Nationalism and Territoriality in Barue and Mozambique

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Nationalism and Territoriality in Barue and Mozambique

Independence, Belonging, Contradiction

By

André van Dokkum

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Preface and Acknowledgements

Barue, with a population famously known in the past to be 'passionate about its independence' (Teixeira Botelho, 1921, p. 557), has a fascinating, intriguing precolonial history, which challenges, as I hope to show in this work, many assumptions that are current in thinking about nations, states, and nation-states. The precolonial Kingdom of Barue will provide useful contrasts with postcolonial Mozambique, which it eventually became a part of. As a text, the present work is a child of two parents. One is the author's doctoral thesis completed in 2015 at VU University Amsterdam and the African Studies Centre in Leiden, the Netherlands. The other is an additional study concerning material available at the Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino in Lisbon about precolonial Barue, along with an additional literature study. Moreover, the present work focusses more on nationalism than the original thesis, which necessitated some rewriting, although some attention to processes of electing/selecting leaders has been retained.

I am very grateful for the kind supervision I received from Professors G.J. Abbink and M.P. Meneses during my graduate studies, and for their cooperation afterwards. In the District of Barue, I was offered very generous support by Mr Carlos Firmino Mutapa, at the time Technical Officer for Culture of the Service of Education, Youth, and Technology of the District Government of Barue District. I wish to thank Gerrit Berkelder for providing help and moral support for the initial set-up of the research project, Victor Igreja for triggering a restart for the project, Alex Bolding for setting me on the path, and Harry Wels for my arrival at the present product.

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To all the interviewees in Barue and elsewhere, and to all the other informants: I am greatly indebted to you for sharing with me your knowledge and reflections, which have formed the main substance of my studies over the last few years.

The responsibility for the analyses and conclusions in this work is solely the author's and no interviewee or other informant, or person who assisted or helped should be held accountable for any views expressed herein.

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Acronyms, Abbreviations, Symbols and Names

Acronyms

AHM	Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique
AHU	Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino
AMETRAMO	Associação dos Médicos Tradicionais de Moçambique
ANTT	Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo
CNE	Comissão Nacional de Eleições
COREMO	Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique
DGS	Direcção-Geral de Segurança (formerly PIDE)
EMS	Dr. Eduardo Mondlane Stichting (Amsterdam)
Frelimo	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
GPA	General Peace Agreement (between Frelimo and Renamo in 1992)
IESE	Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos
MDM	Movimento Democrático de Moçambique
MFA	Movimento das Forças Armadas
MZN	New Mozambican metical (MZN 100 = ± USD 2.90 = ± ZAR 21 in 2010)
OMM	Organização da Mulher Moçambicana
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
PIDE	Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (later DGS)
Renamo	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
SCCI	Serviços de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações
STAE	Secretariado Técnico da Administração Eleitoral

Abbreviations

Bw	Barwe language
Pt	Portuguese language
Sh	Shona language
art.	article(s)
bk.	book
c.	circa
ch.	chapter(s)
FNs	field notes
opp.	opposite
pers. comm.	personal communication
resp.	respectively
sg.	singular

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Symbols

|	descent line
└┘	marriage
└/┘	divorce
┌┐	siblinghood
=:=:=	unclear relationship
=	indicates (1) the identity of a person with different names, e.g. Kanga = Nyaupare; (2) the usual mathematical identity.
~	indicates variants of different ways of pronouncing and/or writing the same name or other word (e.g. Hanga ~ Kanga), with quotation marks omitted; the difference between English/Shona and Portuguese spelling conventions (e.g. Samanyanga ~ Samanhanga) will usually not be indicated. Chipapata ~ Xipapata is pronounced 'Shipapata'. In the present book a name like 'Chivembe' will be written (mostly, not always) in the Portuguese way with 'Ch-'. Consistency in spelling names has not always been attempted; one reason is that changing spelling makes it more difficult to recognize names in the existing literature.

Names

People in Barue have a personal name (Pt: *nome*), but names of their (patrilineal) ancestors, usually the father and a more distant ancestor, may be added to it, giving a full name (Pt: *nome completo*). I will often abbreviate full names, using initials mostly without periods, especially when referring to interview material, e.g. 'SAC'). If the name of some more distant ancestor is repeatedly inherited, this name may yield the effect of a family name. In childhood, an individual may have a specific 'child name', replaced by another name when reaching adulthood. Nicknames are also frequently used, as are war names (Pt: *nomes de guerra*) provoked by situations of war and resistance struggles. People may also adopt the name of their father or another family member as their own for reference in daily life.

Geographical spots are often named after a person, which means they may change over time, but it also happens that existing geographical names are incorporated into a person's name. A single person many have rather different names, at times complicating historical identifications. Moreover, the same name may appear in different variations here indicated with the '~' symbol. Prefixes such as 'Mu-', 'Nya-' and 'Sa-' may or may not be used in a name, so that Satangwena ~ Tangwena. Finally, the name of a chief is sometimes identical with the name of an area a chief rules, so 'Tangwena' may

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refer to a family, a member of that family, and the area ruled by (a member of) the family.

In general (with exceptions), I have been reluctant to include individuals' full names, given the sensitivity of many of the situations involved. That said, in my personal data no pseudonyms have been used for people or places.

Names like 'Da Cruz', etc., are usually classified under 'Da'. Not all Portuguese names of organizations have been translated; it is taken for granted that expressions like '*União Democrática*', etc., are easily understood to mean 'Democratic Union' in English, for example.

It is evident from historical sources that the royal dynastic title 'Makombe' is applicable to more than one person. Nowadays in Barue District, however, it is apparent that 'Makombe' is used as a name for a single person ('Makombe, also known as Kabudu Kagoro, the one who fought against the Portuguese'), while I will argue below that two different historical persons are often conflated into one in the local oral tradition.

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Sources

Figure 1: Arnold (1995[1901]: 244); Coutinho (1904; 1936); Isaacman (1976); Portugal (1967: 2); Ranger (1963); CSG; ICN; MMN; Martinho CC in FNs; Figure 2: Portugal (1967: 2, 141); Figure 3: FJB; MMN; Figure 4: Portugal (1967: 141); Figure 5: CFS; PFS; TSCS; ZNG; Figure 6: Portugal (1967: 143); Figure 7: LMS; Figure 8: Conselho do Barue (1967); Portugal (1967: 146-147); Figure 9: Ioanes/Nyamukucu; CSG; GTS and ESS; Portugal (1967: 146-147, taking Mukuziwadzira ~ Cuziuazira); Figure 10: Christian Action Publications (1972: 44); Makambe (1980: 560); Moore (2005: 15, 17, 182); Portugal (1967: 145); SC; Figure 11: Portugal (1967: 142, 145); Figure 12: CNS; MSN; OBS; Figure 13: Portugal (1967: 143-144); MN; Figure 14: JNS; MN; Figure 15: Portugal (1967: 145-146); Figure 16: ADC; PMM; Figure 17: ADC; CJS; MFS; QJS; VMM; Figure 18: RJC.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction and Outline of the Argument

The former Kingdom of Barue, lying almost wholly within present-day Mozambique (cf. Map 1), has left the legacy of having successfully waged *two* wars of independence, one against the State of Mutapa in 1608 and one against the State of Portugal in 1890–1892. From this, two conclusions can immediately be drawn: first, that the kingdom was an anthropological entity with an existence of several centuries, longer than the life of any individuals belonging to it; second, that this entity was defended as such by substantial numbers of these individuals when the independent kingdom was not yet, or temporarily no longer, existent in a practical sense but only as an idea. These two conclusions point to the relevance of the question of whether precolonial Barue should not be analysed using the terminology of nationalism. In fact, at least two authors have already indicated that this is indeed the case. Bhila (1982, p. 125) writes about the 'nationalist' policy of a Barue king named Gunguru (~ Gunguro), and Isaacman (1976, p. 68n1) about Barue having '[b]y the middle of the nineteenth century, if not earlier, [...] all the characteristics of a "modern nation-state"'. These comments, however, were made in books that focussed on topics other than theoretical, conceptual reflections on 'nationalism'. On the other hand, precolonial Barue does not figure in theoretical books about nationalism. Davidson (2007[1992], pp. 58–59, 76) makes the case for Asante as a precolonial nation-state (cf. Hastings 1997, pp. 155–158 on Buganda). Davidson's laudable analysis comprises, however, only a few pages. One task of the present book is to provide at some length for a theoretically and historically informed understanding of precolonial Barue as a nation-state.

Studies about nationalism would not usually understand a precolonial state like Barue as an example of 'nationalist' politics or as embodying a 'nation-state'. On the other hand, nationalism can be found associated with postcolonial Mozambique quite casually in the literature, as if such an association was something pretty much self-evident (Anderson 1991[1983], pp. 134–135; Malešević 2013, p. 122). However, nationalism in postcolonial Mozambique is actually far more difficult to establish unambiguously than in precolonial Barue. Of course, there exist nationalist ideas in Mozambique. But there is a variation when it comes to what nationalism really means for Mozambique. The party in power and erstwhile anticolonial movement, Frelimo, has always considered itself to be an integral part of the definition of the Mozambican nation. Because not all Mozambicans share that conception of the nation, there

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is at the moment no nation-wide nationalism in Mozambique. A second task of this book then is to explain how the indeterminacy of Mozambican nationalism came about, and a third is to investigate its consequences for political stability.

After independence, from about 1977 until 1992, Mozambique suffered from a war between Frelimo and the resistance movement Renamo, which had both internal and external causes. The external causes involved the efforts of the Rhodesian and South African racist minority regimes to remain in power. This aspect will not be a main topic of investigation in this book, which will be mainly concerned with the internal aspect. Large segments of the Mozambican population were dissatisfied with Frelimo's policies and way of governing the country, and came to support Renamo. The peace process, concluded in 1992 and leading to Mozambique's first multiparty elections in 1994 (largely) transformed Renamo into a political party, but scarcely addressed Frelimo's problematic history involving its self-definition as being an integral part of the definition of the Mozambican nation. Already before independence, Frelimo experienced violent episodes with dissenters, episodes that were largely of its own making. This book treats these episodes not as self-standing but as cognate with the war after independence. The infamous 'crisis within Frelimo' of the late 1960s will therefore be studied in some detail, as present-day Mozambique cannot be properly understood without addressing it.

The first multiparty elections of 1994 allowed Frelimo to continue its control of the government and rebuild its position in the countryside (for a large part lost during the war), a process still on-going during my fieldwork periods. The 1999 elections were marred by uncertainties in the vote count. Specifically the presidential election between the two candidates Chissano (Frelimo) and Dhlakama (Renamo) was affected by irregularities to such an extent that, as is shown in this book, it was impossible to declare Chissano the preferred choice of the majority of the voters, which was nevertheless formally done with the quite remarkable final approval of international observers. Except in some local situations, later elections as well have been ineffectual in bringing about political change in Mozambique.[1] The failure of the post-1992 political system to bring national cohesion has become manifest in the 2010s with the re-emergence of armed hostilities.

1 The problematics of identifying democracy with elections with a so-called 'choice set' approach as applied in Mozambique is not a topic of this book, but is dealt with extensively in Van Dokkum (2015); cf. Arrow (1963[1951]); Sen (1970).

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In precolonial Barue, there were sometimes internal violent conflicts, usually involving the issue of who should be the new king after the death of the old one; yet the character of these internal conflicts was different from the situation in anti- or postcolonial Mozambique because they were not based on contested interpretations of the role of the political system within the national framework. That the Kingdom of Barue lay mostly within present-day Mozambique and had a history of anticolonial activity will provide ample opportunities to compare postcolonial Mozambique with one of its own precolonial predecessors. To compare variant instances of nationalism, one does not necessarily have to compare two contemporary countries. Comparing Mozambique with its own predecessor, Barue, has the advantage of keeping certain parameters, such as geography, constant and of providing a certain continuity of geopolitical circumstances (specifically Portuguese influence). But Barue is also interesting because the memory of anticolonial resistance up to the early twentieth century is still quite alive in Barue District. Moreover, some chiefdoms in Barue District can still trace their origins to the last period, in which Barue was independent, although this tracing is not without its complications. Local debates about these complications provide a good insight into how people discuss such sociopolitical aspects like territoriality, collective identification, and power using predominantly oral rather than written communications. Apart from this, field data from Barue District also reveal how Frelimo has built/rebuilt its control apparatus with respect to the population, conveniently legally covered by a government decree (2000/15), which defined party secretaries as 'community authorities'. In this way the later parts of the book present a merger of the themes of Barue history and contemporary party-politics in Mozambique.

1 Data Collection: Written Historical Data; Aspects of Fieldwork; Oral Data

Written historical data about Barue were available from a variety of published sources, such as among others Bhila (1982), Isaacman (1976), Pélissier 1994[1984] (Vols. 1 & 2), Pires (2006), Ranger (1963) and Rita-Ferreira (1982). Many people within Barue were kind enough to provide me with written information about Barue. None of the material obtained, however, has the integral history of the Kingdom of Barue, and its successor the present-day Barue District, as its principal focus in the way the present book has. The work by Artur (1996) comes closest to such a focus, but still the emphasis in that book concerning the kingdom is predominantly focussed on the time after the mid-nineteenth century.

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I was able to do physical archival research using original material about colonial Barue at the Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique in Maputo in 2010, and about the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century kingdom at the Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU) in Lisbon in 2016. The latter research activity provided useful data that were not incorporated in the thesis or, as far as I could ascertain, in the works of other authors, and thus offers novelties in historical data for the readership in addition to the fieldwork data. The AHU kindly allowed its documents to be photographed, which enabled me to study the material unhurriedly back home. Numerous historical documents are furthermore already available in print, as will be clear from the references. In a few cases, information taken from sources already consulted by others (published and unpublished) will be interpreted differently by me in this book. Online archival research over the years was possible with the Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, which has made publicly available thousands of pages about Frelimo during the anticolonial struggle. A similar online research situation concerning Frelimo existed with the João Cabrita collection at the Contemporary Portuguese History Research Centre (CPHRC). The African Studies Centre in Leiden provided physical material dating from the time of the anticolonial struggle.

Fieldwork was undertaken in several stints. In 2008, a short preparatory trip to Beira, Manica Province, and Maputo was undertaken. Fieldwork in Barue District was carried out in the periods 27 August–13 December 2009, 22 March–20 September 2010, and 8 July–12 August 2012. Permission to do fieldwork was granted by the Chimoio branch of the ARPAC research institution of the Mozambican government. The area of research (Barue District) is 5821 km^2 (Rafael 2001, p. 19); I cannot claim to have seen every corner of the district, but I have at least visited all chiefdoms within it. In 2009, I stayed in hotel accommodations in Catandica and for a while in a temporarily vacant shop (*banca fixa*) in Cagole (Mpanze chiefdom). In 2010 and 2012, houses were rented in Catandica with electricity, which facilitated the elaboration of interviews with research assistants. Although some relevant information was indeed gathered in Cagole, it was far handier to live in Catandica because the research necessitated much travelling around in the district to reach places wholly different from Cagole. This travelling was much easier to facilitate by staying in the district capital. Transport itself was carried out using a motorbike. Participant observation was done through attendance at neighbourhood meetings, an excursion to a ceremonial place on Ntsuanda Mountain, and the inauguration ceremony of Chief José Notice Sabão.

Most information was gathered through interviews, most of them recorded to enable scrutiny for details that would have been lost if only summarizing notes had been taken. Oral data were extremely important for reconstructing

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events, especially recent events. Written sources do not necessarily provide a complete picture of the circumstances leading to a certain result. For example, Mozambique (2005a, p. 50) lists the dates of governmental recognition of seven chiefs in Barue District in written form, but does not provide any information about the events leading up to such recognition (selection procedures, historical disputes, etc.). Following Vansina (2006[1961], pp. 19–21), we may distinguish between eyewitness accounts of events and oral tradition, which latter involves oral information transmitted from person to person, with the receiver of the information not being an eyewitness. Oral tradition made intelligible reconstructions of the history of chiefdoms within Barue Districts, during the last century or so, possible. Here again, written information does not provide an exhaustive overview of the situation. As much of the field research involved the history of chiefdoms, interviews relied heavily on obtaining genealogical information. Though there are exceptions, in most cases this provides reasonably robust data because the questions and their answers can be dealt with in a step-by-step way without too many complications ('Who was the father of A?'; 'It was B'; 'Who was the father of B?', etc., to establish patrilineal descent lines). The genealogical relationships obtained can then be used as anchor points for other information, such as the succession of chiefs in the past.

Naturally, oral data do have their problems. Especially with oral tradition about events a long time ago, the transmitted information may have been altered, simplified, or may have disappeared altogether. It appears that the activities of two people, father Chipapata/Kabudu Kagoro and son Kanga/Nyaupare, have been merged into one person 'Makombe'. In this case, information could still be useful when accounts were disassembled according to the components making up certain information. Reported activities of people from the past can usually be analysed according to factors like 'actor(s)', 'place(s)', '(relative) chronology', 'act(s)', etc. The researcher can then rephrase a piece of information 'person A did act P at place Z' as 'someone did P somewhere', and vary the hypothetical possibilities qua persons and places to see which possibilities would be optimal according to logical constraints in view of internal and external coherence (cf. Beach 1980, 1994a). As for oral information that has disappeared, there is the instance that there is apparently no oral tradition of Barue's 1608 war of independence. In this case, we have to rely entirely on written information from the seventeenth century.

In 2012, a few structured interviews were done concerning conceptual matters of democracy and multiparty politics (cf. Van Dokkum 2015, pp. 273–278). Joaquim Mantrujar Meque carried out a number of interviews on my behalf in 2013 and 2017/2018.

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2 Theoretical Aspects

The present book proposes bundles of components for definitions of 'nationalism', rather than a definition as such because it will be necessary to study the *variation* in the definitions that people, especially within Frelimo, have given for 'nationalism'. On the one hand, the fact that there exists in the literature no consensus on what nationalism exactly is, and no agreement on whether nationalism is a recent phenomenon or not, points to nationalism's complexity both theoretically and empirically, which is not done justice through pontificating a fixed definition for something better viewed as a multidimensional variable. It will, however, be possible to provide definitions for some smaller salient components of the nationalism variable.

