The crucible of war: Dutch and British military learning processes in and beyond southern Afghanistan
Vorm, M. van der

Citation

Bibliography

Bibliography

1 Military Intelligence Brigade. (2011). *Operational Intelligence Best Practice Handbook.* Bulford.

Aarten, R. J. (2019). Trident Juncture 2018: Substantiële Nederlandse bijdrage aan Joint High Visibility Exercise. *Militaire Spectator, 188*(9), 408-423.

Adamsky, D. (2010). *The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Adamsky, D., & Inge Bjerga, K. (Eds.). (2012). *Contemporary Military Innovation: Between anticipation and adaptation.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken. (2015). *Instabiliteit rond Europa: Confrontatie met een nieuwe werkelijkheid.* Den Haag.

Ahmar, S., & Kolbe, C. (2011). *Innovative Approach to Evaluating Interventions in Fragile and Conflict Affected States: The Case of Helmand.* London: Coffey International Development.

Akam, S. (2021). *The Changing of the Guard: The British Army since 9/11.* London: Scribe.

Alderson, A. (2007). Revising the British Army's Counter-Insurgency Doctrine. *The RUSI Journal, 152*(4), 6-11.

Alderson, A. (2009). *The Validity of British Counterinsurgency Insurgency Doctrine after the War in Iraq 2003-2009.* Cranfield: Cranfield University.

Alderson, A. (2010). The Army Brain: A historical perspective on doctrine, development and the challenges of future conflict. *The RUSI Journal, 155*(3), 10-15.

Alderson, A. (2010). United Kingdom. In T. Rid, & T. Keaney (Eds.), *Understanding Counterinsurgency* (pp. 28-45). London: Routledge.

Alderson, A. (2012). Influence, the Indirect Approach and Manoeuvre. *The RUSI Journal, 157*(1), 36-43.

Alderson, A. (2012). The British Approach to COIN and Stabilisation: A Retrospective on Developments since 2001. *The RUSI Journal, 157*(4), 62-71.

Alderson, A. (2013). Too Busy to Learn: Personal Observations on British Campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. In J. Bailey, R. Iron, & H. Strachan (Eds.), *British Generals in Blair's Wars* (pp. 281-296). Farnham: Ashgate.

Alderson, A. (2014). 'Learn from Experience' or 'Never Again'. *The RUSI Journal, 159*(1), 40-48.

Altman, Y., & Iles, P. (1998). Learning, leadership, teams: corporate learning and organisational change. *The Journal of Management Development, 17*(1), 44-55.

Andres, R. B. (2007). The Afghan Model in northern Iraq. In T. G. Mahnken, & T. A. Keaney (Eds.), *War in Iraq: Planning and Execution* (pp. 52-68). New York: Routledge.

Antill, P., & Smith, J. (2017). The British Army in Transition: From Army 2020 to the Strike Brigades and the Logistics of Future Operations. *RUSI Journal, 162*(3), 50-58.

Aragon, M. I., Jimenez, D. J., & Valle, R. S. (2013). Training and performance: The mediating role of organizational learning. *Business Research Quarterly, 17*, 161-173.

Argote, L., & Miron-Spektor, E. (2010). Organizational Learning: From Experience to Knowledge. *Organization Science, 22*(5), 1123-1137.

Argyris, C. (1977). Double Loop Learning in Organizations. *Harvard Business Review, 55*(5), 115-124.

Arjomand, N. (2013, January 25). *Eagle's Summit Revisted.* Retrieved July 23, 2021, from Afghanistan Analyst's Network: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2013/02/20130125_Arjomand_Kajaki_Dam_final1.pdf

Asprey, R. B. (2002). *War In The Shadows.* Lincoln: iUniverse.

Avant, D. A. (1993). The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars. *International Studies Quarterly, 37*(4), 409-430.

Avant, D. A., & Lebovic, J. H. (2002). U.S. Military Responses to Post-Cold War Missions. In T. Farrell, & T. Terriff (Eds.), *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology* (pp. 139-160). Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Aylwin-Foster, N. R. (2005). Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations. *Military Review, 85*(6), 2-15.

Bacevich, A. J. (1986). *The Pentomic Era: the US Army between Korea and Vietnam.* Washington DC: National Defense University Press.

Baechler, J. (2016). *Operationalizing "Whole-of-Government" as an approach to state fragility and instability: case studies from Ottowa, Canada and London, United Kingdom.* Halifax: Dalhousie University (Doctoral Dissertation).

Bailey, J. (2013). The Political Context: Why We Went to War and the Mismatch of Ends, Ways and Means. In J. Bailey, R. Iron, & H. Strachan (Eds.), *British Generals in Blair's Wars* (pp. 5-25). Farnham: Ashgate.

Bailey, J. B. (2006). Military history and the pathology of lessons learned: the Russo-Japanese War, a case study. In W. Murray, & R. H. Sinnreich (Eds.), *The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession* (pp. 170-194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bailey, J., Iron, R., & Strachan, H. (Eds.). (2013). *British Generals in Blair's Wars.* Farnham: Ashgate.

Barno, D., & Bensahel, N. (2020). *Adaptation under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Barros, A. I., & Monsuur, H. (2011). Operationele Analyse: Science at the frontline. *Militaire Spectator, 180(6)*, 248-259.

Barry, B. (2017). *Harsh Lessons: Iraq, Afghanistan and the Changing Character of War.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Basten, D., & Haamann, T. (2018). Approaches for Organizational Learning: A Literature Review. *SAGE Open*, 1-20.

Battle Group 3. (2007). *Evaluatieverslag Commandant 42 (NLD) BG LJ TFE 3, missie Uruzgan 1 apr 2007 t/m 1 aug 2007.* Tarin Kowt.

Beadle, N. (2011). Afghanistan and the Context of Iraq. In M. Clarke (Ed.), *The Afghan Papers: Committing Britain to War in Helmand, 2005-2006* (pp. 73-80). Abingdon: Royal United Services Institute.

Beckett, I. (2012). The Historiography of Insurgency. In P. B. Duyvesteyn, *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency* (pp. 23-31). London : Routledge.

Beckett, I. F. (2001). *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750*. London: Routledge.

Beckett, I. F. (2012). British counter-insurgency: a historiographical reflection. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 781-798.

Ben-Ari, A., & Levy, Y. (2014). Getting Access to the Field: Insider/Outsider Perspectives. In J. Soeters, S. Rietjens, & P. Shields (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies* (pp. 9-18). Abingdon: Routledge.

Bennett, C. J., & Howlett, M. (1992). The lessons of learning: Reconciling theories of policy learning and policy change. *Policy Sciences, 25*, 275-294.

Bennett, H. (2007). The Other Side of the COIN: Minimum and Exemplary Force in British Army Counterinsurgency in Kenya. *Small Wars and Insurgencies, 18*(4), 638-664.

Bensahel, N. (2007). Mission not accomplished. In T. G. Mahnken, & T. A. Keaney (Eds.), *War in Iraq: Planning and Execution* (pp. 129-144). New York: Routledge.

Berends, H., & Antonacopoulou, E. (2014). Time and Organizational Learning: A Review and Agenda for Future Research. *International Journal of Management Reviews, 16*, 437-453.

Berends, H., & Lammers, I. (2010). Explaining Discontinuity in Organizational Learning: A Process Analysis. *Organization Studies, 31*(8), 1045-1068.

Berman, E., Felter, J. H., & Shapiro, J. N. (2018). *Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Berman, L. (2012). Capturing Contemporary Innovation: Studying IDF Innovation against Hamas and Hizballah. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 35*(1), 121-147.

Bethell, J. (2010). Accidental counterinsurgents: Nad E Ali, Hybrid War and the Future of the British Army. *British Army Review, 149*(Summer), 8-17.

Betz, D., & Cormack, A. (2009). Hot War, Cold Comfort: A Less Optimistic Take on the British Military in Afghanistan. *RUSI Journal, 154*(4), 26-29.

Bevelhebber Nederlandsche Landstrijdkrachten. (1928). *Voorschrift voor de Uitoefening van de Politiek-Politionele Taak van het Leger.* Batavia: Departement van Oorlog.

Bickel, K. B. (2001). *Mars Learning: The Marine Corps' Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940.* Boulder: Westview Press.

Biddle, S. (1996). Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict. *International Security, 21*(2), 139-179.

Biddle, S. (2002). *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy.* Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute.

Biddle, S. (2004). *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Biddle, S. (2006). Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon. *Foreign Affairs, 85*(2), 2-14.

Biddle, S., Friedman, J., & Shapiro, J. (2012). Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007? *International Security, 37*(1), 7-40.

Bjerga, K. I., & Haaland, T. L. (2010). Development of Military Doctrine: The Particular Case of Small States. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 33*(4), 505-533.

Black, J. (2016). *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: A Global History.* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Blanken, L. J., Rothstein, H., & Lepore, J. J. (Eds.). (2015). *Assessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success and Failure.* Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Boh, W. F. (2007). Mechanisms for sharing knowledge in project-based organizations. *Information and Organization, 17*(1), 27-58.

Boot, M. (2003). The New American Way of War. *Foreign Affairs, 82*(4), 41-58.

Bousquet, A. (2009). *The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity.* London: Hurst.

British Army. (2001). *Army Field Manual 1-10: Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines).*

British Army. (2006). *Operation Banner: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland.* Warminster: Land Warfare Centre.

British Army. (2010). *Army Field Manual 1-10: Countering Insurgency.* Warminster: Land Warfare Centre.

British Army. (2010). *Operations in Iraq: An Analysis from a Land Perspective.* Warminster: Land Warfare Centre.

British Army. (2012). *The Company Intelligence Support Handbook.* Warminster: Land Warfare Centre.

British Army. (2012). *Transforming the British Army, July 2012: Modernising to face an unpredictable future.* London.

British Army. (2014). *Force Troops Command: Forces Troop Command overview and brigades.* Andover.

British Army. (2015). *Operation HERRICK Campaign Study.* Warminster: Directorate Land Warfare.

British Army. (2016, May). 77 Brigade (unclassified presentation).

British Army. (2017). *Army doctrine Publication Land Operations.* Warminster: Land Warfare Development Centre .

British Army. (2017). *Army Field Manual: Tactics for Stability Operations.* Warminster: Land Warfare Development Centre.

British Army. (2018, May 8). *Joint Warfighting*. Retrieved June 6, 2021, from British Army: https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/news/2018/05/joint-warfighting/

British Army. (2019). *Army Field Manual Counter-irregular Activity.* Warminster: Land Warfare Development Centre.

Brocades Zaalberg, T. (2006). Countering insurgent-terrorism. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 17*(4), 399-420.

Brocades Zaalberg, T. (2008). 'The roots of Dutch Counter-Insurgency, Balancing and integrating Military and civilian efforts from Aceh to Uruzgan. In R. G. Davis (Ed.), *The U.S. army and irregular warfare 1775-2007: Selected papers from the 2007 Conference of Army Historians.* Washington D.C.: Center of Military History.

Brocades Zaalberg, T. (2012). Counterinsurgency and Peace Operations. In P. B. Rich, & I. Duyvesteyn (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency* (pp. 80-97). London: Routledge.

Brocades Zaalberg, T. (2013). The Use and Abuse of the 'Dutch Approach' to Counterinsurgency. *Journal of Strategic Studies, 36*(3), 867-897.

Brocades Zaalberg, T. (2017). The Snake Oil of Stabilisation? Explaining the Rise and Demise of the Comprehensive Approach. In P. Ducheine, & F. Osinga (Eds.), *Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies, NL Arms* (pp. 67-89). The Hague: Asser Press.

Brocades Zaalberg, T., & ten Cate, A. (2012). A Gentle Occupation: unravelling the Dutch approach in Iraq, 2003-2005. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 23*(1), 117-143.

Broekema, W. (2018). *When does the phoenix rise? Factors and mechanisms that influence crisis-induced learning by public organizations.* Leiden: Leiden University.

Broekhof, M., Kitzen, M., & Osinga, F. (2019). A Tale of Two Mosuls: the resurrection of the Iraqi armed forces and the military defeat of ISIS. *The Journal of Strategic Studies*.

Broos, E., & Sissingh, M. (2013). Verhelderen van de informatieomgeving voor 'Information Operations' door 'Systemic Analysis'. *Militaire Spectator, 182*(7/8), 343-354.

Brun, I. (2010). 'While You're Busy Making Other Plans'- The 'Other RMA'. *Journal of Strategic Studies, 33*(4), 535-565.

Burke, E. (2018). *An Army of Tribes: British Army Cohesion, Deviancy and Murder in Northern Ireland.* Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

Burnes, B., Cooper, C., & West, P. (2003). Organisational learning: the new management paradigm? *Management Decision, 41*(5/6), 452-464.

Burton, B., & Nagl, J. (2008). Learning as we go: the US army adapts to counterinsurgency in Iraq, July 2004–December 2006. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 19*(3), 303-327.

Bury, P. (2017). Barossa Night: cohesion in the British Army officer corps. *The British Journal Of Sociology, 68*(2), 314-335.

