traffickers has also been set up. This fund is available to all victims, and in 2018, the government allocated a total of 1.8 million naira (USD 4,990) to 18 trafficking victims. While the anti-trafficking law provided for victim restitution and allowed victims to file civil suits against their traffickers, the success rate is still low. The USDS (2019) reported that NAPTIP prosecutors regularly sought restitution in trafficking cases, but 'judges were unfamiliar with that provision of the anti-trafficking law.'

NAPTIP continues to demonstrate an ability to obtain convictions from the prosecutions it initiated. But less than 5 percent of investigations conducted (2019) has so far resulted in prosecutions (compared to about 10 percent in 2012). Reasons for this range from limited efforts at investigating or prosecuting government officials alleged to have been involved in trafficking, and lack of provision of specialized training to pertinent law enforcement officials to recognize, investigate, and prosecute trafficking cases. According to the US Department of State (2019), '[T]he Government of Nigeria does

not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so.' The relatively little attention given to grappling with the internal dynamics of internal trafficking and its outcomes contributed to the USDS (2019) assessment that the Nigerian government did not meet with minimum standards in certain key areas. For example, it was stated in the report that the 'government did not investigate, prosecute, or hold accountable any military or the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) members for exploiting IDPs in sex trafficking or past recruitment and use of child soldiers. The Nigerian military did not provide female and child trafficking victims allegedly associated with insurgencies trafficking victim protections.' Some of the factors that were identified as undermining to accountability for trafficking offenses include 'widespread and pervasive corruption affected all levels of government, including the security forces.' The report alleged that '[t]he government did not take adequate steps to investigate or prosecute military personnel or CJTF members complicit in trafficking in the North-east, in particular sexual exploitation of IDPs and female detainees.' The Nigerian Army has categorically denied that any of its personnel used child soldiers in the past or sexually exploited IDPs. Importantly, there are no new verified cases of children being used by the Nigerian Military in supporting roles, and this was confirmed by an NGO and international organizations contacted during the reporting period (USDS 2019).

NAPTIP also suffer from lack of adequate research tools, staff training on modern research technics, inadequate databank, limited access to properly equipped forensic laboratory, and a general lack of statistic software for staff. Despite these observations, the general commitment of the Nigerian government to combatting trafficking contributed to the country's upgrading to Tier 2 in the US government rankings. For example, the Nigerian 'government convicted significantly more traffickers than the previous reporting period and initiated prosecutions against seven government officials allegedly complicit in trafficking' (USDS 2019, 353). In order to improve the standards in Nigeria, prioritized recommendations made by the US government to the Nigerian government include the expansion of existing efforts to identify trafficking victims among IDPs, investigate cases, implement preventative measures, and to disburse 'the full promised budget for NAPTIP, particularly to provide adequate victim care.'

Some Considerations

The Covid-19 pandemic of 2020 brought further destabilization to the already fragile north-eastern zone of Nigeria. Sporadic attacks by Boko Haram

and ISIS-WA caused more abduction of women and girls in the northern region of Nigeria, some of whom they subject to domestic servitude, sexual slavery, and forced labour. Many of the internally displaced and refugees are vulnerable to traffickers due to their limited access to economic opportunity and formal justice. On the international front, criminal actors increased their exploitation of Nigerians in countries in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East (USDS, 2021). All these signposts increase the responsibilities of the NAPTIP, along with the necessity of focussing urgent attention on helping it overcome the constraints highlighted above. Strengthened internal processes within NAPTIP and partnerships with Nigeria's States and foreign donors would go a long way to eroding Nigerians' vulnerability to trafficking.

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4

‘I wanted to travel...’ Complex Bonds, Imaginations and Realities in Nigerian Female Migration to Europe

Kristin Kastner

Abstract

The current international migration of women from Edo State, Nigeria, is not a recent phenomenon but builds on already existing forms of female migration in Nigeria. On their way to Europe, the daily reality on the road sharply contrasts with the European dream. In this transitional phase, especially women have developed a range of tactics in order to preserve a certain mobility. Hereby their bodies play a crucial role, both as resources and objects of violence. In this contribution, I explore the complex bonds these women are tied to both on their way as well as later on in Europe. Rather than behaving as mere individuals, they act as social persons, who are part of a tight web of dependencies and patronage and, at the same time, question the concept of trafficking, since many of them do not consider themselves as victims. I suggest that what I call ‘deliberate illusion’ is an intrinsic feature of this form of migration characterizing both imaginations as well as social ties.

Introduction: A Bodily Approach

Migration is a deeply bodily experience. Besides the obvious physical movement of bodies, migration involves crossing a range of borders and boundaries, and may even shift the allegedly stable boundaries of the human body itself. Female and male migrants on their way to Europe pass through the same places and often share similar experiences. However, their migration experience is highly gendered, as women are exposed to multiple forms of violence. At the same time, they use their body to be able to continue their journey.

This chapter is based on ethnographic fieldwork with Nigerian migrants, mainly conducted in the border zone of the Strait of Gibraltar in northern Morocco and in southern Spain. Over a period of 18 months, I had the opportunity to gain insights into these women's lives before and after their arrival in Europe.²⁴ During fieldwork, the women slowly revealed to me different facets of their bodies: how the perilous journey overland and the often year-long waiting period in the so called transit countries was carved in their bodies; the way they were exposed to gender-related violence from their own countrymen as well as from police and military on the road to Europe; the spontaneous or provoked abortions or births under extremely difficult circumstances; and how they and their children embodied the clandestine condition and, at the same time, the ways in which they actively used their bodies in order to proceed with the journey and to gain a living, both on the road and in Europe. Thus, their bodies play a crucial and ambivalent role. On the one hand, they are frequently targets of suffering and violence as well as objects of a profitable business, which has been established around the commodified body. On the other, many women make use of their bodies as protection and capital when they simulate pregnancies or illness in order to avoid rapes; when they enter relationships with countrymen to make their life easier; when they form, under-dress, and up-dress their bodies to avoid deportation; and finally, through their engagement in sex work in Europe, many of them achieve their plans to support their families and to gain social status.

The focus on these different and often hardly communicable dimensions of the human body is revealing when analysing the interconnectedness between structural constraints and human agency within a tight web of dependencies. In his analysis of the role of female sex workers in Nollywood film productions, Alessandro Jedlowski (2016) provides an Afrocentric perspective on this phenomenon. He concludes that the female protagonists try to negotiate a space of autonomy and thereby 'break rigid binary oppositions (...) such as

24 Long-term field research started in 2005 and included a few weeks stay in Benin City, Edo State. The main methods were participant observation, active listening, informal conversations, interviews as well as photography. Even though most of the material was collected more than ten years ago, I am still involved in the field through regular visits and try to follow and track its dynamics as well as the women's biographies. The undocumented migrants' high mobility had a considerable impact on the research itself. During this multi-sited ethnography, complying with the ethical code of transparent research was at times challenging and required situated approaches. For a discussion of methodological and ethical challenges related to research in the context of smuggling, 'trafficking', and different forms of 'illegality', see the contributions in Van Lierp and Bilger (2009); for the published PhD thesis in German, see Kastner (2014).

those between family ties and individual aspirations, exploitation and agency, and sacrifice and personal economic gain' (Jedlowski, A., 2016, p. 19).

In the following, I will deal with these ambivalences. I start with the various motivations that make young women leave Nigeria, before delving into the long journey along the western route to Europe and the sponsoring system, which reveals the complex bonds to which young women from Edo State are tied. Finally, I will approach the imaginations and realities that shape the daily life in Nigeria and the aspirations of potential migrants and will suggest that 'deliberate illusion' is an intrinsic feature of this kind of migration.

'I wanted to travel...' Motivations and the Journey Towards Europe

'Nigeria is a corrupt country, you know. Anything you want to do is money. So, life is very, very difficult in Nigeria. We the seniors have to fight for the younger ones to go to school. So that is why I left Nigeria. People used to say that if I get to Europe, six months I get my car, I get my house, I make my money' (Evelyn, 9/5/2005, Spain).²⁵

'You see, Nigeria in fact, let me say, we are suffering, you understand? For my own side, we are not rich, we are poor, you understand? That man ask me: You want to travel? And I say 'Yes, I like to travel.' And then I travelled. He said Europe is good' (Jennifer, 12/11/2005, Spain).

'I saw people that came back from Europe. I say: Ah! They are living in very good condition! I say: Let me try!' (Princess, 8/9/2006, Spain).

Apart from long-standing trading activities and the love of adventure, it is these days mainly the support of the family that makes young women leave their country. The migration of women from Edo State in the South of Nigeria, where most of my interlocutors came from, is not a recent phenomenon. I follow Eno Ikpe and other scholars, who consider the present international and intercontinental migration of Nigerian women as an extension of the already existing forms of female autonomous migration in Nigeria (Ikpe, 2005). The women and men I met during my research rarely used the terms 'migrant' and 'migrating' to refer to themselves, although they had left their

25 All names are pseudonyms. The quotations have not been changed, because I wanted to maintain the women's distinctive speech. They talked to me in a mix of Nigerian Pidgin and Standard English and did not follow the standards of English grammar.

country in search of greener pastures. Rather, and as the quote above from Jennifer demonstrates, they referred to their migration project as ‘travelling’. This self-description as ‘travellers’ downplays or even ignores the existence of inhibiting national borders, which illustrates a striking paradox between the idea of uninhibited ‘travel’ and the existence of rigid border regimes. Generally, they imagined Europe as a place of *sweet life*.

However, especially when travelling overland, the European continent turns out to be a very distant place, and the daily reality on the road sharply contrasts with the dreams of Europe. What is more, severe border surveillance has led to a prolongation and negative intensification of the journey to Europe and, in recent years, the eastern route via Libya, even more dangerous, and involving inhumane conditions, has been frequented more often. Most Nigerians I encountered during my fieldwork took the western route via Mali and Algeria. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has adopted an agreement on the free movement of goods and persons, facilitates the journey to towns like Gao in Mali or Agadez in Niger, both important migrant junctions. From there, migrants have to cross the border to Algeria before they can try to enter Morocco near the border town of Oujda. The subsequent stay in Morocco mainly means waiting until the necessary *connection money*, the sum to be paid for the crossing by zodiac, can be raised, and until the wind and weather conditions in the Strait of Gibraltar as well as gaps in coastguard surveillance allow the crossing to Spain.²⁶ The route to reach one of the European borders has become increasingly difficult within the last two decades, and migrants on the road regularly face deportation – from Morocco to the Algerian border and from Algeria to the border with Mali or Niger.²⁷ In this transitional phase, many women have developed a range of tactics in order to preserve a certain mobility. Compared to men, women, and in particular pregnant women or women with babies, can oftentimes move more freely. Although frequently a result of forced relationships or, at least, not one of mutual consent, children play a crucial role and may even protect their mothers from deportation. During the stay in northern Africa, which is marked by frequent raids and various forms of violence, children, both born and unborn, represent a kind of ‘paper’ and protection for their mothers’ life. Moreover, a baby in the belly

26 For further insights into the impact of border for the migrants’ journey overland and the waiting period in the city of Tangier, see Kastner (2013).

27 For a recent account of migrant women’s lives in Morocco, which are marked by violence and deportation, see: https://alarmphone.org/en/2020/04/08/struggles-of-women-on-the-move/?post_type_release_type=post [retrieved 8 April, 2020].

or on the back also secures her survival, as babies help to make a living when women have to rely on begging in the streets.

Despite living underground, migrants are often astonishingly visible, even during the extended liminal phase on the road, and dressing up or dressing down can be crucial when avoiding deportations or violations. Women – and in this case, particularly single women – confidently play different roles by dressing up to pass as ‘legal’ residents, tourists, or by dressing down as pregnant Muslim beggars, or acting like ill or mad persons to maintain their mobility, seek out a living, and try to safeguard their bodily integrity. Apart from these existential forms of role play, styling can also be a means of refuge and escape during strenuous times and even a way to remain a human being or to regain bodily integrity.

Hence, on their journey towards the north, migrants cross a range of borders and boundaries. Besides political borders, they often reach their financial and existential limits. The same is true for moral limits that challenge the integrity of the body and the self. This may be the case when migrants have to make their living by begging in Morocco, which they often feel ashamed of, or later through sex work in Europe. Also, their own bodily boundaries can be transcended, as in the case of the migrant’s *package*, which remains in Nigeria and is intimately tied to the sponsoring system.

‘Somebody brought me...’ The Gender-Specific System of Sponsoring

‘Madam cannot sponsor boy, because he know, boy cannot do prostitution here, you understand. Madam don’t carry boy’ (Ifoma, 9/6/2005, Spain).

Most women cannot bear the costs of the journey themselves and therefore rely on sponsoring. In the context of the overland journey, at least two arrangements are common: buying, which means that the entire journey from Nigeria to Europe is sponsored, and pushing, in which case women try to reach Morocco by their own means and get sponsored only for the sea passage, the crossing over to one of the European shores. While until a decade ago a sizeable number of women had the opportunity to rely (only) on pushing, nowadays the overwhelming majority of women reach Europe through buying. This shift within the sponsoring system is also due to the fact that it has become more and more difficult to legally cross a European border, which has augmented the risks and costs, prolonged the overland journey, and turned the organization of the journey into a profitable business for

the members of the network that spans from Nigeria to different European countries and their collaborators on the road. The sponsoring causes financial indebtedness, and, in this context, tens of thousands of euros have to be paid back to the Nigerian madam when the migrant has reached Europe. Often, the migrant earns the money by engaging in sex work. Most of those I met considered this activity as temporary and provisional, and developed a rather pragmatic attitude towards this disliked phase of their life, which they regard as a necessary evil in order to realize their migration project.²⁸ Although they face moral difficulties in terms of their work in prostitution, most women managed to accept this reality by alienating their self from their body. This also implies that most of the women did not identify with the struggle for the rights of sex-workers, since they did not identify with this profession as such and did not consider themselves as being 'real' prostitutes. At the same time, the possibility of making 'fast money' in prostitution and, thereby, supporting their families, was often considered as an advantage compared to the situation of male migrants.

It is only after many years, when the migrant has paid back her debts, that she becomes independent again. While some migrants continue to work in prostitution after this point, most try to get out of this business. Once the migrant possesses her own financial resources, she herself might take over the role of a madam and thereby sponsor the journey of female compatriots. The system is hence constantly reproducing itself and is highly gendered as explained by Ifoma above: Only women are sponsored, since they are supposed to rely on sex work in Europe and thus be able to pay back their debts more quickly than men.

'You go to juju-shrine...' Ritual and Contract

'Juju will worry them, will trouble them, yes. As for me, I did not do that. But some do it, some did, so they will go to juju to swear. If they refuse to pay the money, the juju will keep the person like that, but if they pay the money, they will be free' (Jennifer, 12/11/2005, Spain).

'They say we should make oath with juju. (...) They are dangerous. (...) They go and disturb your parents. That is their mission. (...) They have power. But what I believe, I believe in God. They can't do me nothing' (Princess, 8/9/2006, Spain).

28 This observation is also confirmed by Sina Plambeck (2017), who conducted fieldwork among deported female migrants in Benin City (ibid, p. 12).

In the migration process, even one's own bodily boundaries can be transcended and cease to correspond to the physical shape of the body. This is the case when certain parts of the body are removed from the women's own sphere of action. By referring to the phenomenon of the 'extended body', I emphasize the deep embeddedness of embodied experience within the sociocultural realm, which acquires an altered meaning in the transnational context of Nigerian migration: women, whose journey to Europe is sponsored, often undergo a ritual, sometimes combined with a written contract, in which the migrant commits herself to return the agreed sum of money. Although the migrants I spoke to had been told not to talk about this preparatory phase, still, they often insinuated or made use of narrative tricks to be able to talk about what should remain unspoken. I also met some women who breached the contract for various reasons and were open to share their experiences with me.

As pointed out in the excellent paper by Ifra on the relation between oath taking, transnational silence, and migration imaginaries, the term *juju* is difficult to define, since it comprises various ideas and concepts (Ifra, 2019, p. 4). Generally, *juju* designates 'the utilization of supernatural forces to impress on the natural', which is achieved via the backing of deities or deified ancestors (ibid.). It can be used positively, as protection, to bring prosperity and healing, or negatively, to curse someone or make one act against his will, while aiming to elicit compliance of the parties involved (ibid.: 5). In the context of the migration of women from Edo State, both aspects are crucial. On the one hand, the ritual will protect the future migrant during her journey to Europe and guarantee prosperity once she has reached Europe; on the other, the oath will commit the woman to return the contracted sum to her madam.

For the ritual, the future migrant leaves a so-called *package* or *body*, comprised of different bodily substances, like hair and nails, and, occasionally, a photo taken in Nigeria before setting out for Europe. It reveals strong parallels to the *akpa*, the substitute corpse that is collected from a real corpse and well secured until it loses its power with completion of the mortuary rites, as was already described by R.E. Bradbury for the Edo people in the 1970s (Bradbury, 1973, p. 217). Hair and nails are particularly adequate, since 'nails do not rot, the hair does not rot, say the Edo' (ibid). The significance of these substances goes beyond their physical persistence. It is also their 'capacity for continuous growth and renewal, which persists for a short time even after death. *Akpa* can also mean foetus' (ibid). As long as the migrant is on the road and her debts remain unpaid, she is 'in-between', in a liminal phase. The pledge entailed in this act loses its significance and power only when

the debts related to the journey have been amortised and, ultimately, when the *package* is given back to the migrant or a reliable family member. Even though, at this moment, the migrant may not be in possession of a residence permit and, from a legal perspective, still navigates in a kind of limbo, an a-legal or illegal space, the return of the *package* means the definite ending of the physical liminal phase and the beginning of freedom. As reported for Italy, this moment is celebrated with a party, often organised by the madam herself (Maragnani & Aikpitanyi, 2007, p. 54).

If the contract with the madam is not fulfilled, the powers of the *juju* can provoke psychological and physical consequences. Madness, illness, or even death may not only strike the migrant herself but also her family members back home in Nigeria, as was made clear by Princess in the quote above. Hence, the migrants' families often exercise considerable control and pressure, since the madam or other mediators may be part of the wider family.

For most of the women I met, the contract and the ritual were considered an accepted part of the travel arrangements, with rights and duties for both parties. The ritual should protect the future migrant on her journey, and help her gain success and wealth once she arrives in Europe, while, at the same time, it strengthens her loyalty towards the madam.

'My madam is nice, but...' Ambivalent Bonds

'They say: Come Rita, we were like you before. We were once like you. When we got here, we force. We never wanted to do this job. But now, if you know what you are looking for, you have to do it and survive yourself' (Rita, 8/5/2006, Spain).

The relationship toward the madam is, in most cases, highly ambivalent. On the one hand, the women find themselves in an extreme state of dependence and are exposed to strong control, pressure, and violence, both physical and psychological. On the other, the madam is generally viewed as a respectable person who, far from home and family, often takes on the role of an older relative and is addressed as 'mamie' or 'auntie'. Many women I spoke to expressed their gratitude towards their madam, because she helped them come to Europe, a finding also confirmed by Sine Plambech (2017, pp. 13-14). Additionally, the madam functioned as a model, since she had already accumulated considerable wealth, and had gained status and respect within the Nigerian community in Europe and back home in Nigeria. Despite frequent complaints about the madam and fears of possible sanctions,

most women did not consider the sponsoring agreement as unfair per se and regarded having to repay the contracted sum as a mere fact. In most cases, the migration arrangements were seen as 'a joint effort' between the women, their families, and the individuals who arranged their travels to Europe, and not as forced upon them (Plambech, 2014, p. 389). Neither did the women consider themselves as victims, and the idea of human trafficking was not familiar to them (cf. Skogseth, 2006). Plambech argues in a similar vein by referring to women in Benin City who reported that 'trafficking' was unknown to them until they were deported back to Nigeria and, due to being classified as 'victims of trafficking', accompanied by local NGOs on their way to reintegration (Plambech, 2014. p. 390).

Rather than behaving as mere individuals, the migrants act as social persons who are part of a tight net of dependencies and patronage. As daughters, wives, or younger sisters, they act in line with the principle of seniority, which claims respect towards their elders. Further aspects that, following Clementina Osezua, emerge from the longstanding gender inequality within the patriarchal society of the Benin people, such as unequal economic resources, highly controlled female sexuality, male child preference, and polygamous households, have a decisive impact on this particular form of migration (Osezua, 2016). Further phenomena within the country, like foster parenthood and domestic labour, show similar asymmetric relations. This social fabric is embedded in the pervasive system of patronage, which has a long history and is part of daily reality in Nigeria. Originally defined as a mutual relationship of exchange of resources – maintenance and protection in exchange for loyalty – this system has not only been gradually commercialized in Nigeria since the 1990s but also been perverted and corrupted (FitzGibbon, 2003, p. 84). As a result, the lines between voluntary migration, work, and trafficking have become increasingly blurred.

'I knew I would work in it...' Imaginations and Reality

'I knew I would work in it, but not like this they tell. Maybe they just tell some few months the girl will have to pay for' (Princess, 8/9/2006, Spain).

'I knew, in Europe I would work in it, but I did not know that it was so difficult. Europe is not easy at all!' (Vera, 11/9/2006, Spain).

Most of the young women declared that they knew beforehand about their future work in prostitution in Europe, although they tried to keep this idea in the back of their minds for as long as possible. In our conversations, the

notion of prostitution was frequently paraphrased, which revealed their disdain towards that kind of work. The statements of Princess and Vera point to an experience shared by many migrant women: the discrepancy between imagination and reality of sex work in Europe, where working conditions, frequently on the street, are harsh and differ from the organization of sex work in Nigeria.²⁹ Although all my interlocutors stated they had not engaged in sex work in Nigeria before this, they nevertheless quickly realised the contrast between here and there. Moreover, many women had not realistically envisaged the huge sum they had contracted and promised to return.

A range of persons in Nigeria benefit from the women working in Europe, whose migration project generates a source of income for various groups: the families (which may encourage the women to travel and also be involved in the organisation), travel organisers, native doctors and priests, and lawyers and authority representatives. These multiple interests may be one reason that, compared to other countries, women from Edo State who work in prostitution in Europe are less stigmatised and rather enjoy a certain prestige due to their financial power. Here, the concept of 'bound migration' (*gebundene migration*; Bilger, 2001, p. 7) adds to that of 'trafficking',³⁰ since it makes it possible to analyse the complex network of dependencies and patronage beyond simplifying dichotomies, like that of victim and perpetrator. In a similar vein, Plambech coins the notion of *indentured sex work migration* (Plambech, 2016, p. 6) to grasp the situation of many Nigerian women, which fluctuates on a trafficking/migration continuum.

'So the families, all of them know...' Deliberate Illusion

'So the families, all of them know, once the girl is going to Europe, they know that this girl is once to go and do this [prostitution]. Except you, you said it to yourself that this Europe I am going, though they are doing it, but I myself, I am not going to do it' (Rita, 8/5/2006, Spain).

Rita's statement refers to the self-deception on which many rely in order to protect themselves and which the organisers of the journey as well as the

29 For the organization of sex work in Nigeria and the differences between rural and urban contexts, see Nwando Achebe (2004).

30 I use 'trafficking' according to the UN definition as 'recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation' (UN 2000: Article 3(a)).

migrants' families take advantage of. In this context, Franco Prina points to 'a level of intermediate understanding between deception and self-deception' (Prina, 2003, p. 31), since the migrants want to believe the attractive offers made by their relatives or acquaintances, although the working and living situation for Nigerian women in Europe is by now widely known in Nigeria (Okojie et al., 2003). And although a law against prostitution was adopted in Edo State in 2000 in order to stop prostitution and human trafficking (Adepoju, 2005, p. 86; Okojie et al., 2003, p. 42), the international migration of young Nigerian women continues to flourish.

Migration implies exchange, not only of people but also of goods, images, and ideas (Gardner, 1993, p. 2). Following the complex relations between migrants and non-migrants, Jørgen Carling introduces the notion of asymmetries within the three spheres, namely of moralities, information, and imagination and resource inequalities, and argues that 'communicating means negotiating contested representations, creating as well as filling information gaps' (Carling, 2008, p. 1462f). Those migrants I encountered in the course of my research most often maintained the unequal level of information, when they affirmed the glorious imaginations of Europe by those who had stayed in Nigeria.

The migrants' narrations and my own observations revealed that their families were not concerned about the way the money sent by their daughters, sisters, or wives was earned in Europe. What counted were the regular remittances via Western Union, which has an especially high concentration of offices in Benin City. The reason was not mere ignorance of the circumstances; rather, the migrants and their families did not want to (and chose not to) know or talk about these circumstances. The madams and various other mediators affirmed the dreams of the young migrants that were not fulfilled in Europe; for the migrants themselves they reproduced an image of Europe as a *sweet place* and Eldorado, which the families wanted to believe in. Doubts and questions were usually not uttered so as not to upset appearances.

Dominique Malaquais' description of Douala's inhabitants as '*voyageurs réels ou en imagination*' (Malaquais, 2006, p. 17) also holds true for those of Benin City. Although they are physically present in their city, their minds live abroad and the dream to be elsewhere is omnipresent (ibid, p. 23). It is due to this lived immobility, and the impossibility of leaving, that ideas and ideals about mobility unfold (Malaquais, 2004, p. 23). The author follows Arjun Appadurai when employing the French notion *imaginaire*, which he understands as a social practice, as 'a constructed landscape of collective

aspirations' (Appadurai, 1996, p. 31). Malaquais considers the *imaginaire* as constitutive of daily life in many African cities. Thus, the 'imagined foreign worlds' (Gardner, 1993, p. 1) become symbols and metaphors way beyond its geographical references, as the '*exile imaginaire*' (Fouquet, 2007, p. 104) also shapes daily practices. Moreover, these dreams have manifested themselves in the urban environment and immediately evoke associations with Europe. In Benin City, names of shops or hotels reference, above all, Italian cities; even more visible are newly constructed houses that, due to their distinctive architecture and style, can be identified as belonging to Nigerians living abroad and allude to the potential success and social mobility that can be gained through migration (Plambech, 2014, p. 389).

I refer to this pervasive phenomenon as 'deliberate illusion,' which shapes the social relations and the communication between (future) migrants, mediators, and families, and suggest that it also has a considerable impact on the migration of young women from Edo State.

Conclusion

The 'deliberate illusion' that guides the adoption of various disguises and roles may also lead to a rather unconscious reaction to external circumstances. In a life characterised by uncertainty and transience, there is little room left for well-planned strategies. Rather, many women must act spontaneously and according to the situation. In doing so, they may resort to different identity fragments shaped by the experiences made in Nigeria, on the road and in Europe, where no strict lines can be drawn between imagination and reality, truth or lie. Just as clear lines cannot be drawn between the conscious role-play and the rather unconscious adoption of identity fragments and roles, between 'reality' and fiction, the line between external constraints and individual agency is not clear. Hence, structures are 'both constraining and enabling' (Giddens, 1984, p. 25), and even the supposedly powerless are capable of mobilising resources and securing their own realms of action.

The majority of the women I met more than a decade ago have been able to fulfil their aspirations to improve their own and their families' life. Although their various detours and journeys have not come to an end, these women continue to strive forward. Despite the multiple forms of suffering and gender-related violence that most have experienced, they constantly search for new ways to make good their migration project, often armed with astonishing creativity and humour. Their biographies indicate that stable classifications and categories such as victim or perpetrator, truth and

lie, reality and imagination are of little value when trying to approach the complex bonds that work in the context of Nigerian female migration as well as the daily realities in Nigeria. Rather, these binary oppositions collapse into one another and become blurred. Similarly, the 'extended body' challenges a dichotomous perspective on the body and is only partly analysable through concepts of European intellectual and body history. It alludes to body boundaries that may shift the contours of the physical body and permits an extended understanding of the concept of the person that cannot act as a mere individual, but as part of a tight social web.

Recent changes in the migration dynamics of Nigerian women indicate, however, that the migrants have become increasingly younger when they head to Europe and are thus even more vulnerable. Underage and mainly from rural areas, the educational level of these migrants is quite low, and they have little access to information and campaigns, like those produced by NAPTIP.

The recent statement made by Oba Ewuare II, who summoned all chiefs, priests, and native doctors of his kingdom for an emergency meeting in March 2018, has opened up the prospect of an incipient change of consciousness. The Oba of Benin declared that, from then on, no religious instance was allowed to perform trafficking-related rituals. This was accompanied by the Oba's suspension of all trafficking related oaths so far, involving a curse on perpetrators of human trafficking instead (IOM, 2018). This statement might be more effective than campaigns and programs that, up to now, have often been initiated by institutions far from the scene.

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5

Lives Upside Down: Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation of Nigerian Women and Minors in Italy

Francesco Carchedi

Abstract

Relying substantially on evidence-based research on human trafficking and sexual exploitation in Italy, from 2000 to date of publication, this research establishes the prevalence of Nigerian women and minors as the most exploited national group, when compared to other nationalities. Among other things, this chapter analyses the structures of exploitation based on nationalities, methods of recruitment, transit, travel, exploitation models, modus operandi, and the asymmetrical gender relationships, which determine behaviour. It considers the exploitative roles of the madam, the Boga, and the 'lover boy', and navigates the changing landscape of the phenomenon. It concludes with a critical reflection on the anathema of the Oba of Benin and its effects on the perception of Nigerian trafficking in Italy, suggesting that the relations between the madam and the victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation remain substantially the same as they were before the anathema.

Main Results of Some Studies on Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation

From the official data produced by the Italian Department for Equal Opportunity since the early 2000s, predominantly based on the information provided by the services/projects of the provisions of article 18 of the legislative decree no. 286 of 1998, it became clear that the national groups most involved in forced and coercive prostitution were those made up of Nigerian, Romanian, and Albanian women. For example, the Nigerian group, from 2000 to 2006, recorded an average annual intake by social services of about 650 victims of sexual exploitation, compared to that of the Romanian

group, which in the same period reached an annual average of 390, and the Albanian group, a total average number of 215.

A careful analysis of the numerical data showed that the Nigerian group remained substantially constant over the years, unlike the Romanians and Albanians. The Romanian figures in fact show a surge towards the top of the number of entries in social services from 2000 to 2002, with about 550 units, while from 2003 to 2006 the number decreased to 170. For the Albanians, on the other hand, the number went from about 400 to 123. Other national groups generally made up of many sexually exploited women (and in some cases transsexuals) recorded figures, which were far from those of the three main groups previously mentioned (Carchedi and Tola, 2008). Nonetheless, all the victims belonging to these other groups reached significant percentages, ranging between 25% and 30% of the whole.

According to another study carried out by Parsec/Tecos in 2013, the number of the victims that were assisted in the two-year period 2010-2012 still recorded Nigerian women in first position with about 1300, then 650 for each single year considered, which is equal to 45.7% of 2900. Romanians were 300, an equivalence of 10.8%. Other nationalities consisted of Albanians with less than 120, followed by the Moldovans, Moroccans, and Chinese with much lower percentages. The same position of Nigerian women was recorded in 2016, according to data processed by the same source mentioned above, with 527 (66.7% of the total of 790 in assistance/protection programs), while the Romanian component (in the same year) dropped to about 60 cases (equal to 7.3%), followed by the Moroccan and Albanian nationals.

These numerical disparities – which were recorded among the different groups under consideration – have prompted some scholars to analyse the structure of sexual exploitation based on nationality, noting the characteristics that differentiate them and at the same time those, that, on the contrary, they have in common. In this regard, some research that analysed the methods of prostitution according to the priority axis of nationality is worth mentioning. Two research projects, which could be considered the most thorough, were carried out by the Emilia-Romagna Region and by the Municipality of Rome around the mid-2000s. Both research projects focused on defining the different models that underpin the practice of prostitution. The first was on groups of women from Eastern European countries in general and specifically from Albania and Romania (Ciconte, 2005). The second was on seven different national groups (in addition to those just mentioned,

including those from Moldavia, Nigeria, the Maghreb, and China), referring in greater depth to other preceding studies.

The models of prostitution that emerged therefore are: a.) the intertwining of explanatory variables attributable to the criminal conduct of the exploiters (also with reference to the delinquent schemes of the country of origin and in particular that of the sub-areas of migratory exodus); b.) the strongly asymmetrical gender relationships, which socially determine these behaviours; and c.) the dynamics that are triggered in the territory/place of prostitution, since local criminal gangs can interfere in the action of the judicial authorities. This double parallel action in fact compels the criminal organisations to engage in a continuous modification of the respective *modus operandi* and of the respective enslavement/exploitation of the victims involved from time to time in the prostitution circuits (regardless of the location that characterises them).

The similarities between the different exploitation models are found above all in the practices of the subjugation of the victims, which is often the direct product of psycho-physical violence, in those areas of segregation and constant and meticulous control of the same, as well as emotional blackmail (especially in the presence of vulnerable children or parents). The differences, on the other hand, are mostly found in the methods of recruitment (especially where false promises of work and advance fees are paid to expatriate, determining as a result the stipulation of a debt to be paid back) and methods of travel. For the latter, those who travel from one country to another are further exploited based on length, duration, and danger of transfers. Such practices of exploitation also depend on their arriving at their destination, for example, in Italian cities and therefore also in Rome and other cities in the Lazio region.

As can be seen from the official data and from the investigations mentioned above (it should be highlighted that many other research projects and journalistic investigations have been published in this regard), Nigerians, particularly females and minors, are the ones who are mainly involved in the trafficking in human beings and in practices of sexual exploitation. The exploitation model that emerged beginning in the second half of the nineties (outlined in the *Colours of the Night*) has been further investigated in a research project of particularly descriptive effectiveness conducted at the beginning of the year 2000 by Franco Prina (2004).

This research is based on the so-called 'trafficking cycle' highlighted by the Palermo Protocol against organised crime and trafficking in human beings (UN, 2000). The author, through a mixed methodological approach, highlights the conditions of exploitation that characterise the victims within each of the phases that make up the entire cycle. From this perspective, in fact, the recruitment process in the countries of origin (the specific places of origin, the indebtedness of the potential victims, and the oath by traditional religious rites) is analysed, the journey, the main routes and the crossing of the border, as well as inclusion in the circuits of exploitation (Prina, 2005) and the methods of escape through the action of the social services and the police forces. This theoretical point of view allows us to understand – albeit in a way that is not always exhaustive – the complexity that characterises this phenomenon, not only in its entirety but also in the context of each of the phases that it is specifically composed of, in a sequential manner that allows interaction with the groups and the individuals involved.

These aspects are further investigated by Paola Monzini through the reconstruction of the experience of a Nigerian woman escaping from prostitution circuits who told her story. Particularly harsh and violent situations emerged from her story, which were brought about by the madam and their associates for their own enrichment. Maragnani and Aikpitani (2007) have used the same approach of reconstructing the ugly experience of the lives of the Nigerian women involved in a subtle and deceptive, sexual exploitation network³¹. In both studies what is appalling is the apparent simplicity with which potential victims come into contact with recruiters, who are almost always women (the so-called Madam), and how the latter manage to urge them, with false promises which most of the women contacted tended to believe, to undertake the rough path that will lead them to sexual enslavement and exploitation.

All the three studies carried out between 2007 and 2009, with particular focus on the Nigerian constituent (one was carried out with the assistance of techno-structure³², the other from Parsec-UNHCR (2009, November), have

31 The reflection proposed by Lorenza Maluccelli is also interesting in its analysis of the volume cited above, which focusses attention on the relationship between clients and prostitutes that the authors consider the architrave of the phenomenon of prostitution. See Lorenza Maluccelli, *Clients and Prostitutes: Beyond the Sex-Economic Exchange? Case Study on the Girls of Benin City*, in Emanuela Abbatecola (Ed.), (2010), *The scenarios of foreign prostitutions* (pp. 103-134), *Migrant Worlds*, Journal of Studies and Research on International Migration, 1, Franco Angeli.

32 The research project, called 'Exit Routes' was carried out with the institutional assistance of techno-structure of the region; it had the Piedmont Region as its leader and the Campania

resulted in further insight into the relationship with the 'exploitation model'. The first study highlighted the phenomenon of the *black boys* and *cultists*. Compared with what Franco Prima pointed out a few years afterwards, the study included their social configuration, and their specific criminal activity was treated with in-depth understanding, that is, that they are to be the guards who use mafia methods based on intimidation and violence, which thus highlights the command structure involved in trafficking human beings and their subsequent sexual exploitation. The latter practice does not necessarily or sequentially follow from the trafficking procedures – that is, arrival in Italy in a deceptive or violent way – but is rather implemented in the phases following the arrival itself. The potential victims are able to choose to completely disregard what to expect, not only at destination but what can (of course) happen in the coming months.

The second research project by Parsec-UNHCR, was carried out five years after verification of the perpetuation of the exploitation model highlighted by the studies mentioned above (with some additional information). It focuses attention on Nigerian minors who were involved as victims of the practice of forced prostitution. The overall estimate – made by Parsec – of Nigerian women practicing street prostitution ranged between 8000 and 10,000 in 2008 (the higher estimate had been advanced by the Nigerian Embassy in Rome). This is equivalent to 9%, with the adult victims totalled 8180 and the minors about 820 (Parsec-UNHCR). This percentage, on average, has also been found in other subsequent studies. These figures remain more or less the same in a constant manner, even in institutional data (as will be seen below).

This investigation has in fact deepened some aspects of the Nigerian exploitation model, which indiscriminately involves both adult and underage women, as well as male components (albeit in much lower numbers). The recruitment of adult and minor women appears to be an unspecific modality in the sense that there are no particular differences. Recruitment takes place in the most diverse places and in ways that are difficult to categorise, since they correlate to the specific situations that individual people experience daily. The meeting with the madam recruiters can take place anywhere and at any time of the day. The latter are capable of enchanting young women, exploiting their dissatisfaction with life mainly due to their condition of

Region as its coordinator. The other regions that collaborated in it were: Lazio, Tosca, and Valle d'Aosta. The collaboration also extended to the Department for Equal Opportunities. See Tecnostruttura, (2007), Exit Routes. Prostitution and Trafficking, The Library of the Regions no. 4, Franco Angeli.

unemployment and therefore relative poverty, which pushes them to consider emigrating. The madam is one of the possible solutions to the continuing condition of social deprivation. Consequently, once the madam/recruiter has hooked the woman willing to expatriate, the phase of persuasion subtly begins. This ranges from planning and organising the trip, instilling in the woman the idea that once in Italy she will have a good job with which she will be able to pay back the money she herself offers to lend her. Generally, the madam does not act alone, since it is usually a network of highly specialised criminal partnerships which have been put in place to meet a series of technical-logistical needs ranging from travel, the falsification of documents, the buying/selling practices of the women themselves, to the multiple ways of enslavement/exploitation that they have structurally put in place for their illegal enrichment.

By agreeing to expatriate, the woman psychologically takes on the role of a migrant and prepares for departure. She also talks about it with her parents who sometimes encourage her, more or less. She accepts the loan and agrees to undergo traditional rituals to seal the expatriation agreement in exchange for the repayment of the debt. For the madam, on the contrary, this victim has immediately become a source of wealth, like the other women who underwent the same enthrallment. The oath takes on a 'symbolic-ritual character', according to Parsec-UNHCR: 'It consists of the oath that the woman (adult or minor) must take in front of the *sponsor* (the madam or her associates), that is, those who lend them the money to pay the travel expenses and also to pay those who directly or indirectly participate in its organisation. In this way, the oath becomes the official commitment to the restitution of the money received in the presence of a local religious figure (usually the *baba-lawo*). Therefore, a commitment is sealed between the parties (the woman or the minor and the 'benefactors' or 'sponsors', usually the same madam and other recruiters who help them in the enterprise). This commitment rite is traditionally referred to as voodoo practice or *juju*.

This oath celebrated by the *baba-lawo* (generally men, but they can also be women) in the *shrine* requires women, without any possibility of negotiation to respect the oath to return the money received once they arrive at their destination and begin the work promised and prefigured by the madams/sponsors. At the time of the research by Parsec-UNHCR (2010), the journey would take place along the desert tracks from Benin City through the Maghreb and the Mediterranean via the region of Agadez (in Niger), as it is the direction that leads to Fezzan, the Libyan desert region that crosses Tripoli. The trip is made by several people, usually groups of women destined

to become victims of trafficking and sexual exploitation. The crossing of the border takes place by sea or by land, and by travelling through the desert in the direction of Tangier (Morocco) or Cairo (Egypt), and in some cases Istanbul (Turkey) and therefore Athens (Greece). The routes are different and are more expensive depending on the route and point of entry into Italy. All expenses are paid by the potential victims, which is another reason why the initial debt rises exponentially.

The arrival and settlement in Italy are studded with false promises and violence, not only for women or minors but also for young Nigerian males (Akinyoade and Carchedi, 2012)³³. The meeting with the madam's associates or with the Madam herself who recruited the young women or young males sent to Italy is characterised by a double behaviour: one persuasive and the other violent. The madam is unscrupulous, and after a day or two after arrival, the migrant women are transformed into victims: systematically beaten, humiliated, subservient and dehumanised. The street is the place to exercise forced prostitution. The earnings are reserved for the madam and her associates. The victims live together in groups, controlled by the so-called 'small madam' or 'sister', practically collaborators of the 'boss madam' assigned to supervise the women under exploitation. The 'small madam/sister' also practices prostitution, but from a slightly more privileged position as she can keep a small part of what she collects for herself³⁴.

The Madam and the *Boga*: Two Sides of the Same Coin

In the last three to four years (2014/2015) active criminal organisations have grown in Italy. This includes the management of migration flows coming mostly from South Nigeria and heading towards Libya. After a transit, through the Mediterranean, they attempt to land on the coasts of Italy. The activity of these criminal organisations begins in the villages surrounding Benin City. These cities are urbanised and known for significant internal migrations from the states adjacent to the delta of the Niger River, whose overall population is around 30 million.

These criminal organisations have a double configuration: The first is horizontal. These are small groups that act autonomously but with a propensity to ally with other similar organisations in case of need, or when they

33 In particular, Part one - Chapter 2, 'Comparative reading of the collected cases. The exploitation cycle and the conditions experienced by the victims,' pp. 57 et seq

34 See Parsec - UNHCR, *The Trafficking of Nigerian Minors in Italy...*, cit., pp. 26-28.

have to manage illicit affairs of greater complexity. The other is vertical, the expression of organisations that are more structured and articulated within themselves, with a marked hierarchy of roles and functions starting from top to bottom. The shape that these Nigerian organisations often take has been defined as a 'comet star', an intertwining of verticalized organisations, which aggregates a multiplicity of other criminal or even smaller organisations³⁵.

Unlike the exploitation model practiced by Romanian criminal organisations, which has remained almost the same in the last decade, the extensive articulation of the exploitation model of Nigerian women has undergone evident transformations. This is so because many interviewees find it difficult to share the information they have with those from the social services in charge of providing them with support and integration. The novelty, however is that, while remaining part of the well-known model based on the complex figure of the madam, there is, at the same time, the emergence of the figure of the *boga*, a male figure that was entirely absent in the recent past or at least did not have a significant function as in the current situation, where he plays the role of the king, so to say.

The figure of the *boga*, according to the interviews (Int. 5, Int. 6, Int.2, Int. 3, Int. 16, Int. 64), is somewhat complex, like that of the madam to the point that they appear to reflect each other with the only difference being that of gender: the first is a man while the second is a woman. In fact, the *boga* in Pidgin English is a contraction of *Burger*. An explanatory hypothesis for *boga*, inferred with the help of several informants (Int. 2, Int. 64, Int. 179), is that it comes from *Burger* (whose pronunciation in English *be: ga*, pidgin = *boga*), which is a contraction of the word *hamburger*, that is, a meat sandwich with different sauce fillings which can be purchased in special rotisseries and which therefore refers to young people or underworld adults who can spend more than others to eat. This means the ability to eat often in these places, usually fast-food chains (food to be consumed quickly) of a high standard by Benin City standards. It is necessary to have a spending capacity that is above average to be a *boga*. *Boga*, therefore, could mean the one who has a lot of money in his pocket, the one who acquires money quickly (like eating a sandwich, in fact) in a fraudulent way and therefore, thanks to this availability

35 See Francesco Carchedi, *The Criminal Transnational Nigerian Reality*, cit. pp.36-37. In addition, Leonardo Palmisano, (2019), *Black Axe. The Brutal Intelligence of the Nigerian Mafia*, Fandango Libri, where in the first pages it describes the hierarchical structure of the Black Axes, one of the strongest and most fearsome organizing actions from the point of view of their social danger, pp. 11-13. IOM, *Trafficking in Human Beings*, cit. p. 7. 'Boga – reads the report – is the male equivalent of the madam.'

of money, can afford to eat his meals in these *Burger Shops* as selective refreshment points. He is therefore a person who is integrated in a criminal organisation with diversified functions. The *boga* can also be a recruiter or serves as bait for a recruiter of higher capability in the shop where he works or on the adjacent streets. The *boga* therefore has specific and well-defined tasks, such as that of quickly identifying potential victims and as a figure with more diversified functions within the hubs of organised groups dedicated to human trafficking. Furthermore, the *boga* also refers to the speed with which meals are eaten (*fast food*), as well as the decision to leave for Italy. For the International Organisation for Migration, (IOM, and now UN Agency for Migration) the *boga* is an escort for women from Nigeria to Libya, who maintains telephone contacts with the madam (See IOM, *Trafficking in Human Beings ...*, cit. p. 7). Among Ghanaian, the term

Similarly, the *boga*, can, at the same time, be a recruiter of women and men to be transported abroad behind false promises (in the same way as the madam); the one who acquires the documentation for the journey, falsifies them or use documents of other migrants (the same as it happens for the criminal organisations managed by the madam). He also organises the trip along the Benin City-Kano route and then Agadez-Dirko route, before entering Fezzan, the southern region of Libya³⁶, and in particular to Awbari or Sabha. Both cities have 'connection houses', a generic term that configures a multiplicity of meaning such as refreshment centres/accommodation centres or even brothels, a place of business or gathering of buying/selling, centres for people, a place for the reorganisation of travel/change of transporters, as well as places of detention/concentration and torture of Nigerian women crossing the desert. The situation that has arisen in Libya for migrants who pass through it is well described by multiple research or human rights bodies, particularly the United Nations-Support Mission in Libya (UNHCR, 2016).