On the other hand, it is also assumed here that a people do not need to have a single word 'nationalism' in order to experience any phenomenon of nationalism. It is only assumed that people may have and express ideas about the interaction between different anthropological components of the collective life of their existing or desired political collectivities. These ideas may be, but are not necessarily, summarized in one word.

A variety of approaches to nationalism exist in the literature. As this book is concerned with contrasting precolonial Barue with postcolonial Mozambique, I will focus on the difference between 'modernists' and 'ethnicists' only (discussion by Day & Thompson, 2004, p. 9, latter term from Hutchinson). 'Modernists' view 'nation' and 'nationalism' as rather late phenomena, not more than a few centuries old, associated with industrialization and capitalism, and related to certain political events, such as the French Revolution. 'Ethnicists' maintain that nationalism could emerge within ethnic communities possibly from 'pre-modern' roots (2004, pp. 9–10). I will label these as the 'late' and 'early' interpretations of nationalism, respectively. Representatives of the 'late' approach are authors like Anderson (1991[1983]), Gellner (2006[1983]), and Hobsbawm (2004[1990]), of the 'early' approach authors like Grosby (2005) and Smith (2008). With the present book arguing that 'nationalism' applies very well to the Kingdom of Barue, its sympathy lies with the 'early' approach. To substantiate such argumentation, some discussion of the literature about nations and nationalism is necessary.

Young understands nationalism as asserting that 'a historically constituted human collectivity exists which has a natural claim to sovereignty and self-rule' (2001, p. 165). This would apply very well to precolonial Barue, with its repeated anticolonial activity. But other definitions bring in more complex matters. Anderson (1991[1983]) defines 'nation' as a '[limited and sovereign] imagined political community' where 'sovereign' is to be understood as such

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'because the concept [i.e. "nation"] was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm' (1991[1983], pp. 6–7), thus taking a certain historical period as a constitutive part of the definition of the concept. For Anderson, 'imagined' means that 'the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members' (1991[1983], p. 6). Anderson actually takes postcolonial Mozambique as an example and in that context claims that '[p]rint-language is what invents nationalism' (1991[1983], p. 134). He maintains that '[i]f radical Mozambique speaks Portuguese, the significance of this is that Portuguese is the medium through which Mozambique is imagined' (ibid.). This does not help understand postcolonial Mozambique: when Anderson wrote this, a devastating civil war was going on in the country, but he writes about 'Mozambiquian [sic] national solidarity' as to emerge through 'advances in communications technology' (1991[1983], pp. 134–135).

Hobsbawm elaborates on Anderson and writes that 'the modern nation [...] differs [...] from the actual communities with which human beings have identified over most of history'; this '"imagined community" [...] can [...] fill the emotional void left by the retreat [etc.] of *real* human communities' (2004[1990], p. 46; emphasis original). Here it is made clear that 'imagined' is to be understood as 'unreal', something that implies that nations are not 'actual communities'. I find this difficult to accept. Nations can be understood in certain ways as webs of people, and their direct and indirect communications and sociopolitical relations. There is nothing unreal about these things and consequently their aggregation. Gellner (2006[1983], pp. 23–37) stresses the emergence of mass education necessitated by industrialization. Mass education would then have had to be organized around nation-focussed frameworks. However, Day and Thompson point out that 'some of their [nationalism or the nation-state's] strongest manifestations anticipate rather than follow industrialization [e.g. Germany, Italy]' (2004, pp. 52, cf. 91). The interplay between education and nationalism during early Frelimo history will be studied further on in this book.

Grosby (2005, pp. 71–72) critically provides a list of six characteristics which 'justify considering [certain pre-modern societies] to be nations:

(1) a self-designating name;
(2) a written history;
(3) a degree of cultural uniformity, often as a result of and sustained by religion;
(4) legal codes;
(5) an authoritative centre[;] and
(6) a conception of a bounded territory.

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Grosby points out, correctly I think, difficulties in the application of these characteristics. I proceed by giving my own comments. Aspect (2) is unnecessarily strong, referring to a vehicle for transmitting information, not its content. Writing preserves people's exact utterances better than orality (cf. Mudimbe & Appiah, 1993, p. 132), but still orality can work perfectly well in organizing a large society (Feierman, 1993, p. 177). 'Cultural uniformity' in (3) is logically problematic; 'tribes' or 'ethnic groups' (cf. Grosby, 2005, p. 7) are not necessarily less uniform than nations. In fact, a nation may encompass various ethnic groups with different cultural aspects, with the nation consequently being less uniform than each of the separate ethnic groups, although people may make *reference to* uniformity (real or perceived) as a criterion for nationhood. Aspect (4), legal codes, is trivial, as societal levels below and above nations may dispose of legal codes. Aspect (5), having an authoritative centre, cannot be demanded from nations but applies more to entities like chiefdoms and states. As Grosby observes (2005, p. 73), a nation may not have its own state, such as Poland in the nineteenth century.

Malešević (2013, pp. 64–66) lists five features of nation-states summarized here as:

(1) borders;
(2) the delegitimization of innate status-based rights, the moral equality of all human beings;
(3) legitimacy is derived from a self-understanding which is not based on kinship or local attachments, and which is particularist and not universalist;
(4) a substantial degree of cultural homogeneity;
(5) existence is justified in secular terms.

The relevance of aspect (2) can be questioned, considering the history of women's right to vote in Europe (cf. Smith, 2008, pp. 14–15), or the existence of monarchical political systems where members of certain noble families enjoy certain privileges. Moreover, arguments of nationality as descent can be used to *strip* people of their nationality and thus of their rights within a certain country, as happened with the Banyamulenge in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the 1990s (Abbink, Van Dijk, & Van Dokkum, 2008, p. 6; Young, 2001, p. 173; cf. Grosby, 2005, pp. 73–74). Concerning cultural homogeneity (aspect 4), we may refer to Somalia where cultural and ethnic uniformity of the Somali nation could not prevent the complete collapse in 1990–1991 of the (southern) Somalian state due to Somali-internal divisions along clan lines (Lewis, 2008[2004]). With many stable states showing greater cultural diversity than Somalia, it appears that cultural homogeneity is not a decisive factor for political unity in a nation-state. Malešević requires secularism for nation-states (aspect 5), but Grosby acknowledges religion's role when it contributes

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to sustaining nations' cultural uniformity, and Smith even defines a special category of nationhood based on religious vocabulary ('covenantal nations'–2008, pp. 106–134). Here we have arrived at a situation that being a nation/nation-state depends, in a rather arbitrary way, on how an author defines matters. Though this may not be logically faulty, it is more fruitful for empirical research to leave the importance (or not) of an item such as religion to the people studied themselves.

Amoah (2011, pp. 2–3) provides ten criteria for various forms of nationalism (numbers added):

[1] a large centralized government (or state);
[2] a common territory;
[3] a collective proper name;
[4] common myths of ancestry or origin or shared historical myths;
[5] a common language;
[6] a common economic life and policy;
[7] common rights and duties for all citizens, plus a common mental make-up (that all citizens belong to the same nation/state);
[8] evidence of some sort of ideology or doctrine serving as guidance to leaders of the nationalist movement and that contributed to the emergence of the nation;
[9] evidence of cohesion between the masses–the common people–and the aristocracy, that is, no class barriers in politics;
[10] a common public culture or education system.

Some of Amoah's points are familiar from the lists of Grosby and Malešević. In total, Amoah's list is longer than either of the two other lists, but his indication that nationalism may come in different forms without demanding that all criteria should be satisfied by all forms (2011, p. 2), is an approach which is better adapted to the real world where sociopolitical circumstances are rarely so straightforward as any fixed checklist might suggest.

From the lists of Grosby and Malešević, I have left only two aspects without objections: self-designation and territory. This is too thin a basis for discussion, but as the other aspects mentioned by Grosby and Malešević, Anderson's shared language and Gellner's education do not help us out, we will have to search for other ways to talk about nations and nation-states. Moreover, criteria put forward in a checklist help little to analyse situations where people disagree about what their nation 'is and should be' (Grosby, 2005, p. 58). An approach is needed which accommodates 'nations' as entities that can be referred to externally as well as self-referentially, and which can *simultaneously* account for the possibility that people may refer to themselves in conflicting, contradictory ways. In Appendix 1 proposals are made for the modelling of

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such an approach. No definition of nationalism is therefore stipulated here as we will also need to investigate how people can have debates not only about their own 'nation' but also about their interpretations of 'national-*ism*'. It is nonetheless useful to offer some indications of what I understand by certain other terms.

3 Terminology

The definitions occurring in this paragraph are based on the literature in a general sense, not on specific authors, but I claim no originality here. 'Nation-state' refers to any sociopolitical entity largely or entirely consisting of one nation handling its most important political affairs through a state structure that can be said to be that nation's own. 'Particular nationalism' refers to any communicated desire that a nation-state situation should indeed apply to a person's, or a group of persons', own nation. 'General nationalism' refers to any ideology stating that all nations in which a desire for particular nationalism is expressed should have their own state. 'Chauvinistic nationalism' refers to any attitude that one's own nation-state is better than any other. With 'political' I mean 'related to decision making concerning wider affairs within society'; with 'society' I mean any group, of some size, of people related and co-operating in some way. It may be observed that it would be more appropriate to speak of 'nation-statism' (cf. Davidson 2007[1992], p. 10) rather than 'nationalism', but as the latter word is more common, I will continue to use that word. I will now discuss the terms 'nation', 'state', and 'ethnicity' in separate sub-sections.

3.1 *The Concept of 'Nation' and Mozambique*

Appendix 1 discusses in detail how the concept of 'nation' can be circumscribed while allowing for flexibility. Here I will offer a summary of that discussion. 'Nation' can be taken as referring to self-referential human collectivities, with a name, associated with a territory, a wish to continue to exist, relatively large in numbers of people but smaller than all of humanity, and subject to certain ideas about characteristics of specific nations, where, as Hobsbawm describes it, people 'recogniz[e] an affinity with one another' (2004[1990], p. 53). The character of the affinity, it should be noted, may be contested among the people.

'Does Mozambique exist?' asks Cahen at the beginning of his article on Mozambique as a 'country without nation', ending with another question at the end as to whether a nation could arise from internal integration within a

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democratized state (1994). The approach in the present book is to say that it is not so much existence per se that is problematic but the views people have on *how* Mozambique and the Mozambican nation should exist. It is not strange to say that Mozambique and a Mozambican nation existed at least since 25 June 1975. People can denote such items quite straightforwardly. But what people mean with these expressions is a different matter (cf. Frege's [1997(1892)] distinction between *reference* [denotation] and *sense* [associative thought]). As we will see, Mozambique's first president Samora Machel could address 'the nation' in a speech, which nation would comprise a collectivity of people, but not all of those addressed (and denoted) would share the same associations that Machel had concerning the nation. It is the contradictions between these associations with 'the nation' that the present study is interested in, not the denial of its existence. One can reasonably speak of a shared nation in Mozambique at the moment of independence but not of a shared nationalism among all members of that nation. Ngoenha states that 'Mozambican nationalism is the work of the Mozambicans themselves' (1999, p. 436), but though agreeing with the aspect of agency, the present book will insist on dealing with nationalisms in the plural. Below we will also study an example of a proposed but non-existent nation, that of 'Rumbézia' in North Mozambique. Nationhood is not a matter of 'anything goes'.

3.2 *State*

Hobsbawm, as a representative of the 'late' approach towards the nation, comments about the 'modern state' that it 'receiv[ed] its systematic shape in the era of the French revolutions' from earlier European antecedents. He considers that this 'modern state' was 'novel', enumerating aspects of territoriality, distinct frontiers or borders, and direct rule over all its inhabitants (2004[1990], p. 80). But all of these the Barue Kingdom had. Naturally, there was a tiered system of government (as we expect in states), but ultimately all authority over the state emanated in a centralist way from the Makombe, the dynastic ruler. On the other hand, Hydén, when discussing 'the problematic state' in contemporary Africa, speaks of 'a weak indigenous state tradition' where precolonial states had less interest in territory than in people, and would have had 'no border, only a frontier' (2013[2006], pp. 53, 56, 57). These comments do not hold for Barue. Malešević (2013, p. 64) writes that

> …unlike empires and composite kingdoms, whose territorial domains are internally contested and externally undefined, nation-states have fixed, stable and, for the most part, internationally recognized territories that are run, directed and organized from the capital city.

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This describes pretty well the unitary Kingdom of Barue. But then Hansen and Stepputat's (2005, p. 25) assertion that '[t]he definition of states and sovereignty in terms of territorial unity evolved in the late colonial period' must be rejected. Barue did not develop territorial unity as a result of colonialism. It had to defend it *against* colonialism. Barue as a historical case implies that Hansen and Stepputat's assertion about the said definition is not sound.

As we will see, a few members of the Makombe family have indeed been willing to cede territory in order to secure Portuguese cooperation for themselves, but territory as such was certainly well defined and appreciated for its own sake. In fact, ceding territory implies it has clear delineations. Moreover, one Makombe insisted on getting lost territory back from the Portuguese, and as far as data go this policy objective appears to have been successful for a while. So, when studying precolonial Barue, it is difficult to maintain (*a*) that borders and state-centralism are specifically European and exogenous to Africa; or (*b*) that a dichotomy precolonial/'premodern' versus postcolonial/'modern', with the latter related to the imposition of fixed borders and state-centralism, must be assumed. In so far as the postcolonial Mozambican state must be regarded as problematic, this would not be explained by the ideas in the points (*a*) and (*b*) just mentioned. These points have no theoretical validity for Mozambique.

A straightforward approach defining 'state', without being preoccupied with any qualification 'modern', has been given by Carneiro (1981). He even considers the difference between chiefdoms and states as basically quantitative rather than qualitative (p. 38) and sees 'state' as referring to political structures with three administrative levels, endowed with a monopoly of physical coercion reminiscent of Weber's (1956[1922]) famous understanding of 'state'. The monopolistic character of the physical coercion mentioned is something to be problematized in this book because of the war between Frelimo and Renamo. Carneiro's morphological approach concerning administrative levels may be technically sound but also too simple for many things that we might want to investigate about states. Nettl (1968) has argued that 'state' might be some sort of *variable*, something flexible and not requiring that it be interpreted uniformly. Das and Poole (2004) make similar points. Nettl's suggestion of the state as a variable can be seen as a model for the flexible approach to 'nation' discussed above. Macamo and Neubert (2003/2004) make a concrete proposal for a framework for analysing varying types of political systems, with which they are able to argue that the Mozambican state transformed from 'authoritarian state' (bureaucratic) to 'command state' (arbitrary) under Frelimo during the 1970s-1980s. As Ruigrok (2011, pp. 42–45) argues in her work on Angola, it is not enough to look at the aspects of bureaucracy and force alone to study

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present-day states, specifically in Africa where states are indicated as 'collapsing' or 'institutionally weak'.

Based on ideas of others discussed so far, a proposal for a delineation of 'state' may be that it can be conceived of as a complex variable involving flexible aspects such as people, territory, power distribution (including the threat or application of violence, monopolistic or not), and hierarchical morphology with some sort of enduring political centre, along with, and coupled to this, aspects of cross-generational replication and self-referentiality. The self-referential character of the state is constitutive for it and informs political action, even if, or especially when, people might disagree about how to see the state and what actions to take concerning it. Mozambicans, who had *ideas* (plural) of the Mozambican state in the 1960s, had these in a prospective way, but on 25 June 1975 one particular idea about the Mozambican state became actual, namely that the state should be controlled solely by Frelimo. In Mozambique on 25 June 1975, the state as a variable was realized in one real manifestation. It is not difficult to see at least one contradiction emerging here: some people did not agree with the particular idea that Frelimo alone controlled the state without reckoning with other political actors, a situation to be discussed in this book.

In some of the literature, a certain European bias towards postcolonial states can be observed. Malešević writes:

> [I]n Algeria, Vietnam, Angola and Mozambique, to name a few, full state sovereignty was achieved through the protracted, violent conflicts of 'national liberation'. In most of these cases nationalist movements were led by individuals and groups inspired by the rhetoric and practice of nineteenth-century European nationalist ideologues.
>
> 2013, p. 122

Hansen and Stepputat suggest that '[the Western] understanding of the state was eagerly embraced by the nationalist political elites in the postcolonial world' (2001, p. 10; similarly Neuberger 2002[1976]). For Mozambique this is plainly false; there has never existed any Western-European equivalent of the *Party-State Frelimo* (De Brito, 1988). Even comparison with Soviet-Russia is imperfect (Cahen, 1993). After the colonial destruction of precolonial states in Mozambique, Frelimo desired neither to resurrect these nor to copy Western-European political systems. It desired to install a new political formation that assumed its own unquestioned guidance of the Mozambican population.

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3.3 *Ethnicity and Different Manifestations of Nationalism in Postcolonial Africa*

Vail (1989, pp. 1–3) points out that in the 1950s-1970s a common evolutionary thought was that the emergence of the postcolonial nation-state in Africa would or should erase the relevance of ethnicity. However, such relevance is still continuing; in the approach adopted in this book, however, this is not at all problematic in a formal theoretical sense. Ethnicity and nationhood are two ways of referring to human collectivities, and they may be coinciding, encompassing, or only overlapping as any given case may be.

Dorman, Hammett, and Nugent discuss how nationalism in Africa has been much less debated than ethnicity, which 'has almost been debated to death' (2007, p. 6). A contentious issue in debates about ethnicity in Africa is whether or not there was 'ethnicity' before colonialism (ibid.). MacGonagle (2007) does not deny that some collective references may be colonial artefacts, but argues for the possibility of the development of ethnic identities in precolonial times, specifically concerning the Ndau. Hastings argues similarly (1997, pp. 148–150). Funada-Classen laments the dichotomic character of the debate on ethnicity in Mozambique (2013[2012], pp. 18–20). She identifies two approaches, one of Michel Cahen, who stresses the continued existence and relevance of ethnic divisions during the liberation struggle and the civil war (Cahen 1994), and another, associated with Carlos Serra and Severino Ngoenha, maintaining that 'Mozambicanness' (*Moçambicanidade*) should ignore ethnic particularities, being largely colonial artefacts. Cahen argues that stressing ethnic division was exactly what the Portuguese colonial government did not do because 'it implied the valuation of certain groups, and hence the recognition of an African political organization' (1994, p. 224).