Bury, P., & King, A. (2015). A Profession of Love: Cohesion in a British Platoon in Afghanistan. In A. King (Ed.), *Frontline: combat and cohesion in the 21st century* (pp. 200-215). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Butler, E. (2015). Setting Ourselves up for a Fall in Afghanistan: Where Does Accountability Lie for Decision-Making in Helmand in 2005–06? *RUSI Journal, 160*(1), 46-57.

Byrne, B., & Bannister, F. (2013). Knowledge Management in Defence. *Defence Forces Review*, 71-93.

Callwell, C. (1899). *Small Wars: Their Principles & Practice.* London: War Office.

Carley, K. M., & Harrald, J. R. (1997). Organizational Learning Under Fire: Theory and Practice. *The American Behavioral Scientist, 40*(3), 310-332.

Catignani, S. (2012). 'Getting COIN' at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the British Army. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 35*(4), 513-539.

Catignani, S. (2014). Coping with Knowledge: Organizational Learning in the British Army? *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 37*(1), 30-64.

Causey, T. (2020, June 22). *War is a Learning Competition: How a Culture of Debrief Can Improve Multi-Domain Operations.* Retrieved from Over the Horizon Journal: https://othjournal. com/2020/06/22/war-is-a-learning-competition/amp/?__twitter_impression=true#

Cavanagh, M. (2012). Ministerial Decision-Making in the Run-Up to the Helmand Deployment. *RUSI Journal, 157*(2), 48-54.

Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research. (2016). Being ready for warfighting at scale – lessons learned and today's challenges. *Ares & Athena, 6*, 15-22.

Chalmers, M. (2011). Keeping our powder dry? UK Defence policy beyond Afghanistan. *RUSI Journal, 156*(1), 20-28.

Chalmers, M. (2016). The 2015 SDSR in Context: From Boom to Bust – and Back Again? *RUSI Journal, 161*(1), 4-12.

Chandler, J. (2020). An Introduction to 77 Brigade. *British Army Review, 177*, 14-19.

Chandrasekaran, R. (2012). *Little America: The War within the War for Afghanistan.* London: Bloomsbury.

Chin, W. (2008). Why Did It All Go Wrong? Reassessing British Counterinsurgency in Iraq. *Strategic Studies Quarterly, 2*(4), 119-135.

Chin, W. (2010). Colonial Warfare in a Post-Colonial State: British Military Operations in Helmand. *Defence Studies, 10*(1-2), 215-247.

Chiva, R., Ghauri, P., & Alegre, J. (2014). Organizational Learning, Innovation and Internationalization: A Complex System Model. *British Journal of Management, 25*, 687-705.

Clarke, J. P. (2019, March 29). *"Good Allies": International Perspectives on Afghanistan.* Retrieved from The War Room: https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/good-allies/

Clarke, M. (2011). The Helmand Decision. In M. Clarke (Ed.), *The Afghan Papers: Committing Britain to War in Helmand, 2005-2006* (pp. 5-29). Abingdon: Royal United Services Institute.

Clarke, M., & Soria, V. (2011). Charging up the Valley: British Decisions in Afghanistan. *The RUSI Journal, 156*(4), 80-88.

Clegg, M. (2016). Protecting British Soldiers in Afghanistan. *RUSI Journal, 157*(3), 22-30.

Clemis, M. G. (2009). Crafting non-kinetic warfare: the academic-military nexus in US counterinsurgency doctrine. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 20*(1), 160-184.

Cochrane, B. (2012). *The Development of the British Approach to Improvised Explosive Device Disposal in Northern Ireland.* Bedford: Cranfield University.

Cohen, E. A., & Gooch, J. (2006). *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War.* New York: Free Press.

Cohen, E., Crane, C., Horvath, J., & Nagl, J. (2006). Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency. *Military Review, 86*(2), 49-53.

Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1989). Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D. *The Economic Journal, 99*, 569-596.

Commander Battlegroup. (2006). *Evaluatie 1 (NLD) BG TFU-1, missie Uruzghan jun 2006-t/m dec 2006.* Tarin Kowt.

Commander Battlegroup 3. (2007). *Evaluatieverslag Commandant 42 (NLD) BG LJ TFE 3, missie Uruzgan: 1 apr 2007 t/m/ 1 aug 2007.* Tarin Kowt.

Commander British Forces Op HERRICK 7. (2008). *Counterinsurgency in Helmand: Task Force Operational Design.* Lashkar Gah.

Commando Landstrijdkrachten. (2019, July 11). Memo: Raad Ervaringslessen Staf CLAS. Utrecht.

Connable, B. (2012). *Embracing the Fog of War: Assessment and Metrics in Counterinsurgency.* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Connolly, J., & Pyper, R. (2020). Developing capacity within the British civil service: the case of the Stabilisation Unit. *Public Money & Management*, 1-12.

Coombs, H. G. (2015). Canada: The Evolution of a New Canadian Way of War. In S. Grenier, & G. Mattox (Eds.), *The Politics of Alliance: Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan* (pp. 65-79). Redford City: Stanford University Press.

Coombs, H. G. (2019). Canada's Lessons. *Parameters, 49*(3), 27-40.

Cordesman, A. (2010). *The Afghan Test Bed in "Marja": Key tests of victory are still months and years away.* Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Cordesman, A. (2015). *Afghanistan at Transition: Lessons of the Longest War.* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Cornish, P. (2010). *Evaluating the 2010 Strategy Review.* Chatham House: London.

Cornish, P. (2013). Strategic Culture in the United Kingdom. In H. Biehl, B. Giegerich, & A. Jonas (Eds.), *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Politics Across the Continent* (pp. 371-385). Wiesbaden: Springer.

Coticchia, F., & Moro, F. N. (2016). Learning From Others? Emulation and Change in the Italian Armed Forces Since 2001. *Armed Forces & Society, 42*(4), 696-718.

Cowper-Coles, S. (2011). *Cables from Kabul.* London: Harper Press.

Crane, C. C. (2016). *Cassandra in Oz.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.

Crane, C. C., & Terrill, W. A. (2003). *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario.* Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute.

Crossan, M. M., & Apaydin, M. (2010). A Multi-Dimensional Framework of Organizational Innovation: A Systemic Review of the Literature. *Journal of Management Studies, 47(6)*, 1154-1191.

Crossan, M. M., Lane, H. W., & White, R. E. (1999). An Organizational Learning Framework: From Intuition to Institution. *Academy of Management Review, 24(3)*, 522-537.

Crossan, M. M., Maurer, C. C., & White, R. E. (2011). Reflections on the 2009 AMR Decade Award: Do we have a theory of organizational learning? *Academy of Management Review, 36(3)*, 446-460.

Daddis, G. A. (2011). *No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Darling, M. J., Sparkers Guber, H., Smith, J. S., & Stiles, J. E. (2016). Emergent Learning: A Framework for Whole-System Strategy, Learning, and Adaptation. *The Foundation Review, 8(1)*, 59-73.

Davidson, J. (2010). *Lifting the Fog of Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War.* Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

De Long, D. W., & Fahey, L. (2000). Diagnosing cultural barriers to knowledge management. *The Academy of Management Executive, 14(4)*, 113-127.

De Ruiter, R. (2018). *Breuklijn 1989: Continuiteit en verandering in het Nederlandse defensiebeleid 1989-1993.* Breda: Netherlands Defence Academy.

De Spiegeleire, S., de Bruijne, K., Bekkers, F., Meijnders, M., & Sweijs, T. (2017). *Strategische Monitor 2017-2018: Stilte voor de Storm?* The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies/Clingendael.

De Waard, E., Rietjens, S., Romme, G., & van Fenema, P. (2021). Learning in complex public systems: The case of MINUSMA's intelligence organization. *Public Management Review*, 1-32.

De Wijk, R., & Osinga, F. (2010). Military Innovation on a Shrinking Playing Field: Military Change in the Netherlands. In T. Terriff, F. Osinga, & T. Farrell (Eds.), *A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Change* (pp. 108-143). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

De Winter, S. (2015). *The Army after Afghanistan: A Case Study on Military Adaptation to Counterinsurgency Warfare within 12 Infantry Battalion Air Assault the Regiment Van Heutsz.* Breda: Netherlands Defence Academy (Master Thesis).

Defensie Materieel Organisatie. (2016). *Kennis- & Innovatieplan Grondgebonden Wapensystemen (GWS), 2016-2018.* Den Haag.

Deijkers, L. (2020). *Politieke zuinigheid en militaire volgzaamheid: De militaire strategie van Nederland in de periode 2000-2014.* Culemborg: Armex Special.

Dekkers, P., & Grijpstra, P. (2016). *Informatie als Wapen.* Den Haag: Ministerie van Defensie.

Department for International Development. (2010). *Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations: Links between Politics, Security and Development.* London.

Department of Defense. (2014). *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014.* Washington D.C.

Department of Defense. (2018). *National Defense Strategy.* Washington D.C.

Department of the Army. (2007). *FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency Field Manual.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Department of the Army. (2008). *FM 3.07: Stability Operations.* Washington D.C.: Combined Arms Center.

Department of the Army. (2018). *Army Techniques Publication 3-96.1: Security Force Assistance Brigade.* Washington D.C.: Department of the Army.

Di Schiena, R., Letens, G., Van Aken, E., & Farris, J. (2013). Relationship between Leadership and Characteristics of Learning Organizations in Deployed Military Units: An Exploratory Study. *Administrative Sciences*(3), 143-165.

Dimitriu, G., & De Graaf, B. (2010). The Dutch Coin approach: three years in Uruzgan, 2006-2009. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 21*(3), 429-458.

Dimitriu, G., Tuinman, G., & van der Vorm, M. (2016). Formative Years: Military Adaptation of Dutch Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan. *Special Operations Journal, 2*(2), 146-166.

Dixon, P. (2009). 'Hearts and Minds'? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq. *The Journal Of Strategic Studies, 32*(3), 353-381.

Doubler, M. D. (1994). *Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945.* Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Dougherty, D. (1999). Organizing for Innovation. In S. R. Clegg, C. Hardy, & W. R. Nord (Eds.), *Managing Organizations* (pp. 174-189). London: SAGE Publications.

Downes-Martin, S. (2011). Operations Assessment in Afghanistan is Broken: What Is to Be Done. *Naval War College Review, 64*(4), 103-125.

Downie, R. D. (1998). *Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War.* Westport: Praeger.

Dressler, J. (2009). *Securing Helmand: Understanding and Responding to the Enemy.* Washington DC: Institute for the Study of War.

Drummond, N. (2020, April 8). *The Anatomy of Strike.* Retrieved March 3, 2022, from UK Land Power: https://uklandpower.com/2020/04/08/the-anatomy-of-strike/

DSTL. (2010). *Delivering Strategic Communications and Influence in Afghanistan: A UK Perspective.* London.

Duarte Aponte, S. P., & Castaneda Zapata, D. I. (2013). A model of organizational learning in practice. *Estudios Gerenciales, 29*, 439-444.

Duffield, S., & Whitty, S. (2016). How to apply the Systemic Lessons Learned Knowledge model to wire an organisation for the capability of storytelling. *International Journal of Project Management, 34*(3), 429-443.

Dyson, T. (2012). Organizing for Counter-insurgency: Explaining Doctrinal Adaptation in Britain and Germany. *Contemporary Security Policy, 33*(1), 27-58.

Dyson, T. (2019). The military as learning organisation: establishing the fundamentals of best-practice in lessons learned. *Defence Studies*, 1-23.

Dyson, T. (2020). *Organisational Learning and the Modern Army: a new model for lessons-learned processes.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Echevarria, A. J. (2011). Reconsidering War's Logic and Grammar. *Infinity Journal, 1*(2), 4-7.

Egnell, R. (2011). Lessons from Helmand, Afghanistan: what now for British counterinsurgency? *International Affairs, 87*(2), 297-315.

Eikelboom, A. R., Gouweleeuw, R. G., Roseboom, G., & Schwerzel, J. (2019). The Dutch Approach in OPSA: Lessons Learned from a Decade of OPSA in Afghanistan. In A. Shilling (Ed.), *Operations Assessment in Complex Environments: Theory and Practice* (pp. 247-262). NATO Science and Technology Organization.

Elliott, C. (2015). *High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.* London: Hurst & Company.

Etzioni, A. (2015). COIN: A study of strategic illusion. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 26*(3), 345-376.

Evans, M. (2003). Kadesh to Kandahar: Military Theory and the Future of War. *Naval War College Review, 56*(3), 132-150.

Fairweather, J. (2015). *The Good War: Why We Couldn't Win the War or the Peace in Afghanistan.* London: Vintage.

Fang, C., Lee, J., & Schilling, M. A. (2010). Balancing Exploration and Exploitation Through Structural Design: The Isolation of Subgroups and Organizational Learning. *Organization Science, 21*(3), 625-642.

Farrell, T. (1998). Culture and Military Power. *Review of International Studies, 24*(3), 407-416.

Farrell, T. (2008). The dynamics of British military transformation. *International affairs, 84*(4), 777-807.

Farrell, T. (2010). Appraising Moshtarak. *RUSI Briefing Note*, 1-13.

Farrell, T. (2010). Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 33*(4), 567-594.