Parallel and Intersecting Roles of the Madam and the *Boga*

It must be said that over the years the figures of the madam and the *boga* are the most cited by Nigerian women, who are in protected shelters, in describing how they are recruited, imposed the ritual oath, or transported/accompanied abroad and then exploited on Italian territories. Although they perform the same functions, it should be added that these tend to change accordingly. For example, at the recruitment phase, therefore, trafficked Nigerian women,

36 For a view of the desert routes and from western and central Africa to Libya and related maps, cf. Limes, *Mediterranean*, no. 6/2017, in particular the 'Editorial', pp. 7-30.

speak of madam, sponsor, master, and currently of the *boga*. At the phase of oath taking, they speak of the *Babalawo* (that is, the spirits of *Voodoo*) or *Babalawo* (A Yoruba, Western Nigeria word meaning father of divination) and of 'native doctor' or 'savant man' (who makes fetishes and rules their soul) or simply 'Voodoo man'. When it comes to describing their trip, the figures that emerged were those of the 'trolley' or the madam or the 'taxi driver' or the 'desert driver' or even the 'pick-up man', and currently the *boga* and all the others. The gathering places were called 'camps' or 'barrack' (military terms that is, encampment or barrack). When it comes to 'connection house', there is the associating figure of the connection 'man' (the one who manages it and who maintains connections with logistics and criminal networks). At the phase of exploitation, the madam stands out with her various hierarchical articulations: 'big madam', 'madam boss', 'small madam', and 'sister', as well as the 'madam boys' or 'Black boys' or the 'cultists of the confraternities' and now, in addition to the madam and these latest gangs/criminal organisations, even the 'lover boy' and the *boga* who would seem to be detached from criminal organisations in the strict sense (but functional relationships with each other are not excluded). These different ways of naming those who participate in trafficking and consequent exploitation can be correlated to the different areas of origin of trafficked women. Consequently, linguistic terms follow local dialects or slang. This being the case, the different temporality of the flow – the periods of formation/expatriation – as well as the different territorial areas of origin, distinguishable in urban/rural areas, may also play important parts in the use of language, terminology, or slang.

Although both the madam and the *boga* seem to carry out the same criminal activities, when they are carried out in Nigerian territory, these tend to be divided into differentiated tasks in the desert stages of progressive approach to the Libyan border. This division of tasks is because the madam in Libya does not have the same power and managerial skills that she has, unquestionably, within Nigerian territory and in Italy.

In the eyes of the militia leaders operating in southern Fezzan and along the internal routes leading to Tripoli – conservative males and adults and not infrequently even fundamentalists – the madam (being a woman, and mostly a Christian or *Voodooist*/animist) is not considered a third party to any bargaining. Thus, the Nigerian criminal organisations have changed their strategy. For example, in Libya, only men from cultist and mafia organisations with specific executive mandates make agreements with the militia leaders, that is, to manage the groups of migrants up to the Mediterranean coast and then leave them to the other organisations managed by the northern militias

of the maritime transshipment towards the Italian coasts. Indeed, the *boga* is the representative of the Nigerian associations, which, having established a non-conflict transit agreement with the militia chiefs has a 'let pass', which allows them to transport the victims and potential victims to their destination, crossing the Libyan territory without impediments.

Nevertheless, the *boga* could belong to another parallel organisation apart from where he has been operatively assigned by the madam. From this perspective it would emerge that in the last two to three years the *boga* has been playing a key role in addressing the critical issues and above all the violence (and the loss of future earnings) and linear transport on the Libyan route of emigrants and asylum seekers or potential victims destined for prostitution. It has been indispensable for the Nigerian mafia consortia to establish other organisations with male staff to facilitate relations with the Libyan militiamen and their command organisations. These two organisations, with supply chains centred around the madam or *boga* and built on the basis of gender of the main protagonists, can therefore have multiple *modus operandi*, and at the same time remain independent of each other, albeit with a distinct operational advantage in the Libyan territory for those who are male (led by the *boga*).

However, the most probable organisational form, given the wealth and the criminal fame acquired in these decades by the 'big madam' (and of the hierarchically underlying madam) is what could be called the mixed one, that is, a supply chain centred purely on the madam with sub-chains centred on the *boga*, and therefore comprising configurable organisations with flexible organisational modules but entirely of highly encoded and rigidly hierarchical structures. The implementation of both management methods depends on the nature of the critical issues to be overcome from time to time. It should also be added that Nigerian criminal organisations have also diversified their duties and functions according to those who must complete them and divide them on a territorial basis. Accordingly, the position of the 'big madam' (who proclaims herself as a daughter or priestess of Mamiwater) does not change hierarchically; she retains her decision-making power within the organisation, while remaining on the side lines in business within the Libyan borders.

The 'big madam' therefore maintains her influence intact in Nigerian territory, perhaps also in the Agadez area and in all the circuits of the 'connection houses', reducing it near the Libyan borders where the negotiating and technical-operational capacities of the *boga* come into play in relations with

the militia leaders. His influence strongly emerges when the victims have landed on the shores, and the figure of the *boga* remains constantly present. The name *boga*, attributable to many male figures that rotate parasitically around sexually exploited women, is to be considered deliberately generic, since it camouflages differentiated and categorically hierarchical roles and functions so as not to be identifiable externally. The aim is to make it more difficult for them to be intercepted by the police forces and by directly competing criminal gangs/associations.

The *boga* who negotiates with the Libyan militiamen is an organic member of the Nigerian criminal organisations that holds an apical position, while the *boga* that governs the 'connection houses' in Libya or the *boga* that carries women or migrants is comparable to a taxi driver, that is, a mere carrier (the 'connection house' manager is of a higher rank; the taxi driver is of a lower rank). Therefore, the *boga* who 'accompanies' women on the road in Rome or Latina or sells psychotropic substances or carries out courier activities from one city to another in Lazio – or controls and delivers services to women exercising prostitution – is a figure that is peripheral to that which is placed in the first steps of the Nigerian underworld organisation. In summary, and from what emerges from the multiple interviews, alongside the innovative figure of the *boga*, Nigerian organisations always revolve around the 'madam', her 'Black boys' or 'madam boys', a sort of bodyguard and protector from other delinquents and rival organisations, including cultist groups capable of carrying out typically mafia-type criminal activities³⁷.

The Social Profile of the Victims

The social profile of young Nigerian women who migrate has also changed. In addition to the entry of the figure of the *boga* into the Nigerian criminal organisations, the social profile of the victims represents the other element of novelty in the general scheme of exploitation comparable with what appeared only a few years ago. In fact, on the one hand, it is very relevant to highlight the number of women who left on their own, from both the cities and the villages. They travel by organising themselves without the intervention of the madam or the *boga*, even though the majority is still composed of women involved in recruitment practices based mostly on false promises and deceptive prospects for economic progress. On the other hand, the origin

37 To frame the role of Nigerian cultists, please refer again to DIA (Anti-Mafia Investigation Directorate), Report of the Ministry of the Interior to Parliament, cit. pp. 214-217, which shows that the main operating groups also in our country are the Supreme Eye Confraternity and the Black Axe Confraternity.

of the migration process is also different, since for some groups of Nigerian women (and men) the first departure for Italy came from Libya, where they had immigrated before the institutional collapse, from where they are unable to return home or emigrate to another region/foreign country.

However, while those who continue to leave directly from Nigeria are very young (in accordance with the Nigerian demographic figures, they are on average 16/20 years old). The World Bank notes that 44.0% of Nigeria's population is aged between 0-14 years, and about 60.0% are up to 30. The over 65s are at least 3.0% of the entire Nigerian population, estimated in 2017 at around 190 million. Those leaving from Libya are a bit older (about 22/26); they have also usually come from rural areas all around the capitals of Edo state, with most of them being illiterate (at least those who come into contact with anti-trafficking services, from which, among other things, the main information in this regard is gathered). An operator says: 'Only marginal members have been able to study a number of years equivalent to our third grade ... very often they only attended kindergartens ... and in some cases Koranic schools, for those who are originally from Kano'. 'In rare cases we have Nigerian women who studied up to high school, and sometimes they also declare that they attended the first years at university but then they had to abandon their education. Those who are coming from small villages are a good majority; it is understood that the school was not central in their educational and existential experience before expatriation' (Int. 2).

The agreement that these women sign with the groups that organise the trip also appears to be different. Those who leave either alone or in small/very small groups of friends, perhaps fleeing from the war zones of the Southeast and North-east are only slightly entangled in *voodoo* or *juju* practices before departure, as well as those who start from Libya to Italy (if they had not already done so at the time of their first migration). Instead, for those women recruited and persuaded to migrate by the madam or *boga*, they undergo the ritual as a condition *sine qua non* to activate the whole process, which will lead to entrapment. Again, it is also, as is now well known, the magical/religious weapon that will lead progressively to the oath that is sealed in the presence of *Babalawo* in terms of the agreement involving debt repayment. However, not all women who contract debt to expatriate are forced to ritualise their departure in order to guarantee repayment.

The debt contracted entails, in both cases, enslavement, since it is only with the exercise of prostitution that it can be promptly honoured. An expert-operator says: 'The Para-slave bonding, in previous years as in the latter,

begins as soon as you leave the Nigerian territory and can continue without interruption whatsoever to the beaches of Tripoli' (Int. 13, Int. 23). However, in both cases, that is, for those who leave on their own initiative and those who leave organised by the madam or *boga* or other ill-fated groups, on arrival in Libya, they often remain involved in 'connection houses'. In these houses, they almost automatically fall 'under the control of traffickers or so ... or the control of armed groups that abduct and keep them in the same facilities'³⁸, or even under the control 'of the improvised bands who kidnap them even for a few days in order to ask for the payment of ransom either from the families or from the same madam' (Int. 8, Int. 9, Int. 17). The situation of despair and suffering, says another interviewee, pushes those who left by themselves – often fleeing from indiscriminately dangerous situations – to voluntarily seek protection in 'connection house' and even to seek the help of some madam. 'They further subject themselves to the *voodoo ljuju* practice in order for them to feel protected by traditional divinities and to be in tune with the other women of the group. Essentially, they are required to take on socialising identities to counter the loneliness and fear that dominates and immobilises them ... making them prey of every atrocity' (Int. 9). In this situation, subjecting themselves to the ritual oath, and the consequent promise to repay a debt that is contracted at the same time becomes, among other things, an instrument of access and therefore integration into the wider group of the potential victims of exploitation. According to one of the operators, 'Thus the conditions of degradation and violence, creates a strong bond between these women which becomes necessary in order from them to be protected against the continuous torture and abuse of various kinds to which they are subjected' (Int. 64). Additionally, 'even women who were already in Libya before the crash, have to incur debt by undergoing the oath process under the conditions dictated by the madam, since they understand that this is the only way that they have the possibility of expatriating towards the Italian coasts'. A small part of the former migrants who intend to return to their home countries often take advantage of the return trip organised by the *boga* with the promise that once they return, they will pay the required compensation (Int. 7).

38 University of Rome, Roma Tre, Department of Law, Libya. Detention of Migrants, COI reports, Rome, 11 May 2018, Rome, p. 16. Retrieved 23 Feb. 2019, from <http://protezioneinternazionale.giur.uniroma3.it/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Rapporto-COI-Libia-detention-migranti-11-maggio-2018.pdf>

Exploitation Strategies. The Madam, the *Boga*, and the *Lover Boy*

The exploitation strategies follow the modality of engagement/recruitment, of debt negotiation (if any), travel and crossing the border, as well as settlement in the destination areas (for example in the Lazio/Rome areas). This is followed by rigorous exploitation practices and withdrawal of the proceeds from prostitution by the madam. Three main strategies emerge from this scheme and previous observations.

The first is related to women who leave by themselves, sometimes with friends, who cross the desert to the Libyan border. Here, out of necessity, they meet their co-nationals in order for them to adapt themselves in a highly difficult and dangerous territory. The encounter with the madam or *boga* is inevitable. They discover that these women are substantially alone, and so they offer their support, help them to integrate into their group, and act as self-defence against impending dangers. This relationship is ambiguous, opaque, and also aggressive and violent. These women, to put it in the words of an interviewed person (Int. 2), progressively slide 'into the circuits of prostitution that revolve around the now known "connection houses" or into those characterised as labour exploitation, or in both circuits, in alternation or simultaneously'. This condition, according to a Nigerian mediator in Priverno (Int. 111) means that the accumulation of money enables them to have more 'chances' to leave Libya and then have money to sail to Lampedusa or to Pozzallo. The 'connection house' often is a situation of violence, either imposed by the madam or the *boga*. In the desperate attempt to leave Libya, many women prefer to prostitute themselves in the hope of having the resources to be able to leave as soon as possible. In these cases, prostitution paradoxically becomes a minor source of suffering in this context. In desperation, anything that allows these women to glimpse a way out is pursued and, in order to have the money to pay for a place on the ship for many of these women, prostitution remains the only real and concrete way out. The women who have fled in this way often do nothing but cry when they tell their story, sometimes, joyfully for having found the strength not to succumb definitively. Although these women are sometimes very young, they have shown extraordinary strength.

The second is related to the formal codification of these relationships: both for women who migrate, have migrated alone or with friends, or who have fled with the prospect of requesting international protection, and for those who have followed the channels managed by the madam or *boga* but did not perform any rituals and therefore took no oath. But even in these cases, in a social environment like Libya that is highly unstable and violent, the

meeting of Nigerian women and the madam or *boga* is inevitable as already mentioned, in a perspective of (apparent) mutual support.

These established relationships tend to consolidate and consequently to strengthen. The relationships between the madam or *boga* and the young women with whom they come in contact in the Libyan territory pass almost obligatorily through the ritual of the oath taking in front of a *voodoo* official (with full blown experience, or by fake impostors who improvise). Among other things, there is the solemn and explicit promise to make provision, as soon as possible, for the restitution of what they are receiving in support and assistance; however, this is deceptive and decidedly instrumental. The information acquired in this regard from the interviews unequivocally confirms that the ritual, for women who have not carried it out in the phase prior to departure, is proposed in these situations and accepted by the women themselves as a 'symbolic/religious nourishment in a context of particular danger', as observed by an interviewed psychologist (Int. 9).

According to another person interviewed (Int. 20), 'the *voodoo* rite acquires a double meaning in these situations'. The first is almost an explicit request from the woman, since she thus enters a symbolic and at the same time concrete protective sphere, without which she would be excluded. The rite carried out has the effect or the idea of a group identity and therefore gives access to being 'protected by the spirits that protect the circle of the madam', as noted by a Nigerian cultural mediator (Int. 111). The second is, in fact to use the words of another interviewee (Int. 8), 'a voluntary surrender to the arbitrary power of the madam or *boga* and therefore to a substantial subjection ... in consideration of the privilege of having entered their protection, even if this or self-surrender is subsequently used to subdue them to engage in predatory practices'. The *boga*, who is at the service of the madam in Libya, directly manages the 'connection house' (in the form of brothel). They are also called 'connection men', because they are attached to the displacement of the women to be exploited. In carrying out the first and the second activity, they are accompanied by armed groups of Nigerian origin and militiamen with whom they have established functional relationships. The dangers for migrants, in general, and for women victims of trafficking destined for prostitution, in particular, come not only from Libyan militias or from fringes of corrupt police officers but also from mixed groups of Nigerians and Libyans or other groups called 'Asma boys' (which refer to Islamic religious sub-cultures). These very dangerous and violent gangs can be compared to cultist (typically Nigerian) brotherhoods due to their sectarian and hierarchical structure. In order for them to assault migrants – and ask for ransom – the 'Asma boys'

team up with Nigerian, and in some cases Eritrean militias, because without their help the 'Asma boys' would have difficulty in communicating with the families of the kidnapped people from whom they ask for ransoms. Joint actions between them are often directed against 'connection houses', where they offer their subjugating protection in return. These bands, as recounted by Nigerian women who belong to the services (Such as Roxanne and Lazio 2 Network: Int. 5, Int. 7, Int. 64), only operate in Libya, because they never speak once you arrive in Rome and Lazio. They are violent groups, and when they intercept a 'pickup' of women destined for prostitution, they are paid even by the most powerful madam or *boga*, as they are well armed and manage to have autonomous spaces of manoeuvre even in the fragmented situation of southern Libya. This happens, according to other interlocutors (Int. 63, Int. 64, Int. 179, 'when these gangs have not entered into any non-belligerence pact with the Nigerian partnerships'. This is also reported in the sessions of the Tribunal of the Peoples on migrants, Palermo, 18-20 December 2017 where the 'Asma boys' are cited as armed groups living on robberies and ransom involving migrants stuck mainly in Sabha and other smaller towns.

The third strategy is related to the exploitation practices that accompany Nigerian women who have now arrived in Italy, following the indications received on departure from Tripoli. A significant number of these women arrive with experience marked by multiple abuse and violence (Int. 63, Int. 32). Entry into Italy recomposes the relationships between women destined for prostitution and their exploiters, under different configurations. 'The madam or Boga, in Nigeria or Libya or anywhere else, come in contact with their victims and reconnect at different hierarchical scales of the organised structures of belonging', says an operator (Int. 2).

The people, who are part of criminal associations, have been linked to another protagonist, that is to say, the boyfriend or 'lover boy' (this figure was almost completely absent in previous studies). The role of the 'lover boy' is very similar to that found among Romanian women, and of other nationalities. The 'lover boy' of Romanian and Nigerian women (but also Polish and Ukrainian women) is the same as the 'boyfriend' of Albanian women a few years back. Behind this appellation, he is a real criminal and exploiter, who in an entirely arbitrary and cynical way can exploit a woman, declaring himself her man, and future husband, while at the same time exploiting other women, and declaring the same thing to them. In addition, this figure, very widespread in recent years, is involved in the processes of exploitation, in which he plays the card of a sentimental relationship. This relationship masks, in substance, subtle or openly coercive behaviour (like those found in

Romanian and Albanian groups); the figure of the 'lover boy' has been a part of the panorama of sexual exploitation of Nigerian women for a few years now and therefore is the result of a transformation of the previous model. This figure has been widespread in the prostitution practices of Albanian women over the years, and remains present in Romanian ones. This means that between the different gangs of torturers – belonging to different nationalities – there is a tendency to use the most suitable methods to reiterate exploitation practices in a non-conflicting manner. Therefore, the introduction of the 'lover boy' into Nigerian practices is nothing more than the product of a process of Albanisation/Rumanisation of the exploitation model, and an extensive articulation of the founding axis which is persuasion and a repeated sales pitch.

The Anathema of the Oba of Benin

A large part of the inhabitants of the State of Edo today are convinced – says Sister Mary Dorothy Ezech – that their kings come from heaven. This belief confirms why the Oba or king represents the embodiment of the culture of the State of Edo, in such a way that everything revolves around the person of the Oba. It is for this reason that the Oba holds a highly significant moral power and is listened to as a charismatic figure and spiritual and political guide at the same time. The Oba, therefore, from a symbolic point of view, represents the father-king who descends to earth to govern/administer the life of the community, since 'they are considered both as political leaders and as sacred figures' according to John S. Mbiti in his book *Beyond Magic*. Power, however, is the prerogative of the state (understood in its modernity) and therefore belongs to the constitutionally elected government and parliament (since independence in October 1960). It should be added that, according to Bernardo Bernardi (see *Africa Tradition and Modernity*, 1998, pp. 80-81), in African society (in general) there is a direct equation between culture and religion, while in western culture this is matter of debate and strong divisions. Therefore, the Oba, considering this overlap, can be considered a king-bishop, 'a deified king', as Joseph Ki-Zerbo defines it (see *History of Black Africa*, 2016, in particular Chapter Four, part III, The Yoruba Kingdoms and Benin, pp. 195-198).

On 9 March 2019, Oba Ewuare II, in his residence and solemnly in front of about 200 'native doctors' (or part of the religious class of the Benin communities in Edo State), organised an event of historically significant importance. He, in substance placed a curse (through an anathema) on the traffickers of human beings and all those who practice *voodoo/juju*

rites as a curse, condemning them on the grounds that these rights are to be considered as acts of witchcraft, and therefore opposite and contrasting with disinterested religious practices. The importance of this clear stance is determined by the dichotomy that the Oba has created between licit religious practices and illicit religious practices, thus outlining precise boundaries between them, exposing the 'double face' that characterises the *babalowo* who practice deceptive rites.

It is the Oba's view that these deliberately deceptive and blasphemous rituals and actions are nothing more than malign practices aimed at subjugating young women, or anyone else remaining entangled, using symbolic and ritual religious power not for the well-being – the emotional, social, and spiritual aspects – of the members of the community but, on the contrary, for brutalization and psycho-physical degradation, subjecting them to differentiated forms of exploitation. Ewuare II thus has chosen sides, as an enlightened king who is sensitive to the continuing protests from the Nigerian and international institutions, thereby has called into play all the dynamics created around this ugly phenomenon in Edo State and beyond. These constitute social, economic, and political dynamics, therefore, which are produced by the interaction or conflict arising among dishonest and honest operators of the cult, by rich and not so rich madams who hire them to bend them to their will without encountering any resistance from poor families, who often suffer from an absence of a male figure, which then makes it easier to send the most enterprising children abroad so they will send remittances; which also include business centres that falsify documents, and taxi drivers ready to cross the desert without documentation. And involved as well are simple idiots who furnish information to the madams on potential migrants and members of the cultist groups, as well as associates of transnational organised crime, actively engaged in the processes of sexual exploitation.

So, what has been the effect of the Oba's curse among young women forced into prostitution on the streets of Italy? Several interviewees in this regard have substantially affirmed that this anathema has generally had a positive effect among Nigerian women who have been taken into humanitarian protection throughout the national territory and therefore also in Lazio. This positive effect, attributed to the anathema, 'in some cases, according to an interviewee (Int. 2), was a real liberation ... a euphoric feeling of breaking the lines. The madams were on the defensive; they did not know how to remodel their ancestry with women who prostitute themselves for them. For madam and traffickers it was a real and unexpected shock.'

Another Nigerian continues: 'a few days after the anathema, a Nigerian woman told us that her madam offered to halve the debt of the remaining 15,000 euros and was willing to accept 7500, but that also 6000 would be ok. This was because the exploited woman was from Uromi and not from Benin City. However, the same woman said that after what the King had said she was no longer afraid of becoming crazy or dying' (Int.111). After the summer (2019) the effect of the anathema had diminished somewhat, as the madams – and the criminal networks involved with them – began to argue against the anathema itself. On the one hand, they said that the Benin City Oba had spiritual competence only in the urban area and its surroundings, not in the more distant areas and therefore in the territories of other cities, for example in Uromi or Auchi (Int. 3). On the other hand, they affirmed that the validity of the anathema only correlated with those rites performed before March 9 and not to subsequent ones (Int. 7).

Another consideration, more subtle and deceptive, states that the madams are more powerful than the Oba, because with the anathema the Oba himself put himself in opposition to religion and the *juju* (in this case to be considered as spiritualised fetishes) that also protected the madam, and which is powerful thanks to them. In addition, if the Oba is so powerful then even the madams are as well, especially those who call themselves daughters of Mamiwater. Furthermore, Alessandra Brivio, in his book, *Il Vodù in Africa* (viz. p. 14) notes that 'the relationship between divinity and priest is a mirror of the relationship between men in the society. The status of a leader depends on the number of faithful he has and the prestige of a cult is a function of the devotion that the faithful reserve to him, and this prestige is reflected in the faithful themselves. For this reason, it is not important for a believer that his belief has a systematic set of all the divinities that make up the alleged pantheon, but the personal and mutual relationship with the *voodoo*. Hence the tendency to fragment them into numerous different manifestations, so that each individual or group of people have their own customised version'. From this perspective, on the one hand, the Oba is more powerful in terms of the number of faithful (in practice the whole province of Benin City and, through relations with the Oba, the other provinces of the whole State of Edo). On the other hand, the madam, although prestigious and powerful, will not be able to compete with the Oba but can only carve out a niche of faithful who praise her, including segments of women who are subjected and exploited by her. The personalization of religious beliefs is also argued by Ulrick Beck (in *The Personal God. The Birth of Secular Religiosity*, Laterza, Rome, 2009), as trying to combine, perhaps in vain, as he himself points

out, 'water and fire, to the advantage of both: (i.e.) of the cognitive need of sociology, and perhaps also the self-understanding of religion' (pp. 4-5).

It is therefore possible that a balance is established between the power of one and the other, and by virtue of this balance, the relations between the madam and the women subjected to them remain substantially the same as they were before the anathema.

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6

Domestic Violence and Abuse Within the African Churches

Carrie Pemberton Ford

Abstract

This is a redacted piece of research into the African Churches of the Pentecostal tradition in the UK undertaken in 2017 and presented to the House of Lords in a more substantial report in the summer of 2017. The complex ‘intersectionality’ of abuses taking place ‘behind closed doors’ in communities of all ethnicities, in diasporic and indigenous communities, is something that is increasingly understood by those working in counter-trafficking, modern-day slavery, and domestic abuse resilience building. However, the work of making the offences clear, of enabling the voices of those who suffer ‘behind closed doors’ to be heard, and not foreclosed, not silenced, or ignored is a vital piece of gospel-shaped discipleship being called forth from contemporary Pentecostal communities in this report’s engagement.

Behind closed doors – voices against gender-based violence, human trafficking and modern-day slavery



Figure 6.1

On the frontispiece sit two young women — one is just 17, the other a young woman of 22. Today they are both in their thirties, because this picture was taken over thirteen years ago when the work of the Churches Alert to Sex Trafficking Across Europe was just starting. The presence of young women from West and Central Africa was just emerging as a presence within ‘Human Trafficking’ in the UK. Then, the patterns of exploitation were not clearly understood by police forces in general, and their cases were classified as ‘irregular migration’ and fought through ‘asylum’ case law. However, these two women represented many hundreds who were present, under the radar of police or legislative protection, who had been brought over either for direct exploitation within a diasporic ‘sex industry’ — with most of their clients being from their ethnic or national communities — or for domestic servitude. However, even within domestic servitude, the presence of the additional trauma of sexual harassment and exploitation is never far away, with adult males behind the closed doors of the ‘domestic space’ able to seize on the opportunity of vulnerable, unprotected young women who are seen as readily ‘available for sex’ within his domicile.

This scenario was a regular component of the debriefs I would receive whilst operating ‘first responding’ care in the early years before the National Referral Mechanism was established. Recognition of this growing phenomenon has since started to emerge from the various asylum and counter-trafficking cases being pursued in asylum tribunals and county courts across the UK and Ireland. The full reach of this appalling breach of ‘hospitality codes’, of sexual abuse, rape, humiliation, trauma, and degradation, whilst young women, as minors or young adults, were ‘keeping house’ or ‘minding the children’ for working parents from the hard-pressed West African community, has not yet been fully catalogued. Many breaches never made it into any ‘crime report’ or formal recognition by the State. Their abuse and their trauma remain unacknowledged, unrectified, ‘being swallowed’ as one of my Ugandan clients told me – ‘We just have to swallow, we suffer in silence, and swallow the pain, what else can we do?’³⁹

The complex ‘intersectionality’ of abuses taking place ‘behind closed doors’ in communities of all ethnicities, in diasporic and indigenous communities, is something that is increasingly understood by those working in counter trafficking, modern-day slavery, and domestic abuse resilience building. However, the work of making the offences clear, of enabling the voices of those who suffer ‘behind closed doors’ to be heard and not foreclosed, not silenced, or ignored, is a vital piece of gospel-shaped discipleship being called forth from contemporary Pentecostal communities in this report’s engagement.

The methodology adopted for this piece of research was essentially qualitative, supplemented by contextualising desk-research and review of the current information available on the areas in focus, Human Trafficking, Domestic Servitude, and Domestic Violence. All three of the most common qualitative methods – participant observation, in-depth interviews, and workshop-based focus groups – were used alongside an on-line survey, which was made available off-line for some specific congregations visited. The response to the survey itself was not particularly well supported – with the feed-back received from the constituency being approached being that on-line was not a particularly good way to proceed. It was suggested that, for future reference, a rapid survey utilising phone technology would be a more suitable medium for harnessing the mobile phone using population (from observation of church services ubiquitously deployed by all ages). This learning curve has been taken on board as part of the iterative process of

39 Patricia (not given name) brought over for domestic servitude and sexual exploitation. 2003 (Yarl’s Wood detained parishioner).

research, and some conversations have been had with parties who would be interested in servicing a future 'dip response' through mobile tech.

Alongside the survey, and the approaches mentioned above, the classic strategy for investigating discrete communities using snowball interviewing was undertaken, with a few key gatekeepers enabling access to a range of voices from within one particular stream of the African Independent Churches opening up with direct face-to-face engagement with the lead researcher. There were numerous telephone interviews with key 'witnesses' and advocates, and researchers established a creative, dynamic WhatsApp, which continues to undertake engagement on the themes set in motion by this research with a membership of over 200 active participants, mostly church pastors, prophetesses, and some public officials drawn from medicine, law, policing, and the legislature, and drawn from the UK, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Italy. As a piece of participant observer engagement, the work evolved to generate some designated training events with African Independent Church and Caribbean Pentecostal Church leadership fora, which were identified as key areas to commence the conversation around domestic servitude, human trafficking and domestic abuse – a highly gendered discourse but with both sexes in the frame.

The aims and methods of qualitative research can, at first glance, seem imprecise; a common criticism includes the fact that the sampled constituency can be small and not necessarily representative of the broader population, from whom information is also sought by the commissioning body, so that there is the ubiquitous challenge that there is difficulty in coming up with any 'generalisation' from the results. Nevertheless, the method of direct researcher engagement has now considerable credence in the field of social research, particularly in arenas where there is limited formal research undertaken and where data sampling is small and erratic.

The recommendations that emerged from the report focussed on a number of key issues, which were signposted and flagged across the course of this eighteen-month engagement.

One of the communities that has been less well understood in terms of the pattern and means of trafficking abuse has been the various West African communities, amongst whom trafficking networks have been profiting from supplying young women for the 'informal market spaces' of sexual exploitation frequently linked with operations in Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands, and in domestic servitude. Detailed analysis of how these networks operate is

not the subject of this report; its focus is instead on how the reality of the abuse, its mitigation, and its transformation might be enabled through the participation of the churches who are part and parcel of the reality of so many ‘#BlackLivesMatter’ experiences here in the UK. For those seeking a deeper understanding of the methods and the continued spread of West African trafficking networks the following reports will be of interest.⁴⁰ With the emergence of the National Referral Mechanism, the increasing identification of West African females within the trafficked numbers, either as victims of domestic servitude or as sexually exploited, has been a cause for concern from the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner’s Office, alongside a number of advocacy agencies, including AFRUCA whose founder Debbie Ariyo has for over a decade been signalling the presence of substantial numbers of black female lives, both children and adults, being caught up in the human trafficking nexus.

An article in the Guardian in August 2016 drew attention to how – in the current ‘migration crisis’ from across the loading bays of Libya and Egypt – young Nigerian women were noted in number, with around 3600 Nigerian women arriving by boat into Italy in the first six months of 2016, almost double the number who were registered in the same time period in 2015, according to the International Office of Migration (OM).⁴¹ Many of these young women are indebted to their traffickers to the tune of GBP 40,000 for their journey, and numbers have been climbing steadily from about 1500 Nigerian women who arrived by sea in 2014 to 5633 in 2015, with these figures climbing to just below 10,000 in 2016. Although many of those who are trafficked into the UK arrive directly through long haul and short haul airports, the pressure of movement through illicit routes that are regularised through accessing Italy by boat will have undoubtedly added pressure across Europe. As can be seen from graphs assembled from data compiled by the

40 Baarda, C.S. (2016). Human Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation from Nigeria into Western Europe: The Role of Voodoo Rituals in the Functioning of a Criminal Network. *European Journal of Criminology*, 13, 257-273. Campana, P. (2016). The Structure of Human Trafficking: Lifting the Bonnet on a Nigerian Transnational Network. *British Journal of Criminology*, 56, 68-86. Ebbe, O.N.I., & Das, D.K. (2008). *Global Trafficking in Women and Children*, Boca Raton, FL, International Police Executive Symposium: CRC Press. Cherti, M., Pennington, J., & Grant, P. (2013). *Beyond Borders: Human Trafficking from Nigeria to the UK*. Institute For Public Policy Research. Nwogu, V.I. (2006). Nigeria: Human Trafficking and Migration. *Forced Migration Review*, 32-33. Okojie, C.E.E., Prina, F., & United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. (2004). *Trafficking of Nigerian Girls to Italy (Il Traffico delle Ragazze Nigeriane in Italia)*, Turin, Italy, Unicri, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute.

41 Retrieved 10 January 2017, from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/aug/08/trafficking-of-nigerian-women-into-prostitution-in-europe-at-crisis-level>.

National Crime Agency, Nigerian females constitute the highest referral group of victims of domestic servitude across the nationalities reported, followed by the amalgamated African countries. Nigerian females ranked third amongst the international referral group for sexual exploitation in 2016, though by the time this essay was submitted to press (Quarter 2 of 2021) this ranking had reduced by a fifth, behind numbers recorded for Chinese, Romanian, Vietnamese, and Albanian victims. There is clearly a challenge here for the European networks of the churches who seek to address this abuse and who seek to proffer sustainable and meaningful responses to the humanitarian crisis that it represents, alongside an appropriate riposte to the criminal networks that are sustaining its presence.

Public sector bodies acknowledge that in all communities, these areas of abuse, whether sexual exploitation, offences within the domestic realm – domestic servitude, or child abuse, or coercive control as part of domestic abuse – are extremely difficult to access, measure, and assess in order to determine their extent, pervasiveness, or ‘harm’ impact. Patterns of behaviour have been deeply cultural and indeed legitimatised by customary law over time – embedded in legislation, themes lying latent in theological reflection and gender-asymmetric homilies, in household ordering and patterns of ‘acceptable’ disciplining or gendered role confirmation, in a sexual economy largely approved of or at the very least ‘accepted’. The paradigms of whichever dominant theologies and community practices cement the identity of particular ideologically or geographically constituted communities are performed and solidified across the generations to bring about ‘approved of’ behaviours and defined gendered roles. This is particularly powerful in the ways in which household ‘economies’ are managed: they are private zones, with an enormous potential for harm to be practiced ‘behind closed doors’ without recourse to the assistance of the wider community.

This social patterning and coding have a particular impact on how any form of sexual abuse, coercive control and domestic violence, disciplining of children and partners, and household-located domestic servitude is understood by the wider community in whose households it occurs. Many communities feel ‘under pressure’ from the wider ‘host’ community, and so there are some importantly alterities experienced by diasporic communities in the way in which cultural change and ‘reporting procedures’ are experienced. Moreover, domains of the ‘sexual’ and the ‘household’ are frequently configured as ‘private’ zones to be managed discretely either among power-broking males, or within the particular communities or households in which the abuses occur. It is only recently that domestic abuse has started to be owned by

the government of the UK as a substantial challenge for safety, well-being, and human rights for all of its citizens. The same is the case for domestic servitude, and for all forms of human trafficking and modern-day slavery.⁴² We are on a journey. And the journey commences by opening some doors on what is happening behind them.

A breakthrough in reporting numbers occurred when the British Crime Survey introduced the ability for their informants (who were notwithstanding skewed to a certain ethnicity, class, and experience of crime background) to report independently and anonymously through the researcher's laptop. Once handed over to respondents so they could directly respond to questions around rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment and domestic violence, this reporting mechanism enabled incidents of domestic violence, previously undisclosed, to emerge for analysis by the National Office of Statistics and as analysable data for Whitehall and Westminster to consider as they occurred across Britain. The prevalence of disclosure shifted dramatically, to the consternation of those in Home Office governance. This move towards 'safe anonymised reporting' massively assisted the 'evidence-based' drive towards a more pro-active legislation, which elevated domestic violence and assaults into the 'publicly' chargeable domain.

Furthermore, the external leverage of the Istanbul Convention, drawing considered attention from police and crime commissioners nationwide, would require commensurate backing with resources and further front-line responder training.⁴³ Further developments have been resourced by the Home Office in the United Kingdom with the establishment of an Independent Office of Domestic Abuse Commissioner, tasked with encouraging good practice in preventing domestic abuse, identifying both those at risk of abuse as well as those perpetrating it, and improving the protection and provision of support to those affected by domestic abuse. They will also be tasked with the publication of reports that can hold statutory agencies and the government to account. This is an area in which ethnic minorities need to mobilise

42 A further discussion on the challenges which the term 'modern-day slavery' raises as an appropriate way to flag contemporary human-trafficking maleficence, and the sociopolitical cultural questions it both poses and silences in its deployment, awaits publication from my pen later this year 2020.

43 The Council of Europe Convention, which was adopted by the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers on 7 April 2011 and opened for signature on 11 May 2011 on the occasion of the 121st Session of the Committee of Ministers in Istanbul: this is an advisory international convention to counter violence against women, with specific attention to domestic abuse and gender-based violations. Now ratified through a rising number of signatories.

resources so as to input research on the nature of domestic abuse occurring within their communities and develop contextualised practices to not only enhance reporting but create fresh discourses around how abuse is to be addressed and redressed, minimising the ongoing economic, psychological, and physiological traumatic impacts on the victim and any dependents.

These are whole community issues, which need to be brought forward as the critical health, gender equity and safeguarding challenges that they are. For many years, this ‘criminality’ has hidden itself away under the tag of ‘marital difficulties’ or domestic incidents to be addressed by community elders (ubiquitously male, sharing the gender of a majority of the abusers, which requires further interrogation and deconstruction in order to bring about a reporting mechanism that privileges and protects the victim rather than the abuser). As domestic abuse enters with greater clarity into statute books around the globe, domestic abuse will need to be understood as a criminal event whereby a citizen – either an adult or a minor – is abused, beaten, intimidated, raped, controlled, and bullied by another domiciled with them. The only thing different about crimes committed beyond the secrecy triggered by the closing of the front door is the fact that the realm of the domestic has been ‘not counted’ in the discourses of post-enlightenment political economy. As has been trenchantly described by Katrine Marçal in her deconstruction of modern transactional market economics built on the exclusion of the female lived experience in *Who Cooked Adam Smith’s Dinner?*

Women for thousands of years (have) been excluded from the parts of society that held economic and political power. – Even though the word ‘economy’ comes from the Greek word meaning home, economists have long been uninterested in what exactly happens at home. Woman’s self-sacrificing nature was said to tie her to the private sphere, and thus she was not economically relevant. Activities like raising children, cleaning, washing or ironing for her family. (One might also add, in other contexts, fetching water, wood, gardening the essentials for the domestic table, educating the girls, preparing the grains, butchering the meat, cooking and feeding everybody).⁴⁴

This perspective, which has informed much of the cultural milieu and civil laws in place in both the former ‘Metropolises’ and their satellite colonised juridical systems, needs to be fully understood and deconstructed in order to bring contemporary responses to what takes place within the ‘domestic

44 Marçal, K. (2012). *Who Cooked Adam Smith’s Dinner*. Granta.

space' into the public domain in a way that no longer denigrates women as personifying the 'body' while elevating male behaviours to a realm solely governed by 'reason'. Domestic violence, abuse, and servitude has to be brought under the forensic gaze of public justice systems, with the incidents classified as offences against the human being, regardless of gender. Furthermore, when cultural mores are invoked that seek to 'disappear' once again the female into the realm of 'male guardianship', whether that be those who convene the religious structures, or the local political and community voices that engage with the wider civil authorities, it is critically important that the protocols of victim protection, advocacy, and essential human rights to safety, integrity, fully informed choice, and access to independent juridical systems are protected and delivered. Only in this way will the centuries of disappeared female bodies, battered psyches, and sustained emotional abuse start to be redressed.

The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, referred to above more popularly as the Istanbul Convention, has been a singularly important initiative in widening the capacity and attention of states to address the urgent requirement to address gender-based and all other forms of domestic violence. It is based on the understanding that violence against women is a form of gender-based violence, committed against women because they are women. It places an obligation on signatory states to fully address it in all its forms and to take measures to prevent violence against women, protect its victims, and prosecute the perpetrators. In the definition articulated in Article 3 of the convention, domestic violence means all acts of physical, sexual, psychological, or economic violence that occur within the family or domestic unit or between former or current spouses or partners, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with the victim (COE, 2011).

Furthermore, and significantly in the light of a plethora of counterexamples in the existing legislatures, article 36 announces that:

1. Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the following intentional conducts are criminalised:
 - a.) engaging in non-consensual vaginal, anal or oral penetration of a sexual nature of the body of another person with any bodily part or object;
 - b.) engaging in other non-consensual acts of a sexual nature with a person;
 - c.) causing another person to engage in non-consensual acts of a sexual nature with a third person.

2. Consent must be given voluntarily as the result of the person's free will assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances.
3. Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the provisions of paragraph 1 also apply to acts committed against former or current spouses or partners as recognised by internal law.⁴⁵

Significantly, legislation in Nigeria and the United Kingdom is currently not aligned with the recognition of Article 36, and so incidents of marital rape are seriously under-prosecuted in Nigeria. Such incidents, when escalated to the attention of prosecutors, are only able to be captured under legislation proscribing sexual assault, which fails to appropriately capture the possibility of a woman withholding consent from the sexual act, conceived by many traditions in Nigeria and other territories as part of the implicit agreement of 'bride price' traditions.⁴⁶ As a consequence, transatlantic churches have a significant role to play in lifting perceptions in their communities around protection, the varied nature of abuse that can pertain notwithstanding marriage contracts, and the ambiguity that has surrounded behaviours within the domestic terrain. This is now determined to be an arena for public protection, thankfully no longer a domain to be partitioned off from public justice and patrolled by men, whether as husbands, clerics, or imams.

Under-reporting afflicts the UK as much as it does Nigeria. As in the fight against domestic abuse, so with human trafficking and modern-day slavery: police, the Home Office and anti-corruption and fraud agencies in the United Kingdom have found it extremely problematic to get a true grip on the nature, extent, and impacts of this complex and morphing crime type, due to its inherently criminal and 'hidden nature'. Not only is there direct intimidation of the 'victim' as in the case of domestic violence and abuse, but there is also a range of intimidatory and control techniques that frequently cascade across the Atlantic, affecting families thousands of miles from where the current abuse is taking place. Of course the complicity of some families in the initial recruitment of the one being trafficked into domestic servitude adds another hugely problematic layer to unpacking the abuse and creating the circumstances where liberty can be once more enjoyed when and if the domestic servitude is ever revealed to the authorities and successfully prosecuted. Very few of these cases surface to the attention of the authorities, being largely accepted as part of the 'African mindset' and as cultural norms that assist Nigerian women, (alongside females from other African countries)

⁴⁵ Council of Europe 2011. The Istanbul Convention. Council of Europe, *ibid*.

⁴⁶ See noted on discussion of Renewing the African Mindset, You Tube, 18 April 2020.

manage their households whilst they pursue their working lives outside of the home.⁴⁷

Moreover, with human trafficking and modern-day slavery there is a vital 'second' economy developed, an economy that sustains, markets, and supports abuse operating alongside the first economy, which is regulated, taxed, and made increasingly transparent and open to a range of algorithms and analysis to serve the purposes of planning. This second economy finances a range of intimidatory and silencing methods to protect itself and its 'business,' the people commodities 'which' are exchanged between households, countries, regions, towns, with their lives and autonomy sold into several years of 'debt servitude' that must be endured before 'release' can be envisaged.⁴⁸ It is necessary to acknowledge that what can appear as a somewhat chaotic matrix of abuse that locates itself within the domestic realm has significant points of intersection with networks depending on organised crime groups in Nigeria and other African countries that have become embroiled in providing young women and men for placement in situations of domestic servitude – alongside social security and benefit fraud, drug running, and other forms of criminality in countries of destination and source. Furthermore, it is important to understand that there is a ubiquitous threat of sexual exploitation and abuse that frequently surfaces in all of these various chattelage roles, once the exposure of the dominant form of exploitation comes to the attention of the authorities.

Addressing Anxieties

What emerged from this research is that there is clearly an urgent and pressing requirement for awareness across church communities of the various abuses that are in play around domestic abuse, coercive control, human trafficking, sexual exploitation of minors, and domestic servitude. Every one of these areas is particularly loaded with profound anxieties, calling forth an oscillating response from the church communities in which they manifest. This is not

47 Renewing the African Mindset online panel on domestic abuse and human trafficking, 25 April 2020.

48 Different countries have different methods of indebted labour within the trafficking cycle. The method of a 'mutually agreed' debt to access the labour market of regional cities or the international market of the UK or Europe, or the Middle East, which is deployed by West African trafficking networks, is exceedingly invidious to crack as those who are entrapped in this way feel that they have colluded and agreed with these terms, however challenging and abusive the situation becomes. This is quite apart from the contractual *juju* ceremonies which are deployed in the Edo and Delta State to 'seal the deal' with profound fear around any 'deviation of contract'.

because the churches are solely responsible for, or corner the market in, these abuses and violation of dignity and rights. Churches are a part of the wider community in which these offences have been historically present and, as is seen in international trafficking, churches have been embroiled through their extended membership (notwithstanding the exception with the presence of 'rogue' pastorates) on occasion as points of deployment of young trafficked victims, exploited in either domestic servitude or sexual exploitation.

Furthermore, because churches are part of the narrative of safety in diaspora communities, and the settling of identity in countries where latent and embedded institutional racism has meant that there is not as open an access to safety information as one might like to assume, there needs to be a robust, consistent, well-resourced programme of training for those in community leadership, overwhelmingly manifested in churches and mosques in relation to the way in which households are to be run, children raised, marriages arbitrated, sexual consent understood and brokered, and extended household members protected. Such training is a pressing matter; this particular research revealed an appetite for it amongst many of those who were interviewed, particularly amongst the women in leadership, operating as prophetesses, choir directors, and church founders, in the UK and across the Nigerian and West African diaspora.

From time to time reports emerging in the press undermine confidence across communities with reports of exorcisms performed on young adolescents or the implication that some pastors or elders are involved in trafficking networks from Nigeria, into Europe and the UK. Jean La Fontaine points out that the churches as cultural communities offer group cohesion and provide social welfare that may not be particularly accessible through the processes of the state, owing to worries about the intervention of social services in a way disruptive to households, or the unwelcome attention of the immigration directorate. This is a concern with heightened relevance in the aftermath of the Windrush scandal, which brought to public attention some of the layers of ignorance which the Immigration directorate had as to the layered history of African and Caribbean citizens in Britain, which requires more careful interventions into these communities.⁴⁹ Furthermore negative stories about exorcisms, or complicity of church members with trafficking for fostering and adoption – or with domestic servitude in focus – is extremely damaging for the ability of these communities to be treated with seriousness and respect by the public authorities. The compliment is therefore reciprocated, with

⁴⁹ Williams (2020). Windrush Learned Response.

unfortunate levels of under-reporting and confidence in reporting concerns and violations that occur within these frequently tight-knit communities.