4 Outline of the Book

Broadly speaking, the book is set up as a comparative study, not so much by juxtaposing two contemporary countries but by comparing postcolonial Mozambique with one of its precolonial predecessors. After this introductory chapter, first the precolonial Kingdom of Barue is described. An intermezzo provides a connection between precolonial and more recent times. In two chapters, recent history is dealt with by giving an overview of the early history of Frelimo and Mozambican political developments after independence, respectively. Another intermezzo follows to enable a textual return to Barue. In two chapters, present-day Barue District is then described, highlighting the continuing relevance of the precolonial past and the local impact of Frelimo

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political thought and behaviour described in general in the earlier chapters. Hence the chapters about postcolomial Barue provide a synthesis of the parts about precolonial Barue on the one hand and Frelimo and postcolonial Mozambique on the other.

Chapter 2 provides an integral historical overview about the Kingdom of Barue from its beginning in the fifteenth century to 1902 and the Barue Revolt of 1917/1918. Some argumentation follows about Barue as a state, with the data supporting, it is argued, the view that the kingdom's royal family and commoners had a shared, self-conscious political orientation over the centuries in keeping the political entity independent.

Chapter 3 reviews Frelimo history before Mozambique's independence. This must be done in some detail, as the events concerning the infamous 'crisis within Frelimo' of the 1960s are essential for an understanding of present-day Mozambique. So far no definitive history of early Frelimo history has been published, so it is necessary for me to recapitulate and re-analyse certain issues anew. The leadership situation, which eventually emerged within Frelimo in 1970, was effectively magnified in 1975 on a countrywide scale with Mozambique's independence. The current (early 2019) political situation is still a direct consequence of the victory of the so-called 'revolutionary' group in the crisis. An analysis is given of the role of conceptions of 'nationalism' within the disputes. A numerical analysis of the delegates at Frelimo's Second Congress in 1968 is elaborated and related to the outcome of the crisis. An interpretation of Eduardo Mondlane's views about the independence struggle is given, which indicates that he shared little with the so-called 'revolutionary' group within Frelimo with which he is usually associated in the literature. Information about non-Frelimo organizations is provided, indicating the pluriform character of Mozambican politics in the time before independence, a pluriformity that Frelimo sought (and for a while successfully) to extinguish in 1974–1975 when applying its interpretation of nationalism. A brief discussion is provided about Western countries' dealing with Mozambican independence, indicating that the West had no coherent approach concerning nationalism.

Chapter 4 provides information about Frelimo's ascendance to power around the time of independence and the subsequent development of Renamo as a challenger to Frelimo's political monopoly. The very destructive war between Frelimo and Renamo ended with a peace agreement and the implementation of a multiparty system, which, it is argued, have not solved the problems associated with Frelimo's monopolistic assumption of political power in Mozambique. Especially the crucial but problematic presidential election of 1999, the official result of which was accepted by foreign observers without

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any basis for such an endorsement, as shown in this book, perpetuated Frelimo's considerably disproportional hold on the country.

Chapter 5 deals with the political history of what is now Barue District after the Barue Revolt of 1917–1918, especially the chiefdoms. Although not independent states, at least some of the chiefdoms in Barue do show aspects of political self-determination, coupled to territoriality. Connections are made between the present-day chiefdoms in the district and the situation around the time of the last Makombes in the early twentieth century. The dynamics of the chiefly political situation in the Chôa area of Barue District is described and analysed, providing further elaborations of the work by Virtanen (2001, 2005).

Chapter 6 provides an intersection of Barue and Mozambican political history, dealing with party politics in Barue District, especially Frelimo's bureaucratic machinery for controlling the population. Data are provided, which show that Frelimo, almost half a century after the 'crisis within Frelimo' in the 1960s, has not abandoned its view, established then, of its own importance for nationalism. Chapter 7 contains the book's conclusions. I note that the maps and the appendices, though placed separately at the end of the book, are integral parts of the text. Sources of the figures are mentioned in the List of Maps, Figures and Tables section.

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CHAPTER 2

The Kingdom of Barue: The Desire for Independence

1 Introductory Comments

Before undertaking the subject of precolonial Barue, it would be useful to provide some background about dynastic politics, beliefs about spirit mediums, and languages and ethnic groups. Some of the literature about these topics hails from present-day Zimbabwe but can be considered relevant for the Barue area.

1.1 *Dynastic Politics*

As in Shona societies, we can observe the system of alternation of leadership within ruling families in Barue. Except for the founding leader of a dynasty, leadership often rotates across lineages of sons of the founder and their descendants, a phenomenon known as adelphic collateral succession ('adelphic succession' for short). Ideally, a 'brother succeed[s] brother […] and then [after all brothers] the first son of the first brother [and then] the first son of the next brother and so forth' (Mudenge, 1988, pp. 81–83; cf. Garbett, 1966, pp. 152–155; Meneses, Fumo, Mbilana, & Gomes, 2003, p. 372). This is the theory. In practice, over time, age and generation differences complicate the eligibility of individuals, making it difficult to determine a specific person as 'the correct' successor to an earlier leader. At times, the rotation principle may also simply not be applied at all. Succession disputes may present an opportunity for others to intervene in matters of succession.

1.2 *Beliefs about Spirit Mediums*

It is useful to introduce (partially) some ideas about spirits and spirit mediums. A *mhondoro* (lion) spirit is the spirit of a deceased ruler and is relevant for entire political communities. Living people can host spirits; some spirits can speak through their hosts, or mediums (*masvikiro*, sg. *svikiro*). That someone hosts a spirit is usually determined after the onset of an affliction, after which the spirit (if any) is identified. *Mhondoro* spirits are important because they can interfere in political life, specifically in the indication of new rulers. When not hosted by humans, they may reside in lions, hence the name. A *mhondoro* spirit can make its opinions public during trance sessions of its *svikiro* when the latter speaks in an altered voice, 'possessed' by the spirit. In the academic

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literature the expressions of the *mhondoro* spirits are often interpreted as *communis opinio*. *Mhondoro* spirits are also understood to control rain. Recognition of a spirit medium as genuine is not automatic and depends on expert opinion as well as popularity among the general population. Mediums may lose status among the general population despite having been respected earlier. (This paragraph compiled from: Acquina, 1973; Fry, 1976, Ch. 5; Garbett, 1966, 1969; Lan, 1985, Ch. 4; Latham, 1974; Mudenge, 1988, p. 28; Spierenburg, 2000, 2004; author's fieldwork.)

1.3 *Languages and Ethnic Groups*

In Barue District, at least four major languages are spoken: Barwe, Shona, Portuguese, and English. Of these Barwe (Bw: *ciBalke*) is spoken most widely. Spoken by more than 100,000 people, the language is unfortunately little known academically. I am unaware of any dictionary of the language. Only recently a definitive orthography of Barwe has appeared (Ngunga & Faquir, 2012[2011], pp. 134–147) (with conventions that do not always seem to square with those used in Barue itself). Shona (Manyika dialect) is spoken mostly (but not only) in the mountainous areas of the Chôa Administrative Post. Barwe has some overlap with Shona in vocabulary and grammar, but it is not a Shona dialect in the way Manyika is a Shona dialect, and is more properly seen as associated with languages such as Nyungwe and Sena as classified by Guthrie (1948, p. 59; Zone N, group 40, there given as 'Rue'). The idea of viewing Barwe as a variant of Shona (Mangoya & Mheta, 2016) is as far as I know not shared by Barue people. I myself had to abandon this idea, which in fact I mistakenly had in the beginning of my fieldwork because it was not a workable one. However, with the geographical proximity between Shona and Barwe, it is not surprising that Shona and Barwe are often mixed in sentences, often resulting in some difficulty in telling the difference in individual quotes. I use 'Barwe' (Bw) for the language and 'Barue' for geographical and ethnographical references (the stress is on the syllable 'Ba-').

Portuguese, Mozambique's national language, though not universally understood, is spoken by many, and those who know it speak it a lot among themselves, also when using a local language would suffice. English is spoken by Zimbabwean immigrants but also by Mozambicans who went to school in that country and/or fled there from Mozambique because of the Frelimo-Renamo war. As for the translations into English in this book, all of them are my responsibility, except where indicated otherwise in cases of published material. That they are my responsibility does not mean other people have not contributed to the production of translations, especially from Shona or Barwe, just that they are not responsible for any errors in them, should they exist.

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As for matters of ethnicity, in the beginning of the seventeenth century, João dos Santos (1989[1609], p. 107, Bk. 2, Ch. 10) differentiated between the linguistic groups '*mocarangas*' (nowadays identified as 'Shona') and '*botonga*'. The name 'Tonga' may refer to distinct populations. It may indicate people living along the right bank of the Zambezi River, but also more generally to people speaking languages other than Shona, including Barwe, and even some Shona populations after all (Beach, 1980, pp. 157–159; Florêncio, 2002, p. 50). In the context of this study, it will be useful to distinguish between the 'Barue', permanent inhabitants of the Barue Kingdom, and, north of that, the 'Tonga' on the eastern side of the Luenha River along the right bank of the lower Zambezi (Isaacman 1972a, p. 6). In addition, the origin of the Makombe dynasty is associated with the Shona Mutapa state, as we will see. Thus, if we are to speak of any ethnic differentiation in the Kingdom of Barue, we can refer to Shona versus Barue and possibly other groups, and not just to Barue versus Tonga groups. The Portuguese colonial government identified three ethnic groups in the area of what had been the Kingdom of Barue, namely (from west to east) 'Manica', 'Barue', and 'Atonga', while populations along the south bank of the Zambezi were called 'Sena' (SCCI in Monteiro, 1993, *Anexo* 2). In any case, the rule of the Makombe dynasty is difficult to interpret as a specifically ethnic domination of Shona over Barue populations, since Shona as well as Barue people would have been subordinate to this dynasty.

As for writing, it appears that the Barue state did not use written texts for its own internal affairs, but this does not mean that Baruese were not aware of what writing was, given the written treaties concluded between several Makombes and Portuguese representatives (e.g. Bhila, 1982, p. 166n12 concerning 1795; and Santana, 1967, pp. 445–447 concerning 1811).

1.4 *Economic Aspects*

Precolonial Barue was famous for honey, beeswax, and ivory. Mining produced coloured stones, but modest amounts of gold were also extracted. In the sixteenth century, Barue exported food to Manyika (~ Manica), which was involved in much gold mining activity. Manyika was also the location of a Portuguese trading post, and the Portuguese needed good relations with Barue, not predominantly to trade with that kingdom but to be able to cross Barue territory to Manyika. Existent trade between Barue and the Portuguese consisted of ivory, iron, cattle, and some gold; internally, iron hoes were used as money.[1]

1 This paragraph up to here: Barreto de Rezende (1898[1634], pp. 387, 411); Barretto (1964[1667], p. 489); Bhila (1982, pp. 3, 68, 98, 131); Ignacio Caetano Xavier in De Andrade (1955, pp. 156, 176); Lobato 1989[1957], p. 37; Newitt (1995, pp. 93–94).

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By the end of the seventeenth century, Da Conceição (2009[1696], pp. 16–17) reported that 'some' slaves were exported from Barue. I do not know about any such declaration before or after that time, and the slave trade was apparently not part of general Barue/Portuguese interactions. Nevertheless, some Barue individuals are reported as being slaves, 11 on the nineteenth-century estate of Francisco Maria De Azevedo in Quelimane (Capela, 2010[2005], p. 45), and eight (from Barue and Quiteve together) in the district of Tete Town in 1856 (Isaacman & Isaacman, 2005, p. 130). It is unclear how these individuals got to these places. In 1798, De Lacerda e Almeida referred to recent cases of voluntary enslavement by Baruese (1889[1798], p. 22). Such an action might have been motivated by the destitute situation of a person, who then sought protection from a master (Newitt, 1968, p. 486).

1.5 *Open Questions*

Abraham (1966, p. 36n3) reports that 'Makombe' would have had a duty to erect 'the cult-hut of a newly installed medium', presumably of the Chaminuka spirit. I know of no confirmation of this. Coutinho's comments (1904, p. 40) that the physical remains of the Barue kings would have been deposited in a cave on Mount Guro (present-day Guro District) seem unreliable. Interviewees indicated that the mountain at most has a few holes with animals, and added that they never heard any stories of dead persons deposited on the mountain or were in fact certain that such a thing never took place there. Since a repeated custom of depositing dead kings on the mountain would certainly have been remembered in oral tradition, the lack of such reports is a safe reason to conclude that on Mount Guro there were no such events. Where the physical remains of the Makombe kings would then have been deposited I am so far unable to say (cf. Wieschhoff, 1941, pp. 91–92). Interviewees could also not remember any spirit medium. A medium descending from Mount Guru in 1894 is mentioned by Isaacman (1976, p. 53); the lack of any remembrance may be explained here by assuming this was a one-off event. (Armando J, Azéria J, Buleza, Catoya MG, Fazbem MK, Guezane N, José MK, Maria EC, Pinto M, and Titos C, interviewed by Joaquim Mantrujar Meque in 2017.)

2 Borders, Capital, and Population of the Kingdom of Barue

2.1 *Borders*

After its establishment as a political entity, it would seem that the limits of the Kingdom of Barue were relatively stable over the centuries, although exceptions to this general rule existed especially in the northeast, mostly as a result

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of interventions from the outside. By the middle of the seventeenth century, the maximum diameter of Barue seems to have been 50 leagues, or about 250 km, lying between Sena and the remaining Mutapa state, 'inclining towards the north' (Barretto, 1964[1667], pp. 482, 487–488; the distance of 370 km of Coutinho, 1904, p. 9, seems to me far too much; league = 5 km: Randles, 1975, p. 33). Certainly at that time the northern border did not reach the Zambezi River because Barretto (1964[1667], p. 482) comments that 'the Botonga' who at that time were under the domination of the Portuguese (that is, in the strip on the right side of the lower Zambezi) were formerly under the rule of the Mutapa (cf. Beach, 1980, p. 66). Sungue is indicated as Portuguese territory bordering Barue at the latter's north (Galvão da Silva, 1954[1790], pp. 323–324n*; Lobato, 1989[1957], p. 182; *Moçambique*, 1957(89–92), pp. 228–229, § 255). Events associated with this border area, eventually resulting in loss of territory for Barue, will be dealt with below. Paiva de Andrada (1886, pp. 4, 5) indicates the rivers Kaeredzi (~ Caurese) and Luenha as the western limit of the kingdom, with the latter also mentioned a century before as a limit by Galvão da Silva (1954[1790], pp. 323–324n*). In 1794, an anonymous source mentions Barue as separate from 'Butogagem' (~ Botonga, along the Zambezi River) and from Catarera (~ Katerere, west of the Kaeredzi River, in present-day Zimbabwe) (Lobato, 1989[1957], pp. 41–43; Summers, 1958, p. 4). Indeed, the Kaeredzi River probably was a border river in precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial times. Beach suggests that Nyanga (west of the Kaeredzi in present-day Zimbabwe) was occupied by 'Barwe Tonga' or 'Sena-speaking Tonga people of Barwe' (1980, opp. p. 188, resp. p. 185), but the area apparently did not belong to the state, except perhaps for a small piece south of the origin of the Kaeredzi (Peters, 1902, pp. 124–126; Summers, 1958, pp. 4, 265–267; Tabler [Ed.], 1963[1860–1863], p. 194n2; also Lobato, ibid., p. 48–49).

Rita-Ferreira (1982, p. 73) mentions the Pungue River as the southern border of the initial establishment of the Barue kingdom in the fifteenth century. However, Tracey (1968, pp. 11, 18), interpreting António Fernandes's itinerary in the early sixteenth century, suggests that an area Amasose (~ Amçoce, Masose) existed south of Barue but north of the Pungue. If this area was indeed north and not south of the Pungue, Barue must indeed have known an expansion at some point in time; if so, I suspect it would more likely have been before Barue's independence in 1608. The location of 'Amasose' north of the Pungue is, however, not certain in my view. Da Conceição indicates the 'Roangua' River as a border at the end of the seventeenth century; Newitt identifies this as the Ruenha ~ Luenha, 'the traditional boundary between Barue and Mokaranga [Mutapa]' (Da Conceição, 2009[1696], pp. 74–75 and note 177), but an identification as the Pungue is more likely, which had 'Aruangua' as an alternative

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name (Lapa & Ferreri, 1889, pp. 7, 10; cf. 'Ruangua' in AHU #2108; Santana, 1974, p. 889; Bhila, 1982, p. 148). Geographically this would fit more easily with a situation near Manica, which Da Conceição describes (a threat from the Rozvi, cf. below). Either way, it shows how a river could be used to mark a definite border between African polities, and not only by the Portuguese. Galvão da Silva (1954[1790], p. 325) and Coutinho (1904, p. 9) mention the Aruangua/Pungue as the southern border (see also Santana, 1974, pp. 887–888 concerning material from 1833 about the Aruanga).

To the east, Barue would never have extended further than the western side of Gorongosa, with this area being part of the Quiteve Kingdom (~ Teve, Tewe, Uteve) before being under Portuguese rule at least since the mid-seventeenth century (Newitt, 1995, p. 226; Lapa & Ferreri, 1889, p. 42; Rita-Ferreira, 1982, p. 118). Material from 1833 suggests the Unduze (~ Vanduzi) as border river (Santana, 1974, pp. 887–888). Paiva de Andrada (1885) mentions the Vunduse (~ Vanduzi) River as the border between Gorongosa and the Kingdom of Barue. The full length of the Vanduzi River would not have been the border because the area of Macossa was part of the kingdom, situated to the east of the river. On the other hand, Maringue (~ Marríngué) is mentioned in an eighteenth-century document as part of Gorongosa (AHU #1132); hence, we can deduce that the border between Barue and Gorongosa in this area tended more or less from the southwest (from the Vanduzi) to the northeast, with the result that Barue was partially situated to the north of Gorongosa Mountain – cf. Paiva de Andrada (1885) on the Inhandue ~ Nhandugué River, and Küss (1882, p. 374) on the Sambza ~ Semsa River (cf. USA, 1964a[1937]). Mauch (1969[1872], p. 245) indicates a small, unidentified river near the Nyaliviro (~ Nhaluiro) River as the border between the 'Makombe country' and the 'Senna District'. Isaacman (1976, p. 64) identifies Sança as 'located on the Barue frontier'. Observing Map 2, which incorporates the above-mentioned borders, we can conclude that the maximum diameter of approximately 250 km, alluded to by Barretto, corresponds very reasonably with the line from the northwest to the southeast of the reconstructed country. The situation is admittedly complicated because, as discussed below, in the late eighteenth century Barue definitively ceded pieces of land to the Portuguese, probably from the northeast corner of the country; I suspect that some of these pieces of land are referred to by Da Costa as '*prazos* [estates] between [Barue] and the north of Gorongosa' (1939[1902], p. 107).

