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Paul Natorp's reformulation of the Kantian distinction between intuition and concept

Pelegrin, L.A.

Citation

Pelegrin, L. A. (2023, July 6). *Paul Natorp's reformulation of the Kantian distinction between intuition and concept*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3629812>

Version: Publisher's Version

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Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Chapter 1. The Kantian Distinction between Intuitions and Concepts.

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to study the way in which Kant understands the distinction between intuitions and concepts. We will show the relation between the Kantian conception and how it was understood by the tradition. We will highlight some of the central problems of the Kantian proposal. This aspect will be taken up in chapter four. We will exhibit that the problems faced by Kant depend on the peculiar way in which he defined these notions.

In the first place, we will study some of the central problems of the Kantian proposal. We will show that Kant starts with a series of unclear definitions. The distinction between intuition and concepts is introduced as if it were completely evident. The distinction between intuition and concepts is merely assumed without any grounding. We will show the complexity of determining the specific features of intuitions and concepts. Then, we will exhibit that the Kantian definition of intuition leads to the problem of affection. Second, we will briefly study the history of the definition of intuitions and concepts. We will show that this distinction was first drawn by Duns Scotus and then continued by modern rationalism. We will study the relation between the Kantian proposal and the tradition. We will exhibit how Kant built his own definition of these notions in dialogue with the tradition. Third, we will show that Kant's reference to intuition arises from the requirement of a complete determination of objects. We will analyze the problem of incongruent counterparts. We will explain how this problem leads Kant to formulate the distinction between intuitions and concepts. The argument is used to prove the insufficiency of conceptual determination for a complete determination of objects. As concepts are insufficient, it is necessary another sort of determination, i.e., intuitive determination. Finally, we will study Kant's letter to Herz of February 22, 1772. It will become clear that Kant's reference to affection arises as a peculiar way of understanding the limits of human knowledge. We will argue that the reference of intuition to affection is a consequence of the imperfection of our knowledge.

1.1. Introduction to the Distinction between Intuitions and Concepts

In Transcendental Aesthetics, Kant introduces one of the central distinctions of critical idealism. Intuitions are singular and immediate representations, and concepts are general and mediated representations. Intuitions have their origin in sensibility while concepts are products of the understanding. Kant explains:

Auf welche Art und durch welche Mittel sich auch immer eine Erkenntniß auf Gegenstände beziehen mag, so ist doch diejenige, wodurch sie sich auf dieselbe unmittelbar bezieht, und worauf alles Denken als Mittel abzweckt, die Anschauung. Diese findet aber nur statt, sofern uns der Gegenstand gegeben wird; dieses aber ist wiederum uns Menschen wenigstens nur dadurch möglich, daß er das Gemüth auf gewisse Weise afficire. Die Fähigkeit (Receptivität), Vorstellungen durch die Art, wie wir von Gegenständen afficirt werden, zu bekommen, heißt Sinnlichkeit. Vermittelst der Sinnlichkeit also werden uns Gegenstände gegeben, und sie allein liefert uns Anschauungen; durch den Verstand aber werden sie gedacht, und von ihm entspringen Begriffe. Alles Denken aber muß sich, es sei geradezu (*directe*), oder im Umschweife (*indirecte*), vermittelst gewisser Merkmale zuletzt auf Anschauungen, mithin bei uns auf Sinnlichkeit beziehen, weil uns auf andere Weise kein Gegenstand gegeben werden kann.

This dichotomy between intuition and concept works as a foundation upon which is built not only the Aesthetics but all the Kantian critical system. There is a general agreement that the peculiar critical conception of the distinction between intuitions and concepts is “the pillar of Kant’s theoretical philosophy.”¹⁵ However, unfortunately, there is a second general agreement among the Kantian studies. Scholars agree that in the first passages of the Aesthetics, Kant is providing a series of definitions¹⁶. Commentators consider that

¹⁵ Cf. Falkenstein, L., 1991, p. 165. Also: Brandt, Reinhard, 1998, p. 81. Smit, Houston; 2000, p. 235. Smyth, D., 2014, p. 1.

¹⁶ We use the concept of definition in a broad sense and not in technical sense. Kant does not give a definition of the concepts of space and time, but he makes an exposition because, as Luciana Martínez explains: “los conceptos de la metafísica no pueden ser definidos en el sentido matemático de la definición, y ii) la elucidación de tales conceptos no puede darse, como en matemática, al inicio de la investigación”. Cf. Martínez, L., 2019, p. 683. See: Kant, I., *KrV*, A727/B 755.

these Kantian statements at the beginning of the *Aesthetics* are not conclusions of any previous argument provided by Kant¹⁷. Kant introduces the distinction as if it were completely evident, and it did not require any further explanation¹⁸. For this reason, as Daniel Kolb notes, the distinction between intuitions and concepts has been considered one of the weakest points of the Kantian system¹⁹. Mario Caimi highlights: “it is generally assumed that Kant begins by setting forth some definitions, to immediately committing himself to the study of what is considered to be the central subject of the *Aesthetic*, namely space and time, in §2.”²⁰ Indeed, as Caimi claims, most of the studies of this section go in the same direction. Kemp Smith considers that “the *Aesthetics* opens with a series of definitions” that must be understood in relation to later results.”²¹ Hans Vaihinger stresses in the first volume of his *Commentar* this point too. In this first paragraph of the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, Kant provides definitions and basic assumptions of the system. For him, “this introductory paragraph gives a series of important definitions and fundamental assumptions.”²² Henry Paton supports this reading²³. Charles Parsons, in the same direction, remarks that this passage cannot be considered as a conclusion of any argument but, rather, it is an initial premise assumed in the system²⁴. The analysis of Reinhard Brandt shares this reading. For this scholar, the dichotomies of these passages are introduced by Kant without any support. Kant introduces the differentiation between intuitions and concepts as if it were completely evident, and it did not require any further clarification. The differentiation is introduced without any grounding²⁵. Likewise, Lorne Falkenstein affirms that Kant's critical

¹⁷ Daniel Smyth holds against this canonical interpretation: “Indeed, it can seem that the *Critique* and the *Prolegomena* begin by presupposing, stipulating or otherwise hypothesizing certain robust conceptions of judgement, intuition, conceptual representation, mathematical cognition, etc. and then proceed to demonstrate (with more or less success) the fruitfulness of these conceptions indirectly, by showing how they (alone?) serve to resolve various philosophical difficulties. In what follows, I will resist this impression and suggest that Kant does, in fact, provide the materials for an extended argument in favour of his nuanced conceptions of conceptual and intuitive representation over the course of the *Aesthetic* and *Analytic*.” Smyth, D., 2014, p. 1.

¹⁸ Cf. Brandt, R., 1998, p. 82.

¹⁹ “Given its centrality to the entire Kantian system, it is surprising that Kant nowhere undertakes a sustained, rigorous defense of the distinction.” Kolb, Daniel, 1992, p. 244.

²⁰ Caimi, M., 1996, p. 27.

²¹ According to him, “Kant is here defining his terms in light of his subsequent results. Kemp Smith, N., 1918, p. 79n.

²² Vaihinger, H.; 1892, p. 1.

²³ “At the beginning of the *Aesthetic*, Kant gives us a rather complicated explanation of the terms which he employs. There is a considerable element of ambiguity in what he says, and the full meaning of his terms can be grasped only from their use as the argument develops.” Paton, H. J., 19, p. 93.

²⁴ Parsons, C., 1992, p. 66.

²⁵ Brandt, R., 1998, pp. 81 ss.

philosophy begins with the postulate of these dichotomies: intuition-concept, sensibility-understanding. In this sense, he points out:

Kant's critical philosophy begins with the postulate that man has two distinct cognitive faculties, sensibility and intellect. Critical philosophy begins with this postulate in every sense of the word.²⁶

For this commentator, the reference of the intuition to the affection, which Kant alleges in this passage, exhibits that “empiricism is an assumption of Kant.”²⁷ In his *The Bounds of Sense*, Strawson follows this reading. He considers, taking the argument even further, that the distinctions presented, those with which the *Critique* opens, are a necessary assumption of any philosophical system dealing with the problem of knowledge²⁸. In the same way, Robert Pippin considers that in these first passages of *Aesthetics*, Kant offers a series of definitions. Specifically, regarding the distinction between intuition and concept, he says:

His first attempt to define these terms occurs at the beginning of *Transcendental Aesthetics*. In fact, he starts with a flurry of definitions.” (B33 = A19 ff.) (...)²⁹

Moreover, Kant not only assumes the definition of these concepts but the exhaustiveness of the distinction. The arguments of the *Aesthetic* require us to assume that all our representations are divided into intuitions and concepts. The distinction between intuitions and concepts is presented as an exhaustive one.³⁰ Precisely for this reason, in the arguments of *Transcendental Aesthetics*, it is enough to show that space and time are not concepts, to legitimately conclude that they are intuitions. This is particularly evident

²⁶ Falkenstein, L., 1995, p. 28 ss.

²⁷ Falkenstein, L., 1995., p. 367n. In this line, Andrew Stephenson argues “Kant repeatedly affirms his commitment to empirical realism.” Stephenson, A., 2015, p. 509.

²⁸ Strawson claims: “The duality of intuitions and concepts is not in fact but a form or aspect of a duality that must be recognized in any philosophy that seriously deals with human knowledge, its objects or its expressions and communication.” Strawson, P. F; 1966, p. 23.

²⁹ Pippin, R., 1982, p. 32.

³⁰ As Lorne Falkenstein explains: “Either a representation is a discursive or universal concept, or it must have been originally given in intuition.” Falkenstein, L., 1995, p. 218. Also: Chenet, X., 1994, p. 76. Falkenstein’s statements have a critical tone here. He considers this premise as “highly controversial and completely unexplicated and undefended.” Falkenstein, L., 1995, p. 222.

in the third argument of the metaphysical exposition of space where Kant aims to demonstrate that space is a pure intuition. The argument is formulated in a negative way. It must be shown that space *is not* a discursive concept. It will be enough for Kant's argumentative purposes to show that space is not a concept so that the immediate conclusion that it is an intuition can be inferred. To demonstrate that the representations of space are not conceptual is to show in concomitance that they are intuitive.³¹

This exegetic tradition has, in effect, interpretative nuances. As we saw, some scholars consider that the Transcendental Aesthetic contains certain arguments to ground the distinction between intuitions and concepts that can be reconstructed within the Transcendental Aesthetic or in the light of later results to be found in the Transcendental Logic, while others just hold that there is not such an argument. However, for all of them, there is not really an argumentative structure in these first passages where Kant introduces the distinction. Therefore, the first problem that we are facing is that the core upon which the whole critical system is built seems to be resting on a series of unjustified assumptions.

The second problem is to determine the specificity of these two modes of representation. Kant establishes that immediacy and singularity are the differential marks of intuition. Intuition is an immediate and singular representation. On the contrary, concepts are universal and mediate representations. However, it is still not so clear what he meant by the claim that immediacy and singularity are the main marks of intuition while universality and mediation are those of concepts. For some scholars, immediacy is the feature of intuition that makes it different from the concept³². Lorne Falkenstein considers that when Kant claims that the singularity of the intuitive representation is the distinctive mark of intuition, he is using scholastic terminology which is not truly proper to the critical system³³. He thinks that there is an "old" use of the notion of intuition – which is present in the Dissertation of 1770 (as a singular representation) – and another use of the notion of intuition that is present in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where it is

³¹ Cf. Kant, I., AA 9: 91. Allison correctly marks: "this argument assumes the exhaustiveness of the concept-intuition distinction." François-Xavier Chenet also considers that: "The argument can only be understood in the light of partition of all our representations into intuitions and concepts and on the definition of one and the other." Previously, this had already been noticed by Kemp Smith. In his *Commentary*, he writes: "Kant's proof rests on the assumption that there are only two kinds of representation, intuitions and concepts and also in equal degree upon the further assumption that all concepts are of one and the same type." Allison, H., 2004, p. 104. Chenet, X., 1994, p. 76. Smith, K. 1918, p. 106.

³² Caimi, M., 1996, p.30, Falkenstein L., 1995, p. 28ss.

³³ Falkenstein, L., 1991, p. 165.

defined as a given immediate representation. Houston Smit also agrees on the centrality of the immediacy criterion. However, he considers that it has been traditionally misunderstood. Intuitions are also related to objects by means of their marks. The difference is that concepts relate to objects by general marks whilst intuitions relate to objects by singular marks. Intuition is an immediate representation because it relates to objects only through itself³⁴. In the opposite direction, Jaakko Hintikka argues that intuition is a representation of a particular. Intuitions can be defined as singular representations. He considers that the immediacy criterion is a reformulation of the feature of singularity. Concepts represent the object abstracting its general marks which mediate between the object and the concept. The concept is a mediated representation because it is an abstractive representation. On the contrary, as intuitions refer to singular representations, they do not need this mediation³⁵. Henry Paton had also stressed the importance of the singularity criterion³⁶. Against Hintikka, Charles Parsons argues that intuition cannot be defined merely as a singular representation. The intuition is directly present to the mind and concepts are not. While it is possible to admit the possibility of singular concepts, it is not possible to have an immediate conceptual representation. Thus, a representation is an intuition if it satisfies both requirements: singularity and immediacy, but the singularity criterion is broader than the immediacy criterion³⁷. Daniel Kolb shares this point of view. Intuitions cannot be distinguished from concepts just by the singularity criterion since there are concepts that also refer to singular objects, such as the concept of God³⁸. Manley Thompson argues that Hintikka and Parsons make the mistake of considering intuition in relation to its mathematical aspect and not in relation

³⁴ “What distinguishes sensible intuitions from concepts is that they are objective perceptions that relate to objects through singular, as against general, marks. It is neither a part, nor a logical consequence, of Kant’s notion of intuition that an intuition does not relate to its object through marks.” Houston Smit, 2000, esp. p.239. A mark, he claims, is not a mere determination of the thing but “a property through which we can cognize, not just any subject matter, but things.” Smit, H., 2000, p. 245.

