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The crucible of war: Dutch and British military learning processes in and beyond southern Afghanistan

Vorm, M. van der

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
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	International Boundary
	Regional Command Boundary
	Province Boundary
	District Boundary
	Main road
	Other road
	Track
	River
	Province Capital
	Town
	Airfield

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The Crucible of War

*Dutch and British military learning processes
in and beyond southern Afghanistan*

Martijn van der Vorm

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To my parents, Rien and Nel van der Vorm

Table of contents

Table of contents

Chapter 1: Introduction	15
1.1 Research puzzle: The lessons of modern counterinsurgency operations.....	15
1.2: Objectives and relevance	20
1.2.1: <i>Research objectives and questions</i>	20
1.2.2: <i>Empirical relevance</i>	21
1.2.3: <i>Theoretical relevance</i>	22
1.3: Research design and methodology	24
1.3.1: <i>Methodology</i>	24
1.3.2: <i>Scope and limitations</i>	25
1.3.3: <i>A note on sources</i>	27
1.4: Book outline	28
Chapter 2: The Military Dimensions of Organizational Learning.....	31
2.1: Introduction	31
2.2: Organizational learning theory	33
2.2.1: <i>Definition</i>	34
2.2.2: <i>Organizational learning as a process</i>	35
2.2.2.1: <i>Levels of learning</i>	35
2.2.2.2: <i>Models of organizational learning</i>	37
2.2.3: <i>The dynamics and political dimension of organizational learning</i>	40
2.2.4: <i>Influencing factors on organizational learning</i>	43
2.2.5: <i>Sub conclusion</i>	46
2.3: Military innovation studies and learning in military organizations	47
2.3.1: <i>Historiography and critique</i>	48
2.3.2: <i>Approaches to study military change</i>	49
2.3.3: <i>Current trends in the literature</i>	53
2.3.4: <i>Aspects of military learning</i>	58
2.3.4.1: <i>External factors of influence</i>	59
2.3.4.2: <i>Internal factors of influence</i>	63
2.3.4.3: <i>Impediments</i>	68
2.3.4.4: <i>Manifestations</i>	69
2.3.5: <i>Sub conclusion</i>	71
2.4: Synthesis	71
2.4.1: <i>Three strands of learning</i>	71
2.4.1.1: <i>Informal organizational learning in conflict</i>	72
2.4.1.2: <i>Formal organizational learning in conflict</i>	74
2.4.1.3: <i>Institutional interconflict learning</i>	76

2.4.2: Towards an analytical model	77
2.4.2.1: Steps of learning	78
2.4.2.1.1: Evaluation	79
2.4.2.1.2: Identification	81
2.4.2.1.3: Reaction	83
2.4.2.1.4: Adaptation	84
2.4.2.1.5: Contemplation	85
2.4.2.1.6: Institutionalization	87
2.4.2.2: An analytical model	89
2.4.3: Sub conclusion	90
2.5: Conclusion	91
Chapter 3: Counterinsurgency theory	95
3.1: Introduction	95
3.2: Establishing control: the colonial experience	96
3.3: “The counterinsurgency era”	102
3.4: The rediscovery of counterinsurgency	111
3.5: Conclusion	122
Chapter 4: Uruzgan, the Dutch experience	129
4.1: Introduction	129
4.2: The run-up to Uruzgan	130
4.2.1: Strategic and organizational cultures	130
4.2.2: Preambles in Iraq and Afghanistan	133
4.2.2.1: ISAF Kabul	134
4.2.2.2: PRT Baghlan	135
4.2.2.3: Stabilization Force Iraq	137
4.2.2.4: Task Group Orange in Kandahar	139
4.2.3: Doctrine on counterinsurgency	140
4.2.4: Political decision to deploy to Uruzgan	142
4.2.5: Sub conclusion	146
4.3: The mission: Task Force Uruzgan, 2006-2010	146
4.3.1: Deployment and the Task Force Uruzgan	147
4.3.1.1: Predeployment training	149
4.3.2: Operational analysis and lessons learned processes	154
4.3.2.1: Campaign assessment	154
4.3.2.2: Lessons learned processes	156
4.3.3: Planning and executing the campaign	160
4.3.3.1: The Master Plan (2006-2008)	160
4.3.3.2: The Focal Paper (2008-2009)	168