A map published in 1591 by Lopez and Pigafetta mentions 'Baroe' inland south of the Zambezi (reproduced in Santos, 1988[1978], Fig. 36). In a map of 1725, D'Anville mentioned both a 'R.me [Royaume] de Barbè' and a 'R.me de Macombè' inland south of a 'R.me de Mongas', west of '*cafres indépendans*' and east

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of a river called 'Manzoro', which on D'Anville's map of 1727 is given an alternative name 'Cabrézè', which is almost certainly ~ Kaeredzi (Teixeira da Mota, 1962, Fig. 3, Fig. 5). All this points to the fact that the overall geographical positioning of Barue remained pretty much the same over the centuries. As we will see, the Kingdom of Barue was temporarily occupied by foreign forces a few times during its existence. Apart from this, the borders of west and south did not change significantly (if at all), and those of north and east probably only in the northeast corner with the mentioned cession of territory in the late eighteenth century, if the *prazo* 'Panda' mentioned by De Castilho (1891) can be taken as one of the territories involved. This will be studied in more detail below.

2.2 *Capital*

At least for much of the nineteenth century, the capital of the kingdom was a place that was identical with or very close to Demera Mountain in the present-day district of Macossa. This place is known as Mbombona (~ Pombona, Bombona) (*Régulo* [chief] Melo Mpanze, Coutinho, 1904, p. 17, Portugal, 1967, p. 2). In some maps, it is mentioned as 'Macombe' (Mauch, 1969 [1872], Map 1; Randles, 1975: attached maps; cf. Montez, 1941, p. 120). Coutinho (ibid.) mentions that in the time of Chipapata the place was 'notable for its size'. Missongue, suggested by Isaacman (1973) to be residence of the Makombes in general, was not the capital of Barue during most of the nineteenth century. It played, however, a significant role when it was the residence of Kanga.

2.3 *Population Numbers; Fighting Force of the Army*

As for the size of the population, we may reason as follows. The surface area of the country I estimate to have been about 22,000 km^2. With an estimated population density in the order of about 2.5 people per km^2, this gives us a population of 55,000. A census in 1905 counted about 19,000 'souls' in the colonial territory of Barue at the time (Neuparth, 1907, p. 121). Junod (1936, p. 310) gives a population density of 1.9/km^2 in 1932, but I suspect this early colonial figure to have been lower than the population density before 1880, when Chipapata/Kabudu Kagoro had been able to ward off external threats to Barue, while the demography of Barue in 1932 would have experienced the effects of the wars of 1902 and 1917/1918. Mauch (1969[1872], p. 241) speaks of a 'very densely populated' country in 1872.

Assuming stationary population in pre-1880 times, we may estimate the maximum size of the army, taking the number of male soldiers of age 20–49 as a proxy, to have been roughly 20% of the estimated 55,000 people (see Weeks, 2016, p. 311), or about 11,000. Teixeira Botelho (1921, p. 563) and Isaacman (1976, p. 62) mention 10,000, while Graham estimated 8000 in January 1892, i.e. during

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the struggle against Manuel António de Sousa, leader of Gorongosa (Maxwell, 1999, p. 244n51). Naturally, women might have been soldiers as well (cf. Rita-Ferreira, 1999, p. 46), but on the other hand not all in the age group mentioned would have been able to fight, so that the number indicated serves well as an approximation of the maximum size of the army. Probably, as far as can be ascertained, the Barue fighting forces would have resembled those of the Akan in Ghana. In the words of Wiredu: 'the army was a citizen army, not a standing, professional, one […] apart from the people' (2001, p. 164). The relevance of this will become apparent below in several war efforts to obtain or regain Barue's independence from external overrule. These efforts would be very difficult to understand were they not endorsed by the great majority of the fighters themselves, apart from the wishes of the royal leadership.

3 The Mutapa State and the Formation of the Kingdom of Barue

The sources cited in this work along with oral tradition do not indicate that there was a state organization in the Barue area prior to the rise of the Mutapa state around 1450. Consequently, the 'Kingdom of Barue' is interpreted as the state that began as a sort of province of the Mutapa state. The reported gradual disintegration of the Mutapa state coincided, more or less, with the arrival of the Portuguese. Once involved in the areas of present-day Mozambique and Zimbabwe, the Portuguese became a causal factor within the politics of African states there (Mudenge, 1988, pp. 41, 51–59, 76).

To understand the emergence of Barue as a kingdom it is necessary to discuss the origin of the Mwene Mutapa state (~ Monomotapa, Munhumutapa, 'Mutapa' for short). We will start at the Great Zimbabwe stone complex near Masvingo in present-day Zimbabwe, erected about 1250–1300 (Beach, 1994a, pp. 82–88). One version of the relevant history then goes more or less as follows (Abraham, 1959, 1962). Around the mid-fifteenth century, one Mutota, son of King Chibatamatosi (~ Chimubatamatosi), went northwards near present-day Tete after having obtained intelligence about the great availability of salt there. He then successfully resolved to conquer land along the Zambezi River. Chibatamatosi died and Mutota became king with the newly acquired territories added to the existing kingdom. Mutota was given the praise name Mwene Mutapa, a name for which no agreement exists as to its interpretation.[2]

2 See Abraham (1959, 1962); Randles (1975, pp. 17, 25); Bhila (1974); Beach (1975), and Mudenge (1988, pp. 37–41). For the ups and downs of Mutapa-Portuguese relations across the centuries see Mudenge (1988).

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Rita-Ferreira (1999, p. 41) maintains that rather than salt, it was control of trade, gold, and cattle that motivated the northward movement. The connection with Great Zimbabwe seems to be supported by the observation that the complex was largely abandoned in the period 1450–1550, while the Mutapa expansion is believed to have occurred around 1440–1450 (Serra [Ed.], 2000[1982], p. 34). The Mutapa state was not capable of maintaining the geographical extension first obtained, and Dos Santos (1989[1609], p. 118, Bk. 2, Ch. 15) mentions that the states of Quiteve, Chicanga (Manyika), and Sedanda had by his time already separated from the original Mutapa state; for a discussion of details and complications, see Mtetwa (1984). That Barue was part of Mutapa and then separated can be established unambiguously from the available sources, as we will see.

Matope (also known as Nyanhehwe) is identified as a son of Mutota and an early ruler of the Mutapa state. The existing literature contains stories linking Matope to Barue. Matope sent his daughter Mureche (~ Murexe) and her husband to occupy Barue. Mureche's eldest son, Makombe, gave his name to the Makombe dynasty, according to oral tradition in Abraham (1962, pp. 63–66, 82n38). Pacheco, a government official active in the 1860s, identified Mureche as Matope's sister and the husband as a son of the king of Quiteve, and he added that Mureche had been given Barue as a dowry when she married (Pacheco, 2013[1883], pp. 46–47n10). The husband's name is given as Chimupore (Abraham, ibid.).[3] Ioanes CN mentioned a woman Nyamudzororo, who was a relative (*samukadzi*[4]) of Mutota. Ioanes CN further stated that Nyamudzororo and Mutota came from Chidima, and were the first persons to arrive in Barue. Nyamudzororo was a great queen who ruled Mpataguenha (in the northwest of Barue District, where ICN lives). ICN's story has resemblances to Abraham's and Pacheco's report about Mureche, although Mutota's role is different (in ICN's version he migrates himself rather than only being the

3 Unfortunately, Pacheco's and Abraham's data together yield an unclear chronological picture. However, the information that a certain woman stands at the beginning of the Barue Kingdom is still remembered today, cf. below. In 2017 Eulália L offered a tradition that still mentioned 'Muleche' (~ Mureche). 'Mutata' (interpreted here as ~ Mutota) would have been son of this Muleche and Kabudu Kagoro and had a base in Mbombona. We are probably dealing with telescoping and inversion of historical relations; Kabudu Kagoro was a nineteenth-century individual (cf. below). Interview by Joaquim Mantrujar Meque.

4 My assistant translated this word (in a Barwe context) with 'sister' (*irmã*). The Shona '*samukadzi*' would suggest 'paternal aunt' (Hannan, 2000[1959], p. 591). During the fieldwork I did notice a tendency to 'upgrade' genealogical terms when reference was made to older people, so indeed 'aunt' may then be used for 'a grown-up person's grown-up sister'.

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woman's grandfather). Chidima is indeed within the Mutapa plateau area (Serra [Ed.], 2000[1982], p. 36).

Barue as an area with a king was identified around 1512 by António Fernandes.[5] If the supposed Matope died around 1480 (Abraham, 1962; cf. Beach, 1976, for critical evaluation), the dynasty of the kings of Barue may have been founded around that time as well; at least no dynasty change is known. Bocarro (1876[1635], p. 537; Ch. 123) mentions a 'Macobe' in 1635, as far as I know the first clearly recognizable mentioning of the dynastic title 'Makombe' in a written source. Barreto de Rezende (1898[1634], p. 387, cf. 411) gives 'Machone' in 1634 as king of 'Baro'. Baro is almost certainly ~ Barue; here the king's reference is quite possibly a corrupted form of the title rather than a proper name (cf. Theal's introduction to his introduction to Barreto de Rezende, ibid., p. 378). De Alcáçova (1962[1506]) mentions a Monomotapa 'Mocomba', but I see no reason to identify that person as 'Makombe'. Von Sicard (1954) gives a list of 35 Makombe kings as related by Shungano to H. Wieschhoff in 1929. There are some problems of interpretation (see Appendix 2 for some proposals), but the list is important because it still preserves the idea that the Barue kings formed a long-lasting dynasty, which is not a commonly held view in Barue today.

4 The Arrival of the Portuguese at the Lower Zambezi; the *Prazos*

For a general understanding of historical developments concerning Barue as placed within the region of central Mozambique, it is useful to point out here that the apparent gradual disintegration of the initially strong Mutapa state overlapped, more or less, with the arrival of the Portuguese. This overlap of disintegration and arrival was coincidental, but once the Portuguese had established themselves in the area, their behaviour became a causal factor within the politics of the African political entities. During its history, Barue has been the victim of attacks by Portuguese individuals and the Portuguese state, though attacks by African agents, specifically the Nguni in the nineteenth century, have also occurred. My judgement is that Barue suffered attacks more than that it inflicted aggression on others (although this was not absent), but in general it showed great resilience as an independent state for about three centuries.

After the initial voyages of Vasco da Gama and Pedro Alvares Cabral along the East-African coast, Portugal occupied Sofala and Mozambique Island in the early sixteenth century. In 1531, the Portuguese captain of Sofala, Vicente

5 In Veloso (1964[1512], p. 183); cf. Newitt (1995, pp. 41–42); Tracey (1968).

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Pegado, authorized the setting up of Portuguese settlements along the Zambezi, in order to facilitate the acquisition of gold from the interior. Gold production occurred in the Manica area and south of the Zambezi. The Portuguese needed African gold and also ivory in order to obtain Asian spices. The Zambezi River also functioned as an access route for the Portuguese to be able to penetrate the interior of Africa. Muslim influence was also diminished. Dos Santos reports that by the early seventeenth century both the population and leaders of eleven African settlements were under the complete control of the captain of Tete. In 1629, King Mavura (~ Mavhura) formally surrendered the whole Mutapa kingdom to the Tete captaincy, signalling a serious weakening of the internal cohesion of the state (Mavura had himself become king with Portuguese aid during a civil war). Granting of tracts of land had meanwhile also been made to individuals rather than just to the Portuguese state.[6]

The decisive step taken was that the granting of land was not done by Africans to the Portuguese but by the Portuguese authorities to other Portuguese. Once established, these landholders developed the habit of building private armies, raiding, killing, and taking Mutapa inhabitants as slaves. Mavura complained about the situation in a communication to the Portuguese viceroy in Goa, India, in 1645, but little could be done about it. By the end of the seventeenth century the entire south bank of the lower Zambezi was under Portuguese jurisdiction, and the heartland of the Mutapa state was largely deserted (Mudenge, 1988, pp. 270–272; Newitt, 1973, pp. 60–69; Serra [Ed.], 2000[1982], pp. 55–59).

Barretto regretted that Portuguese occupation was not thorough enough and that gold production was low. He gave the following example of colonial attitude:

> [T]he encozes [local chiefs] […] will allow no digging [of gold] in their lands, that the Portuguese may not covet them. This obstacle might be avoided if all the lands containing gold belonged to the Portuguese, for then the Kaffirs, being their vassals, would labour to extract as much as their masters wished.
>
> BARRETTO, 1964[1667], pp. 490–491

The estates in Zambezia but also elsewhere in what is now central Mozambique were known as *prazos*. '*Prazo*' denotes 'term' or 'period' and a *prazo* was

6 This paragraph: Abraham (1962, p. 72); Dos Santos (1989[1609], pp. 122–123; Bk. 2 Ch. 17); Meneses (pers. comm.); Mudenge (1988, pp. 256–258); Newitt (1973, pp. 13, 22, 32, 34, 46, 52, 56–59; 1995, pp. 15–20, 217–218); text of surrender: Manuza (sic, i.e. Mavura) (1881[1629]).

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legally a tract of land formally issued by the Portuguese government to a usually female titleholder for three lives (from a woman to daughter to granddaughter). After those three lives the family could apply for renewal of the arrangement. This way of inheritance across women was meant to stimulate immigration from Portugal to Mozambique by men, who would then marry the women (De Almeida, 1920, p. 270; Newitt, 1973, Ch. 6; 1995, p. 223). Husbands and fathers of the women were often in charge, but just as often the women themselves were the undisputed bosses of their *prazos*. These women are known as *donas* (Newitt, 1995, pp. 228–229; for a photograph, see Eça, 1953, opp. p. 72). The *prazos* themselves were supposed to be cultivated and yield tax income for the government. All of these objectives had rather limited success in practice. Slavery was inherent to the *prazo* system. Slaves were not necessarily deferential, and some of them obtained a separate and notorious collective identity as *achikunda* (sg. *chikunda* – Isaacman, 1972b; Serra [Ed.], 2000[1982], p. 59). The people of this Zambezian society are known as 'Afro-Portuguese' in the literature (Isaacman, 1976, p. 5). The *prazo* holders were given nominal titles like 'captain' and were supposed to represent the presence of Portugal in the Lower Zambezi area (Meneses pers. comm.; cf. Serra [Ed.], 2000[1982], p. 252).

5 Barue as an Independent State

Barue split off from the Mutapa kingdom when it refused to pay tribute to the latter. Mutapa king Gatsi Rusere (~ Gasse Lucere) was unable to undo this refusal, and so Barue obtained its independence. The event may be dated to 1608 (Bocarro, 1876[1635], pp. 548, 554; Ch. 127, 129; Mudenge, 1988, pp. 76, 229–230, 243, 245). Do Avellar (1944[1617], p. 74) noted in 1617 that Barue had belonged to the Mutapa state, so that in the case of Barue we have a historical record of a split-off by a country from Mutapa almost in real time; there is no reason to doubt the existence of the separation event as such. Unfortunately, Bocarro gives few details, but it is intriguing that the tribute strike is not described as an act of the Barue king but of 'the kingdom' and that 'the Baruese defended themselves courageously' (Bocarro, ibid., pp. 554–555), suggesting at least some popular involvement. Structurally the situation in 1608 comprises a common action against domination by the Mutapa state. Admittedly, information is scarce, but the circumstances suggest that the revolt against Mutapa was not just motivated by the desire just to pay less tribute but that there was also another motivation, which was to end political domination as such. It is illustrative to compare this event with the following reasoning within the 'recent' approach towards nationalism:

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> Before modernity, any call for national unity in the wake of an external threat *could not* possibly resonate with a majority of an essentially peasant population. Moreover, no pre-modern commoner would be willing to die or kill for an abstract notion such as political sovereignty or national liberty.
>
> MALEŠEVIĆ, 2013, p. 115, emphasis added

If 'modern' implies 'industrialized' (Malešević, 2013, p. 109) Barue could be considered 'pre-modern'. The quote is then relevant because Barue is described by Bocarro as under a threat from a Mutapa army. Now, it is very difficult to believe that the majority of the Barue peasants could not formulate a response to a call for national unity. They would certainly have had the cognitive capacity to judge for themselves whether they preferred to adhere to Mutapa or to side with the Baruese defiance against it. The military action against the incoming Mutapa soldiers must have been coordinated somehow (quite probably anticipated already with the tribute strike), and therefore would have required people to make up their minds with whom their primary loyalty lay: their fellow Baruese or Mutapa. This is a loyalty question because the individual Barue soldier cannot have been completely prescient as to whether he would survive the fighting or not. Furthermore, for the Baruese, the matter would not have been an abstraction. One main issue of paying tribute is that one has to work for it. If the tribute situation changes due to collective action, the Baruese peasants would have been aware of it *by necessity*. For them, independence was not an abstract notion at all.

In 1634, relations between Barue and the Portuguese are reported as peaceful, with agreements that the latter could traverse the country so as to reach Manica, and arrangements to exchange cloth from the Portuguese against Baruese cows (Barreto de Rezende, 1898[1634], pp. 387, 411). Barue lost its independence shortly thereafter in about 1659 when António Lobo da Silva overran the country. This person was a powerful individual within the sphere of the Zambezia landholdings discussed above. However, the Portuguese captain of Sena, Francisco Pires, supported the Barue king, and Lobo da Silva withdrew from Barue. Pires feared Lobo da Silva would become too powerful with the kingdom incorporated in his jurisdictions (Barretto, 1964[1667], pp. 487–488; Lobato, 1989[1957], p. 160).