It is important that the religious communities in which so many in the West African diaspora are involved, as part of their configuration of identity as they establish presence and confidence within their host country of residence, do not feel particularly under scrutiny for issues pertaining to trafficking, domestic abuse, sexual exploitation, or domestic servitude. Although the numbers now being reported in the National Referral Mechanism do show West African numbers to be significant in relation to reported cases of trafficking for sexual exploitation and domestic servitude, the attitude of many of the church leaders with whom I engaged was a mixture of consternation and a desire 'to root out' any pastors who were disclosed as having become party to benefitting from 'trafficking networks', and to enable their congregations to attain greater clarity about the nature in particular of domestic servitude. The anxiety around the presence of domestic abuse was clearly present, as was an associated intergenerational rather than a purely gendered issue, that of the way in which familial discipline is exercised, and gendered identities transmitted in a Transatlantic environment. That is a matter for another piece of important work for Nigerian and other West, Central, and East African communities to address as they integrate into the different laws and expectations of UK society.⁵⁰

Domestic Violence and Abuse – Cultural Silencing and Shame

Work emerging from African scholars and legal practitioners, undertaken particularly over the last three decades, has started to shine a light on domestic abuse and violence, which has previously sheltered unaddressed by colonial legal structures, even if there is evidence from some research, particularly

⁵⁰ BMC Numbers – from the report from [https://faithandplacenetwork.org/London Borough of Barking and Dagenham](https://faithandplacenetwork.org/London%20Borough%20of%20Barking%20and%20Dagenham). Andrew Roger's work *Being Built Together* project undertaken in the London Borough of Southwark over 2011-13, investigated the number, places, and priorities of new Black majority churches (BMCs) in the Borough. The particular interest was in BMCs formed independently of the historic denominations since the 1950s. Now contributing to the 'Pentecostalism in Britain' series, the research revealed 240 Black majority churches in Southwark, South London, alone, understood to be the greatest concentration of African Christianity in the world outside of Africa. The percentage of Black Christianity grew between the 2001 and 2011 Census by 100%, whilst all other charts in the British Social Attitudes survey from 1983-2014 showed a steady decline for the Church of England, a slight decline for the Roman Catholics (buoyed in part by the A+12 inward migration with a substantial number of Roman Catholic nations captured in that cluster), and a substantial increase in other churches amongst which are numbered BMCs.

amongst matriarchal communities, where ‘virilocality’ is not practiced, that female protection within the marriage unit, and indeed the protection of the female child, was better defended before the intrusion of essentially patriarchal legal codes inserted under European political regimes imposed across sub-Saharan Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Nigerian Lawyer Itoro Eze Anaba notes that:

Women in Africa, like their counterparts the world over, suffer domestic violence irrespective of class, age, religion or social status. Incidents of domestic violence include battery, beatings, torture, acid baths, rape, and even death through honour killing. It is estimated that one in every three women suffers domestic violence from the hands of those who claim to love and protect them. Many of the victims do not speak out about violations of their rights due to lack of positive response from the society. Domestic violence is so entrenched in the society that even the victims condone such violations of their rights, some claiming it is a sign of love. Due to poverty and economic dependence on men, many victims suffer in silence for fear of losing the economic support of the male perpetrator—where a victim summons the courage to report to law enforcement agents, the issue is trivialized and termed a “private matter.” Many African countries do not have specific laws prohibiting domestic violence and punishing perpetrators of domestic violence (Anaba, 2008).

More recently Ajo Bamidele has reported the following challenges in Nigeria and in the UK. She notes that domestic violence is seldom reported for a variety of reasons. Some could be the result of fear of reprisal and lack of response from law enforcement officials. Other reasons include the shame of women having to admit they are being abused by their husbands, especially for those that live in small communities, coupled with the ignorance of the fact that it is wrong and could be corrected. Dame Julie Okah Donli, the recently retired director of NAPTIP in Nigeria, confirmed this community silencing effect, and the presumption of innocence of the male, and a form of ‘malevolence’ or ‘fault’ or provocation lying with the female, being somehow ingrained in many West African communities with which NAPTIP become involved as the arm of child safeguarding and prosecution of domestic abuse offences for the state of Abuja.⁵¹

51 Note in conversation with Dame Julie Okah Donli, 20 May 2020; Rev. Dr Carrie Pemberton Ford. Zoom interview.

Women who eventually extricate themselves from abusive relationships are noted to 'report feeling ashamed about getting involved with the abuser or not acting on the warning signs of the abuse.'

Psychologists working on the taxonomy of ostracism and the experience of having been a recipient of violence have found that being a victim of violence can generate strong negative feelings about the self, due to the failure of 'the self' to keep 'oneself from harm.' In this appallingly negative bundle of emotions can be included the disabling feelings of guilt and shame.⁵² Cultural scripts around the rectitude of the male are such that his female partner may believe she is to blame for her abuse, and such feelings of responsibility may decrease the likelihood that victims will report the abuse. In addition, the victim may engage in reasoning strategies such as denying the abuse occurred, minimizing the threatening nature of the abuse, or rationalizing why the abuse happened.⁵³

These strategies of course may help the victim to cope with the abuse, but they further decrease the likelihood that the abuse will be reported. Furthermore, the battered woman may also feel a very strong positive attachment towards her abuser through a process termed traumatic bonding. These feelings of love may increase the difficulty of reporting the abuse, perhaps because of feelings of disloyalty or guilt over 'betraying' the husband. The more subtle and less understood forms of psychological introjection, which has maintained patriarchal societies, and in this specific instance the 'rectitude' of the 'senior' male authority within their domiciles, needs to be better understood. It is this psychological process, alongside legislative and cultural underpinnings, that have shielded such societies from changing their patterns of gendered conformity and power relations.

Reporting to any outside authority is the biggest hurdle faced by most of the African-based churches that we interviewed during the research period. Reluctance to engage formal proceedings against the perpetrator is present for a range of reasons. Female-only focus groups exposed reasons around deconstructing the respect for the family in the wider community of faith and, furthermore, the inherent risk of attracting blame on the wife for things going wrong within the family. Across other communities in the UK there is concern about triggering further abuse and the real threat of violence, should the abuse reach the ears of community elders and the perpetrator

52 Williams, K. (2016). *The Power of Silence*.

53 Bamidele et al., *The Menace of Domestic Violence: Improving the Lives of Women in Nigeria*.

be called to some account. There was very real fear of losing the children, their home, employment, or family, and having nowhere else to go. Similarly, a fear of loneliness as a result of community ostracism, ungrounded but pervasive optimism that things would eventually change for the better, or an over-reliance on the 'promises of the scriptures' that prayer from a righteous woman could and maybe should change their spouses' behaviour (1 Corinthians 7:14), all operate as effective deterrents to women leaving violent situations.

Domestic violence cuts across all communities in Nigeria, as it does in communities across the world. Male violence or abuse can be mitigated by the surrounding social norms of his community through blaming actions undertaken by the wife, or impugned character flaws that are projected onto the abused woman. When a woman suffers violence due to failure to meet some socially accepted standard of behaviour, such failure can become the communities' excuse for failing to intervene on the violence she suffers, whether in the public realm through rape ('What sort of provocation was she giving to men?') or, in the family context, where exploring domestic abuse maintains a standard psychological distancing from any responsibility to act. A woman can suffer violence for refusing sex, 'nagging', or challenging the man's behaviour. She can be subjected to violence for not preparing meals on time and for having, or being under suspicion of having, a sexual relationship outside the marriage.

In a survey carried out in Nigeria by Project Alert in 2001, participants were picked out randomly: market women, business-women, women in education and health provision, alongside younger women studying at the university. In Lagos, more than half of the participants reported that their partners, boyfriends, or husband had beaten them. So not just domestic abuse or coercive control was reported but physical harm in the realm of 'partnered intimacy'. The reasons that were given by the women for why they had been beaten included drunkenness of the perpetrator, financial problems in the household, and the woman's refusal to have sex with the perpetrator. Significantly the criminal charge of rape is not available for prosecutors in Nigeria to launch legal actions against abusive husbands who do not seek consent before intercourse. The bar for bringing a case of marital rape is set high, with the charge having to sit within the law for battery and external physical harm. Many of the participants in Project Alert reported that they had disclosed physical injuries and threats to their own family, the perpetrator's family and their religious leaders, without reporting how these had responded. Some had endured the abuse without recourse to their

social networks of ‘support’ and potential ‘safety.’ Significantly not a single respondent reported filing a complaint with the police or seeking redress in court. Such a recourse to the state would have been viewed as useless or humiliating, simply exacerbating an already dangerous set of circumstances for themselves.⁵⁴

Dame Julie Okah Donli is clear about the substantial challenges facing Nigeria in cascading new legislation addressing domestic abuse and violence in the public consciousness and providing more effective protection for those at risk of violence in their homes, from either partners or other family members. She is also aware of the tabooed topic of abuse of children whilst in the care of extended family members, or even sometimes of their own fathers, though usually this form of abuse frequently is a feature of male relatives other than the child’s biological father. ‘These monsters,’ she told me, ‘will be prosecuted if they are reported and found guilty of these horrific crimes. In the past our societies have tended not to lend credence to reports from children of incest and sexual assault on them from trusted male relatives. Unfortunately, we now know that this is a reality, and it is time for our communities to understand that children need to be listened to, and safeguarded. With the presence now of a 24/7 reporting line, at least in Abuja, and front-line officers trained to respond in our unit, this can now start to be addressed. We have some way to go, but we are doing well in making an impact with the new laws that recognise the presence of domestic and child abuse, and have the instruments in place for the court to prosecute the offenders.’⁵⁵

Domestic violence, needless to say, can also be committed by women against men; however, such cases are in a minority, and they require a separate set of interventions to address. The reality that men can be attacked by women does need to be acknowledged in society, and processes and procedures put in place in order to place men in environments of safety when enduring domestic abuse and violence in their homes. This is not the place to interrogate the challenges faced by men when enduring attacks by either their partners or dominant females in their household – as can be set up in matriarchal households – but it is worth noting that the self-silencing that is operative in women’s under-reporting of violence endured in the home is frequently in play when men are seen by the wider community to succumb to counter-

54 Ibid.

55 Dame Julie Okah Donli Director of NAPTIP, The Nigerian Agency for the Prosecution of Trafficking in Persons. 20 May 2020, Rev. Dr Carrie Pemberton Ford.

cultural roles, ‘permitting’ their spouses to intimidate and abuse them within their common household.

In all of this, it is important for churches to develop a human rights-based approach alongside strengthening theological messaging that affirms equality and respect. These are messages that are available within Islam and Christianity, the two major religions of Africa, and interweaving this human rights approach with their theological motifs and values could help faith communities partner more effectively with the efforts their political counterparts in governance and the legislature are making to achieve profound societal and cultural change. Addressing gender-based violence, which Project Alert revealed in the Nigerian context to be prevalent but under-reported in the home, requires interventions across early education provision and curricula and employment opportunities, addressing ubiquitous levels of sexual harassment and exploitation in society, the gendered power interests in the political arena, and work on bringing appropriate legislation through the state legislature and effective resourcing of the victim protection portfolio in the criminal justice system. Every aspect of the national, regional, and international response to domestic abuse is anchored in human rights law.

Similarly with human trafficking: although frequently manifesting as a crusade against mafia-style networks, counter-trafficking is anchored in the rights and obligations established by international human rights law. It is important for the courts to look at human trafficking from a human rights-based approach and learn from other areas – such as development and, increasingly, public health (with this being amplified during this recent time of Covid 19) – to gain important insights into the main features of the approach and how it could be applied to trafficking. As the combination of these two worlds of violence against women showed in our report, thinking and acting against human trafficking, and in particular trafficking of women into sexual exploitation and domestic servitude leads one’s attention through the interconnections of a woman’s narrative of grooming, recruitment, and then exploitation down a series of intersecting narratives of domestic vulnerabilities, socio-economic inequalities, legal gaps in protection, and interlocking cultures of male privilege. Between human trafficking and exploitation and domestic abuse in its several manifestations, there lies extraction from the domicile of one’s immediate natal family, but then the differences become increasingly blurred as one considers the removal of consent, the construction of power asymmetries, and the inability to extract oneself from the ongoing situation of abuse – which is compounded by various forms of societal acquiescence and complicity.

Outcomes of the Survey Instrument

An on-line and paper survey was undertaken in 2017, and it was clear that technology had divided itself along generational and gendered lines, with the majority of females over 45 preferring to complete the questionnaire off-line. The following information was revealed as a result of this surveying of over 250 members of several churches affiliated to the Cherubim and Seraphim movement, and other African Churches, each cluster affiliated to the Churches Together in England.

It became clear across the survey, workshops, church visits, and discussions that the reporting mechanisms are not well understood – neither their impacts on churches or pastors nor the impacts on identified ‘victims’.

- It is essential that the pathways of how to report and ‘what then’ are clearly communicated across the church communities.
- Some form of monitoring and accountability around outcomes needs to be in place to develop confidence in ‘lifting the lid’.
- Congregations and individuals need to feel that their communities will not be undermined and threatened through the act of reporting – either through the impact of unwanted attention of the Immigration authorities, in a wider cultural setting of ‘hostile environment’, or perceived ‘punitive’ action by Social Services whose impact is frequently to dismantle family groups. A significant amount of further work needs to be undertaken in this area, in order to release the public sector into appropriate safeguarding of resourcing into vulnerable communities, represented by those subjected to trafficking or domestic violence in Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic environments (BAME). This has subsequently been picked up as a challenge for Whitehall as a whole, consequent to the Windrush travesty, in the report published in early 2020.⁵⁶
- There needs to be a requirement to build strong multi-agency, local and international networks of support, to undergird a transformation in ‘reporting’ at all levels.
- In relation to working with reporting of domestic abuse, there was a strong theme that emerged from church members to seek to ‘deal with the problem internally at first’. This clearly needs to have some alternative protocols put in place to ensure that there is immediate and sustainable protection of the victim, and the due process of opening up reporting of what is frequently a series of criminal acts that need to be reported to the

⁵⁶ Williams (2020).

public authorities responsible for exercising and enforcing the rule of law in the jurisdiction within which faith communities sit.

It is obvious that there are a number of culturally embedded hesitations for working with complete openness with external state actors in this area of domestic violence and abuse. Not only is a better relationship with the state actors required for the safety of the victims and their families, but it is critical that perpetrators are seen to be held to account, and not in any way protected by 'cover ups', male networks protecting those who are not only breaking the 'law' of the land but harming congregational members who should be under the active protection of the faith community leadership, and not being 'managed' away from receiving comprehensive protection and validation through the processes of state justice.

Recent work undertaken in Nigeria by public health researchers revealed a wide range of prevalence of intimate partner violence (IPV) depending on region, cohort, and age – the most concerning being that amongst women of reproductive age attending clinics in the eastern section of Nigeria, just under 50% at 46.3% had experienced domestic abuse or IPV in the last twelve months. IPV, the authors of the report declare, is not 'simply a matter of family privacy, individual choice or inevitable facet of life. It is a complex problem related to patterns of thought and behaviour that are shaped by a multitude of forces within families and communities. It is a major public health and human rights problem that cuts across all populations, irrespective of social, economic, religious or cultural groups.'⁵⁷

Legislation enacted across the European Union to promote equality between the genders in the workplace has an eye to what is going on behind the closed doors of the domestic, as opposed to the public realm of 'business'. This includes Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006, which saw the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation. This directive defines direct and indirect discrimination, harassment, and sexual harassment. It also encourages employers to take preventive measures to combat sexual harassment (in its many guises), reinforces the sanctions for discrimination, and provides for the establishment within the member states of bodies responsible for promoting equal treatment between women and men. At present, the EU Parliament

⁵⁷ Tanimu, T.S. *The Pattern and Correlates of Intimate Partner Violence among Women in Kano, Nigeria*.

is seeking the revision of the provisions on equal pay in this directive and has also adopted an implementation report on the basis of several studies commissioned by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). As with the legal implementation of the equality legislation in the UK, there has been a let-out clause for religious bodies in relation to the management of their faith ministers, which is a significant weakness in the full implementation and impact of the legislation. However, there is at least a basis from which those working within faith environments can address the worlds within the congregational and domestic spaces, which needs now to be cascaded through education, awareness raising, the development of reporting mechanisms, and enhanced trust with the public sector instruments of realisation, the police, and the social services. This needs to be resourced in order for it to attain a level of sustained and trusted delivery in the communities with which we have interacted during this research.

Theological Resources

There has been a repeated request during this encounter with the churches to develop materials which engage some of the highly gendered and disempowering narratives which can underscore domestic violence, sexual exploitation, safeguarding breaches in household discipline and having their exploitative entrails cast up in human trafficking narratives. This is an area of great sensitivity and must be fully engaged with the whole community – pastors, prophets, choir directors, bishops, and the executive leaders of the wider communities.

The form of these resources should not be constrained to books, though some more considered theological work, relating the challenges of contemporary society with the central and important paradigms of the particular church community's faith and core beliefs are important to undertake.

Requests were raised around developing for congregations:

- Choral inputs – a flowering of new songs and hymns directly naming domestic violence as a violation of God's intentions, and domestic servitude and modern-day slavery as an abomination in line with the experience which Israel had experienced under the Egyptians, thereby raising awareness and underpinning a re-articulation of mutual respect across gender: complementarity embedded in equality.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ As part of this engagement with the important element of song and movement within many of the BMC churches, it was mooted that a choral competition could be initiated to encourage the

- Bible themes to be consciously selected for regular preaching within the calendar of sermons and talks within the churches, with clear articulation around how gender inequality, social justice, children's safety, international inequalities, all forms of disempowerment, refusal of violence against the person, ideas around 'submission', 'silencing', and 'enslavement' are brought forward in the Scriptures, and require addressing by the church membership today.
- Cartoon-based narratives of 'Godly' responses to modern dilemmas being experienced by BAME communities (remembering always that globally many of these so-called minorities are in fact in the global majority!) – particularly in relation to widespread violence against minors and grooming undertaken within gangs and county-line criminal activity, sexual exploitation, sexual consent, consumption of prostitution, domestic servitude, domestic abuse, irregular migration, and lack of amnesty, household discipline, and safeguarding.
- Prayers and meditations for use in cell groups with the above themes in mind.
- The curating of films and the development of a team of 'facilitators' who can assist in embedding what is learned from the films for the congregations and rendering some 'transformative changes'.
- Practical books of instruction for discipleship – addressing contemporary challenges for parents, youth (male and female), and the challenges of living trans-nationally.
- YouTube shorts – on a cluster of issues, for sharing across phone-based networks – which will start to emerge as church membership with film and media skills become involved.
- Involvement in Freedom Sunday, and the emergence of other dedicated Sundays, which are already arising in pockets across Nigeria and West Africa. The proposal that there should be at least three dedicated Sundays a year, focussing on servitude and trafficking, and abuse within the home – including addressing the taboo of incest and the abuse of children. This needs to be cascaded across the extended 'dioceses' of different bishops in the fast moving and fluid church structures of the African churches in

writing of new lyrics and the expanding of the choral corpus for churches to share and inspire fresh approaches to what have become in some instances embedded inequalities. This could be an initiative worth sourcing finance for and a sustainable input for the proliferation of new theological approaches to encourage congregations into altered perceptions of 'victims', 'offenders', 'gendered vulnerabilities', and state-and-church relations.

Europe and Africa, which have dioceses which extend beyond national borders.

- Creating a core module within the curriculum of all theological colleges and training institutes associated with the formation of BAME church leadership, so that the harms and human rights violations of domestic abuse, trafficking in human beings, and domestic servitude is properly digested as part of the core delivery of scriptural and pastoral formation. Bishops and regional leaders need to take the principles of this module and to see it cascaded to all pastors in order to build quality control and a systemised response to these violations of an individual's essential identity as a child of God, and one loved by the living God who created all living beings and commands that we respect one another because of this radical equality and provenance.

The key question raised by the discussion which followed the House of Lords presentation of this report (its full text can be found on www.ccarht.org/library) by members of some of the congregations represented in follow up workshops, was who and how this work of education and advocacy would be funded, going forward. It was clearly recognised that the bodies which run the current theological formation colleges, and the ways in which pastors and prophets within the independent African church traditions are currently trained and authorised, are sadly lacking in the incorporation of these issues in their core training requirements, and this is something which all general councils need to be addressing. There was conversation around how the World Council of Churches might be prevailed upon to further resource both the generation of specific materials to address this deficit. Such seeding support is essential to grow the voices to undertake direct advocacy within different regional bodies and inter-regional bodies in order to challenge ignorance and avoidance. Many independent churches are represented here, often as a hat tip to diversity. Now it is essential that there is a comprehensive raising of standards and understanding around protection, the provision of safety for children, and gender specific strategies around reporting of abuse, working with the regulatory authorities, addressing any deficiencies in cultures of support, instances where all the mission church denominations of the metropolises have shown a seam of collusion and cover up with the perpetrators, and silencing of the victims. All this work is before us: to cascade the principles of protection. It will require sustained evaluation, research, teaching resources, and funding for change to be embedded and secured for the next generation of believers and the communities they serve.

Understanding the State

It was expressed across a number of fora, that there was the need to

- Develop robust advocacy with the UK government around ‘irregular migration’, including the desire for so many of the West African church members for regularising their citizenship. The presence of layers of uncertainty and the strong stance on ‘getting net migration down’ causes real challenges for communities when it comes to reporting a variety of offences with any confidence around outcomes.
- Articulate the global mandate for social and economic justice.
- Understand the role of the state and its various responsibilities in relation to the church community and its membership (Romans 13 et al.).
- How victims, customers, sponsors, families, and clients in human trafficking are understood by the state and the various protocols which surround national, local, and international responses and procedures.
- When working with *juju* or in undertaking voluntary ‘safeguarding’ work with vulnerable adults, to appropriately seek the requisite qualifications for interoperability across secular state- and church-based organisational inputs.

Capacity Building

The report has been concerned with articulating the resources already in place and the pioneering activities of many who have been seeking to address the widespread, ubiquitous, and in many instances hidden abuses which are outlined in this report.

There are a range of agencies, churches, and individuals stepping up to engage with the challenges which are explicated across this report. These are present both in West Africa, in other countries where the trail of West African Trafficking is clearly manifested such as in Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Germany, as well as in the UK. The alliances which are not springing up are significant and thankfully will only keep growing.

The challenge in addressing human trafficking, carried out insidiously and globally across all communities in some form or other, is one which brings those who engage seriously with its realities, into a sharp engagement with geopolitical, social, economic, psychological, cultural, legal, theological, and anthropological fissures. These are ‘fissures’ in respect to what we take as normative for our own lives. But when those who are vulnerable or who lack adequate social protection in their own lives are taken advantage of,

commoditised, exploited, diminished in their humanity and systematically disempowered, we run up against another kind of normative behaviour for others, whether we are dealing with suppliers, sponsors, procurers, trolleys, enablers, or 'end' clients and 'consumers.' The world suddenly looks less safe, less reasonable, less predictable. Another side of our human capacity is revealed, and it is one which requires purposeful, informed, resourced, and strategically supported responses. There are no quick fixes here, only galvanised communities at point of source and at destination can begin to make breakthroughs against this undercurrent of abuse, through which a minority assemble wealth and substantially more accrue some form of benefit, be it sexual pleasure, domestic work and child care at minimal cost, child support benefit, and a host of scams, scourges, etc.

And where the churches, through exploring the abuses of trafficking and modern-day slavery, can make the interconnections with some of its manifestations in sexual abuse, ongoing gender inequalities of access to education, control of reproductivity, land ownership, consent to marriage, consent to sexual 'access' in marriage. They encounter subtle distinctions around capacities and gendered 'roles' which serve to privilege male interests and undermine the capacity of persons to fully flourish, which encompasses equality of autonomy which has been the underpinning of the Nobel Prize Winning economist Amartya Sen's important contribution to discussions on global and intercommunity justice.⁵⁹ These are important and significant conversations to have.

The interlinkages between how communities are operating in terms of gendered roles, silencing opinion, and depriving people of their freedom to flourish, and how church communities are experiencing the 'flourishing good news of the gospel,' the fact that it is odds with its content and expression is profoundly significant. This is an area which requires some sustained focus, resources, and encouragement in engaging in these issues. The lessons for Whitehall are also the lessons for Westminster Abbey, Lambeth, and the ecclesiastical centres of former imperial power. It is a struggle to be undertaken globally and locally. Churches need to be open to the pervasiveness of the patriarchal default schemas, which can undermine their ability to call out male violence, entitlement, and privilege.

Elements within the cultural environment of the West have undoubtedly objectified women, disempowered children, and discounted males who are

59 Sen, A. (1999). *Development As Freedom*. New York: Oxford University Press.

not able to access the corridors of power or the trappings of education and wealth. Patriarchy has created much of the environment, the very context in which human trafficking and domestic abuse and violence can thrive. How this has emerged within the diverse cultures of West Africa and Central Africa, within our own churches, carries with it their own specific narratives of abuse and pro-social relationships that need unpacking. What is clear is that the church's founding Pentecostal mandate, wherever we are, is to speak out about abuse, to advocate for change, to listen to the victims, to attend to their wounded narratives, and to seek to address not only the person in front of us, requiring immediate assistance and support, but also to lift our voices prophetically, addressing the systemic abuses and inequalities which have fed into this sacred meeting, when a victim discloses and starts their long journey to freedom. Our report *Behind Closed Doors* was the beginning of this journey for the Cherubim and Seraphim churches. Their journey is one in which churches across the world are now joining, called by prophetic voices lifted across the world against this intergenerational burden. We will need to develop the theological and people resources available for the church to call upon, so that they are equipped for the marathon, which long-term transformation in dismantling human trafficking, particularly in terms of sexual exploitation and domestic servitude, and abuse in the home, will undoubtedly take.

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7

Internal Forced Migration in North Eastern Nigeria: Trends, Patterns, and Drivers

Sadiq Mukhtar

Abstract

Nigeria is perceived as a country facing a series of migratory crises ranging from insurgency, violent conflict, and environmental stress and developmental projects, thereby forcing large numbers of people to flee from their respective residential origins to neighbouring destinations. This chapter specifically examines the trends, patterns, and drivers of internal forced migration in North Eastern Nigeria. Data for the study were obtained from the United Nations, International Organization for Migration (IOM) database tagged Digital Tracking Matrix (DTM). The data collected were analysed through the use of descriptive statistical analysis such as frequencies and bar charts. The study reveals an uneven trend and distribution pattern in the study area, with the majority of the forced migrants dwelling in host communities. It was also found that insecurity, insurgency, and terrorist activities are the major drivers of internal forced migration in the study area, whilst an overwhelming proportion of the forced migrants in the study area were displaced in 2015. Finally, the study recommends the government urgently attend to, address, and solve the issues behind high numbers of internal forced migrants in the North Eastern region and the country in general.

Introduction

Nigeria, a famous country and the most populous in Africa, is a country with a considerable number of internal forced migration crises resulting from political, religious, social, economic, and related reasons. Internal displaced due to war, insurgent activities, violent conflicts, persecution, environmental or climatic crises, among many other factors, have gained an increasingly eminent position in humanitarian and migration scholarship. More recently research in internal forced migration studies has emerged from a broader

array of scholars providing a more complex picture of the subject matter ‘internal forced migration’ (Akume, 2015; Erdal & Oeppen, 2018; Gillian, 2018; Olanrewaju, Omotoso, & Alabi, 2018). This chapter explores and examines the spatial trend, spatial pattern, and drivers of internal forced migration in the North Eastern region of Nigeria. The chapter is divided into four main sections. First, it offers a brief overview and theoretical background on the term ‘forced migration’ and ‘internal forced migration’. The second section provides a brief summary of the study area North Eastern Nigeria. In the third section, the chapter examines the spatial trend, spatial pattern, and drivers of internal forced migration in the study region: North Eastern Nigeria.

Brief Overview of Forced Migration and Internal Forced Migration

The phrase ‘forced migrant’ has in recent years emerged in academic scholarship and policy making to refer to a person who has been forced to leave his or her habitual place of residential origin for whatsoever reason, natural or human induced (Turton, 2006). Hansen (1996) adduced that forced migration has turn out to be a new problem-oriented academic field of enquiry, encompassing the fields of geography, economics, environmental management, sociology, anthropology, political science, law and international relations. Forced migration has been caused as the result of war, famine, and political tussles. These disruptions have increased globally in the last three decades (Pumariiega, Rothe, & Pumariiega, 2005). Forced migrants are classified into refugees and internally displaced persons. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) the number of forced migrants around the world has almost doubled from 33.9 million in 1997 to 65.6 million in 2016 (UNHCR, 2017), out of which 40.3 million were internally forced migrants or Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), 22.5 million refugees and 2.8 million asylum seekers.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) defines internal forced migrants also referred as Internal Displaced Person (IDP) as:

persons or groups of people who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (IDMC 2012).

In this chapter, the terms internal forced migrants and IDPs are used interchangeably.

IDMC (2017) reported that at the end of 2016 there were about 40.3 million internal forced migrants around the world as a result of conflicts and violence. The report further adduced that the number has almost doubled that of the internal forced migrants in 2000 and has greatly increased in the last five years. However, IDMC stated that this number does not include the number of unknown people that were forced to migrate as a result of disaster prior to, or in 2016. Similarly, the UNHCR (2017) has stated that the number of internal forced migrants around the world has drastically increased from 35.8 million in 2012 to 65.3 million in 2015, specifically because of conflicts in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, etc.) and other regions of the world.

North-eastern Nigeria

The North-eastern region of Nigeria is one of the six geopolitical regions and formerly an administrative region in Nigeria. It was created on 27 May 1967 from the Northern region with headquarters in Maiduguri, the present capital city of Borno state. The North-east was divided into three states; Bauchi, Borno, and Gongola states in 1978 and was further divided in 1991 to comprise six states namely, Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe State.

The region covers a land area of about 280,419 km² and located between longitude 09°02 – 14°38 East and Latitude 06°30 – 13°42 North. It shares international borders with Niger Republic, Republic of Chad, and Cameroon Republic, and an internal border with North West and North Central Regions of Nigeria.

The population of the region was estimated at 24.5 million inhabitants (National Population Commission Projected 2011 population). The region sheltered about 1.4 million IDPs in June 2015 (IDMC 2015) and an estimated 4.6 million are in need of humanitarian assistance (European Commission for Humanitarian Aid 2016). In terms of socioeconomic activities, the region is ranked as the lowest in Nigeria and had a poverty rate of 69 percent in 2010, which is the highest in the country (National Bureau of Statistics 2010). A map of the area is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1
North Eastern Nigeria

Spatial Trends, Patterns, and Drivers of Internal Forced Migration in North-eastern Nigeria

As a starting point, Colson, (2003) tagged the twentieth century as the ‘century of the refugee’, so it is not surprising that the twenty-first century truly expressed is to be identified as the ‘century of displacement and dispossession’. In this twenty-first century, scholars across various disciplines around the world are increasingly engaged in studies of migration, uprooting, displacement, and resettlement.

In Africa as a whole, many forces or factors have resulted in a considerable number of forced migratory movements, thus resulting to displacement of many individuals either as refugees or Internally Displaced Persons; a few examples are the Biafra war in Nigeria (1967-1970); the Liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau (1963-1973); the Mauritanian conflict of 1989; the conflict which tore apart River Mano countries of Sierra Leone and Liberia (1999-2000); the Mai-Tatsine crises in Nigeria (1979-1980); the Casamance Independence Movement in Senegal (1980 till date); the Sudan and South Sudanese Conflict; the Nigeria-Cameroon Bakassi peninsula conflicts; the 2011 post-election crises in Nigeria; the post elections crisis in Ivory Coast

(2010-2011); the ongoing political crises in Mali; as well as the current Boko Haram insurgent activities in Nigeria, Cameroon and Niger Republic (2007 to date) – apart from that, there are too many natural environmental disasters to mention (Eweka & Olusegun, 2016).

Before the onset of Boko Haram insurgent activities in the North Eastern region of Nigeria and Nigeria as a whole, the country was well known as a peaceful, hospitable, secure, and cordial country, however the region in recent years has been facing a series of terrorism and violent activities, along with various security challenges that have forcefully caused a large number of people to flee from their habitual residential places of origin. For instance, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) reported that 2,152,000 people in Nigeria were reported to be internally displaced persons in Nigeria in December 2015, which is the highest number ever recorded in the country (IDMC, 2016)

North East is a geopolitical zone of Nigeria that had been well known for its peace, hospitality, and harmony, however in recent years the region has been facing terrorism and security challenges. Paramount among these are the activities of an insurgent group called 'Jama'atul Ahlus-Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad' popularly known as the Boko Haram, a Hausa word which literally means 'western education is forbidden'. The Boko Haram group opposes western education and also western culture (Adeyemi, 2014). This is adduced to their wrong indoctrination and beliefs (Abdulrasheed, Onuselogu, & Obioma, 2015). The group started launching attacks in 2009 in Maiduguri the capital of Borno state and has resulted in the loss of properties worth millions of dollars along with the loss of many lives (Abdulrasheed, Onuselogu, & Obioma, 2015; Aliyu, Moorthy, & Bin Idris, 2015).

The activities of the Boko Haram insurgent group are ascertained as the main cause of the rising number of internally displaced persons in the North-eastern region of Nigeria. The Boko Haram group was allegedly formed in Borno state in 2001 according to Adamu (2009); however, Aliyu, Moorthy, and Bin Idris (2015) and Yerima and Singh (2017) contend that the group originated in 2002 with headquarters in Maiduguri the Borno state capital. Thereafter in 2010, Mantzikos (2010) established that the group had international links with the Al-Qaeda terrorist group. The group is reported to have begun launching attacks on the 29 July 2009 with an attack on a police station in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital, as reported by Nyako (2015) in a report submitted to the Nigerian Senate. Consequent to the first attack, a series of other attacks followed in other areas not only within the region but also in areas across the country example in states like Kano, Niger, and the

Federal Capital Territory Abuja. As a result, Boko Haram insurgent terrorist activities alone have forced millions of people to flee from their habitual place of residential origin because of either threat or fear for their lives, insecurity, and generalized violence.

Data

Flahaux and De Haas (2016) asseverate that African migration research is haunted by a dearth of reliable and consistent data and the nonexistence of appropriate sampling procedures in the form of survey data. Even though these problems are far from solved, recently the availability of new migration databases, including that of forced migration, has significantly increased.

Most recently, the Digital Tracking Matrix (DTM) was initiated by the United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM) in September 2014 in Nigeria, with collaboration from the Nigerian National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). The national commissions for Refugees, Migrants, and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI) have introduced a program whose aim is to collect, organize, and disseminate data on IDPs, refugees, and returnees in Nigeria. The first collected data was made available in December 2014 and was tagged DTM Nigeria Round 1; subsequently data on forced migration have been collected quarterly and updated every year, from all parts of the country. This chapter uses the DTM Nigeria Round 1 to DTM Nigeria Round 21, which is for the period December 2014 to February 2018, to analyse the spatial trends and patterns of internal forced migration in Nigeria's North East region.

The Migration Trends and Patterns

In this section the migration trends and patterns of internally displaced persons in the study region is discussed. The section was divided into four different parts, the first part examines IDPs spatial and temporal distribution, in the second part the IDPs temporal distribution is discussed. The total annual trend of IDPs in the region is presented in the third part, while the last part examines the distribution pattern of IDPs by state of dwelling the region of study.

IDPs Spatial Distribution

Figure 2 shows the spatial distribution of internal forced migrants from December 2014–June 2015. In December 2014, the total number of internal forced migrants recorded for the period are 389,281; however, there is no any record for Borno state and out of the total Yobe state has the highest with 32.37%, followed by Adamawa state with 31.75%, 21.01%, 11.92%, and 2.95% for Taraba, Bauchi, and Gombe states, respectively. In subsequent months, when the data of Borno state become readily available, this state recorded the highest number of forced migrants accounting for more than 50% of the total number of internal forced migrants, with 56% in February, 62.97% in April, and 72.38% in June 2015. While the total number of the migrants in February 2015 was 1,188,018, and in April 2015 the number increased to 1,491,706 and in June 2015 the number slightly decrease to 1,385,298. Taraba, Bauchi, and Gombe continue to be the lowest throughout these periods, respectively. However, the distribution is not uniform in Yobe and Adamawa, as Adamawa has a higher percentage in February and April 2015, while the number decreased in June 2015, thereby making Yobe the highest after Borno state.




Figure 2
Spatial Distribution of IDPs December 2014 – June 2015

Figure 3 shows the spatial distribution of internal forced migrants from Aug 2015-Feb 2016. The results for the spatial distribution from August 2015 to February 2016 also shows that Borno state has the highest number of internal forced migrants and the state accounted for more than 70% of the total in all the four periods. Out of the total number of 2,099,089 internal forced migrants in the study area in August 2015, 78.64% were reported to be in Borno, but in October 2015, even as the number of internal forced migrants slightly decreases to 2,042,219, the percentage in Borno almost remains the same with a record of 78.66%. The total number in December 2015 and February 2016 were recorded as 1,846,999 and 1,932,765, respectively, of which Borno state accounted for 77.45% and 78.84%, respectively. Conversely, Gombe, Bauchi, and Taraba hierarchically starting with the lowest, respectively, continue to record the lowest number of internal forced migrants in the study area, with each individually accounting for less than 5% of the total number of the forced migrants. Nevertheless, the spatial distribution in the two remaining states Adamawa and Yobe, are uneven as Yobe is reported to have a higher percentage in August 2015, October 2015, and February 2016 than Adamawa, whereas Adamawa is reported to have a higher percentage in December 2015.




Figure 3
Spatial Distribution of IDPs August 2015 – February 2016
Source: IOM (2017)

Figure 4 shows the spatial distribution of internal forced migrants from April 2016-October 2016. The results for the spatial distribution from April 2016 to October 2016 also shows that Borno state has the highest number of internal forced migrants and the state accounts for more than 75% of the total number of internally displaced in all the four periods presented in the figure below. Out of the total number of 1,850,321 internally displaced persons in the study area in April 2016, 77.18% were reported to be living within Borno, however in June 2016 when the number of internal forced migrants was 1,814,066 Borno state was reported to have 77.42%, similarly in 2016 and October 2016 when the total number of Internally Displaced Persons was 1,883,714 and 1,822,541 Borno state has a total percentage of 76.81% and 76.42%, respectively. Conversely, Gombe, Bauchi and Taraba state continue to have the lowest number of internally displaced persons for the period under study in the study area with each state record lower than 4% of the total. Similarly, the distribution for the period April 2016-October 2016 between Adamawa and Yobe states is quite even as Adamawa state is reported in all the four periods to have a higher percentage than Yobe.




Figure 4
Spatial Distribution of IDPs April 2016 – October 2016
 Source: IOM (2017)

Figure 5 shows the spatial distribution of internal forced migrants from December 2016-August 2017. The results for the spatial distribution from December 2016 to August 2017 also shows that Borno state has the highest number of internally displaced persons in the study area, and the state accounts for more than 75% of the total number of internal forced migrants in all the four periods under investigation. In December 2016, it was reported that out of the total number of 1,770,444 internal forced migrants in the study, 77.43% were reported to be living in Borno. February 2017 was reported to have a total of 1,899,830 internally displaced persons, with 79% of the total reported to be in Borno. Similarly, in May 2017 and August 2017 the total number recorded were 1,884,131 and 1,1757,288, whilst the percentage Borno state represents was 79.45% and 78.16%, respectively. Conversely, Gombe, Bauchi, and Taraba states continue to have the lowest number of forced internal migrants, with each individually having less than 4% of the total number in the study area. Comparably, the distribution in Adamawa and Yobe for the period December 2016-August 2017 is relatively evenly distributed, as Adamawa state is reported in all the four periods to have a higher percentage than Yobe (Mukhtar et al., 2018).




Figure 5
Spatial Distribution of IDPs December 2016 – August 2017
Source: IOM (2018)

Temporal Distribution

A time series analysis was carried out on the discrete time data collected for study; the result of the analysis as shown in figure 6 depicts the overall trend of internal displacement in the study area over the period under study. From this figure, it can be stated that Borno state has the highest number of internal displaced persons throughout the period under study, then followed by Adamawa, Yobe, Bauchi, Taraba, and Gombe, respectively.




Figure 6

Temporal Distribution of IDPs December 2014 – August 2017

Source: IOM

Annual Trend of IDPs

An analysis of the annual trend of IDP within the years under study is shown in figure 7. The result shows that the year 2015 has the highest number of IDPs in the study area, with a representation of 31%; this is followed by 2016 with a representation of 29%, 2016 and 2014 has a representation of 19% and 20%, respectively. However, only one percent of IDPs in the study region were forced to migrate from their areas of residential origin before 2014.




Figure 7

Annual Trend of IDPs (in percentage)

Source: IOM

Distribution Pattern of IDPs

The result of the IDP distribution pattern by state of dwelling shows that 76.55% are dwelling in Borno State, 9.21% are living in Adamawa State, 5.91% in Yobe State, 3.55% in Taraba state, 2.99% in Bauchi State, and 1.79% in Gombe State; the distribution is presented in a map in figure 8.




Figure 8
Distribution Pattern of IDPs by state of Dwelling
 Source: IOM

Drivers of Internal Forced Migration

Armed conflict remains the main reason for forced migration around the world (Ferris, 2012; IDMC, 2016; Mbanugo, 2012; Mohammed, 2017; Walicki, Swain, & Bilak, 2015). Results of this study reveal that conflict-induced forced migration is the main reason for internal forced migration in the study area. As presented in figure 9, the result shows that, 94.4% are displaced because of insurgent activities, 5.5% because of communal clashes, and 0.1% by natural disasters.




Figure 9
Distribution Pattern of IDPs by state of Dwelling
Source: IOM

5. Conclusion

The North East region of Nigeria has intensively faced a sizeable number of IDPs in Nigeria; this could be attributed to the activities of Boko Haram insurgent group in the area. This therefore made the study area a hub of IDPs in Nigeria, as it has produced and sheltered the highest number of internal forced migrants in the history of the country. NEMA (2016) cited that this region produced 86% of the total population of internal forced migrants in Nigeria.

Findings from this chapter also indicated that the majority of IDPs in the study area are dwelling in host communities. As it was also found that armed conflict and insurgent activities are the major causes for internal forced migration, it was then noted that an overwhelming proportion of the IDPs in the study area were displaced in 2015. As a final note, this chapter concludes by recommending that the government urgently attend to, address, and solve

the issues behind the large numbers of internal forced migrants in the North Eastern region of the country, and the whole country in general.

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8

Insecurity, Female Vulnerability in War and Conflict Situations in Nigeria: Fact, Fiction, and Creative Imagination

Aisha Umar and Safiya Ismaila Yero

Abstract

This chapter interrogates the vulnerability of Nigerian women during and after the Nigerian Civil War. Thus, this paper will review selected war literatures and how they project the issue of female vulnerability during this crisis as it affects the female. The paper further looks at other emergent crises in Nigeria such as insurgency, ethno-religious crises, and how women are projected in texts like *After They Left*, *Roses and Bullets*, *The Last Duty*, etc., which respectively project the female's subjection to situations like rape, battering, trafficking, deprivation, brutality, kidnapping, widowhood, poor or ill-health, etc. The threat of these crises to both the physical and psychological well-being of women is assessed. The paper establishes that women are victims of the current insecurity trends and the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria. Fictions and creative imaginations around vulnerability in Nigeria literature presentations are also examined.

Introduction

Literature is a viable tool for analysing sociocultural issues. Many writers have viewed war and conflict situations, especially the Nigerian Civil War through their writings. For example, Wole Soyinka's *The Man Died* (1972), Elechi Amadi's *Sunset in Biafra* (1973), Flora Nwapa's *Never Again* (1976), Isidore Okpewho's *The Last Duty* (1976), Chukwuemeka Ike's *Sunset at Dawn* (1976), Buchi Emecheta's *Destination Biafra* (1982), Ken Saro Wiwa's *Sozaboy* (1985), Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie's *Half of a Yellow Sun* (2006), Akachi Adimora Eziegbo's *Roses and Bullets* (2011), and Chinua Achebe's *There was a Country* (2012), all focus on the mass destruction of human and

material resources, due to the Nigerian Civil War, the first major conflict that confronted Nigeria after independence between 1968 and 1970. The Nigerian Civil War created both a physical and psychological impact on the baby nation and on Nigerians who were enthusiastic over the new independent status of the country after many decades colonialism. The Nigerian Civil War has remained the most painful conflict in the history of the country.⁶⁰

These works recount the trauma of the civil war from different points of view, but none seem to pay any specific attention to female vulnerability to the war situation, with the exception of texts by female authors, whose writings alongside research and true-life narrations reveal that females, whether adult or young, suffered more from both external and internal predators, the invading troops and the defending troops. Some suffered the loss of their loved ones: husbands, parents, relatives, or children, and therefore loss of security. Others suffered separation from home; the not-so-lucky either died or were left with rape-induced pregnancies and kids that remain the memories of their bad experiences. Women were direct victims of the war, because one of the fundamental problems with war is that it always results in the death and suffering of innocent civilians, of which women make up a larger percentage. It is imperative therefore to focus on female vulnerability in conflict circumstances through imagination and reality.

Nigerian literature got an inspirational boost through this historical antecedent: the Nigerian Civil War. The fact that writers like Wole Soyinka, J.P. Clark, Chinua Achebe, Christopher Okigbo, etc., suffered directly the trauma of the war, helped in the establishment of a canon of Nigerian literature.

The Nigerian Civil War has given birth to what could be known as Nigerian Literature. The event which besieged the country immediately after independence in 1960 turned the writers' focus to the search for an adequate metaphor to define their communities. This war, with its horrors and atrocities, traumatized the writers, provoking a deep concern for society's fate and conscious quest for social restructuring through the art ...⁶¹

60 Yakubu, A.N. (2008). Women in the Crossfire of Conflict and the Quest for Peace: Femi Osofisan's *Farewell to a Carnival Page and a Restless Run of Locusts as Parandigus*. In Nwankwo E. Izuu, Tracie Utoh-Ezeajugh, & Daria Tunca (Eds.), *Proceedings of Professor Femi Osofison International Conference* (pp. 144-148). University of Ibadan, 17-21 June 2008.

61 Obafemi, Olu, (2007). Synopsis. *Nigerian Writers on the Nigerian Civil War* (pp. vi). Ilorin: Christy-David.

The war inspired many fictional narratives and provided more writers with issues of discourse than any other monumental event in Nigeria. 'It has provided the fertile ground for African writers to dramatize the problems of the African nations.'⁶² It also created the platform for examining the various problems of Nigeria since the war. The event has no doubt generated several bodies of literature in Nigerian writing. This chapter examines the place of women in war, insecurity, and crises situations as portrayed by literary writings as well as social reality. It is worth noting that, initially, apart from female writers, the male writers pay little attention to women as victims of the situation collectively or individually. Even when they do, they portray them as villains.