³⁵ Jaakko Hintikka argues: “There is not the slightest doubt that the idea of immediacy (direct reference to objects) was associated by Kant with the notion of intuition. There is not much more doubt in my mind that it was not an independent aspect of the Kantian concept of intuition but simply a corollary of the individuality criterion.” (...) “A general term or its counterpart in the mind does not refer to its object immediately, but only through the mediation of a characteristic which several objects may share. These characteristics, so to speak, ‘intervene’ between concepts and their objects” Hintikka, J., 1972, pp. 341, 343.

³⁶ Paton, J., 1970, Vol I., pp. 97, 115.

³⁷ “But it evidently means that the object of an intuition is in some way directly present to the mind, as in perception, and that intuition is thus a source, ultimately the only source, of immediate knowledge of objects. Thus, the fact that mathematics is based on intuition implies that it is immediate knowledge and thus, even though synthetic a priori, does not require the elaborate justificatory argument which the Principles do (A 87 = B 120).” Parsons, C., 1992b, p. 44.

³⁸ He concludes: “the concept of a singular representation is, then, too broad to serve as a criterion for distinguishing intuitions from concepts, since both intuitions and concepts may be characterized as singular representations.” Kolb, D., 1986, p. 227.

to the integral aspect in which it is defined. While both concepts and intuitions can be defined as singular representations, the distinction should be read in relation to the role of empirical judgments, and therefore, it must be contemplated that Kant here has in mind not only pure intuition but also empirical intuition³⁹. Kirk Dallas Wilson argues that the two criteria, although they are extensionally identical, they are intentionally different. Against Hintikka's reading, he maintains that the trait of immediacy cannot be reduced to that of singularity. The immediacy of intuition is not a mere logical feature. Against Parsons, he argues that the singularity of intuition must be distinguished from the singularity of singular concepts⁴⁰. For others, what properly distinguishes the intuition from the concept is the relation of wholes and parts. In the concept, the parts precede the whole, while in the intuition the whole precedes the parts⁴¹. Thus, we observe how the tradition of Kantian scholars does not agree on what is the distinctive feature of intuition, whether singularity or immediacy⁴². Moreover, there is no agreement on how we should understand these notions. As we shall see, Kant took the notion of intuition as it was established by Duns Scotus. The criteria of singularity and immediacy should be understood in this light.

The third problem implied in the distinction between intuition and concepts is the relation of intuition to sensibility and, therefore, the relation of intuition to affection⁴³. The problem that the concept of affection implied for the Kantian system was already recognized by his contemporaries. Salomon Maimon, in one of his letters to Kant, argues that intuition cannot be related to anything but itself⁴⁴. Jakob Sigismund Beck also rejects the conception of intuition as an object-oriented representation. The object that affects the mind cannot be considered as something external to it. On the contrary, the object of intuition must be regarded as a product of the understanding. It could be claimed that the object affects the mind, just when we consider the objectivity-product from the sensibility

³⁹ Thompson, M., 1972, esp. p. 314.

⁴⁰ Wilson, K. D., 1975.

⁴¹ Pippin, R., 1982, p.65. Mario Caimi argues that this is a mistake of Pippin's reading. Caimi, M., 1996, p. 37 n.25.

⁴² James Conant exhibits that for some commentators there are two possible definitions of the concept of intuition. Cf. Conant, J., 2016, esp. 99ss.

⁴³ Hernán Pringe showed that the cognition of the individual object requires not only perception- and thus, affection, but also the homogeneity of sensible data and, therefore, regulative principles. Cf. Pringe, H., 2015.

⁴⁴ Maimon claimed: "An intuition, in my opinion, is not related to anything other than itself. It becomes a *representation* only by being united with other intuitions in a synthetic unity, and it is as an element of the synthesis that the intuition relates itself to that representation, that is, to its object." AA 12: 286.

point of view⁴⁵. Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk also argues in this direction. According to him, the only reasonable explanation of the problem of affection is that the mind affects itself⁴⁶. Fichte argues against Kant in this direction too. He claims that “a finite rational being has nothing beyond experience; it is this that comprises the entire staple of his thought”⁴⁷. In the framework of a genuine idealism, there is no place for anything like affection. The concept of objectivity only makes sense when it is referred to the ‘I think’. There is nothing like an object *in itself*. The object of experience is the object *in itself* when it is considered independently from the ‘I think’ pole. However, this is only a point of view. There is no affecting object because there are no objects independently of the experience. Hegel built his system as an attempt to overcome this dualism between what is given and what is thought. According to Hegel, Kant showed in the deduction of categories that the original synthetic unity of apperception is the principle of sensibility. The receptivity is nothing but a product of the unity of apperception. Both sensibility and intellect depend on the unity of apperception⁴⁸. As we will show, the conception of

⁴⁵ Beck writes to Kant: “Allow me to ask whether in what follows I have understood you correctly.... The *Critique* calls "intuition" a representation that relates immediately to an object. But in fact, a representation does not become objective until it is subsumed under the categories. Since intuition similarly acquires its objective character only by means of the application of categories to it, I am in favor of leaving out that definition of "intuition" that refers to it as a representation relating to objects. I find in intuition nothing more than a manifold accompanied by consciousness (or by the *unique "I think"*), and determined by consciousness, a manifold in which there is as such no relation to an object.” AA 12: 311.

⁴⁶ In his letter to Kant on November 5, 1797, Tieftrunk writes: “But whence comes the manifold of sensation, *the merely empirical* aspect of sensation? (...) Whence the material? Out of sensibility. But whence did sensibility obtain it? From the objects that affect it? But what are these objects that affect sensibility? Are they things in themselves or - ? (...) example, those in which the mind regards itself as spontaneous. If I ask further, What is it that affects the mind? I must answer, it affects itself since it is both receptivity and spontaneity.” AA 12: 214.

⁴⁷ „Das endliche Vernunftwesen hat nichts ausser der Erfahrung; diese ist es, die den ganzen Stoff seines Denkens enthält.“ Fichte, G., GA I, 425. In relation to Beck, Fichte and Maimon, Arnulf Zweig claims: “Although each of these philosophers found his own views to be either subtly or dramatically different from those of the others (Beck, for example, tried to convince Kant that he was radically opposed to Fichte), they agreed that Kant's theory of affection must be reconsidered or reformulated.” Zweig, A., 1999, p. 33. The overcoming of dualisms is an inherent element of German idealism as a whole. Lucas Amaral correctly highlights: “...a number of dualisms, deriving from the old Cartesian scheme, which the author of the *Critique of Pure Reason* had accepted largely in the context of his doctrine, would have been dissolved by idealism”. As González Porta affirms, the rejection of dualisms is an inherent element of German idealism as a whole. He explains: “La superación de los dualismos, la eliminación de la cosa en sí, la tarea de la totalidad y la concepción de la filosofía como “Sistema”, son elementos inherentes al idealismo alemán en su conjunto.” Amaral, L., 2015, p. 250. González Porta, M., A., 2005, p. 44. Marco Giovanelli, correctly concludes: “La fondamentale funzione sistematica che la distinzione tra concetto e intuizione riveste nella filosofia di Kant trova d'altra parte conferma nel fatto che la filosofia post-kantiana, dall'idealismo classico al neokantismo, fece proprio il programma di superare tale opposizione, nell'intento di dare unità a un pensiero che, a causa di essa, sembrava spezzarsi in una serie di dualismi insanabili.” Giovanelli, M., 2005, p.116.

⁴⁸ In *Glauben und Wissen*, Hegel holds: “the original synthetic unity of apperception is recognized also as the principle of the figurative synthesis, i.e., of the forms of intuition; space and time are themselves conceived as synthetic unities, and spontaneity, the absolute synthetic activity of the productive imagination, is conceived as the principle of the very sensibility which was previously characterized as

Natorp will follow this line⁴⁹. This difficulty remains one of the hardest issues for Kantian studies. Mario Caimi has called the fact of affection “an unexplained first moment”, a “zero moment” which “defies all explanations.”⁵⁰ According to Caimi, this reference to something outside experience could make the Kantian building stumble and fall⁵¹. Marcus Willaschek holds that “Kant gives no explicit argument” to explain the relation of intuition to sensibility. According to him, Kant takes this relationship for granted⁵². Some authors explained the role of affection by emphasizing the finite nature of human knowledge. Martin Heidegger, following Hegel, developed this interpretation.⁵³ Heidegger considers that the receptive character of human intuition is grounded on the finite essence of human beings. As we are finite beings, we cannot create the object of intuition, but it must be given in some way⁵⁴. Heidegger is followed – directly or indirectly- by many other contemporary scholars who also claim that the finitude of the human essence constitutes an explanation for the relation of intuition to affection⁵⁵. Alberto Rosales, criticizing Heidegger, deepens his reading. According to him, it must be taken into account that not only intuition is affected by finitude but thinking too. The

receptivity.” (...) “The Kantian forms of intuitions and the forms of thought cannot be kept apart at all as the particular, isolated faculties which they are usually presented as. One and the same synthetic unity- we have just determined what this means here- is the principle of intuition and of the intellect.” Hegel, G. W., 1986, p. 16ss. Hegel claims that the Kantian idealisms reduced knowledge to finite knowledge. Then, the Kantian conception is constrained within the boundaries of the finite cognitive subject. His theory is not truly a theory of knowledge but merely a theory based on the perspective of the finite thinking subject. Hegel, G.W., 1986, p. 10.

⁴⁹ We will develop this point in Chapter 3.

⁵⁰ “The whole development of the Transcendental Aesthetic may be said to originate at a sort of Big Bang, at a zero moment, a starting point beyond which it is not possible to reach. This point- that is, the affection-defies all explanation. It is recognized in the first paragraph of the Aesthetic, and thereafter no revert to it is made. The whole sequence of thoughts stems from this unexplained first moment onwards...” Caimi, M., 1996, p. 29.

⁵¹ Caimi, M., 1983, p. 109.

⁵² “The claim that human intuition is sensible is an integral part of Kant’s distinction between sensibility and the understanding, of which he briefly “reminds” us at the end of the Introduction to the first *Critique* (A 15, B 29) and from then on takes for granted without any argument.” Willaschek, M., 2015, p. 129.

⁵³ Cf. Heidegger, GA 3, esp. §5. GA 21, p.115ss., and §23. GA 25, esp. §§5 - 6. GA 41, §24d.

⁵⁴ “In the first place, we can say negatively: finite knowledge is noncreative intuition. What has to be presented immediately in its particularity must already have been “at hand” in advance. Finite intuition sees that it is dependent upon the intuitable as a being which exists in its own right. The intuited is derived from such beings; thus, this intuition is also called *intuitus derivativus*, “deduced” [*“abgeleitet”*], that is, intuition which conduces [*sich herleitende Anschauung*].^{33a} Finite intuition of the being cannot give the object from out of itself. It must allow the object to be given. Not every intuition as such, but rather only the finite, is intuition that “takes things in stride.” Hence, the character of the finitude of intuition is found in its receptivity. Finite intuition, however, cannot take something in stride unless that which is to be taken in stride announces itself. According to its essence, finite intuition must be solicited or affected by that which is intuitable in it.” Heidegger, GA3, p. 25.

⁵⁵ Stadler, A., 1897, esp. pp. 101, 103. Allison, H., 2004, esp. p. 14. Kolb, D.C., 1992, p. 215. Chenet, F., 1994, p. 43. Cazeaux, C., 1995, p. 348. p.43ss. Heidemann, D., 2019.

reference of sensibility to affection is just one of the expressions of the limitations of finite human cognition⁵⁶.

However, even when the problem of affection could be overcome, the problem of the relation between two heterogeneous faculties still remains. It must be shown how concepts relate to intuition and thus get content. The problem of endowing the concept of content is a result of the pure origin of a priori concepts because pure concepts, independently of their relation to intuition, are empty. In the Kantian conception, there can be concepts without any content. The problem of giving content to the concepts arises as a result of this novelty of the Kantian system: the possibility of empty concepts⁵⁷. As we shall exhibit, this will be one of the main points of discussion with Leibnizian rationalism which will lead Kant to reformulate the notion of intuition. For the Kantian conception, that a concept does not contain any contradiction does not guarantee that it has a possible content. It must be proved that the concept has a possible relation to the form of sensibility. To have a reference to objects, concepts must have a reference to intuition. To know something at all, concepts must have a relation to intuition⁵⁸. Concepts have their origin in the understanding and intuitions in sensibility. Then, it must be explained the relationship between these two heterogeneous faculties. It must be shown how these two different sources of knowledge, which are interdependent, cooperate so as to get cognitions⁵⁹. Moreover, the relation of concepts to existent objects requires the reference to sensibility. The problem is not only to explain the relationship between two heterogeneous faculties but also the relation of concepts to existent objects, and then it is necessary to explain not only the relation of concept to the pure form of sensibility but also the relation of thinking to sensibility, i.e., to given objects⁶⁰. Furthermore, singular objects must be subsumed under categories. Then, even if the task of the Transcendental Deduction is fully accomplished, it still subsists the problem of subsuming the particular object under the categories. This is explained by Kant in the so discussed chapter of

⁵⁶ Rosales A., 2000, esp. pp. 46, 58ss, 350ss.