Farrell, T. (2013). Back from the Brink: British Military Adaptation and the Struggle for Helmand. In T. Farrell, F. Osinga, & J. A. Russell (Eds.), *Military Adaptation in Afghanistan* (pp. 108-134). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Farrell, T. (2013). Introduction: Military Adaptation in War. In T. Farrell, F. Osinga, & J. A. Russell (Eds.), *Military Adaptation in Afghanistan* (pp. 1-23). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Farrell, T. (2017). *Unwinnable: Britain's War in Afghanistan, 2001-2014.* London: The Bodley Head.

Farrell, T. (2018). Unbeatable: Social Resources, Military Adaptation, and the Afghan Taliban. *Texas National Security Review, 1*(3), 59-75.

Farrell, T., & Gordon, S. (2009). COIN Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan. *The RUSI Journal, 154*(3), 18-25.

Farrell, T., & Terriff, T. (2002). Introduction. In T. Farrell, & T. Terriff (Eds.), *The Sources of Military Change* (pp. 3-20). Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Farrell, T., & Terriff, T. (Eds.). (2002). *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology.* Boulder: Lynne Riener Publishers.

Farrell, T., & Terriff, T. (2010). Military Transformation in NATO: A Framework for Analysis. In T. Terriff, F. Osinga, & T. Farrell (Eds.), *A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Military Change* (pp. 1-13). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Farrell, T., Osinga, F., & Russell, J. A. (Eds.). (2013). *Military Adaptation in Afghanistan.* Stanford: Stanford Universty Press.

Feichtinger, M., Malinowski, S., & Richards, C. (2012). Transformative Invasions: Western Post-9/11 Counterinsurgency and the Lessons of Colonialism. *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism and Development, 3*(1), 35-63.

Filkins, D. (2010, February 12). Afghan Offensive is New War Model. *The New York Times*.

Finkel, M. (2011). *On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Fiol, C. M., & Lyles, M. A. (1985). Organizational Learning. *The Academy of Management Review, 10*(4), 803-813.

Fitzgerald, D. (2013). *Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Fitzsimmons, M. (2008). Hard Hearts and Open Minds? Governance, Identity and the Intellectual Foundations of Counterinsurgency Strategy. *Journal of Strategic Studies, 31*(3), 337-365.

Foley, R. T. (2014). Dumb donkeys or cunning foxes? Learning in the British and German armies during the Great War. *International Affairs, 90*(2), 279-298.

Foley, R. T., Griffin, S., & McCartney, H. (2011). 'Transformation in contact': learning the lessons of modern war. *International Affairs, 87*(2), 253-270.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office. (2014). *Capturing the lessons from the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT).* Steyning: Wilton Park.

Foschini, F. (2012, March 18). *A year of transition: A look back.* Retrieved from Afghanistan Analysts Network: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/one-year-of-transition-a-look-back-1/

Fox, A. (2018). *Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British Army, 1914-1918.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Frame, T., & Palazzo, A. (Eds.). (2016). *On Ops: Lessons and Challenges for the Australian Army sice East Timor.* Sydney: UNSW Press.

Freedman, L. (2013). *Strategy: A History.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Freedman, L. (2017). Force and the International Relations community: Blair's Chicago speech and the criteria for intervention. *International Relations, 31*(2), 107-124.

Freedman, L. (2017). *The Future of War: A History.* London: Penguin.

Fry, R., & Bowen, D. (2011). UK National Strategy and Helmand. In M. Clarke (Ed.), *The Afghan Papers: Committing Britain to War in Helmand, 2005-2006* (pp. 68-72). Abingdon: Royal United Services Institute.

Fuller, J. W. (2008). What is a military lesson? In T. G. Mahnken, & J. A. Maiolo (Eds.), *Strategic Studies: A Reader* (pp. 34-49). New York: Routledge.

Galula, D. (1964). *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.* Westport: Praeger Security International.

Ganz, S. G. (2018). Ignorant Decision Making and Educated Inertia: Some Political Pathologies of Organizational Learning. *Organization Science, 29*(1), 39-57.

Gartner, S. (2015). Wartime Strategic Assessment: Concepts and challenges. In L. Blanken, H. Rothstein, & J. Lepore (Eds.), *Assessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success and failure* (pp. 30-45). Washington DC: Georgetown University Press.

Gentile, G. (2013). *Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency.* New York: The New Press.

Gentile, G. P. (2008). A (Slightly) Better War: A Narrative and Its Defects. *World Affairs, 171*(1), 57-64.

Gentile, G. P. (2009). A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army. *Parameters, 39*(3), 5-17.

Gentile, G. P. (2010). Freeing the Army from the Counterinsurgency Straitjacket. *Joint Forces Quarterly, 58*(3), 121-122.

Gentile, G. P. (2010). Time for the Deconstruction of Field Manual 3-24. *Joint Forces Quarterly, 58*(3), 116-117.

George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2004). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Gilgun, J. (2019). Deductive qualitative analysis and grounded theory: Sensitizing concepts and hypothesis-testing. In A. Bryant, & K. Charmaz (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Current Developments in Grounded Theory* (pp. 107-122). London: Sage.

Gioia, D. A., Corley, K. G., & Hamilton, A. L. (2013). Seeking Qualitative Rigor in Inductive Research: Notes on the Gioia Methodology. *Organizational Research Methods, 16*(1), 15-31.

Giustozzi, A. (2015). *The Army of Afghanistan.* London: Hurst.

Goldman, E. O. (2002). The Spread of Western Military Models to Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan. In T. Farrell, & T. Terriff (Eds.), *The Sources of Military Change* (pp. 41-67). Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Gompert, D. C., & Gordon IV, J. (2008). *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency.* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Gompert, D. C., Kugler, R. L., & Libicki, M. C. (1999). *Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs.* Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press.

Grah, B., Dimovski, V., Snow, C. C., & Peterlin, J. (2016). Expanding the Model of Organizational Learning: Scope, Contingencies, and Dynamics. *Economic and Business Review, 18*(2), 183-212.

Grandia Mantas, M. (2015). *Deadly Embrace? The Decision Paths to Helmand and Uruzgan.* Leiden: Doctoral Dissertation Leiden University.

Gray, C. (2001). The RMA and intervention: A sceptical view. *Contemporary Security Policy, 22*(3), 52-65.

Gray, C. S. (2015). *Thucydides was right: Defining the future threat.* Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute.

Griffin, C. (2009). A Revolution in Colonial Military Affairs: Gallieni, Lyautey and the "Tache d'Huile". *British International Studies Association Conference.* Leicester.

Griffin, S. (2011). Iraq, Afghanistan and the future of British military doctrine: from counterinsurgency to Stabilization. *International Affairs, 87*(2), 317-333.

Griffin, S. (2017). Military Innovation Studies: Multidisciplinary or Lacking Discipline. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 40*(1-2), 196-224.

Grissom, A. (2006). The future of military innovation studies. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 29*(5), 905-934.

Gudmundsson, B. I. (1989). *Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918.* New York: Praeger.

Gupta, A. K., Smith, K. G., & Shalley, C. E. (2006). The Interplay between Exploration and Exploitation. *Academy of Management Journal, 49*(4), 693-706.

Gwynn, C. (1939). *Imperial Policing.* London: MacMillan & Co.

Haaland, T. L. (2016). The Limits to Learning in Military Operations: Bottom-up Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 39*(7), 999-1022.

Hack, K. (2018). 'Devils that suck the blood of the Malayan People': The Case for Post-Revisionist Analysis of Counter-insurgency Violence. *War in History, 25*(2), 202-226.

Hammes, T. X. (2012). The Future of Counterinsurgency. *Orbis, 56*(4), 565-587.

Hao, Z., & Yunlong, D. (2014). Research on the relationship of institutional innovation, organizational learning and synergistic effect: An emperical study of Chinese university spin-offs. *Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management, 7*(3), 645-659.

Hardt, H. (2018). *NATO's Lessons in Crisis: Institutional Memory in International Organizations.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Harkness, K. A., & Hunzeker, M. (2015). Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the Politics of Failure. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 38*(6), 777-800.

Harnden, T. (2011). *Dead Men Risen: The Welsh Guards and the Real Story of Britain's War in Afghanistan.* London: Quercus Publishing.

Harris, R., & Yan, J. (2019). The Measurement of Absorptive Capacity from an Economics Perspective: Definition, Measurement and Importance. *Journal of Economic Surveys, 33*(3), 729–756.

Harrison, G. (2014). The time before Helmand: British engagement in northern Afghanistan. In B. Chiari (Ed.), *From Venus to Mars?: Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the European Military Experience in Afghanistan, 2001-2014* (pp. 123-133). Freiburg: Rombach Verlag.

Hartmann, A., & Doree, A. (2015). Learning between projects: More than sending messages in bottles. *International Journal of Project Management, 33*(2), 341-351.

Harvey, C., & Wilkinson, M. (2009). The Value of Doctrine: Adressing British Officers' Perspectives. *RUSI Journal, 154*(6), 26-31.

Hashimi, A. (2020). Lessons of Modern War: A Case Study of the Sri Lankan War. In T. Mahnken (Ed.), *Learning the Lessons of Modern War* (pp. 181-196). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Hasselbladh, H., & Yden, K. (2019). Why Military Organizations Are Cautious About Learning? *Armed Forces & Society*, 1-20.

Hastings, M. (2009, July 20). General Dannatt is a principled man guilty of telling the truth. *Daily Mail*.

Hastings, M. (2012). *The Operators: The Wild and Terrifying Inside Story of America's War in Afghanistan*. London: Blue Rider Press.

Haun, P. (2019). Peacetime military innovation through inter-service cooperation: The unique case of the U.S. Air Force and Battlefield Air Interdiction. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 42*(1), 1-27.

Hazelbag, L. (2009). *Politieke besluitvorming van de missie in Uruzgan: een reconstructie.* Breda: Faculty of Military Sciences.

Hazelbag, L. J. (2016). *De geïntegreerde benadering in Afghanistan: tussen ambitie en praktijk.* Breda: Netherlands Defence Academy.

Hazelton, J. L. (2018). The client gets a vote: counterinsurgency warfare and the U.S. military advisory mission in South Vietnam, 1954-1965. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 41*(1), 1-28.

Headquarters International Security Assistance Force. (2009, July 6). Tactical Directive. Kabul.

Heuser, B., & Shamir, E. (Eds.). (2016). *Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies : National Styles and Strategic Cultures.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Heuser, B., & Shamir, E. (2016). Universal Toolbox, National Styles or Divergence of Civilisations? In B. Heuser, & E. Shamir (Eds.), *Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures* (pp. 332-370). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hill, A., & Gerras, S. (2016). Systems of Denial. *Naval War College Review, 69*(1), 109-132.

HM Government. (2010). *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy .* London.

HM Government. (2010). *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review.* London.

HM Government. (2015). *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom.* London.

Hoffman, B. (2004). *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq.* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Hoffman, F. G. (2011-2012). Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency. *Parameters, 41*(4), 1-17.

Hoffman, F. G. (2015). *Learning While Under Fire: Military Change in Wartime.* London: King's College (Doctoral Dissertation) .

Hoffman, F. G. (2021). *Mars Adapting: Military Change during War.* Annapolis: Naval Insitute Press.

Hoiback, H. (2011). What is Doctrine? *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 34*(6), 879-900.

Hoiback, H. (2016). The Anatomy of Doctrine and Ways to Keep It Fit. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 39*(2), 185-197.

Holmqvist, M. (2003). A Dynamic Model of Intra- and Interorganizational Learning. *Organization Studies, 24*(1), 95-123.

Horowitz, M. C. (2010). *The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Horowitz, M. C., & Pindyck, S. E. (2019). *What is A Military Innovation? A Proposed Framework.* University of Pennsylvania. Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3504246

Horowitz, M., & Rosen, S. (2005). Evolution or Revolution. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 28*(3), 437-448.

House of Commons. (2004, April 20). Defence - Minutes of Evidence. London.

House of Commons. (2007, October 23). Defence - Minutes of Evidence. London.

House of Commons. (2008, October 29). Written Ministerial Statements: Defence National Recognition Study Report - Government Response. London.

House of Commons. (2009, February 23). Afghanistan (Troop Deployment) Volume 488: debated on Monday 23 February 2009. London.

House of Commons. (2012, July 9). Afghanistan: The Timetable for Security Transition. London.

House of Commons. (2014, October 27). Written Questions and Answers: Defence Cultural Specialist Unit. London.

House of Commons. (2016, December 15). Strategic Defence and Security Review - Army: Statement made on 15 December 2016 by Michael Fallon. London.

House of Commons Defence Committee. (2006, April 6). The UK deployment to Afghanistan: Fifth Report of Session 2005–06 HC 558. London.

House of Commons Defence Committee. (2007, May 11). The Army's requirement for armoured vehicles: the FRES programme: Government Response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2006–07 HC 511. London.

House of Commons Defence Committee. (2009, July 16). Helicopter Capability Eleventh Report of Session 2008–09 HC 434. London.

House of Commons Defence Committee. (2010, March 18). The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace HC 224. London.

House of Commons Defence Committee. (2011, July 6). Operations in Afghanistan Fourth Report of Session 2010–12. London.

House of Commons Defence Committee. (2011, July 17). Operations in Afghanistan Fourth Report of Session 2010–12 HC 554. London.