This episode shows that during this period Barue as an independent country was not yet very strong in resisting the influence of the Portuguese. At the end of the seventeenth century, Da Conceição described what the attitude in Barue was like at the time: 'The kings of Barue always remain friendly towards us, but it must be understood that this is rather through fear than good will'

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(Da Conceição, 2009[1696], p. 17). Around that time, 1695, there was a Portuguese vicar in Barue, but at one point the king suspected that this man of the church was only a pretext for the Portuguese to seize the kingdom (Da Conceição, ibid.). Interestingly, Da Conceição (ibid.) reports that Barue was at that time also paying a 'small tribute' to Mutapa, an apparent reversal of the situation of 1608, although the Barue king appears nonetheless to have made his own political decisions, and the indication 'small' suggests that the payment was of a different character than the pre-1608 payments. I propose that the tribute expressed an alliance with Mutapa. Rita-Ferreira (1999, p. 64n23) states that the Barue Kingdom was 'allied to the Rozvi'. For 1695, the existence of such a Rozvi-Barue alliance is not likely. The later part of the seventeenth century is known for the expansion of the Rozvi state within the area of present-day Zimbabwe, coming from the southwest (as seen from Barue) under Changamire Dombo (Beach, 1980, p. 219; Mudenge, 1988, pp. 285–292). Da Conceição mentions that the Rozvi king Changamire wanted to attack Sena, for which it would be necessary to cross Barue territory. The Barue king apparently got wind of this and prepared to stop Changamire (*o foi detendo*), which suggests there was no Rozvi-Barue alliance. Because the Rozvi king died, the planned campaign was not realized (Da Conceição, ibid., pp. 74–77). The precolonial stone architecture existing in Barue District appears to date from this period and architectural features suggest at least a partial Rozvi cultural influence (Gerharz in Macamo, 2006, p. 145), if not, judging from what has just been discussed, from an actual occupation by the Rozvi. Lobato (1989[1957], pp. 96–97) quotes information from 1730, which would indicate that Barue and neighbouring kingdoms had again become lords over areas that the Portuguese had dominated earlier, indicating a process of recuperating territory that had been lost. Unfortunately, Lobato's text does not give exact data on borders.

6 Makombe Gunguru

The earliest historically clear personal names of Makombes, which I could find so far in written sources, are 'Gongurro' and 'Mottuconho' in 1758 (~ Gunguro, Gonguru, I write 'Gunguru'; resp. ~ Mutuconha, I write 'Mutukunya' according to spellings of present-day people Mutukunya/Mutucunha on the Internet). The events associated with these two political opponents provide very significant information concerning the operation of Barue as a state. Gunguru is mentioned as the reigning king in 1758, having defeated Mutukunya who had been favoured by the Portuguese for the royal position. However, as we can deduce below, Mutukunya reigned at least for some time in the 1760s until

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Gunguru emerged again as king. At that time, Gunguru also showed himself a tough opponent of the Portuguese community in Sena. Let us look into this episode in more detail.

Manuel António de Almeida reported that Gunguru 'gave' him (as Portuguese representative) twelve pieces of land bordering on the Sungue area, which was already under Portuguese jurisdiction, out of gratitude for not (or no longer) helping his opponent (AHU #158; cf. Forquilha, 2010, p. 45n2). The status of this 'giving' is not entirely clear; Rodrigues (2000, p. n18) mentions that the Portuguese in 1760 had 'maintained […] during a short time' pieces of land offered by the king of Barue a short while ago. Below, we will see that a dispute cropped up about land between the Portuguese and Gunguru concerning pieces of land. In March 1762, the offering of the land of Panda by the king of Barue (unspecified) is mentioned, which was then given in usufruct within the *prazo* framework for three lives (annex of 26 March in AHU #790). In June 1762, ten 'new pieces of land of Barue' are summed up, namely Vengo, Mussamba, Cuze, Betta, Pandda (~ Panda), Cumbe, Girama, Inhapandda (~ Inhapanda), Mavava, and Muttamba (AHU #768). So far I have only been able to identify the probable location of Panda, which is mentioned in a map by De Castilho (1891, p. 17, *Documento* T) as being near the mouth of the Inhamacombe into the Muira (cf. Newitt, 1973, p. 259); this would imply that the eastern part of the northern border of Barue would have shifted southwards. This eastern part would have been under the relevant jurisdiction of Sena rather than Tete, which governed Massangano and Tipue (AHU #768; cf. Da Costa, 1939[1902], p. 233). If other pieces of land can be identified as the *prazos* mentioned by Da Costa (1939[1902], p. 107) as situated between Barue and North Gorongosa, the ceded territories together possibly formed an inverted 'L' shape from Barue's northeast corner (see Map 2 for a proposal). This must, unfortunately, remain hypothetical as it is even unclear from the information at my disposal whether there is any relationship between the group of twelve and the group of ten pieces of land.[7]

In November 1767, Lieutenant General of the Rivers (the area under Sena jurisdiction) Inacio de Melo Alvim reported trouble with the king of Barue (unspecified, but from what follows it must have been Gunguru). The king had blocked the road to the Manica Fair and had taken by force some pieces of land

7 Isaacman (1972a, pp. 112, 215n79) mentions a cession of land around 1752 by a Barue King as a reward for help against a certain Linhembe. So far I have had no access to the original source and I am reluctant to incorporate the information without being certain whether the said 'Linhembe' was or was not identical with the 'Zinheme' mentioned below. As for names other than 'Panda', some can be found in other texts, but I suspect they concern cases of different places with identical or similar names to those given here.

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from the Portuguese inhabitants. A punitive military campaign against the king was planned. Begun under the command of Miguel José Pereira Gaio on 6 December, with mixed results, it evolved into a prolonged war. One serious event was the burning of the village of Xetenda (~ Chetenda) by José Carlos Coelho de Campos and António José Pereira Salema (but apparently on orders of Gaio) sometime around the turn of that year, which provoked reprisal burnings of some settlements in Sungue and the houses of De Campos and Salema, with the help of Chief Chirima who lived outside Barue.[8] The episode is referred to in Bhila (1982, p. 124), Isaacman (1972a, p. 39), and Newitt (1995, p. 213), but without giving due weight to the destruction of Xetenda. From the data it appears that this event provoked shock and moral indignation not only among Baruese but also neighbouring non-Baruese who sympathized with Barue. The cooperation with Barue, which Chief Chirima demonstrated, had not so much to do with 'banditry' (Newitt, ibid.) but was directly triggered by the destruction. This appears from a comment by Gunguru. In mid-1768, the Makombe sent envoys to Gaio who were ordered to say that he (Gunguru)

> …did not want war with the *Muzungos* [Portuguese] and that he only had histories with José Carlos, and with Salema because of the insults to him which they had done to his people [this almost certainly refers to Xetenda's destruction because of the two persons mentioned], […] and that excepting these two, the others could pass to Manica.
>
> *Moçambique*, 1957, pp. 89–92, 229, § 255

Note the identification in the quote of the Makombe with the population. Later that year, meetings took place to discuss unresolved issues between the Baruese and the Portuguese. The minutes made by the Portuguese scribe are quite detailed and interesting, and it is illuminating to provide some translations *in extenso*. They not only illustrate the relationship between Barue and the Sena Portuguese at the time but also the formal functioning of the Barue state as well as the political stance of Gunguru.

On 3 October, a group of inhabitants under the jurisdiction of Sena gathered with an ambassador of the Makombe, who opened saying:

> …that his King ordered him to know from the Sir Lieutenant-General, which fault he had committed, so that they would leave him stay calmly in his Kingdom because the last year [i.e. 1767] they waged war on him at

8 This paragraph up to here compiled from AHU #1353, #1374; *Moçambique* (1956[85], pp. 114, 117, § 168); *Moçambique* (1957[89–92], pp. 193, § 231; 200, § 236; 219–221, § 252).

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> the same time that he had earlier sent goodwill gifts [*pegado pés*] by another ambassador to make the same plead, so he Macombe considered himself without fault which would merit retribution.
>
> *Moçambique*, 1956[85], pp. 113, 116, § 168

When the then Commander José Caetano da Mota showed unawareness of the earlier envoy, the ambassador explained that the latter had been sent to Vicente Caetano Dias, who then apparently had taken the gifts for himself without any effects on the war. The conversation then came to the questions

> …for which reason the roads [to] Manica were closed; for which reason they [Baruese] had taken the lands from the *muzungos* [Portuguese], and for which reason, he Makombe allowed robberies on the roads.
>
> *Moçambique*, 1956[85], pp. 113, 116, § 168

to which the ambassador responded

> …that the roads had always been open until the time at which he received the notice of Vicente Caetano Dias that there was war. That the pieces of land he had neither taken them nor had he expulsed the *muzungos*, but that the Quiteves together with the sons of the princes his enemies had expulsed the *muzungos* for reasons, which they had had, and that he Makombe seeing that the pieces of land were in the hands of other owners he expulsed them and took possession of them [i.e. the pieces of land] because of [these] being his[, and] that concerning the robberies he wants that they [i.e. the Portuguese] should show who robbed, and who was robbed, because he wants to pay, and he wants to punish, for he knows it is untrue [the information about] the robberies, which they [accused] him [of]; because his desire, and his interest is to have friendship with the *muzungos* in order to cultivate [*colimar*], and eat peacefully.
>
> *Moçambique*, 1956[85], pp. 113, 117, § 168

The ambassador further explained that

> …the entry, which they had made into Sungue was a retaliation of war which attacked them [Baruese], yet that the said entry [had been done by] the Prince Changara *Munhai* [envoy] of Chicova [i.e. Mutapa] without permission from his [probably the ambassador's] king.
>
> *Moçambique*, 1956[85], pp. 114, 117, § 168

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This comment I interpret as saying that the 'entry' (i.e. the episode of the burning of the houses mentioned above) was not coordinated by the Makombe, since it needed to be executed quickly if it was to have any effect, but obtained the Makombe's approval afterwards.

The Sena Portuguese had no immediate response, and it was arranged that the discussion would continue the next day, 4 October 1768. First, they tried to undermine the professional status (*carácter*) of the Barue ambassador by implying that another envoy had had a higher ranking (*graduação*). The ambassador explained that he was

> …the *Baso* of the gate of the [Barue] king, and that from him he had all the powers for the conclusion of the peace which he requested…

and that the other envoy mentioned

> …was [a] *sachicunda* [of] lower [*ínfima*] ranking than his, that he moreover enjoyed being confidant of his King.
>
> *Moçambique*, 1956[85], pp. 114, 118, § 168; (for the ranking of *bazo* and *sachikunda*, see Newitt, 1973, p. 195)

Satisfied, the Sena group put forward their demands without showing consideration for the concerns of the Baruese mentioned the previous day: the Makombe should either kill or hand over any robbers, and the pieces of land should be given to the Portuguese if there was to be peace (*Moçambique*, 1956[85], pp. 114–115, 118, § 168). The ambassador responded that

> …he promised in name of his king by whom he had competence to be able to do, guard, and comply with anything that was mandated to him, however that concerning the handover of the said land he could decide nothing, since for that he had no authority.
>
> *Moçambique*, 1956[85], pp. 115, 118, § 168

After deliberation, the Sena group accepted this functional limitation of the ambassador, planned to send two inhabitants to discuss the land issue directly with the Makombe, and suspended the war until a solution could be found (ibid., pp. 115, 118–119).

On 28 October or shortly before, the planned visit was realized by Agostinho Viegas de Brito in the company of the scribe, Filipe Pereira. As to the question of why the Makombe had taken back pieces of land given by his 'predecessors', Gunguru answered that these pieces

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> …had been given by Mutuconha, interposed by Bernardo Xavier de Sá without for this having any powers, and that the said Gunguro incumbent king of Barue to whom *de jure* belonged the kingdom taking possession of his *quite* [throne, Gamitto, 1857–1858, p. 28], and establishing his government he wanted take possession of those, but foreseeing, that the said Mutuconha, Zinheme, and Cuvava were rising up […] he [Gunguru] did not want to wage war over the said pieces of land […] until seeing whether time gave some space, and seeing that Mutuconha had died and had, [sic] broken the forces of Zinheme, and Cuvava[,] he soon took action to […] take possession of his lands…

adding that

> …the Quiteves had waged war accompanied by some princes because António José Pereira Salema gave a bad life to the said Quiteves, who lived in the said pieces of land paying [*soncando*] maize tribute, giving much work in the building of houses in the style of Sena, [so] they rose against him, and they threw them [unspecified, probably people of Salema] out.

The 'princes' are not specified but probably at least Changara is meant. The Makombe confirmed to Viegas the Brito that he had given a knife as a present in the past, but in contrast to what the Portuguese claimed, this had not been done as a confirmation of the cession of the pieces of land but that

> …he had given [the knife] to Manuel Cabral de Abreu […] to kill the three mentioned before [i.e. Mutukunya, Zinheme, Cuvava] enemies of Makombe, or hand them over, and enjoy a land Cuzo, for the time of four years, and [after that] return to give [it] back.
>
> *Moçambique*, 1956[85], pp. 126, § 170; cf. Bhila, 1982, pp. 124–126; (whether or not Cuzo ~ Cuze is unclear)

Concerning the mentioned Quiteves, Gunguru explained that

> …the Quiteves, after throwing out the *Muzungos*, took possession of the pieces of land, the said king [i.e. Gunguro] being true lord of those, [this] compelled [him] to send his envoy to the king of Quiteve that he should remove [*excluísse*] the said Quiteves out of the said pieces of land, [consequently] the said king of Quiteve sent his person with a journey so that the Quiteves who were in possession of the said pieces of land would

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> hand [those] over forthwith, and soon to their true lord, and with the handover which the said Quiteves did the said king took possession of those, and forthwith ordered [them] to [be] govern[ed] by his chiefs [*cabos*], and to have a hand in them [the pieces of land] in the form which the king of Quiteve ordered to say.
>
> *Moçambique*, 1956[85], pp. 127, § 170

The latter comment probably refers not to a situation in which the Quiteve king indirectly rules part of Barue but to the coordination of the desired removal of the Quiteve people. In contrast to what Hydén (2013[2006], p. 56) notes as to the interest in people rather than territory, we see Gunguru being interested in the territory concerned rather than the Quiteves inhabiting it. Probably they had not been original inhabitants of that part of Barue territory but had been brought there by Salema. The Portuguese did not give up, but the Makombe

> …well confronted [*bem combatido*] about the point of the pieces of land, responded as ultimate resolution that he could not give [those], and that the earlier gift, which they [Baruese] say had been in the form practiced before, and not had been twelve lands like misleadingly said Cabral but indeed really only a piece of land for him to eat four years, and this particular land was Cuzo.
>
> *Moçambique*, 1956[85], pp. 128, § 170

A few days later, on 31 October, the Makombe called another meeting with Viegas de Brito and Pereira. Gaio had tried to appease Gunguru on his own by sending his slaves secretly through the bush instead of – much to the Makombe's discontent–Barue's public roads. With Gaio's main representative trembling before the Makombe and several of Barue's higher leaders (Mucomovache,[9] Manamuchenge, Sarvange, Manamafobo, and Satambara), the meeting was not a success for Gaio (*Moçambique*, 1956[85], pp. 119–125, § 169).

The relationship between the 1768 disputes and the information about the twelve and ten pieces of land, respectively, referred to above is not clear, but judging from the report by Filipe Pereira, the Portuguese and Gunguru eventually agreed in 1768 that the disputed pieces of land had not been given by

9 It is unclear to me whether or not there is any relationship with the *m'comaatche* (~ *Mukomowasha*) mentioned by Coutinho (1904, pp. 38, 40), an advisor to the Makombe (cf. Isaacman, 1973, pp. 399–402).

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the latter; the Portuguese only claimed that Gunguru had confirmed the alleged cession. From this and the declaration of Gunguru, we can then conclude that those pieces were given by Mutukunya. That Mutukunya (~ Montecone) was interposed by Bernardo Xavier (de Sá), as the Makombe said, is confirmed by Gaio in *Moçambique* (1957[89–92], pp. 228, § 255; cf. Isaacman, 1972, p. 112), implying that Mutukunya was Makombe sometime between 1758 and 1767.

In July 1769, the situation between Barue and the Portuguese is finally referred to as peaceful (*Moçambique*, 1955[81], pp. 140, § 104; cf. Newitt, 1995, p. 213). From the later information, dealt with below, it becomes clear that Panda and at least some other pieces of land must indeed have been recovered by Barue, for some period of time already. The best explanation available for this is that Gunguru was able to consolidate his position vis-à-vis the Portuguese, and the peace was concluded in favour of Gunguru.

From these episodes with Gunguru, we can derive some significant conclusions. The chronology and character of the events suggests that Mutukunya got hold of the throne in or around March 1762 when the ten 'new pieces of land of Barue' were given to the Portuguese for prolonged if not perpetual occupation. Then, in or around August 1767, Gunguru was back on the throne and reversed the Portuguese-friendly policies of Mutukunya, blocking transit, defending the territorial integrity of the kingdom, and protesting against the maltreatment of his people. This self-conscious stance, which appears to have been successful, must almost certainly have been a great inspiration for contemporary and later Baruese. Indeed, 130 years later Gunguru was still remembered as 'the great Makombe who first made the Barue a united and powerful people' (Arnold, 1995[1901], p. 244). The aforementioned Quiteves, on the other hand, are treated as not belonging to Barue and to be removed under the auspices of their own king. It is difficult to view this situation as structurally different from national identity as conceived in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Whether the expulsion from Barue of these Quiteves with the cooperation of their king was or was not against their own will is difficult to determine from the data, but it is likely they were not born in the disputed area since this had only recently been occupied by the Portuguese for whom they worked.