⁵⁷ Cf. Caimi, M., 2005, esp. 142ss.

⁵⁸ As Mario Caimi explains: „Ein Begriff kann also leer sein, wenn er auch nach formallogischen Kriterien tadellos ist. Er kann nämlich auf diese neue Weise leer sein, indem er keine ihm entsprechende Anschauung aufweisen kann. Kants Leistung, seine Neuerung der leibniz- wolffschen Philosophie, tritt hier hervor. Sie besteht in der Anerkennung der Anschauung als notwendige Bedingung der Erkenntnis. Das bringt die Anerkennung der Unzulänglichkeit des Verstandes als alleinige Erkenntnisquelle mit sich.“ Caimi, M., 2005, p. 145.

⁵⁹ Cf. Caimi, M., 2007, p. 68ss.

⁶⁰ Cf. Caimi, M., 2007, p. 66ss.

schematism, where he introduces the third faculty of imagination⁶¹. All in all, regardless of the different conceptions of the respective task of each section of the *Critique*, the problem of reconciling these two different sources of the mind is acknowledged by every reader of the critical system.

That Kant does not give an accurate definition of these concepts can be explained by the fact that these notions were far understood by philosophers at that time. As we will see, the general problem of the relation of universals and particulars was already widespread as one of the philosophical central issues, and the notions of concepts and intuitions were commonly used. A brief sketch on the history of the distinction will reveal how Kant built his own definition of these notions in dialogue with the tradition. Furthermore, we will see that the peculiar way in which Kant defined the relation of intuition and concept is intimately related to a) his rupture with rationalism and b) a new conception of the limits of human knowledge. This brief sketch on the history of the distinction between intuitions and concepts will show, not so much how Kant solved the problems we have just presented but rather how they arose at first.

⁶¹ Cf. Moledo, F., 2011. Henry Allison believes that the function of schematism is to explain how the pure concepts of the understanding are expressed in sensible terms. Allison, H. E., 1992, p. 274. Paton tries to show that this chapter will indicate the universal and necessary characteristics of sensible objects without which the pure categories would not refer to any assignable object. Paton, H.J., 1965, p. 23. For Roberto Torretti, the schematism of concepts is the procedure by which pure categories organize time (that is: the universal form of sensibility) and thus apply to the empirical multiplicity given in that form. Torretti, R., 1980, p. 406. All in all, some interpreters have chosen to take schematism as a continuation of the deduction of the categories, others have considered the possibility of giving the deduction a new foundation, and others have considered it superfluous and unnecessary.

1.2. Brief Sketch on the History of the Distinction between Intuitions and Concepts

The distinction between intuition and concepts has a long history that can be traced back to the Aristotelian tradition⁶². The specific distinction among these notions appeared for the first time in medieval philosophy, and it has been shown that the Kantian use of the word *intuitus* (*Anschauung*) dates back to Middle Ages terminology⁶³. The medieval theory of intuitive cognition is mainly grounded in the philosophy of Duns Scotus and William Ockham⁶⁴. Even when the debates on the status of universals and particulars were widely developed⁶⁵, it was Scotus who introduced for the first time this specific distinction. Duns Scotus was the first who systematically developed a theory of intuition⁶⁶, and William Ockham inherited the distinction from him⁶⁷.

In his *Questions on the Metaphysic of Aristotle*, Scotus distinguishes a kind of cognition proper of senses from another type of cognition proper of the intellect:

Note that in the sense there is one cognition primarily proper, [viz.,] intuitive cognition; another sort of cognition is proper primarily and *per se* and that is knowledge through a species, but it is not intuitive (...) An example of the first: the visual sense sees color; an example of the second, the sense imagination or phantasy imagines color.

In the intellect, intuitive cognition or vision, which is primarily knowledge, is not possible in this life, because no potency reserving the species or the formal principle of knowledge in the absence of the object, could know in this fashion. For such a potency has the same

⁶² Cf. Falkenstein, L., 1995, p. 29.

⁶³ Norbert Hinske explains that the German word *Anschauung* was rather infrequent in early modern philosophers. Kant uses for the first time the noun *Anschauung* around 1762, and he uses it just eight times in the pre-critical writings. According to Giorgio Tonelli, the Scholastic is one of the main sources of the Kantian new terminology, mainly from 1770 on. Lorne Falkenstein maintains that “the meaning of the term *Anschauung* is to be determined by looking at traditional uses of Latin term *intuitus*, not the German *ascouen*.” Falkenstein considers that Kant’s definition of the term ‘intuition’ is, in fact, in accord with the scholastic distinction. Hinske, N., 1983, p.VI ss. Tonelli, G., 1964, p. 233. Falkenstein, L. 1995, p. 18.

⁶⁴ John Boler holds: “Especially notable among those landmarks are the theories of intuitive cognition in Duns Scotus and William Ockham. Nearly all the medieval discussions of intuition that follow them are an attack on or defence of one or the other.” Boler, John F., 1982, p. 460.

⁶⁵ Katherine Tachau holds in this regard: “the history of medieval theories of knowledge from ca. 1310 can be traced as a development of this dichotomy.” Quoted in Pasnau, R., 2002, p. 296.

⁶⁶ Cf. Boler, John F., 1982, p. 463. Day, S., 1947., p. xiii. Pasnau, R., 2002, p. 297. For Robert Pasnau, “this would prove to be, by far, Scotus’s most influential contribution to the theory of cognition.” According to Camille Bérubé, Scotus was the first to use the term intuition to make reference to the cognition of individual material objects. Bérubé, C., 1964, p. 179. Pasnau, R., 2002, p. 297

⁶⁷ Cf. Scott, Kermit; 1969, p. 431. Gilson, E., 1952, p. 426.

principle [of knowing] whether the thing is present or not present, and that knowledge [i.e., intuitive] is only of a thing present under the aspect of its being present.⁶⁸

The concept of intuition was opposite to the notion of abstractive concepts. The abstractive knowing was the process of the intellect to know things by means of their common features. It is a discursive process. The formation of concepts takes place through this process of abstraction. The conception of the object by concepts disregards the problem of its existence⁶⁹. On the contrary, intuitive cognition gives the object in its singularity, i.e., “in its proper nature.”⁷⁰ Intuitive cognition involves a relation to what exists right here, right now. We apprehend something as existing by intuition. While by the process of abstraction we can get the concept, the intuition gets in touch with what is real. Intuitive cognition is “an intuition of something as existing and present in its own existence.”⁷¹ For Scotus, the impossibility of grasping the object in its individuality was an expression of the imperfection of the human mind. We, human beings, do not have an intuition of the object in its singularity. We do not grasp the object *in individuo* by the process of thinking but just by sensation. Scotus holds:

... the intellect does not know the object as here-and-now because it grasps it in its absolute quidditative form, whereas the senses cannot know the object in this fashion because the power of each is limited to knowing it under the aspect of existing...⁷²

Intuition “must include in itself real and actual relation to the object itself” as:

⁶⁸ Scotus, D., 1997, p. 193.

⁶⁹As Gilson explains : «Il est en effet remarquable que, pour définir la connaissance abstractive (*cognitio abstractiva*), Duns Scot la présente comme faisant abstraction de toute existence actuelle: *cognitio objecti secundum quod abstrahit ab omni existentia actuali*. Prenons cette formule au pied de la lettre : être «abstraite», pour une connaissance, c'est ne pas inclure l'existence de son objet. Inversement, la connaissance intuitive est celle qui saisit l'objet en tant qu'existant et que présent dans une existence actuelle...» Gilson, E., 1952, p. 425.

⁷⁰ “The first is that of intuitive cognition which is of a thing present, and not just through a species, nor only under a knowable aspect, but in its proper nature.” Scotus, D., 1997, p. 197.

⁷¹ *Quad.* 6:19. Scotus, D., 1975, p. 137. Etienne Gilson remarks: «L'intuition seule saisit le réel comme existant.» Gilson, E., 1952, p. 109. As Bérubé explains: «L'intuition nécessairement comporte une relation réelle et actuelle à son objet.» Bérubé, C., 1964, p. 181.

⁷² *Quad.* 13:32, Scotus, D., 1975, p. 292.

... there can be no knowledge of this sort unless the knower has to the object an actual relationship that is such that the relata actually exist and are really distinct, and given the nature of the relata the relationship arises necessarily.⁷³

Moreover, what we apprehend in sensation is just the existence. The existence does not belong to the concept of the thing. The thing can be fully determined without existing. To exist is not a property of the thing. However, to know something about the thing, we need a process of abstraction⁷⁴. The abstraction allows the intellect to get the common marks of the thing. For this reason, the sciences deal only with abstractive concepts and not with intuitions of the objects, as sciences do not attend to the existence of the things in their particularity. The existence does not concern the reality of the concept. The concept is built by abstraction, the existence is apprehended by intuition. Within this theory, the concept is always, *per definitionem*, an abstractive concept. The intuition is immediate and of what is singular and gives the existence of the thing. Thus, the problem of the distinction between abstractive and intuitive cognition came along with the issue of the possibility (or impossibility) of the human intellect of grasping the object in its individuality, and the problem of the existence of particular objects. The problem is that if our mind knows things only through concepts – which are *per definitionem* abstractive – how does it know singular things? Gilson puts the problem as follows: « l'intellect ne connaît, *pro statu isto*, que les quiddités abstraites du sensible ; enfin, que les êtres sensibles connus de nous sont des existants singuliers: il est donc inévitable de se demander si et comment l'intellect humain, *pro statu isto*, connaît le singulier.»⁷⁵

Kant inherited this problem from the medieval tradition through the glass of modern thinkers. The Kantian distinction between intuitions and concepts is constructed

⁷³ *Quod.* 13:33, Scotus, D., 1975, p. 292

⁷⁴ "... in the case intuitive knowledge, it is the thing in its own existence that is the per se motive factor objectively, whereas in the case of abstractive knowledge what moves the intellect per se is something in which the thing has "knowable being", whether this be an effect such as the [intelligible] species or likeness that contained the thing of which it is the likeness representationally" *Quod.* 13:33, Scotus, D., 1975, p. 292. Gilson explains : « Seulement, c'est dans la sensation que notre intellect atteint le singulier, et puisque le sens même ne le perçoit pas dans sa différence individuante, mais comme « nature » il ne révèle à l'intellect, du singulier existant, que son existence. Percevant la « nature » indifférente de cet être, le sens permet à l'intellect de connaître abstractivement la nature de ce singulier, et intuitivement son existence. » (...) « Puisqu'elle ne va pas au-delà de la nature indéterminée, la connaissance qu'en prend l'intellect est nécessairement abstraite. » Gilson., E., 1952, p. 546.

⁷⁵ Gilson, E., 1952, p. 543.

mainly with and in opposition to the modern use of the terminology⁷⁶. To establish the distinction between intuition and concepts, Kant had to contend mainly with the Cartesian⁷⁷ and Leibnizian⁷⁸ tradition. According to Descartes, intuition is one of the sources of knowledge. Descartes claimed that intuition is an immediate and direct apprehension of simple ideas. Intuition is the faculty of the mind capable of direct and immediate cognition. In the *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, Descartes defines intuition as follows:

By 'intuition' I understand, neither the fluctuating testimony of the senses nor the deceptive judgment of an imagination which composes things badly, but rather the conceptual act of the pure and attentive mind, a conceptual act so easy and so distinct that no doubt whatsoever can remain about what we are understanding. Alternatively, it amounts to the same thing to say by intuition I understand the conceptual act of the pure attentive mind, which conceptual act springs from the light of reason alone. Because this act is simpler, it is more certain than deduction, which, however, as we have noted above, a human being also cannot perform wrongly⁷⁹.

Intuition does not require any process in order to acquire knowledge. The mind has access to objects directly and immediately by means of intuition. There is no process involved. The mind grasps all at once its object. Intuition is the product of the understanding by means of which the mind is able to form doubtless ideas⁸⁰.

⁷⁶According to Giorgio Tonelli, Kant started introducing new terminology in 1769, mainly, due to his reading on Locke and Leibniz. Particularly, he holds, that the concept of *Anschauung* was rather infrequent in the eighteenth century „Anschauung" (intuitio) wird im 18. Jahrhundert sehr wenig gebraucht. Zwar spricht man gelegentlich von der intellektuellen Anschauung Gottes, aber im Bereich der Psychologia Empirica ist von intuitio sehr selten die Rede. Allein bei Resewitz erhält dieser Terminus einen gewissen Nachdruck. Bei Locke und Leibniz ist er dagegen sehr geläufig als „intuition". Tonelli, G., 1964, p. 233.

⁷⁷ It has been shown that Kant read, at least, the following Cartesian works: *Geometry*, *Metaphysical Meditations*, and the *Principles of Philosophy*. Cf. Gatto, A., 2017, p. 141.

⁷⁸ Anja Jauernig noted that “with the exception of God, Leibniz is the most mentioned individual in the Kantian corpus overall.” Jauernig, A., 2008, p. 41. Manuel Sánchez Rodríguez makes a brief and accurate analysis of how the notion of intuition was appropriated by Wolff and Baumgarten. Cf. Sánchez Rodríguez, M., 2013.