In Okpewho's *The Last Duty*, Aku's loyalty and devoted wait for her husband's return from prison is threatened by social insecurity characterized by men like Toje and his evil plan. Toje takes advantage of her helplessness. Odibo uses her as a tool to establish and confirm his self-worth as a man and experience strength. Aku is therefore a tool used to the advantage and fulfilment of the men around her, to the detriment of her own integrity. Aku as a vulnerable female deserves to be considered as a victim of war, whose vulnerability is both physical and psychological. She is physically isolated and alienated by the Urukpe people who treat her as an outcast due to her husband's supposed conspiracy. 'Caged in a seemingly endless solitude rejected and hated by all, she feels helpless and convinced that she and her son would collapse under the weight of rejection by the community.'⁶³

Excluding Women from the Civil War Narratives

Elechi Amadi in his non-fictional work *Sunset in Biafra* (1973) narrates the experience of a non-Biafran soldier caught in the tragedy of invasion conquest and occupation. Amadi is unconscious of the plight of women as victims of war and therefore no focus is given to them. Like the above, Ken Saro Wiwa's *Soza Boy* (1985) and Chukwuemeka Ike's *Sunset at Dawn* (1976) focus on the predicament and experiences of a young naive boy-soldier during the war. Zainab Quadri argues that '...the authors draw convincingly on his own

62 Machiko, Oiko, *Becoming a Feminist Writer: Representation of the Subaltern in Buchi Emecheta's Destination Biafra*. In Ernest Emenyonu (Ed.) (2008), *War in African Literature Today, African Literature Today* 26, Ibadan: HEBN, 60-70.

63 Okpewho, I. (1976). *The Last Duty*. Ibadan: Longman.

experiences of the Biafran tragedy, ...the novel tells with humour a human story set in the tragedy of the Biafran war.⁶⁴

Chinua Achebe's *There was a Country* is the author's personal account and meditation over the events of the Nigerian Civil War. Ibrahim Daniel interprets *There was a Country* not as 'a justification of Biafra but rather a re-evaluation of the human mistake that led to it.'⁶⁵ The text focuses more on the sociopolitical tragedy of the war rather than the human tragedy. Achebe's other works on the war are *Beware Soul Brother* (1971), and *Girls at War* (1972). Cyprian Ekwensi's *Survive the Peace* (1976) probes the trauma of surviving the war, only to die at the end of it. It tells the story of a young journalist, James Odugo, whose initial survival of the war terminates in his death at the hands of former soldiers at the end of the war. Frederick Forsyth's *The Making of an African Legend* (1977) is a tribute to the state of Biafra. It gives an account of the 1966 coups and the massacres of Igbos. The book emerged from the author's personal experiences of the war as a journalist. Wole Soyinka's *The Man Died* (1972) is the author's personal notes compiled in the confines of a Nigerian prison during the war. Soyinka believes that 'the man dies in all who keeps quiet in the face of tyranny and oppression.'⁶⁶

With the above brief review of various fictional and non-fictional works by male authors, it can be observed that women's vulnerability has not always been the focus of narratives about the Nigerian Civil War. It took the emergence of female writers in Nigeria for female vulnerability and active participation during the war to be laid bare. This emergence and their determination to tell their own story about the war, with a specific focus on women as victims of the war, draw our attention to the pain and disillusionment of women during the war and beyond. Women like Buchi Emecheta in *Destination Biafra* (1982), Flora Nwapa in *Never Again* (1975), Rose Njoku in *Withstand the Storm* (1985), Leslie Jean Ofoegbu in *Blow the Fire* (1986), Akachi Adimora Ezeigbo in *Roses and Bullets* (2011), and Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie in *Half of a Yellow Sun* (2006) are examples.

Buchi Emecheta in *Destination Biafra* projects the concerted efforts of women, both young and old, to survive the inhumanity of rape, rejection, abandonment, destitution, and death at the hands of soldiers, civilians, and

64 Qaudri, Zainab (2016). African Literature, Ten Powerful Books that Explore the Legacy of the Biafra War. *Pulse Nigeria*, 31 May 2016, 247.

65 Achebe, Chinua (2012). *There was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra*. USA: Penguin Press.

66 Soyinka, Wole (1972). *The Man Died* (pp. 70). Ibadan: Spectrum Book.

a disoriented society. Emecheta portrays not just the active significance of the Biafran women but their vulnerability to the war situation and survival instincts during the war. Etuk argues that:

Emecheta in *Destination Biafra* depicts the assertive woman through the positive portrayal of her heroine; 'Debbie Ogedemgbe,' which is a conscious effort in the process of critically re-creating women. It is in the light of this that Emecheta's female characters such as Debbie demonstrates her capability to make alternative choice, both within and without oriented spheres...⁶⁷

In *Never Again*, Nwapa fictionalizes the reality of the bitter experiences of women during the war. They suffer losses of loved ones – husbands, children, parents – and properties and are left to live with the trauma of these losses. The author therefore concludes that Nigerians should never again experience such carnages and human/material waste. Rose Njoku's *Withstands the Storm* is a non-fictional narration (memoir) of the author's experience of the war. Married to an army officer, her displacement and involuntary movement to the east to join the Biafra army creates family identity crises for her, as they are regarded as belonging to the vandals by their people while to the North, they are enemies. Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie's *Half of a Yellow Sun* (2006) projects the hopes, disappointments, and trauma of women, and describes the Nigerian state before the outbreak of the war, the activities of the war, its effect and after effects. The novel 'broadly reconstructs a series of historical events and the spirits of the past age.'⁶⁸ She gives to the two heroines of her novel so much independence and dominant roles, even better than to some of the men in the war-torn Biafra.

Sefi Atta's *Everything Good Will Come* (2005) presents an unusual story of two young girls in the tragic incidences of war-torn Nigeria. It invokes a universal story of love, friendship, discrimination, survival, politics, and divided loyalty. Chinelo Okparanta's *Under the Udala Tree* (2015) presents the story of a young girl, Ijeoma, whose life is destroyed by war, death, and queer sexuality (lesbianism). It however draws a peculiar type of unity that cuts across tribe and religion. Ijeoma, a Christian Igbo, and Amina, a Muslim Hausa, find themselves entangled in a forbidden sexual relationship (lesbianism) as an

67 Etuk, Dorothy (2013). Celebrating Female Assertiveness in Emecheta's *Second Class Citizen and Destination Biafra*. In Sophia Obiajulu Ogwude (Ed.), *Writing the Female Image in African Fiction* (pp. 295-310), Ibadan: University Press.

68 Nnolim, Charles. *Approaches to the African Novel. Essays in Analysis*, 3rd ed., Lagos: Malthouse Press, 2010.

alternative to the insecurity that characterizes their war-torn environment. Okparanta in this novel draws our attention to the possible dimensions of female disillusionment and the permanent reshaping of a woman's life. While the fictional narratives project the possible effects of war, conflicts, and insecurity on women in Nigeria, the non-fictional narratives present the facts of female vulnerability under these circumstances.

Women's Vulnerability in Ezeigbo's *Roses and Bullets* (2011)

Adimora-Ezeigbo attempts to create a border-line woman who, though partially independent, is subsumed in the patriarchal influence and authority of men, using the war situation as a means to an end. The war situation that characterizes the narration serves as a focal point for all the events in the text. Besides the adverse effects of the conflicts of war, women are the most vulnerable to the dangers and effects of the war among other circumstances. The protagonist of the novel, Ginika, is first of all vulnerable to her father's 'overbearing manner'.⁶⁹ And then '[she] is smuggled away from her dream world of what she wanted to do and where she wanted to be'.⁷⁰ In an attempt to get away from the hostility around her, in her husband's absence she accepts Janet's invitation to a party which will lead to her rape and the drastic end of her marriage and happiness. She is vulnerable to tradition and man's inhumanity resulting from the war situation. Just as she accepts her fate and attempts to move on, she once again finds herself a helpless victim of soldiers of the federal troops, even after the war has ended. They gang-rape and lock her up for days, news that results in the death of her only brother and her husband. The author uses rape as a major crisis to which women are vulnerable, as a result of wartime insecurity.

Other female characters in the text are victims of one calamity or another; they either die or lose loved ones to death, often in the most gruesome manner. Njide, who joins the Red Cross to serve the nation 'is hit by a stray bullet'.⁷¹ Mrs Mgboli loses her two children to food poisoning in the refugee camp and she laments, 'I have lost two people whose existence compelled me to struggle on to try to come to terms with a war that has stripped me of my possessions'.⁷² Auntie Chito finds herself saddled with the responsibility of her family and her aged mother-in-law, when her husband joins the war. Boma watches helplessly as her mother dies by the roadside from the effects of an

69 Adimora-Ezeigbo, Akachi. *Roses and Bullets*. Lagos: JALAA Writers Collectives, 2011.

70 Ibid. p. 30.

71 Ibid. p. 365.

72 Ibid. p. 336.

air raid, the only relative she has left as a result of the war. She is carrying a pregnancy from a soldier whose whereabouts are unknown: 'she had no one who could help her and her mother, the only person, was dead.'⁷³ This symbolic death of any relation or person to comfort her projects the social insecurity of women in conflict situations.

The protagonist's several experiences throughout the duration of the war, and in fact from the very beginning of her life, makes her look forward to a blissful life with her husband after the war, but circumstances cut short that dream. She is a victim of circumstance and has one loss after another from the circumstances of war, aggravated by traditional restrictions against women: '...she had been a school girl when the war started but three years after, she is a woman with enough experiences to last her a life time. She had experienced grief and she had known loss.'⁷⁴ The devastation of women as a result of war and conflicts is metaphorically depicted by the title of the novel; while roses are a metaphor for women, bullets are a metaphor for war, conflict, and the resultant insecurity.

Female Vulnerability in Edify Yakusak's *After They Left*

Edify Yakusak's *After They Left* (2015) tells the story of a young woman's childhood experience under an over-bearing and ambitious mother. Mafeng, the protagonist, ends up not marrying her beloved Samuel but the wealthy Bot, her mother's choice, who turns out to be a womanizer. Upon Bot's death, Mafeng relocates to Jos with her two kids and reunites with Samuel, her first love, and they get married. As Mafeng and Samuel try to give her kids, Kim and Jugu, a happy family and home, a bloody crisis breaks out in Jos nine months after her relocation from Abuja. This bloody crisis leads to the loss of her parents, husband, and neighbours, and her children end up missing, while she is raped and stabbed. Traumatized and devastated, she ends up in a psychiatric hospital, where she later escapes to search for her missing children. She single-handedly buries the already decomposing body of her husband Samuel. The vulnerability of the female in crisis situations is emphatically projected here. 'Askari the gang leader, ripped off her wrapper... tore her panties with the machete with the adeptness of a slaughterer, flung her to the ground and leapt on her.'⁷⁵ This scene is also enhanced by the

⁷³ Ibid. p. 422.

⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 511.

⁷⁵ Yakusak, E. (2015). *After they Left*. Lagos: Kurdan Press.

presence of Samuel's corpse, a symbolic emphasis of the breach of her marital security, upon the death of her husband.

At the Internally Displaced Persons' (IDP) camp, the women and young girls are victims of kidnapping and human trafficking. Since literature reflects society, the reality of re-curent inter-ethnic/ religious crises that have ravaged Nigeria in recent times leading to destruction of lives and properties is as much a concern to government as it is to individuals. *After they Left* tells story of what happens in the aftermath of rape and massacre,⁷⁶ whose victims are mostly female. The novel is about a '...woman's fight or battle with inner demons...'⁷⁷ This juxtaposition of an irresponsible husband with a woman like Mafeng helps us to see and feel for the character, first as a victim of patriarchy and tradition, and later as a victim of ethno-religious crises.

Mafeng's helplessness and insecurity is presented through the images of her living room, using blood and death as evidence of female insecurity induced by inhumanity. This scene is also enhanced by the presence of Samuel's corpse, a symbolic emphasis of the breach of her marital security, on the death of her husband, a security that was not available in her marriage to Bot.

At the IDP camp, the women and young girls are victims of kidnapping and human trafficking. Kim, Talatu and other young girls are sold into neighbouring countries by Madam Mati and Danjuma. The females are portrayed as victims of societal ills and exploitations; they are vulnerable to crisis situations, as exemplified by the IDP camp.

In Nigeria, the worrisome situation of insecurity and conflict is a major concern for writers. For Edify Yakusak, the time is ripe to take a critical look at these killings and hatred for one another with the aim of finding lasting solutions. *After they Left* is a novel that not only blames the orchestrators of evil and killings but is also an indictment of the social order, the leadership system, and the security and law enforcement system of a nation. A government has the responsibility to protect the lives and properties of the people it governs. This government is also responsible for ensuring the prompt enforcement of law and order in order to curtail crime and social vices, and to protect the lives and properties of the people.

76 Ajamu, p. 20.

77 Ibid. p. 21.

Female Vulnerability in Contemporary Insecurity in Nigeria

In the years after the Nigerian Civil War, the nation has witnessed and is still witnessing various crises that cut across socio-political, religious, ethnic, environmental, and economic boundaries. The place and plight of women in these emerging situations are such that they are vulnerable to the aftermath of these crises. Apart from their biological features or nature, they are adversely affected as custodians of the family.

Though their birth may not be welcomed, women still get their unfair share of the family burden in their biological or marital homes, where they are exposed to the dangers of rape, abuse/molestation, kidnapping, etc. They are also denied access to certain privileges that could boost their actualization, notable among which is education, through which the female could shield herself from insecurity as well as contribute to national development.

The biological nature of the female makes her vulnerable to crises and insecurity that hinder her progress and self-actualization. In situations of rape, for example, the female is saddled with the stigmatization of the situation, and the psychological and physical trauma that follows. The victim's life never returns to normal, and, even if it does, her future is defined by the occurrence of her past.

In situations of unwanted pregnancies, the man walks freely, leaving the woman with the burden of pregnancy – that is, if not rejected by family and society. And when the child is born, she is faced with the task of motherhood she is not prepared for.

In recent times, human trafficking has affected the female in no small measure. The shipping of women and girls to Italy for prostitution from Nigeria in the early 90s marked the beginning of a new form of enslavement and social insecurity for these victims. This human trade and transcontinental prostitution heralds the beginning of sex slavery, molestations, and destitution. These ambitious young women in their bid to earn a living are deceitfully lured into a lifestyle that turns them into prostitutes. The domestication of prostitution is in the form of the movement of young girls from poorer countries like Benin, Niger, and Togo to Nigeria to either serve as household help in wealthy homes, where they are mostly sexually and physically abused, or as waiters in restaurants where they are provided as sexual palliatives for wealthy customers.

Worthy of note is the fact that the nature of these duties (as in the international version above) are not revealed to the victims and their parents; they face the reality helplessly upon arrival. In most cases, they have no option of returning to their home countries, because their passports are seized by their benefactors.

Females are also evidently channels for drug trafficking, a task they mostly accept doing under duress or out of helplessness as a means for survival.⁷⁸

A reasonable number of feminist writings in Nigeria depict marital insecurity is a common occurrence in Nigerian homes. The female is exposed to molestation by her spouse, especially if she is uneducated and dependent. They are physically and emotionally abused, and the society expects them to be silent. The novels analysed in this chapter, such as *After they Left*, portray the social reality of female vulnerability in the insecurity situation of the society. Most Nigerian Civil War literature focus on this.

In northern Nigeria, for example, the female is emotionally belittled in her father's house due to gender insecurity, while her brothers are availed more privileges than her. She is married off, with little or no hope for companionship, love, care, and protection, especially if the husband has been chosen by the family (which is largely the case). Marital insecurity is compounded when she has to deal with co-wives, an uncaring or unavailable husband, along with the hostility of in-laws. All these unfavourable circumstances lead to her decline in terms of low self-esteem, trauma, or depression.⁷⁹

Widowhood is another form of insecurity in Nigeria. Many widows are subjected to marital mal-treatment such as physical and emotional abuse, alongside the trauma of losing her spouse. First, she is accused of killing the man and then follows the inhuman treatment of the widow in the name of rites. Although this widowhood practice is not common in northern Nigeria, the woman is saddled with the responsibility of being the bread winner with little or no education or source of income, alongside the already low self-esteem.

The various phases of insecurity in Nigeria such as Niger Delta militancy, the Boko Haram insurgency, as well as the various inter-communal and ethno-religious crises result in the homelessness of these females, with

78 Council on Hemisphere Affairs Forum, October 2011.

79 Umar & Iyere, p.160.

most of them ending up in IDP camps. Already broken as a result of their experience during the crises, most of these women live on the edge of life, given the poor living conditions in the IDP camps. They are also exposed to hunger and starvation due to poor funding of these camps or the corrupt practices of the administrators of the IDP camps. They are again prone to the dangers of human trafficking and sex slavery, a situation they mostly fall prey to in the search for security and better living conditions. The reality of the above conditions of insecurity, and its resulting effect on the female, serves as inspiration to fictional writers across Nigeria and beyond. This therefore further establishes the connection between facts, fiction, and creative imagination in the face of emerging social realities all over the world.

Women are the most vulnerable in war and crises situation, insurgency, or any form of insecurity. A large percentage of Northern Nigerian women are uneducated and are largely dependent on their spouses, if married, their fathers, if single, and their sons, if widowed. A look at the Boko Haram insurgency shows that it has claimed more men than women, leaving women insecure due to the death or kidnapping of their breadwinners, their husbands, fathers, or sons as the case may be. They become helpless and clueless as to how to fend for themselves and therefore readily accept any marriage proposal, with the hope of a livelihood. They live with the trauma of not knowing what happened to their spouses, whether they are dead or alive in the dreaded 'Sambisa Forest' in North East Nigeria, the abode of the Boko Haram insurgents. The younger girls and some of the women and their children, who did not find a husband willing to take them in, end up in the IDP camps. Some of them get married in the camps.

Kopdiya argues that 'Nigeria is struggling with the challenge of ethno-religious violence. Literary works can provide a safe forum for discourse ...of issue to reveal the despondency and frustration of characters that are victims of ethno-religious violence...'⁸⁰ In recent times, there has been a rapid increase in the number of young girls who are victims of rape, in Nigeria and in the world at large. A sixty-six years old man (Baba Sahabi) was caught repeatedly defiling young girls in Yobe State, North East Nigeria. Vera Uwaila Omozuwa, a 22-year-old year one student of the University of Benin was raped and murdered in a church in Benin City, Nigeria, on 31 May 2020. Barely a week later, eighteen-year-old Barakat Bello was raped and murdered on Tuesday, 2 June 2020, in Ibadan, Oyo state, Nigeria. These are just a few

80 Kopdiya, Lomka Iliya. (2016). Reflections of the Jos Crisis in Selected Short Stories of D.E. Kaze & Dul Johnson. *JLSN: Journal of the Literary Society of Nigeria*, 8, June 2016, 231-241.

among the numerous daily reports of how vulnerable women are to social insecurity, such as rape and other forms of violence.

Northern Nigerian Females and the Boko Haram Experience: Some Facts

Northern Nigerian females are left to tackle the challenges of survival or actualization in the face of the emergent insecurity around them. For Kassam,⁸¹ 'the gender problematic in northern Nigeria revolves around the combination of physical seclusion and psychological marginalization, a situation made worse where the women are not educated.'⁸²

A visit to some Internally Displaced Persons camps reveals a lot about the plight of the female in northern Nigeria.

Most of the women interviewed are victims of the psychological and economic trauma of insecurity, especially the experiences of burying the decomposed or decomposing bodies of their breadwinners-husbands, sons, fathers, etc. These females drift in and out of consciousness and grapple with the trauma of the experience as well as the resulting economic hardship. Eventually, most of the widows re-marry within the camps not out of love or readiness to live with another man or go into marriage but because of the fear of financial insecurity, hunger and starvation.⁸³

In the Durumi camp in Abuja, some of these women marry the security guards in the camp, with the hope of food. Ironically, sometimes, food doesn't come with the marriage. One of the explanations is that these camp staff are in the forefront of distribution of relief materials and palliatives, and being their wives guarantees getting a generous portion of these commodities, without having to scuffle in queues with the others. The young girls in these camps prostitute themselves for as low as five hundred naira (less than two dollars) due to fear of hunger, or even to get the military men and the camp workers to give their families food. As mentioned earlier, others are exposed to the dangers of rape, and child labour or trafficking. Some not so lucky are trafficked overseas as domestic slaves, sex workers or generally as victims of modern-day slavery.

81 Kassam Hauwa.

82 Kassam Hauwa.

83 Safiya Ismaila Yero's interview with the inmates of the Durumi IDP Camp, Abuja, Nigeria, November, 2016.

This then tends to focus on the question the role of men in the fate of women as a result of insecurity. First, it is (mainly) men who perpetrate these insurgent activities, and they are also the ones who prey on women's vulnerability and exploit them, as circumstantial husbands or sex mates. Rather than offer them help out of humanitarian feelings, they take advantage of them.

Another effect of insecurity is drug abuse amongst these victims. Drug abuse is rampant among younger women between ages 12-20 as an escape from the daily reality of their lives. The money for the drugs comes from the little they make from prostitution. Again, Safiya in her interaction with these females in both the Borno and Abuja Camps, discovers that '...to a large extent, the mindset of these females is altered. They do not see the need for living; rather they just exist and accept life's daily dosage destined for them. Insecurity permanently changed their lives beyond the point of return.'⁸⁴

In IDP camps in Borno State, North East Nigeria, women and girls tell their tales of woe, in the hands of Boko Haram insurgents in the Sambisa Forest, through abduction. Others become destitute in IDP camps, having lost their loved ones. Some of these females, who are lucky to escape from the insurgents, tell their horrible experience of repeated rape or forced marriages. This zone in Nigeria is therefore filled with females who are wracked by hunger and trauma due to insecurity. 'Halima Yakubu, a 42-year-old woman begs in order to feed her four children. The destruction of their homes and properties forces them into IDP camps. Of the total displaced, 80% are women.'⁸⁵ Women and young girls are subjected to physical and psychological abuse, forced labour, forced marriage to their captors, sexual abuse, rape, and forced participation in military operations, including carrying ammunition or luring men into ambush. In addition, they are made to cook, clean, and perform other household chores. Those who rebel are maimed and killed. The few who regain freedom suffer from social stigmatization due to their contact with the insurgents.⁸⁶

Ibrahim Adeyemi's conversation with Aisha Ali and Salamatu Musa at the Bakasi and Delwa camps, respectively, reveals the hardship conditions of these females after their encounter with the insurgents. To the girls, there is no freedom, for the memories of their past experiences haunt them all their lives.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibrahim Adeyemi in an interview with Women at the Sambisa IDP camp in Borno State, Nigeria, Business Day, May, 28, 2020.

⁸⁶ According to the UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2019 report.

To conclude, this paper is particularly focused on the female question in the wake of world interest in female development. The need to examine the various situations of female vulnerability in crises and war situations, and the need to find ways to initiate peace and create security, is the thrust of this paper. Yakubu suggests that ‘crisis... situations do not augur well for women’s development particularly because, their lives are distorted and destabilized’⁸⁷ (145). This focus on women’s development led to the United Nations declaration proclaiming 1975 as a decade for the status of women all over the world. In 1994, a further declaration was adopted by the UN General Assembly focussing on the elimination of violence against women, which addresses issues of women in situation of armed conflicts like war (Meredith). But this declaration has yet to be enforced, and women remain vulnerable to war and conflict situations the world over. Beyond the fictional narratives of writers, history reveals that despite the fact that (fortunately) no subsequent civil war has taken place in Nigeria, fifty years after the first crises of various kinds and magnitude plague the Nigerian nation. In northern Nigeria for example, the Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in the goriest human carnage of our time, through multiple bombings and massacres. In this inferno, women and girls are reported to be major victims. For instance, besides the killings by the members of the Boko Haram sect in villages and cities, especially in North East Nigeria, several females, especially young school girls, have been abducted and never returned by the Boko Haram sect. On 14 April 2014, 276 school girls were kidnapped by the Boko Haram sect from a government school in Chibok Village in Borno State, Nigeria. Their release after over a year in custody was in batches and incomplete. Some died in captivity, while other were raped and returned home with rape-induced pregnancies/babies. Over 100 of them never returned. Apart from the girls who were victims of this insecurity, every Nigerian mother felt the pain of loss for the mothers of these girls. Just as Nigerians tried to get over the unfortunate incident of the Chibok girls, another 111 girls were kidnapped on 19 February 2017 from the premises of Government Girls Science and Technical College, Dapchi, in Yobe State, North East Nigeria, only a few kilometres from the scene of the first kidnapping. After several attempts at negotiations, a fraction of them was again released, five were said to have died in captivity, while some of them have never been released to this day. Leah Sharibu, for example, is still being held by members of the sect.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Yakubu, A.N., *ibid.*, 145.

⁸⁸ Vanguardnig.com.

Some women/girls are also used by the Boko Haram insurgents as suicide bombers, who are brainwashed into believing that they are going straight to heaven when they die as suicide bombers carrying out an act of 'holy war.' Some of the girls used as suicide bombers don't even care whether they really will go to heaven or not; they just accept that they have to carry out these acts due to the fact that they don't have any meaningful reason to remain alive anyway: some have watched their husbands or fathers or brothers slaughtered before their very eyes before they were taken away. Others have been gang-raped repeatedly to the point that life has lost its meaning for them. With no hope of returning home, losing their lives isn't such a bad idea after all.

Of the 276 girls kidnaped by Boko Haram from the north-eastern town of Chibok on April 14, 2014, over 100 are still missing. Abubakar Shekau, the Boko Haram leader responsible for using girls as suicide bombers, has claimed in videos that the girls have converted to Islam and have been 'Married off'.⁸⁹

The ethno-religious crises in the North-central cities of Jos, Benue, Kaduna, and their environs have also resulted in the rape, molestation, mutilation, and abduction of women and girls. Women have been known to be victims of their male partner's personal crisis or frustration. These women tend to be the punching bags of drunken husbands, jobless and frustrated husbands, victims of street-gang rape, and molestation resulting from a faulty social order. Culturally, women and girls are victims of harmful cultural practices such as 'circumcision', early/forced marriage, denial of access to education, and patriarchal subjugation, along with political discrimination.

Rape is one of the commonest nightmares of women and girls when ethno-religious crises break out. Just like war situations, women are vulnerable to rape as a result of insecurity and chaos. It is estimated that, '20,000-50,000 women were raped during the Nigerian Civil War, five times that number during the Rwanda Civil War'.⁹⁰ Interethnic and intra-ethnic conflicts, as well as religious crises, whenever they occur, have been permanent threats to women since the Civil War.

⁸⁹ UNICEF in Channels Television, 13 April 2018.

⁹⁰ Meredith, Turshen (1998). Women's War Stories, What Women do in Wartime. *Gender and Conflicts in African* (pp. 1-26). NY, USA: Zed Books.

In eastern Nigeria, young women and girls of reproductive age are reportedly lured into baby production and sales, a situation where they are isolated, raped repeatedly, impregnated, and, on delivery, their babies are taken away and sold. Statistics reports that 'more 70% of human trafficking victims in Nigeria are women and young girls.'⁹¹ This explains the fact that females slip easily into prostitution and end up as domestic servants in the western world. Both the baby business and human trafficking are offshoots of economic crises both nationally and globally.

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9

Exploring the Material Bases for Outmigration and Human Trafficking in the Farming Communities of Kwara State, Nigeria

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Abstract

Perception of human trafficking among selected rural-farming households in Kwara State in the Middle Belt of Nigeria is based on analysis of data obtained from 120 heads of farming households. Deploying a 5-point Likert-type scale as indicator of awareness of human trafficking, knowledge of the phenomenon is not gender-selective in nature, and a majority (77.5%) stated that they have out-migrants in their household, more than half (54.2%) of which were in the age range 10-20 years at the time of move. Major reasons for leaving base include: lack of employment opportunities (mean score=4.6 of 5), lack of better social services and amenities and poor access to better education, while high wage and income in destination was a major pull factor. Most of the victims thus get lured by human trafficking agents premised on prospects of getting them good jobs abroad but eventually find themselves trapped and often end up with concocted debts mounted on them by these traffickers. Implications of cross-border social and economic linkages of the study area to northern areas of Benin Republic are further highlighted for international trafficking.

Introduction

A Gallup poll conducted before the 2019 Nigerian presidential elections showed that roughly half of all Nigerians said it was a “bad time” to find a job in the economy. The proportion of youth planning to leave Nigeria permanently increased from 36 percent in 2014 to 52 percent in 2018, one of the highest levels in sub-Saharan Africa. In absolute numbers, the figure of international

migrants from Nigeria has increased from around 450,000 in 1990 to 1.4 million in 2019. Many among these millions are young people preyed upon by traffickers to migrate not just out of his or her local community to urban centres but out of the country.

Human trafficking is a form of business venture that dehumanize humanity in itself (WHO, 2002) – a situation whereby humans turn follow humans into a commodity and a product. Nigeria is still listed among the Tier 2 watch list of United States Department of State trafficking in persons 2017 report and other significant documents that contain extensive research data on human trafficking. Also, UNESCO (2020) claimed that trafficking of humans is regarded as the third largest crime after economic fraud and drug trafficking. Thus, Nigeria is commonly identified as a country of origin, transit, and destination for human trafficking, with endemic communities often cited in the deep south or the core north of the country.

However, while so much attention has been given to the international dimensions of human trafficking, as well as the southern and northern geographical delimitations of endemic communities and experiences, little is known about the dynamics of trafficking in the Middle Belt of Nigeria. Kwara State, one of the six Middle Belt States (of Nigeria's total 36 States) is the focus of this study. In Nigeria, the major hot-spots of out-migration and human trafficking are Edo and Lagos in the Southwest of the country. The majority of trafficked persons for the purpose of sexual exploitation are young women and minors from Edo State (UNODC, 2010).

Lagos State is unique for being a place of origin, destination, and transit point of victims of trafficking (Akinyoade & Oyeniyi, 2012). An IMADR (2015) report indicates that '[In] the last two decades, there has been a growth in the internal trafficking of Nigerian women and children. An increased number of people are trafficked from rural communities to cities such as Lagos, Abeokuta, Ibadan, Kano, Kaduna, Calabar and Port-Harcourt. Trafficking to these regions is predominantly for exploitative domestic work, farm labor and prostitution.'

Examination of the forced labour experience of victims rescued by NAPTIP in the aforementioned locations by Akinyoade and colleagues (2012) underlies this point. Geographically, Kwara State, which is located in the middle belt, is a major transit route between these identified cities. Yet, little or no information exists regarding the occurrence, nature, and context of human trafficking in the state. This chapter also offer qualitative insights to

child fostering practices in Kwara State, particularly how fostering turns a child into domestic help in conditions of forced labour (which in itself is an outcome of trafficking).

In the general literature, there are several underlying perspectives to the nexus of outmigration, emigration, human trafficking, human mobility, and the like. First is the issue of the lure of opportunities in the city as a driver of rural-urban migration; secondly, the use of members of the extended family system for domestic work in large town agglomerations; thirdly, the bigger city as a stepping stone in the eventuality of international travel; fourthly, seeking higher educational opportunities, and a host of several factors playing individually or acting together as motivation for rural-urban movement. In this wide array of propelling factors lie unscrupulous agents and intermediaries that broker and facilitate linkage to opportunities. Many of these agents are sometimes close to the family or on many occasions not related to the out-migrant or the victim, but the agents do serve to inform/misinform and facilitate the potential for the would-be out-migrant to become a victim of trafficking (IOM, 2016).

Traffickers find an easy prey in the victims and in some cases their families in situations of impaired livelihood conditions. Irrespective of the national or international destination, many of the trafficked persons are sourced from rural areas and oftentimes poor socioeconomic backgrounds (UNODC, 2008). Where the source is from rural areas, human trafficking imposes extremely adverse effects on agricultural production and productivity (Ofuoku, 2010; Ofuoku & Uzokwe, 2012). The dearth in statistics for rural-urban migration in Nigeria and the thin line involved in attempting to distinguish travelling to secure work in domestic servitude (or forced labour conditions) from local child fostering practices and child adoption makes it difficult to obtain fairly accurate statistics on human trafficking. Adoption is the legal process whereby a person obtains judicial or administrative authorization to take the child of another person as his own, and parental rights and obligations are permanently transferred from the child's natural parents to the adopter (Issa & Awoyemi, 2016).

In rural settlements, where most people are being trafficked, many appear to be not only unconscious of the probable consequences of migration on themselves and, of course, on its effect on the economies of the local communities they are about leaving behind them (Ofuoku, 2010). Most rural communities are settlements that are always characterized by gross diminishing returns and low income emanating from population pressure

and uneconomic land ownership, and the resultant decrease in population of farmers may aggravate further these diminishing returns and income. The level of dependence by rural communities on manual labour, especially that provided by women and young able-bodied men, will also relate with the level to which farm output and income in the rural areas may be affected.

In Kwara State, Nigeria, bush clearing, tilling, planting, harvesting, storage processing, and marketing of arable crops are carried out by women and young people in the form of manual labour. Agriculture is an important source of employment for about 87% of economically active women and 80% of economically active young men (Blackden & Rwebangira, 2004). Trafficking in women/youth may lead to labour shortages and output reduction. The arable crops mainly grown in Kwara State include cassava, maize, vegetables, sorghum, yam, rice, and sweet potato. An affirmative conclusion is, however, difficult to make as to how out-migration and attendant forms of human trafficking have affected agricultural productivity. It would therefore be worthwhile to examine the perceptions of rural-farming households on the effect of human trafficking in the study area where there has been a recent upsurge in the number of young people leaving the communities in search of perceived better opportunities elsewhere.

The Nigerian setting, with attention to Kwara State

Decades of military regimes in Nigeria served as a fundamental contributory factor for the emergence and deepening of human trafficking in the country as some citizens used it as form of escape from the severe political, social, and economic crises experienced in the period 1966-1999 (cf. UNESCO, 2020). Following the oil boom in the 1970s, opportunities for migration, both inside and outside the country, created avenues for exploitation and international trafficking. Despite the potential wealth of the country from its abundant natural and human resources, political instability and widespread corruption hampered the progress towards poverty reduction, and, as people sought greener pastures into a world environment where borders have been increasingly militarized, the facilitation of trafficking thrived. A 2015 report by Human Rights Watch noted that, significantly, corruption in the public sector has been endemic and it has 'continued to undermine the enjoyment of social and economic rights' in the country (HRW, 2015). The link of corruption to the facilitation of trafficking is direct; for example, it eases the transportation of victims within countries and across borders without detection or requests for paperwork. Economically, families seeking to escape destitution and poor conditions of living become vulnerable

to the antics of traffickers. And, with the feminization of poverty, women and young girls (who also suffer discriminatory cultural practices) became more exposed to the tactics of traffickers. Added to this fragile landscape are different forms of internal conflict and instability (the Boko Haram conflict and violence that occurs in the four-year electoral cycles) have combined to create fertile ground for organized criminal groups to thrive (see Oarhe & Sylvester, 2012). At the international level, the United State Trafficking in Persons Report (2015) reported that 'EUROPOL has identified Nigerian organized crime related to trafficking in persons as one of the greatest law enforcement challenges to European governments.'

In 2017, the trafficking in persons (TIP) report was published by the United States Department of State and noted that more than three dozen women and children were exploited 'in sex trafficking among seven IDP camps in Maiduguri', and that government officials managing the camps are alleged to be complicit in these activities. Kwara State was not left out in this menace; it was made known in 2018 that the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) reported assisting the Kwara State government in retrieving the indigenes of the state that were victims of human trafficking in Lebanon and other destination countries in the Middle East. The agency recently had even taken some steps further to sensitize communities within the borders of Togo and Benin Republic. And the agency has concluded plans to profile the victims and work out modalities to return them to Nigeria. According to the Nigerian Living Standards Survey (NLSS) report released by the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS) covering the year 2019, Kwara State was ranked 28th in position of poverty head-counts out of 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) in Nigeria.

The major objective of this study therefore is to sample the perceptions of rural-farming households about the nature and context of out-migration and the ways it has manifested as human trafficking in Kwara State, Nigeria. Specifically, the study sought to:

- Describe the socioeconomic characteristics of rural-farming households in the study area
- Identify the historical roots of out-migration from the study area
- Examine major factors that contribute to the occurrence of human trafficking in the study area.

Methodology

The study was carried out in Kwara State, Nigeria, which is located in the country's Middle Belt. While the state is bounded locally by other states in its northern (marked by the West African River Niger), eastern, and southern sections, it shares an international border with the Republic of Benin in the west. It is located in the forest savanna and enjoys moderate dry and wet seasons; the state is noted for a heavy rainfall season from March to November, and annual rainfall varies from 1000 mm to 1500 mm, with the peak between September and early October, which is essential for rain-fed agricultural practices. Thus, the major occupation of people in the state is farming, and various crops which are cultivated both for local consumption and as cash crops are cashew and oil palm. Rice, sorghum, cassava, maize, yam, beans, and sweet potatoes are the major crops grown mainly for consumption in the state (Kwara ADP, 2015). The vegetation type found here is derived savannah with riparian forest along the river bank. Kwara State is located about 300 kilometres away from Lagos (the national commercial capital) and 500 kilometres away from Abuja (Nigeria's administrative capital). These geographical and administrative attributes put the state in a vantage connection position locally and internationally, with favourable means of transportation by land, water and air – ideal for traffickers needs.

Baruten Local Government Area in the North Central district of Kwara State, Nigeria, sharing a long land border with Republic of Benin, is a major transit point for would be traffickers. 'The local government begins in Ilesha Baruba and ends in Chikanda which is the border town, and it has its headquarters in the town of Kosubosu.' The main language spoken in Baruten is Baruba, and other languages spoken in the area include Yoruba, French, Pidgin, Hausa, and Ffulde (Fulani). The border town (Chikanda) is known for oil importation and exportation. It has an area of 9749 km² and a population of 209,459 as at the 2006 census, and the Baruten LGA includes a part of the Borgu Game Reserve (UN Environment Programme, 2007)

In order to achieve the objectives of this study, primary data were sought and obtained through structured questionnaire survey. A three-stage sampling technique was adopted for identification of respondents. The first stage involved a random selection of three local governments from the 16 local governments in Kwara state. At the second stage, simple random sampling was also deployed for the selection of five villages from all the selected three local governments. At the final stage, 24 farming households from each village were identified, which led to identification of a total of 120 respondents.

Descriptive statistics and a 5-point Likert-type scale analysis was used to analyse the data obtained from the study area.

Results and Discussion

Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Respondents

The importance of prevailing socioeconomic conditions as contributory factors for persons to migrate out of an area, and/or become victims of trafficking, has been shown in several studies (see Akinyoade & Carchedi, 2012; Perry & McEwing, 2013; Honeyman et al., 2016). For our study area, the socioeconomic background of respondents is presented in Table 2. The tabulated information shows that males constituted over 70% of the respondents. This is in tandem with research work that indicates a preponderance of males as heads of households. However, since the study sought to elicit information from farming communities, the higher percentage of males compared to females may be due to the very nature of farming as a male-denominated activity in Nigeria. In Table 1, the marital status profile of the rural-farming households interviewed shows that 70.0% of them are married. The presence of the 21.7% that reported being widows is in tandem with the earlier observation that, where female heads of household exist, their changed marital conditions dictated their new positions as household heads. The relatively high percentage of married rural-farming households is also indicative of potentially large families where the married bear a lot of children who are expected to support farm labour so as to enhance farming activities on family land.

Also, about half (46%) of the respondents have no formal education; those with primary education constitute 29.2% of the sample, and 16.7% of the respondents have some form of tertiary education. The fairly large proportion of uneducated heads of households appears to suggest a likelihood of vulnerability to the preying techniques of 'agents' and traffickers who promise better lives for unsuspecting victims. Farming is the primary occupation (over 80% of the respondents) in these local governments. A few of the respondents engage in trading, teaching, and the transporter business. Approximately three-fifths (59.2%) of household heads interviewed have been involved in farming for more than 20 years.

Table 9.1

Grain Crops Yield (Tons), Area Cultivated (Ha), and Yield (Tons/Ha)

	Crops	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
1	<i>Maize</i>					
	Ton	149.89	164.53	189.78	196.56	210.70
	Ha	109.20	114.66	126.22	133.27	141.16
	Yield (Tons/Ha)	1.37	1.43	1.50	1.47	1.49
2	<i>Sorghum</i>					
	Ton	102.97	112.70	131.05	137.96	146
	Ha	67.30	80.50	84.93	87.32	96.26
	Yield (Tons/Ha)	1.53	1.4	1.54	1.58	1.52
3	<i>Rice</i>					
	Ton	234.21	345.69	440.43	480.80	384.44
	Ha	97.18	135.04	142.81	147.13	128.75
	Yield (Tons/Ha)	2.41	2.56	3.08	3.27	2.986
4	<i>Millet</i>					
	Ton	25.39	28.44	19.54	20.50	26.01
	Ha	13.43	15.05	16.64	17.09	19.26
	Yield (Tons/Ha)	1.89	1.89	1.17	1.20	1.35
5	<i>Cowpea</i>					
	Ton	0.968	1.08	3.12	3.27	3.58
	Ha	4.34	5.12	5.42	5.54	5.91
	Yield (Tons/Ha)	0.22	0.21	0.57	0.59	0.60

Source: KWADP, 2012.

Generally, despite the growing evidence that fertilizers can substantially increase yields in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as well as slow down environmental degradation, farmers in this region (include Kwara State, Nigeria) still lag far behind other developing countries in fertilizer use (Liverpool-Tasie et al., 2010). The fertilizer supply is limited, and the cost is prohibitive for SSA farmers because fertilizer may cost as much as five times the global market price (Mosier & Syers, 2005). This is one of the contributing factors that has led to low yield, low income, and arable land degradation, that is, all these afore-mentioned factors, creating fertile ground for out-migration and a probability of yielding to entreaties of traffickers in the study area.

The few samples of arable crops mentioned show low yield (ton/ha) in the study area, which could also contribute to the out-migration of the people in the state when their living conditions are not commensurate with the income gained from their agricultural production.

Table 2 also shows the farm-size profile of the household head, where a majority (86.7%) of the farmers have a farm size that ranges between one to five hectares, which implies that the respondents practice small-scale farming because of fragmented land holdings in the study area.

Generally, over three-quarters (77.5%) of the rural-farming households have either one or more of their members as migrants; more the half (54.7%) of the migrants in the study area are males, whose age as of the time of migration was in the age range of 10-20 years. The implication of this finding is that the young migrants have the strength and risk-bearing ability associated with such movement. This is in tandem with Gimba and Kumshe (2000) that says a majority of the migrants from the villages to cities are young and energetic enough to cope with the hurdles faced in cities.

In Table 2, data are presented to show that nearly half of the migrants left the study area in search of employment, while 35.2% of them do so to further their education. This study is not too different from the studies conducted by Omonigho and Olaniyan (2013), McCarthy and colleagues (2006), and Todaro (1997), which show that education and employment are two basic reasons why people move from the rural area to an urban centre. This study also reveals that a majority (70.6%) of the migrants were not employed before migration, while 29.4% of the migrants were employed before migration but looking for better employment.

Table 9.2

Socioeconomic Characteristics of Rural-Farming Households Sampled

Characteristics	Frequency (F)	Percentage (%)
<i>Gender</i>		
Male	88	73.3
Female	32	26.7
<i>Marital Status</i>		
Single	10	8.4
Married	84	70.0
Widow	26	21.7
<i>Education Level</i>		
No formal education	55	45.8
Primary education	35	29.2
Secondary education	10	8.3
Tertiary education	20	16.7
<i>Primary Occupation</i>		
Farming	98	81.7
Others	22	18.3
<i>Farming experience (Years)</i>		
0-10	32	26.6
11-20	17	14.2
20+	71	59.2
<i>Farm size (Ha)</i>		
1-5	104	86.7
6-10	13	10.8
11-15	3	2.5
<i>Association Membership</i>		
Yes	73	60.8
<i>Household with migrants</i>		
Yes	93	77,5
<i>Gender of migrants</i>		
Male	66	54.7
Female	54	45.3
<i>Age (year) at time of migrants</i>		
0-9	3	2.2.
10-20	65	54.2
20+	52	43.6

Table 9.2

Socioeconomic Characteristics of Rural-Farming Households Sampled (continued)

Characteristics	Frequency (F)	Percentage (%)
<i>Reasons for migration</i>		
Employment	52	43.1
Education	42	35.2
Marriage	15	12.5
Bored of rural life	6	4.3
Joining a relative	4	4.1
Conflicts/Natural disaster	1	0.7
<i>Employment status of migrants before migration</i>		
Yes	35	29.4
<i>Received remittance from migrants</i>		
Yes	87	72.3
<i>Amount received as remittance (Naira/Year)</i>		
0,000-60,000	31	25.8
70,000-100,000	18	15.0
120,000-200,000	31	25.8
>200,000	5	4.1
No remittance	35	29.2
<i>Factors responsible for rural-urban migration</i>		
Push	60	50.0
Pull	24	20.0
Both	36	30.0

Source: Field Survey 120 farming household Baruten LGA, Kwara State 2018

In traditional cultures where arranged marriages are common, girls are sometimes forced into child marriage, which can also be identified as a form of human trafficking (Hartmann, 2018). In this study, 12.5% of households that experienced out-migration of at least one of their members did so for marital reasons. In the local government areas studied, early marriage is common, and human trafficking for marriage becomes a crucial possibility as highlighted by the fact that an appreciable proportion of migrants left these areas in their mid-teen years for places outside the zones on the pretext of marriage.

The study also examined whether remittance or assistance is received by the households from the migrants, and, in this case, 72.3% of the households claimed to receive remittances and 27.7% claimed not to receive remittances

from the migrants. This show that all migrants in the household migrated either to further their education or in search of employment; thus, migrants may have heterogeneous motives, and their remitting behaviour can be described as altruism or self-interest. Under this assumption of altruism, the likelihood of sending remittances is a function of the migrant's level of income (Lucas & Stark, 1988; Vanwey, 2004).

The amount of remittances claimed to be received by the farming households is shown in Table 2. A quarter (25.8%) of the farming households, respectively, stated having received remittances in the range of NGN 30,000-60,000 per annum, and the range of NGN 120,000-200,000 per annum. Some farming households received a bit more (NGN 200,000 per annum), but this constituted less than 5% of the sampled households. Yet, 29.2% of the farming households claimed not to have received any remittances from their members that have migrated.