House of Commons Defence Committee. (2014, March 6). Future Army 2020 Ninth Report of Session 2013–14 HC 576. London.

House of Commons Defence Committee. (2014, January 14). Intervention: Why, When and How? Government Response. London.

House of Commons Defence Committee. (2014, March 26). Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part One: Government response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2013–14 HC 1175. London.

House of Commons Defence Committee. (2016, June 14). Oral evidence: SDSR 2015 and the Army, HC 108. London.

House of Commons Defence Committee. (2017, April 29). SDSR 2015 and the Army: Eighth Report of Session 2016–17 HC 108. London.

House of Lords: Select Committee on the Constitution. (2006). *Waging war: Parliament's role and responsibility.* London: The Stationary Office.

Howard, M. (1963). The Use and Abuse of Military History. *RUSI Journal, 107*(625), 4-10.

Huber, G. P. (1991). Organizational learning: the contributing processes and the literatures. *Organization Science, 2*(1), 88-115.

Hughes, G. (2012). Iraqnophobia. *RUSI Journal, 157*(6), 54-60.

Hunzeker, M. A. (2021). *Dying to Learn: Wartime Lessons from the Western Front.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Huysman, M. (2000). An organizational learning approach to the learning organization. *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 9*(2), 133-145.

Hyams, T. (2018). The New Land Warfare Centre. *British Army Review, 173*(Autumn), 4-9.

Inspecteur-Generaal der Krijgsmacht. (2006). *Jaarverslag 2005.* Den Haag : Ministerie van Defensie.

Interdepartementale project-Verkenningen. (2010). *Eindrapport Verkenningen: Houvast voor de krijgsmacht van de toekomst.* Den Haag.

Iraq Study Group. (2011). *Operation TELIC lessons compendium.* London.

Iron, R. (2017). Case studies of adaptation in the British Army: Northern Ireland and Southern Iraq. *The Skill of Adaptability: the learning curve in combat* (pp. 234-250). Canberra: Army History Unit.

Irwin, A. (2013). The Northern Ireland Campaign: The Challenges of Command. In J. Bailey, R. Iron, & H. Strachan (Eds.), *British Generals in Blair's Wars* (pp. 27-39). Farnham: Ashgate.

Jensen, B. (2016). Escaping the iron cage: the institutional foundations of FM 3-24. counterinsurgency doctrine. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 39*(2), 213-230.

Jensen, B. M. (2016). *Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Jockel, J. T. (2014). Canada, Nederland en de oorlog in Zuid-Afghanistan. *Militaire Spectator, 183*(1), 4-16.

Joes, A. J. (2004). *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency.* Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.

Johnson, D. E. (2016). You Go to Coin with the Military You Have. In B. Heuser, & E. Shamir (Eds.), *Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures* (pp. 113-148). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Johnson, D. E., Moroney, J., Cliff, R., Markel, M. W., Smallman, L., & Spirtas, M. (2009). *Preparing and Training for the Full Spectrum of Military Challenges: Insights from the Experiences of China, France, the United Kingdom, India, and Israel.* Santa Monica: RAND.

Johnson, J. L. (2018). *The Marines, Counterinsurgency and Strategic Culture.* Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Johnson, R., & Clack, T. (Eds.). (2015). *At the End of Military Intervention: Historical, Theoretical, and Applied Approaches to Transition, Handover, and Withdrawal.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Johnson, T. (2013). Taliban Adaptations and Innovations. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24*(1), 3-27.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2016). *Joint Operating Environment 2035.* Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense.

Joint Staff, J-7. (2011). *Commander's Handbook for Assessment Planning and Execution.* Suffolk.

Jones, D. M., & Smith, M. L. (2010). Grammar but No Logic: Technique is Not Enough - A Response to Nagl and Burton. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 33*(3), 437-446.

Jones, D. M., & Smith, M. L. (2010). Whose Hearts and Whose Minds? The Curious Case of Global Counter-Insurgency. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 33*(1), 81-121.

Jones, D. M., & Smith, M. L. (2013). Myth and the small war tradition: Reassessing the discourse of British counter-insurgency. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24*(3), 436-464.

Jones, N. B., & Mahon, J. F. (2012). Nimble knowledge transfer in high velocity/turbulent environments. *Journal of Knowledge Management, 16*(5), 774-788.

Jones, S. G. (2008). *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Jones, S. G. (2017). *Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Jungdahl, A. M., & MacDonald, J. M. (2015). Innovation Inhibitors in War: Overcoming Obstacles in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 38*(4), 467-499.

Kaldor, M. (2012). *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (3 ed.). Cambridge: Polity.

Kalyvas, S. (2006). *The Logic of Violence in Civil War.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kamphuis, B. (2010). Drie botsende D's: de tegenstrijdigheden in de 'geïntegreerde' benadering in Afghanistan. *Militaire Spectator, 179*(9), 420-430.

Kaplan, F. (2013). The of the Age of Petraeus: The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency. *Foreign Affairs, 92*(1), 75-90.

Karlsrud, J. (2018). From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabilization and Counterterrorism. *International Peacekeeping*, 1-21.

Katagiri, N. (2014). *Adapting to Win: How Insurgencies Fight and Defeat Foreign States in War.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Kelton, M., & Jackson, A. P. (2015). Australia: Terrorism, Regional Security, and the US Alliance. In G. A. Mattox, & S. M. Grenier (Eds.), *Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan: The Politics of Alliance* (pp. 225-241). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Kier, E. (1997). *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kilcullen, D. (2005). Countering Global Insurgency. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 28*(4), 597-617.

Kilcullen, D. (2006). Counter-insurgency Redux. *Survival, 48*(4), 111-130.

Kilcullen, D. (2009). *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One.* London: Hurst & Company .

Kilcullen, D. (2010). *Counterinsurgency.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Kilcullen, D. (2012). Counterinsurgency: The state of a controversial art. In P. B. Rich, & I. Duyvesteyn (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency* (pp. 128-153). London: Routledge.

Kilcullen, D. (2013). *Out of the Mountains.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kilcullen, D. (2016). *Blood Year: The Unravelling of Western Counterterrorism.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Kilcullen, D. (2019). Strategic Culture. In P. R. Mansoor, & W. Murray (Eds.), *The Culture of Military Organizations* (pp. 33-52). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kilcullen, D. (2019). The Evolution of Unconventional Warfare. *Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies, 2*(1), 61-71.

Kilcullen, D. (2020). *The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West.* London: Hurst & Company.

Kim, D. H. (1993). The Link between Individual and Organizational Learning. *Sloan Management Review, 35*(1), 37-50.

King, A. (2010). Understanding the Helmand Campaign. *International Affairs, 86*(2), 311-332.

King, A. (2012). Operation Herrick: the British Campaign in Helmand. In N. Hynek, & P. Marton (Eds.), *Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Multinational contributions to reconstruction* (pp. 27-41). Abingdon: Routledge.

King, A. (2021). Operation Moshtarak: Counter-insurgency command in Kandahar 2009-10. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 44*(1), 36-62.

Kirwan, C. (2013). *Making Sense of Organizational Learning: Putting Theory into Practice.* Farnham: Gower Publishing.

Kissinger, H. (2014). *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of Hisotry.* London: Penguin.

Kiszely, J. (2006). The relevance of history to the military profession: a British view. In W. Murray, & R. Hart Sinnreich (Eds.), *The Past as Prologue* (pp. 23-33). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kiszely, J. (2013). The British Army and Thinking About the Operational Level. In J. Bailey, R. Iron, & H. Strachan (Eds.), *British Generals in Blair's Wars* (pp. 119-130). Farnham: Ashgate.

Kitson, F. (1971). *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping.* London: Faber and Faber.

Kitzen, M. (2012). Close Encounters of the Tribal Kind: the Implementation of Co-option as a Tool for De-escalation of Conflict – The Case of the Netherlands in Afghanistan's Uruzgan Province. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 35*(5), 713-734.

Kitzen, M. (2012). Western Military Culture and Counterinsurgency: An Ambiguous Reality. *Scientia Militaria, 40*(1), 1-24.

Kitzen, M. (2016). *The Course of Co-option: Co-option of local power-holders as a tool for obtaining control over the population in counterinsurgency campaigns in weblike societies.* Breda: Netherlands Defence Academy.

Kitzen, M. (2020). Operations in Irregular Warfare. In A. Sookermanny (Ed.), *Handbook of Military Sciences* (pp. 1-18). Cham: Springer.

Kitzen, M., & Thonissen, F. (2018). Strategische Vaagheid: Hoe het gebrek aan strategische visie het lerend vermogen van de Koninklijke Landmacht beperkt. *Militaire Spectator, 187*(4), 206-223.

Kitzen, M., Rietjens, S., & Osinga, F. (2013). Soft Power, the Hard Way: Adaptation by the Netherlands, Task Force Uruzgan. In T. Farrell, F. Osinga, & J. A. Russell (Eds.), *Military Adaptation in Afghanistan* (pp. 159-191). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Klep, C., & van Gils, R. (2005). *Van Korea tot Kabul: De Nederlandse militaire deelname aan vredesoperaties sinds 1945.* Den Haag: Sdu uitgevers.

Klinkert, W. (2008). *Van Waterloo tot Uruzgan: De Nederlandse militaire identiteit.* Amsterdam: Vossiuspers UvA.

Knox, M., & Murray, W. (Eds.). (2001). *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kollars, N. (2012). *By the Seat of Their Pants: Military Technological Adaptation in War.* Columbus: The Ohio State University.

Kollars, N. (2014). Military Innovation's Dialectic: Gun Trucks and Rapid Acquisition. *Security Studies, 23(4)*, 787-813.

Kollars, N. (2015). Organising Adaptation in War. *Survival, 57(6)*, 111-126.

Kollars, N. (2017). Genius and Mastery in Military Innovation. *Survival, 59(2)*, 125-138.

Kollars, N. A. (2015). War's Horizon: Soldier-Led Adaptation in Iraq and Vietnam. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 38(4)*, 529-553.

Koninklijke Landmacht. (2003). *Gevechtsoperaties, LDP II-C: Gevechtsoperaties tegen een irregulier optredende tegenstander.* Den Haag.

Koninklijke Landmacht. (2006). *Leidraad Inlichtingen LD-5.* Amersfoort.

Koninklijke Landmacht. (2009). *Land Doctrine Publicatie: Militaire Doctrine voor het Landoptreden.* Amersfoort: Opleidings- en Trainingscentrum Operatien.

Koninklijke Landmacht. (2014). *Doctrine Publicatie Landoperaties 3.2.* Amersfoort: Land Warfare Centre.

Koninklijke Landmacht. (2016, January 22). Prioriteiten Kennis en Innovatie Landoptreden t.b.v. DKIP 2017. Utrecht.

Koninklijke Landmacht. (2016). *Voorlopig reorganisatieplan LRP 1630: LvM.03 'Herschikking I&V-veld'.* Utrecht: Koninklijke Landmacht.

Koninklijke Landmacht. (2018). *Evaluation Exercise Deep Strike.* Utrecht.

Koninklijke Landmacht. (2018). *Veiligheid is vooruitzien: De toekomstvisie van de Koninklijke Landmacht.* Utrecht.

Koninlijke Landmacht. (2010, December 8). Terugkoppeling Evaluatie TFU-commandanten aan Commmandant der Strijdkrachten. Utrecht.

Korski, D. (2009). British civil-military integration: the history and steps. *RUSI Journal, 154(6)*, 14-24.

Korteweg, R. (2011). *The Superpower, The Bridge-Builder and The Hestitant Ally: How Defense Transformation Divided NATO (1991-2008).* Leiden: Leiden University Press.

Korteweg, R. (2015). The Netherlands: To Fight, or Not to Fight? The Rise and Fall of a Smaller Power. In G. A. Mattox, & S. M. Grenier (Eds.), *Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan* (pp. 140-156). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Kraft, P. S., & Bausch, A. (2016). How Do Transformational Leaders Promote Exploratory and Exploitative Innovation? Examining the Black Box through MASEM. *Journal of Product Innovation Management, 33(6)*, 687-707.

Krepinevich, A. F. (1986). *The Army and Vietnam.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Krijnsen, G. P. (2007). 103 ISTAR-bataljon: Onbekend maakt onbemind. *Militaire Spectator, 176(2)*, 52-60.

Kronval, O., & Petersson, M. (2016). Doctrine and Defence Transformation in Norway and Sweden. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 39(2)*, 280-296.

Kuijl, W. (2019). De All-Sources Information Fusion Unit in Mali en de Dutch Approach. *Militaire Spectator, 188(1)*, 4-17.

Kuperman, A. J. (2013). A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO's Libya Campaign. *International Security, 38(1)*, 105-136.

Lambeth, B. S. (2010). Operation Enduring Freedom, 2001. In J. A. Olsen (Ed.), *A History of Air Warfare* (pp. 255-277). Dulles: Potomac Books.

Lambeth, B. S. (2012). Israel's War in Gaza. *International Security, 37(2)*, 81-118.

Land Warfare Centre. (2008, July 3). Post Operations Interview: Commander Operation Herrick 7. Edinburgh.

Land Warfare Centre. (2016). *Future Land Operating Concept: Editie Ascalon.* Amersfoort.