⁷⁹ Descartes, R., *Regulae* III, AT X p. 368.

⁸⁰ According to the canonical reading, the simple ideas apprehended by intuition are purely intellectual. Cf. Lewis Beck, 1969, p. 192. Caimi, M., 2009, p. VIII. Against this reading, Frederick van de Pitte holds that intuition does not exclude sensory awareness. He holds that the object of intuition is not necessarily purely intellectual. van de Pitte, F., 1988, p. 457.

The intuition grasps what is singular, i.e., what cannot be divided into simpler parts. Intuition provides the simplest elements upon which the intellect operates, making relations among them. Thus, intuitions are the first step in the path of knowledge as the process of knowledge begins with these simple ideas. Having analyzed the idea up to the point when no further distinction can be made, the method prescribes to unite those simple elements into one. We must pass from a simple idea to another simple idea to form a new unity. That is the task of synthesis. The synthesis comes after the analysis, and it operates on the basis of what the intuition provided. The process is secure as long as it retains these simplest elements grasped in the first step.

Starting at the simplest elements, intuition provides clear and distinct knowledge⁸¹. An idea is distinct when it is completely separated from any other, and it is clear when it manifests directly to the spirit. The criterion of clarity ensures that we have a direct and immediate access to the idea. The idea is directly presented to our minds. An idea is distinct when it is completely separated from any other idea. The intuition can be clear even when it is not distinct, but a distinct idea is always clear as we have the possibility to separate every element in the idea just when it is patent to our understanding. Descartes gives the example of the sensation of pain⁸². We have a present and immediate access to the sensation of pain without truly distinguishing it properly. In this case, the sensation is confused. The idea is present but is not precise. There is no intuitive access to the representation.

The distinct and clear ideas grasped by intuition are necessarily true. Thus, when we apprehend intuitively, there is no possibility of error⁸³. When we apprehend by means

⁸¹ “I call that clear which is present and manifest to the mind giving attention to it, just as we are said clearly to see objects when, being present to the eye looking on, they stimulate it with sufficient force. and it is disposed to regard them; but the distinct is that which is so precise and different from all other objects as to comprehend in itself only what is clear.” Descartes, R., *Principia* I, XLV, AT VIII p. 22.

⁸² “It is shown, from the example of pain, that a perception may be clear without being distinct, but that it cannot be distinct unless it is clear.” Descartes, R., *Principia* I, XLVI, AT VIII p. 22.

⁸³In the *Discourse*, Descartes concludes: “I concluded that I could take it to be a general rule that things we conceive of very clearly and distinctly are all true...” Descartes, R., AT VI, p. 33. In the same line, he held in the *Meditations*: “For in this first act of knowledge [*cognitione*] there is nothing other than a clear and distinct perception of what I affirm to be the case; and this certainly would be insufficient to make me certain of the truth of the matter, if it could ever come to pass that something I perceived so clearly and distinctly was false. And therefore, I seem already to be able to lay down, as a general rule, that everything I very clearly and distinctly perceive is true.” Descartes, R., *Med* AT VII p.35 And in his reply to the second objections, we read: “Whatever we clearly understand to belong to the nature of some thing, can be truly affirmed of that thing.” Descartes, D. AT VII, p. 150. According to some scholars, the evidence provided by intuition is a sufficient criterion of truth. Caimi, M., 2009, pp. XXVIII, XXXII. Frederick van de Pitte challenges this reading arguing that judgment is the only source of truth. He holds that “intuition is not the source of truth for Descartes, i.e., that while intuition is certainly a necessary condition for truth, it is *not* both the necessary and the *sufficient* condition for truth.” van de Pitte, F., 1988.

of intuition, we cannot be deceived. In the *First Meditations*, the intuitive knowledge plays a fundamental role as what the mind grasps by the intuitive evidence marks the limits in the deconstruction of the building of knowledge. The evidence provided by intuition cannot be affected by natural doubt⁸⁴. The intuition provides fully certain and indubitable knowledge, and then this kind of evidence establishes the limits to methodical doubt⁸⁵.

To sum up, the knowledge provided by intuition is the ground of the building of knowledge. The method commands to reach these simplest ideas. The goal is to get as close as possible to those simple elements where no doubt is left. Intuition is the name that Descartes gives to the act of the understanding that reaches those first elements in the construction of the object of cognition. The mind is able to have access to what is real by means of intuition because intuition provides the simplest elements -thus, the most certain- of cognition. For this reason, a concept can have reference to an object just when it is grounded on those immediate and simple elements that the intuition provided. As it was for Scotus, the problem of intuition came along with the problem of the possibility to grasp what is fully determined, the object in its singularity. Moreover, the limits of intuition mark a limit for human understanding. For an infinite understanding could go even further in the distinction up to the point to reveal all the determinations that correspond to the thing. So even when intuition provides self-evident knowledge, it also represents the limitations of a finite intellect. Then, our mind can *legitimately* be related to what it represents - the Kantian question we posed in the very beginning – insofar it is grounded on what intuition provided. I can claim to be true whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly, i.e., intuitively. However, knowledge operates with concepts. Then, how can we guarantee that those constructions are truly grounded on those secure elements? If our mind, which operates with concepts, is only able to have a reference to what is real by means of intuition, how can we ensure that this truth we grasped is not “lost” in the process? As it has been noted, this can be only grounded on the metaphysical assumption of a non-deceiver God⁸⁶.

⁸⁴ Cf. Caimi, M., 2009, pp. XLVI.

⁸⁵ The first step of the Cartesian method is: “...never to accept anything as true that I did not *incontrovertibly* know to be so; that is to say, carefully to avoid both *prejudice* and premature conclusions; and to include nothing in my judgements other than that which presented itself to my mind so *clearly* and *distinctly*, that I would have no occasion to doubt it.” Descartes, R., *Discourse* AT VI p. 18.

⁸⁶ This point has led to what has been called “the cartesian circle”. The problem is whether the hyperbolic doubt affects the first intuitive principles. On one hand, Descartes claims that whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly is true. The first principles, such as the causality principle, are perceived by intuition, clearly and distinctly. Then, we must accept the principle as one of the first steps in the construction of knowledge.

As it was for Descartes, Leibniz also considered that intuition is the cognition of clear and distinct ideas. However, according to him, Descartes had not provided an accurate definition of the notions he was employing⁸⁷. For Leibniz, the Cartesian account of the concepts of clarity and distinction— and the definition of intuition itself— was neither clear nor distinct. Leibniz provided a more accurate definition of the terms that Kant inherited⁸⁸.

Leibniz holds that we have primitive ideas that can be decomposed into simple parts. Ideas can be analyzed into simple elements. These simple ideas are clear and distinct. Nature is made up of these simple elements which are “the true atoms of nature; in a word, the elements of things”⁸⁹. Everything we can find in nature is a composition of these first elements: the monads. Perception is the temporal unity generated among multiplicity⁹⁰. It is a temporary state in which we do not necessarily attend to the unities that belong to this higher unity. This state is temporary because it is possible to attend to the unities that compound the higher unity. Intuition is the apprehension of the simple elements that compound the multiplicity which we temporarily perceive as a unity. Clarity and distinction are the marks of intuitive cognition. Cognition is clear when the idea is present to the mind, and the mind is capable of distinguishing it from any other idea. In a clear cognition, we can separate the representation from another representation. Leibniz specifies this definition of the clarity criterion establishing a relation with the principle of non-contradiction: clear representations can always be defined with a non-contradictory definition. It is always possible to give a non-contradictory definition of a clear representation. This possibility of demarcation defines the clarity criterion. However, in clear cognition, I cannot tell apart the determinations that make this idea different from the other. Even when I can claim that they are both different, I cannot determine the difference. While I can state that these ideas are different, I cannot establish how they differ. In this case, my cognition is clear but not distinct. A clear idea can be distinct or confused⁹¹. An idea is distinct when

The Cartesian proof of the existence of God relies on the endorsement of such principles. However, on the other hand, the hyperbolic doubt led us to deny the reliability of these first evident principles, which can only be accepted after the existence of God has been proved. Cf. Van Cave, J., 1998, p.101.

⁸⁷ Leibniz, G., G., IV, p. 422.

⁸⁸ Cf. Sánchez Rodríguez, M., 2013, p. 2.

⁸⁹ Leibniz, G., Mon. §3. (G., VI, p. 607)

⁹⁰ “The transitory state which incorporates and represents a multitude within a unity or within a simple substance is nothing but what we *call perception*.” Leibniz, G., Mon. §14. (G., VI, p.608)

⁹¹ Leibniz, G., G., IV, p. 422.

the mind can identify the determinations that belong to the representation. In a distinct cognition, the mind is able to discern the elements that truly belong to the thing. Intuition is the apprehension of these first simple elements that correspond to the thing, and this kind of access guarantees that we have true knowledge of the thing and not a mere notion⁹².

The idea is distinct when I can get to these differential marks. In fact, we truly have an idea of the thing- and not a mere confused notion- when we have an intuition of the determinations that belong to the concept⁹³. A cognition is adequate when it is clear and distinct, and I can guarantee that the analysis of the idea has been carried out up to the end. Adequate cognitions are very rare for us, human beings. The limitation of knowledge consists, precisely, in this incapacity to represent distinctly every part of the universe. The level of determinations is a question of degree⁹⁴. Sense perception is just this degree of confusion where I cannot clearly identify the elements that compound my perception. Once I have analyzed the components of the substances and distinguished the parts that belong to them, I have intellectual cognition. The difference between intuitive cognition and intellectual cognition is a question of degree. The representations of the sensibility and understanding have the same root or, more precisely, concepts and intuitions do not come from different origins, but they have the same source. The difference between these two types of perception is the degree they achieve in the determination of the object. The intellect finds the distinctive marks that belong to the thing and turns this confused perception into a distinct one. Leibniz identifies sensibility with obscure and confused cognition and the understanding with distinct cognitions. These two faculties differ in the degree of clarity they can achieve. Actually, they are different degrees of the same function.

⁹² Every concept has content. As the concept is always composed of simple elements, it is never empty. An empty concept is not truly a concept but a mere notion, a chimere. There are not empty concepts but those that contain a contradiction. For the Leibnizian conception, all non-contradictory concepts have content and then, all knowledge can arise from them Cf. Caimi, M. 2005, p. 142.

⁹³ “When I can recognize one thing among others without being able to say what its differences or properties consist in, my knowledge is *confused* (...) But when I can explain the evidence I am using, the knowledge is *distinct* (...) But when everything which enters into a definition or an item of distinct knowledge is known distinctly, right down to the primary notions, I call the knowledge *adequate*. And when my mind simultaneously and distinctly understands all the primary ingredients of a notion, it has *intuitive* knowledge of it. This is very rare; most human knowledge is only confused, or *suppositive*.” Leibniz, G., Disc., §24. (G., IV, p. 449 ss)

⁹⁴ “...this representation of the details of the whole universe is confused and can only be distinct with respect to a small part of things ...” Leibniz, G., Mon. §60. (G., VI, p. 616ss.) Also: Leibniz, G., Disc., §24. (G., IV, p. 450).

Now, it must be kept in mind that the truth of a proposition is grounded on its agreement with things as they are in themselves. A proposition is true if what is predicated of a subject actually belongs to it⁹⁵. Leibniz's account of intuition is grounded on his theory of substance. According to him, the substance is what is fully determined. The substance is the subject of every predicate that can be attributed to it while it cannot be an attribution of anything else. Nature can be considered a composition of these simple elements: the monads⁹⁶. These simple things – which are the atoms of nature- are fully determined in every respect such that nothing can be added or subtracted from it. The universals are composed of these simple elements created by God. The substance is always perfectly determined. Then, every true proposition that we can hold that belongs to the subject is actually already included in it. As every predicate we can ascribe is already included in the subject, there is nothing that could be added to it. The distinction between the substance and its accidents is just a question of the level we reach in the determination. The accident of a substance is a concept that has not been completely determined⁹⁷. Every concept of an individual substance is an entirely determined concept. The task of thinking is to analyze the subject up to the simple elements. Once we get to those simple determinations that are the proper determinations of the things, the relation among them is resolved by mere calculus. The process of knowledge consists precisely in this process of determinations. The goal is to identify those properties that belong to the thing which, at the very beginning, are presented confusedly to the mind. The mind can go every time further in the analyzes so that those elements that were clear but not distinct can be determined and turned into distinct apprehensions. To enumerate all the determinations to be found in substances is what is demanded. Each new determination demands to be brought to clarity and distinction, and complete determination is the eternal task of thinking. Reasoning is precisely the act of the mind by which it discovers the intermediate ideas that make it possible to claim that a certain determination actually belongs to the thing⁹⁸.

Space is a determination required to individualize things. It is a determination that makes it possible to differentiate between a point and another. As, if these points were

⁹⁵ “Now it is obvious that all true predication has some foundation in the nature of things.” Leibniz, G., *Disc.*, §8. (G., IV, p. 432 ss.).

⁹⁶ Leibniz, G., *Mon.* §1. (G., VI, p. 607).

⁹⁷ Leibniz, G., *Disc.*, §8. (G., IV, p. 432 ss.).