A certain 'Katsvaganyidze' was mentioned a few times during my fieldwork, either associated with Samanyanga (Melo MN); or with 'Makombe' (Luís NCM), that is, Kabudu Kagoro; specifically as the latter's father (Oniasse BS); or grandfather, that is, father's father (Ioanes CN). The Wieschhoff/Shungano list mentions a 'Kapsakanesi' with the number 22. With no other candidates on the list, it is likely that Katsvaganyidze ~ Kapsakanesi. Because he is still remembered by name in Barue, even if no concrete stories are recalled, it

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may be hypothesized that he was a person of importance, and the hypothesis may be formulated that Katsvaganyidze was identical with Gunguru. ICN's identification of Katsvaganyidze as grandfather of Kabudu Kagoro fits well with Arnold's (1995[1901]) identification of Gunguru as grandfather of Chipapata.

7 After Gunguru until the Mid-Nineteenth Century

In April 1781, Filipe Caetano de Sousa reported that Prince Cuava tried to get hold of the Barue throne with the aid of some Quiteve princes, which would lead to disruption of traffic along the roads and robberies on the Portuguese estates (*fazendas*). In order to safeguard Portuguese trade interests and recuperate the pieces of land, 'which were formerly of our dominion', it was decided to support a Makombe friendly to the Portuguese (AHU #2108). It took a while before the Portuguese objectives were realized. On 4 October 1782, an apparently recent inauguration of a Makombe is reported, with a concomitant opening of the transit routes for the Portuguese to Manica–unfortunately the source does not give the Makombe's name. His forces were fighting against two lower-level leaders, the above-mentioned Cuava and one Chicomo (~ Chincoma; Isaacman, 1972a, p. 112; 1973, p. 405), who had positioned themselves along two main roads, blocking and robbing Portuguese. It is on this occasion that Portuguese aid is invoked in order to 'get the heads of the rebel leaders', with the counterprestation that the Governor of the Rivers 'might order to take possession of all the pieces of Land which were formerly given to the State [i.e. Portugal]' except Panda (cf. above), which the king offered to João de Almeida. Borders (*lemites*) would have to be physically demarcated (AHU #2356). The fact that pieces of land are promised although they had been given earlier indicates that they were not in Portuguese hands on 4 October 1782. This makes it probable that Gunguru had been successful in regaining the lands in the episode described above. His incognito (perhaps not immediate) successor was evidently less adamant about keeping the territory of the country intact. However, even the cession of the pieces of land implies that Barue had a clear notion of territory (otherwise territory could not be exchanged for a service), and we also see that there is a concept of a physical border.

In 1788, Manuel Galvão da Silva (1954[1790], p. 324) crossed what is now southern Barue District. A little later, we find in the literature Makombe Gange, who almost certainly can be identified with the Ganye, number 26 of the Wieschhoff/Shungano list. Sanhantamba (2001, p. 26) implies that *gange* and *gungulu* represent different descent groups within the Makombe family, apparently considered distinct enough so as to be able to consider marriages between

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them as exogamous and not incestuous–people of the same totem group are not supposed to marry each other. Sanhantamba (ibid.) indicates this idea of exogamy was an innovation by 'Makombe' around the time of the 'expansion' – probably this refers to the 1890s (cf. below). Similar information was provided by John TQ. John TQ also mentioned Gange and Gungulu (~ Gunguru) as individuals, being involved with rain rituals. Gungulu would have defended the prohibition of marriage within the same totem group while Gange would have promoted marriage within the same totem group, so disregarding 'the norms of the Gungulus' (John TQ, interview in 2017 by Joaquim Mantrujar Meque). I interpret the oral tradition information as indicating that Gange and Gunguru belonged to different descent groups. If this is correct this means that at least with Gange, if not earlier, there has been a lineage change in the ruling position within the Makombe family after Gunguru.

Gange was Makombe until 1794/1795 and was succeeded by Sazua probably in 1795. With this Makombe, the possibilities for the Portuguese to travel through Barue to the re-established Masekese (Manica) market were renewed.[10] Thanks to the information of this period we know that, in order to have permission for transit, the Portuguese of Sena had to negotiate with the kingdom concerning the payment of tribute. Lower-level leaders of Barue obtained parts of the tribute in the form of cloth; mentioned are the following: Savengo (possibly ~ Sarvange), Guerema, Bondo, Sanha, Samsaera, Sanhaganza, Sanhamutamba, and Inhagope (Bhila in Rita-Ferreira, 1982, p. 145; Bhila, 1982, pp. 149–150, 166n12). Although they could receive tribute, it was the Makombe who agreed the terms of it with the Portuguese, indicating the centralized character of the Barue state. Around this time, the presence of Muslims in Barue, who are said to be descendants of Muslims who fled Sofala when it was taken by the Portuguese (Liesegang [Ed.], 1966, pp. 29–30, 35n57; cf. Lobato, 1989[1957], p. 55), is mentioned. In the eighteenth century, 'dispersed' Christians, who belonged to the Manica church (De Andrade, 1955, p. 76), are also reported as living in Barue.

Also around this time, an intriguing aspect of the inauguration of a new Makombe became the final ceremony of a Makombe's investiture through the involvement of a Portuguese representative bringing water from Sena in a flask. In 1811, Chimbatata underwent such a ceremony, with the accompaniment of political agreements (e.g. concerning transit possibilities) between the states of Barue and Portugal. For 1830, such a procedure is mentioned

10 Rita-Ferreira (1982, p. 144); Bhila (1982, pp. 149–150, 166n12). The comments of De Lacerda e Almeida (1889[1798], pp. 21–22) probably refer to this Sazua.

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concerning Inhamaguada.[11] Gamitto (1857–1858) provides more details, some of which I will mention here. After the indigenous ceremonies, the Portuguese representative

> …emptied over the head of the new king a flask of water, which he brought with him, and which they [the Baruese] believed to be blessed, and with the latter ceremony he [the new king] was recognized [and] thus acclaimed king […].

This happened after the king had been fasting three days, in order to experience what hardship was. After the pouring, the king was presented with a bow and arrow, and a hoe. He was supposed to pick up the hoe, signifying he would promote peace and prosperity rather than war. Usually the kings did pick the hoe (Gamitto, ibid., p. 29). Here we see that Barue knew an institutionalized expression of the king's association with the welfare of the people, even if he had large discretion in taking decisions.

The poured water was known as *madzi amanga* (~ *mazia manga*; the form 'madzi-manga' does not seem correct, omitting the second 'a'). The literal meaning of this may be rendered as 'water that binds' or 'ties' (cf. Montez, 1941, p. 119). The symbolic meaning of what it was that was bound/tied is less easily determined, and Isaacman's (1973) interpretation of the ceremony is problematic, associating *madzi* with beer instead of water, which is the word's linguistic as well as physical reference (clear from Santana, 1967, p. 346; for more discussion, see Van Dokkum, 2015, pp. 300–301, Appendix B, § 2). In general, however, the ritual indicates that the states of Portugal and Barue had some *modus vivendi* without mutually directed hostilities in this historical period, with the exception of the kingless period discussed below. In 1798, the ritual must have existed for some time already, as it was described as 'ingrained' (*inveterado*), but it was almost certainly established after the time of Gunguru, considering that the disputes between Gunguru and the Portuguese mentioned above never referred to such a ceremony. Indeed, we may well hypothesize that the confusion about the status of the pieces of land, the handover of which enjoyed no legality in Gunguru's eyes, was a motive for the introduction of the ritual so as to avoid similar conflicts in the future.[12]

11 Chimbatata: Alves Barboza (~ Barbosa) in Montez (1941); cf. Alpers (1970, p. 212); Santana (1967, pp. 445–447); Inhamaguada: (Santana (1967, pp. 346, cf. 903); cf. Alpers (1970, p. 212).

12 Ingrained: De Lacerda e Almeida (1889[1798], pp. 21–22). Newitt (1995, p. 211) quotes the *Descripção Corografica*, which describes a similar ritual for the Manyika kingdom. Since

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In 1811, we find Inhamauano (~ Nyamawanu) mentioned as the recently deceased Barue king (AHU #6219; cf. Arnold, 1995[1901], p. 244). Envoys to the Portuguese community in Sena of the aspirant new king, quite possibly Chimbatata, included a certain Chigogorij a.k.a. Ganje; he may have been Gange's son. The envoys requested the Portuguese not only to arrange for the ceremonial water but also for hats for all the subordinate leaders of the aspirant king.

The accession of Chimbatata in late 1811 probably signified a lineage change within the Makombe rulership away from Gunguru's descendants (at least Nyamawanu) because individuals of the 'descent group [*geração*] of the Gonguros' are indicated as Chimbatata's enemies who should not be helped by Portugal (Santana, 1967, pp. 446–447). If the aspirant king mentioned above was Chimbatata, he, Gange and Chigogorij, were probably related more closely. In 1818, it seems we encounter the 'descent group of the Gonguros' back in power with Muzucutto (or perhaps Mazucutto; AHU #8399), whose name is probably ~ Mocuzucuto in Santana (1967, pp. 445–447). Capanga (~ Kapanga in the Wieschhoff/Shungano list), identified as a son of Gunguru (Arnold, 1995[1901], p. 244), reigned at least in 1820 (Alpers, 1970, p. 212; Isaacman, 1976, p. 204). After Capanga, Isaacman (ibid.) mentions two Makombes in the period 1822–1826, Sazua and Bingo. At present it is unclear whether this Sazua and the Sazua mentioned above were or were not the same person. A different Sazua is mentioned in 1832 as Barue 'prince', staying in *prazo* Gorongosa (Santana, 1974, p. 556). It may be that we are dealing here with three generations of a 'Sazua' lineage.

In the period 1826–1830, Barue experienced a kingless period for four years (Alpers, 1970, p. 212; Santana, 1967, p. 329). This period was characterized by the effects of locusts, drought, famine, and disease (Newitt, 1995, pp. 254–255). Groups of Baruese and others, with ad hoc leaders, marauded the surroundings of the country in search of sustenance. One of these leaders was Chidana (~ Chidanna), who had left Barue as a child and now led groups of escaped slaves who ravaged the area around Sena. The Portuguese cooperated with Inhamaguada to defeat Chidana in November 1829 (Santana, 1964, pp. 338, 788–792, 883, 963, 1082; information in Santana, 1974, p. 350 probably refers to such attacks). The following March, Barue itself was still in disorder, however. The Portuguese decided to back Inhamaguada as prospective king, which apparently was approved by the latter's family members. Preparations were then made for the confirmation ritual described above (Santana, 1967, pp. 166, 329).

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that document dates from the end of the eighteenth century (Bhila, 1982, p. 48), it is not clear whether the Manyika ritual would have antedated the Barue ritual.

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In 1833, there was a dispute between Makombe (unspecified) and the Portuguese government in relation to the *feira* (Portuguese trading post) in Masekesa in the Manyika (~ Manica) kingdom. Traders passing through Barue to the *feira* had stopped paying Makombe transit fees, and Makombe had blocked transit. A treaty resolved the dispute. Meanwhile, Nguni had started to attack the *feira*, one of the first signs that Nguni, originally coming from the south, would soon play a dominant role in what is now central Mozambique (Bhila, 1982, p. 177; Santana, 1974, pp. 886, cf. 78). The diverse Nguni groups also occupied *prazos* and frightened the Portuguese government in the Lower Zambezi region (Serra [Ed.], 2000[1982], p. 101).

An invasion of Barue by the Maseko people (one of the several Nguni groups) in 1838 is reported (Liesegang, 1970, pp. 321, 334–335); somewhat later, 'by the 1840s', Barue was under the control of the Gaza Nguni of Soshangane (Newitt, 1995, p. 287; cf. Rita-Ferreira, 1999, p. 52). This situation apparently did not last long–it is not clear exactly why; Newitt (1973, p. 316) states that the Nguni 'left the region'. In any case, the mobile character of the Nguni, who often operated through raids rather than fixed occupation of territory (Meneses pers. comm.) may complicate any reconstruction. According to Newitt, polities subject to Gaza rule kept their identities and their own ruling houses, 'but they had to accept the presence of representatives of the Gaza state at their capital', and armed parties would periodically come by for tax-collecting (1995, p. 287; cf. Bhila, 1982, p. 185). As for Barue, it is not clear whether the Makombe dynasty was really functional; so far, no ruling Makombes are known in the Nguni period. Barue's political fate apparently only stabilized around 1853, when we encounter the Makombe who is the best known in Barue District today, Kabudu Kagoro, also known as Chipapata (~ Xipapata, Chipatata, Chimpampata).

8 The Efforts to Maintain Independence c. 1853–1918

The fact that Kabudu Kagoro can be identified with the Chipapata mentioned in the literature has so far not been widely recognized, but is obvious thanks to the information given by Von Sicard (1954, p. 54). There are also the following considerations:

(1) Fieldwork data of the present author (see Van Dokkum, 2015, pp. 305–307, Appendix B, § 4).

(2) Portugal (1967, p. 141) mentions 'Nhampale' as son of 'Cabudocagolo'. Taking Nhampale ~ Nyaupare ~ Nyapaure in the compound 'Nyapaure-Hanga' (Ranger, 1963, p. 60), we can take Nyaupare = Kanga (~ Canga, Hanga, Nkanga). Taking Cabudocagolo ~ Kabudu Kagoro, and recognizing

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that Kanga was Chipapata's son (Isaacman, 1976, p. 50), these observations yield the identity Chipapata = Kabudu Kagoro.

(3) There is mention of 'Kabudu Kagore' (~ Kabudu Kagoro) directly after Tenere and before Samacande in the Wieschhoff/Shungano list; these two persons lived not long before 1929.

With the above, a problem alluded to by Alpers is solved:

> Chipapata [...] appears to have come to power in 1853. [He was not] recorded by Wieschoff [sic], but Coutinho [mentions] Xipapata [...] An unpublished manuscript by Jason Maciwanyika [mentions] Kabudu Kagore, who is number 30 on the Wieschoff [sic] tally.
>
> ALPERS, 1970, p. 213

We can say that Chipapata was indeed recorded by Wieschhoff, but under another name. Isaacman (1973, p. 396) does state that 'Kabudu Kagoro is also remembered in the traditions by the name of Chipapata', but in that article's context he understands that as referring to a 'first king of Barue' before the mid-sixteenth century without discussing Pacheco's information from the 1860s, Wieschhoff's from the 1920s, and Abraham's from the 1950s-1960s, who do not identify Kabudu Kagoro as such. It may be that at least some, if not all, of the traditions Isaacman refers to in this quote were in fact about the nineteenth-century Kabudu Kagoro. At least certain references, in the same traditions, to the spirit of Kabudu Kagoro as residing in mediums can be understood as related to that same person because Coutinho writes about 'the *m'pondoro* [*mhondoro* spirit medium] [...] in whose body they [the Baruese] say is the spirit of the father of Macombe' (1904, p. 38), while on the same page Coutinho identifies Kanga as 'Macombe' and thus the spirit would have been of Kanga's father. (In 1976, Isaacman does not mention the identity 'Chipapata = Kabudu Kagoro' anymore, but nevertheless still sticks to his 1973 interpretation of Kabudu Kagoro.)

It is likely that my interlocutors in Barue conflated at least two different historical individuals into the single person of 'Makombe', namely Kabudu Kagoro and his son Kanga, even if they only recognized Kabudu Kagoro as 'Makombe'. This conflation aspect is relevant for a good understanding of the history and legitimation of certain chiefdoms in Barue District, and of the importance of 'Makombe' in general. An indication for the existence of the conflation is that *Régulo* Sanhantamba indicated a flight path of 'Makombe' via Macossa and Ntsuanda (Sabão, near Catandica) to Zimbabwe. Though not exactly identical with Coutinho's (1904, p. 55, 261) data on Kanga's escape route after Coutinho had defeated him in 1902 (as discussed below), *Régulo* Sanhantamba's

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information is similar enough to Coutinho's, and different enough from the flight path taken by the brothers Nongwe-Nongwe and Makosa[13] in 1918, to warrant the conclusion that present-day reference by Baruese to 'Makombe' may have *originated* from Kanga/Nyaupare, not Kabudu Kagoro, even if the latter is *intended*. Sueta AC even said that Makombe's name was 'Kabudu Kagoro Nyaupare', thus giving direct proof of the conflation (FN[s] 29/07/2010; it is safe to assume he would mean the father Makombe, not the son Makombe). Also references to 'Makombe' by *Régulo* Sanhatunze and *Sabhuku* (headman) Musosonora seem more applicable to Kanga than to Kabudu Kagoro. Their ancestors got the areas to rule as a reward for their contribution in anti-Portuguese warfare, and this squares better with the situation after De Sousa's defeat in 1892, when a power vacuum could be filled, than with the actions of Chipapata who fought against but never *defeated* the Portuguese in a war.

8.1 *Genealogical Aspects*

For a better understanding of the historical developments mentioned below, it will be opportune to discuss here some genealogical aspects. Arnold (1995[1901], p. 244) and Coutinho (1904) provide useful genealogical information about Gunguru and his descendants. According to Arnold, Gunguru had four reigning sons: Nengisa, Nyamawanu, Shimori (~ Shimari), and Kapanga (Mocuzucuto's name is not mentioned; he may have been a son of Nengisa, or his name an alias of e.g. Shimori). Nyamawanu and Shimori were the fathers of Chibudu and Chipapata, respectively. Coutinho (1904, p. 17) identifies Chibudu and Chipapata as brothers, but without identifying their father, while Arnold is very specific in providing the names of different fathers, which seems more reliable. Chibudu and Chipapata, and their descendants, disputed the leadership from the mid-nineteenth until the early twentieth century, as we will see in more detail below. Figure 1 gives a summary of the relevant genealogy (for sources of figures, see the end of the references section).

8.2 *Activities and Defeat of Chipapata/Kabudu Kagoro*

Chibudu at least reigned in 1844. He was backed by Portuguese settlers, and as late as 1854, though apparently unsuccessfully, by the Gaza Nguni governor (later king) Mzila (~ Umzila). Chipapata/Kabudu Kagoro challenged Chibudu

13 The identification of Nongwe-Nongwe and Makosa (~ Macossa) as brothers is not common in the literature, but follows from the identification of Macossa as son of Cabuducagolo in Portugal (1967, p. 2). For more arguments, see Van Dokkum (2015, pp. 307–312, Appendix B, § 5). The 1918 flight path was near the Nhamitomboé (~ Nhabitomboé, Nyakutombwi, Nyamatombgwi) area in Samanhanga (Isaacman, 1976, p. 172; Ranger, 1963, pp. 78–79). Nongwe-Nongwe was also known as Chikuwore (Isaacman, 1976, p. 158).