Lane, P. J., Koka, B. R., & Pathak, S. (2006). The Reification of Absorptive Capacity: A Critical Review and Rejuvenation of the Construct. *Academy of Management Review, 31*(4), 833-863.

Laqueur, W. (1998). *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical Case Study.* New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Lawrence, T. B., Mauws, M. K., Dyck, B., & Kleysen, R. F. (2005). The Politics of Organizational Learning: Integrating Power into the 4I Framework. *Academy of Management Review, 30*(1), 180-191.

Ledwidge, F. (2017). *Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in the 9/11 Wars.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lee, C. (2019). The role of culture in military innovation studies: Lessons learned from the US Air Force's adoption of the Predator Drone, 1993-1997. *The Journal of Strategic Studies*.

Leeuwenburg, L., & Wiltenburg, I. (2022). *Met Geweer en Geduld: Trainen, adviseren en vechten met het Afghaanse leger.* Amsterdam: Boom.

Levinthal, D. A., & March, J. G. (1993). The Myopia of Learning. *Strategic Management Journal, 14*, 95-112.

Lindsay, J. R. (2020). *Information Technology and Power.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Lis, A. (2012). How to Strengthen Positive Organizational Behaviors Fostering Experential Learning? The Case of Military Organizations. *Journal of Entrepreneurship, Management and Innovation, 8*(4), 21-34.

Lis, A. (2014). Knowledge Creation and Conversion in Military Organizations: How the SECI Model is Applied Within Armed Forces. *Journal of Entrepreneurship Management and Innovation, 10*(1), 57-78.

Loch, C. H., & Huberman, B. A. (1999). A Punctuated-Equilibrium Model of Technology Diffusion. *Management Science, 45*(2), 160-177.

Long, A. (2006). *On "Other War": Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research.* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Long, A. (2008). *Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006.* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Long, A. (2016). *The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Lundin, R., & Soderholm, A. (2013). Temporary organizations and end states: A theory is a child of its time and in need of reconsideration and reconstruction. *International Journal of Managing Projects in Business, 6*(3), 587-594.

Luttwak, E. N. (2007). Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice. *Harper's Magazine, 314*(1881), 33-42.

Lynch, J. (2019, July 30). *The Three Types of Organizational Learning.* Retrieved January 2, 2020, from The Strategy Bridge: https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/7/30/the-three-types-of-organizational-learning?rq=lynch

Maas, J.-W., Greune, M., & Livingstone, J. (2017). 1 (GE/NL) Corps, ready for oprations! The road to a Land Centric Joint Task Force Headquarters. *Militaire Spectator, 186*(7/8), 316-326.

Mack, A. (1983). Why big nations lose small wars: The politics of asymmetric conflict. *World Politics, 27*(2), 175-200.

Mackay, A. (2013). Helmand 2007-2008: Behavioural Conflict - From General to Strategic Corporal. In J. Bailey, R. Iron, & H. Strachan (Eds.), *British Generals in Blair's Wars* (pp. 249-264). Farnham: Ashgate.

Mackay, A., & Tatham, S. (2012). *The Effectiveness of US Military Information Operations in Afghanistan 2001-2010: Why RAND missed the point.* Shrivenham: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.

MacKenzie, J. (2011, May 27). *The Enteqal Seven (3): Lashkargah – Southern Poster Child for Transition.* Retrieved July 23, 2021, from Afghanistan Analysts Network: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/the-enteqal-seven-3-lashkargah-southern-poster-child-for-transition/

Mackinlay, J. (2005). *Defeating Complex Insurgency: Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.* London: The Royal United Services Institute.

Mackinlay, J. (2009). *The Insurgent Archipelago.* London: Hurst.

Mackinlay, J., & Al-Baddawy, A. (2008). *Rethinking Counterinsurgency.* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Madsen, P. M., & Desai, V. (2018). No Firm Is an Island: The Role Population-Level Actors in Organizational Learning from Failure. *Organization Science, 29*(4), 739-753.

Mahnken, T. G., & Watts, B. D. (1997). What the Gulf War Can (and Cannot) Tell Us about the Future of Warfare. *International Security, 22*(2), 151-162.

Mahura, A., & Birollo, G. (2021). Organizational practices that enable and disable knowledge transfer: The case of a public sector project-based organization. *International Journal of Project Management, 39,* 270-281.

Mains, S., & Ad Ariely, G. (2011). Learning While Fighting: Operational Knowledge Management That Makes a Difference. *PRISM, 2*(3), 165-176.

Maley, W. (2012). PRT activity in Afghanistan: the Australian experience. In N. Hynek (Red.), *Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Multinational contributions to reconstruction* (pp. 124-138). Abingdon: Routledge.

Malkasian, C. (2016). *War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Malkasian, C. (2021). *The American War in Afghanistan: A History.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Malkin, S. (2019). From small wars to counterinsurgency: C.W. Gwynn, 'Imperial Policing' and transformation of doctrine. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 30*(3), 660-678.

Mansfield, D. (2015). *Effective Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict-affected Environments: Afghanistan Post-2014.* Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace.

Mansoor, P. R., & Murray, W. (Eds.). (2019). *The Culture of Military Organizations.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning. *Organization Sccience, 2*(1), 71-87.

Marcus, R. D. (2015). Military Innovation and Tactical Adaptation in the Israel-Hizballah Conflict: The Institutionalization of Lesson-Learning in the IDF. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 38*(4), 500-528.

Marcus, R. D. (2018). *Israel's Long War With Hezbollah: Military Innovation and Adaptation Under Fire.* Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Marcus, R. D. (2019). Learning 'Under Fire': Israel's improvised military adaptation to Hamas tunnel warfare. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 42*(3-4), 344-370.

Mariano, S., Casey, A., & Olivera, F. (2020). Organizational Forgetting Part I: A Review of the Literature and Future Research Directions. *The Learning Organization, 27*(3), 185-209.

Marshall, A. (2017). Missionaries of modernity. Advisory missions and the struggle for hegemony in Afghanistan and beyond. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 28*(3), 662-665.

Marston, D. (2010). Adaptation in the Field: The British Army's Difficult Campaign in Iraq. *Security Challenges, 6*(1), 71-84.

Marston, D. (2019). Operation TELIC VIII to XI: Difficulties of twenty-first-century command. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 44*(1), 63-90.

Martin de Holan, P., & Philips, N. (2004). Remembrance of Things Past? The Dynamics of Organizational Forgetting. *Management Science, 50*(11), 1603-1613.

Martin, M. (2017). *An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict.* London: Hurst & Company.

Matthijssen, C. (2014). Van 3D naar geïntegreerde benadering: Een beeld van de ontwikkelingen sinds Uruzgan. *Militaire Spectator, 183*(5), 228-239.

McChrystal, S. (2009, September 21). *COMISAF Initial Assessment (Unclassified).* Retrieved July 23, 2021, from The Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092100110.html

McChrystal, S. A. (2011, February 21). It Takes A Network: The new frontline of modern warfare. *Foreign Policy.*

McClory, S., Read, M., & Labib, A. (2017). Conceptualising the lessons-learned process in project management: Towards a triple-loop learning framework. *International Journal of Project Management*, 35, 1322-1335.

McColl, J. (2013). Modern Campaigning: From a Practitioner's Perspective. In J. Bailey, R. Iron, & H. Strachan (Eds.), *British Generals in Blair's Wars* (pp. 109-118). Farnham: Ashgate.

McFate, M. (2018). A Military Anthropologist Looks at Islamic Insurgency in Aceh. *Orbis*, 632-654.

McFate, M. (2018). *Military Anthropology.* London: Hurst & Company.

McInnis, K. J. (2020). *How and Why States Defect from Contemporary Military Coalitions.* Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

McMaster, H. (2017). Learning from Contemporary Conflicts to Prepare for Future War. *Orbis, 61*(3), 303-321.

Mead, J. (2019). Winning the Firefight on the 'Road to Warfighter'. *British Army Review, 175*, 64-73.

Medina, R., & Medina, A. (2017). Managing competence and learning in knowledge-intensive, project-intensive organizations: A case study of a public organization. *International Journal of Managing Projects in Business, 10*(3), 505-526.

Melkonian, T., & Picq, T. (2010). Opening the "Black Box" of Collective Competence in Extreme Projects: Lessons from the French Special Forces. *Project Management Journal, 41*(3), 79-90.

Melkonian, T., & Picq, T. (2011). Building Project Capabilities in PBOs: Lessons from the French Special Forces. *International Journal of Project Management, 29*, 455-467.

Merom, G. (1998). Strong Powers in small wars: The unnoticed foundations of success. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 9*(2), 38-63.

Merom, G. (2003). *How Democracies Lose Small Wars.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Metz, S. (2007). *Rethinking Insurgency.* Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute.

Metz, S. (2012). Rethinking Insurgency. In P. B. Rich, & I. Duyvesteyn (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency* (pp. 32-44). London: Routledge.

Metz, S., & Millen, R. (2004). *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st century: Reconceptualising Threat and Respons.* Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute.

Meurer, W. (2015). *Countering de current en future IED dreiging.* Den Haag: Ministerie van Defensie.

Middleton, K. (2011). *An Unwinnable War.* Victoria: Melbourne University Press.

Miller, K. D., & Martignoni, D. (2016). Organizational learning with forgetting: Reconsidering the exploration-exploitation tradeoff. *Strategic Organization, 14*(1), 53-72.

Miller, P. D. (2016). Graveyard of Analogies: The Use and Abuse of History for the War in Afghanistan. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 39*(3), 446-476.

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. (2014). *Leidraad Geintegreerde Benadering: De Nederlandse visie op een samenhangende inzet op veiligheid en stabiliteit in fragiele staten en conflictgebieden.* Den Haag.

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. (2019). *Op zoek naar draagvlak: De geintegreerde politietrainingsmissie in Kunduz, Afghanistan.* Den Haag: Directie Internationaal Onderzoek en Beleidsevaluatie.

Ministerie van Defensie. (2006). *Eindevaluatie Stabilisation Force Iraq (SFIR), 2003-2005.* Den Haag: Ministerie van Defensie.

Ministerie van Defensie. (2006). *Evaluatie Nederlandse Special Forces Taakgroep in Operation Enduring Freedom, April 2005 - April 2006.* Den Haag.

Ministerie van Defensie. (2007). *Analyse DTF, TFU-1 en ATF.* Den Haag.

Ministerie van Defensie. (2007). *Beleidsstudie Staven op Brigadeniveau.* Den Haag.

Ministerie van Defensie. (2007). *Eindevaluatie Provincial Reconstruction Team Baghlan.* Den Haag: Ministerie van Defensie.

Ministerie van Defensie. (2009). *Tussentijdse evaluatie ISAF: 2008.* Den Haag.

Ministerie van Defensie. (2010). *Militair Strategische Visie 2010.* Den Haag.

Ministerie van Defensie. (2010). *'Van Eredivise naar Europees voetbal'.* Den Haag.

Ministerie van Defensie. (2011). *Eindevaluatie Nederlandse bijdrage aan ISAF, 2006 – 2010 .* Den Haag.

Ministerie van Defensie. (2012). *Joint Doctrine Publicatie 2: Inlichtingen.* Den Haag.

Ministerie van Defensie. (2012). *Lessons Identified en best practices van de voortrekkers.* Den Haag.

Ministerie van Defensie. (2012). *Lessons Identified ISAF: Eindrapportage over de Nederlandse inzet bij de ISAF missie 2006 - 2010.* Den Haag.

Ministerie van Defensie. (2013). *In het belang van Nederland.* Den Haag.

Ministerie van Defensie. (2014). *Eindevaluatie Geintegreerde Politietrainingsmissie.* Den Haag.

Ministerie van Defensie. (2014, October 8). Task Force Counter-IED wordt expertisecentrum. *Defensiekrant.*

Ministerie van Defensie. (2017). *Houvast in een onzekere wereld: Lijnen van ontwikkeling in het meerjarig perspectief voor een duurzaam gerede en snel inzetbare Krijgsmacht.* Den Haag.

Ministerie van Defensie. (2018). *Defensienota 2018: Invensteren in onze mensen, slagkracht en zichtbaarheid.* Den Haag.

Ministry of Defence. (2009). *Joint Doctrine Publication 3/40 Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution.* London.

Ministry of Defence. (2010, February 24). Military develops its cultural understanding of Afghanistan. *Defence Policy and Business.*

Ministry of Defence. (2011). *Future Reserves 2020: The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces.* London.

Ministry of Defence. (2011). *Joint Doctrine Note 11/08 Female Engagement Team.* London.

Ministry of Defence. (2011). *Joint Doctrine Publication 2-00: Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations .* London.

Ministry of Defence. (2011). *Operation TELIC Lessons Compendium - MOD Statement (5th April 2011).* London.

Ministry of Defence. (2012). *Joint Concept Note 2/12: Future Land Operating Concept.* London.

Ministry of Defence. (2012). *Joint Doctrine Note 2/12: Assessment.* London.

Ministry of Defence. (2012). *Structure of the MSSG.* London.

Ministry of Defence. (2015). *Strategic Trends Programme: Future Operating Environment 2035.* Shrivenham: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre.

Ministry of Defence. (2016). *Background Quality Report: Improvised Explosive Device (IED) events involving UK personnel on Op HERRICK in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 1 April 2009 to 30 November 2014.* London.

