

## Paul Natorp's reformulation of the Kantian distinction between intuition and concept

Pelegrin, L.A.

## Citation

Pelegrin, L. A. (2023, July 6). *Paul Natorp's reformulation of the Kantian distinction between intuition and concept*. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3629812

Version:	Publisher's Version
License:	Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden
Downloaded from:	https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3629812

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

## Proposition

1. The general problem of knowledge cannot be reduced, as Kant claimed, to the question of on what foundation the relationship of the representation with the object rests.

2. The general problem of knowledge is how thinking creates objectivity.

3. Thinking creates both universality and singularity by setting laws.

4. Only idealism gives an account of how thinking can be the source of objectivity.

5. The understanding of a philosophical concept demands an analysis of its genesis in history.

6. All science in the strict sense depends on mathematics.

7. Philosophy is the history of philosophy.

8. The philosophical issues remain the same throughout history.

9. The task of the philosopher is to struggle against the unscientific conception of the world.