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

FIGURE 1 Gunguru and some of his descendants

and, as indicated, came to power not later than 1853. Somewhat earlier, in 1849, the Portuguese had established Joaquim José da Cruz as leaseholder in *prazo* Massangano (in the south corner of the Luenha and Zambezi Rivers, north of Barue) to withstand Nguni. But Da Cruz (nickname Nhaude–spider) and his son António Vicente (Bonga–wild cat) became a nuisance for the Portuguese government when Massangano interfered with the trade along the Zambezi River and engaged in raids.[14]

In 1853, Chipapata combined with Pereira (Chissaka), ruler of Macanga (north of Tete), to attack Massangano in 1853. They were unsuccessful and had to give up the effort when the rains started (Eça, 1953, pp. 279–287; Newitt, 1973, pp. 238, 316). According to informants of Isaacman (1972a, p. 144), the motivation (for Chipapata) to attack Da Cruz (Nhaude) was that the latter had conquered land that had pertained to Barue. It is not clear how this explanation should be understood: it might refer to land that had been Barue territory in the time of Gunguru and then lost as we analysed above, or land that was still under Barue jurisdiction in the mid-nineteenth century. Eça (1953, p. 279) speaks of a 'mystery' concerning the two attackers' motivations to unite forces,

14 This paragraph: Alpers (1970, p. 213); Coutinho (1904, p. 17); Eça (1953, pp. 48–51, 58, 62–63); Isaacman (1976, p. 204); Newitt (1973, pp. 254–257, 316, 402n268); and Serra ([Ed.] 2000[1982], p. 102). Note that succession within the Da Cruz family was along male lines; this signals a change away from the standard model of a *prazo*.

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but probably their attack was a preemptive one and an attempt to neutralize Da Cruz, whose increasing power they felt threatened by (Newitt, 1973, pp. 239–240).

From information about the 1853 siege, we know that in 1853 Chipapata had relations with the Portuguese, and in such a way that he was able to bully them. During the Massangano siege, some Portuguese officials passed by over the Zambezi, and Chipapata demanded a piece of artillery from them. When they refused, saying it was government property, Chipapata said he had a treaty with the Portuguese government to help him, and that if it would not be given he would take it by force and moreover would do with government enterprises as he wished. Eventually the artillery piece, some other material, and two soldiers to accompany the military equipment were handed over to the Makombe, who duly signed a receipt (Eça, 1953, pp. 285–286; Macombe [Chipapata] 1953[1853]; Vasconcelos e Sá 1953[1854]). The text of the treaty Chipapata referred to does not seem available in published works. However, the fact that Chipapata acted like he had the upper hand indicates that such a treaty was concluded after he had neutralized his cousin Chibudu, who was supported by Portuguese settlers as mentioned above. Probably having no other option, the Portuguese government decided to cooperate with the winner of the Chipapata/Chibudu conflict.

This firm position of Chipapata would gradually erode. Despite its initial assertiveness and subsequent stability, the reign of Chipapata signalled the beginning of the end for Barue's independence, due to the Portuguese. The activities of Manuel António de Sousa, who was born into a Goan family in Portuguese India in about 1835, formed the prelude to the Portuguese colonization of Barue. De Sousa, also known as Gouveia, was sent to eastern Africa to administer the estate of an uncle, became a trader based in Sena, and later built himself a base at Gorongosa, a vast old *prazo* granted to him in 1854 or 1855. In 1863, the Portuguese government appointed him *capitão-mor* ('captain-major'). His usefulness for the Portuguese government became evident in the period 1867–1869 when he assisted the Portuguese in suppressing the then independently operating Da Cruz (Bonga) of Massangano (Coutinho, 1936; Newitt, 1973, pp. 313–322).

We read that during one of the military operations against Da Cruz, in August 1868, some Baruese were under De Sousa's command, and that people speaking 'the same dialect' were with Massangano (suggesting they were also Baruese, but the possibility that they spoke the closely related Nyungwe language cannot be ruled out). We read further that some individuals of the two militarily opposed groups were 'almost fraternizing' with each other at a time when there was no fighting activity (Eça, 1954, p. 244). There is no necessity to consider this situation as going against Barue nationalism; it at most shows

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that 'Baruese' (also) existed as an ethnic identity, which did not perfectly coincide with the Barue state. That some Baruese were fighting with De Sousa quite possibly resulted, I hypothesize, from Chipapata's political calculations at the time, which suggested to him that it was better to cooperate with De Sousa rather than with Da Cruz of Massangano. Indeed, in mid-1869, the Portuguese commander Tavares de Almeida still thought that he could count on Barue and Macanga support against Massangano (Eça, 1954, pp. 363, cf. 553), but it appears that around this time Chipapata had changed his mind concerning the political and military situation in the region.

Eventually, however, De Sousa's power and intrigues became a threat to Barue, and Makombe Chipapata now cooperated with Da Cruz (Bonga) to try to render De Sousa and other enemy Portuguese harmless. The Makombe even attacked De Sousa in Gorongosa around this time (I suspect after mid-1869), without success (Newitt, 1973, pp. 316–317; Coutinho, 1936, p. 24). In September 1869, troops of Chipapata are reported to be stationed on Portuguese-administered territory near Sena. This operation was not a matter of territorial expansion. The Barue army threatened to kill the women and children of the local African population so as to prevent people of that population participating in the fight against Da Cruz. A son (unspecified) of the Makombe also had a dispute with an inhabitant of Sena and threatened to attack the town. The military commander of Sena responded to the Makombe's son that he had neither the right to be on Portuguese territory without permission nor to dictate laws to local populations. After a small exchange of fire, the Baruese retreated to Barue (Tavares de Almeida in Eça, 1954, pp. 614–615, cf. 371; Anonymous, 1870, pp. 16, 18).

In 1873, De Sousa concluded a treaty with Tendai Mutasa, king of Manyika (~ Manica). Possibly this was a reason for Chipapata and Muruko, king of Maungwe, to attack Tendai in 1874. Tendai was relieved by De Sousa, and in or around that year De Sousa married a daughter of the Makombe (known as Adriana). Chipapata, I hypothesize, probably realized that military resistance against De Sousa did not work. Trade agreements were also established. These events are probably related to a shifting power balance in favour of De Sousa. 'Very shortly afterwards' (i.e. after the indicated wedding) De Sousa tricked a caravan of his into being looted in Barue, giving him a pretext to 'persuade' the Makombe to submit to De Sousa–done symbolically by sending a tusk filled with earth to De Sousa.[15]

15 This paragraph: Abraham (1951, p. 72); Beach (1999, pp. 81, 85); Coutinho (1904, pp. 17–18; 1936); De Almeida (1979, p. 186); Isaacman (1976, pp. 49–50); Maugham (1910, pp. 140–141); Newitt (1973, pp. 315–317); ICN; LNCM; MMN. See also Beach (1999, pp. 81, 85).

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Chipapata died in 1880 or 1881.[16] Isaacman (1976, pp. 50–52), however, gives 1887 as the year of Chipapata's death, leading Pélissier (1994[1984] vol. 1, p. 466) to complain about the 'confused chronology'. Information obtained by the 1900 expedition of Col. Arnold maintained that Chipapata's death was 'as far as can be ascertained, about 1886 or 1888' (1995[1901], p. 244). If Isaacman's 1892 source is to be interpreted as referring to 1887 as the year of Chipapata's death, it must be incorrect because Paiva de Andrada wrote in (1885) about the 'late' (*fallecido*) Makombe, which must imply that Chipapata was dead. Obviously, the same objection holds for the uncertain Arnold data. From Isaacman (1976, p. 51) it would appear that Chipapata was killed during an attack by De Sousa that followed a quarrel between him and Chipapata concerning tribute that Barue should pay to De Sousa, but this is far from clear. The '7' in the year '1887' may be a simple writing error, but I suspect we are dealing here (perhaps additionally) with the confusion of two different persons, Chipapata and someone else, possibly Chimukaka (~ Mucaka) because Bhila (1982, p. 224) cites a 'Shimkaka Fesembo Makombe' as being shot.[17] In De Sousa's words about the dispute, this tribute was imposed 'fifteen years ago', which would mean in or around 1875 if this statement was originally made in 1890 during De Sousa's custody, an event discussed below. This year of 1875 fits well with the wedding and the caravan incident referred to above, occurring in or around 1874, and that in its turn with the information that De Sousa and Adriana's eldest son João Francisco was about six years old when he was made, according to De Sousa's wish, the formal leader of Barue after Chipapata's death (Newitt, 1973, p. 317; cf. Axelson, 1967, p. 141).

With Chipapata dead (and no effective successor who could keep De Sousa out), De Sousa occupied the defunct kingdom, acted as regent for his son João

16 Axelson (1967, pp. 140–141); Newitt (1973, p. 317; 1995, p. 338); Ranger (1963, p. 59); cf. Isaacman (1972a, p. 149). Oral tradition has it that Chipapata/Kabudu Kagoro 'disappeared' (Artur, 1996, p. 31), i.e. 'did not die' (HSG; MJC) and 'went to the Zambezi' (HSG) or 'transformed himself into a partridge and flew across the border of Zimbabwe' (MJC).

17 The main source involved is R.N.A. [Rhodesia] CT 1/15/3, Graham to Local Managing Director, BSAC, 19 January 1892. So far I have had no access to this source. It is used by Isaacman (1976, p. 51), Bhila (1982, pp. 224–225, 229n3) and Mutwira (1982, pp. 5–6, & n30, n43). Confusion abounds in relation to this source, quite beyond the '1887' issue. Bhila's 'Shimkaka Fesembo Makombe' looks suspiciously similar to Isaacman's 'Makombe, Shimkala, Rosembo', where Bhila refers to one person and Isaacman to three. Moreover, Bhila states that in July 1891 a tribute imposed by De Sousa was 'increased', which is not very likely because De Sousa was not in full control of the territory at that time in the first place, cf. below. I suspect the '1887' and '1891' references concern, in fact, the year 1881. On the other hand Bhila is probably right with the said one-person interpretation. See also Van Dokkum (2015, pp. 302–305, Appendix B, § 3).

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Francisco, regrouped the population, and appointed his own local chiefs (Newitt, 1973, p. 317). Isaacman (1976, p. 51) states that 'Gouveia's power was not nearly as complete as either his contemporaries or current historians have thought'. I disagree and posit that De Sousa's usurpation of power was crucial in destroying most of the original political fabric of Barue. Chipapata's son Kanga had little (probably none) concrete political weight during De Sousa's reign and had to build a resistance apparatus almost entirely from scratch. De Sousa's 'legacy' is that none of the current chiefly lineages in Barue District can unequivocally trace their origin (as chiefly lineages) before the period 1890–1892 and probably came into being in or after these years (see Chapter 5).

This does not mean there was no resistance against De Sousa by the Baruese. Coutinho (1904, p. 17; 1936, p. 25) indicates that Chibudu's son, Mucaka, attempted to occupy the throne of the kingdom, but was killed by De Sousa's military efforts. This possibly explains part of the confusion discussed above. Anyhow, after 1880–1881, De Sousa was obliged to employ military force to subdue Barue, which was concluded in Humbe (south Barue) in 1883.[18] Da Costa (1939[1902], p. 281) associates a fugitive Chipitura (~ Chiputura) with the defeat of the kingdom that year. In any case, none of the Makombes was able to defend or recapture Barue decisively in the decade after Chipapata's death.

8.3 *Activities of Kanga until 1890*

Kanga, Chipapata's most prominent son, was born in or around 1851 (Peters, 1900, p. 64). Isaacman's (1976, p. 51) phrase that Gouveia/De Sousa 'recognized his archenemy Hanga as future ruler' is imprecise because De Sousa, as would appear from Isaacman's source, appointed Kanga as king under his own contemporary supervision, not as ruler in some unspecified future (ibid.). Arnold provides more information about this matter from the perspective of Kanga. In this version, it was Kanga who took the initiative to acknowledge De Sousa as overlord of Barue if the latter would get rid of Chipitura (~ Shupatora), son of Chibudu, and opponent of Kanga. When De Sousa expected Kanga to fulfil his side of this alleged agreement, Kanga did not acknowledge De Sousa but unsuccessfully tried to convince Chipitura to repel De Sousa instead (Arnold, 1995[1901], p. 244). It may be highlighted that Kanga's 'deal' with De Sousa is probably not to be interpreted as an act of betrayal of Barue but rather as a trick to demonstrate to Chipitura that De Sousa could not be trusted. It appears that Chipitura's disinterest in acting against Portuguese intrusion (Isaacman, 1976, pp. 54–55) prevented Kanga from specifically reacting against the captain-major.

18 Beach (1999, pp. 41n41, 47); Paiva de Andrada (1886); cf. Newitt (1973, p. 317).

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At least for some time during the 1880s, Kanga (also ~ Ganga, Gonga) stayed in Demera on the left bank of the Luenha River in territory controlled by the Da Cruz of Massangano (this Demera is not to be confused with the Serra Demera mentioned above or the *prazo* Demera on the right bank of the river). The place was attacked and destroyed under the auspices of Paiva de Andrada's military campaigns on September 4, 1887. Axelson reports a 'rising' in or around July 1888, which was joined by 'numbers of the elders of Barue', apparently including Kanga, when De Sousa was in Lisbon.[19]

Oral tradition collected by Artur (1996, pp. 16–17) and myself (cf. Luís NCM) states that 'Makombe' came with his younger brother (identified as Samanyanga or Chivembe), to Barue from 'Mbire' in present-day Zimbabwe. This may refer to Chipapata coming from a place called Mbire around the end of Nguni domination of Barue in the 1840s, discussed above. Oral tradition collected by Gelfand (1974, p. 77) in Nyamaropa (Zimbabwe) is consistent with this.[20] The tradition may also be a remnant of older information, projected onto the more recent Chipapata, that the Barue ruling family as a whole originated from a western or northwestern direction. Yet another possibility–as far as I am concerned the most likely–is that the aspect of conflation of father Chipapata/Kabudu Kagoro with son Kanga plays a role in the oral tradition concerned here, and the 'brothers coming from Mbire' were Kanga and Chipitura. If so, the hypothesis can be defended that Chivembe, ancestor of the present-day Samanhanga chiefly family, can be identified with the Chipitura of the literature (with the result that the two travelling people were more distant relatives than brothers). We know that Kanga fled to Manica around the time of the destruction of Demera, and then went to Massanga (Coutinho, 1936, p. 26;

19 This paragraph: Axelson (1967, p. 144); Coutinho (1936); Isaacman (1972a, p. 144; 1976, p. 50, 69n12); Paiva de Andrada (1888–1889, pp. 413, 418); Newitt (1973, p. 259).

20 This Nyamaropa tradition tells of a 'Nyanguru' coming from Mbire near Wedza during the time of the Nguni. *Nyanguru* (pig) is the totem animal of the Makombe family (Artur, 1996, p. 24; Isaacman, 1976, p. 180n51). As Tracey (1968, p. 20) mentions, the name 'Mbiri' is not unique, and he puts forward the possibility that one 'Mbiri' may have been associated with Mwene Mutapa (see also Beach, 1994b, p. 115). Abrahams's (1966, p. 33n1) informants referred to a Mbire north of the Zambezi River. The information of Gelfand's informants seems to fit better with other data. Difficult to interpret is the comment by Galvão da Silva (1954[1790], p. 328) that 'the lands of Embiri' were 'belonging to Barui'. I have so far not encountered any reference to a Mbire, which would be an exclave of Barue. Possibly Galvão da Silva's information on the 'belonging' is based on some biographical connection between 'Mbire' and a member of the Makombe family before the activities of Chipapata and Chivembe. Maxwell recorded oral tradition among the Hwesa in present-day Zimbabwe that they came from 'Mbire' and arrived in Katerere, having broken away from Makombe in Mozambique' (1999, p. 157).

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Newitt, 1973, p. 330). Massanga is near Tumbula (~ Tumbura), a place mentioned by Adjunct-*Régulo* Luís Nhamugodzo CM in the context of Makombe's entry into Barue from present-day Zimbabwe. Chipitura came to rule west-Barue as we can deduce from Peters (1902, p. 89), who states that, in 1899, a mountainous area of what must be interpreted as a mountain chain in and/or slightly north of the Chôa area was called the 'Chipatula highland'. Taking Chipatula ~ Chipitura, this fits in with Chipitura's dominance of the west of Barue during the time of his struggle with Kanga. In Barue today stories are told how Chivembe and 'Makombe' were in disagreement, with the latter eventually prevailing. (For Luís NCM's version of the episode in Barwe and an English translation, see Van Dokkum, 2015, pp. 329–331, Appendix E). I hypothesize that such stories are a starkly reduced form of the historical circumstance that Kanga eventually got the upper hand in the Barue Kingdom, to be discussed below.

8.4 *Barue's Independence, 1890/1892–1902*

The Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 had defined the principle of 'effective occupation', meaning European countries had to substantiate territorial claims in Africa by exerting physical presence. This led to some bickering between Portugal and Britain over territorial rights in such areas as Mashonaland in (present-day) Zimbabwe and Southern Malawi. In 1887, Portugal published its 'rose-coloured map' that claimed a large part of Central Africa as Portuguese territory, linking present-day Angola and Mozambique. Britain made the diplomatically rash move to present Portugal with an ultimatum on 11 January 1890, demanding practically immediate withdrawal of Portuguese forces from territories Britain considered its own. Portugal complied. Eventually a treaty was formulated, and ratified on 11 June 1891, laying the basis for the geographical shape of Mozambique as it is today.[21]

Especially for Portugal, one practical way to ensure physical presence was using commercially chartered companies to perform the physical presence in the country's name. One such company was the Mozambique Company (*Companhia de Moçambique*), established in 1888 by Colonel Joaquim Carlos Paiva de Andrada (already alluded to). Paiva de Andrada cooperated with De Sousa, but they suffered a setback when trying to consolidate access to the Manyika area, which was in dispute with the British. They were arrested by the British

21 This paragraph: Axelson (1967, pp. 81, 201–297); Nowell (1982); Pélissier (1994[1984] Vol. 2, p. 67); Serra ([Ed. 2000[1982], pp. 161–168, 182–188]; treaty text in Dos Santos (1986, pp. 149–164); for backgrounds of the ultimatum and how it stirred anti-monarchical political sentiment within Portugal, see Teixeira (1987).