Data also show that out of the 120 rural-farming household heads interviewed, 50% strongly stated that migration is caused by push factors, 20% cited pull factors as causal agents, while about one-third opined that the migration pattern is caused by both factors. This is similar to the push and pull factors developed for understanding migration by Lee (1966). 'Push factors' are those circumstances that make people leave home for other areas such as famine, drought, low agricultural productivity; while the pull factors are those conditions that attract rural migrants to urban areas such as job opportunities, and better income opportunities among others.

Factors contributing to the vulnerability of trafficking

Vulnerability to trafficking in the study area was measured by exploring respondents' perception of factors of human trafficking identified in the literature. These factors include: lack of employment opportunities, lack of better social services/amenities, and unequal access to better education, along with other factors which they ranked 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, respectively, based on the high mean scores (most important factors) in a descending order. And logically, this study follows the tenet of previous studies that identified these factors mentioned as major push/pull factors influencing human trafficking/migration. According to Omonigho and Olaniyan (2013), and Todaro (1997), education and employment are two basic reasons why people migrate.

Collated responses in Table 3 indicated that lack of employment opportunities (mean=4.6 out of a maximum of 5.0) was a major factor responsible for

people's decision to give themselves up to trafficking. This was congruent with Ofuoku and Uzokwe (2012) who found that people had a high desire to survive and escape from poverty which was prompted by unemployment and lack of access to opportunities. Another major push factor was the lack of better social services and amenities (mean=4.51), and unequal access to better education (mean=4.41). Ofuoku and Uzokwe (2012) argued that parents allowed their household members to be trafficked because they believed that the destination, whether in or out of the country, could provide better employment and educational opportunities, as well as stable social amenities.

High wage and income differences at the place of destination (mean=4.24) was a major pull factor responsible for victims giving up and landing in the hands of local agents, which comes with the promise of such a relatively better life. This observation matched the findings of UNESCO (2006), and Ofuoku and Uzokwe (2012), whose studies showed that high income at the destination of trafficked persons was an important pull factor in human trafficking. The desire for this high income has a tendency to motivate people to decide to be trafficked outside their original place of abode.

Connections to Benin Republic

The Baruten LGA in the North Central district of Kwara State, Nigeria, shares a long border with the Republic of Benin. The Baruba people that are found in this geographical location in the Benin Republic and Nigeria share the same culture and speak the same dialect, despite the division by international border. Inter-marriages and other cross-border celebrations are common, all signifying a high level of commuting as well as exposure to opportunities. Unfortunately, cross-border criminal groups subject Beninese children to domestic servitude and other forms of forced labour in Nigeria. The local forms of child fostering that mutate into servitude occur in this area too. In the United States Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report of 2020, 'a lack of identity documentation contributed to increased vulnerability to trafficking in Benin.' Officials reported that traffickers exploit boys, girls, and women from Parakou in the north-east of Benin Republic. Experts have also highlighted the commune of Djougou in north-western Benin as one of the corridors for traffickers who subject women to forced labour and potentially sexual exploitation in Persian Gulf countries, Lebanon, and the Maghreb. Some of these towns in Benin Republic that share the international border with Kwara State of Nigeria are frequented by visitors from the Baruten local government area. Cross-border communities are vantage manifestation

points for the characteristics of trafficking – as transit areas, even as endemic areas. Up till now, little scholarly and programmatic attention have been given to these so-called far-flung outposts. Evidence from this study show that the characteristics of these locations should no longer be ignored.

Table 9.3

Push/Pull Factors of Human Trafficking/Migration from the Perception of Respondents

Push/Pull Factors	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Mean Score	Rank
Lack of employment opportunities	0 (0.0%)	4 (3.3%)	1 (0.8%)	34 (28.3%)	4.60	1st
Lack of better social services and amenities	0 (0.0%)	4 (3.3%)	2 (1.7%)	43 (35.8%)	4.51	2nd
Unequal access to better education	1 (0.8%)	8 (6.7%)	2 (1.7%)	39 (32.5%)	4.41	3rd
High wage/income difference	0 (0.0%)	15 (12.5%)	5 (4.2%)	36 (30.0%)	4.24	4th
Joining relative or friend	0 (0.0%)	12 (10.0%)	5 (4.2%)	81 (67.5%)	3.94	5th
Political instability	3 (2.5%)	16 (13.3%)	12 (10.0%)	45 (37.5%)	3.93	6th
Farming is tedious	1 (0.8%)	22 (18.3%)	13 (10.8%)	60 (50.0%)	3.70	7th
Shortage and unfair distribution of land	2 (1.7%)	36 (30.0%)	16 (13.3%)	38 (31.7%)	3.45	8th
Inadequate access to resources such as input, technology etc	3 (2.5%)	45 (37.5%)	14 (11.7%)	36 (30.0%)	3.24	9th
Natural disaster flood fire. etc	7 (5.8%)	45 (37.5%)	19 (15.8%)	32 (26.7%)	2.98	10th
Increase in rural population	7 (5.8%)	57 (47.5%)	12 (10.0%)	32 (26.7%)	2.88	11th
Evil social customs and practices	12 (10.0%)	54 (45.0%)	19 (15.8%)	30 (25.0%)	2.68	12th

Cut-off mean score = 3.0 (≥ 3.0 =important factor)

Source: Field Survey 120 farming household Baruten LGA, Kwara State 2018

Conclusion and policy implications

The study indicated that the push factors associated with human trafficking included lack of employment opportunities, lack of better social services and amenities, unequal access to better education, political instability and insecurities, lack of interest in tedious farming activity, shortage and unfair distribution of land, inadequate access to resources such as input, technology, natural disaster such as flood and fire outbreaks, increase in rural population, and evil social customs and practices. While the pull factors include high wage and income differences and joining a relative and friends, these are factors that ease the manipulation and control of trafficked persons with a promise of high income in the working destination and a perceived low risk involved in the working destination. While there is a lack of comprehensive or reliable data on the occurrence of human trafficking in Kwara State, the geographical location puts it as a vantage transit position in Nigeria's internal trafficking route from the north to the south or vice versa; its border shared with the Republic of Benin makes it a conduit of sub-regional traffickers, and the convergence of points found in other studies to be conducive to conditions where trafficking thrives are found in these communities.

This study is exploratory yet very important as it adds to the literature on the internal dynamics of trafficking in Nigeria. It presents a background to be built on, not only for the further understanding of how endemic trafficking works locally but also to understand the fine line between what seemingly looks like out-migration as opposed to enticed migration facilitated by traffickers and brokers. Further studies are thus recommended to capture in better detail the extent of trafficking, the networks, deficiencies in public services delivery, and the operationalization of counter-trafficking protocols and initiatives. For farming communities, this study serves to underscore the potential incorporation of agricultural extension agents to disseminate anti-trafficking messages during their interactions with farmers. Finally, government needs to join forces together with community-based organization (CBOs), the immigration agency, and the police force in order to create and sustain anti-trafficking awareness programmes in the farming communities of the state.

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10 Human Trafficking, Modern Day Slavery and Global Public Health: The Impact of Covid 19 and the ‘New Normal’ on Old Narratives

Pauline Aweto

Abstract

The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines public health as ‘the art and science of preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting health through the organised efforts of society’ (Acheson, 1988). Understood from this perspective, it could reasonably be argued that a specific public-health approach, which focuses more on preventive measures, inclusive of health promotion, has, to a significant extent, been absent in existing measures to tackle the scourge of human trafficking and/or modern-day slavery. Therefore, this chapter aims to establish this tripartite framework and a triangular relationship of interdependence between human trafficking, modern-day slavery, and global public health. Nevertheless, the most recent Covid 19 pandemic has become a major game changer which legitimates global health’s focus on non-communicable diseases and will, for a long time to come, shape the content of concern, where human movement, migration, and, by extension, human trafficking and modern-day slavery cannot but constitute an essential part of a conversation that has, excessively, been long overdue.

Introduction

Following the unprecedented ‘migration crisis’ of 2015 in Europe, the United Nations Agency for Migration has to date recorded an estimated total death of more than 18,000 Africans crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Since then, there has been a significant shift in focus to address and redress illegal migration and, by extension, human trafficking, from both destination and transit countries to countries of origin: an approach, so to say, that prioritises the

prevention of trafficking over the protection of victims and the prosecution of perpetrators.

Consequently, this chapter aims to argue in favour of a preventive approach to human trafficking. Nevertheless, this preventive approach is not to be understood as business as usual in terms of awareness-raising campaigns in origin countries to prevent potential victims from being trafficked. On the contrary, the preventive perspective being proposed is completely from the perspective of public health, which, as previously highlighted is defined as ‘the art and science of preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting health through the organised efforts of society’ (Acheson, 1988). In doing so, it will start from the journey so far travelled in terms of the use of human trafficking and modern-day slavery by comparing, for example, approaches embraced by the United Kingdom and Italy. It will proceed to analyse the public-health approach to human trafficking/modern-day slavery within the framework of the 2020 Covid 19 pandemic. Therefore, in contextualising this discourse within the pandemic, this chapter will consider its impact on the phenomenon of human trafficking and how post Covid 19 approaches would, as a matter of necessity, involve a qualitative leap from the old narrative to the ‘new normal’, as it were. Alongside this concern, other emerging, under explored, or yet to be explored aspects of human trafficking would be highlighted for future consideration.

Human Trafficking and/or Modern-day slavery? Terms and Conditions Apply

To understand the relationship between human trafficking and modern-day slavery, it would be necessary to refer to the Palermo protocol. The 2003 Palermo Protocol of the United Nations is the first attempt to provide a globally acceptable definition of human trafficking or trafficking in persons as ‘the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices like slavery, servitude or the removal, manipulation or implantation of organs.’ This definition leaves no further doubt that ‘slavery’ or ‘practices similar to slavery’ and ‘servitude’ are integral parts of human

trafficking, from the perspective of the form of exploitation, or, more specifically, the purpose of exploitation.

Over the years, however, this dialectical relationship between the “means” and “purpose” of human trafficking has given rise to different approaches, perspectives and use of terminology, for example human trafficking or modern-day slavery. From this point of view, for example, the United Kingdom specifically uses modern-day slavery as a podium for different underlying crimes or offences including ‘human trafficking and slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labour’ (Reed et al., 2018). Similarly, it is relevant to look more closely, possibly with a magnifying lens, at the nature of crimes or offences that could be classified under the umbrella of modern-day slavery. In the first place, it must be highlighted that these crimes are not immediately visible, classifiable, and recognisable like other crimes. This is further worsened by the fact that a modern-day slavery crime is most often not a single crime that takes place as a one-off occurrence in one place and at one time but, on the contrary cuts across the spectrum of place, time, purpose, and type. Understandably, this accounts for the need to consider, for example, the different stages involved in the process, including recruitment, transportation, and exploitation.

Nevertheless, it should be specified that often the type of exploitation defines the nature of the crime or offence. Once again, this is always not perfectly clear due to the juxtaposition of a series of interwoven violations. It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that in the United Kingdom, there are at least 17 types of offences recognised as modern-day slavery offences and classifiable under the categories of labour exploitation, sexual exploitation, domestic servitude, and criminal exploitation (Cooper et al., 2017).

As far as modern-day slavery is concerned, it is necessary to specify that the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) of the United Kingdom was set up in 2009 as a concrete counter-trafficking response to the Council of Europe Convention. The National Referral Mechanism is used to identify potential victims of human trafficking and modern-day slavery. The information gathered through the NRM contributes to the development of data on the phenomenon of human trafficking and modern-day slavery in the UK. However, in order to have a clearer picture of the phenomenon, the figures gathered by the NRM are published every trimester by the National Crime Agency (NCA), rigorously classified according to gender, age, type of exploitation, and so on. For example, in 2017, the referrals for potential victims recorded were 5145, an increase of 35% of the preceding year. These

potential victims were from 116 countries. From these numbers, Nigeria had a total of 264 with 87 recorded under domestic servitude, 23 for labour exploitation, 133 for sexual exploitation, and 22 non classifiable referrals. Similarly, the data published by the NCA on the NRM between January and March 2018 and then between April and June 2018 saw a total of 107 referrals of Nigerian women, with 24 for domestic servitude, 16 for labour exploitation, 57 for sexual exploitation, and 10 referrals as non-classified. It should be highlighted, however, that overall, the most prevalent form of exploitation registered was labour exploitation, while for Nigerian women, the most prevalent form of exploitation was sexual exploitation, followed by domestic servitude. One important factor for consideration as far as the use of the National Referral Mechanism goes is the fact that it is only used in the initial identification of 'potential' victims. Consequently, not all potential victims receive a positive confirmation of the victim status of trafficking or exploitation after an exhaustive assessment. In fact, there is a huge asymmetrical difference between the potential and actual victim of modern-day slavery. In this direction, for example, according to the data of June 2017, the total referrals were 3804, but only 907 were finally recognised as victims.

On the contrary, the scenario is very different as far as Italy is concerned. Even though Italy has been identified as the main destination country for Nigerian victims of trafficking, especially for sexual exploitation, unlike the UK, the term predominantly used in Italy is human trafficking, which suggests a total absence of other forms of exploitation, such as labour exploitation (often considered under illegal migration) or domestic servitude as evident from the UK perspective. In other words, human trafficking, as applicable to Italy and to the Nigerian experience, is almost exclusively for the purpose of sexual exploitation. One of the main limitations of this perspective is that other forms of exploitation are undermined, with the logical consequence of overly focusing on sexual exploitation, to the detriment of other forms of existing or co-existing crimes or offences. Furthermore, there is the overall assumption that woman who are trafficked to Italy are exclusively for sexual exploitation, and, as a consequence, have to, as a matter of necessity, fit into the prescriptions of Article 18 of the legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 of the Council of Ministers, which, among other things, specifies how humanitarian protection and assistance are to be given to victims of human trafficking. The lacuna of this legislative provision became evident in 2015, when even economic migrant women were immediately taken to shelters meant for trafficked victims even before they were identified as such. In comparison to the UK, where too much caution is taken in order to recognise victims of exploitation who need to pass the rigorous system of the National

Referral Mechanism before they qualify for adequate available support services, Italy, on the contrary, seems to have taken the opposite approach, with consequences that overwhelmed existing humanitarian assistance for Nigerian victims of human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation.

This human trafficking versus modern-day slavery conundrum, mainly caused by the application of different terms and conditions of reference, is better understood from the perspective of the implications of the definition of human trafficking as specified by the previously mentioned Palermo Protocol of 2003. One of such insinuations is the underlying overtone of the human rights dimension of this definition, which, among other things, identifies the Protocol's mandate as preventing, suppressing, and punishing trafficking in persons, with particular emphasis on women and children, in accordance with the United Nation's Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (CTOC). It could further be argued that such pre-eminence for the crime dimension of human trafficking has encouraged a carrot and stick approach in the protection and assistance of victims, who, even at the cost of the violation of their human rights, would only be eligible for protection on the condition that they collaborate with law enforcement agencies in bringing their perpetrators before the criminal justice system.

Nevertheless, there seems to be a transformation, or, more specifically, a transition or shift in focus in terms of the use of terminology. In this direction, Molland (2013), in his article with the non-conformist title of 'What has happened to sex trafficking', not only recognises this shift but strongly disagrees with the view that it is mainly attributable to a clearer understanding of the phenomenon brought about by various awareness-raising projects and campaigns. In his opinion, trafficking for sexual exploitation, which he simply refers to as 'sex trafficking', has not, as suggested, been reduced. On the contrary, he provides ample examples of countries such as Australia, Scandinavia, and Norway where 'trafficking for sexual exploitation remains the main focus both in media and government interventions' (Molland, 2013). This affirmation seems to suggest that both media attention and funding attraction are two correlatives that hugely impact on the 'view', 'trend', or perspective when it comes to the troubled waters of trafficking for sexual exploitation.

While it could unequivocally be inferred from the above that the global concept of human trafficking is subject to the waves of fashion, how it is projected through the lenses of the media and, to a large extent, in the aid coming from both national and international donor agencies, the Nigerian experience is

not by any means left out of the scramble for this cosmetic focus on ‘sexual exploitation’ or ‘sex trafficking’. Nigeria has remained comfortable with the use of this term, as it suits its purpose in the shame game of shifting the focus almost exclusively onto the state of Edo. After more than two decades of the first appearance of Nigerian girls on the streets of Italy, the stigma has remained confined to Edo, as the perception to date has remained that most trafficked women for sexual exploitation are from Edo. In correlation, Italy is also grossly misunderstood as the main destination country of these ‘Edo’ women. Therefore, this overemphasis on trafficking for sexual exploitation, as has been previously mentioned, draws attention away not only from other forms of trafficking but also the trafficking of women from other states of Nigeria, and to other destinations and for different purposes of exploitation.

In a similar manner, the use of ‘human trafficking’ for sexual exploitation, in comparison to ‘modern-day slavery’, is understandably more appealing in terms of application to Nigeria as a black African country. ‘Slavery’, in all its forms and representations, is one homely and familiar word that Africans would rather remember not to forget. Arguably, this becomes even the more suspicious as disguised imperialism. For instance, some of the crimes or offences that are classified under the Modern Slavery Act (2015) such as domestic servitude are in fact a diffused cultural practice in most African countries, including Nigeria. Similarly, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2020) includes forced begging, forced marriage, selling children, and child soldiers as some exploitative purposes for which people are trafficked. Again, some of these practices, devoid of every exploitative and coercive connotation, continue to remain as integral parts of cultural practices and identities, for example, in Nigeria. Nevertheless, while the debate on where to draw the lines of demarcation between culture and crime persists, it should be emphasised that any discourse on the penalisation or criminalisation of culture, must, as a matter of necessity, start from within, in order not to run the risk of being misinterpreted and misunderstood as foreign imposition.

A Global Public Health Dimension of Human Trafficking and Modern-Day Slavery

Health, per se has always, had a role to play in the individual lives of trafficked victims, precisely because they are human beings, who like others have health-support needs. Nevertheless, their exposure to a more aggravating degree of emotional, physical, and psychological violence, as well as abuse from their exploiters and traffickers, who keep them perpetually in risky,

harmful, and hazardous working conditions and environments, makes them more vulnerable and therefore more likely to need the attention of health professionals. However, in terms of collocating this within the Palermo Protocol, the provision of health services would fall within the range of the protection of the victims of human trafficking, more precisely at the stage when they are rescued from their traffickers, in other words, at a stage when trafficking has already taken place.

A global public health approach, on the other hand would be triggered at an earlier stage, thereby strongly militating against the occurrence of trafficking, in a proactive rather than reactive manner. This is better understood in the light of the definition of public health as the 'the art and science of preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting health through the organised efforts of society' (Acheson, 1988). This is closely interwoven with the World Health Organisation's ambitious definition of health as 'a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease'.

One of the main strengths of tackling human trafficking specifically from a public health dimension lies primarily in the administration of preventive measures similar to the proactive approach of public health in response to diseases, more especially in disease outbreak. Analogically, this would mean the prevention of the disease of human trafficking. In this line of thought, Zimmerman and Kiss (2017) consider human trafficking as a 'substantial health determinant that needs to be treated as preventable, drawing on public health intervention approaches that target the underlying drivers of exploitation before the harm occurs' (Zimmerman & Kiss, 2017). This point concerning the focus on prevention or what is preventable from a public health perspective as opposed to curative measures is better illustrated by Todres (2011) when he argues that 'it would make little sense if, instead of vaccinating a population, a government simply waited for a major disease outbreak... success, from a public health perspective, is achieved when a population is fully immunised or vaccinated and if illnesses do not occur'. While the recent Covid 19 pandemic would counteract the hypothesis of 'simply waiting for a major disease outbreak', it is possible, on the other hand, to prevent illnesses from occurring. This is where health promotion comes in because health (as total physical, mental, emotional, psychological, and social wellness) goes beyond the absence of disease at the prevention stage to embrace the totality: a healthy lifestyle. In this perspective, public health plays a significant role in shaping individual health, lifestyles, underlying attitudes, health behaviour, and health beliefs through a variety of health promotion campaigns and programmes. The objectives of these campaigns

are the engagement and empowerment of individuals and communities, encouraging them to consciously choose healthy behaviours, thereby enabling them to make the necessary changes that would ultimately reduce the risk of developing diseases and other morbidities. This approach to public health, most especially in addressing individual and, by extension, societally risky and harmful behaviours could be harnessed in addressing the root causes of trafficking and correlating individual and societal attitudes, beliefs, and lifestyles. In this case, a public health approach would be indispensable in the identification of specific segments of the population that is at the highest risk due, for example, to vulnerability, unemployment, gender, war, or disease outbreak. With reference to the latter, Worsnop (2019) in 'The Disease Outbreak-Human Trafficking Connection: A Missed Opportunity' (Worsnop, 2019) examines the link between the concepts of human trafficking within the context of a disease outbreak. Although the focus is on the risk of trafficking in an emergent situation, such as that of an epidemic or a pandemic, nevertheless there is an emphasis on the need to integrate the prevention of trafficking in responses to disease outbreak (Worsnop, 2019).

Similarly, other underused public health approaches which would significantly benefit counter-trafficking responses are found in the areas of stakeholder coordination (for example, education, media, labour, housing medicine, business, entertainment, criminal justice). This is so because public health recognises the interconnectivity of issues and, as a result, operates an appropriate responsive approach. For example, in human trafficking issues of violence are deeply entrenched in underlying systemic inequalities, cultural norms and practices, the gender gap and inequalities, poor or lack of education, socioeconomic dynamics, and they effectively respond proactively through partnerships and effective community engagement and empowerment, both at early intervention levels as well as prevention, and progressively to the promotion stage.

The importance and advantage of adopting a public health approach to human trafficking can also be considered from the perspectives of the health costs and impact of human trafficking so as to evaluate the cost and benefits of adopting a preventive approach. In this dimension, Such and Salway (2017) identified a series of physical and mental health consequences of modern-day slavery, associated with forced labour and sexual exploitation including the transmission of sexually infectious diseases, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), stress and anxiety (Such & Salway, 2017). Adopting the 'cost of crime methodology' (Reed et al., 2018), the authors analysed and estimated the cost of crime in the areas of anticipation (this does not

apply to the human trafficking or modern-day slavery), consequences, and responses. In relation to the consequences of crime, aspects such as physical and emotional harm, cost of health services, lost time and output (referring to when the victim is unable to work and output), and victim services were meticulously scrutinised. In relation to the cost of crime response, areas such as police response and criminal justice system costs were highlighted ((Reed et al., 2018). Overall, their finding was that ‘the unit cost of crimes of modern slavery is second only to homicide’ (Reed et al., 2018).

A 2017 collaborative study carried out in the United Kingdom by the University of Sheffield and Public Health England (PHE) identified the gap created in the UK due primarily to the absence of a public health perspective and approach in response to the scourge of modern-day slavery (Such & Salway, 2017).

Although the attempt to address human trafficking and modern-day slavery from a public health approach has yet to gain substantial ground and recognition, it must be specified that the underlying relationship between the two has been embryonic. Such an incubating interlude has made it possible for other perspectives not only to be tried and tested but also exhausted, including the human rights, humanitarian, criminal justice with a wider focus on labour exploitation, illegal migration, child protection, and, more recently, on the supply chain. The approaches so far adopted, as has been briefly highlighted previously, were responses that reflected, in a specific manner, the triangular recommendation of the Palermo Protocol, which, consequently, has limited counter-trafficking responses to law enforcement agencies and social services (Todres, 2011). On the other hand, ‘the added value of a public health approach’ would have supplemented or subsidised the limitations of law enforcement, especially in meeting the needs of survivors (Such & Salway, 2017).

The Impact of Covid 19 and the ‘New Normal’ on Old Narratives

As has previously been highlighted, one of the main aims of this chapter is not only to propose but also to justify why a public health approach to tackling human trafficking and modern-day slavery is not only relevant but also essentially crucial in the provision of evidence-based methodologies, preventive approaches, and coordinated expertise that are indispensable in mitigating against this scourge.

Nevertheless, it is equally essential to underline the fact that any discourse on public health approaches cannot be completely devoid of its correlation with the unprecedented global health challenge of the 2020 Covid 19 pandemic, which, without warning, not only transformed the usual and familiar way of being and doing but also, in a rather forceful manner, introduced the 'new normal'. Interestingly, this 'new normal' also made its entry with a baggage of new or refurbished vocabulary or terminology, which has not only come to stay, in the transitional phase of the pandemic, but will without doubt remain a permanent feature both in the present and post Covid 19 distant future. In this regard, usages, such as 'social distancing' (or physical distancing as more applicable to the Nigerian experience), 'social isolation', 'self-isolation', 'lockdown', 'stay at home', 'stay alert', have not only inadvertently transmuted social consciousness but, more importantly, have had significant impact and consequences, not only on the phenomenon of trafficking in persons itself but also, and more specifically, on global and local mitigating responses.

In counting the spoils of the 2020 Covid 19 pandemic on a global scale, a necessary point of departure would be, for example, the impact of the months of total or partial lockdown, experienced by different parts of the world, at different times, and for different durations. During these times, for example, there was a global record set for increase in domestic violence of 20%, purportedly. It comes as no surprise therefore that the United Nations (2020) described domestic violence during the Covid 19 lockdown as a 'shadow pandemic' in relation to the pandemic under consideration. Arguably, if violence which occurred within the supposedly safe walls of the family could be described as 'shadow', that is to say, invisible or not visible to the eye, the same correlation could be applied to the victims of trafficking, who are more likely to be trapped at home or in locations where exploitation is perpetuated by their abusers, and therefore also more likely to be victims of domestic violence.

Although the focus here is not to establish the interconnectivity between domestic violence and human trafficking, especially for sexual exploitation, it would be relevant to underline that previous studies such as that of Pemberton (2017) have explored this essential link. This is important in understanding the dynamics of the phenomenon in order to propose targeted and evidence-based responses.

That notwithstanding, it is essential to identify domestic violence as a precursor and pointer to human trafficking in order to establish the essential link between them. As a result of the interface of a necessary coexistence

between domestic violence and human trafficking, it logically follows that the latter could equally be defined as a 'shadow pandemic', not only in terms of association but, more importantly, in terms of its very nature, which is further explainable in terms of its correlation with organised crime.

Similarly, another major post Covid 19 challenge could be attributed to the innumerable migrants who have been grounded in different countries due to travel restrictions, bans, and flight cancellations. These persons are more likely to become vulnerable to being trafficked for different purposes, as they struggle financially to survive in a precarious situation they did not envisage. Additionally, even migrants who had a travelling visa to travel to their chosen destination may suddenly find themselves with expired travel documents, making them also defenceless and susceptible to being recruited by traffickers. Similarly, due to the border closures and travel bans to some destination countries, traffickers would tend to exploit this favourably to their advantage and explore new and unsuspected destinations, with fewer travel checks.

Furthermore, both new and existing migration borders, with an excessive focus on the transmission or detection of the Covid 19 virus with checks of temperatures, as the new normal would, as a result, pave the way for traffickers to safely transport their victims across borders in an unsuspected manner. Trafficking for labour exploitation is particularly the order of the day under the pandemic outbreak. While border closures have, for example, made it impossible for seasonal workers to travel and have disrupted the routine for traffickers, it has, on the other hand, increased the likelihood of trafficking in the agriculture sector, especially in European countries where, according to the Organisation for Security Council and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), agriculture is not only a key example of an area to monitor closely but also an area of high risk that needs to be monitored after the pandemic and beyond. In this regard, for instance, the slave labour market in the agricultural farms in Amantea in the Cosentino of South Italy has recently been reported as harbouring workers from Bangladesh, who were subjected to work in shifts lasting as long as 26 hours for a shocking pay of 1.50 euros per hour. What was even more shocking was not the labour exploitation in terms of a ridiculously unfair wage but the inhuman and slavish way in which they were treated. These included eating and sleeping on the ground, threats, insults, humiliation, and living in overcrowded accommodations with 10 in a 70-square-meter apartment. Interestingly, these 'slaves' had to show their commitment and appreciation at being so terribly exploited by queuing to join the long list of illegal migrants waiting to be pardoned for not drowning

in the Mediterranean and granted legality under the 2020 Amnesty in Italy, whereby their sojourn would receive a legal status. Unscrupulous employers see this as another avenue to exploit these migrants further, by asking them to pay up to 8000 euros, alongside other exploitative fees that they must pay to their co-nationals as facilitators of the long and tortuous journey towards the recognition of their status as 'officially' exploitable.

In terms of a specific reference to the Nigerian experience of human trafficking, there are some underlying assumptions that impact our understanding. And, therefore, corresponding responsive approaches are defined by these distorted assumptions. One such misleading presumption is that more than 90% of women trafficked from Nigeria are from the single state of Edo and, more specifically, from the city of Benin and commutable surrounding villages (Laczko, 2006). In a way, this has hugely affected the way that the human-trafficking response has been carried out. From this perspective, the phenomenon was considered as not affecting Nigeria as a country but only Edo as a state, therefore, not a national problem deserving of national attention. Nevertheless, it is also presumptuous to assume that after more than 20 years of existence, human trafficking from Nigeria has remained within the environs of the state of Edo, without spreading out significantly to other states. This has made it rather easy for other states to exonerate themselves and claim innocence of what the entire country is guilty of. On a second note, a similar assumption is the direct link that tends to be drawn between the issue of human trafficking for the exclusive purpose of sexual exploitation. At this point, it is important to specify that this does not apply to Nigeria alone. Globally, many studies have criticised the separation of human trafficking from sexual exploitation as concepts that necessarily co-exist. (Martti & Aromaa, 2006). Furthermore, there is the connection that is, almost as a norm, drawn between Edo state and Italy. There is a general underlying perception, especially at the grassroots level, that if the country of destination is not Italy, then there is no trafficking, at least for the purpose of sexual exploitation, even though, trafficking does in fact occur, and exploitation, including sexual exploitation, take place. A consequential syllogistic conclusion, as has been previously highlighted, is that attention is diverted from other forms of trafficking and from other states, such as, for example, domestic servitude to the Arab nations.

With reference to the theme of domestic servitude, it has previously been underlined that this is the second classified purpose of trafficking of Nigerian young women to the United Kingdom, according to the data of the National Referral Mechanism (NRM), while the narrative records that women trafficked

to Italy are exclusively for sexual exploitation. Given the fact that domestic servitude is a culturally widespread and acceptable practice in Nigeria, it could, like practices surrounding child fostering, 'be used to cover practices that amount to trafficking' (Laczko, 2006). This could equally be applied to the practice of the trafficking of young women for domestic servitude to Arab countries such as Lebanon, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and especially Dubai as a prime location. Assumingly, these women travel for domestic work, which, though initially legal, becomes domestic servitude in the absence of properly documented work arrangements, thereby serving as a breeding ground for exploitation. Under this circumstance, unscrupulous employers take advantage of existing language and cultural barriers not only to treat these workers unfairly but also to exploit and abuse them. Such abuses and exploitations often include sexual exploitation, which, pushed to its legitimate conclusion, could be said to be more dangerous than exploitation on the streets for prostitution. This form of exploitation is more hidden, less suspicious, and, more essentially with some form of legal backing, as regular and contracted employment.

Moving on further from this all important argument on domestic servitude, it is important, though devoid of an in-depth analysis at this point in time, to call attention to some of those other forms of trafficking, apart from domestic servitude, which tend to be ignored due to an excessive attention given to trafficking for sexual exploitation, resulting in the neglect of other multiple forms of exploitation including financial and emotional abuse, violence, and especially domestic violence and abuse. Furthermore, an overemphasis on the trafficking of women for sexual exploitation, has shifted the focus from, for example, the trafficking of men for labour exploitation or the trafficking of children under the guise of adoption or child fostering.

Nevertheless, if the consequences of the post Covid 19 pandemic on human trafficking are to be meaningfully addressed as they apply to the Nigerian experience of the phenomenon, a qualitative leap needs to be made, essentially from what is culturally acceptable to what is criminally punishable. A clear line of demarcation must be drawn in terms of identification, definition, dimension, and limitation of applicative concepts. In Nigeria, for example there are many direct and indirect ways of buying and selling sexual services that call for a retrospective consideration of gender and sexuality relationships. Bamgbose (2002) explored the practice of girlfriend-'sugardaddy' relations that are widespread in Nigeria, where young girls, in exchange for sexual favours, receive money and other gifts. This latter has also been visited by Omorodion (1993). Regrettably, this practice has found

its way into institutions of higher learning such as the universities, where lecturers demand sex in exchange for academic grades. While Nigerian society frowns on the latter, the former is condoned, but the fact is that both practices are two sides of the same coin.

Other culturally acceptable practices that need redefinition are the concepts of 'house-girl' and child fostering. Both are widespread practices which are being used to cover up trafficking in all forms and for different purposes. In a nutshell, as far as the practice of harbouring house-girls, in a legally and even morally inexplicable way, persists in Nigeria; its transformation into subsequently exported and exploitative practices such as domestic slaves is only a step further way.

From a back-to-the-future perspective, a conceptual discourse on emerging and under-explored forms or avenues of exploitation would need to take place. These include trafficking for sports and fashion. Another area of specific concern is the trafficking of persons with the promise of the potential for becoming ministers of religion beyond the shores of Nigeria. Similarly, the new slave market in Libya, and the briefly mentioned trafficking of domestic slaves to Lebanon, needs further exploration. Overall, the challenges of the use and abuse of information and communication technology skilfully and advantageously utilised by traffickers, even before the wake of the 'new normal', would need to be equally addressed and redressed.

Ironically the 2019 Covid 19 pandemic was significantly interwoven with international travel, movement, and migration. It would, therefore, be an unpardonable oversight if future considerations, policies, and initiatives on global health, with or without a pandemic undertone, would underestimate the public and global health dimension of human trafficking and modern-day slavery in all its forms and superstructures. However, in considering the limits of the context, scope, and objective of this current exploration, it could be further reiterated that current 'teething' levels of public health engagement necessarily call for a qualitative leap from the here and now to a rebalance of responses, which only a specifically public health approach can deliver.

In summary, this chapter has argued in favour of a preventive approach as a proactive response to human trafficking. The focus on the preventive approach that was envisaged relied reasonably on the definition of public health as 'the art and science of preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting health through the organised efforts of society' (Acheson, 1988).

In doing so, it started from the journey so far travelled in terms of the use of human trafficking and modern-day slavery, and compared approaches embraced by the United Kingdom and Italy. It proceeded to analyse the public health approach to human trafficking/modern-day slavery in a bid to promote the adoption of a global health perspective. In contextualising this discourse within the recent Covid 19 pandemic, it evaluated its impact on the phenomenon of human trafficking and analysed how post Covid 19 approaches to human trafficking and modern-day slavery would, necessarily, involve a qualitative leap from the old narrative, to the 'new normal'. Alongside this concern, other emerging underexplored or yet to be explored aspects of human trafficking should be highlighted for future exploration.

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11 **Xenophobic Violence: The Case of Black African Migrants in South Africa**

Oluwayemisi Adebola Abisuga

Abstract

Interminably, xenophobic violence has been a problem that threatens the well-being of Black African migrants in Post-Apartheid South Africa. The primary aim of this study is to examine the impact of the South African Government on the need for fundamental changes in the country's immigration system and subsequently provide recommendations to address these phenomena. The primary purpose of this study is to contribute to the emerging discourse on Black African migration by examining the problems with immigration and causes of what is regularly termed as a 'xenophobic attack' to mitigate re-occurrences. Qualitative data were collected by interviewing individuals who historically suffered xenophobic violence in communities around the City of Johannesburg. Results obtained from an in-depth interview show that from all the four races in South Africa only the Black race are engaged in xenophobic violence against the foreign Black nationals, as they have more physical contact with these immigrants.

Introduction

Xenophobic violence has been a problem in South Africa together with the threat it poses to communities and individuals for a long time. Many organisations and players have identified this problem and cautioned the government about the need to address the causes and symptoms consistently. Even though in some instances these calls have been heeded, in many cases they have not. The issue of xenophobia among South Africans, which many researchers have pointed out, became plain in May 2008 when widespread violent attacks were carried out by crowds of South Africans against African immigrants and other South African citizens (Lauher, 2009).

From the 11 to 26 May 2008, for example, South Africa was shaken by the outbreak of a wave of violence characterised by an intensity and fierceness previously unknown in this young democracy and reminiscent of apartheid bloodshed. Nigerians and other foreign nationals of ethnic minorities were attacked in at least one hundred and thirty-eight (135) sites across South Africa (Bekker et al., 2009). This resulted in sixty-two (62) reported deaths; at least a third of those killed (21) were South African citizens from ethnic minorities (Forced Migration Studies Programme, 2010). In addition to the murders, over a hundred thousand people were displaced and millions of rand of property damaged or stolen (Misago et al., 2010), while thousands fled to internal refugee camps, and many more returned to their home countries (Gomo, 2008). Subsequently, almost every month there has been at least one attack on groups of foreign nationals, with organisations working with migrants regularly reporting threats of renewed large-scale violence. The government and independent humanitarian organisations, such as the Nelson Mandela Foundation (NMF) are doing all they can to ease tension, eradicate xenophobia, and move the country forward (Rulashe, 2009).

Lack of service delivery has stirred up feelings of discontentment and dispossession – and instead of directing this frustration at the government, poor South Africans have become increasingly hostile and violent toward foreigners (Gomo, 2008). For most people, the government is far too distant to be the object of physical aggression, so their anger finds its best outlet in proximity. Furthermore, Gomo articulates the South Africans' well-rehearsed mantras of exclusion: they take our jobs, they take our welfare, taken our wives, and they burden our state. In addition, the sense about what 'African Unity for Renaissance' would create has been dropped and substituted with 'Africa Persecution' by the probity of the continual racial discrimination and hatred for Nigerians and Black foreigners living in South Africa. This continuous racial xenophobia and attacks on Nigerians living in South Africa have created international and local criticism. Hence, this study moves to the fore the fundamental subjects of racial discrimination and hatred for Black foreigners, mostly Nigerians, in South Africa, within the context of the apartheid regime and the post-apartheid socioeconomic relationships, which have continuously formed the practical concepts of wrong community, insecurity, unclear rights, and an imprecise sense of belonging between many Black South Africans and their fellow Black Africans.

According to Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh, and Singh (2005), for South Africa to achieve its promises of human rights, tolerance, and prosperity, it must develop norms, laws, and practices that can capitalise on the contributions

of foreigners to the country; promote the country's reputation abroad; and protect the rights, security, and livelihoods of all of South Africa's residents. Achieving a democratic, rights-based migration policy in South Africa is extraordinarily difficult, however, because South Africa is a highly xenophobic society, which, out of fear of foreigners, does not naturally value the human rights of non-nationals (Dodson, 2010). There are many legislated categories of foreigners living in South Africa, including refugees, asylum seekers, migrants, and immigrants.

In 1993, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the South African Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that allowed for refugees to enter South Africa (Palmary, 2002). Since 1994, the South African government has passed almost 200 new pieces of legislation, however, migration legislation has been slow to be reconsidered, with the Refugee Act passed in 1998 and the Immigration Act only passed in 2002 (Crush & Williams, 2001). The role of local government in the provision of services to refugees has not been evidently spelt out, either in the other policy documents or in the Refugee Act (Palmary, 2002). Despite favourable protection policies, the implementation of refugees' rights remains a challenge (UNHCR, 2013).

South Africa and Socioeconomic Inequalities

African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM, 2007) affirms present-day South Africa to be a country characterised by many problems, such as severely entrenched socioeconomic inequalities. Inequality has continued to grow and now it is over 100:1 in South Africa (OECD, 2011). Thus, discriminatory attitudes and practices continue to manifest themselves, but now against innocent victims: 'The Black Foreigners'. Blank and Buchholz (2008) argue that the xenophobic climate in South Africa is not a new phenomenon but has been penetrating society since the end of apartheid. This has drastically challenged the country's commitment to non-racialism and human rights, thus affecting its ongoing process of nation-building and democratic consolidation. Steenkamp (2009) states the impact of the xenophobic violence concisely: 'Within a single month, notions of a "rainbow nation", Pan-African solidarity and equality in South Africa were ringing hollow'. Yakushko (2009) highlights that xenophobia is a multi-dimensional and multi-causal phenomenon that is intricately tied to views of nationalism and ethnocentrism, both of which are based on the belief that one's ethnic group or nation-state is superior to others (Henderson, 2008).

The Forced Migration Studies Programme (FMSP, 2010) defines xenophobia as hatred or fear of a foreign 'stranger.' Although there are entrenched prejudices against non-nationals in South Africa, it is unclear to what extent violence against non-nationals are always motivated by sentiments and attitudes of hatred. Some targeting of non-nationals appears to be motivated by a desire for material or political gain. Harris (2001) defines xenophobia as typically the 'dislike', and 'hatred or fear of foreigners'. More importantly, however, Harris (2001) correctly emphasises that xenophobia is 'not just an attitude, it is also an action.'

A refugee is a person fleeing from individual persecution, generalised human rights violations, or armed conflict in their country of origin (UNHCR, 1998). While seeking refugee status, the applicant is known as an 'asylum-seeker'. An asylum-seeker is a person whose asylum claim has not yet been examined to ascertain whether his/her fear of persecution is well-founded (UNHCR, 1998). The definitions used by UNHCR and South African legislation to decide on refugee status function on two levels: an individual level and a collective level. The individual level involves assessing whether an asylum seeker has a well-founded fear of persecution in the home country, regardless of the broad social and political conditions of that country (Harris, 2001). Prior to the implementation of the Refugee Act in April 2000, refugee status in South Africa was accorded through a Section 28 permit. This permit pertained solely to recognised refugees and it brought with it a number of legal rights, including rights to:

- Freedom and security of the person;
- Human dignity;
- Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention;
- Freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment;
- Protection from abusive use of state power or authority;
- Freedom of movement and settlement;
- Freedom of religion and belief;
- Freedom of opinion and expression;
- The right to be considered as a person before the law and to have access to courts of law, and
- Administrative action (UNHCR, 1998).

Meanwhile, South Africa has been distinguished by wealth inequality and growing income, while the citizens of the country are increasingly aware of this reality (Harmse, 2013). In the country, the middle and working classes have enjoyed rising levels and high consumption for most of the post-apartheid period, complicating the balance of inequality. Black economic

empowerment (BEE) policies have de-racialised the dominant social class, while the trickle-down theory was supposed to have enriched the common people but has failed terribly. This results in idleness or joblessness have placed a heavy problem on the potential growth of the economy thereby putting pressure on the community. In African middle-income countries, youth unemployment is predominantly evident with young people constituting 60% of total unemployed more specifically in Tunisia (29.3% in 2012), South Africa (52% in 2012), and Lesotho (35.9% in 2012), (ILO, 2013a). Most significantly, awareness of opportunity inequality and relative consumption amongst Blacks seems to be growing. However, South Africa's tendency toward violence results in housebreakings, looting, and vehicle hijackings, motivated by class anger, which does not exclude the Black elite group (Goma, 2009). Therefore, programmes to address socioeconomic contradictions and inequality interventions to intensify education are treasured and should be supported, but these are uncertain to stop violence except combined with responsible local leadership structures (FSMP, 2020).

South Africa and Xenophobic Violence

Landau (2005) observes that South Africa is a highly xenophobic society. Crush (2001) asserts that South Africa displays one of the highest levels of xenophobia in the world and warns that the legacy of apartheid and institutionalized racism will still take decades to rectify. Again, this has specially posed a challenge to the country's commitment to non-racialism and human rights, thus affecting its ongoing work towards nation-building and democratic consolidation. Furthermore, the lack of employment opportunities for nationals causes tensions between them and refugees, limiting the latter are self-reliance and local-integration opportunities, often making them victims of xenophobic attacks (UNHCR, 2013). Despite the country's transition from the apartheid regime to a democracy, prejudice and violence continue to mark contemporary South Africa in the form of a new discriminatory practice against every new victim: 'The Foreigner' (Harris, 2001). Claims that South Africans were becoming increasingly hostile towards foreigners already began to surface in the mid-1990s, resulting in periodic incidents of xenophobic attacks, which all led up to a worse-case scenario in May 2008 (Crush, 2001).

Since South Africa has developed into the economic powerhouse of Africa, it has also become the primary destination for migrants from the rest of the continent (Landau, 2005). As this migration occurs not just legally, migration numbers differ greatly. Valji cites numbers claiming that the illegal immigrant

population is between 4 and 12 million (Valji, 2003). This inability to provide exact numbers has led to a vacuum, in which perceptions and emotions are open to manipulation, causing many South Africans to fear that the country will be over-run by migrants (Valji, 2003). By the end of 2011, some 220,000 asylum-seekers, mainly from Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Somalia, and Zimbabwe were registered in South Africa, and the country continues to be the recipient of the highest annual number of asylum applications worldwide, with 106,904 applications in 2011 (UNHCR, 2013). However, this figure represents a 64 per cent reduction in comparison with 2010, the first such decline in four years.

Table 11.1
UNHCR planning figure for South Africa 2015

		Jan 2015		Dec 2015	
Type of Population	Origin	Total in Country	Of whom assisted by UNHCR	Total in Country	Of whom assisted by UNHCR
Refugees	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	15,000	3000	16,000	3200
	Ethiopia	9600	1920	11,600	2320
	Somalia	24,000	4800	27,000	5400
	Varius	20,400	4080	22,900	4580
Asylum seekers	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	8500	1700	9000	1800
	Ethiopia	4600	920	4400	880
	Zimbabwe	43,000	8600	46,000	9200
	Various	189,900	37,980	194,600	38,920
Total		315,000	63,000	331,500	66,300

Source: UNHCR, 2015.