⁹⁸ The analysis is the “art of finding intermediate ideas” Leibniz, *New Essay*. (G., V, p. 348).

not differentiated in space, they would be the same point. But this contradicts the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of the best world possible. There would be no explanation of why God put this point in one place and not in any other. Space (and time too) is just a phenomenical determination of the substance. Leibniz maintains a relational conception of space according to which space is nothing more than relationships between substances that can be established and determined by rational analysis, without any intervention of sensibility. We perceive it as sensible just because we perceive it confusedly. Space and time can be reduced to relational intellectual properties of the things, as they are just relations among substances that can be perfectly analyzed by the intellect. Space is the order or relation of the coexistent parts of the universe. Space comes into existence at the same point that the parts of the universe are created. It cannot pre-exist them. Then, real things cannot be differentiated by their special location, as the spatial relations are nothing but the relationships among them. Now, the relation among things is established by the pre-established harmony as monads have no “windows”. The relation among substances is established at the same time that the universe is created. The spatial relations among things are just confused perceptions of non-spatial internal properties of monads. Therefore, the spatial location of substances cannot be considered a distinctive mark of it that would make it possible to distinguish two equal substances. As a substance is what is completely determined in every aspect, there cannot be two substances perfectly alike. When we consider two things as equal, it is just because we have not fully analyzed the concept. If after being completely analyzed these two things share all their properties, they are actually the same thing as “nowhere is there perfect similarity”⁹⁹. Then, if two things share all their determinations, they are, in fact, the same thing¹⁰⁰.

To sum up, on Leibniz’s account, nature is a compound of these simple elements which we can reach when we have discovered all the determinations that truly belong to

⁹⁹ “*nowhere* (and this is one of my important new axioms) is there *perfect* similarity.” Leibniz, G., *Nature Itself* §13. (G. IV, p.514)

¹⁰⁰ Other formulations of the principle of identity of indiscernibles are: “... in nature there are never two beings that are perfectly alike, and between which it is not possible to discover some difference which is internal, or founded on an intrinsic denomination.” Leibniz, G., *Mon.*, §9. (G., VI, p. 608) In his *New Essay...*, Leibniz introduces the principle of the identity of indiscernibles as follows: “Every substantial being, be it soul or body, has its relation to every other substantial thing, which is peculiar to itself; and one must always differ from another by intrinsic denominations.” (G., V, p. 100). (...) “By virtue of insensible variations, two individual things can never be perfectly alike . . . and they must always differ more than numero. This at once puts out of court . . . a substance without action, the void in space, atoms and even particles not actually divided in matter, absolute rest, complete uniformity in one part of time, place, or matter. ” (G., V, p. 49).

the thing. Substances are individuated by their intrinsic properties. Therefore, an exhaustive analysis of its determinations would make it possible to know what they are. Intuition is the fulfilment of conceptual analysis. That is to say, there is no methodological difference between the cognition of universal principles and the cognition of particulars. On the contrary, there is a line of continuity between conceptual analysis by which we firstly determine universal properties of things, and the specification of those principles in an every time more definite determination of things that, ultimately, leads us to know things as they are in themselves. The intuitive cognition is just the accomplishment of the conceptual analysis, as the individuality rests on pure rational principles: the principle of contradiction (in regard to its logical determinations) and the principle of sufficient reason (in regard to its physical determinations). Returning to the central question of this thesis, i.e., how the mind can legitimately relate to what is real, we can conclude: first, Leibniz defined as eminently real what is perfectly determined. Then, conceptual analysis gives us the possibility of knowing things as they are in themselves. The principle of noncontradiction guarantees that we can have access to pure rational truths while contingent truths, such as those discovered in physics, are guided by the principle of sufficient reason. Now, contingent truths are just contingent for us. As every predicate necessarily belongs to the thing, all contingent truths are necessarily true from the point of view of things as they are in themselves insofar, they are grounded in the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason. There are not really accidental predicates of things, neither of them nor in the relations among them. The internal properties define the reality of each individual, and the relationships among these individuals are already established by the principle of sufficient reason. Now, there are many problems involved in Leibniz's account. In first place, his conception of the arrangement of nature is, as it was for Descartes, grounded on the assumption of a free willing God who created the world based on the principle of the best world possible. Secondly, his proposal depends on the not so well-argued conception of reminiscence. For Leibniz, our determinations of things are true knowledge and not mere chimeras because we have innate ideas which were introduced in us by a non-deceiver God. Thirdly, the principle of the indiscernible was rather problematic. This is one of the points of departure of the Kantian rupture with rationalism: the distinction between intuition and concept formation. One of the first attempts to establish a new distinction between intuitions and concepts can be found in *On the First Ground of the Distinction of Directions in Space*.

1.3. The Problem of Incongruent Counterparts

*On the first foundation of the directions*¹⁰¹ in space (1768), Kant introduces for the first time the paradox of the incongruent counterparts¹⁰². Kant drew different conclusions from this argument¹⁰³, that it is present throughout the entire Kantian work. The purpose of the introduction of the counterpart phenomenon in this paper of 1768 is to argue in favor of the Newtonian conception of absolute space. However, it is traditionally admitted that from 1770 on, Kant uses the phenomenon of counterparts to sustain that objects, singular things, cannot be determined by mere concepts. Conceptual determinations do not lead the mind to a complete determination of the object of cognition. The argument is used to prove the insufficiency of conceptual determination for a complete determination of objects. This argument will imply a rupture of the Kantian position with Leibnizian rationalism and will lead Kant to elaborate a new relationship of intuitive and conceptual representations. The notions of intuition and concept will be redefined. These new definitions will be the basis of the critical system that begins to be shaped in 1763 and acquires an increasingly elaborated expression during the “silent decade.”¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ David Walford, Paul Rusnock, and George Rolf hold that the term “Gegend” should be translated as “direction” rather than as “region.” David Walford, who makes an exhaustive study of the difference between the concepts of *Gegend* and *Lage*, considers that in no way the term *Gegend* can be understood as a region. Walford considers that the confusion between these concepts would have led to a misunderstanding of the counterparts argument. Walford, D., 2001, pp. 409ss. Rolf, George y Rusnock, Paul, 1994. pp. 459ss.

¹⁰² James Van Cleve argues that Kant was the first philosopher to notice the importance of the problem of counterparts. He states: “Kant was evidently the first major thinker to notice the philosophical significance of such objects.” Clave, J., van, 1999, p. 44. According to Paul Rusnock and George Rolf, Kant would have been familiar with this paradox since 1762/1763 and the first attempted solution in 1764. Rolf, George y Rusnock, Paul, 1994. p. 466. Rolf, George y Rusnock, Paul, 1995. p. 263.

¹⁰³ Cf. Vaihinger, 1892, p. 518 ss., esp. p. 523ss., Bennett, J., 1970, p. 175. Buroker, J. V., 1981, p. 3ss. Earman, J., 1991, p. 235. Kemp Smith, N., 1991, p. 45. Clave, J., van, 1999, p.44. Smith, K., 2003, p. 161ss. Hagar, A., 2008, p. 82. According to Kemp Smith, the argument of 1768 seeks to demonstrate that space is absolute, in 1770 that it is intuitive, and in 1783 that it is subjective. For Jill Vance Buroker, the 1770 presentation shows that space is a pure intuition. In 1783 and 1786, Kant would use the paradox to support the transcendental ideality of space. For Hans Vaihinger, in 1770 the paradox is resolved by accepting that space is a pure intuition and not a concept and in 1783 affirming that it is a form of intuition. For James van Cleve, on the contrary, the presentation of 1770 and 1783 seeks to prove that the representation of space is intuitive. For John Earman, Kant uses the argument in 1768 against the Leibnizian conception of space; in 1770, to show that space is intuited and in 1783 and 1786 to sustain transcendental idealism. Smith, K. 1991, p. 45. Smith, K. 2003, p. 161ss., esp. pp. 164,165. Clave, James van, 1991, p. 15. Burocker, J., 1981, p. 68. Vaihinger, 1892, p. 523. Earman, J., 1991, pp. 235,249. Clave, J., van, 1999, p. 44. Pippin considers that “The assumption of an absolute frame of reference (or space as a singular whole) seemed to him unavoidable,” (...) “all we need note here is how crucial it was in turning him away from the Leibnizian view once and for all.” Pippin, R., 1982, p. 61.

¹⁰⁴ Jill Vance Burocker emphasizes that “the key to transcendental idealism is a series of arguments that appear in Kant's writings from 1768 to 1786, the author adds that the argument considered here “points out not only a radical change in Kant's thinking about space, but it is also the prelude to critical philosophy.”

In his mature formulations, Kant explicitly uses the argument of the incongruent counterparts to show that the determination of the phenomenon cannot be carried out only by means of concepts¹⁰⁵. Kant shows that there are object determinations that cannot be elucidated by purely conceptual means. Specifically, the location of the phenomenon in space and time cannot be obtained by analyzing their intellectual marks. The spatio-temporal determinations cannot be obtained through an analysis of the conceptual marks of the phenomenon. Then, a complete determination can never be achieved through concepts. The argument will show that the reference of the mind to the object *in individuo* can only be guaranteed by a non-conceptual factor.

Kant begins the argument with a definition of equality, similarity, and congruence. Kant's point of departure is to be found in the definitions provided by Leibniz¹⁰⁶, followed by Wolff¹⁰⁷ and Baumgarten¹⁰⁸.

Burocker, J., 1991, p. 316. Also: Burocker, J., 1981, p. 3. Robert Pippin shares this reading. He considers that by the argument of the counterparts, "Kant became convinced that a wholly relational view of space could not be defended, and, while for a time appearing to resort to some more Newtonian view, began his own search for a satisfactory solution short of the postulation of a metaphysical *Unding* like absolute space. The results of that search first appeared in their new critical form in his 1770 *Dissertation*, and a great deal of the case made there is preserved in the *Critique*. The assumption of an absolute frame of reference (or space as a singular whole) seemed to him unavoidable" Pippin, R, 1982, p. 61. Following this line, Brigitte Falkeburg states: "Kant's theory of intuition emerged from an intriguing puzzle concerning the mathematical foundations of his pre-Critical cosmology, the puzzle of incongruent counterparts. [...] Thus genetically, Kant's theory of intuition cannot be separated from his 1768 paper on incongruent counterparts." Falkeburg, B., 2006, p.157-158. Ezequiel Zerbudis challenges this interpretation. Zerbudis holds: "in contrast to what many scholars have supposed, there seems to be nothing in Kant's original presentation of the phenomenon of incongruous counterparts that should be taken as an indication of the need to postulate a separate intuitive faculty, which would be necessary for someone to be able to know the difference between a figure and its counterpart". Zerbudis, E., 2012, p. 327.

¹⁰⁵ The purpose of the argument in its mature presentation "is to show that there are characteristics of the phenomena that can only be known with sensibility; since they are inaccessible to the purely conceptual approach" Caimi, M., 1999, p. 111. Mario Caimi emphasizes that this is the purpose of the argument in the *Prolegomena*, taking into account that Kant's aim in the presentations of the argument in 1769 and 1789 is not so clear. Mario Caimi and Kemp Smith consider that the clearest presentation of this point is only reached in the *Prolegomena*. Smith, K. 2003, p. 163. Caimi, M., 1999, p. 111. On the contrary, Amit Hagar considers that already in the *Dissertatio* "Kant uses the idea of incongruent counterparts to illustrate (and not to prove) the intuitive character of spatial knowledge". Hagar, A., 2008, p.82.

¹⁰⁶ Paul Rusnock and George Rolf explain that Kant took the notions of "congruence", "equality" and "similarity" from the system of Leibniz. The technical sense of these terms should be understood in the light of the Leibnizian system: "Figures which have the same inner characteristics are called similar. Figures are congruent when capable of being moved to coincide, or when they differ at most by being in a different place (*solo numero*). Equality is still simply equality of magnitude. Leibniz believed congruence to be definable as the conjunction of similarity and equality." Rolf, George y Rusnock, Paul, 1995. p. 261.

¹⁰⁷ "When I can put one thing B instead of another A without prejudice to the magnitude, then it is that A and B are equal. I say without prejudice to the magnitude, that is, if substituting A for B is, in terms of magnitude, the same as if I had kept A." Wolff, C., 1719, §22. For Wolff, congruence is equality of what is similar. Wolff, C., Ont, §465.

¹⁰⁸ "Things that are the same according to quality are SIMILAR (~); according to quantity, EQUAL (=); according to both, CONGRUENT (@). Things that are different according to quality are DISSIMILAR (L); according to quantity, UNEQUAL (≠); according to both, INCONGRUENT." Baumgarten, G., *Met*, §70.

According to the Kantian presentation, two objects are congruent when they share all their determinations. Even in the *Prolegomena*, Kant keeps the conceptions of congruence introduced by the Leibnizian tradition. Two things are congruent when they share all the determinations in relation to quality and quantity. When they share all the quantitative determinations, they are equal, and when they share all the qualitative determinations, they are defined as similar. If two figures are congruent, they should be able to completely cover each other. One of the figures must be able to fully replace the other without this substitution altering in the least any of the properties of the thing. Kant observes in the *Prolegomena*:

If two things are fully the same (in all determinations belonging to magnitude and quality) in all the parts of each that can always be cognized by itself alone, it should indeed then follow that one, in all cases and respects, can be put in the place of the other, without this exchange causing the least recognizable difference¹⁰⁹.

