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The crucible of war: Dutch and British military learning processes in and beyond southern Afghanistan

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Appendix

Appendix 1: List of interviews

List of semistructured interviews		
Interview date	Anonymized label (role)	Nationality
Uruzgan		
11-4-2018	Dutch army staff officer 1	NLD
24-4-2018	Dutch Marine staff officer 1	NLD
24-4-2018	Dutch commanding officer 1	NLD
24-4-2018	Dutch army staff officer 3	GER
3-2-2020	Dutch civil servant 1	NLD
3-2-2020	Dutch army staff officer 4	NLD
7-2-2020	Dutch army reservist 1	NLD
10-2-2020	Dutch Army reservist 2	NLD
26-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 5	NLD
24-1-2020	Dutch civil servant 2	NLD
20-2-2020	Dutch army staff officer 6	NLD
6-2-2020	Dutch army staff officer 7	NLD
6-3-2020	Dutch Navy staff officer 1	NLD
20-2-2020	Dutch Air Force officer 1	NLD
5-3-2020	Dutch commanding officer 2	NLD
4-3-2020	Dutch commanding officer 3	NLD
5-3-2020	Dutch commanding officer 4	NLD
6-3-2020	Dutch commanding officer 5	NLD
10-3-2020	Dutch Marine staff officer 2	NLD
9-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 8	NLD
12-3-2020	Dutch commanding officer 6	NLD
12-3-2020	Dutch commanding officer 7	NLD

4-6-2020	Dutch army reservist 3	NLD
16-3-2020	Dutch army staff officer 9	NLD
17-6-2020	Dutch commanding officer 8	NLD
24-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 10	NLD
24-3-2020	Dutch commanding officer 9	NLD
25-3-2020	Dutch army staff officer 11	NLD
3-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 12	NLD
3-4-2020	Dutch army staff officer 13	NLD
8-4-2020	Dutch army staff officer 14	NLD
4-6-2020	Dutch army reservist 4	NLD
3-6-2020	Dutch commanding officer 10	NLD
8-6-2020	Dutch army reservist 5	NLD
2-6-2020	Dutch commanding officer 11	NLD
10-7-2020	Dutch commanding officer 12	NLD
22-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 15	NLD
11-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 16	NLD
20-5-2020	Dutch army staff officer 17	NLD
12-5-2020	Dutch army staff officer 18	NLD
15-4-2020	Dutch civil servant 3	NLD
25-3-2021	Dutch commanding officer 13	NLD
24-5-2020	Dutch army staff officer 19	NLD
2-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 20	NLD
5-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 21	NLD
17-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 22	NLD
25-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 23	NLD
25-6-2020	Dutch army staff officer 24	NLD
15-2-2021	Dutch scholar 1	NLD

3-7-2020	Dutch civil servant 4	NLD
7-10-2020	Dutch commanding officer 14	NLD
5-3-2021	Dutch army staff officer 25	NLD
31-7-2020	Dutch army staff officer 26	NLD
6-8-2020	Dutch civil servant 5	NLD
14-10-2020	Dutch commanding officer 15	NLD
23-10-2020	Dutch commanding officer 16	NLD
29-1-2020	Dutch Army staff officer 27	NLD
16-2-2021	Dutch commanding officer 17	NLD
9-3-2021	Dutch commanding officer 18	NLD
3-3-2021	Dutch army staff officer 28	NLD
3-3-2021	Dutch army staff officer 29	NLD
22-2-2021	Dutch Air Force officer 2	NLD
25-3-2021	Dutch commanding officer 19	NLD
2-6-2021	Dutch commanding officer 20	NLD
1-8-2020	Dutch army staff officer 30	NLD
2-6-2021	Dutch commanding officer 21	NLD
12-5-2021	Dutch army staff officer 31	NLD
19-5-2021	Dutch army staff officer 32	NLD
2-7-2020	Dutch commanding officer 22	NLD
28-1-2020	Dutch commanding officer 23	NLD
12-10-2020	Dutch Staff officer 33	NLD
29-4-2020	Dutch civil servant 6	NLD
9-4-2020	Dutch army staff officer 34	NLD
Helmand		
24-2-2020	British scholar 1	UK
27-2-2020	British army staff officer 1	UK

27-2-2020	British army staff officer 2	UK
27-2-2020	British army staff officer 3	UK
27-2-2020	British army staff officer 4	UK
27-2-2020	British army staff officer 5	UK
5-3-2020	British army staff officer 6	UK
16-12-2020	British civil servant 1	UK
11-9-2020	British commanding officer 1	UK
28-10-2020	British commanding officer 2	UK
28-10-2020	British commanding officer 3	UK
17-9-2020	British commanding officer 4	UK
9-11-2020	American scholar 1	US
14-12-2020	British army staff officer 7	UK
15-12-2020	British commanding officer 5	UK
17-2-2021	British staff officer 8	UK
26-2-2021	British commanding officer 6	UK
17-1-2021	British commanding officer 7	UK
8-3-2021	British army staff officer 9	UK
12-2-2021	British commanding officer 10	UK
4-2-2021	British civil servant 2	UK
17-12-2020	British civil servant 3	UK
18-2-2021	British commanding officer 11	UK
16-2-2021	British commanding officer 12	UK
9-2-2021	British commanding officer 13	UK
24-2-2021	British commanding officer 14	UK
1-3-2021	British army staff officer 10	UK
22-2-2021	British army staff officer 11	UK
23-2-2021	British commanding officer 15	UK

23-2-2021	British army staff officer 12	UK
24-2-2021	British civil servant 4	UK
2-3-2021	British army staff officer 13	UK
11-3-2021	British army warrant officer 1	UK
10-3-2021	American scholar 2	UK
9-3-2021	British army staff officer 14	UK
9-4-2021	British army staff officer 15	UK
17-3-2021	British army staff officer 16	UK
13-4-2021	British commanding officer 16	UK
6-4-2021	British commanding officer 17	UK
14-4-2021	British army staff officer 17	UK
16-4-2021	British army staff officer 18	UK
11-5-2021	British army staff officer 19	UK
12-5-2021	British army staff officer 20	UK
23-4-2021	British civil servant 5	UK
28-4-2021	British civil servant 6	UK
12-4-2021	British staff officer 21	UK
3-3-2021	British army staff officer 22	UK
3-3-2021	British army staff officer 23	UK
7-9-2021	British civil servant 7	SWE
11-5-2021	British staff officer 24	UK
12-8-2021	British civil servant 8	UK
British Commanding officers 8 and 9 withdrew their contribution		