Table 11.1 shows the population of refugees and asylum seekers increasing in South Africa, by 16,500 between January and December 2015, with Zimbabweans and Somalis the most numerous. The table also shows new applications by refugees and asylum seekers for UNHCR assistance

increasing by 3300 by the end of 2013, particularly from Zimbabweans and Somalis. This process of combined flows of refugees and asylum seekers continues to cause a major challenge for refugee assistance in the country. The South African labour markets have placed pressure on the economic migrants making it difficult as they seek asylum to regularize their stay. Hence, this creates more difficulty for those with legal refugee status when it comes to having their applications assessed reasonably. In August 2008, the United Nation Office of Coordinating Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) Regional Office for Southern Africa states the number of those displaced in the three provinces stood at 8556 in 53 sites: (i) Gauteng had 10 sites and 4340 people; (ii) Western Cape had 40 sites and 3958 people; and (iii) Kwazulu-Natal had 3 sites and 258 people (UN OCHA, 2008). By 30 November 2008, all the safe sites were closed. As observed by the Task Team of Members of Parliament, the 'impact of the violence and attacks, was severe, as many people were gripped by fear and experienced the trauma of being evicted from their homes, being physically assaulted, killed and in some instances burnt'. Furthermore, the violence had consequences for all of South Africa: the 'new' South Africa may have set up a vision of human dignity, human rights, and equality of all, but it lacked the capacity to protect individuals in the country from violent criminal assaults. In addition, its capacity to offer justice to victims has been incomplete. One year after the attacks, only 137 of the 1433 people arrested in connection with the attacks had been prosecuted. Mashaba (2009) mentioned that another 133 cases were still being processed, and about 182 were withdrawn due to difficulties in tracking complaints and other issues.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

The UNHCR and human rights organisations are undertaking community outreach initiatives to address xenophobia in South Africa. Rulashe (2009) observes that: 'Initiatives of this nature are to be welcomed,' in the words of UNHCR Regional Representative Sanda Kimbimbi. Rulashe further confirms that: 'We will certainly play our part to ensure that the NMF and other credible institutions achieve our collective goal of combating xenophobic tendencies.' According to Rulashe (2009), The NMF has invited the UNHCR, which has long opposed xenophobic behaviour in South Africa, to sit on its steering committee and help implement the plan.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Policy Development and Evaluation Service (UNHCR, PDES, 2010) clarify the primary movement of people as being from the Horn of Africa to South

Africa, generally transiting through Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, and, to some extent, Zimbabwe; second, there is a movement of people from the Great Lakes region of Africa (Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda) to South Africa, a proportion of whom are also taking up residence in Malawi and Mozambique; and third, there is the large-scale departure of Zimbabwean citizens from their country of origin, the majority of them also moving to South Africa. Duncan and colleagues (2008) argue that until this psychological violence is comprehensively and systematically confronted and engaged with, it will continue to repeat itself in the interpersonal and intergroup relationships in South African communities.

According to the UNHCR country operations profile ((UNHCR, 2013), the South African asylum system continues to be overwhelmed by the sheer number of asylum applications it receives, making it difficult to ensure that refugee status determination (RSD) process is always fair and efficient. Hence, supporting the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) to improve the quality and quantity of its status decisions remains a priority for the UNHCR (UNHCR, 2013). With this, the UNHCR has defined its main objectives and targets for 2013 as creating a: 'Favourable protection environment by improving access to legal assistance and legal remedies; Improvement and maintenance of basic needs and essential services; and, Improving livelihood, community empowerment and self-reliance'.

The UNHCR will continue its collaboration with relevant government departments and parliamentary committees in South Africa. Regular consultations with the DHA at all levels help to build mutual trust and a good working relationship. The UNHCR will support the Department of Home Affairs with technical advice, and work closely with the Department of Social Development and relevant NGOs on social assistance, and cooperation with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) will improve logistical support for refugees in resettlement and voluntary repatriation programmes.

Table 11.2
UNHCR partner in South Africa

Implementing Partners
NGOs: The Agency for Refugee Education, Skills Training and Advocacy; Cape Town Refugee Centre, Caritas Swaziland, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Displaced and Migrants Persons Support Programme, Future Families, Jesuit Refugee Services; Lawyers for Human Rights and Refugee Social Services, the Study Trust
Others: Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University; University of Cape Town, Refugee Rights Clinic
Operational Partners
Government agencies: City Councils of Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Polokwane, and Tshwane; Department of Basic Education; Department of Health; Department of Home Affairs; Department of International Relations and Cooperation; Department of Social Development; national and provincial disaster management centres; provincial Governments of Gauteng, Eastern Cape, KwaZuluNatal, Limpopo, and Western Cape; South Africa Social Security Agency, South African Police Service, and the South African Human Rights Commission
NGOs: Black Sash, Child Welfare South Africa, Childline South Africa, Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa, ICMC, Lifeline, National Alliance for the Development of Community Advice Offices, RefugePoint, Sonke Gender Justice, Save the Children, and Scalabrini
Others: ICMC, ICRC, African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS), IOM, UN Information Center, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, OCHA, and the University of South Africa (UNISA)

Source: UNHCR Global Appeal 2015 Update.

Table 2 shows that in South Africa the UNHCR worked with ten implementing partners in 2015, including local international and NGOs. IOM delivers services associated with resettlement to third countries and repatriation to various countries of origin from South Africa. UNHCR worked directly with main government departments, comprising Social Development and Home Affairs, along with the related local and provincial authorities. In the leading urban centres in South Africa, UNHCR also keeps a close relationship with refugee NGOs, Christian-based organizations, and local NGOs. Altogether, the UNHCR maintained its close collaboration with UN agencies.

UNHCR Strategy and Activities in 2015

The UNHCR puts forward that it will advocate for the asylum space established in South Africa to be maintained by allowing both refugees and asylum-seekers to work and study. Also, because of the challenges related to registration and data management, the UNHCR promises to work with the DHA to review the latter's registration and data management systems in order to identify gaps and find solutions. Furthermore, activities that promote self-reliance and ease local integration will receive strong UNHCR support. The Office will also seek to continue providing short-term material assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers with specific needs, and help the implementing partners to integrate such cases into national and charitable social-service programmes. Inclusively, the UNHCR will create and maintain capacity within the community to respond to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Public-information materials and tools aimed at promoting tolerance and coexistence will likewise continue to be produced, and resettlement will be used as a protection tool.

The UNHCR advocates for the adoption of the international conventions on statelessness and for national legislation to be made consistent with them. It also wants to increase efforts to identify stateless people in the region and the root causes of their predicament. In addition, effective responses to prevent and reduce statelessness will be developed. Furthermore, UNHCR anticipates teaming up with other UN agencies, civil society and academia to train key stakeholders to prevent statelessness and support legal partners working on individual cases of statelessness.

Table 3 provides some of the activities in the UNHCR programme plans for 2015, for instance, vulnerable people who have a problem in gaining access to government social assistance grants because of documentation and language challenges. The institution has targeted 15,000 refugees and asylum seekers in the urban area for this programme. UNHCR strengthens efforts to provide relevant information to refugees, identified as most vulnerable, to access any financial grants before being integrated into the Government's social grant system. Some refugees face challenges earning a living, while some who operate tuck shops are mostly aimed at during xenophobic violence. To permit POC official access to labour opportunities in South Africa, the UNHCR in 2015 executed a livelihoods support and holistic self-reliance strategy with consulting partners. This plan aimed to assist 500 businesses with entrepreneurship training and small grants, and to implement language

Table 11.3

UNHCR main objectives and targets for 2015

Planned Activities	People of Concern (POC)	2015 Comprehensive Target	Potential Gap
Basic Needs and Essential Services			
Number of POC assessed for vulnerability	Refugees and asylum-seekers in urban areas	15,000	10,000
Community Empowerment and Self-Reliance			
Number of POC provided with entrepreneurship/business training	Number of POC provided with entrepreneurship/business training	500	250
Number of POC provided with language training for livelihoods purposes	Refugees and asylum-seekers in urban areas	2000	1000
Favourable Protection Environment			
Number of media representatives and journalists trained	Refugees and asylum-seekers in urban areas	150	75
Number of POC receiving legal assistance	Refugees and asylum-seekers in urban areas	30,000	10,000
Security From Violence and Exploitation			
Number of reported SGBV incidents for which survivors receive psychological counselling	Refugees and asylum-seekers in urban areas	350	priority area
Number of partners, government and UNHCR staff trained on SGBV prevention and response	Refugees and asylum-seekers in urban areas	40	priority area

Source: 2015 UNHCR South Africa.

training for 2000 asylum seekers and refugees for livelihood purposes. There is high competition for business opportunities and available jobs, which has created conflicts between Black South Africans and foreign Black African migrants for many years. The UNHCR advocates for the rights of POC with the aim of minimizing xenophobic attacks. Asylum seekers do not have access to institutions, such as schools, banks, business registration, and hospitals because some of them do not understand temporary asylum permits (CoRMSA, 2009). The UNHCR provide counselling, legal assistance, and protection information to POC, by rendering training to 150 officials to provide advocacy services to protect refugees' rights. Also, most refugees reside in informal settlements where rape, domestic violence, and crime incidents are prominent. The UNHCR provides 30,000 POC with national-level advocacy in the justice system, as well as implementing court interdicts to improve the protection of girls and women, irrespective of their status.




Figure 1
UNHCR Budgets for the South Africa 2010–2015
 Source: 2015 UNHCR Global Appeal South Africa

The rate of funding for the South Africa operation has been moderately fluctuating over the past decade regardless of rising needs on the part of legal support, social assistance, and response to xenophobia. Figure 1 above illustrates that a substantial decrease in arrivals of new asylum seekers has caused a reduction in requirements, from USD 37.6M in 2013 to USD 26.7M in 2014. This decrease can be ascribed to the operation's change centred on providing advice and technical support as well as the strengthening

and widening of partnerships. However, the UNHCR in South Africa also strategizes to build-up its advocacy in 2014 for the integration of refugees into the prevailing support systems, especially in the areas of social grants and shelter. The all-inclusive budget has experienced substantial growth by 3% to USD 27.3M in 2015. This is as a result of an increase in the standard of living, along with the addition of a budget for Namibia, which is required to be phased out by 2015. The 2015 budget has been planned to address regional resettlement projects, public information, the refugee status determination process, registration of POC, voluntary repatriation, the assistance and protection of asylum-seekers and refugees in urban areas of South Africa, and responses to xenophobia and activities to deal with statelessness in the region (UNHCR, 2015). The budget for South Africa almost doubled in 2011, with an increase of 52 per cent in comparison to 2010 and 2014. Although there is a slight decrease in the needs for 2012 and 2013, the comprehensive budget has remained high, reflecting the increased needs. Also, in 2013 emphasis was placed on supporting the Department of Home Affairs in improving the quality and quantity of RSD decisions as well as on programmes to promote tolerance and co-existence so as to enhance self-reliance (UNHCR, 2013). As a result, the budget for 2013 totalled USD 37.6 million, slightly more than the 2012 budget of USD 35.1 million.

Methodology

This study examined the causes of xenophobia in order to stop it from re-emerging by investigating existing situations of xenophobia, and evaluating the extent and scope to which the UNHCR has been able to provide effective peacebuilding actions between refugees/asylum seekers and Black South African citizens. To validate this, a qualitative research method was used. This method significantly enhances the research as it allows the use of certain kinds of data collected from various secondary sources, such as non-governmental organisations, books and journals, and the data derived from statistics and surveys. In addition, the paper draws more specifically on secondary data collected by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in South Africa (UNHCR, 2013; 2015). Qualitative data were collected by conducting a case-study investigation on the xenophobic attack in the city of Johannesburg with the respondents. A tape recorder was used for recording interviews. Interviews were transcribed and coded. Qualitative data analysis was done by using tallying, coding, textual analysis, and content analysis (Ritchie, Lewis, Nicholls, & Ormston, 2013). The case study approach was used to improve

the validity of the in-depth interview and provides a deeper insight into the project object of analysis to inform future practice and policymaking.

The collection of primary data was obtained by way of in-depth interviews and focus group discussions conducted within the period of June and July 2008 with refugees, asylum seekers, and undocumented migrants. Again, the information provided is not statistically representative but was utilised to supplement the overall research process and confirm certain findings. It was also in the form of a range of activities, such as meetings, seminars, and peacebuilding campaigns that took place during the course of the project.

Case Studies

Xenophobic Violence in Johannesburg

Johannesburg, South Africa was on 11 May 2008 the scene of a wave of xenophobic violence that forced tens of thousands of people to flee their homes. It all started with community meetings about crime and taxis and ended in an act of xenophobic violence that tore Alexandra, one of Johannesburg's oldest townships, apart. Alexandra is one of the most densely populated townships in Johannesburg that is demographically and culturally mixed and has been home to people from all over South Africa and the African continent (Misago, Monson, Polzer, & Landau, 2010). The socioeconomic situation of the township is very poor with high levels of unemployment, and poor access to public services and utilities such as electricity, and water and sewage systems.

Alexandra has a long history of political unrest, as well as organised and criminal violence records, including xenophobia and the violent exclusion of foreign nationals; the most recent incidents included taxi violence and protests over service delivery. Though not all parts of the township experienced the violence, the area most affected was Sector 2, which is a predominantly Zulu-populated area. However, there are also other ethnic groups, and before May 2008 there have been a significant number of migrants, particularly from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Malawi. The perpetrators came in the night carrying iron bars, stones, sticks, and guns to hunt foreigners to punish them for taking their jobs. All the foreign nationals, irrespective of their nationality, gender, legal status, or length of stay in the area were attacked. Even, South African women married to foreign nationals were not left out. A large number of residents, men and women, participated in the attacks and the majority of them were hostel residents. The violence was well planned

and actively led by Zulu-speakers from the hostels under the leadership of Indunas (a leader based on a traditional model) and the local Community Policing Sub-Forum.

The previous week before the outbreak of the violence, community meetings had been held where local residents complained about foreigners taking away the jobs of local taxi drivers and the rising crime rates in the area. Even though the police had guaranteed residents that they would deal with this issue, they still threatened to take matters into their own hands and to remove foreigners from the area, which they did.

Findings

Interviews conducted in the affected areas reveal that South African residents in general perceived foreign nationals living in their midst as a serious threat to their livelihoods. They particularly mentioned various reasons for not liking Nigerians and Zimbabweans, among these they stated: they steal our jobs and provide cheap labour, which creates unemployment for South Africans; they are criminals and cannot be traced because most of them are undocumented; they sell drugs; they illegally occupy government houses while locals have been living in shacks for more than 20 years; and they run of cheap businesses and are involved in illegal trading, which damages local business capacity.

Nieftaqodien (2008) emphasizes that any attempt to understand this enmity and violence towards foreigners should be located in the politics of failed development and delivery. Alexandra and similar townships that experienced xenophobic violence are still the dumping grounds of the marginalised and socially disoriented; the township has scarcely benefited at all from the country's economic growth for the past two decades. This corresponds with residents' frustrations over the inability or perceived unwillingness of local authorities to address matters concerning the presence of foreign nationals, especially Nigerians involved in criminal activities. Although most of the foreign nationals had been living in that area for a long time and no mass entry has ever been recorded in the recent past, South African residents still had the general feeling that the number of Nigerians and other foreign nationals had increased significantly, intensifying their frustrations. Now, the situation has calmed down considerably, but there are fears of fresh violence amid the continuing economic depression. The independent humanitarian organisations, such as the Nelson Mandela Foundation (NMF), and the government are doing all they can to reduce tension, eliminate xenophobic

violence, and move the country forward. The NMF has requested the UNHCR, which has long opposed xenophobic behaviour in South Africa, to sit on its handling committee and help implement the plan.

Xenophobic Attacks on Nigerians

Regarding the xenophobic attacks on Black African nationals in South Africa, Nigeria has endured the impact of most of the jungle-justice killing. In South Africa, the flagrant killing of Nigerians has in many ways had a negative impact on Nigeria-South Africa relations. However, so many questions have been raised in the context of the contributions of the Nigerian community towards the positive economic growth of South Africa, including the fact that most of the Nigerians are law-abiding citizens in South Africa. Also, South Africa is a country where anyone, whether native or foreigner, that runs contrary to the law faces the consequence. But the laws of the country cannot curb the outcry by South Africans about the involvement of some Nigerians in crime (Ryan, 1997). The general tendency is then to point a finger of accusation and condemnation at all Nigerians as bad. In South Africa, there are Nigerians with diverse legitimate businesses, employers of labour, and honourable professions, for example, medical doctors and lecturers in the universities. These are some of the Nigerians positively contributing to the economy (Dauda, Sakariyau, & Ameen, 2018). Based on this reality, there is a need to analyse the correctness or injustice of xenophobic treatment and attacks on Nigerians in South Africa. Some of the responses from the interviewees in this study state that the xenophobic attacks on Nigerians makes them feel glad and is a source of pleasure to a great number of South Africans because they are selling drugs and taking their wives.

Hence, there will be negative outcomes in South Africa from xenophobic attacks on Nigerians. Ismail and Sakariyau (2017) show that most South Africans are not happy with the government allowing foreigners, particularly Nigerians, into their country because they believe Nigerians are getting their jobs and competing for them. They also think Nigerians are corrupting their communities with involvement in several criminal activities such as prostitution, stealing, drug trafficking, etc. Subsequently, this study found that the responses of some South African citizens, the government, and police show that to a large extent they back-up all these attacks, hence the reason why it keeps repeating itself as a result of their stark disregard for the problem. Also, it was found that the image South Africans portray to the world concerning this brutality against these Nigerians and other Black African nationals in their country is in total incongruence with the

xenophobic attack. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for example, condemns the xenophobic attacks and has also implored the government to be pre-emptive in the protection of the lives and properties of Black Africa foreigners in South Africa.

Discussion

Causes of Xenophobia

In popular terms, what happened in South Africa in May 2008 was referred to as xenophobic violence. However, the reasons for what happened were clearly more complex than a simple dislike or mistrust of foreigners. The study identified five main causal factors.

1. **Failure of the government of South Africa to meet post-apartheid expectations with regard to economic conditions and service delivery:** the democratic transition in South Africa heralded great promise for South Africa's Black population, but substantial positive economic change has been achieved only for relatively few, leading to widespread frustration amongst the population and a tendency to jealously guard against any perceived encroachment.
2. **Competition in the informal business sector:** migrants may, in some cases, compete favourably with South African Blacks for employment because of the relatively greater opportunities offered in other countries prior to the end of apartheid. In addition, certain migrants engage in petty trading, which some South Africans consider being unfair competition.
3. **Media portrayals of foreigners, which reinforce prejudice:** because many South Africans do not have extensive personal experience in dealing with foreigners, they tend to rely heavily on third-party information, especially from the media. For instance, the depictions of migrants coming in 'waves' and 'hordes' and references to 'job stealers' and 'aliens' dehumanise migrants and increase the likelihood of violence.
4. **Perceived tolerance by state institutions towards increasing intolerance against foreign nationals:** the attacks in May 2008 were not the first incidents of violence directed against foreigners in South Africa: more than a decade of incidents, although smaller in scale, can be cited. The failure of the government to aggressively address these incidents helped to create a perception that such violence would be tolerated.
5. **South Africa's legacy of apartheid and isolation:** this legacy created fertile ground for violence in several ways. First, it created racist notions of identity and worth, which encouraged Black South Africans

to see themselves not only as inferior to Whites but also as separate from the rest of the continent. Second, it encouraged separation and compartmentalisation of various populations as a means of governance and discouraged integration or contact between groups. Finally, it institutionalised violence as a means of communicating grievances and achieving political ends.

Combined, these factors created the context within which the shocking events of May 2008 took place. About the *response* to the violence, the report chronicles the responses of the government of South Africa, civil society organisations, and other governments. It describes the slowness of the government to take a stand against the violence: by the time the government took decisive action by sending troops to assist the South African Police Service (SAPS), considerable damage had already been done. At the same time, local government structures, including the police and disaster management structures, while playing a frontline role in responding, had considerable difficulty in ensuring coordination. Meanwhile, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provided immediate assistance and advice to the government, and civil society organisations interrupted their regular programming in order to provide immediate assistance in legal, material, and advocacy terms. Foreign governments were able to assist their nationals in returning home if they desired to do so.

The Effect of Xenophobic Attacks on Nigerians

In South Africa, the country that has suffered the most aftereffects of the xenophobic attacks and discrimination against Black foreign immigrants is Nigeria. These killings have in many ways affected the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa.

After the 2008 attacks on the Black African immigrants, South Africa and Nigeria have been struggling to mend their diplomatic relationship. South Africa and Nigeria signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2013 to strengthen their diplomatic relations and prevent xenophobic attacks in the future (Babalola, 2017). However, the violence against Nigerians has not stopped. In April 2015, the Nigerian Consul-General to South Africa, Uche Ajulu-Okeke, and the Acting High Commissioner, Martin Cobham, were consulted after the xenophobic attacks in Johannesburg and Durban (Channels Television, 2015). Nevertheless, Nigeria moved to harden its relationship with South Africans, and South Africa's Ministry of International

Relations and Cooperation called such a diplomatic move an “unfortunate and regrettable step” (Brock & Dlodla, 2015).

In post-apartheid South Africa, xenophobic violence has through the years planted fear in the mind of Nigerians and other Black African immigrants. Many of these foreigners do not trust or socialise freely with the locals as fellow Black African sisters and brothers with a shared value, history, culture, norms etc., because of fear of being attacked, robbed, or killed. As a result of this, Nigerians are undergoing a change of mind about travelling to South Africa for shopping, tourism, business, medicals, education, etc., after hearing or reading the news about the killings and violence against Nigerians living in South Africa.

In South Africa, the xenophobic attacks and the looting of the shops and stores of Nigerians living in the country has affected South African-owned companies in Nigeria. There are more than 100 South African companies operating in Nigeria’s manufacturing, telecommunications, hospitality, construction, Eskom Nigeria, aviation, banking, entertainment, Stanbic IBTC Bank, and oil and gas industry – including Power Giant, South African Breweries (SAB miller), South African Airways, Shoprite MultiChoice Africa (operating DStv/GOtv), and Umgeni Water, to mention just a few. If anti-Black foreigner violence against Nigerians in South Africa continues in the future, all these companies can easily be the target of retaliatory attacks (DIRCO, 2010; Mbamalu, 2017; Ismail & Sakariyau, 2017). It would likewise be useful to note that attacks on Nigerians and other Black African nationals in South Africa will obviously affect even their legit businesses in the country and could result in job losses. Also, this change might result in the victims of attacks being susceptible to the call of terrorist organisations (e.g., Boko-Haram and al-Shabaab), thus worsening the already grave security conditions in Africa at large. Currently, in South Africa, the majority of the crimes perpetrated are usually by young men with the high rate of unemployment as a key component.

Organisation and Recommendation

The Regional Representation in South Africa provides strategic and policy direction, regional coordination, management oversight, and technical support to the country’s operations in Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe ((UNHCR, 2013). UNHCR South Africa has field offices in Cape Town and Musina, but the Pretoria office is directly responsible for the UNHCR’s programmes

and activities in South Africa as well as in Comoros, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Swaziland ((UNHCR, 2013).

This review of the UNHCR's role and activities in Southern Africa is one of a series being conducted by the organisation's Policy Development and Evaluation Service (PDES) in fulfilment of that commitment (UNHCR PDES, 2010). The UNHCR's Policy Development and Evaluation Service (PDES) is committed to the systematic examination and assessment of UNHCR policies, programmes, projects, and practices. PDES also promotes rigorous research on issues related to the work of the UNHCR and encourages an active exchange of ideas and information between humanitarian practitioners, policymakers, and the research community. All of these activities are undertaken for the purpose of strengthening the UNHCR's operational effectiveness, thereby enhancing the organisation's capacity to fulfil its mandate on behalf of refugees and other persons of concern to the office. The work of the unit is guided by the principles of transparency, independence, consultation, relevance, and integrity.

In addition, UNHCR South Africa should implement the following:

- Review current arrangements for the identification and release of any persons of concern to UNHCR who may be held at the Lindela deportation centre;
- Review the issues of DHA participation in the Protection Working Group (PWG) and, more generally, membership criteria for the group;
- Ensure that the PWG has comprehensive contingency plans in place to ensure an effective response to any major outbursts of xenophobic violence;
- Continue to establish effective working relationships with the police, community leaders, and refugee associations so that immediate action can be taken in relation to any early warnings of xenophobic violence;
- Ensure that refugees and asylum seekers receive accurate information about resettlement policies, procedures, and criteria, so as to avert the potential for misunderstandings on this matter; and
- Persist and strengthen its efforts to encourage regional approaches to the issues of refugee protection and migration management, especially in relation to the role of SADC and the forthcoming regional conference on mixed migratory movements, organized by UNHCR and IOM. (UNHCR PDES, 2009).

Conclusion

The rage of xenophobic violence, spanning South Africa in May 2008, greatly shocked both the international community and many South Africans themselves, demonstrating one of the salient points in the country's short post-apartheid history. Nevertheless, xenophobia in South Africa is not a new occurrence; in fact, it has been persistent since the beginning of the country's transformation process. The xenophobic brutality in 2008 simply brought the problem to the forefront, resulting in wide range of research projects to explain the events.

This research, relating to a socioeconomic rationale, cultural aspects, as well as the official and public discourse, seeks to offer different levels of explanation for the xenophobic attitudes of a considerable part of the South African population. On the other hand, to fully comprehend the nature and capacity of xenophobia in South Africa, they have to be read as an interrelated set of explanations, while taking into account the foundational causes, such as the legacy of apartheid and the struggle inherent in the transformation process.

Evidence has been gathered that the South African government has shown high levels of tolerance for xenophobia and intolerance aimed at Nigerians and other Black foreign Africans. However, more positive action might have saved lives. Government and Civil Society Organisations have to engage in a better campaign aimed at ascertaining that the human rights of migrants are respected and that xenophobia is not allowed to fester. One system of doing this may be to draw upon South Africa's experience of apartheid and to educate the public about self-reliance and respect for the age-old principle and philosophy of *Ubuntu*.

The UNHCR in South Africa has a peculiar mandate that dates back to the first Memorandum of Understanding signed with South Africa in 1993. This Memorandum limits, in many ways, the UNHCR's functions within the country. Unlike the UNHCR's practices in nearly all countries, in South Africa, the organisation is largely confined to protection issues and finding durable solutions. The UNHCR is largely tied to playing a supportive role to the government, rather than any separate, proactive function.

Lastly, it needs to be highlighted that, while South Africans of all races are xenophobic towards foreigners, the violence is principally carried out by Black South Africans against Black Africans, as they have more contact with migrants, which serves to fuel xenophobic attitudes and hostility. Moreover,

the South African government may have been successful in quelling these recent attacks, but it cannot assure that violent crime against Nigerians and migrants from African countries or its citizens would not occur again.

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12 Performing the Oppressed: Theatre as Intervention Against Human-Trafficking in Nigeria

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Abstract

This chapter details findings in a study on the employment of applied theatre techniques in investigating underdevelopment in communities with a view to discovering why there is a prevalence of human trafficking in Africa, with Nigeria as case study. Field work was carried out in Eleyele in order to examine the prevalence of human-trafficking incidences. Through the results from this field work, the study revealed community and youth neglect as contributing factors to human trafficking. Themes such as human-trafficking, applied theatre, community development, and youth empowerment will be looked into in this paper.

Introduction

The audience in traditional African theatre performances enjoy collective effervescence as a result of the electrifying body contact and merging of souls (Hagher, 1990, p. 3).

One of the leading functions of performative art is the idea of creating a sense of recognising people's predicaments, especially those whose voices have been suppressed. Conversations around the employment of theatre in Africa as compared with its usage in Western climes have continued to generate interesting dialogues. For African literati and other proponents of African theatre as agency for community development, the audience in traditional African theatre performances enjoy warmth and collective effervescence as a result of the electrifying body contact and merging of souls, a feat that Western theatre hardly ever achieves with their chairs and arm-rests. By contrast, therefore, Western theatre is observed to be cold and mechanical, even alienating (Hagher, 1990, p. 3). In essence, beyond aesthetics and entertainment, African theatre forms have historically been employed

in matters of the common good of the community. With an upsurge in the rampant human-trafficking incidences on the continent in today's age of globalisation, there is a need for pragmatic steps in understanding and addressing the present scourge of trade in humans. This chapter details findings in a study on the employment of applied theatre techniques in investigating underdevelopment in communities with a view to discovering why there is a prevalence of human-trafficking in Africa, with Nigeria as case study. On the assumption that this approach could possibly have a desolating effect through the way in which some community members would feel about their situations, field work in Eleyele, Ibadan, Oyo State (Nigeria) was conducted in order to examine the prevalence of human-trafficking incidences as a result of the neglect of the youth of these communities. Through the results from field work, the study unveiled community and youth neglect as contributing factors to human-trafficking. Themes such as human-trafficking, applied theatre, community development, and youth empowerment will be looked into in this chapter.

Human-Trafficking Concerns in Nigeria

In Nigeria, the human-trafficking menace has remained a most concerning issue. Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, with a population that is currently estimated at some two-hundred million people, is noted to have become a major supplier country for young girls, women, and children who are victims of human-trafficking, specifically into conditions of forced labour and prostitution (Uwa, O.G., Okor, P., & Titilade M., Ahmed, 2014, p. 10). According to Akpala and Ellis (2011), human-trafficking in Nigeria is viewable from a migration perspective because both legal and illegal forms of migration are driven by similar factors like poverty, war, lack of information, gender inequality, and cheap labour. These national 'ailments' in Nigeria are a great concern because they appear to fuel emigration and, resultantly, human-trafficking. There are also growing and disturbing concerns that when neglected and disgruntled young people then venture into acts of terrorism and kidnapping, this furthers an increase in the growth of the trade in humans. There is an even more urgent need for intervention to curtail human-trafficking due to the escalation of Boko Haram terror attacks, which has displaced over 2.5 million people in the last decade (2010-2020), especially in the north-eastern region of the country.

Human-Trafficking and Terrorism

Frequent terror attacks which keep leading to displacements of residents in the north-eastern part of Nigeria is a contributing factor in human-trafficking incidences in Nigeria. In the wake of 14 April 2014, in what could be described as a defiant abuse and violation of the rights of the girl child to education, freedom, and security in any community, the world woke up to the news of the abduction of 276 school girls from their high school dormitories in the middle of the night by the Boko Haram terror group. Human-trafficking incidences and concerns in Nigeria have continued to increase due to terrorism acts such as this, targeted against the Nigerian State. Over the last decade, the north-eastern region of Nigeria has witnessed forced migration of its population to other parts of Africa such as neighbouring Chad, Niger, and Cameroon because of the killings and abductions unleashed on the communities by the terror group Boko Haram. Innumerable numbers of kidnapped girls have either been sold off or used as sex slaves by terror groups (Haarr, 2012). The girls were woken from their sleep and carried away in trucks to an unknown destination. It was only after 18 days, as a result of international outcry and media pressure on the Nigerian government, before a first official statement was made on the abductions. Although community unrest and the violation of the rights of people to live peacefully have become prevalent in Africa and some other parts of the world, this attack carried out by the Boko Haram terror organisation on a government secondary school in north-east Nigeria's Chibok and Dapchi communities brought the matter of community safety, exploitation, discrimination, and abuse of the rights of Nigerian youth, especially the girl child, to the fore. Derived from a combination of Hausa and Arabic-Islamic terms meaning 'Western education and civilisation is evil', the Boko Haram terrorists, themselves disgruntled young people and young adults that have been excluded from the perceived benefits of the neo-colonial state, have continued to employ, perhaps paradoxically, the most sophisticated weapons from the Western military industrial architecture to perpetrate terror and mayhem.

Whereas, it is no longer news that young people are denied their human rights in many countries, what is disturbing is the apparent inability of politicians and governmental authorities to protect these girls from abduction or address the menace in an urgent and engaging manner. According to Haarr (2012), these vulnerable girls face not only economic hardship but discrimination and exploitation in their own communities where they ought to be safest. The abduction, abuse, and eventual commodification of the Chibok girls, whose ages range between 15 to 23 years, brought the danger and neglect faced by

young girls to a disturbing and unprecedented level in Nigeria. The incident further exposed to the world the growing vulnerability of young people and girls in unsafe communities. Although the attack was widely condemned, the incident has further escalated concerns about the neglect of communities and youth, and the consequent human-trafficking possibilities.

Human-Trafficking and Underdevelopment

In their reports in the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) human development reports research paper, Laczko and Danailova-Trainor (2009) reveal the nexus between underdevelopment and human trafficking, which has continued to receive reviews and attention. Although underdevelopment (poverty) is often regarded as the 'root cause' of human trafficking, the linkages between poverty, lack of development, and trafficking are complex. For example, there is some evidence to suggest that victims of cross-border trafficking are more likely to originate from middle-income rather than lower-income countries. Trafficking and development have tended to be treated as very separate policy areas, and the assessment of the development impact of counter-trafficking programmes is still at an early stage. Not surprising, human rights violations have been linked to human trafficking in Africa.

Besides human rights violations and denial of girl-child education in its Islamic northern parts, human-trafficking in Nigeria has become lucrative largely due to the inability of government to address issues surrounding declining living conditions in Africa's most populous nation. In contemporary times, any society that epitomises underdevelopment or the exposure of youth to vices can easily be regarded as backward or uncivilised because this discrimination or oversight is frowned upon in most regions of the civilised world. Since efforts by government agencies and concerned NGOs appear inadequate to eradicate the human-trafficking scourge, there seems, therefore, to be an urgent need for intervention. In the immediate, the basic needs of young people should be improved in their communities so that these youth can participate fully in the social, economic, and political life of their community rather than seeking for ways to migrate or fall victims to human traffickers. Although some progress has been achieved, much remains to be done to protect the rights of young people, and, in the process, assure them of a future in which they may benefit themselves and their communities.

Human-Trafficking and the Niger Delta Unrest

At some point in Nigeria's history, the continued clamour of the Niger Delta people of Nigeria for resource control of oil deposits domiciled in that region escalated the incidences of unrest in the country. In addition to the poverty rate in the region, the upsurge of human-trafficking incidences could, indirectly, therefore also be a result of unrest emanating from that region. The unrest and conflicts in the Niger Delta first arose in the early 1990s as a result of tensions between foreign oil corporations and a few Niger Delta minority clusters, particularly the Ogoni and the Ijaw, who felt marginalised and exploited. Despite the return to democratic government, ethnic and political unrest has escalated, resulting in competition for oil wealth that has fuelled violence between ethnic militia groups, which prompted a need for government's frequent militarisation of nearly the entire region by the Nigerian Army and Mobile Anti-Riot Police forces. From 2004 on, violence also hit the oil industry with piracy and kidnappings. In 2009, under the presidency of late President Umaru Yar'Adua, a Presidential Amnesty Programme, accompanied with support and training for ex-militants, proved to be a success. However, starting from October 2012, Nigeria experienced a large spike in piracy off its coast. By early 2013 Nigeria had become the second most-pirated nation in Africa, after Somalia. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is thought to be behind most of the attacks. According to a 23 November 2010 BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) news programme, since October 2012 MEND has hijacked 12 ships, kidnapped 33 sailors, and killed 4 oil workers. Since this started, the United States, particularly for its own commercial reason, sent anti-terrorism military experts to train Nigerian soldiers in maritime combat against pirates. Although the Nigerian Navy now has learned new tactics to use against pirates, attacks still occur on an almost regular basis.

Human-Trafficking and Unemployment in Nigeria

Unemployment in Nigeria, particularly in the active youthful population, is a social problem plaguing the country. According to Adegun (2013, p. 746), the Nigerian economy is cutting jobs rather than creating them, while the educational system is expanding faster than the economy and, as a result, young people who graduate scramble for the few available jobs, leaving many of them unemployed. In spite of the high number of annual graduates, it is disturbing that many young people remain unemployed due to the few available vacancies and because of the type of training they were exposed to, which, as Diablen (2000) explains, seems not to favour self-employment. This

development is suspected to be a result of disequilibrium between labour market requirements, where graduates lack essential employable skills, as well as a faulty interaction between the educational sector and the economy. Consequently, youth self-employment has not been impressive because only a hand full are equipped and enabled to venture into self-employment (Adegun, 2013, p. 746).

Corroborating findings by Adegun, an 18 May 2015 online editorial in *The Punch Newspapers* in Nigeria reported that Nigeria had an unemployment rate of about 14-16 per cent but very large under-employment. It claimed further that, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Nigeria's unemployment rate averaged 14.6 per cent from 2006, 21.1 per cent in 2010, reaching an all-time high of 23.9 per cent in December 2011. The National Population Commission (NPC) revealed that the NBS figures clearly illustrated the deep challenges in Nigeria's labour market, where the nation's rapid economic growth has not translated into effective job creation. With the old method, the NBS' new methodology would have put the rate at 24.3 per cent for the fourth quarter of 2014. The reports accused the then sitting Minister for Finance, Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, of administrative complicity in this development, observing that in spite of all her gratuitous claims at international fora, reforms have gone undone, roads and electricity remain unavailable, recurrent expenditure still unchecked, and national debts continues to balloon (*Punch Newspaper*, 2015). As a result of the high unemployment rate and economic hardships in the country, which has led to lack of opportunity for young people, emigration has become a way out, with the daring ones among the youth forced to pay unscrupulous individuals or organisations specialising in trafficking people across borders (Ellis et al., 2011).

Human-Trafficking within Nigeria

Within Nigeria, human-trafficking from rural areas to metropolitan coastal cities like Lagos, the commercial capital with well over twenty-three million in population, is common (UNODC, 2006, p. 29). David-Odegie (2008, p. 65) reports that an estimated 83 per cent of those who were victims of human-trafficking were trafficked internally for exploitation in domestic service, street trading, commercial sex work, labour on plantations, construction site works, quarries, and mines. Uwa and colleagues (2014, p. 13), refer to a 1992 study in Nigeria carried out among children living in five states. The study revealed that 54 per cent to 70 per cent of children living in the streets were migrants and that 40 per cent of those children in domestic service came to

town with a third party or non-family member. Again, another survey carried out by UNODC on 173 children living in four Nigerian streets discovered that 15 per cent of the children came with their parents while 67 per cent came in the company of other friends of the family, who are adults or even total strangers to them but who are known to their parents. Another example of internal human-trafficking is when a child is in a situation of placement working outside of his/her immediate family unit and living with his or her employer. Those who are affected are mostly children and young women who are recruited from rural areas, remote villages, or small towns, a majority of whom are victims of exploitation due to lack of education (Aronowitz, 2004). These migrations from more economically disadvantaged regions to those which are economically more secure expose Nigerian demographic populations such as women and children to be at high risk alert of becoming victims of human traffickers.

Internal human-trafficking activities in Nigeria include young victims recruited in places such as Akwa Ibom State⁹² and trafficked to cocoa plantations in Ondo State⁹³, while adult victims were reportedly recruited from big towns such as Benin City⁹⁴, Asaba⁹⁵, Yola⁹⁶, and Kano⁹⁷ to cities like Lagos⁹⁸ and Abuja⁹⁹ (Aronowitz, 2004). These forms of internal human-trafficking involve mostly but are not limited to Nigerian women and children trafficked from rural areas within the country's borders: the women and girls for involuntary domestic servitude and forced commercial sexual exploitation, while the boys are coerced into forced labour, street vending, domestic servitude, mining, and begging (Uwa et al., 2014, p. 10).

92 Akwa Ibom State - A state in Nigeria located in the coastal southern part of the country. 2 Ondo State - A state in Nigeria created on 3 February 1976, from the former Western State.

93 Ondo State - A state in Nigeria created on 3 February 1976, from the former Western State.

94 Benin City - A city and the capital of Edo State in southern Nigeria; it is the centre of Nigeria's rubber industry and palm oil production.

95 Asaba - A city strategically located on a hill at the western edge of the Niger River; it is the capital of Nigeria's Delta State.

96 Yola - The capital city and administrative centre of Adamawa State, Nigeria, located on the Benue River.

97 Kano - The commercial nerve centre of Northern Nigeria and the second largest city in Nigeria after Lagos.

98 Lagos - A city in the Nigerian state of the same name. It is the largest in Nigeria, as well as on the African continent, and one of the fastest growing in the world; it is also one of the most populous urban agglomerations.

99 Abuja - Abuja is the capital city of Nigeria located in the centre of the country within the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). It is a planned city and was built for the most part in the 1980s, replacing the country's most populous city of Lagos as the capital on 12 December 1991.

Cross-Border Human-Trafficking from and into Nigeria

Since the 1990s, due to a drastic reduction in dignified livelihood opportunities in Nigeria, cross-border trafficking from Nigeria has increased dramatically (Onyejekwe, 2005, p. 144). Nigerian migrants are driven by a range of 'push factors' such as poverty, lack of education, lack of parental care, poor social services, traditional practices, a desire for a higher standard of living, and, recently, terror attacks. Nigerian women and children are taken from Nigeria to other West, Central, and sometimes North African countries but primarily Gabon, Cameroon, Ghana, Chad, Benin, Togo, Niger, Bukina Faso, and the Gambia, for the same purposes of involuntary domestic servitude or commercial sexual exploitation (Uwa et al., 2014, p. 10). Children from West African states like Benin, Togo, and Ghana – where the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) rules allow for easy border passage – are also forced to work in Nigeria, where some are subjected to hazardous jobs in the country's granite mines. According to Uwa and colleagues (2014, p. 10), mainly young Nigerian women and girls are trafficked to Europe and other destinations, and there is growing evidence of the involvement of Nigerian criminal networks with human traffickers.

Observation in recent times has revealed that cross-border human-trafficking themes have become an election campaign tool in Nigeria. The 18 March 2015 online edition of the *Vanguard Newspaper* of Nigeria published a headline saying 'We'll stop Edo State girls from traveling abroad for prostitution'. The declaration is credited to the wife of the then opposition leader, General Mohammadu Buhari. On her visit to Edo State¹⁰⁰ in Nigeria, while campaigning for her husband in the 2015 Presidential election, Hajia Aisha Buhari promised that 'I am here to let Edo women know that when my husband is elected, insecurity, girl-child trafficking (...) will end'. She further proclaimed that 'they don't need to go and prostitute somewhere to survive' (*Vanguard on-line*, 18 March 2015). Rhetoric such as that of Aisha Buhari reveals the deep-rooted problem of human-trafficking in Nigeria as well as on the continent. The primary thrust of this paper is to discover the reasons Nigerian youth are leaving the country as well as to find a novel way, in this case, applied theatre, to address and possibly reduce the growing numbers of trafficked humans from Nigeria.

100 Edo State - A state in Nigeria, with Benin City as capital. It is made up of five major ethnic groups; namely Edo (Benin), Esan, Owan, Akoko Edo, and Etsako. However, the state has a high presence of residents from across the country and the world because of Benin City's cosmopolitan outlook.

African Theatre in History

In a bid to discover new methods for addressing the human-trafficking menace in Nigeria, the relevance of applied theatre as a tool was investigated. Although theatre has been employed to address various aspects of community development in Africa, there is a paucity of research in the use of applied theatre as an intervention. Theatre is as old in our world today as wo/man herself/himself. The enactment of drama itself is theatre, which is performed by actors on a stage before an audience, presupposing collaborative mode of production and a collective form of reception. Moreover, drama is a unique tool in the expression of human feelings. It is also an important form of behaviour in all cultures. Like religion, the origin of theatre is founded in the earliest attempts by man to understand, order, as well as control the environment. According to Hagher (1990, p. 3), in these attempts, 'man tried to control capricious forces like diseases, earthquakes, animals, darkness, bad luck and other breakdowns in the chain of causality'. Through these practices, man is believed to have invented theatre, which was exhibited as ritual. In describing this process, Horn (1981) argues that, sometimes, the divine and the natural force are objectified or physicalised in a sacred tree, a carved fetish, or even a real human being, which, by executing prescribed actions in a special magical ritualised form, may either become the representative of the force, or the force itself. In order to further establish greater control of these forces, systems of rituals and festivals evolved often on a yearly cyclical basis. In traditional societies, where festivals are practiced annually, we can see theatre at work. This imitative creation is applied in these traditional festivals by the process of what Gordon Frazer (1922) refers to as mimetic magic. By this process, the obvious way of obtaining a result in nature is to make an imitation of it in a small scale. For instance, to achieve rain, water must be splashed about or some other characteristic of storm or shower must be reproduced. To achieve sunshine, a fire must be lit. In African traditional festivals, we find some ingenuity in the way our forefathers employ theatrical enactments to control their environments as well as the unknown (Hagher, 1990, p. 4).

Today, African theatre history notwithstanding, structured performances have evolved to become theatre performed before an audience. These performances include such artistic activities as drama, dance, music, storytelling, gymnastics, and ritual. Rural areas of Nigeria, where traditional society is still extant, as described by Iyorwuese Harry Hagher, exude a

vitality that derives from and is maintained by a vibrant theatrical activity, comprising dance, songs, masquerades, ritual enactments, and storytelling performances. Invariably, activities that are defined as theatrical can be expanded to include secular ceremonies such as weddings and initiation ceremonies. These activities are sometimes presented as spectacle or as entertainment to mark seasonal or important events in communities. As stated in the epigraph above, these activities were not performed in a special building, nor does performance become a commercial enterprise for a fee-paying audience. Rather, the audience in traditional African performances enjoy what Hagher (1990, p. 4) describes as collective effervescence because the bodies make electrifying contacts, with souls merging. Conversely, the auditoria of Western theatre with their chairs and arm-rests rarely achieve the warmth exuded by this type of theatre. This is why Western theatre is, by contrast, perceived to be cold, mechanical, and alienating (Hagher, 1990). In the wake of globalisation, the African continent has evidently acquired and perfected the skills of Western drama, including their choreography, music, and dance. A result of this 'acquisition' is that the establishment of the text and the mass media have made the intrusion of Western theatre into African life a definite reality. Hagher (1990) is of the opinion that this theatre of the West has a profound influence in our lives, with a primary purpose of accentuating our dependency on the West and its values. Invariably, Western culture appears to have become the dominant culture of most of Africa, ensuring an institutional framework to foster Western theatre through education. As a result, the arrival of European 'conquerors' over the past centuries has practically ensured a regrettable diminishing of traditional Africa theatre. However, in spite of the seemingly diminishing African theatre forms and practices, there has interestingly emerged a renewed interest in the potential of African theatre as an important tool for intervention in evoking awareness for societal change and transformation. This renewed interest has given rise to the adoption of what is popularly known today as applied theatre. It is therefore necessary to employ the inherent theatrical traditions of those communities. At this point, it is important to explain the elements that constitute applied theatre.

Critical Pedagogy and Theatre Pedagogy

In addressing human-trafficking issues in Nigeria through applied theatre, examination of critical pedagogy is advised. Like critical pedagogy, theatre pedagogy is mostly definable as the method of teaching which aims to help in questioning and actively struggling against any form of oppressive customs, beliefs, or social oppression.