If two things are equal and similar, they are congruent, and then one of them should be able to replace the other. Kant holds that this is an *a priori* synthetic proposition grounded on the pure intuition of space¹¹⁰. However, the phenomenon of incongruent counterparts reveals that two figures can share all their internal properties, and yet they are not interchangeable. These figures are incongruent counterparts. The incongruent counterparts are defined as follows:

When a body is perfectly equal and similar to another, and yet cannot be included within the same boundaries, I entitle it the incongruent counterpart of that other¹¹¹.

¹⁰⁹ „Wenn zwei Dinge in allen Stücken, die an jedem für sich nur immer können erkannt werden, (in alien zur Grösse und Qualität gehörigen Bestimmungen) völlig einerlei sind, so muss doch folgen, dass eins in alien Fällen und Beziehungen an die Stelle des andern könne gesetzt werden, ohne dass diese Vertauschung den mindesten kenntlichen Unterschied verursachen würde.“ *Proleg*, AA 4: 285.

¹¹⁰ „Um etwas zur Erläuterung und Bestätigung beizufügen, darf man nur das gewöhnliche und unumgänglich notwendige Verfahren der Geometern ansehen. Alle Beweise von durchgängiger Gleichheit zweier gegebenen Figuren (da eine in allen Stücken an die Stelle der andern gesetzt werden kann) laufen zuletzt darauf hinaus, dass sie einander decken, welches offenbar nichts anders als ein auf der unmittelbaren Anschauung beruhender synthetischer Satz ist...“ *Proleg*, AA 4: 284.

¹¹¹ „Ich nenne einen Körper, der einem andern völlig gleich und ähnlich ist, ob er gleich nicht in eben denselben Grenzen kann beschlossen werden, sein incongruentes Gegenstück.“ AA 2: 382.

Congruence is defined as similarity of what is equal. Congruent things are capable of being enclosed in the same limits. We can move them and make them coincide. The paradox will be that two figures can be equal and similar without being congruent. The problem is that there are objects that share all their determinations and, however, one of them cannot be put in the place of the other. These objects have certain determinations that make them different which are not conceptual marks.

An example of incongruent counterparts is that of the spherical triangles of two opposite hemispheres¹¹². The triangles of each hemisphere can be congruent with respect to their sides and angles and, however, cannot be enclosed within the same boundaries¹¹³. Kant argues that the determinations and the relationships among them are equal. However, the triangle on one side of the hemisphere is not interchangeable for the one on the other side. One triangle cannot occupy the same place in the space occupied by the other. A complete description of their determinations is insufficient to specify this difference. In this case, it is shown that even when there is a difference between the figures, it is impossible for the understanding to apprehend it. The understanding cannot give an account of this difference as there are no internal differences that explain the fact that one figure cannot take the place of the other¹¹⁴. The construction of two triangles on a spherical surface shows that the figures corresponding to each of the hemispheres can be equal with respect to the marks that define them and not be congruent with each other¹¹⁵. Thus, the paradox is that being these figures completely equal and similar, they are not congruent. This demonstrates that mere concepts cannot define geometric knowledge, i.e., "there is geometric knowledge that cannot even be described by concepts"¹¹⁶.

Kant takes in the *Prolegomena* an example that he had already presented in *On the first foundation ...* and in the *Inaugural Dissertation* of 1770. The example is based on the possibility of distinguishing the right hand from the left hand. Both are equal in

¹¹² It is interesting to note that the example of the triangles is precisely the example that Wolff introduces to define congruence. Two triangles are congruent, if they are similar and equal and if they are congruent one should be capable of being moved to the place of the other. Wolff, C., *Ont*, 465. Mario Caimi and Rogelio Severo explain that the argument does not work for equilateral triangles. Cf. Caimi, M., 1999, p. 335. Severo, R., 2007, p. 519.

¹¹³ In one of his early works, Bertrand Russell uses this Kantian argument to argue that the concept of magnitude cannot be applied to space. He states: "The same irreducibility of space to mere magnitude is proved by Kant's hands and spherical triangles, in which a difference persists in spite of complete quantitative equality". Russell, Bertrand; 1956, p. 86n.

¹¹⁴ *Proleg*, AA 4: 285.

¹¹⁵ AA 2: 403.

¹¹⁶ Torretti, R., 1974, p.28.

regard to their parts. One could give a complete description of each of them while it still would be missing one feature that makes one hand different from the other. The understanding cannot tell any difference where there is one: one hand is left-orientated, the other is right-orientated. One hand cannot take the place of the other hand as the space that encloses the boundaries of one cannot enclose the opposite. The right and left hand is one of these cases in which, even when the objects are equal in their extension, they are not congruent with each other¹¹⁷. We will get the same result if we consider the right hand or the left hand as they are reflected in the mirror. Even if we can make a complete description of each of them, of our own hand and of the hand that is reflected, it would not be possible to establish through this characterization of their properties a distinctive mark that allows us to differentiate the original hand from the hand in the mirror. There are certain features of the object – as its spatial orientation- which are not revealed by analyzes of its marks. These solids or these figures, even though they are perfectly equal, cannot be substituted. Another example introduced by Kant is that of spirals that have opposite directions. In this case, as in the other cases, the conceptual determinations are insufficient to specify the difference present between the counterparts. The difference between spirals in the opposite direction, “we cannot make it intelligible by any concept whatsoever.”¹¹⁸ The exhaustive analysis of the marks of the spiral figures is insufficient to indicate their directionality. The orientation is not contained in the concept.

In the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (1786), Kant presents the problem of incongruent counterparts in relation to motion and direction.. Kant analyzes the case of a body moving in a circle. It changes direction as its movement continues; so that at one moment it goes to one side and then to the other¹¹⁹. The movement always follows the same direction but the side of the plane towards which it is moving changes. Then, the question is how to determine the side towards which the movement is directed. It should be possible to establish the difference between the movement towards one side and the other. This difference is not intelligible by mere concepts. There are no general marks that allow us to establish the direction of the movement. The discursiveness of

¹¹⁷ *Proleg*, AA 4: 286.

¹¹⁸ *Proleg*, AA 4: 286.

¹¹⁹ „In jeder Bewegung sind Richtung und Geschwindigkeit die beiden Momente der Erwägung derselben, wenn man von allen anderen Eigenschaften des Beweglichen abstrahirt. Ich setze hier die gewöhnliche Definition beider voraus; allein die der Richtung bedarf noch verschiedener Einschränkungen. Ein im Kreise bewegter Körper verändert seine Richtung continuirlich, so daß er bis zu seiner Rückkehr zum Punkte, von dem er ausging, alle in einer Fläche nur mögliche Richtungen eingeschlagen ist, und doch sagt man: er bewege sich immer in derselben Richtung, z.B. der Planet von Abend gegen Morgen (...) Allein was ist hier die Seite, nach der die Bewegung gerichtet ist?“ *Proleg*, AA 4: 483.

understanding is insufficient to trace this difference. The problem is that for the understanding the two movements correspond in all aspects and then, they are identical from this perspective. However, there is "a genuinely mathematical internal difference"; the movements differ in their direction¹²⁰. The problem is how to explain this difference that the understanding cannot trace. The direction of motion is only intelligible intuitively. There is no problem here of greater or lesser darkness of the representation. It is not possible to explain the direction by means of the marks that make up the moving object. Space, Kant concludes, is not a property or relation of things but the pure form of intuition¹²¹. Space must be considered as a subjective form of our sensible intuition. Congruence is defined as the perfect equality and similarity in the determination of the object, which is only achieved through intuition¹²². Thus, the problem of counterparts, in its critical formulation, is introduced in direct connection with the requirement of a determination of the object that cannot be obtained conceptually. As we will further develop in chapter four, this conclusion depends on the peculiar definition that Kant gave of the notion of concept.

The determination of the object in a univocal way implies the possibility of distinguishing it from any other. However, Kant showed that an object can share with another all its intellectual determinations and still not be the congruent to it. But neither the determination of its parts nor the relation among them can explain why one object is different from the other. This is the case of the incongruent counterparts. Kant's incongruent counterparts argument shows that complete determination requires the individualization of space and time¹²³ but the determination of a unique place in space

¹²⁰ „keinen erdenklichen Unterschied in den innern Folgen geben kann und demnach ein wahrhafter mathematischer und zwar innerer Unterschied ist, womit der von dem Unterschiede zweier sonst in allen Stücken gleichen, der Richtung nach aber verschiedenen Kreisbewegungen, obgleich nicht völlig einerlei, dennoch aber zusammenhängend ist.“ *Proleg*, AA 4: 484.

¹²¹ „Ich habe anderwärts gezeigt, daß, da sich dieser Unterschied zwar in der Anschauung geben, aber gar nicht auf deutliche Begriffe bringen, mithin nicht verständlich erklären (dari, non intelli) läßt, er einen guten bestätigenden Beweisgrund zu dem Satze abgebe: daß der Raum überhaupt nicht zu den Eigenschaften oder Verhältnissen der Dinge an sich selbst, die sich nothwendig | auf objective Begriffe müßten bringen lassen, sondern blos zu der subjectiven Form unserer sinnlichen Anschauung von Dingen oder Verhältnissen, die uns nach dem, was sie an sich sein mögen, völlig unbekannt bleiben, gehöre.“ *Proleg*, AA 4: 484.

¹²² „Die völlige Ähnlichkeit und Gleichheit, so fern sie nur in der Anschauung erkannt werden kann, ist die Congruenz.“ *Proleg*, AA 4: 493.

¹²³ Henry Allison argues that Kant does not have an analogue of the problem of the counterparts for time. Allison, H., 1992, p. 168. According to Hans Reichenbach the problem of counterparts does not arise at all in the case of time. To refute this consideration, John Earman argues in this way: "The temporal analogue of a spatially extended figure would be a temporarily extended figure, for example, a temporal type vector." James Van Cleve also argues that the problem remains in the case of time. He argues that: "If you saw a movie or a micro-event from back to front, you would not be able to distinguish that something was not the same." James van Clave, R. Frederick, 1991, pp. 17 and 143. Sean Walsh holds that the problem of

and time is never reached by means of concepts. As it was shown, the conceptual marks are insufficient to identify spatial and temporal determinations. The spatio-temporal determinations required for the complete determination are not conceptual but intuitive. According to Kant, the possibility of determining the object in a unique way requires a factor that is not conceptual. The complete determination is never achieved through concepts. The possibility of satisfying the requirement of a complete determination of the object requires a non-conceptual factor, namely, intuition. The establishment of space and time as intuitions is introduced to make possible a unique determination of the object. Objects are individuated by means of intuitive representations: space and time.

This argument introduced in 1768 is one of his first attempts to explain how our imperfect thinking reaches what is fully determined. As we have noted, the need to introduce the intuitive factor in the process of cognition came along with the problem of the possibility of determining the object in its concreteness. Then, even when it is clear that Kant presented the argument with different formulations and reached different kinds of conclusions, the problem that he is trying to solve is the same: how can thinking have access to the object in its singularity? The postulation of absolute space or the distinction of faculties are just different attempted solutions to the same problem. The assumption of the two-faculty account of cognition was the definite answer that Kant found to this problem introduced in 1768. As we have exhibited, it was the problem that Leibniz introduced when he presented the principles of the identity of the indiscernible, and that was also present in Scotus formulation of the distinction between intuitions and concepts. As we have seen, in 1768, Kant had already in mind that objects can be individualized when they are specially located and, the determination of their special location cannot be done just analyzing its internal properties¹²⁴.

However, unfortunately, in 1768, Kant still lacked an accurate definition of the notions of concept and intuition. He uses these notions as he inherited them from medieval and modern philosophy. Concepts are abstractions of common marks of objects while intuition is the determination of singularity. The problem is that when Kant introduced the distinction in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, he did not give a proper account of the

temporary counterparts is found in *The First Foundations of Nature Science*, where Kant introduces the problem of movement. Walsh, Sean, 2007, esp., p. 421.

¹²⁴ As Pippin explains: "Indeed, contrary to Leibniz's principle of identity, such bodies *were* individual bodies at all only by their already being spatially located." Pippin, R, 1982, p. 62.

definition of these two notions. As we showed, there seems to be a general agreement that Kant just introduced these terms without a proper clarification of what he properly meant.

Intuitions and concepts are different ways of giving unity to the diverse. Intuition is the unity of the manifold that sensibility can provide; the concept is the unity that the understanding provides. The unity of the concept is a product of the understanding, while the unity of the intuition is a product of sensibility. Intuitions are singular representations while concepts are universal representations. All our knowledge, as representations that refer to an object with consciousness, are intuitive or conceptual representations. Thus, all our cognitions are either intuitions or concepts. Intuition is a singular representation. The concept is a universal representation. The concept is a universal representation because it is a representation that is generated from what is common to all objects that fall under it. The concept is generated by abstracting what is common in many objects¹²⁵. Then, "if a representation is not a common representation: then it is not a concept at all."¹²⁶ On the contrary, intuition is a representation of singular things. Intuitive representations give us the singular object and then allow us to obtain completely determined knowledge. The complete determination can only be given by the individual object, because "only singular things or individuals are completely determined."¹²⁷ Therefore, the possibility of completely determined knowledge is sensibility only possible as an intuitive representation; that is, "there can only be totally determined knowledge as intuitions (not as concepts)."¹²⁸ Thus, in regard to intuitions, the logical determination can be complete, but "in regard to the concepts, the logical determination can never be considered as achieved"¹²⁹.