Ministry of Defence. (2016). *Improvised Explosive Device (IED) events involving UK personnel on Op HERRICK in Helmand Province, Afghanistan: 1 April 2009 to 30 November 2014.* London.

Ministry of Defence. (2016). *Joint Doctrine Publication 05 Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution.* Shrivenham: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre.

Ministry of Defence. (2016). *Types of Injuries Sustained by UK Service Personnel on Op HERRICK in Afghanistan, April 2006 to 30 November 2014.* London.

Ministry of Defence. (2017). *Female Engagement Teams in the Army.* London.

Ministry of Defence. (2017). *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-20: UK Land Power.* Shrivenham: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre.

Ministry of Defence. (2018). *Defence Knowledge Strategy.* London.

Ministry of Defence. (2020, December 21). Operation CABRIT explained: Deterring Aggression in Estonia and Poland. London.

Mockaitis, T. (1995). *British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era: War, Armed Forces and Society.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Mockaitis, T. R. (2016). *The COIN Conundrum: The Future of Counterinsurgency and U.S. Land Power.* Carlisle: U.S. Army War College.

Molman, H. (2007). Counter-IED: van reactief naar proactief. *Militaire Spectator, 176*(7), 360-367.

Mooney, J., & Crackett, J. (2018). A Certain Reserve: Strategic Thinking and Britain's Army Reserve. *RUSI Journal, 163*(4), 84-92 .

Moore, B. L. (2014). In-depth Interviewing. In J. Soeters, S. Rietjens, & P. Shields (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies* (pp. 116-128). Abingdon: Routledge.

Moss, J. (2015). Basing Stabilisation Efforts on Evidence of What Works: Lessons from Afghanistan. *Small Wars Journal*.

Moyar, M. (2009). *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Moynihan, D. P. (2008). Learning under Uncertainty: Networks in Crisis Management. *Public Administration Review, 68*(2), 350-365.

Moynihan, D. P. (2009). From Intercrisis to Intracrisis Learning. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 17*(3), 189-198.

Mumford, A. (2011). *Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth: Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present, and Future.* Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute.

Murray, W. (1996). *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Murray, W. (2011). *Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Nagl, J. A. (2002). *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Nagl, J. A. (2010). Learning and Adapting to Win. *Joint Forces Quarterly, 58*(3), 123-124.

Nagl, J. A. (2014). *Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice.* Penguin: New York.

Nagl, J. A. (2015). COIN fights: A response to Etzioni. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 26*(3), 377-382.

Nagl, J. A., & Weitz, R. (2015). Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: The UK, Dutch, German, and French Cases. In G. A. Mattox, & S. M. Grenier (Eds.), *Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan* (pp. 170-182). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaart Laboratorium. (2011). *Systematisch Borgen Lessons Learned.* Amsterdam.

National Audit Office. (2009). *Support to High Intensity Operations.* London.

National Intelligence Council. (2017). *Global Trends: Paradoxes of Progress.* Washington D.C.

Newton, P. (2013). Adapt or Fail: The Challenge for the Armed Forces After Blair's Wars. In J. Bailey, R. Iron, & H. Strachan (Eds.), *British General in Blair's Wars* (pp. 297-326). Farnham: Ashgate.

Nielsen, J. A., Mathiassen, L., & Hansen, A. M. (2018). Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning: A Critical Application of the 4I Model. *British Journal of Management, 29*, 835-850.

Noll, J., & Rietjens, S. (2016). Learning the hard way: NATO's civil-military cooperation. In M. Webber, & A. Hyde-Price (Eds.), *Theorising NATO: New perspective on the Atlantic alliance* (pp. 223-242). London: Routledge.

Nonaka, I. (1991). The Knowledge-creating Company. *Harvard Business Review*, 96-104.

Nonaka, I., & Konno, N. (1998). The Concept of "Ba": Building a Foundation for Knowledge Creation. *California Management Review, 40*(3), 40-54.

Nonaka, I., & Toyama, R. (2003). The knowledge-creating theory revisited: knowledge creation as a synthesizing process. *Knowledge Management Research & Practice*(1), 2-10.

Nonaka, I., & von Krogh, G. (2009). Perspective—Tacit Knowledge and Knowledge Conversion: Controversy and Advancement in Organizational Knowledge Creation Theory. *Organization Science, 20*(3), 635-652.

Obama, B. (2009, December 1). *The New Way Forward - The President's Address.* Retrieved from Obama Whitehouse: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/12/01/new-way-forward-presidents-address

Offermans, S., & Brosky, J. (2011). Project Common Effort: Een praktische manier van comprehensive trainen? *Militaire Spectator, 180*(10), 424-430.

O'Hanlon, M. E. (2009). *The Science of War: Defense Budgeting, Military Technology, Logisitcs, and Combat Outcomes.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

O'Neill, B. E. (2005). *Insurgency and Terrorism.* Dulles : Potomac.

Ooink, B. (2008). *The Cultural Backpack: Training soldiers to operate in unfamiliar environments.* Nijmegen: Radboud Universiteit.

Osinga, F. (2005). *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd.* Delft: Eburon Academic Publishers.

Osinga, F. (2010). The Rise of Military Transformation. In T. Terriff, F. Osinga, & T. Farrell (Eds.), *A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Military Change* (pp. 14-34). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

OTC Operatien. (2007). *Informatiebulletin 07/02.* Amersfoort.

OTC Operatien. (2008). *Informatiebulletin 08/01.* Amersfoort.

O'Toole, P., & Talbot, S. (2011). Fighting for Knowledge: Developing Learning Systems in the Australian Army. *Armed Forces & Society, 37*(1), 42-67.

Packer, G. (2006, April 10). The Lesson of Tal Afar. *The New Yorker.*

Paul, C., Clarke, C. P., Grill, B., & Dunigan, M. (2013). *Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies.* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Paul, C., Clarke, C. P., Grill, B., & Dunigan, M. (2016). Moving Beyond Population-Centric vs. Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27*(6), 1019-1042.

Phillips, M. (2011). *Exercise Agile Warrior and the Future Development of UK Land Forces.* London: RUSI Occasional paper.

Pijpers, A. (1996). The Netherlands: The weakening pull of atlanticism. In C. Hill (Ed.), *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy* (pp. 247-267). London: Routledge.

Popper, M., & Lipshitz, R. (1998). Organizational Learning Mechanisms: A Structural and Cultural Approach to Organizational Learning. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 34*(2), 161-179.

Porch, D. (1986). Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare. In P. Paret (Ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy* (pp. 376-407). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Porch, D. (2001). *Wars of Empire.* London: Cassell & Co.

Porch, D. (2011). The dangerous myths and dubious promise of COIN. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 22*(2), 239-257.

Porch, D. (2013). *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Porch, D. (2020). An Incomplete Success: Security Assistance in Colombia. In T. Mahnken (Ed.), *Learning the Lessons of Modern War* (pp. 269-289). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Porter, P. (2018). *Blunder: Britain's War in Iraq.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Posen, B. R. (1984). *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Postma, R. (2011). Zonder kennisuitwisseling geen 'lessons learned': Onderzoek bij het Commando Landstrijdkrachten. *Militaire Spectator, 179*(9), 317-326.

Pounds, N. (2013). Southern Afghanistan 2006-2008: The Challenges to a Comprehensive Approach to Counter-Insurgency. In J. Bailey, R. Iron, & H. Strachan (Eds.), *British Generals in Blair's Wars* (pp. 225-236). Farnham: Ashgate.

Pritchard, J., & Smith, M. L. (2010). Thompson in Helmand: Comparing Theory to Practice in British Counter-insurgency Operations in Afghanistan. *Civil Wars Journal, 12*(1-2), 65-90.

Provincial Reconstruction Team Uruzgan. (2006). *Evaluatie PRT 1 Uruzgan.* Tarin Kowt.

Provincial Reconstruction Team Uruzgan. (2007). *Evaluatie PRT 3 ISAF TFU 2 en 3: Periode maart t/m september 2007.* Tarin Kowt.

Provincial Reconstruction Team Uruzgan. (2009). PRT Briefing. Amersfoort.

Rahman, M. H., Moonesar, I. A., Hossain, M., & Islam, Z. (2018). Influence of organizational culture on knowledge transfer: E vidence from the Government of Dubai. *Journal of Public Affairs, 18*, 1-13.

Ramjeet, T. (2008). Operational Analysis in Support of HQ RC(S), Kandahar, Afghanistan, September 2007 to January 2008. *Cornwallis XIII: Analysis in Support of Policy* (pp. 51-61). Nova Scotia: Cornwallis Group.

Rasmussen, M. V. (2013). The Military Metier: Second Order Adaptation and the Danish Experience in Task Force Helmand. In T. Farrell, F. Osinga, & J. A. Russell (Eds.), *Military Adaptation in Afghanistan* (pp. 136-158). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Rayburn, J. D., & Sobchak, F. K. (Eds.). (2019). *The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Volume I: Invasion, Insurgency, Civil War, 2003-2006.* Carlisle: United States Army War College Press.

Rayburn, J. D., & Sobchak, F. K. (Eds.). (2019). *The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Volume II: Surge and Withdrawal, 2007-2011.* Carlisle: United States Army War College Press.

Rayment, S. (2011, February 19). Army facing huge cuts after withdrawal from Afghanistan. *The Telegraph*.

Reis, B. (2011). The Myth of British Minimum Force in Counterinsurgency Campaigns during Decolonisation (1945–1970). *Journal of Strategic Studies, 34*(2), 245-279.

Reynolds, N. (2015). The 'soft' touch: Delivering non-kinetic effects to influence the battlespace. *Jane's Defence Weekly*.

Rice, G. (2014). What Did We Learn from the War in Afghanistan? *Australian Army Journal, 11*(1), 6-17.

Rich, P. B., & Duyvesteyn, I. (2012). The Study of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. In P. B. Rich, & I. Duyvesteyn (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency* (pp. 1-19). London: Routledge.

Richards, D. (2014). *Taking Command.* London: Headline Publishing Group.

Ricks, T. E. (2009). *The Gamble: General Petraeus and the Untold Story of the American surge in Iraq, 2006-2008.* London: Allen Lane.

Rid, T. (2010). The Nineteeth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine. *Journal of Startegic Studies, 33*(5), 727-758.

Riddle, B. (2018). *Essence of Desperation.* Lanham : Lexington Books.

Rietjens, S. (2012). Between expectations and reality: the Dutch engagement in Uruzgan. In N. Hynek, & P. Marton (Eds.), *Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Multinational contributions to reconstruction* (pp. 65-78). Abingdon: Routledge.

Rietjens, S., & De Waard, E. (2017). UN Peacekeeping Intelligence: The ASIFU Experiment. *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, 30*(3), 532-556.

Rietjens, S., Soeters, J., & Klumper, W. (2011). Measuring the Immeasurable? The Effects-Based Approach in Comprehensive Peace Operations. *International Journal of Public Administration, 34*, 329–338.

Ripley, T. (2015, June 24). Ready to go: UK rapid reaction forces return to contingency. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, pp. 26-30.

Rodwell, T. (2011). *Between the idea and the reality: the evolution and application of the Comprehensive Approach. Hollow men and doctrine in Helmand?* London: King's College.

Rohwerder, B. (2015). *Lessons from Female Engagement Teams.* Birmingham: GSDRC Applied Knowledge Services.

Romme, G. A., & van Witteloostuijn, A. (1999). Circular organizing and triple loop learning. *Journal of Organizational Change Management, 12*(5), 439-454.

Rosen, S. P. (1991). *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Royal United Services Institute. (2016, June 28). *Speech by General Nick Carter RUSI Land Warfare Conference 2016*. Retrieved from RUSI.org: https://rusi.org/events/conferences/rusi-land-warfare-conference-2016

Russell, J. A. (2010). Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 33*(4), 595-624.

Russell, J. A. (2011). *Innovation, Transformation and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Ruttig, T. (2010, February 13). *An Offensive Foretold.* Retrieved July 23, 2021, from Afghanistan Analysts Network: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/an-offensive-foretold/

Ruttig, T. (2014, November 9). *Handing Over Alive: Whither Afghanistan's political transition?* Retrieved from Afghanistan Analysts Network: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/handing-over-alive-whither-afghanistans-political-transition/

Saideman, S. M. (2013). Canadian Forces in Afghanistan: Minority Government and Generational Change while under Fire. In T. Farrell, F. Osinga, & J. A. Russell (Red.), *Military Adaptation in Afghanistan* (pp. 219-241). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Saideman, S. M. (2016). *Adapting in the Dust: Lessons Learned from Canada's War in Afghanistan.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Sanders, A., & Wood, I. S. (2012). *Times of Troubles: Britain's War in Northern Ireland.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Sangar, E. (2016). The pitfalls of learning from historical experience: the British Army's debate on useful lessons for the war in Afghanistan. *Contemporary Security Policy, 37*(2), 223-245.

Sapolsky, H. M. (1972). *Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Succes in Government.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Savelsbergh, C., Havermans, L., & Storm, P. (2016). Development paths of project managers: What and how do project managers learn from their experiences? *International Journal of Project Management, 34*(4), 559-569.