Through the theory and practice of theatre pedagogy, pupils gain critical awareness of issues that concern their wellbeing. It is paramount that there are on-going criticisms of the status quo. With a view of reducing societal inequalities, theatre pedagogy questions how societies perceive the efforts of the government, or the absence thereof, in improving the lives and living conditions of communities. From this point of view, the use of theatre for social critique is necessary if one does not want the kind of upbringing and education that contributes to the reproduction of inequality. In effect, since social critique produces social change, theatre pedagogy becomes committed to liberation and emancipation of the populace from the prevailing oppressive social interactions. It is important that, with the mode of critiques such as theatre pedagogy provides, government agents, NGOs, and communities clearly understand that phenomena like inequality are unnecessary. Rather, communities must realise that inequality and its characteristics are products of social processes arranged by human beings. This realisation sets a person free from feeling like an object prone to manipulation. Theatre pedagogues agree that issues surrounding human-trafficking are inherently political, and, for this reason, a social and educational vision of justice and equality should be the basis for any kind of performance, with liberation from oppression and human suffering being important dimensions in its enactments. In the instructive modernisation of Bertolt Brecht's epic theatre, the audience is relevant because they form the soul of the performance. For this reason, the community theatre is one in which the audience is not restricted to passive viewing but in which their active participation is expected. Invariably, popular or community theatre is not expected to retreat to prepared positions: it is an art of permeation with boundaries that are ill-defined and far extended, including but not limited to demonstrations, political rallies, religious festivals, and the celebration of daily life. The theatre will become more of an art when it becomes less consciously aesthetic (Schechner, 1970). It is this freedom in the creative process which is improvised constantly, as well as the awareness of a socio-political reality which has drawn this researcher into this study in applied theatre techniques for human-trafficking. Essentially, it is assumed that theatre can best achieve independent artistic objectives if it becomes an integral part of the hugely complex movement towards a developed, sophisticated, but liberating form of socialism which is happening all over the world. Invariably, to be good as theatre, plays must now ruthlessly question their ideological bases, the sets of assumptions about life upon which they are built, as well

as a questioning of the critical relationship with their audience, based on trust, cultural identification, and political solidarity.

African Popular Theatre as Pedagogy and Mobilisation

Before colonialism and its attendant imposed ways of speaking, living, and doing, Africans have had indigenous ways of speaking, living, and doing. Since this study's focus is on applied theatre techniques, it is imperative to address a general bias in the way indigenous African theatre has normally been analysed by previous scholars. A major bias, according to Kerr (1995, p. 2), arises from the fact that pre-colonial African theatre has not been thoroughly researched. Compared, for example, with the African pre-colonial history of state formation, there has been little use in theatre studies of such evidence as archaeology or oral sources. Much of available information has been from reconstructions and hypothesis that were propounded by colonial anthropologists and so-called Africanists. The limitation of those sources is not only that they tended to have values which are alien to African culture but also that they had an ideological bias which distorted the image of African theatre, as if to deny that pre-colonial, colonised or post-colonial Africans do not possess the ability to contribute knowledge to issues concerning societal development. A lot of the colonial Africanists shared views of African pre-colonial culture as static over centuries. This view suited colonial ideology since it made African culture appear outside of the dynamic process of history and, as such, rationalising increased dependency of African economies and knowledge systems on European models.

Interestingly, this image of Africa, in Kerr's (1995, p. 2) opinion, has proved quite durable even after independence. For instance, in the Negritude philosophy of the 1930s and 1940s, African intellectuals turned colonial ideology inside out, retaining the static view of African history but eulogising it in contrast to the dynamic but destructive sterility of European culture. This philosophy has had an important impact on post-independence views of African culture with African academics and government spokespersons endorsing the conception of a classless, innocent, unchanging African pre-colonial culture. A pre-colonial Africa, with its notion of sharing, communal society, has found a theatrical equivalent in an aesthetic emphasis on African theatre's anonymous, participatory qualities. Kerr (1995) informs further that even anthropologically inclined studies from the late colonial era commented on the participatory qualities of indigenous African theatre. For example, masked plays of the Afikpo people of Nigeria witnessed play leaders who had to move around the audience because of the absence of raked

seating arrangements which solved the problems of sightlines. Although, this caused a slackening in dramatic tension, it increased the audience-player interaction. Scholars of post-independence Africa have given a polemical thrust to the participatory element inherent in African theatre. Of this, Mukotani Rugyendo, according to Awoonor, gives a description of Ugandan indigenous theatre as follows:

In the course of performance, all the spectators could participate as they liked by clapping, shouting or whistling, all in appreciation, and actually contributing to the force of the performance by joining beautifully with the performers (Awoonor, 1972, p. 40).

This form of community theatre for development, described by Kofi Awoonor, is corroborated by Hagher (1990, p. 3) when he opines that community theatre for development is a theatrical style which stresses ‘participation,’ ‘dialogue,’ and ‘critical consciousness.’ The practitioners of this theatre are committed to social transformation through cultural action, using theatre. Through this type of theatre practice, they hope to invoke the peasants and workers in finding solution to their own common problems through research, dramatization, analysis, and follow-up actions.

In Nigeria, the community theatre for development bears a remarkable resemblance to Paulo Freire’s and Augusto Boal’s experiments in Latin America, through East African experiments in Kenya, especially the Laedza Batanini campaigns in Botswana and the Chikwakwa travelling theatre in Zambia. A closer look at the international and domestic manifestations of Tfd show a polarity between the theatre that domesticates and one that liberates, leading to the position of this paper that, through the ages, theatre has always been employed or manipulated for different purposes. The Nigerian traditional theatre, literary theatre, and radical literary theatre, presents each genre as being effective in taking a particular position that tallies with the held opinions of the practitioners. Importantly, the use of theatre through generations has been to answer the question: ‘theatre for whom and for what purpose?’ The performers in indigenous theatre can, therefore, through their experiences, present to authorities and policy makers how their predicaments can be amended. This is because, as sufferers, those who experience neglect are better equipped to explain their own predicaments. The quintessential Nigerian dramatist, Hubert Ogunde, for example, utilised theatre to address societal ills and governmental ineptitude. Like Ogunde, the opinion of Nigeria’s leading literati such as Chinua Achebe’s (of ‘Things Fall Apart’ fame) and Wole Soyinka’s (Nigeria’s Nobel prize laureate and theatre practitioner)

is that art should expose, reflect, and indeed magnify the decadent, rotten underbelly of a society that has lost its sense of direction. Consequently, the dominant aim of African community theatre is the scrutiny of social injustice and 'how to transform inequitable, undemocratic, or oppressive institutions and social relations' (2001, p. 155). At some point, assessments of truth or conceptual slipperiness might come into the discussion, but they are in the service of demonstrating how certain power effects occur, not in the service of pursuing truth in some impassioned sense (Burbules, 1992). Therefore, community theatre is that which illuminates and, at the same time, creates its own irresistible necessity and logic. It is a process which seduces the viewer and performer back, according to Yerima (1990), to the beginning for possible questioning of communal myths as well as a confrontation with morality. It is this level of seriousness, almost sacred in the religious sense, that a community theatre, in whatever hue and whenever it is practiced, should be viewed.

Essentially, the interest of this paper is drawn to community-focused theatre as intervention in human-trafficking due to its communal experience: an experience which exists within the traditional theatrical activities of African societies. The theory, in this regard, concentrates on the community or popular theatre, negating known theatrical conventions and which abandons theatre halls for the streets in search of audience communication. A community-focused theatre involves researchers in collaboration with community members, in most cases, amateurs, working with them to create plays which are evaluated after presentation. Ultimately, the end result of such collaborations is a new purpose leading to a new art of communication.

Applied Theatre

Theatre for Development (TfD) is regarded as an offshoot of popular theatre, which refers to an approach that directly involves the underprivileged majority as they utilise the arts of theatre and performance to sensitise and conscientize the audience on issues that concern the community at large. In this scenario, the underprivileged are also the audience. It is a kind of theatre of the people, by the people, and for the people. According to Kidd (1982), popular theatre can be defined as a means of expression which has traditionally been used to educate the young, unify the community, and articulate the common concerns and aspirations of the people, thereby building an educational approach and means of communication which is familiar to and accepted by the community. It is a spontaneous means of education and grassroots

communication as well as a process of communicating necessary community-building information and strategies to the people, by the people, and for the people.

In more ways than not, Tfd as a form of popular theatre presents the major elements of grassroots participation which is viewed as a direct involvement of the underprivileged in the creative and organisational process of combating the oppressive forces in the society. This method of creative communication through performance becomes an instrument enabling ordinary citizens to understand their environment, limitations as well as their predicaments, with the end result of articulating personal or corporate concerns. This theatre form acquires an immediacy that stimulates self-awareness and self-expression which, in turn, instils a sense of purpose and responsibility in the individual (Uwah, 2012). Furthermore, popular theatre contains some elements which differentiates it from Tfd. On the one hand, Tfd is mainly viewed as a passive, post-colonial African phenomenon which deploys no forceful negotiating tools to build its structures. On the other hand, popular theatre connotes a political stance that is, not only politically confrontational but directly challenging, in order to bring change to existing political or traditional structures. Tfd is also defined as a progression from less interactive theatre forms to a more dialogic process (Mikhail Bakhtin, cited in Storey, 1986) where theatre is practiced with the people, and by the people, as a way of empowering communities, listening to their concerns, and then encouraging them to voice and solve their own problems. According to Chinyowa (2006), Tfd in Africa has largely been premised on product rather than process. This implies that the objective of Tfd is to disseminate messages, or to conscientize communities about their social and political situation. Referring to the enterprise as Popular Theatre, he further describes its aims as making people not only aware of but also active participants in developmental processes by expressing their viewpoints and acting to improve their conditions. Popular theatre is, therefore, intended to empower the common wo/man with a critical consciousness crucial to the struggle against the forces responsible for his/her poverty. An interesting component of Tfd is that it can be a kind of participatory theatre that encourages improvisation while at the same time allowing members of the audience to take roles in the performance. It can also be fully scripted and staged, with the audience as observers. Many Tfd productions are a mix of the two. Another interesting variation of applied theatre is Theatre of the Oppressed (TO).

Theatre of the Oppressed

Theatre of the Oppressed (TO), a technique created and experimented by Augusto Boal, is a form of community-based theatre that was influenced by the work of the educator and theorist, Paulo Freire. Boal's techniques use theatre as means of promoting social and political change. In TO, the audience becomes active such that as 'spect-actors' they explore, show, analyse, and transform their real-life experiences. This kind of theatre speaks to the people in their own language and idiom in addition to dealing with issues of direct relevance to their lives. The practice builds the people's artistic modes of expression such as songs, dance, art works, and so on, into the process of discussion of salient issues as well as exhibiting performances. Predominantly, TO's primary aim is targeted towards addressing the basic needs of oppressed people, by the oppressed people, in oppressed communities. It exposes the real-life experiences of these neglected people in societies.

Applied Theatre and Real-life Experiences

Theatrical performances have played major roles in bringing to the public space issues that the ruling classes would rather have discussed privately. Such performances tend to confirm, without prejudice, the precarious circumstances of the masses whose voices would ordinarily have been muffled. Somers (1996, p. 65) proposes that one of the crucial roles for applied theatre practice is to create a sense of validation of people's experiences. This paper's aim is to raise awareness of the plight of community members when themes of human-trafficking, for example, are performed by young people whose future is under threat. The story is expected to capture aspects of the life as well as the circumstances of audience members, and for this to be effective the young people in the audience or on stage need to feel that the storyline and the characters within it reflect the verities of their own experiences. If the story is an accurate representation of young people and their community, it is expected to provide validation for these experiences. Moreover, these stories are also expected to allow communities to come together to witness a collective concern for their neglect. It is assumed that this will have, according to Somers (1996, p. 65), a desolating effect, aided by the way some community members would feel about their human-trafficking predicament as well as the life dilemmas young people find themselves in. Expectedly, there is the possibility that the young people in these communities already feel disconnected or disenfranchised from the rest of the world, but it is assumed that the applied theatre techniques employed would provide a forum in which their opinions matter. This could be relevant since applied theatre

creates shared life conditions and a feeling of belonging, which encourages reflection on existential issues as well as draw attention to issues connected to the local context. In all of this, the local farmer in the village, for example, or the ordinary labourer in the street is, as it were, put in the 'driving seat' of the drama, availing her/him the opportunity to control the dramaturgical process. It is important that government agencies realise that rural people have minds of their own and are experienced managers who want to, and should, be part of decisions made on crucial issues which affect them.

Moreover, Tfd efforts amongst young people predominantly transfer the structures and facilitations of the actual process itself to participants. This handing over of control of the process entails a 'de-construction' of the notion of expertise in theatre and drama and in development and human rights expertise. In many ways, such steps transform and re-examine the understanding of what constitutes expertise. Invariably, the absence of input by theatre experts, rather than frustrating the investigations into community problems and solutions, opens a path to a better understanding of a people's predicament, without the prescriptive, often opinionated, input of so-called experts. The primary aim of the study, which preceded this paper, is to allow those who suffer to make suggestions on how to address issues that concern community development, youth empowerment, and in the process combat the dehumanising human-trafficking problems.

Theoretical Framework

Besides the useful entertainment that she/he provides to community service, the traditional artist dedicates herself/himself, at whatever risks to her/his person, to revealing truth and satirizing social ills, with the inherent desire to deplete the community's suffering (Obafemi, 2001, p. 37). This paper presents important concepts and framing strategies in the search for ways to address issues of human-trafficking in Nigerian communities. The theoretical framework upon which this study is rooted includes the necessary theme of drama and dramatization as both *practice* and *concept*. Importantly, theatre, or that which is dramatic, is an important tool utilised in exploring the feelings of humans. As a fundamental cultural human activity in all cultures, the dramatic has been known to be an essential form of behaviour. Historically, drama as a terminology is derived from a Greek word that signifies 'action', and it is a derivative of the word meaning 'to do' or 'to act' (Terry & Thomas, 1978). When drama is enacted on a stage before an audience by actors, it is theatre. This effort involves collaborative modes of production as well as a collective form of reception. Through the dramatic, cultural heritages remain

intact. Beyond entertainment, theatre has become a major instrument for raising societal awareness on sundry issues.

In Nigeria, for example, the role of the traditional artist, apart from the obvious one of entertainment, is self-education in order to unveil unbridled truth and, in that process, satirise social ills (Obafemi, 2001). While analysing the work and impact of the Nigerian community theatre legends, Duro Ladipo and Hubert Ogunde, Olu Obafemi notes that:

From the historical and mythological world of Ladipo's *Oba Ko So*, one turns to Ogunde's commentary on contemporary Nigerian society. *Strike and Hunger* has been chosen from Ogunde's opus as an example of plays that are committed to the nationalist struggle as well as of a political satire in post-independence Nigeria.

In essence, the history of drama in Nigeria continues to grow as it includes expressing ethics, myths, religion, politics, and conscientisation issues in the society. During the Mass Mobilization (MAMSER) drive of the early 80s, the government of the then military dictator General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida employed drama, dance, and musicals as major instruments of public awareness to instil nationalism and discipline in the citizens of Nigeria. This is largely due to the power of theatre as an effective means of education, conscientisation, and orientation. In other spheres, drama is also discipline.

Drama as Discipline

Drama as discipline can be divided into many parts. First is improvisational drama. Improvisation in drama is collaboratively achieved by participants in a group. Modifications in such plays are achieved at-the-moment by different role players, therefore, the basic factor in this type is spontaneity. Another function of drama is the role plays. This refers to the act of a particular character or a person. According to Terry and Thomas (1978) sometimes in a classroom students are given a particular role in a scripted play, which is also a form of role play. Oftentimes, the teacher also acts out a particular character. After rehearsal, the play is performed before the class or before any audience for that matter. The next type of drama is mime. Mime is expressed through mute gestures. In this type of drama, body language, stage properties, and dialogue are excluded from the performance. Actors who engage in mimetic acts require great skill. Another type of drama is the mask drama. Here, the mask is an object worn over the face. Masks are

predominantly employed when players, for instance, want to portray animals in jungle stories. Children are known to enjoy this type of drama because they are less inhibited in performing and overact (Terry & Thomas, 1978). Other types of drama are puppet drama, radio drama, and applied drama. Puppetry is a traditional and ancient form of theatre. The puppetry items are made of a wide variety of materials, ranging from fabrics, metals, flexible strings, and wood. Children are known to use puppets to say and do things that they may feel too restricted to say or do by themselves. Besides the voice of actors, radio dramas depend mainly on employing the use of sound effects to carry out the radio's main objective of dissemination of information to the general public. Applied drama is an umbrella term for the wider use of drama practices in specific social contexts and environments. Applied drama has forms such as Theatre for Development (TfD), Forum Theatre (FT), Newspaper Theatre (NT), and Theatre of the Oppressed (TO). All of these forms are community development enterprises by theatre practitioners and sundry allied groups. The aim in the adoption of any or a combination of any of these forms of applied theatre is to employ theatre as a tool in achieving mobilisation in communities, small or large.

Methodology

The study from which this paper emanated was an in-depth qualitative research endeavour that relied on pre-play discussions, the dramatic presentations, and after-play discussions of selected participants in Ibadan, Oyo State in Nigeria, because the country is a major supplier of trafficked humans to Europe and other parts of the world. In addition, the study also employed the use of a qualitative document in the research study in order to further investigate human-trafficking, community development, and youth empowerment. Human-trafficking as a social problem in public discourse is discussed in order to discover any possible underlying factors that might mitigate the human-trafficking phenomenon. Available research evidences on the presence, cause, prevalence, scale, size, and effect of human-trafficking on communities and young people are thereafter analysed.

The study was amongst community members domiciled in the selected community, with a high proportion of young people from low-income households. Interactions with community members revealed that young people from these households lack better opportunities and alternatives to the kind of lives they live. These people are alienated from various infrastructural developments that city dwellers enjoy. Discussions,

workshops, and presentations from the actors and participants revealed a series of unpleasant lived realities of neglect that poor people experience. The adopted procedure is in accord with Somers (2008, p. 65) who reveals that, unless the target audience feels that the story captures its lived reality, the power of the medium to create engagement and change will be weakened. When authenticity is captured within the dramatic form, powerful outcomes are possible. Other models were also utilized, presenting common emerging themes that include aesthetic engagement (the intrinsic value of attending a theatre event), catharsis, and empathy (emotional responses and shifts in understanding), dialogue as well as changes in social relationships that may result from watching the play. Other themes include the use of drama as a teaching tool, and the extent to which participants (and audience) learned from the drama. Through in-depth interviews, the team scripted a story of how marginalised groups, in varying contexts and for different reasons, can give voice to their experiences through applied theatre techniques and, in so doing, attempt to strengthen their own as well as the audiences' rights. In attending to the aim of finding possible intervention in addressing Nigeria's human-trafficking problems, workshops were carried out with volunteer participating young people in order to write a good story that would be their story. Through these stories, the team examined the various experiences of community members in Eleyele (Ologun-Eru) as Nigerian young people with dreams and desires, in order to discover how they expect them to be achieved and fulfilled. Largely, we also examined the thoughts of these young people, including their fears and their expectations, from their governments and communities.

Without in-depth research, experts in applied theatre like Ackroyd (2001, p. 1) and Bradby (1993, p. 18-19) opine that it is unrealistic to expect that drama participants will be able to capture the reality of those affected by the issues being dealt with. Therefore, an interactive theatre programme on how the average Nigerian young person fares in their communities is expected to help capture the psychological, social, and technical reality of Nigerian young people aspiring to better living conditions. In his submission about the nature of interventions through applied theatre, Thompson (2003, pp. 200-202) is of the opinion that, on the one hand, much of the practices in its 'intentional' form create a practice that seeks to debate vital issues and see those concerns transformed into new stories. But, on the other, within unfamiliar settings, he argues that it is a way to provide people with a means to work their way through difficult transitory periods, aiding in their safe transition into a new place or time. About this, Somers (2008, p. 65) corroborates that 'the research process works best when all participants are engaged in it,

leading to a pooling of understanding which enhances the group's insight and supports a sense of ownership of that knowledge and the emerging dramatic experience'. Somers (2008, p. 65) argues further that 'effective intervention requires the drama to be 'applied' in researched and understood contexts'. This has been discovered to be true, whether the drama used is rooted in workshops, with little or no intention of performance, or is 'the product of a scripted play' or a 'devised performance'. From initial workshops and interviews with participating young people from the selected community in Nigeria, the study team became familiar with the field of human experience dealt with, especially in terms of human-trafficking. In the workshops, we brought in all the information which could be digested by the participants. This was born out of the concern that, when workshops stretch over several days or weeks, on-going research can be conducted by those involved.

In essence, in order to attend to the aims and objectives of this study, a qualitative research design was considered and adopted. The qualitative method investigates the why and how of decision-making, not just what, where, or when, hence the smaller but focused samples are more often needed rather than large samples. According to William (cited in Akinola, 2014, p. 30), the qualitative research methodology should help us become more experienced with the phenomenon we are interested in. If we really want to understand how people think, some in-depth interviewing would also probably be needed. We therefore interviewed people who directly participated in the play discussions or debates on human-trafficking in Nigeria. In order to achieve wholesome details, individual interviews with selected members of the participating groups were conducted through questionnaires designed to be able to investigate how participants react or interpret their roles in the play or debates (after performance discussions). Participants and players were monitored as much as possible to observe body language that may be useful in post-production debates. Questionnaires were developed and administered to selected participants. The aim here is to discover the participants' awareness of human-trafficking incidences around their community.

Our study in Nigeria took place on the outskirts of the city of Ibadan and, for the purpose of the study, a cluster of performers from Fourth Man's Theatre Company were employed. This is a group of young university undergraduates who have been engaged in various forms of community engagement through theatre. The random sampling amongst volunteer community members guaranteed that the sample chosen is representative of the population, ensuring that the statistical conclusions will be valid to enable us achieve

our investigation into the reasons for human-trafficking in Nigeria. The community targeted in Nigeria is Eleyele in Ibadan, the capital city of Oyo state.

Although community leaders were informed in Eleyele about the study as well as the performances that would involve participation of the community members, it was difficult to get venues for the performances. This is because community gathering infrastructure was lacking and, besides, the local government officials at Eleyele demanded exorbitant fees to use the available facility. The study team decided to use available spaces such as open fields in Eleyele, on the way to Ologun-Eru village, near the city's water works department. Investigations involving performances went on for six days: the first three days for fact finding and gathering approval from designated authorities. The team arrived in the morning of the fourth day, around 11 o'clock each day to set up and create a feeling of something-is-about-to-happen. The idea for this strategy was to create a little spectacle with the team's presence as the mobile stage was set up while music played. As curious community members walked past, the team engaged with them and told them about the study, and, in the process, asked for volunteer participants. Interviews were carried out to ascertain that those who volunteered actually belonged to those communities. Although participants were randomly selected, the team was more interested in those who could communicate in English, which is the adopted mode of communication with participants. We focused on those who were either born in these places or have been living there for more than ten years. The reason for this was to involve only participants that would be good representatives of the chosen communities. The last two days were used to focus on one-on-one interviews with some participants that were not yet interviewed on the fourth day. For data collection or capturing, interactive interviews of participants were carried out. The male to female ratio was 50:50 from Eleyele community. Because the study adopted a purposive approach, the researcher requested equal numbers of male and female respondents in all samplings. This is in a quest to have equal representation for both genders.

Findings

The enthusiasm of the participants implies that they like to discuss issues that directly affect their wellbeing rather than imbibe solutions from disconnected politicians. Invariable, the research team felt that if those who suffer directly were allowed to investigate and proffer solutions to those issues that common points would emerge. It is believed that, from

their personal ‘encounters’ with their problems, the same avenue could also be employed in a play to bring up ways by which those predicaments could be removed or altogether eradicated.

I contend that in order to get to this deeper understanding, there is expected to be a rigorous creative purpose. The entire process of understanding the lives of, and our interactions with, young people can be underpinned by a coherent aesthetic of improvisation and dramatic performance.

Fielded Questions

This portion represents some questions that were fielded for the participants and answers given by some of them:

Question 1: What are your thoughts about the play?

Me I think it is a good play, because this is what is going on around us. It is lack of opportunity and anyone who is lucky must take advantage so that one can be a better person. *(3rd Respondent – Eleyele)*

It is truth what the play is saying now. Me too I will travel if I have the means. *(12th Respondent – Eleyele)*

The play is good. It is good. I like it. *(7th Respondent – Eleyele)*

Question 2: Does the play portray realities in your community?

Yes. These things are happening every time. *(4th Respondent – Eleyele)*

What is portrayed in the play is real. Many of our young ones are always keen about travelling overseas. But then, these things are happening every time. *(13th Respondent – Eleyele)*

It is o, but not in my family yet (laughs). *(12th Respondent – Eleyele)*

The play is correct. It is very correct. *(17th Respondent – Eleyele)*

Question 3: What are your thoughts about people who leave your community to seek better lives elsewhere?

I think it is a good thing. You want people to stay in a bad place and die? It is good o (laughs). *(14th Respondent – Eleyele)*

I like it here actually. I like my community. But I think since it is a free world, anybody can do anything. I mean, anybody can travel anywhere. It is their lives. *(11th Respondent (Eleyele)*

Me I will not blame anyone. *(9th Respondent – Eleyele)*

The questions fielded above provided the opportunity in the study to allow the 'oppressed' of the investigated communities to participate in providing insights into how they felt about life in their cultural and economic milieu. As represented above, all of the respondents agreed that the play adequately covered the theme of their community. Besides agreeing that the play was apt and a reflection of their society, they seemed to support anyone who has the opportunity to travel out of their community in search of better life.

The 9th Respondent was quick to say 'Me I will not blame anyone.' The 14th Responder, armed with a rhetorical question, feels that people cannot be compelled to live in an environment that could deplete the quality of their lives. With a passing laugh, the respondent says:

I think it is a good thing. You want people to stay in a bad place and die? It is good o (laughs). (14th Respondent – Eleyele)

When asked (in Question 2) if the play portray realities in their community, the 4th Responder was quick to say:

'Yes. These things are happening every time'.

The questions and the answers provided reveal the prevalence of young people who migrate from their communities as they search for a more conducive community anywhere in the world. The 12th Responder says it directly:

'It is truth what the play is saying now. Me too I will travel if I have the means'.

Conclusion

This paper has described the method of a study on applied theatre techniques. Today, more than ever, the need to confront human-trafficking around the world, and especially as it affects the African continent, has become a persistent situation. Nigeria's trauma, due to the increasing number of annual human-traffic victims, directly or otherwise, is relatively high, compared to the trauma of other parts of the African continent. Interviews with participants reveal a number of young people, especially women and girls, who claimed they had been subject to attempts to be trafficked into sexual exploitation, domestic slavery, and, in other instances, forced marriages. The survey found that many were keen to seek a better life abroad but were also at risk of being coerced into dangerous situations. While resourceful and pragmatic

steps are continually being taken by governments and NGOs, there is a great need for political will to end human-trafficking in Nigeria, but there is a huge lack of awareness as well, especially among girls and women who live in very poor economic conditions. It is imperative to search for novel methods to combat the human-trafficking scourge. The use of theatre and drama as pedagogy as an intervention in the human-trafficking trend in Nigeria is not only new but also productive according to findings from the research that led to this paper. A major component of performance in Africa is the idea of creating an opportunity for people to recognise their own predicament, especially for people whose voices have been suppressed.

The participants interrogated in the Eleyele community we chose were limited to young people who were below twenty-four years of age but above eighteen and were probably high school students, those who had graduated from high school, or who had dropped out. Interviews were carried out using volunteers who actually belonged to those communities. Randomly selected participants who could speak English were chosen so as to make the field work easier and quicker for volunteers who were paid hourly. In the data analysis, the demography of the investigated communities was also analysed. The field work preceding this paper involved the merging of investigation through the employment of play-performance techniques with observation and audience participation. Findings revealed some underlying reasons for the prevalence of human-trafficking. Some of these push factors are poor or non-existing infrastructure, inequality, conflicts, poverty, lack of opportunity for education, unrest, terrorism, as well as Islamic fundamentalism. Findings from interviews of some of the respondents who were community members in Eleyele revealed that this applied theatre approach laid bare the way some community members felt about their situations. Findings from responses during the interaction and interviews with volunteers also revealed that there is a prevailing neglect of the young people in the community, which could be a reason young people migrate to other places for better opportunities. Findings revealed that girls and women were interested in migrating in order to improve their lives, with more than half of them claiming that getting out of Nigeria would avail them of an opportunity to better their lives. Although immigration has existed for centuries, there is real concern about the persistence of these ultimately destructive dreams. Young girls keep on believing that they will have better lives elsewhere. The

reality is quite the contrary. For most migrants, migration has become a trap. This is still ongoing.

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13

Migrating Africans and the Brickwall of European Borders: A Cosmopolitanist Evaluation of Hardin's Lifeboat Ethics

Andrew Onwudinjo and Anthony Okeregbe

Abstract

This chapter is a critical evaluation of Hardin's lifeboat ethics from a cosmopolitanist standpoint. Using his lifeboat metaphor, Hardin argues that more affluent countries should curb migrants' influx from poorer countries so that their (the affluent) carrying capacities will not be exceeded thereby subjecting the latter to the poverty state of migrants. Apart from providing viability to the centrality of cosmopolitanism in migration ethics, the cosmopolitan approach accords value to the essence of humaneness, difference, interrelatedness etc. in migration issues. The ontological focus of cosmopolitan analysis is the relationality between self, other and the world. Placing this phenomenon of Africans' migration to European countries against the lifeboat ethics, this paper submits that the few Africans who migrate to European countries do not fit into the 'carrying capacity' of these states, hence the need for a cosmopolitan approach in migration ethics.

Introduction

There are some facts that need to be pointed out from the inception of this paper so that it can be understood in the right context. First, the number of Africans migrating to Europe and other Western countries is far less than intra-African migrations. But the experience of Africans who cannot legally obtain immigration permits is worrisome, hence the focus of this paper is on Africans migrating to western countries, hereafter referred to as Afro-Western migration. Second, the route they follow (either desert or sea) and the reception met by the surviving migrants raise questions about the ethics

of migration, hence our inquiry into closed border policies. Third, the focus of this paper is not to discuss the reason(s) why these Africans emigrate or why legal channels of immigration were not followed, as these would shift our emphasis. Rather, our paper is skewed to the critique of closed border policies, with specific reference to Garrett Hardin's Lifeboat Ethics.

The number of African migrants who die in the Mediterranean when their dinghies capsize due to conditions at sea, overloading, or the simple fact that such dinghies were never made for such voyage is disheartening. When analysed alongside the fate of these migrants during their journey through the Sahara Desert with the hope of arriving at the promised land of Europe in search for a better life only to be shut out, the discourse within the ethics of migration needs to be re-evaluated. Oxfam reports that more than 7000 people trying to reach Italy have died in the central Mediterranean since 2014, making the Italian route to Europe one of the deadliest in the world. Much less is known however about those who have died trying to reach the sea, crossing the endless desert of *Ténéré*, in south central Sahara.¹⁰¹ This merely gives an insight into the situation as the United Nations (UN), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and other groups that are concerned with the migration share several heart-rending stories of migrants' plight. In his research on migrants stranded in Malta in 2014, Agnethe Overgaard summarises thus:

Many migrants perish at sea and passengers fear for their lives. Arriving in Malta, migrants are immediately sent to detention and given a removal order, as they do not carry legal documents. They are then offered to apply for asylum, whereby their entry into Malta is decriminalised in a legal sense. Most West Africans arriving in Malta are rejected in their asylum application according to current Maltese policies. Some are deported, but most are detained for eighteen months, which is the maximum time allowed to detain asylum seekers in the European Union. Afterwards, the immigrants are given freedom and the border between Libya and Malta seems effectively crossed.¹⁰²

Migrants who go to Italy or Spain face similar (or worse) experiences in their quest for a chance at improved subsistence. To capture this situation

101 Oxfam International, (2016). *The Perilous Migration across the Desert of Niger: Africa's Hidden History*. Accessed 20 February 2020, from <https://www.oxfam.org/en/perilous-migration-across-desert-niger-africas-hidden-story>.

102 Overgaard, A., (2014). Four Days, Eighteen Months, and Five Years: West African Migrants Crossing the Border between Libya and Malta. *Etnofoor*, 26(1), 39.

theoretically, this paper is divided into three parts. The first part attempts a general understanding of the concept of migration while an expository analysis of Hardin's lifeboat ethics is done in the second part. The third part criticizes Hardin's propositions using the cosmopolitan approach.

Understanding Migration

Migration is a fact of existence amongst living things for it is a manifestation of the characteristic of movement. Birds and other animals migrate for survival when the seasons change. Chapman and colleagues note that 'animal migration is a fabulously rich and varied tapestry of behaviour, encompassing a diverse range of movements. Migration often evokes images of the spectacular seasonal journeys of birds from their European breeding grounds to the food-rich African plains and forests; or the leaping of Pacific salmon as they fight the river currents to return to their natal streams to reproduce and then die...'¹⁰³ Certainly, man is not left out in this voyage for survival or otherwise. Sager asserts that 'the history of humanity is a history of mobility.'¹⁰⁴ Whether the motivation is voluntary or forced, survival is always an impetus to move.

The concept of migration is very complex. Not only does it encapsulate the concepts of immigration and emigration, but it also includes the concepts of time and distance. This has made its definition very controversial. Migration has been construed from different perspectives or approaches. Another issue that complicates the definition of migration, and making a univocal definition of the concept impossible, is the different usage of the term from one country to another. However, what seems to remain constant in this controversy is the belief that migration involves place of residence, spatial location, and time,¹⁰⁵ but this is where the consensus ends.

The understanding of migration has changed over the years. Between the 50s and 80s physical location was the main theme. Eisenstadt, for instance conceptualized migration as the physical movement of people from one society to another. Such a physical movement, he says, should involve the abandonment of present resident cum social life with the intention of settling

103 Chapman, B. et al. (2014). Patterns of Animal Migration. In Lars-Anders Hansson & Susanne Akesson, *Animal Movement Across Scales*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 11.

104 Sager, A., (2016). *The Ethics and Politics of Immigration: Core Issues and Emerging Trends*. London and New York: Rowman & LittleField, p. 3.

105 Cwerner, S., (2001). The Times of Migration. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, (27)1, p. 65.

in a new residence and starting a new social life.¹⁰⁶ According to Shaw, migration is 'the relatively permanent movement of persons over a significant distance.'¹⁰⁷ A similar opinion was offered by Ross, who sees migration as the geographical mobility of persons from one political, statistical and residence areas to another within a period of time.¹⁰⁸

In recent times, the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) defines migration as 'a process of moving, either across an international border, or within a State. Encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people, and economic migrants.'¹⁰⁹ In the same vein, B.R.K. Sinha sees migration as an 'ubiquitous process of movement of individual or a group of people from one spatial unit or place of residence (known as origin place) to another (called as destination place) defined by any kind of commonly agreed geographical or political or administrative boundary in space and time.'¹¹⁰

From the foregoing, it is apparent that there is no universally accepted definition of migration. Nonetheless, as earlier hinted, what remains constant in these definitions are residential change, spatial boundary, distance, and time. These ideas have been considered very important in delineating the unique characteristics of migration. It has been assumed that the presence of these ideas is what differentiates migration from other related terms such as circulation and mobility. While circulation is the to and fro movement of people from one location to another without a declared intention of either long or short term of change of residence, mobility is general term for all kinds of spatial movement irrespective of time, distance, and residential location.¹¹¹ However, the ability of these ideas to offer a comprehensive and univocal definition of migration has long been in doubt. For instance, the idea that usual place of residence should constitute migration raises more problem that it can solve. Not only does an individual move from one residence to

106 Eisenstadt, S., (1953). *Analysis of Patterns of Migration and Absorption of Immigrants*. London: London School of Economics, pp. 167-180.

107 Shaw, R.P., (1975). *Migration: Theory and Facts*. Philadelphia: Regional Science Research Institute, p. 23.

108 Ross, J., (1982). *International Encyclopedia of Population*. New York: The Free Press, pp. 448-449.

109 International Organisation for Migration, (2004). *Glossary on Migration*. Geneva: International Organisation for Migration, p. 7.

110 Sinha, B.R.K. (2005). Human Migration: Concepts and Approaches. *Foldrajzi Ertesito*, (54)3-4, p. 407.

111 Ibid. p. 408.

another within the same street or community, but also he/she might have more than one residential space across the globe. The former has been one of the problems often encountered in *de jure* population census, whereby individuals hardly declare a change of usual place of residence. This has made the conceptual arena of migration to be an open-ended one.

Migration is intertwined with geopolitics, trade and cultural exchange, and provides opportunities for states, businesses, and communities to benefit enormously. Migration has helped improve people's lives in both origin and destination countries and has offered opportunities for millions of people worldwide to forge safe and meaningful lives abroad. Not all migration occurs in positive circumstances, however. We have in recent years seen an increase in migration and displacement occurring due to conflict, persecution, environmental degradation, and change, and a profound lack of human security and opportunity. While most international migration occurs legally, some of the greatest insecurities for migrants, and much of the public concern about immigration, is associated with irregular migration.¹¹²

Although we mentioned earlier that the causes of migration are not the focus of this paper, an analysis of this measure requires some notation on causes of migration even if briefly. Causes of migration refer to those structural or systematic conditions that act as ground for migration decision. These causes are generally grouped into root and proximate. According to Christina Boswell:

Root causes refer to the underlying structural or systemic conditions which provide the pre-conditions for migration or forced displacement. ...Such as economic underdevelopment, a weak state, severe social fragmentation, as well as migration systems shaping interactions between sending and receiving countries. Proximate causes refer to the immediate conditions that trigger movement, *such as* the escalation of violent conflict, individual persecution, and the collapse of local livelihoods or a new opportunity abroad.¹¹³

In other words, root causes of migration point to the lack of development in the migrants' country of origin as the basic constituting factor of migration. Root causes express that people migrate because of economic disfavours in

112 McAuliffe, M., & Ruhs, M. (2017). Report Overview: *Making Sense of Migration in an Increasingly Interconnected World*. Geneva: International Organisation for Migration, p. 1.

113 Boswell, C. (2002). New Issues in Refugee Research. *Working Paper* No. 73, pp. 4-5. Accessed 27 January 2020, from <https://www.unhcr.org/3e19ac624.pdf>.

their country of origin. It is the desire to satisfy one's basic needs and the scarcity of goods to achieve them that force migrant away from their country. At the other end, proximate causes of migration deal with the immediate conditions that spur migration. The effect of terrorism on an individual's decision to migrate is an example. Terrorist attack increases the likelihood of migration; people tend to migrate from less secured area to a more secured area. Other proximate causes include ethnic and/or religious violence, civil wars, political instability, repression, persecution, armed conflicts, natural disaster, etc.

Garrett Hardin's Lifeboat Ethics

Hardin's lifeboat ethics is one that primarily describes relationships from a perspective of self-interest. He drives home the need for prosperous nations to protect their prosperity from poor nations. Hardin argues that wealthy countries will be overburdened if they continually allow emigrants from poorer countries into their country. He advised destination countries to reject immigrants who seek succour in them so that they (destination countries) will not be overwhelmed and tipped to unsavoury situations. Hardin contends that in the process of helping the poor and incorporating them into the affluent society, the rich will be equalized in poverty with the poor. In other words, the whole idea of helping the poor is a futile exercise that will only lead to an unfavourable end. To drive home his point, Hardin uses the analogy of a spaceship and a lifeboat. He rejects the description of the world as a spaceship seeing it instead as a lifeboat. Daniel Callahan says he does this not only because he believes it to be more descriptive of the actual divided world of nation-states but also because it entails a more realistic ethics.¹¹⁴

Spaceship ethics and food bank ethics offered Hardin a target which was tailor-made to his method of argument against his principal opponents, Kenneth Boulding¹¹⁵ and Norman Borlaug.¹¹⁶ Boulding and Borlaug believe that Spaceship ethics is based on the idea that the earth is like a spaceship with all humanity as its crew and each crew working harmoniously for the common good. The idea, including the term itself, came to the limelight in

114 Callahan, D. (1974). Doing Well by Doing Good: Garrett Hardin's 'Lifeboat Ethic'. *The Hastings Center Report*, (4)6, p. 1.

115 Boulding, K., (1966). The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth. In H. Jarrett (Ed.), *Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy* (pp. 3–14). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

116 Borlaug, N. (1973). Civilization's Future: A Call for International Granaries. *Science and Public Affairs*, (29)8, pp. 7-15.

1897 with the work of Henry George, titled *Poverty and Progress: Why There Are Recessions and Poverty Amid Plenty – and What to Do About It!* (1972, the abridged copy is being used here, 2006). In this book, George explains socioeconomic inequality as resulting from the monopolization of land.¹¹⁷ This monopolization causes unequal ownership of land and distribution of wealth. He buttresses that the increase in material misery of the populace and the economic disparity that are their social realities are reflections of the privatization of land and all its natural resources and opportunities. As he puts it:

We sail through space as if on a well-provisioned ship. If food above deck seems to grow scarce, we simply open a hatch — and there is a new supply. And a very great command over others comes to those who, as the hatches are opened, are permitted to say: This is mine!¹¹⁸

It is this monopolization, this ‘mine,’ this self-ownership of land that disintegrates the society, bifurcates humans into classes of rich and poor, and cripples development.

Barbara Ward, in her books *Spaceship Earth* (1966) and *Only One Earth: the Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet* (1972), uses ‘spaceship earth’ as a metaphor appeal for a new balance of power between the ‘North’ rich nations and the ‘South’ poor nations. Ward explains that there is grave structural inequality confronting the global system,¹¹⁹ one in which there is a divide between the North (or rich) that has economic, technological, scientific, and ideological powers, and exercises control over the wealth of world, and the South (or poor) that is poor and economically dependent on the North for survival and sustenance.¹²⁰ She argues that such a structural inequality has had drastic consequences on the South and in turn helped to sustain economic dependence and poverty in that part of the world:

One is internal. The influence of the modern sector remained restricted. Capital did not accumulate since most of the earnings were dispatched overseas. But without credits the institutions needed to encourage and channel savings into investment did not appear, business did not spring up in competition with imported manufactures, and virtually no investment

117 George, H. (2006). *Poverty and Progress: Why There Are Recessions and Poverty Amid Plenty – and What to do About It!* New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, p. 155.

118 Ibid. p. 136.

119 Ward, B. (1966). *Spaceship Earth*. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 54.

120 Ibid., pp. 54-74.

occurred in traditional static food farming, whether it was communal or feudal. The second consequence of the derivative quality of “southern” economics is an external consequence. The international trade upon which all their pretensions to modernity depend has long been largely beyond their control and directed primarily in other people’s interests.¹²¹

Both the failure of the South to develop its indigenous system of production and local manufacturing system, on the one hand, and the unequal international trade system in which it takes the role of consumerism, on the other, drives it deeper into a vicious cycle of poverty. To fully achieve egalitarianism and equity, spaceship ethics sees distribution of resources to be necessary. The earth and its resources, according to this perspective, is a natural, moral, and inalienable right of all human beings. Rights ‘is a kind of justification (social) moral claim that designates a sphere of freedom, a circumstances or environment in which one is authorized to act in a certain way.’¹²² Spaceship ethics sees individuals as relational beings with socially recognizable rights which are morally justifiable.

Hardin rejects this spaceship description on the ground that environmentalists use the spaceship metaphor to ‘persuade countries, industries and people to stop wasting and polluting our natural resources.’¹²³ They assume that since we all shared the planet ‘no single person or institution has the right to destroy, waste or use more than a fair share of its resources.’¹²⁴ But Hardin questions if everyone has an equal right to an equal share of its resources? Beyond environmentalists, he believes this metaphor can be dangerous when used to form policies on immigration and foreign aid. Hardin, in his earlier article, referred to this idea as the ‘tragedy of the commons,’¹²⁵ in which the common ownership of the world resources results in exploitation and disaster. The greatest weakness of spaceship ethics is that it fails to match rights in the commons with corresponding duties. The exegesis of Hardin’s work, we might say, somehow revolves around a rebuttal of these assumptions. The deadly consequence of such an assumption is the extinction of the human race. According to Hardin:

121 Ibid., pp. 78-79.

122 Machan, T. (2006). *Libertarianism Defended*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, p. 13.

123 Hardin, G., 1974. Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor. *Psychology Today*. Accessed 23 Feb. 2020, from https://www.garretthardinsociety.org/articles/art_lifeboat_ethics_case_against_helping_poor.html.

124 Ibid.

125 Hardin, G. (1968). Tragedy of the Commons. *Science*, (62), pp. 1243-1248.

A true spaceship would have to be under the control of a captain, since no ship could possibly survive if its course were determined by committee. Spaceship Earth certainly has no captain; the United Nations is merely a toothless tiger, with little power to enforce any policy upon its bickering members.¹²⁶

To this end, a lifeboat with limited spaces and without a captain is a better description. He compares the earth to a lifeboat that has the capacity of containing 60 passengers with 50 passengers from the affluent countries on board and with extra space for another 10 passengers as a safety factor. Swimming around this lifeboat are people from the poor nations. Hardin argues that if the rich start letting people into their boat, whose minimum capacity is already near full, the boat will become overcrowded and sink, resulting in everyone, rich and poor, drowning. Even if the rich did pull some poor swimmers into their lifeboat, he says, 'the lifeboat would be quickly overpopulated and sink in the near future, thus costing more lives than would be lost in the present and a loss of the safety factor.'¹²⁷

Hardin concludes that we should 'admit no more survival to the boat and preserve the small safety factor' then the 'survival of the people in the lifeboat is then possible...' Hardin considers this to be a difficult task since some people will be moved by Marxian or Christian injunctions to admit more people to the boat on the basis of generosity. To such people, he advised: 'Get out and yield your place to others.'¹²⁸ Such a selfless service will vindicate the conscience of the moral agent from guilt feeling but has no effect on lifeboat ethics. Hardin uses the lifeboat scenario to discuss two pressing issues in international relations, foreign aid and immigration, and concludes that affluent societies have no moral obligation to aid the poor or allow immigrants passage to their cities.

On the aspect of food aid, Hardin totally disagrees with Borlaug on food bank ethics. His (Borlaug's) proposal that there should be an emergency food supply in times of famine was seen by Hardin as a form interrupting the natural order. Hardin strongly believes that wars, famine, hunger, are nature's way of controlling and stabilising population growth, and interruption of such a mechanism through food banks will lead to 'population escalation'

126 Ibid.

127 Hardin, G. (1974). Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor. *Psychology Today*, September, 1974, Accessed 27 March 2018, from https://www.garrethhardinsociety.org/articles/art_lifeboat_ethics_case_against_helping_poor.html.

128 Ibid.

where there will be an increase in population growth until the earth crumbles. Besides this interference, food banks will encourage irresponsibility and laziness from the recipient countries.