Thus, it is clear that independently of the way in which Kant characterizes the peculiarity of intuitive representations, the faculty of intuitions is introduced so as to explain the way in which thinking relates to singular real things. As we will see, the peculiarity of the Kantian distinction will be grounded in a brand-new way of conceiving

¹²⁵ "The genus is representation in general (*repraesentatio*). Under it stands the representation with consciousness (*perceptio*). A perception that refers to the subject as a modification of its state is a sensation (*sensatio*); an objective perception^a is a cognition (*cognitio*). The latter is either an intuition or a concept (*intuitus vel conceptus*). The former is immediately related to the object and is singular; the latter is mediate, by means of a mark, which can be common to several things." Kant, I., *KrV*, A320 /B376-7.

¹²⁶ „wenn eine Vorstellung nicht repraesentatio communis ist: so ist sie gar kein Begriff.“ Kant, Ak XXIV, p. 908.

¹²⁷ AA 9: 99.

¹²⁸ AA 9: 99.

¹²⁹ AA 9: 99.

the limitations of knowledge. This new approach to the issue will clarify the particular problem that the relation of concepts to intuitions implied.

1.4. The Reference to the Given as a Consequence of our Finitude

We hold that the passivity of intuition is one of the expressions of the finitude of human thought. The reference of intuition to affection is a consequence of the imperfection of our knowledge. To argue in this direction, we will study the fourth observation to Transcendental Aesthetics and Kant's correspondence with Marcus Herz.

1.4.1. Original Intuition and Derivative Intuition in the Fourth Observation to Transcendental Aesthetics.

In the fourth observation on the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant claims:

IV. In natural theology, where one conceives of an object that is not only not an object of intuition for us but cannot even be an object of sensible intuition for itself, one is careful to remove the conditions of time and space from all of its intuition (for all of its cognition must be intuition and not thinking, which is always proof of limitations). But with what right can one do this? If one has antecedently made both of these into forms of things in themselves, and indeed ones that, as *a priori* conditions of the existence of things, would remain even if one removed the things themselves? - for as conditions of all existence in general they would also have to be conditions of the existence of God. (B72)

Kant begins his remark on the Transcendental Aesthetic introducing the theological problem that would cause a realistic conception of space and time. He poses a dichotomous position: either space and time are objective forms of all things, or they are subjective forms of our sensible intuition. If space and time are conditions of things in themselves, they would also be conditions of the existence of God. Then, in order not to condition the divine existence, space and time must be considered subjective forms of our intuition. Thus, the first part of this observation begins with the warning that if space and time are made forms of things in themselves, then God himself would fall into the form of space and time. The beginning of this fourth remark led some scholars to consider that the central issue of this section is a theological problem. For Vaihinger, for example, the crucial point of observation is to confirm the doctrine of the ideality of space and time. In order to prove this point, Kant would have introduced a problem of the philosophy of

religion. The question that must be answered is: “How does God behave in regard to his existence and his way of knowing in relation to space and time?”¹³⁰. The general goal of the observation is, according to Vaihinger, to attack a realistic conception of space using a problem of the philosophy of religion. According to Kemp Smith, in the fourth observation, Kant continues the arguments against Newtonian realism. Kant introduces the theological problem that "If space and time condition all existence, they will condition even divine existence, and so must render God's omniscience, which as such must be intuitive, not discursive, difficult of conception¹³¹." However, we consider that the main point of this section is to be found in the second part of its formulation. According to this interpretation we propose, the question that Kant presents is not only related to a theological problem, but also to an epistemic one. The philosopher explains the relation between intuition, sensibility, and affection that had been introduced in the first paragraph of *Transcendental Aesthetics*. Kant follows the exposition in this fourth remark explaining why our intuition has a relation to affection. The finite intuition:

...is called sensible because it is not original, i.e., one through which the existence of the object of intuition is itself given (and that, so far as we can have insight, can only pertain to the original being); rather it is dependent on the existence of the object/ thus it is possible only insofar as the representational capacity of the subject is affected through that.
(B 72)

Kant explains in this passage why human intuition is related to affection. Our intuition is related to affection because it is a finite intuition. Our intuition is sensible since it is not original. The intuition of human beings is a derivate intuition. For this type of intuition, the existence of the object cannot be produced by the mind. The existence of the object of this intuition is not posited by thinking. On the contrary, this intuition depends on the

¹³⁰ Vaihinger, H., 1892, p. 505.

¹³¹ Kemp Smith, 1918, p. 159 ss. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that commentators who focus on the study of *Transcendental Aesthetics* have not given relevance to this section. They just analyze these passages superficially. Lorne Falkenstein, in his famous study of intuition in *Transcendental Aesthetics*, does not dedicate any line to comment on this passage of *Aesthetics*, even though his book is devoted to a study of the concept of intuition in this section. Likewise, the article by Charles Parson only makes reference to this section in a footnote without further development. Georg Mohr analyzes the concept of intuition in this fourth observation, but according to him, there is no introduction of conceptual novelties here, but responses to the detractors of the first edition. Falkenstein, L., 1995; Mohr G., 1998, pp. 122, 127. Parson, C., 1998.

object and, it is precisely for this reason that the cognitive power endowed with a finite intuition requires that the object affects it. Dependent beings are not able to produce the objects of experience. The original intuition, by contrast, is characterized in this passage as one that does not depend on the object to have a representation of it. For an original thinking, the existence of the object does not require anything but itself. This type of intuition is characteristic of the original Being while for finite thinking beings, intuition is always derivative, i.e., dependent. Finite cognition depends on the object to conform its experience. If the mind were capable of producing the object, it wouldn't require a relation to affection. The recognition of the role of affection is the acknowledgment of our finite condition. In this way, Kant explains the relation between intuition, sensibility, and affection. As Kant noted in the first paragraph of the *Critique*, not every intuition has a necessary relation with sensibility and thus with affection. Kant claimed at the very beginning of the Aesthetic that an object must be given "to us humans." Here, he clarifies his point: intuition is sensible insofar it is not original but derivative. Being a derived intuition is for Kant to be dependent on intuition. This intuition "[is not] such that the existence of the object of intuition is given by it." Derivative intuition requires that an object affects it; that is, "it is possible only because the representative capacity of the subject is affected by it" (B74). Thus, each type of intuition corresponds to one of the two different types of intellect. The intellect of the original Being has an original intuition. The intellect of a dependent being has a derivative intuition. Kant clarifies that the dependent beings can moreover be differentiated in regard to the form of their sensibility. Space and time are forms of human intuition but there could be sensible intuitions with other forms of sensibility. However, this does not affect this feature of the dependent intuitions. All entities that are not independent, such as God, have a *sensible* intuition. For dependent entities, there is no possibility of intellectual intuition. Therefore, Kant affirms that "all finite thinking beings must necessarily agree with human beings in this regard (though we cannot decide this)..." The original intuition only corresponds to the original Being as long as it is independent. Human intuition is sensible "it is derivative (*intuitus derivativus*) and not original (*intuitus originarius*)." In this way, Kant states that the object must be given to us by means of affection *because* our intuition is proper of dependent beings. As the finite intellect is unable to produce the existence of objects, the intellect requires a receptive faculty to produce its representations. In this way, Kant determines that affection is a necessary element for the formation of representations by a peculiar way of conceiving the limitations of finite thinking. Here the comparison with

the divine intellect is used to specify the peculiarity of human intuition. This observation presented in *Aesthetics* had already been developed by Kant. To show this, we will analyze this contraposition between the finite and the infinite intellect as it is posed in the letter of Kant to Marcus Herz of 1772.

1.4.2. The Contrast of *Intellectus Archetypus* and *Intellectus Ectypus* in Kant's Letter to Marcus Herz of February 21, 1772

The exchange of correspondence between Kant and Marcus Herz is one of the richest within the Kantian epistolary¹³². Particularly, the letter sent by Kant to his disciple on February 21, 1772, has been studied by numerous interpreters of his work, as it is considered that this letter exhibits the Kantian critical turn. However, it is discussed what position should be attributed to the letter within the Kantian system. For Cassirer, this document marks “the true hour of birth of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.”¹³³ Kirk Dallas Wilson considers that the typical critical distinction between intuition and concepts “emerges from the important letter to Marcus Herz of February 1772 in which Kant first raised the critical question.”¹³⁴ Wolfgang Carl also understands that the letter anticipates the developments of the *Critique*. Carl argues that the task of deduction of the categories carried out in the *KrV* is defined here¹³⁵. This document shows a rupture with the Dissertation of 1770, especially by the exclusion of the possibility of an intellectual intuition. According to de Vleeschauwer, on the contrary, the epistle has been traditionally misunderstood. What is reflected here is a balance of the past and not a program. The text “begins with a retrospective view from the Dissertation”¹³⁶. Lewis Beck also considers that there is no reason to see in the letter the outline of a project that anticipates the future developments of the Kantian program. Beck argues against Wolfgang Carl. He concludes that, contrary to what Carl thought, the rupture between the Kantian Dissertation of 1770 and the *Critique of Pure Reason* is after 1772, and not earlier¹³⁷. Andrés Lema Hincapié holds that the letter includes both: “critical anticipations and mere dogmatic repetition”¹³⁸. We will not go into the numerous controversies raised by this correspondence. We will focus on the function that the distinction between an ectype and an archetype intellect plays in this letter, as it reveals that the way in which

¹³² Cf. Zweig, Arnulf, 1999, p. 3.

¹³³ „Nicht mit Unrecht hat man von diesem Briefe gesagt, daß er die eigentliche Geburtsstund der »Kritik der reinen Vernunft« bezeichnet.“ Cassirer, Ernst, 1921, p. 135.

¹³⁴ Wilson, K.D., 1975, p. 249.

¹³⁵ Carl, Wolfgang, 1989, pp. 5 ss. Other scholars arguing in this direction are Norman Kemp Smith, Jennifer Mensch, Beatrice Longuenesse, and Fernando Moledo. Kemp Smith, Norman, 1918, p. 219ss. Mensch, J., 2007, esp. p. 110. Longuenesse, B., 1998, p. 17; Moledo, F., 2014, pp. 66ss.

¹³⁶ Vleeschauwer, H.-J., 1962, p. 63.

¹³⁷ Beck, L., 1989, esp. pp. 22 y 26. Alexis Philonenko had also addressed this interpretation. According to him, the problem formulated in this letter cannot be understood as the “positive formulation of the critical problem”. Philonenko, A., 1969, p. 94.

¹³⁸ Lema-Hincapié, A., 2004.

Kant conceives the limitation of human understanding exhibits a rupture with rationalism which leads to reshaping the notion of intuition. Specifically, Kant starts relating the limitation of the human mind with the necessary reference of intuition to affection. Thus, arises the question of how to relate the concepts that emerge purely from the understanding with an element that the mind cannot create by itself.

Kant claims that he had been considering the extent and limits of human knowledge. In this context, he poses the problem of how to ground the relation between a representation and its object. Kant asks how a representation can legitimately relate to the object it represents. He asks: "... on what foundation rests the relationship of what we call representation in us with the object?"¹³⁹ The difficulty is not only to explain the relationship between the representation and the object. Moreover, what must be elucidated is how the representation can *legitimately* relate to what is represented. Two possibilities are outlined that could give an answer to this question. The first possibility is that the intellect was completely ectypic. In this case, the understanding would obtain the material for its logical elaborations from the data provided by the senses. The objects would be the real cause of the representations. The convergence of the representation with the object that it represents would be explained as a cause-effect relation. According to this analogy, the object would be the cause and the representation the effect. The representation would be formed from the material provided by the sensation. The content of the representation would be what the object provides as its cause. Therefore, the validity of the representation would not present difficulties in this case as:

If a representation comprises only the manner in which the subject is affected by the object, then it is easy to see how it is in conformity with this object, namely, as an effect accords with its cause, and it is easy to see how this modification of our mind can

¹³⁹ According to Kemp Smith, this problem, as it is posited here, is the one that is present in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (*KrV*) that Kant introduced in A 84-92 / B 116-24. This scholar uses this letter to Herz to shed light on these passages of the *Critique*. Lema Hincapié follows Kemp Smith. He considers that "the letter does formulate the essential critical problem of the objectivity of representations" José Gómez Caffarena also understands that "the letter is the first explicit expression of what we can call the fundamental critical problem of intellectual knowledge." Arnulf Zweig also claims that Kant had here reached "a formulation of what was to become one central problem of the *Critique*: how are synthetic a priori judgments possible." Many other critics share this interpretation. Fernando Moledo argues that by 1772, Kant not only had posed the critical question, but he already had in mind the clue to give answer to it. For this reason, the Kantian revolution of thinking is to be found around 1772. However, against this reading, Alexis Philonenko argues that in this letter, the problem of *Critique* is still not formulated in critical terms. Kemp Smith, N. 1918, p. 219ss. Lema Hincapié, A., 2004, p. 60. Caffarena, J., 1996, p. XXVIII. Moledo, F., 2017. Philonenko, A., 1969, p. 97.

represent something, that is, have an object. Thus the passive or sensuous representations have an understandable relationship to objects...¹⁴⁰

The second possibility is that the intellect was fully archetypal. The representation would be in this case absolutely active with respect to its object. According to Kant, a fully active mind is capable of producing its object in the act of representing it. The mind creates the represented object. In this way, the material content of the object would be caused by the operation of the mind itself. Therefore, here the validity of this representation is not a problem either because:

...if that in us which we call “representation” were active with regard to the object, that is, if the object itself were created by the representation (as when divine cognitions are conceived as the archetypes of things), the conformity of these representations to their objects could also be understood¹⁴¹.