Scheipers, S. (2014). Counterinsurgency or irregular warfare? Historiography and the study of 'small wars'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 25*(5-6), 879-899.

Schilling, J., & Kluge, A. (2009). Barriers to organizational learning: An integration of theory and research. *International Journal of Management Reviews, 11*(3), 337-360.

Schmitt, O. (2017). French Military Adaptation in the Afghan War: Looking Inward or Outward. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 40*(4), 577-599.

Schmitt, O. (2018). *Allies that count: Junior Partners in Coalition Warfare.* Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Schroden, J. (2014). A best practice for assessment in counterinsurgency. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 25*(2), 479-486.

Sepp, K. (2005). Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. *Military Review, 85*(3), 8-12.

Serena, C. C. (2011). *A Revolution in Military Adaptation: The US Army in Iraq.* Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Serena, C. C. (2014). *It Takes More than a Network.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Sharma, S., & Lenka, U. (2019). Exploring linkages between Unlearning and Relearning in Organizations. *The Learning Organization, 26*(5), 500-517.

Sheehan, N. (1988). *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam.* New York: Vintage.

Shurkin, M. (2014). *France's War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army.* Santa Monica : RAND Corporation.

Shurkin, M. (2020). France's War in the Sahel and the Evolution of Counter-Insurgency Doctrine. *Texas National Security Review, 4*(1).

Shurkin, M. (2020, March 12). *The UK in Mali.* Retrieved May 6, 2021, from The Wavell Room: https://wavellroom.com/2020/03/12/the-uk-in-mali/

Simpson, E. (2012). *War from the ground up: Twenty-first-century comabat as politics.* London: Hurst.

Simsek, Z. (2009). Organizational Ambidexterity: Towards a Multilevel Understanding. *Journal of Management Studies, 46*(4), 597-624.

Sinno, A. H. (2008). *Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Sinterniklaas, R. (2018). *Military Innovation: Cutting the Gordian Knot.* Breda: Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy.

Sinterniklaas, R. (2019). *Information Age Airpower in Afghanistan: Development of the air campaign in Afghanistan and how it supported strategic and operational goals of civil and military policy mekers between 2001 and 2016.* Breda: Netherlands Defence Academy.

Smeenk, B. J., Gouweleeuw, R. G., & van der Have, H. C. (2007). Effect gebaseerde aanpak in Uruzgan: Van het schaakbord naar een bord spaghetti. *Militaire Spectator, 176*(12), 550-559.

Smith, M. L., & Jones, D. M. (2015). *The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency: Strategic Problems, Puzzles and Paradoxes.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Smith, R. (2006). *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World.* London: Penguin.

Soeters, J., Shields, P., & Rietjens, S. (Eds.). (2016). *Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies.* Abingdon: Taylor & Francis.

Soldaat, P. B. (2009). Observaties rond operaties in Afghanistan (I). *Militaire Spectator, 178*(5), 252-266.

Soldaat, P. B. (2009). Observaties rond operaties in Afghanistan (II). *Militaire Spectator, 178*(6), 340-349.

Soria, V. (2011). Flawed 'Comprehensiveness': The Joint Plan for Helmand. In M. Clarke (Ed.), *The Afghan Papers: Committing Britain to War in Helmand, 2005-2006* (pp. 30-48). Abingdon: Royal United Services Institute.

South, T. (2020, October 2). The Army is shutting down its highly praised Asymmetric Warfare Group. *Army Times*.

Spring Storm: 1,000 British Personnel On Exercise In Estonia. (2019, May 10). Retrieved july 12, 2021, from Forces.net: https://www.forces.net/news/exercises/exercise-spring-storm-battle-groups-operating-civilian-populated-towns-estonia

Stabilisation Unit. (2008). *The UK Approach to Stabilisation.* London.

Stabilisation Unit. (2010). *Responding to Stabilisation Challenges in Hostile and insecure environments: Lessons Identified by the UK's Stabilisation Unit.* London.

Stabilisation Unit. (2014). *Monitoring and Evaluation of Conflict and Stabilisation Interventions.* London.

Stabilisation Unit. (2014). *The UK Government's Approach to Stabilisation (2014).* London.

Stabilisation Unit. (2018). *Securing and Sustaining Elite Bargains that Reduce Violent Conflict.* London.

Stapleton, B. J. (2015). The civil-military approaches developed by the United Kingdom under its PRTs in Mazar-e Sharif and Lashkar Gah. In W. Maley, & S. Schmeidl (Eds.), *Reconstructing Afghanistan: Civil-military experiences in comparative perspective* (pp. 25-42). Abingdon: Routledge.

Steiber, A., & Alange, S. (2015). Organizational Innovation: verifying a comprehensive model for catalyzing organizational development and change. *Triple Helix*, 2(14), 1-28.

Stewart, A. (2013). Southern Iraq 2003-2004: Multi-National Command. In J. Bailey, R. Iron, & H. Strachan (Eds.), *British Generals in Blair's Wars* (pp. 79-88). Farnham: Ashgate.

Stoecker, S. W. (1998). *Forging Stalin's Army: Marshal Tukhachevsky and the Politics of Military Innovation.* Boulder: Westview Press.

Stoker, D. (2019). *Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the Present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Summers, H. G. (1982). *On Strategy: a critcal analysis of the Vietnam War.* New York: The Random House Publishing Group.

Sweijs, T., & Osinga, F. (2019). VII: Maintaining NATO's Technological Edge. *Whitehall Papers, 95*(1), 104-118.

Swillens, J. R. (2009). Comprehensive Approach: de praktijk. *Militaire Spectator, 178*(11), 578-589.

Szayna, T. S., O'Mahony, A., Kavanagh, J., Watts, S., Frederick, B., Norlen, T. C., & Voorhies, P. (2017). *Conflict Trends and Conflict Drivers.* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Taber, R. (1965). *War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare.* New York: L. Stuart.

Talbot, S. (2013). Learning to Add Value: Fostering Cultures of Effective Learning in the Australian Army. *Australian Army Journal, 10*(3), 158-171.

Talbot, S., & Fischer, T. (2021). Military Organizations Can Walk and Chew Gum at the Same Time. *Armed Forces & Society*, 1-7.

Tamayo-Torres, J., Roehrich, J., & Lewis, M. (2017). Ambidexterity, performance and environmental dynamism. *International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 37*(3), 282-299.

Task Force Helmand. (2008). *Tactical Conflict Analysis Framework: Trial Report.* Lashkar Gah.

Task Force Helmand J9. (2008, March 4). Presentation: TCAF Trend Analysis. Lashkar Gah.

Task Force Helmand. (Undated). COIN Conceptual Model (Herrick 14). Lashkar Gah.

Task Force Helmand. (Undated). TCAF: Advance Assessment Questionaire. Lashkar Gah.

Task Force Uruzgan. (2007). *Assement Commander TFU-2.* Tarin Kowt.

Task Force Uruzgan. (2007). *Evaluatie Task Force Uruzgan rotatie 2.* Tarin Kowt.

Task Force Uruzgan. (2008). *CDS Evaluatie C-1 (NLD/AUS) Task Force Uruzgan-III.* Driebergen.

Task Force Uruzgan. (2008). *CDS Evaluatie Task Force Uruzgan-III .* Tarin Kowt.

Tatham, S. (2009). Tactical Strategic Communication: Placing Informational Effect at the Centre of Command. *Small Wars Journal*, 1-17.

Tattar, M. A. (2011). *Innovation and Adaptation in War.* Waltham: Brandeis University (Doctoral Dissertation).

Teitler, G. (2001). Voorlopers van het VPTL, 1928-1829. *Militaire Spectator, 170*(5), 268-274.

Ten Cate, A., & Brocades Zaalberg, T. (2014). *A Gentle Occupation.* Leiden: Leiden University Press.

ten Cate, A., & van der Vorm, M. (2016). *Callsign Nassau: Dutch Army Special Forces in Action in the 'New World Disorder'.* Leiden: Leiden University Press.

Tenenbaum, E. (2017). French Exception or Western Variation? A Historical Look at the French Irregular Way of War. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 40*(4), 554-576.

Terriff, T., & Osinga, F. (2010). Conclusion: The Diffusion of Military Transformation to European Militaries. In T. Terriff, F. Osinga, & T. Farrell (Eds.), *A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Military Change* (pp. 187-209). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

The Iraq Inquiry. (2016). *The Report of the Iraq Inquiry: Executive Summary.* London.

The Liaison Office. (2010). *The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan: 2006-2010.* Kabul: The Liaison Office.

Think Defence. (2012, March 10). *Agile Warrior and the Future of the British Army*. Retrieved May 10, 2021, from Think Defence: https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2012/03/agile-warrior-and-the-future-of-the-british-army/

Thomas, K., & Allen, S. (2006). The learning organisation: a meta-analysis of themes in literature. *The Learning Organization, 13*(2/3), 123-139.

Thompson, R. (1966). *Defeating Communist Insurgency.* St Petersburg: Hailer Publishing.

Tickell, C. (2019). Keeping the Competitive Advantage. *British Army Review, 175*, 4-9.

Tikka, T. (2010). *The Process of Organisational Adaptation Through Innovations , and Organisational Adaptability.* Aalto: Aalto University (Doctoral Dissertation).

Toevank, F.-J., & Gouweleeuw, R. (2004). Operationeel analisten bij ISAF-III. *Militaire Spectator, 173*(10), 473-480.

Tosey, P., Visser, M., & Saunders, M. (2011). The origins and conceptualizations of 'triple-loop' learning: A critical review. *Management Learning, 43*(3), 291-307.

Trinquier, R. (1964). *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency.* London: Pall Mall Press Ltd.

Tripodi, C. (2021). *The Unknown Enemy: Counterinsurgency and the illusion of control.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2005, December 22). Dossier 27925 Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme nr. 193. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2006, January 31). Dossier 27925 Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, nr. 201. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2006, July 21). Dossier 27925 Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, nr. 221. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2006, July 20). Dossier 27925 Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, nr. 222. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2006, September 1). Dossier 27925 Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, nr. 226. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2006, September 15). Dossier 27925 Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, nr. 233. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2006, February 2). Handelingen TK: Uitzending Nederlandse militairen. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2007, November 30). Dossier 27925 Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, nr. 279. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2007, December 19). Dossier 27925 Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, nr. 287. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2007, December 17). Handelingen Tweede Kamer: verlenging ISAF. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2008, June 20). Dossier 27925 Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, nr. 315.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2008, October 28). Dossier 27925 Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, nr. 325. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2009, October 14). Dossier 27925 Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, nr. 366. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2011, January 27). Dossier 27925 Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, nr. 419. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2011, April 8). Dossier 32733 Beleidsbrief Defensie, nr. 1. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2011, May 20). Dossier 32733 Beleidsbrief Defensie, nr. 2. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2013, November 1). Dossier 29521 Nederlandse deelname aan vredesmissies, nr. 213. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2014, November 24). Beleidsbrief Internationale

Veiligheid: Turbulente Tijden in een Instabiele Omgeving. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2014, November 7). Dossier 33 763 Toekomst van de krijgsmacht, nr. 59. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2014, January 21). Dossier 33763 Toekomst van de krijgsmacht, nr. 33.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2016, July 1). Dossier 28 676 NAVO, nr. 249. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2018, Oktober 19). Dossier 25921 Nederlandse deelname aan vredesmissies, nr. 369. Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2018, December 14). Dossier 28676 NAVO, nr. 308. Den Haag.

Ucko, D. (2010). Lessons from Basra: The Future of British Counter-insurgency. *Survival, 52*(4), 131-158.

Ucko, D. H. (2009). *The New Counterinsurgency Era.* Washington DC: Georgetown.

Ucko, D. H. (2012). Whither Counterinsurgency. In P. B. Rich, & I. Duyvesteyn (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Countrinsurgency* (pp. 67-79). London: Routledge.

Ucko, D. H. (2014). Critics gone wild: Counterinsurgency as the root of all evil. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 25*(1), 161-179.

Ucko, D. H. (2016). 'The People are Revolting': An Anatomy of Authoritarian Counterinsurgency. *The Journal of Strategic Studies, 39*(1), 29-61.

Ucko, D. H. (2019). Systems Failure: the US way of irregular warfare. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 30*(1), 223-254.

Ucko, D. H., & Egnell, R. (2013). *Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of modern warfare.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Ucko, D. H., & Marks, T. A. (2018). Violence in context: Mapping the strategies and operational art of irregular warfare. *Contemporary Security Policy, 39*(2), 206-233.

UK Parliament. (2003, May 8). Afghanistan: Volume 404. London.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2006, September 2). *Afghan opium cultivation soars 59 percent in 2006, UNODC survey shows.* Retrieved July 27, 2021, from United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/press_release_2006_09_01.html

Unsworth, N. (2020). Fight Light: The appetite for risk in dismounted close combat. *Carre*(3), 1-8.

USAID. (2012). *An Inventory and Review of Countering Violent Extremism and Insurgency Monitoring Systems.* Washington DC.