It is on this same note that Hardin rejects immigration. The world now operates, he notes, in such a way that food is no longer taken to the poor but the poor are taken to the food in form of global immigration. On this issue, Hardin was much concerned about the overpopulation immigration will cause to the hosting countries if not controlled. The people inside the lifeboats of the wealthy nations are doubling in numbers every 87 years; those outside are doubling every 35 years, on the average. And the relative difference in prosperity is becoming greater.¹²⁹

What such a prediction entails, according to Hardin, is that affluent countries will suffer more than the third world countries with high population rate. The consequence of this is the quickening of environmental degradation in the affluent countries. Although he sets some exceptions: the affluent countries allowing political refugees with a corresponding domestic population policy that will regulate reproduction activity.¹³⁰ However, the call for 'one-world' through spaceship ethics exercises charity using the wealth of future generations. For Hardin, 'every life saved this year in a poor country diminishes the quality of life for subsequent generations.'¹³¹ So in order to create a favourable environment for future generations, we must, says Hardin, reject the tragedy of the commons either in the form of aid or immigration: 'For the foreseeable future survival demands that we govern our actions by the ethics of a lifeboat. Posterity will be ill served if we do not.'¹³²

In essence, Hardin avers that the obligatory care for the poor is concomitant with robbing the rich to pay the poor. Arguing in the light of Hardin's position, Ralph Edward describes the implication of obligatory help for the poor thus: 'paying people for being poor resulted in more poor people, not in fewer.'¹³³ Citing Charles Murray's 1984 survey entitled, *Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980*, Edward writes that 'as the welfare subsidies increased, the labor force participation rates of the demographic groups that where the largest recipients of welfare subsidies declined substantially. Many poor

129 See Harding 1974 for full analysis of this view.

130 Ibid.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid.

133 Edward, R. (2012). Is there a 'Libertarian' Justification of the Welfare State? A Critique of James P. Sterba. *Libertarian Paper*, (4)2, p.117.

people either partially or totally withdrew from the labor force, attracted by the opportunity to have income without work.¹³⁴ The poor appropriating the surplus of the rich will not only make the rich extinct but will bring down the whole social system. This is because the poor not only fail to add to social total goods and services, but the poor also depend completely on the production of the rich. And this kind of dependence decreases ipso facto the quantity and the output of the rich; until finally, when the rich die out, the poor will quickly follow suit.

Cosmopolitanism and Hardin's Lifeboat Ethics

Undoubtedly lifeboat ethics is a discriminatory proposition. It seeks to segregate affluent nations from poor ones and restrict access or aid to them. These views open vistas of avenues for critique. For one, immigrants cannot be generally accused of overburdening their host nations because directly or indirectly they contribute to the system. Neither can aid, in times of need, be seen as aiding the poor in their poverty. A cosmopolitan approach sheds more light on a sense of common responsibility, but our cosmopolitan critique will proceed with an understanding of the concept.

The theory of cosmopolitanism is concerned with the 'belief that all people are entitled to equal respect and consideration no matter what their citizenship status or affiliations happens to be.'¹³⁵ According to Kleingeld, cosmopolitanism is the view that 'all human beings share certain essential features that unite or should unite them in a global order that transcends national borders and warrants their designation as citizens of the world.'¹³⁶ Scholars attest to the historical development of the idea of cosmopolitanism long before the idea of nation-states that gave birth to nationalism. Fine opined that it started with the ancient Greeks and has since played a pivotal part within social and political thought. 'Its basic presupposition is that the human species can be understood only if it is treated as a single subject, within which all forms of difference are recognised and respected but conceptualised as internal to the substantive unity of all human beings.'¹³⁷ Cosmopolitanism thus reflects the 'revolt of the individual against the social world, for to be a citizen of the

134 Ibid. p. 118.

135 Brock, G. (2015). Cosmopolitanism. *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Accessed on 27 December 2019, from <https://www.britannica.com/topic/cosmopolitanism-philosophy>.

136 Kleingeld, P. (1999). Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, (60), pp. 505.

137 Fine, R. (2007). *Cosmopolitanism*. London and New York: Routledge, p. ix-x.

world was to reject the immediately given and closed world of particularistic attachments.¹³⁸ According to Held, cosmopolitanism connotes:

The ethical and political space which sets out the terms of reference for the recognition of people's equal moral worth, their active agency and what is required for their autonomy and development. It builds on principles that all could reasonably assent to in defending basic ideas which emphasize equal dignity, equal respect, the priority of vital needs.¹³⁹

Cosmopolitanism is generally grouped under three types namely, cultural, political, and moral. Cultural cosmopolitanism is a view about the conditions under which 'individuals can generate an identity and live a good life. It emphasizes that cultures are constantly changing and that individuals can benefit from mixing elements from different cultural traditions.'¹⁴⁰ Cultural cosmopolitanism envisions human beings are not 'strictly products of culture irrevocably cast into a given cultural mold from birth but as agents free to roam the earth and assemble (or reassemble) for themselves a unique cultural concoction by choice or by chance.'¹⁴¹ It believes in the ability of persons to have that human capability to 'converse and connect across cultures' such capabilities, according to Etinson, include those for 'language, thought, communication, etc. – that facilitates such cultural transaction.' He equally submits that culture itself must be something that can be 'exchanged, altered, translated, or combined in idiosyncratic configurations if we are to believe in the lifestyle of the cosmopolite.'¹⁴²

Political cosmopolitanism (based on Kant's theory) has traditionally been associated with the ideal of a world state encompassing all persons. Another approach to political cosmopolitanism is David Held's model of cosmopolitan democracy. This model envisages not a single world government (as seen in Kant's model) but a range of reforms of international political and economic institutions in the name of democratic accountability, consent, and inclusiveness.¹⁴³ Held's approach is distinctive in its appeal to democracy as

138 Delanty, G. (2006). The Cosmopolitan imagination: Critical Cosmopolitanism and Social Theory. *The British Journal of Sociology*, (57)1, pp. 26.

139 Held, D. (2010). *Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 49.

140 Jones, C. (2006). Cosmopolitanism. In Donald Borchert (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (2), Detroit: Thomson Gale, pp. 569-570.

141 Etinson A. (2011). Cosmopolitanism: Cultural, Moral and Political. In Diogo P. Aufllio, Gabriele De Angelis, & Regina Queiroz (Eds.), *Sovereign Justice: Global Justice in a World of Nations* (pp. 27). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co.

142 Ibid. p. 27.

143 Jones, op. cit., p. 569.

the core value of global political legitimacy. Reasoning in the light of political cosmopolitanism shows that the universal polis envisioned by early Stoic thinkers was not like any ordinary state. This polis, according to Etinson, was a 'cosmic polity (i.e., *kosmopolites*) that did not depend for its existence on human institutional structures or on any means of selfdefence. Its boundaries were set by the sun and its laws were perfect expressions of the divine norms of reason.'¹⁴⁴

Moral cosmopolitanism is the view that 'all human beings are members of a single moral community and that they have moral obligations to all other human beings regardless of their nationality, language, religion, customs, etc.'¹⁴⁵ Moral cosmopolitanism affirms the equal worth of every human individual, quite apart from any subgroup to which they might belong, along with a commitment to impartial concern.¹⁴⁶ It is a 'moral frame of reference for specifying rules and principles that can be universally shared and, concomitantly, it rejects as unjust all those practices, rules, and institutions anchored to principles not all could adopt.'¹⁴⁷ But beyond these typologies, there are three elements identified by Thomas Pogge to be shared by all cosmopolitan positions:

First, individualism: the ultimate units of moral concern are human beings, or persons – rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or citizens. Second, universality: the status of ultimate unit of moral concern attaches to every living human being equally – not merely to some subset, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, generality: this special status has global force. Persons are ultimate units of moral concern for everyone – not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or suchlike.¹⁴⁸

Having stated the kernel of cosmopolitanism, let us now consider lifeboat ethics through its prism, starting with the three central elements as noted by Pogge, namely, individualism, universality, and generality. What is of moral concern in individualism are the individuals, not the nation or state they come from which in the lifeboat ethics are identified as rich or poor nations. Lifeboat ethics takes away that sense of individualism and puts labels

¹⁴⁴ Etinson, op. cit., p. 38.

¹⁴⁵ Kleingeld, op. cit., p. 507.

¹⁴⁶ Jones, op. cit., p. 568.

¹⁴⁷ Held, op. cit., p. 46.

¹⁴⁸ Pogge, T. (1992). Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty. *Ethics*, (103)1, pp. 48-49.

on nations. Fearing that the immigrants from poor nations will overwhelm the rich nations, Hardin writes 'suppose we decide to preserve our small safety factor and admit no more to the lifeboat. Our survival is then possible although we shall have to be constantly on guard against boarding parties.'¹⁴⁹ The concern here is the interest of rich nations and their survival, not the individuals who have sought refuge or sustenance. While having self-interest cannot be condemned, promoting such an interest at the expense of the survival of others for the fear (not certainty) that they will threaten your survival is not a fair decision.

Universality is the second element. Cosmos simply refers to the universe as a whole, which negates the subset of rich nations or poor nations. We are all members of this single universe hence the need to treat everyone as equal in the sense of being humans. When Hardin uses variables like reproductive differences between rich and poor nations (from his calculation of the growth rate of rich and poor nations) or when he describes the food bank project as a tragedy of the commons, he is not speaking of people on different sides of the universe as equal. For instance, he criticizes even the increase in population that he envisages will occur due to improved agricultural methods. Some scholars had argued that rather than give humanitarian food supply to those identified as poor nations, improved farming techniques should be taught to them. Hardin still disagrees with this view, noting increased population had negative effect on the environment. He contends that:

Every human born constitutes a draft on all aspects of the environment: food, air, water, forests, beaches, wildlife, scenery and solitude. Food can, perhaps, be significantly increased to meet a growing demand. But what about clean beaches, unspoiled forests, and solitude? If we satisfy a growing population's need for food, we necessarily decrease its per capita supply of the other resources needed by men.¹⁵⁰

Hardin's criticism of every thought of an increase in population refutes the idea of universality. Thomas Malthus had in a similar way bandied the fear of overpopulation, but contemporary evidence shows that as population increases science and other means of improving humanity increase thereby debunking his fears, or as MacRae puts it 'a fundamental criticism of Malthus was his failure to anticipate the agricultural revolution, which caused food production to meet or exceed population growth and made prosperity

¹⁴⁹ Hardin, *Lifeboat Ethics*, op. cit.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

possible for a larger number of people... Malthus also failed to anticipate the widespread use of contraceptives that brought about a decline in the fertility rate.¹⁵¹ Nurturing similar fears is like underestimating the ability of man to make the best of prevailing circumstances.

There is a global force in the third element of generality. This element holds that persons are ultimate units of moral concern for everyone – not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists. Individuals ought to be units of moral concern not whether they come from so-called rich nations or poor ones. Lifeboat ethics does not look beyond fellow compatriot nations who look down at other nations from the perspective of impoverishment. Beyond persons who are not documented and go through horrendous means to reach their destination, lifeboat ethics is generally against the immigration policies of rich nations with specific reference to the United States. He identified selfishness as the reason for encouraging immigration. According to him ‘the primary selfish interest in unimpeded immigration is the desire of employers for cheap labor, particularly in industries and trades that offer degrading work... The interests of the employers of cheap labor mesh well with the guilty silence of the country’s liberal intelligentsia.’¹⁵² This smacks of being against the theory of being cosmopolitan.

Hardin neglects the fact that the United States and its richness was a product of immigration. Daniel Griswold captures this when he says:

America is a nation of immigrants. That is not a cliché but a simple fact. Almost all Americans today either immigrated themselves or descended from immigrants, whether from England and Germany in the colonial era, Ireland, Eastern Europe, and Scandinavia in the 19th and early 20th centuries, or Latin America and Asia in more recent decades. Today one out of every four people residing in the United States is either first- or second-generation immigrants. Immigration has enriched the United States throughout its history, economically as well as culturally and socially.¹⁵³

Though he acquiesces that the US as it is today was usurped from the original Amerindians, he believes that is not a good reason to be open to further immigrants. He thus submits:

151 MacRae, D.G. (2019). Thomas Malthus. *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Accessed 25 February 2020, from <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Thomas-Malthus>.

152 Hardin, Lifeboat Ethics, op. cit.

153 Griswold, D. (2018). The Benefits of Immigration: Addressing Key Myths. Accessed 26 February 2020, from https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/griswold_-_policy_brief_-_

We are all the descendants of thieves, and the world's resources are inequitably distributed. But we must begin the journey to tomorrow from the point where we are today. We cannot remake the past. We cannot safely divide the wealth equitably among all peoples so long as people reproduce at different rates. To do so would guarantee that our grandchildren and everyone else's grandchildren would have only a ruined world to inhabit.¹⁵⁴

Such fear is not justifiable. It is at best based on conjectures that can be refuted and/or falsified with discoveries and developments yet unknown. The potentialities of human knowledge are ever evolving just as is our knowledge nature. Hardin was reasoning from a narrow perspective when he submitted that 'we must convince them (those calling for love of justice and equality) if we wish to save at least some parts of the world from environmental ruin.'¹⁵⁵ He had concluded that the so-called poor nations were going to end up in ruins, but it is evident that the China or India or Malaysia or Singapore he was referring to in 1974 is not the same as today despite their increase in population. These countries have improved technologically and in other ways that improve the lives of their citizens and others. Africa may not be there yet but the potentials are latent.

Hardin's criticisms of immigrants are unfounded because research has shown that the values of immigrants to rich countries (specifically the US) are inestimable. Tom Jawetz, the vice president for immigration policy at the Center for American Progress (a progressive think tank in the US), while testifying to Congress on the benefits of immigration, states that 'in every state and in communities all across the country, immigrants and their children are helping to build a more dynamic economy and ensure a shared prosperity for all.'¹⁵⁶ A few facts should be noted here:

1. Immigrants not only contribute to the expansion of labour supply but they also bring new skills and ideas, which could potentially foster creativity and promote economic growth.¹⁵⁷

myths_of_immigration_-_v1.pdf.

154 Hardin, *Lifeboat Ethics*, Op. cit.

155 Ibid.

156 Jawetz, T. (2019). Building a More Dynamic Economy: The Benefits of Immigration. Accessed on 26 February 2020, from <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2019/06/26/471497/building-dynamic-economy-benefits-immigration/>

157 Chletsos, M., & Roupakias, S. (2019). Immigration and the Economic Performance of Countries. Accessed on 26 February 2020, from https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/94994/1/MPRA_paper_94994.pdf.

- 2 Immigration can deliver favourable effects and make natives better off by contributing to the expansion of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) through its impact on innovation and entrepreneurship. Productivity gains can also emerge from higher diversity among immigrants. Immigrants can help development through the trade creation channel as well, increasing exports to their countries of origin.¹⁵⁸
3. Evidence suggests that international migration can boost aggregate income (GDP growth) in high-income host countries over the long term. One of the channels for growth is by expanding the labour force and higher wages as international migration can boost capital accumulation for migrants and natives. Another channel is that migrants increase the employment-to-population ratio in host countries, which is particularly important for countries with aging populations. Furthermore, migrants boost capital accumulation and employment through higher foreign investments, international trade, and entrepreneurship. Finally, international migrants have a positive effect on aggregate income in high-income countries as they foster labour productivity, and boost innovation and complementarities with native workers by increasing diversity in productive skills, leading to economic growth.¹⁵⁹
4. Nearly 44 per cent of the companies on the 2018 Fortune 500 list were founded by immigrants or the children of immigrants. Together, these companies in fiscal year 2017 brought in \$5.5 trillion in revenue – a figure that is greater than the gross domestic product (GDP) of every country in the world other than the United States and China.¹⁶⁰
5. Small businesses make up nearly 70 per cent of all employer firms in the country, and they help to create jobs and power local economies. It is therefore significant that immigrants own more than 1 in 5 small businesses and are more than 20 per cent more likely to own such a business than a native-born person. Beyond the direct economic benefits of these businesses and the jobs they create, it's important to talk about what it means to a community to have a thriving Main Street. Immigrants own more than 60 per cent of all gas stations, 58 percent of all dry cleaners, 53 percent of all grocery stores, 45 percent of all nail salons, and 38 per

158 Ibid.

159 Quak, E. (2019). *The Effects Economic Integration of Migrants have on the Economy of Host Countries. K4D Helpdesk Report*. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, p. 2.

160 *New American Economy*, (2018). *New American Fortune 500 in 2018: The Entrepreneurial Legacy of Immigrants and Their Children*, October 10, 2018. Accessed on 26 February 2020, from <https://research.newamericaneconomy.org/report/new-american-fortune-500-in-2018-the-entrepreneurial-legacy-of-immigrants-and-their-children/>.

cent of all restaurants. These are the businesses that represent the life and vitality of local communities.¹⁶¹

- 6 Immigrants are not only helping to build a more dynamic economy right now, but we are counting on them to help ensure our continued shared prosperity in the years ahead. Most immigrants come to the United States during their prime working and reproductive years.¹⁶²
- 7 Immigrants generate new products, ideas, and innovation. Immigrants make up 17 per cent of the US workforce, while filing one-third of the patents and accounting for more than one-third of US workers with a PhD in one of the STEM subjects of science, technology, engineering, and maths. One study found more than half of the high-skilled technology workers and entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley were foreign born.¹⁶³
- 8 Although the image of a refugee that we're often presented with – and that is equally true of asylum seekers now requesting protection at our southwest border – is that of a person who comes with little more than the clothes on their back; this fails to capture the drive and perseverance that it takes to leave your home country and everything you've ever known in order to find safety someplace else and start again. Despite the obstacles, that drive helps to explain why refugees thrive in America.¹⁶⁴
- 9 The Intercultural cities approach publicly advocates respect for diversity and a pluralistic city identity. In an Intercultural city, most citizens regard diversity as an asset accepting that all cultures change as they meet each other in the public space. The city actively combats prejudice and discrimination and ensures equal opportunities for all by adapting its governance structures, institutions, and services to the needs of a diverse population, without compromising the principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. In partnership with business, civil society and public service professionals, the Intercultural city develops a range of policies and actions to encourage greater mixing and interaction between diverse groups.¹⁶⁵

161 Jawetz, op. cit.

162 Singer, A. (2015). *Metropolitan Immigrant Gateways Revisited*, 2014. Washington: Brookings Institution. Accessed on 26 February 2020, from <https://www.brookings.edu/research/metropolitan-immigrant-gateways-revisited-2014>.

163 Griswold, op. cit.

164 Mathema, S. (2018). *Refugees Thrive in America: Trump Cuts the Number of New Arrivals Despite Advancements and Success Stories*. Washington: Center for American Progress. Accessed on 26 February 2020, from <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2018/11/19/461147/refugees-thrive-america/>.

165 Khovanova-Rubicondo, K., & Dino Pinelli, D. (2015). *Evidence of the Economic and Social Advantages of Intercultural Cities Approach*. Accessed on 26 February 2020, from <https://rm.coe.int/1680492f80>.

These facts from recent research work, and not the fear hypothesised by Hardin, are the effects of immigration policies and immigrants on the United States. The same can equally be said of other so-called rich nations. The last point in our list speaks to the benefit of intercultural relations. This emphasizes Jones' earlier view on the essence of cosmopolitanism that 'cultures are constantly changing and that individuals can benefit from mixing elements from different cultural traditions.'¹⁶⁶ Cosmopolitanism thus accentuates the moral worth of immigrants and immigration policies because it sees the values of humans simply as humans and whatever benefit they can bring to whichever environment they find themselves.

Conclusion

This paper has evaluated Hardin's lifeboat ethics through the cosmopolitanism prism and come to the conclusion that lifeboat ethics is a negation to the essence of humanity as advanced by the theory of cosmopolitanism. Hardin's lifeboat ethics is based on discriminatory, self-centered, scaremongering and parochial paradigm of possible effects of migration. We argue that the gains of migration are immeasurable especially to the host destination. Rich countries (as Hardin loves to identify them) are not and do not seem to be on the verge of disaster despite steady inflows of migrants. We have come to these conclusions having analysed the experiences of African migrants, the conceptions of lifeboat ethics and the elements of cosmopolitanism.

¹⁶⁶ Jones, *op. cit.* p. 570.

14 The Location of Cultures: Multiculturalism and Migration

Femi Abodunrin

Abstract

In this chapter we examine the patterns of figuration/signification in *Splinters of a Mirage Dawn: An Anthology of Migrant Poetry from South Africa* vis-à-vis the whole notion of globalisation/fragmentation, on the one hand, and migration/multiculturalism, on the other. This anthology, jointly edited by Amitabh Mitra and Naomi Nkealah captures the creative and poetic voices of migrants in South Africa, their perception of belonging, participating, understanding, and integrating within the contemporary African poetry movement. It concludes that the only thing that is permanent is change, and different aspects of change are described.

Introduction

The primary aim of this study is to examine patterns of figuration/signification in *Splinters of a Mirage Dawn: An Anthology of Migrant Poetry from South Africa* vis-à-vis the whole notion of globalisation/fragmentation, on the one hand and migration/multiculturalism, on the other. In a brilliant review of the volume, Ade-Odutola (2014), describes the anthology in the following way:

I can say without equivocation that the twenty poets in this collection are what my friend calls “feet voters”. To vote with one’s feet, he tells me, is to relocate when the conditions of existence at home is in total or partial dislocation.

According to Ade-Odutola, these poets have left their places of birth for cities, towns, and countries where they are just immigrants or irritants depending on which part of their present location is in contention. Consequently, this collection offers a broad range of experiences to the extent that each poem is like a house within the mansion of our fathers: ‘fathers from different cultures

and climes and linked by the post-colonial umbilical cord and tortured by this new global economic disorder and system' (Ade-Odutola, 2014).

From Different Cultures and Climes

Adebola Fawole's 'Times and Places' and Raphael d'Abdon's 'Sunnyside Nightwalk' and 'Migrant Blues' epitomise the 'third space' of the postcolonial and cultural theorist, Homi Bhabha's reference where migrants initiate new signs of identity and appropriate a terrain for elaborating strategies of selfhood – singular and communal (Bhabha, 1994). At the communal level, the persona in D'Abdon's 'Sunnyside Nightwalk' shares this space of contestation and collaboration with a brother from Burundi:

a rusty lamp throws a weary towel over the street corner
i sit on a bench and share some words with alain,
my brother from burundi
he's a street vendor
he's got two public phones
sells candies
matches
chips
and even *single rizlas*
in case of emergency (*Splinters*, p. 23).

Originally from Italy and described as 'an Italian scholar, writer, editor and translator' (*Splinters*, 86), D'Abdon is now resident in Pretoria and shares this 'third space' or what could be described as a potpourri of postmodern and postcolonial angst with the Burundian, Alain. Pretoria residents will give you a graphic account of the tremendous changes that Pretoria's Sunnyside has undergone from what one commentator described as 'those fun days' in 1999 to the 'crime hot spot' it has become today. The following website records the transformations in a graphically historicist manner:

I fell in love with Pretoria in 1999. I attended a friend's wedding in Johannesburg but stayed at a friend's apartment in the Sentoza block of flats in Pretoria, Sunnyside. I was single (moved from a relationship that didn't work), childless and in my mid-20s. The following year I left the Eastern Cape for Pretoria on a 6 months contract job. Yes, that's how much I loved Pretoria; I was prepared to take such a risk. (Sunnyside, Pretoria, South Africa, by Mbini, <http://www.pretoria-south-africa.com/sunnyside-pretoria-south-africa.html>).

But by 13 June 2014, an anonymous contributor, described Pretoria's Sunnyside in the following manner:

Sunny side has become a crime hot spot please be aware of steve biko and other streets the (sic) are criminals on the street and in the restaurants (sic) if you have to live any place late ask for a cab there are prostitutes everywhere that plot with criminals it's rare to meet a decent ladie (sic) I prefer going out to Hatfield because people here are on a verge to rob you off money or extort you in any way possible it's not as normal as it looks and chance are you will be robbed (Anonymous, <http://www.pretoria-south-africa.com/sunnyside-pretoria-south-africa.html>).

This later description of Sunnyside epitomises the new multicultural Sunnyside and the life the persona in d'Abdon's poem shares with his brother Alain from Burundi. While Alain is 'trying to make a living and raise his two kids' between 'the cops' raids/and the xenoidiotic threats of some local afrophobiacs, the migrant's ordeal is laid bare as he struggles daily with occupants of the first and second spaces or those described as 'xenoidiotics' and 'afrophobiacs', respectively. Like Alain, the persona in d'Abdon's poem is an iconoclastic but faithful recorder of the plight of fellow 'feet-voters' such as 'the three skinny cats' or malnourished migrants who jumped out from a deserted building and looked at the persona with 'disdainful indifference':

it must be my long beard and my tattered shirt
or maybe
they've more urgent things to think about
like finding a way to catch that bloody bird (a female migrant?)
they've skipped too many meals this week
ribs don't lie
and the night cutting wind reminisce
of how fragile they are (*Splinters*, p. 23).

It is to these ones that Alain provides invaluable services such as 'single rizlas/in case of emergency'. And as we are informed *inter alia*, Alain's night trade is punctuated by cop's raids and 'the xenoidiotic threats of some local afrophobiacs'. According to the persona:

apart from this
alain's doing fine
his babies are sleeping now
they're dreaming of tomorrow's crèche
where they'll be playing all day
with the policemen's kids (*Splinters*, p. 23, emphasis added).

The last two lines reiterate an irresistible paradox of the emerging multicultural society where the children of the same cops that hunt the likes of Alain at night play simultaneously with his children at the same crèche in the daytime. As the persona marches on, his 'nightwalk' at Sunnyside takes him through the new multicultural landscape, finding solace and liberation in the seemingly invisible 'third space' of Bhabha's (1994) articulation.

Finally, D'Abdon's "Sunnyside Nightwalk" is reminiscent of Alex La Guma's apartheid novel, *A Walk in the Night* and its brutal depiction of the inhumanity of years of racial segregation and protest writing. Like La Guma's hero, Michael Adonis, the persona wanders through a night of violence and debauchery in which:

Drunk screams from the flats across the road
From under a leafless tree the glittering shadow of a knife
Blinking in the shrieking winter fog
'business as usual' smiles the flashy Nedbank billboard
Over the razor wired fence (*Splinters*, p. 24).

In La Guma's novel, the omniscient third-person narrator inaugurates a similar 'harshly detailed world of nightmare existence.' It is the story of Michael Adonis, a disturbed young man, and his accomplices. Consumed by anger and the rage which a claustrophobic ghetto existence in apartheid's deracinating milieu entails: 'Michael Adonis jumps down from a truck into the chaos of traffic occasioned by workers returning home at the end of the day. He nurses a growing anger, having been fired from his job at a sheet-metal factory for swearing at a white foreman who accused him of being lazy when he requested permission to go to the bathroom.' <http://www.enotes.com/topics/walk-night>

Perhaps what is different in this post-apartheid, multicultural world of migrants is the emergence of what the persona in D'Abdon's poem has described as '...the xenoidiotic threats of some local afrophobiacs' interspersed with the cops' raids to whom he says:

(king shaka would be ashamed of these modern age fighters
and don quixote would pity them) (*Splinters*, p. 23).

The persona appears to be saying that, besides their lack of a common humanity or *Ubuntu*, what the xenoidiotics and afrophobiacs¹⁶⁷ also lack is a common hero in neither the precolonial world of King Shaka nor one that the precursor of postmodernist 'intertextuality, realism, metatheatre, and literary representation'¹⁶⁸ Don Quixote perhaps represents. Ostensibly, 'Sunnyside Nightwalk' ends with:

the umpteenth sickening sound of police sirens
rips the moistened sky in two
it stiffens the mallow along my squeaking spine
while needles
sting the midpoint
of my frozen anus

it reminds me that it's time to go home
and I agree (even if I don't have one).
i walk around the corner
find a seat at sipho's tavern
pull it up my overcoat
pull down my beret
and order another beer

it's the penultimate one
for today (*Splinters*, p. 24).

If the homeless persona and his portrayal of the migrant's ordeal in 'Sunnyside Nightwalk' is a graphic recorder of multicultural Pretoria, D'Abdon's 'Migrant Blues' is more philosophical in its thrust and understanding of the plight of the migrant:

167 'Xenoidiotics' is D'Abdon's coinage and certainly refers to the xenophobic attacks in which South Africa has been caught up in recent times and 'afrophobiacs' probably refers to those in the New South Africa who do not believe in a Pan-African consciousness. From the mundane to the philosophical, xenophobia in South Africa today is taking several dimensions. Leading writer and painter Breyten Breytenbach articulates the philosophical premise of the contemporary malaise, while journalist and media commentator Fred Khumalo supplies the cultural and political arguments. For detail, see Breytenbach (2014) and Khumalo (2014), respectively.

168 For detail, see Angelique, Chrisafis (21 July 2003). Don Quixote is the world's best book says the world's top authors, *The Guardian* (London). Retrieved 13 October 2012.

crossing a land grooved
by the presence of dauntless signs

sighs of solitude hovering
Over the aching night

there are answers hidden
In these moonlit memories

at the centre of the margins
a quiet view
of places left
and paths imagined (*Splinters*, p.25).

Besides the 'dauntless signs', the migrant's existence in the third space where new signs of identity are initiated achieves philosophical equivocation and perhaps resignation where s/he seeks solace 'at the centre of the margins'. However, the '...quiet view/of places left/and paths imagined' is equally illustrated in Fawole's 'Times and Places' where the triple notions of 'Crossing borders and the threshold of womanhood to bring forth (*Splinters*, p.17)' become not just the migrant's blues but perhaps, more importantly, his/her challenge and potential liberation. Before entering the centre of the margins, the persona in Fawole's 'Times and Places' recollects a time when:

My mother said "Don't look me in the eye! A well brought-up girl never does."
My mother said, "You must learn to cook and clean! It is your right."
My mother said, "You must get married and have children! They complete you."

My mother said, "The printed page is a must! You can't succeed without it"
My mother said, "You must greet people around you! You will always need them."

These values I carried with me on my journey (*Splinters*, p. 17).

Upon crossing the threshold, however, the values are not just challenged; they are deconstructed along cultural, political, and economic terrains that bring home the stark realities of the migrant's new multicultural milieu:

I am told only liars can't look you in the eye!
Women are no longer cleaners!
Men are unnecessary essentials and having children is a choice!
Listening to the book is the way to succeed!

You are all sufficient in yourself. Greeting demeans you!
And my children; crossbreeds of divergent times and places
Are caught in the interplay
I can only point to the course I charted in the middle of the two (*Splinters*,
p. 17).

Hybridity has since been established as an enacting notion in postcolonial studies and the persona's children described as 'crossbreeds of divergent times and places' epitomise this hybridity vis-à-vis the whole notion of catalysis and creolisation.¹⁶⁹ The disruptive nature of the migrant's experience and the trans-colonial discourse it animates is equally graphically illustrated in Rodwell Makombe's haiku-like 'Why are You Here?' and 'Crossing the Limpopo' – a euphemism for the porous borders between South Africa and neighbouring Zimbabwe. The purely descriptive haiku spits out the unequal relationship between the migrant and his/her new master in categorical terms:

Please Sir, I can't go back to that country
Look at the boils on my back
If you send me back there, they will finish me off (*Splinters*, p. 20).

'Crossing the Limpopo' elaborates and indeed dramatizes the political, cultural, and economic imperatives that drive the migrant on, urging him/her to go forward:

The heat
the burning heat in the sky
the blisters under my feet
the tight knot in my belly
the fatigue, the anger, the fear...
i feel the excruciating pain in my joints
i can only go ahead, *a man can only go forward* (*Splinters*, p. 19, emphasis added)

169 In postcolonial terms, 'hybridity' can be described as 'new transcultural forms that arise from cross-cultural exchange. Hybridity can be social, political, linguistic, religious, etc. It is not necessarily a peaceful mixture, for it can be contentious and disruptive in its experience. Note the two related definitions – *catalysis*: the (specifically New World) experience of several ethnic groups interacting and mixing with each other often in a contentious environment that gives way to new forms of identity and experience; *creolization*: societies that arise from a mixture of ethnic and racial mixing to form a new material, psychological, and spiritual self-definition. Retrieved 24 April 2014, from <http://www3.dbu.edu/mitchell/postcold.htm>.

Thus, since going back is not an option worth considering, the migrant presses on as s/he ‘...think(s) of home where I can’t return.’ The ‘mirage dawn’ of the anthology of migrant poetry is also captured in the persona’s dream of ‘the milk and honey ahead’ because this is the South Africa of his/her dream:

...bread costs only five rand
five thousand rand a fortnight
ah! if the white man likes your hand...
i look at the splendour of my new life
i could build myself a big house
i could raise money for bride price (*Splinters*, p. 19).

As the persona revels in this dream of future grandeur, the power over life and death that crossing the Limpopo entails is compared to the power of some of the gods in ‘that country’ to which the persona would not like to be sent back:

The Limpopo is like Chief Justice Garwe¹⁷⁰
Life and death are in the palm of her hand
By the banks of this goddess
We speak in hushed voices
We tiptoe, we avoid hustling with our feet
“Limpopo! Limpopo! Tell me my fortunes” (*Splinters*, p. 19).

However, Limpopo’s talismanic qualities and allure, like the ‘fuming and frothing’ River Limpopo, are fraught with real and potential danger for the fleeing migrant and just as:

the night is pitch black
the river is fuming and frothing
crocodiles!
a flooded river harbours no crocodiles, so they say
i brave the waves, i swim like hippopotamus
crossing the Limpopo,
South Africa here I come (*Splinters*, p. 19).

The gateway that the River Limpopo has since become to fleeing Zimbabwean migrants is well known, and Makombe’s mythic depiction of the migrant’s

170 Here at last is the only hint or revelation that ‘that country’ is indeed the politically and economically embattled Zimbabwe where it was announced recently that: ‘Harare – Judge

plight soon gives way to Tendai R Mwanaka's equally graphic portrayal in 'Journey to South Africa' (p. 31), 'Refuges' (p. 32) and 'Voices of Exile' (p. 33), respectively. Again, the Limpopo River '...now a mixture of silt, blood, bone and scars' (p. 32), plays a vital mediatory role in what the persona has described in 'Journey to South Africa' as the 'raven's baggage', which the migrants have become. In the multiple voice of the raven, symbolised by the migrant's 'fevered breath or our own wounded feeling', the nightmares begin:

Out of "there is no cholera in Zimbabwe"
Out of the dead men from cholera
Out of the dead women from HIV Aids
Out of the dead children from hunger
Out of the dead young adults from political killings
Out of little children become war soldiers
Out of the vengeance of Mugabe's CIO
Out of the beast ZANUPF, police and army
Out of a country now locked in political gridlocks (*Splinters*, p. 31)

While animating the trans-colonial situation between Zimbabwe and South Africa, the range of atrocities coming out of the Zimbabwean conflict in which every migrant is circumscribed also straddles the global context or what Jameson (1998, p. 8) has described as 'the old universalism that so often underwrote an imperial knowledge/power system'. Thus, the atrocities continue:

Out of the lunatic moans of Mugabe against Britain
Out of the lunatic bile of Mugabe against the west
Out of the forthcoming breakdown due to this defiance
Out of cry songs that now stain the whole region
Out of the stench of South Africa's silent diplomacy
Out of the stench of SADC and Africa's denial
Out of a conspiring humanity
Out of this chaos
Is a journey that leads across the Limpopo river. (*Splinters*, p. 31)

President Paddington Garwe has been promoted to the Supreme Court and was sworn in yesterday by President Mugabe while Justice Rita Makarau takes over as head of the High Court. Justice Garwe becomes the seventh judge on the Supreme Court bench'. Retrieved 4 June 2014, from <http://allafrica.com/stories/200607070516.html>.

From the so-called Lancaster House agreement¹⁷¹ and the ‘imperial knowledge/power system,’ it reiterates vis-à-vis ‘...the lunatic moans of Mugabe against Britain,’ reduced to ‘footfalls walking through the dense forest,’ it is the migrant who now negotiates the resultant chaos ‘that leads cross the Limpopo River.’ In ‘Refugees’ and ‘Voices of Exile,’ the Limpopo River remains a dominant mediating symbol in Mwanaka’s account of the plight of the migrant:

The raven’s voice falls silent in the darkened leaves
The trees are the only ones who pray for themselves
For the moon always passes on top of them
And in the dark nights we wait for the moon
To tell us to venture into the hungry crocodiles in Limpopo
And I can see their red tongue stretching out
To lick the slime of our yoke and blood. (*Splinters*, pp. 31-32)

Like their ‘...silenced dreams on the other side’ of the trans-colonial divide, as ‘Refugees,’ the migrants’ plight is even more precarious. Emerging ‘out of road bridges, tents and shack-towns’ the migrant becomes dehumanised daily as s/he moves from one undesirable state to another:

Out of refugee camps and dirty bins
Out of ghost towns
Our ghosts burn inside us with guilt...
Out of police trucks ferrying us back to Zimbabwe. (*Splinters*, p. 32)

Against the backdrop of a ‘conspiring humanity’ or global community, like the xenoidiotics and afrophobiatics of Raphael d’Abdon’s reference above, the lack of a common humanity or Ubuntu¹⁷² now ‘breeds unfettered patriotism of citizens against foreigners.’ Harassed and exploited simultaneously, the

171 ‘The negotiations which led to the Lancaster House Agreement brought recognised independence to Rhodesia following Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. The Agreement (signed in December 1979) covered the Independence Constitution, pre-independence arrangements, and a ceasefire. The parties represented during the conference were: the British Government, the Patriotic Front led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union) and ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), and the Zimbabwe Rhodesia government, represented by Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Ian Smith. It was signed on 21 December 1979’. For detail, see Matthew, P. (2004). *Ending Civil War: Rhodesia and Lebanon in Perspective* (page 25). London: Tauris.

172 ‘Ubuntu... is a Nguni Bantu term roughly translating to “human kindness.” It is an idea from the Southern African region which means literally “human-ness”, and is often translated as “humanity towards others”, but is often used in a more philosophical sense to mean “the belief

migrant's double yoke, like 'the slime of our yoke and blood' is epitomised by the policeman pointing his gun at a migrant while:

His partner is picking on me
Curious animals sniffing for a bribe...
They want to crack our skulls
They want to burn us alive...

Our weakness is an affront to them
Always being quantified, measured
And tagged *Makwerekwere*, *Makwerekwere*
Maybe next time they would grind us into flour
Packaged and distribute us
More efficient, more cost-effective. (*Splinters*, pp. 32-33)

However, an examination of the migrant's ordeal is incomplete without a critical understanding of the new multicultural South Africa which they animate. Amitabh Mitra's 'At Hillbrow' (*Splinters*, p. 53) and Naomi Nkealah's 'My Nigerian Flatmate' (*Splinter*, 76), among other poems in the anthology, epitomise the rancorous nature of this multicultural South Africa. Coincidentally, the duo of Mitra and Nkealah are the editors of the volume and have written separate editorials that reflect the dynamic nature of this multiculturalism. Like his poetic contribution, while Mitra focuses on the trauma of what he calls the 'migrant experience in a global fraternity', Nkealah describes the poetic experience as 'an effective medium of communicating human emotions' (*Splinters*, p. 11). That global fraternity in a new South African sense is focused on in Mitra's poem entitled 'At Hillbrow'. Like its counterpart, Sunnyside Pretoria, Johannesburg's Hillbrow¹⁷³ is another multicultural melting-pot – and here

in a universal bond of sharing that connects all humanity". About the Name. *Official Ubuntu Documentation*. Canonical. Retrieved 5 January 2013.

173 According to Verashni Pillay, 'Hillbrow is striking from afar. Its tower and apartment blocks form Johannesburg's iconic jagged skyline as displayed on postcards and glimpsed from the cloistered northern suburbs. But up close, the tower is obscured by tightly packed apartment blocks, many dirt-streaked and dilapidated. The tower's pink advertising ball sits low and heavy on the horizon. This one-kilometre square piece of land, one of the densest in Africa, is the stuff of nightmare and legend. Hillbrow is where you get hijacked, raped, and murdered. It's where uncontrolled revellers drop fridges from high-rises on New Year's Eve and the middle class dare not tread' For detail, see <http://mg.co.za/article/2013-09-20-00-hillbrow-where-cops-do-the-work-for-drug-lords>.

At Hillbrow, a Zimbabwean girl curls in darkness
 before a growing night.
 She is one of three million Zimbabweans
 who have to flee to South Africa.
 Only her eyes glow in perpetual hunger,
 her neurons numbed by daily beatings
 From her Nigerian master. (*Splinters*, p. 53)

As we take stock of the different characters in Mitra's poem, it soon becomes apparent that the 'Makwerekwere' tag in Mwanaka's poem above cannot be applied willy-nilly to every migrant. The 'Nigerian master' who administers 'daily beatings' that numb the Zimbabwean girl's neuron obviously belongs to another class of migrants – a class that employs fellow migrants as servants that can be traumatised. Meanwhile, as the eyes of the Zimbabwean girl 'glow in perpetual hunger', to her counterparts on the other side of the political and economic divide: 'She is a tree now, other girls from Kwekwe¹⁷⁴/seem to see her in borderless sunsets/beckoning them to come' (p. 53). Thus, while part one of the poem takes us through the Zimbabwean girl's odyssey, in the second part a panoramic overview of Hillbrow is portrayed in its global, multicultural propensity:

Hillbrow at Johannesburg
 faces darkness with such ferocity;
 lights clamour over each other's shoulder
 holding a fallen sun, for
 here there can never be any nights.
 Forever evenings scream in shrill rejoinder,
 a clay complexioned Ethiopian girl with a long neck
 revises proximity from a cabaret number.
 Men from Abuja listen with shaking heads,
 some even recite silently. (*Splinters*, p. 53)

In Nkealah's 'My Nigerian Flatmate', on the other hand, the persona presents a light-hearted banter of what Gerald Gaylard (2006, p. 55) has described in a postmodern sense, as the 'incommensurability of the individual':

174 'Kwekwe town was founded in 1898 as a *gold mining* town, and hosts Zimbabwe's *National Mining Museum*. The town remains an industrial centre of the country. The name stems from the Zulu word "isikwekwe", which means "scurvy", "mange" or "scab". Popular belief states that Kwekwe is named after the croaking noise made by the nearby river's frogs. For detail, see Clements, F., (1963). *This Is Our Land: Stories and Legends of the Two Rhodesias* (p. 43). Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia..

My Nigerian flatmate
Is a woman of many smiles
When she runs up my electricity bill,
She smiles
When I scold her for leaving the lights on,
She smiles
When I tell her to turn the TV off,
She smiles
And all the time I'm getting pissed off! (p. 76)

The next section examines the undeniable interface between this postmodern incommensurability and its postcolonial counterpart in practical and theoretical terms, and draws telling conclusions for the migrant experience in the new South Africa.

Conclusion

That the migrant experience is at once ideological and discursive is the focus of Mitra's 'At Hillbrow', Femi Abodunrin's 'Whatever I Hang', and Geoffrey Haresnape's 'We are All Migrants', among other poems in this anthology. In Haresnape's poem, for example, what is described in Mitra's 'At Hillbrow' as part and parcel of the new Hillbrow as a place where there can never be any nights – 'Illumination is not just a street here/and curtains part revealing revelry/of age old explanation' (p. 53) is given the currency of a common humanity in which 'We are all migrants':

from the womb's water-world into the ways of the air
from silence into annals of speech
from the first plasmic division into the burliness of some billions of cells.
(*Splinters*, p. 84)

Like 'the age old explanation' of Mitra's poem, this is Haresnape's annunciation of a journey that awaits all migrants – just as 'We change the houses of our skins ever so often.' Thus, the only thing that is permanent, in this sense, is change, and the poem describes different aspects of change:

the mother's son travels into a youth
his delicate skin is planted with pimples
his eyes shout *no* to control
the young man sets out for middle age
his luggage packed in his belly
there is a descent into the province of the veteran
where the limbs require a cautious stick
and a hand shades the eyes that scan a stranger. (*Splinters*, p. 84, original italics)

From this manner of change, yet other changes occur, and the persona appears to be saying that not every migrant will partake in this next level of change:

A few cross the border of gender
ducking under the barbed-wire of prejudice
they accept the duality written in their genitals
and live as transgressive transients
Hey! Brother! Hey! Sister! Be cool.
I am just me...just here...for this moment.
Do not claim me...Do not castigate me, either. (*Splinters*, p. 84, original italics)

This is neither a plea for acceptance nor rejection, it is another evolutionary process and like the changes we make to the homes of our skins:

Language means moving the domain of the tongue
a journey of curling its softness around a new utterance;
the simple word 'mother' has so many variants
it is like travelling in dark Africa
or even darker Europe
with nowhere an indigenous moment. (*Splinters*, p. 84, original italics)

As a white English-speaking South African, perhaps Haresnape's defensive standpoint in this poem is rather obvious. It reiterates the whole notion of a White liberal consciousness. In a similar vein, CL Innes (1984, p. 422), argues that JanMohamed (1983) brings to the fore particular aspects such as isolation and strangeness common to all three European White writers examined by JanMohamed – Joyce Cary, Karen Blixen, and Nadine Gordimer – vis-à-vis what Innes describes as 'the dilemma of the white liberal consciousness'. However, besides universalising the whole notion of migration, this abolition of borders and every essentialism reduces all to a common humanity as:

World out there, regard us, the habitually errant
 we got here without asking
 change is our daily diet
 we eat out of rucksacks
 and on the hoof
 before our final migration
 into someone or other's memory. (p. 84)

Other poems in the anthology such as Victoria Pereira's epic 'The tale of a privileged "white" [From Mozambique to South Africa]' (pp. 57-62), and Lukas Mkuti's 'Wupatki's Ruins' (pp. 79-80) and its echoes of the West-Indian Derek Walcott's celebrated 'Ruins of a Great House' reiterate this abolition of borders.

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This volume takes stock of the scourge of human trafficking as experienced by Nigerians in the period 1960–2020. “Everyone should be free. And yet, through force, fraud, and coercion, human traffickers violate this most basic right.” According to the US TIP Report of 2022, the Nigerian government fails to meet the minimum standards required to eliminate trafficking but is making significant efforts in this regard. This book documents the issue in a sixty-year period, highlights the overlap between child trafficking and child fostering, presents Nigeria’s legal framework and institutional intervention mechanisms, showcases national and international organisations’ willingness to minimise the menace, and reveals contexts in which people unwittingly and unwillingly become victims of trafficking. It thus identifies hitherto overlooked areas of trafficking in Nigeria, the position of religion, livelihoods, and local conflicts on this crisis, and examines the literary connotations.



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Akinyinka Akinyoade and Francesco Carchedi (together with Marina Galati and Rosa Impalà) recently (2021) edited a book on related theme titled *DOPPIO SGUARDO. La tratta delle donne nigeriane per sfruttamento sessuale attraverso i dati dei servizi sociali dedicati della Regione Calabria*.