This is the way how divine knowledge relates to its objects. The intellect of God is an archetypal intellect, the ground of the existence of objects. According to Kant, human thinking is as archetypal as the mind of God when it operates with quantities. Mathematical thinking proceeds in the same way as archetypal understanding. In mathematics, the mind has pure quantities as data. Therefore, the production of the representation can be explained making reference to spontaneity and its principles¹⁴². The problem of the validity of representation is presented to our intellect because the matter for the construction of knowledge is not just a quantity. The objects of human cognition are also determined by sensible qualities. Therefore, it is here that the relation between representation and its object becomes problematic. The problem is the construction of sensible experience. The difficulty of explaining the legitimacy of the relation between the representation and what is represented becomes particularly complex when the concepts of understanding, which we have a priori, aim to have reference to “things”. In

¹⁴⁰ Kant, I. AA 10:130. We follow the translation of Arnulf Zweig. Kant, I. 1999, pp.133 ss.

¹⁴¹ Kant, I. AA 10:130.

¹⁴² Kant claims: “In mathematics this is possible, because the objects before us are quantities and can be represented as quantities only because it is possible for us to produce their mathematical representations (by taking numerical units a given number of times). Hence the concepts of the quantities can be spontaneous and their principles can be determined a priori.” Kant, I. AA 10:131.

this way, the philosopher restricts the initial conflict of the validity of representations in the following way:

But in the case of relationships involving qualities - as to how my understanding may, completely a priori, form for itself concepts of things with which concepts the facts¹⁴³ should necessarily agree, and as to how my understanding may formulate real principles concerning the possibility of such concepts, with which principles experience must be in exact agreement and which nevertheless are independent of experience – this question, of how the faculty of the understanding achieves this conformity with the things themselves" is still left in a state of obscurity¹⁴⁴.

Explaining the validity of representation is not a problem either for the divine intellect or for the human mind when it operates with pure quantities. The concordance of the representation with the object is a difficulty inherent to the human intellect in shaping its sensible experience. The concepts of the understanding lie a priori in the mind, but our intellect cannot fully construct its experience because the latter does not only contain mere quantities but also qualities. Thus, it raises the question of how concepts that spring out of the mind can correspond to those represented objects that the mind cannot produce by itself. There seems to be an insurmountable darkness in relation to our intellectual faculty: where the conformity with things come from.

As an attempt to clarify the problem, Kant introduces in this letter two types of possible intellect: the ectype and the archetype. The first is characterized as a reproductive understanding, while the second is a productive one. The archetypal understanding can ground things. It can bring objects into existence. The ectype understanding, on the other hand, requires things to provide the data so it can operate with them. It cannot create the data by itself. Thus, Kant notes, the correspondence of the representation of the subject with the object could be explained because the representation is an effect of the object - that is the cause of the representation- or because the representation is the cause of the object. If the mind were archetypal, the object would be created by the act of representing; since the archetypal intellect is one whose intuition is the very grounding of things. It

¹⁴³ For an analysis of the distinction between *Dingen* and *Sachen* in this letter, see Beck, L., 1989, pp. 24 ss. Carl, W., 1989, pp. 6ss.

¹⁴⁴ Kant, I., A 10:130.

constructs them. On the contrary, the ectype intellect must take the data from the sensible intuition of things. The difference between both types of intellect is structural. It is not a mere question of degree as it was for Leibniz. Our understanding cannot be the causal principle of objects. The intellectual concepts of the ectype understanding do not bring the objects of experience into existence¹⁴⁵. As Kant explained, the problem of the correspondence of representation with the object concerns only the intellect as it is neither merely reproductive nor purely productive. The intellectual representation of our finite intellect requires the object to provide the data to form the experience. But pure concepts of understanding are not mere abstractions of sensible material. Then, the problem is to explain the correspondence between thinking and things for an intellect that cannot fully create them. The reference of intuition to affection is an expression of this limitation.

In this correspondence, Kant introduces the notion of God's intuition as a model that contributes to defining certain features of a finite intellect; namely, its necessary relation to affection. The conclusion we reached is that the application of concepts is a problem only for an understanding that cannot create the objects of experience. Finite beings require the object to be given. On the contrary, for God, objects are created in the very act of thinking. As we saw, this contrast between the ectypus intellect and the archetypal has an analogous formulation in the fourth observation to the Aesthetics. There, it was pointed out that the intellect of God can produce the object *materialiter*. Therefore, the original Being does not require sensible affection. We, men, as finite dependent beings, need an affecting object for the constitution of our experience.

As we saw, the receptive nature of intuition and its dependence on an affecting object is the first mark attributed to intuition in *KrV*. In the Introduction to the Aesthetics, Kant stressed that "at least for us, humans" the object must be given to us and that for this to be possible the object must affect the mind in some way. Kant introduced the pronoun "for us" to stress this point. The study that Jakob Sigismund Beck made of this section in his *Erläuternder Auszug* ... offers an indication that in the Introduction to Aesthetics Kant had the same type of argument in mind as those he developed in the fourth

¹⁴⁵ "Thus the possibility of both an *intellectus archetypus* (an intellect whose intuition is itself the ground of things) and an *intellectus ectypus*, an intellect which would derive the data for its logical procedure from the sensuous intuition of things, is at least comprehensible. However, our understanding, through its representations, is neither the cause of the object (save in the case of moral ends), nor is the object the cause of our intellectual representations in the real sense (*in sensu reali*). Therefore, the pure concepts of the understanding must not be abstracted from sense perceptions, nor must they express the reception of representations through the senses; but though they must have their origin in the nature of the soul, they are neither caused by the object nor do they bring the object itself into being." Kant, I., A 10:130.

observation to the Aesthetics and in the letter to Herz. Reading the first lines of Aesthetic, Beck points out: “the content of the representation is given and not produced. Intuitions are, for example, the representations of external objects that we obtain as long as we are affected, and their content is given.” To human intuition, Beck opposes divine intuition. God produces the content of his representations¹⁴⁶. In this way, the Kantian turn “at least for us humans” - introduced in the second edition - is retaken by Beck as “... on the contrary, for God.”¹⁴⁷.

From these developments, we can conclude: the distinctive feature of human intuition according to the first paragraph of Aesthetics is its relation to receptivity. Kant determines that for a finite rationality, it is necessary the reference to affection to know something at all. This restriction is explained in the fourth observation of Aesthetic, and it is also developed in the epistle to Herz. Men require sensible intuitions to be given since their intellect is not purely archetypal. Men, as finite beings, cannot create the object *materialiter*. Therefore, a finite intellect, like the human, requires the object to be given.

¹⁴⁶ Beck, S., 1793, p. 8.

¹⁴⁷ Therefore, as Vaihinger stated, this Kantian allusion to other thinking beings should not be taken as a mere stylistic turn. Vaihinger, H., 1892, p. 345. As Dieter Heidemann has recently shown, Kant opposes the concept of human intuition to that of “intuition in general”. “Intuition in general” includes other kinds of intuition as the intuition of God or any other being. Kant uses this notion to highlight the peculiarities of finite intuition. Heidemann shows that even when the concept of other intuitions can only be defined negatively, there is a positive use of the notions. Heidemann, D., 2019.

Conclusion

In this first part, we have shown that there is a general agreement among scholars on two main issues. First, the distinction between intuition and concepts plays a central role in the building of the critical system. This dichotomy is the ground upon which the Kantian theory is constructed. However, there is a second general agreement within Kantian studies. The *Critique* opens with a series of definitions that are not justified in the first passages of the *Critique*, where they are introduced. They are merely assumed. Therefore, the first problem that we are dealing with is that the core of the Kantian theory of knowledge rests upon a distinction merely introduced by Kant. The core of the *Critique* seems to be resting on a series of unjustified assumptions. The second problem is to understand the main features of intuitions and concepts. We have studied the general characteristics of intuitive and conceptual representations. For Kant, all representations are divided into intuitions and concepts. The concept is a mediated representation. It cannot refer to the object *in individuo*. Intuition was defined as an immediate and singular representation of the object while the concept is a universal and mediated representation. However, as we saw, there is no general agreement on this issue. The third problem that we found is the relation of intuition to affection. Kant affirms that sensible intuition has a necessary reference to an element external to the mind. There must be an affection for the construction of the experience. While the forms of knowledge lie *a priori*, the matter of knowledge is given *a posteriori*. We studied the problems generated from this relationship of intuition to affection. We observed that even when this problem could be solved, it still remains to explain the relation between these two sources of knowledge, which are heterogeneous with each other. Concepts are a product of understanding, while sensibility provides intuitions. As we have seen, the problem of explaining the relationship between these heterogeneous faculties was highlighted by Kantian contemporaries, and it also represents a theoretical endeavour for contemporary researchers of Kantian philosophy.

In the second part of this section, we studied how the differentiation between intuitions and concepts came to be the technical difference that Kant employed. We showed that the main marks on the Kantian notion of intuition were already advanced by Scotus: immediacy, singularity, and the relation with sensibility (and, therefore, with the concept of existence). We saw that Duns Scotus was the first to give a precise distinction

of these notions. As we exhibited, from the very beginning, the distinction between intuitions and concepts came along with the traditional medieval debate of the relation between universals and particulars. The intuitive way of cognition is the way that the intellect has to achieve the particular, and the particular is what is completely determined. We studied how this problem is also present in Descartes and Leibniz. According to both of them, the intellect was potentially capable of knowing what is real: what is perfectly determined, and intuition was the type of representation that named this kind of cognition. Focusing on Leibniz's account, we showed how he conceived intuitive representations. Paradigmatically real is what is perfectly determined: substances. A complete analysis of the determination of a concept would make it possible to fully know things as they are. Intuition is the accomplishment of this analysis. The mind has a legitimate relation to the objects of experience when we have completed the analysis, and we have shown that there is not any contradiction in the concept. Only then we can claim that our concept is a *real* concept and not a mere empty notion. That would be the Leibnizian answer to the question we posed at the very beginning: "What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call 'representation' to the object?" Our representations have a legitimate relation to objects when we can assure that there is not an internal contradiction in the concept, i.e., when we know intuitively.

In the third part, we focused on the Kantian proposal. Particularly, we studied how Kant conceived his new conception of the distinction between intuitions and concepts in dialogue with Descartes and Leibniz. The study of the incongruent counterparts argument showed that satisfying the requirement of a complete determination of the object demands an extra conceptual element: intuition. The analysis of the conceptual marks of the object is insufficient for its univocal determination. Its location at a point in space and in an instant of time cannot be determined by mere concepts. The requirement of a complete determination of the object is never achieved by means of concepts but it is only satisfied by intuition. The reference of thought to the object *in individuo* can only be guaranteed by intuition. The reference to intuition is established so as to guarantee the possibility of a complete determination of the object.

Then, we showed that the necessary reference to what is given is one of the expressions of the finitude of the human mind. Derived intuition requires an object to be given. The original intuition can produce its object in the act of thinking it. The original intuition is proper of the original Being. Ours is a derived intuition. This opposition was present before the developments of the *Critique*. We studied the letter of Kant to Marcus

Herz of 1772. In this letter, Kant explained that the intellect cannot have access to the particular by mere analyses. For Descartes and Leibniz, the limitation of our mind was mainly expressed for its incapability to have access to all the determination of things, i.e., to fully analyse concepts. There is a difference of degree between concepts and intuitions because there is a difference of degree between the model of a perfect mind (infinite) and ours (finite). On the contrary, for Kant, intuitions and concepts are heterogeneous representations because it is not the case that we know less than a perfect model of cognition, but we know different. The impossibility to know things *in individuo* by pure concepts is an expression of this peculiar way of conceiving the imperfection of human knowledge. For Kant, the relation between the representation and what is real is no longer grounded on the possibility of a complete analysis but on the possibility of giving content to concepts, which merely by themselves are empty. The introduction of the possibility of empty concepts comes along with the requirement of an external element to give content to the conceptual representations. Now, we can only know something under the condition that those concepts that belong to the understanding can be applied to particulars without losing their universality. However, the universality of the concept is external to the concreteness of the object in its individuality, in the sense that space and time – those conditions that enable to individualize the object- belong to the forms of intuition while concepts are products of the understanding. At the same time, the matter of experience can only be given *a posteriori*. We saw the numerous problems that Kant faced at splitting the two sources of knowledge. In his overcoming of rationalism, Kant shows the division of two heterogeneous faculties could solve the problem within the rationalistic conception. It seems that we have two possibilities: either we claim that individuals can be reached by a process of the understanding, or we claim that they are heterogeneous elements of thinking. The first option led to the problems that Kant outlined, such as the problem of incongruent counterparts. The division of faculties was meant precisely to overcome this problem. However, the second option ended up in the problems that we summarized. We will argue that the proposal of Paul Natorp is able to deal with both problems. As we shall see, Natorp redefines the distinction between intuition and concepts in the discussion of the problem of method. The transcendental method, which we will argue is a synthesis method, will guarantee to give an answer to the Kantian question: on what foundation rests the relationship of our representation in us with the objects. In Chapter 2, we will study how the problem was introduced by other contemporary approaches: psychologism and logicism. They misunderstood the nature of

the problem. We will exhibit that both currents have a wrong conception of the relationship between intuitions and concepts due to methodological errors. Natorp will show that both positions are unsuccessful to explain the issues raised by Kant.