4.3.3.3: The Uruzgan Campaign Plan (2009-2010)	171
4.3.4: Vignettes of learning in Uruzgan.....	179
4.3.4.1: The provincial reconstruction team	180
4.3.4.2: Intelligence.....	186
4.3.4.3: Non-kinetic activities.....	190
4.3.4.4: Counter-IED.....	193
4.2.5: Sub conclusion	196
4.4: Institutionalization?	198
4.4.1: Learning from Uruzgan: mission evaluations and lessons learned	199
4.4.1.1: Mission evaluations.....	199
4.4.1.2: Lessons learned processes	201
4.4.2: Strategic environment and Defence Policy	203
4.4.3: Doctrine.....	207
4.4.4: Training.....	210
4.4.5: Institutionalization: the vignettes.....	212
4.4.5.1: The Comprehensive approach and the PRT	212
4.4.5.2: Intelligence.....	217
4.4.5.3: Non-kinetic activities.....	221
4.4.5.4: Counter-IED.....	224
4.4.6: Sub conclusion	225
4.5: Conclusion	227

Chapter 5: Task Force Helmand and its impact on the British Army 233

5.1: Introduction	233
5.2: The road to Helmand: prior experiences and preparation	233
5.2.1: Culture.....	234
5.2.1.1: Strategic culture.....	234
5.2.1.2: Organizational culture.....	235
5.2.2: Counterinsurgency doctrine	238
5.2.3: Previous deployments.....	240
5.2.3.1: Operation Banner: counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland	241
5.2.3.2: Return to Afghanistan: 2001-2005	244
5.2.3.3: Operation TELIC: British experiences in Basra	246
5.2.4: Decision to deploy and preparation.....	252
5.2.4.1: The political decision	252
5.2.4.2: The Joint UK Plan for Helmand and force configuration	255
5.2.5: Sub conclusion	260
5.3: The Campaign.....	261
5.3.1: Overview of the campaign and its plans.....	261
5.3.1.1: Initial rotations, 2006 -2007	261

5.3.1.2: <i>The campaign in limbo, 2008-2009</i>	267
5.3.1.3: <i>Surge, concentration, and transition, 2009-2014</i>	272
5.3.2: <i>Operational analysis and campaign assessment</i>	281
5.3.3: <i>Operation Entirety: learning to adapt, adapting to learn</i>	288
5.3.2.1: <i>Learning mechanisms</i>	290
5.3.2.3: <i>Doctrine and the Afghanistan COIN Centre</i>	294
5.3.2.3: <i>Predeployment training</i>	301
5.3.4: <i>Vignettes</i>	305
5.3.4.1: <i>The Helmand PRT</i>	305
5.3.4.2: <i>Intelligence and understanding</i>	312
5.3.4.3: <i>Non-kinetic effects</i>	317
5.3.4.4: <i>Counter-IED efforts</i>	321
5.3.5: <i>Sub conclusion</i>	326
5.4: <i>Institutionalization</i>	328
5.4.1: <i>Evaluation and Army 2020</i>	328
5.4.1.1: <i>The OP Herrick Campaign Study</i>	328
5.4.1.2: <i>Strategic Defence and Security Review and Army 2020</i>	331
5.4.1.3: <i>The 2015 SDSR and Army 2020 Refined</i>	335
5.4.2: <i>The legacy of Operation Entirety: Learning processes, doctrine, training</i>	338
5.4.2.1: <i>Lessons exploitation and learning processes</i>	338
5.4.2.2: <i>Doctrinal developments</i>	341
5.4.2.3: <i>Training and exercises</i>	344
5.4.3: <i>Vignettes</i>	348
5.4.3.1: <i>Interagency cooperation and the Stabilisation Unit</i>	348
5.4.3.2: <i>Intelligence</i>	352
5.4.3.3: <i>Institutionalizing unorthodoxy: the establishment of 77 Brigade for non-kinetic effects</i> ...	354
5.4.3.4: <i>Counter-IED</i>	358
5.4.4: <i>Sub conclusion</i>	359
5.5: <i>Conclusion</i>	361
Chapter 6: Conclusion	365
6.1: <i>Introduction</i>	365
6.2: <i>Theoretical contributions</i>	365
6.3: <i>Empirical findings and theoretical implications</i>	371
6.3.1: <i>Learning processes</i>	372
6.3.2: <i>Limited learning at the campaign level</i>	375
6.3.3: <i>The role of anchor points in learning</i>	379
6.3.4: <i>Temporality in organization and missions</i>	382
6.3.5: <i>Ambidexterity and the tension between exploitation and exploration</i>	384
6.3.6: <i>Influencing factors on learning processes</i>	387

6.4: Conclusion.....	390
6.5: Avenues for further research.....	394
6.6: Practical considerations for military learning	395
Bibliography	399
Appendix 1: List of interviews	455
Summary	461
Samenvatting	465
Acknowledgements	469
Curriculum Vitae.....	473