USAID Office of Military Affairs. (2009, December 15). Presentation: Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework. Washington DC.

van Bemmel, I. E., Eikelboom, A. R., & Hoefsloot, P. G. (2010). 'Comprehensive and iterative planning' in Uruzgan. *Militaire Spectator, 179*(4), 196-209.

van Creveld, M. (2000). Through a Glass, Darkly. *Naval War College Review, 53*(4), 1-20.

van Creveld, M. (2006). *The Changing Face of War.* New York: Ballantine Books.

van de Lijn, J. (2011). *3D "The Next Generation": Lessons Learned From Uruzgan for Future Operations.* Den Haag: Clingendael Institute.

Van den Akerboom, R. (2017). Oude ijzervreters terug om jonge garde te leren vechten? *Militaire Spectator, 186*(9), 412-413.

Van den Bulk, S. (2019, May 7). Communicatie als wapen. *Defensiekrant.*

Van der Bijl, N. (2009). *Operation Banner: The British Army in Northern Ireland.* Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books.

Van der Meer, S. J., van den Berg, C. E., & Bakker, E. (2007). Effecten van IEDs op het Defensieoptreden. *Militaire Spectator, 176*(9), 352-359.

Van der Meulen, J., Rosendahl Huber, A., & Soeters, J. (2000). The Netherlands' Armed Forces: An Organization Preparing for the Next Century. In J. Kuhlman, & J. Callaghan (Eds.), *Military and Society in 21st Century Europe: A Comparitive Analysis* (pp. 283-301). Hamburg: LIT Verlag.

Van der Sar, P. (2007). Kick the enemy where it hurts the most: de steun van de bevolking, daar gaat het om. *Carre, 30*(1), 10-17.

Van der Vorm, M. (2021). Learning and Forgetting Counterinsurgency. In R. Johnson, M. Kitzen, & T. Sweijs (Eds.), *The conduct of War in the 21st Century: Kinetic, Connected and Synthetic* (pp. 189-208). London: Routledge.

Van der Vorm, M. (2021). *War's Didactics: A Theoretical Exploration on how Militaries Learn from Conflict*. Breda: Netherlands Defence Academy.

van Geel, L. W., de Koster, G., & Osinga, F. P. (2013). De NAVO tegen Gaddafi: Operation Unified Protector. *Militaire Spectator, 182*(5), 220-236.

Van Osch, I. M. (2011). Information Operations: Synchronisatie van actie en informatie. *Militaire Spectator, 180*(5), 200-213.

van Veen, E. (2017). *The state and the future of conflict*. The Hague: Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

Van Westerhoven, L. (2011, October 20). Nederlandse krijgsmacht bundelt inlichtingencapaciteit. *Dutch Defence Press*.

Van Wiggen, O. P., & Aarten, R. J. (2017). Oefening Bison Drawsko 2017: Een essentiële nulmeting voor de Landmacht. *Militaire Spectator, 186*(12), 581-596.

Vera, D., Crossan, M., & Apaydin, M. (2011). A Framework for Integrating Organizational Learning, Knowledge, Capabilities, and Absorptive Capacity. In M. Easterby-Smith, & M. A. Lyles (Eds.), *Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management* (pp. 153-180). Chichester: Wiley & Sons.

Visser, M. (2016). Organizational learning capability and battlefield performance: The British Army in World War II. *International Journal of Organizational Analysis, 24*(4), 573-590.

Vrolyk, J. (2019, December 19). *Insurgency, not war is China's most likely course of action*. Retrieved December 19, 2019, from War on the Rocks: https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/insurgency-not-war-is-chinas-most-likely-course-of-action/

VVD-CDA. (2010). Regeerakkoord: Vrijheid en verantwoordelijkheid. Den Haag.

Wang, C. L., & Ahmed, P. K. (2003). Organisational Learning: a critical review. *The Learning Organization, 10*(1), 8-17.

Watling, J. (2021). Preparing Military Intelligence for Great Power Competition: Retooling the 2-Shop. *RUSI Journal*, 1-13.

Watson, A., & Karlshøj-Pedersen, M. (2019). *Fusion Doctrine in Five Steps: Lessons learned from remote warfare in Africa.* London: Oxford Research Group.

Weick, K. E., & Westley, F. (1999). Organizational Learning: Affirming an Oxymoron. In S. R. Clegg, C. Hardy, & W. R. Nord (Eds.), *Managing Organizations* (pp. 190-208). London: SAGE Publications.

White-Spunner, B. (2013). Great Expectations: Broadening the Military Role to Include Nation Building. In J. Bailey, R. Iron, & H. Strachan (Eds.), *British General in Blair's Wars* (pp. 89-96). Farnham: Ashgate.

Whitlock, C. (2019, December 9). At War With the Truth. *The Washington Post*.

Whittingham, D. (2012). 'Savage warfare': C.E. Callwell, the roots of counter-insurgency, and the nineteenth century context. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 23*(4-5), 591-607.

Wiewiora, A., Smidt, M., & Chang, A. (2019). The 'How' of Multilevel Learning Dynamics: A Systemic Literature Review Exploring How Mechanisms Bridge Learning Between Individuals, Teams/Projects and the Organization. *European Management Review, 16*, 93-115.

Willis, M. (2012). An unexpected war, a not unexpected mission: the origins of Kandahar. *International Journal*(Autumn), 979-1000.

Willis, M. (2012). Canada in Regional Command South: Alliance Dynamics and National Imperatives. In M. Clarke (Ed.), *The Afghan Papers* (pp. 49-67). Abingdon: Royal United Services Institute.

Wilson, D., & Conway, G. (2009). The Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework: A Short-lived Panacea. *RUSI Journal, 154*(1), 10-15.

Wiltenburg, I., & Leeuwenburg, L. (2021). *The Battle of Chora: A Military Operational Analysis of the 2007 Defence of the Chora District Centre in Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan.* Breda: Netherlands Defence Academy.

Wither, J. K. (2009). Basra's not Belfast: the British Army, 'Small Wars' and Iraq. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 20*(3-4), 611-635.

Wollin, A. (1999). Punctuated Equilibrium: Reconciling Theory of Revolutionary and Incremental Change. *Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 16*, 359-367.

Wong, L., & Gerras, S. J. (2019). Culture and Military Organizations. In P. R. Mansoor, & W. Murray (Eds.), *The Culture of Military Organizations* (pp. 17-32). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Woodward, B. (2010). *Obama's Wars.* New York: Simon & Schuster.

Yang, J.-t. (2007). The impact of knowledge sharing on organizational learning and effectiveness. *Journal of Knowledge Management, 11*(2), 83-90.

Yin, R. (2018). *Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods.* Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Yuthas, K., Dillard, J. F., & Rogers, R. K. (2004). Beyond Agency and Structure: Triple-Loop Learning. *Journal of Business Ethics, 51*, 229-243.

Zahra, S. A., & George, G. (2002). Absorptive Capacity: A Review, Reconceptualization, and Extension. *Academy of Management Review, 27*(2), 185-203.

Zimmerman, S. R., Jackson, K., Lander, N., Roberts, C., Madden, D., & Orrie, R. (2019). *Movement and Maneuver: Culture and the Competition for Influence Among the U.S. Military Services.* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Appendix

Appendix 1: List of interviews

List of semistructured interviews		
Interview date	Anonymized label (role)	Nationality
Uruzgan		
11-4-2018	Dutch army staff officer 1	NLD
24-4-2018	Dutch Marine staff officer 1	NLD
24-4-2018	Dutch commanding officer 1	NLD
24-4-2018	Dutch army staff officer 3	GER
3-2-2020	Dutch civil servant 1	NLD
3-2-2020	Dutch army staff officer 4	NLD
7-2-2020	Dutch army reservist 1	NLD
10-2-2020	Dutch Army reservist 2	NLD
26-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 5	NLD
24-1-2020	Dutch civil servant 2	NLD
20-2-2020	Dutch army staff officer 6	NLD
6-2-2020	Dutch army staff officer 7	NLD
6-3-2020	Dutch Navy staff officer 1	NLD
20-2-2020	Dutch Air Force officer 1	NLD
5-3-2020	Dutch commanding officer 2	NLD
4-3-2020	Dutch commanding officer 3	NLD
5-3-2020	Dutch commanding officer 4	NLD
6-3-2020	Dutch commanding officer 5	NLD
10-3-2020	Dutch Marine staff officer 2	NLD
9-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 8	NLD
12-3-2020	Dutch commanding officer 6	NLD
12-3-2020	Dutch commanding officer 7	NLD

4-6-2020	Dutch army reservist 3	NLD
16-3-2020	Dutch army staff officer 9	NLD
17-6-2020	Dutch commanding officer 8	NLD
24-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 10	NLD
24-3-2020	Dutch commanding officer 9	NLD
25-3-2020	Dutch army staff officer 11	NLD
3-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 12	NLD
3-4-2020	Dutch army staff officer 13	NLD
8-4-2020	Dutch army staff officer 14	NLD
4-6-2020	Dutch army reservist 4	NLD
3-6-2020	Dutch commanding officer 10	NLD
8-6-2020	Dutch army reservist 5	NLD
2-6-2020	Dutch commanding officer 11	NLD
10-7-2020	Dutch commanding officer 12	NLD
22-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 15	NLD
11-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 16	NLD
20-5-2020	Dutch army staff officer 17	NLD
12-5-2020	Dutch army staff officer 18	NLD
15-4-2020	Dutch civil servant 3	NLD
25-3-2021	Dutch commanding officer 13	NLD
24-5-2020	Dutch army staff officer 19	NLD
2-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 20	NLD
5-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 21	NLD
17-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 22	NLD
25-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 23	NLD
25-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 24	NLD
15-2-2021	Dutch scholar 1	NLD

3-7-2020	Dutch civil servant 4	NLD
7-10-2020	Dutch commanding officer 14	NLD
5-3-2021	Dutch army staff officer 25	NLD
31-7-2020	Dutch army staff officer 26	NLD
6-8-2020	Dutch civil servant 5	NLD
14-10-2020	Dutch commanding officer 15	NLD
23-10-2020	Dutch commanding officer 16	NLD
29-1-2020	Dutch Army staff officer 27	NLD
16-2-2021	Dutch commanding officer 17	NLD
9-3-2021	Dutch commanding officer 18	NLD
3-3-2021	Dutch army staff officer 28	NLD
3-3-2021	Dutch army staff officer 29	NLD
22-2-2021	Dutch Air Force officer 2	NLD
25-3-2021	Dutch commanding officer 19	NLD
2-6-2021	Dutch commanding officer 20	NLD
1-8-2020	Dutch army staff officer 30	NLD
2-6-2021	Dutch commanding officer 21	NLD
12-5-2021	Dutch army staff officer 31	NLD
19-5-2021	Dutch army staff officer 32	NLD
2-7-2020	Dutch commanding officer 22	NLD
28-1-2020	Dutch commanding officer 23	NLD
12-10-2020	Dutch Staff officer 33	NLD
29-4-2020	Dutch civil servant 6	NLD
9-4-2020	Dutch army staff officer 34	NLD
Helmand		
24-2-2020	British scholar 1	UK
27-2-2020	British army staff officer 1	UK

27-2-2020	British army staff officer 2	UK
27-2-2020	British army staff officer 3	UK
27-2-2020	British army staff officer 4	UK
27-2-2020	British army staff officer 5	UK
5-3-2020	British army staff officer 6	UK
16-12-2020	British civil servant 1	UK
11-9-2020	British commanding officer 1	UK
28-10-2020	British commanding officer 2	UK
28-10-2020	British commanding officer 3	UK
17-9-2020	British commanding officer 4	UK
9-11-2020	American scholar 1	US
14-12-2020	British army staff officer 7	UK
15-12-2020	British commanding officer 5	UK
17-2-2021	British staff officer 8	UK
26-2-2021	British commanding officer 6	UK
17-1-2021	British commanding officer 7	UK
8-3-2021	British army staff officer 9	UK
12-2-2021	British commanding officer 10	UK
4-2-2021	British civil servant 2	UK
17-12-2020	British civil servant 3	UK
18-2-2021	British commanding officer 11	UK
16-2-2021	British commanding officer 12	UK
9-2-2021	British commanding officer 13	UK
24-2-2021	British commanding officer 14	UK
1-3-2021	British army staff officer 10	UK
22-2-2021	British army staff officer 11	UK
23-2-2021	British commanding officer 15	UK

23-2-2021	British army staff officer 12	UK
24-2-2021	British civil servant 4	UK
2-3-2021	British army staff officer 13	UK
11-3-2021	British army warrant officer 1	UK
10-3-2021	American scholar 2	UK
9-3-2021	British army staff officer 14	UK
9-4-2021	British army staff officer 15	UK
17-3-2021	British army staff officer 16	UK
13-4-2021	British commanding officer 16	UK
6-4-2021	British commanding officer 17	UK
14-4-2021	British army staff officer 17	UK
16-4-2021	British army staff officer 18	UK
11-5-2021	British army staff officer 19	UK
12-5-2021	British army staff officer 20	UK
23-4-2021	British civil servant 5	UK
28-4-2021	British civil servant 6	UK
12-4-2021	British staff officer 21	UK
3-3-2021	British army staff officer 22	UK
3-3-2021	British army staff officer 23	UK
7-9-2021	British civil servant 7	SWE
11-5-2021	British staff officer 24	UK
12-8-2021	British civil servant 8	UK
British Commanding officers 8 and 9 withdrew their contribution		