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South Africa Company (BSAC) in 1890, trapped by Tendai Mutasa (of Manica, mentioned above). After this, the Portuguese government in February 1891 granted the Mozambique Company full sovereign rights over the area that is now (roughly) the Manica and Sofala Provinces. This was intended to keep the BSAC at bay.[22]

Late 1890 or early 1891, the British released De Sousa. On return to Barue he had to fight against the Da Cruz family of Massangano, and against Kanga and his associates who had taken advantage of De Sousa's absence to try to recapture their areas. De Sousa was helped by João de Azevedo Coutinho (1865–1944), a Portuguese army officer who played an important part in the military subjugation of Mozambique. During an action near Mafunda in November 1891, Coutinho was severely injured when a container with gunpowder exploded. De Sousa himself was defeated by Kanga and his associates near Missongue in January 1892, and he died soon after in unclear circumstances. With this Barue can be said to have regained independence, but there now followed a rather chaotic period in which different individuals, especially brothers Kanga, Inhamesinga, and Samacande, vied for the Barue throne. Eventually Samacande was announced as Makombe in 1894.[23]

The Mozambique Company was to occupy the territory between the Save and Zambezi Rivers, bounded in the west by the British occupied territories and the Kaeredzi and Luenha Rivers. This occupation was not successful in Barue (Isaacman, 1976, p. 62). Coutinho (1904, pp. 22–25) relates that Georges (~ George) Taylor, a North American married to a daughter of Samacande, was appointed by the Mozambique Company as *capitão-mor* for Barue. His alliance with Samacande was supposed to help bring an end to the war between Samacande and Kanga to the former's advantage and to serve as the basis of his own establishment as Barue administrator. Samacande seems to have been reluctant to counter Taylor's ascendency (Isaacman, 1976, p. 54). Taylor, Coutinho (ibid.) explains, had also threatened the chief of Katerere and a certain Sequessa into submission. These chiefdoms, however, did not belong to the Barue area and the Mozambique Company's authority could not yet be considered fully established in Barue itself, although it was already labelled as a *circumscripção* (borough). In so far as Taylor was able to collect any tax, he did it for himself, and, before the Company could take measures against him, he left the scene around 1894. However, Taylor's successors Barreto, Sherbakoff, and Da

22 This paragraph: Axelson (1967, pp. 81, 201–279); Nowell (1982, pp. 219–223); Pélissier (1994[1984] Vol. 2, pp. 61, 67); Serra (2000[1982], pp. 161–168); and Vail (1976, pp. 390–391).

23 This paragraph: Azevedo (1991, p. 50); Da Costa (1939[1902], p. 313); Isaacman (1976, pp. 52–53); Newitt (1973, pp. 330–331, 335); and Pélissier (1994[1984] Vol. 2, pp. 71–80).

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Silva Neves had even less success in consolidating the Company's authority (Coutinho, ibid., pp. 24–26). Da Costa (1939[1902], p. 319) reports that in 1895 the Company was unable to send a representative to Barue due to the Makombe's (unspecified) stance of resistance.

Samacande was unpopular due to his reportedly cruel behaviour and European habits, and he was ousted by his old rival Kanga around 1894–1895 (Pélissier, 1994[1984] vol. 2, p. 137), which possibly explains the Mozambique Company's inability to send its representative. As indicated, Kanga himself was challenged by Chipitura, who had a strong position within Barue in 1896, having his residence in Mungari. Chipitura, who half-heartedly cooperated with the Portuguese, was able to push Kanga to the Muira valley, effectively dividing the Barue kingdom in two (Coutinho, 1904, p. 22; Da Costa, 1939[1902], p. 322; Isaacman, 1976, pp. 53–55; Newitt, 1973, pp. 335–336; Pélissier, ibid.). After his death in 1898, Chipitura was succeeded by his brother Cassiche, who tried to make common cause with the Portuguese. In 1900, the Portuguese authorities commissioned Lieutenant Colonel Arnold to explore the Barue environment. The result of this was that Cassiche formally accepted Portuguese authority in his territory, an event captured in a photo. For this submission, Cassiche was deposed by his subordinate chiefs, and he sought asylum in the area of Makosa, while the subordinates put his nephew Cavunda (~ Chavunda) on the throne, with his residence in Mungari.[24]

With Kanga residing in Missongue near the Muira, there was still no solution to the question of who was paramount ruler of Barue, although Kanga would gain the upper hand in 1901 (Isaacman, 1976, p. 55), which, I suspect, is one reason why many of his activities are described as being of 'Makombe' in Barue District today. The Portuguese tried to lure Cavunda to their side, offering access to arms, but he responded that

> …the disputes between him and Hanga were internal matters […] and that anyone who attacks the one had better be prepared to fight the other.
>
> ISAACMAN, 1976 , p. 55

24 Arnold (1901, 1995[1901]); Coutinho (1904, pp. 23, 26, 44, 158); Isaacman (1976, p. 55); photo in the print version of Van Dokkum (2015, Photos 2a & 2b); '1898' judging from Da Costa (1939[1902], p. 326). It is stated by Gaivão in Coutinho (1904, fold page 'Relação … aprisionados') that Cavunda dethroned Cassiche through intrigue involving Kanga, but Coutinho (1904, p. 23) clearly indicates that the initiative lay with the subordinates. In any case, they were the ones who would have to do the deposition.

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With this understanding between Cavunda and Kanga, the Mozambique Company thus still had no foothold in Barue (Coutinho, 1904, p. 26n1), and the Portuguese government was forced to intervene directly by itself if the territory was to be secured. Note Cavunda's reference to *internal*; it reveals the conscious idea of Barue as a self-standing political community that is nobody else's business to mess with.

Eventually Portugal would attack Barue under the command of Coutinho in 1902. This war is sometimes described as a 'rebellion' of the Baruese (e.g. Allina-Pisano, 2003, p. 65n24), but from the Barue side it seems better to describe the event as a defensive war against foreign invasion, although the war was connected to a large complex of rebellions in other areas outside Barue. Kanga had been preparing for a Portuguese attack for several years by this point. Negotiations with the Portuguese to respect Barue independence had failed, as had a request for support from the British. Kanga had cemented relationships with other peoples surrounding Barue so as to resist or even reverse Portuguese military advance, though with the Nguni he was not successful in this respect. Nevertheless, Barue was able to ward off the Portuguese during Kanga's period of influence in the later 1890s. Spirit mediums were also active in mobilizing support for revolts in areas already under European control, such as in the 1896 revolt in (southern) Rhodesia (Isaacman, 1976, pp. 56–62).

Coutinho, having large supplies of African soldiers, began operations against Barue and its allies, defended by a coalition of Kanga and Cavunda, on 30 July 1902 (Isaacman, 1976, pp. 63–65). BSAC reportedly paid half of the costs (*The Advertiser*, 1902). On 28 August, Coutinho won the decisive battle at Missongue (Inhachirondo), Kanga's capital (Pélissier, 1994[1984] Vol. 2, pp. 146–147). Kanga's son Cabendere (~ Cabedendere) died in the event, but Kanga himself was able to escape to Nyanga in present-day Zimbabwe via Zenlagombie (~ Zamula/Ngombe; Artur, 1996, p. 66) and then Chinda (~ T'chinda, Txinda) in the Chôa area (Coutinho, 1904, p. 261, 363; Isaacman, 1976, p. 65). Cavunda was captured in Inhangone on 28 September[25] and formally capitulated in Macossa on 29 September. He was later taken to Cape Verde. Makosa capitulated in Domba on 15 September and was, like Cassiche, taken to Macossa where he was questioned on 29 September and told he would be free to go back to his area. Nongwe-Nongwe apparently escaped.[26]

25 Coutinho (1904, p. 157) would suggest he was already captured in or near Mungari a bit earlier.

26 This paragraph: Artur (1996, p. 66); Coutinho (1904, pp. 17, 23, 157, 231, 257–258, 261, 363, photo opp. 158); Isaacman (1976, pp. 62–65); Pélissier (1994[1984] Vol. 2, pp. 146–147); *The Advertiser* (1902.)

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8.5 *The Interbellum 1902–1917*

After the war of 1902, the original idea that the Mozambique Company would be the official administrator of the Barue area did not materialize because the Portuguese government would end up administering Barue directly (included in the District of Tete), having borne the costs of its subjection, which the Company was unable or unwilling to compensate for. Barue (then larger than the present-day district) formally became a 'Major Captainship' (*Capitania-Mór*), with its seat in Mungari in 1902, while Catandica was under 'military command'. In 1909, Barue is reported as still 'temporarily' subsumed under Tete District as a 'fiscal borough' (*circunscrição fiscal*) with a capital (*sede*) in Mungari. The designation 'Major Captainship' was changed in 1912 to that of 'civil borough' ('*circunscrição civil*'). In 1914, Catandica became the seat of the borough and was renamed 'Vila Gouveia', after the nickname of MA de Sousa, in January of 1915.[27]

Commercial production in the Mozambique Company's vast area, using forced labour, developed only slowly (Vail, 1976, p. 396). Nevertheless Vasse (1907, pp. 388–389) reported that the Company 'wisely regulated' its relationship with 'the natives', defining the number of working days 'required', mode of recruitment, and the method and rate of pay. He pointed out, however, that the Company had no uniform method of raising taxes, with there existing a poll and a hut tax, which led to population movements. He also reported that the administration of the 'district' was 'well […] carried out' by 'native chiefs'. The latter were mostly 'local headmen' (*inhaqua* or *inyaka*, cf. Bw: *nyakwawa*) because Portuguese authorities had great difficulty in subduing 'great chiefs, or kings'. He added:

> The breaking-up of the authority of the Kaffir chiefs is a powerful factor in the government of a province, and I should be strongly disposed not to abolish the power of these kings at a stroke, but to abstain from replacing them at their demise, and to divide the territory formerly subject to them into a certain number of districts, assigned to chiefs or headmen appointed by the Governor on the nomination of the District Commandant.
>
> VASSE, 1907, p. 389

Makambe (1980, p. 553) quotes Albert Oury of the Company, who complained in 1917 that Barue was an area where 'civilizing influence' was limited to native

27 This paragraph: D'Andrade (1907, pp. 195, 201); Carrilho (1915, p. 157); Pélissier (1994[1984] Vol. 2, p. 152); Pires (2006, p. 28), Portugal (1907, art. 86); Rafael (2001, pp. 19, 675); Warhurst (1970, p. 32).

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tax collection and was becoming a refuge for 'recalcitrants and malcontents' who wanted 'to escape from the system of work and discipline' in the surrounding areas. Allina-Pissano (2003, pp. 65, 71, 75) describes how, in the borough of Manica, most chiefs had refused to be co-opted by the Company and negotiated or protested on the population's behalf concerning matters of labour recruitment. The nearby border with Rhodesia also increased people's options by moving across it. With both British and Portuguese colonial regimes consolidated, these movements were not dependent on the desire for political freedom but on the relative severity of labour and tax requirements (2003, p. 66).

In Barue itself, the Portuguese government seems to have had a regime that grew from less to very oppressive. Little is known about the exact relationship the Barue leaders had with the Portuguese between 1902 and 1917, when the next war broke out. Nongwe-Nongwe and Makosa have been reported to be in Mozambican territory and to 'control' parts of Barue by early 1917, in the north and south, respectively (Tangwena in Isaacman, 1976, p. 159; Ranger, 1963, pp. 65–66).[28] Ranger (ibid.) mentions that they were not part of the Portuguese colonial administration. This would suggest that, in Barue, the Portuguese in this period had not yet rigorously implemented the system of employing leaders, who would later be called *autoridades gentílicas*, that is, 'ethnic authorities' or 'traditional authorities' (Portugal, 1926, art. 8; Meneses et al., 2003, p. 344), but just tolerated leaders who remained from the period before and during the 1902 war, somewhat like Vasse's recommendation quoted above. A Portuguese official reported that in Barue people had to pay tax but were not subject (directly, at least) to forced labour (Galli, 2003, pp. 58, 74n16), a situation that stimulated migration to the area, as indeed indicated by Oury. According to Rodrigues (1910, p. 40), the tax collection was a considerable success in what he considered 'perfectly subjected' Barue.

8.6 *The Barue Revolt of 1917–1918*

With the development of the First World War, however, the situation for the Barue population would worsen drastically. People were recruited to serve in the war against the Germans as carriers or soldiers, or had to work on the Tete-Macequece (~ Masekese) (Manica) road. Initially Nongwe-Nongwe and Makosa both seem to have been reluctant to fight the Portuguese, preferring negotiations instead to try to alleviate the ill treatment of the population. The two

28 This is confirmed for Nongwe-Nongwe in Mungari by SAC, while Makosa had probably lived in his own area since 1902, as he was allowed to do so by the Portuguese (cf. above). For Nongwe-Nongwe, this would mean that he filled the vacuum left by the deported Cavunda.

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were also disputing among themselves about who was to be inaugurated as the next Makombe (Ranger, 1963, pp. 62–66; Isaacman, 1976, pp. 158–159). Two events seem to have caused Nongwe-Nongwe's eventual recognition as Makombe. One is a great assembly that was held to discuss the question of whether or not a revolt against the Portuguese should be organized. There Nongwe-Nongwe now argued in favour of, and Makosa still against, that idea. Since most participants at the assembly were in favour of revolt, Nongwe-Nongwe was acclaimed as leader. Second was his cooperation with a new *mhondoro* spirit medium of Kabudu Kagoro, a young woman known as 'Mbuya' ('Grandmother', almost certainly a nickname), identified by Makambe as 'Nemhuru' (Ranger, 1963, pp. 66–67; Makambe, 1980, pp. 552, 559–560; SC). It is likely that this Mbuya was a member of the Tangwena family, identified by my interlocutor Suzana Calhancambo as Nyamaluodzo (~ Nyamariodzo, Nyamarihwodzo), possibly named after the great-great-grandfather of the well-known Rekayi Tangwena (see Chapter 5). (These associations in the triangle Mbuya-Tangwena family-Makombe family are set out in comments by *Régulo* Seguma; Christian Action Publications, 1972, pp. 1–2, 44; Isaacman, 1976, pp. 159–160; and Moore, 2005, p. 194.)

Mbuya's popularity enabled her to urge the population to rise up, inspiring Nongwe-Nongwe to favour the rebellion, hoping to gain spiritual recognition for his claimed Makombeship (Isaacman, ibid.; cf. Ranger, 1963, p. 67). *Dona* Suzana Calhancambo, approximately born in 1902, confirmed the close cooperation between Nongwe-Nongwe and Mbuya. Makosa joined the rebellion after all, after realizing virtually everybody was in favour of it (Isaacman, 1976, p. 160; Ranger, 1963, p. 66). Nongwe-Nongwe built a broad inter-ethnic coalition just as Kanga had done (Isaacman, 1976, pp. 161–166). There is no agreement in the literature exactly as to when the actual revolt started. Isaacman (1976, p. 167) mentions 27 March 1917, but Pélissier (1994[1984] Vol. 2, p. 358) 24 March, concerning an attack on Mungari, while Artur (1996, p. 67) dates the Mungari attack as the revolt's beginning on 28 March. The latter date is the one now celebrated as *Makombe Day* in Barue District (see Van Dokkum, 2015, pp. 316–320, Appendix B, §§ 9 and 10, for present-day local remembrances of Makombe and the revolt). Initially the revolt was successful and Nongwe-Nongwe even prematurely considered Barue independent for a while, but ten thousand, if not more, Nguni soldiers fought on the Portuguese side, and Nongwe-Nongwe suffered setbacks in mid-1917. Makosa, who thereafter came to be regarded as the (last) Makombe, had to resort to guerrilla warfare and eventually fled, like Nongwe-Nongwe earlier, to Rhodesia in October 1918. A small guerrilla group remained active until 1920 (Isaacman, 1976, pp. 166–177; Pélissier, 1994[1984] Vol. 2, pp. 343–384; Ranger, 1963, pp. 56–57, 69, 78).

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9 Reflections on Barue as a State

From the above, we see that the Kingdom of Barue had a prolonged existence as a coherent political entity over several centuries. Even if the kingdom would not always physically exist because of foreign occupation and annexation, it would exist as an idea in people's heads, on the basis of which the kingdom's physical existence could be re-established. We can summarize the different manifestations of the kingdom as given in Table 1.

It is possible to analyse the Kingdom of Barue according to its existence as a political entity, in relation to other political entities. Eleven periods may be distinguished during more than four centuries from the later fifteenth century until 1902. The first period comprises the situation after Barue emerged as a kingdom subsumed under the Mutapa state. This is the only period in which we can unequivocally consider Barue politics as expansionist, but the expansion was under the auspices of Mutapa. The beginning of the second period can be exactly dated as the year 1608, when Barue separated from Mutapa after Mutapa's army was defeated. The second period comprises Barue as a self-standing, independent, kingdom. So far, no dynasty change has been noted, and it is quite possible that the royal lineage remained the same as in the first period. Periods of independence I will call here 'polities'. The second period equals Barue's first polity, characterized by a weak politico-military positioning relative to the Portuguese, as the period ended with the apparently easy annexation by António Lobo da Silva, of Barue to his territories. This Portuguese occupation, the third period of Barue's historical fate, can be labelled as Barue's 'first occupation'. In this case, restoration of the kingdom was much dependent on another Portuguese. Despite this dependency concerning its restoration, the second polity in the fourth period in Barue's history shows an increasing assertiveness as well as a practical capability of withstanding Portuguese intrusion. Furthermore, Mutapa and Rozvi influences seem to fade away during this period. Gunguru emerges as a leader to reckon with, and many of his descendants will dominate later Barue politics. Characteristic for the fifth period (the first part of the third polity) is the introduction and noticeable performance of the *madzi amanga* ritual, which signifies the political strength of the Portuguese in Sena. However, Barue must still be seen as firmly independent in this period, as the initial selection of a Makombe leader was still an internal matter, and the Portuguese also remained dependent on Barue for transit permits. The treaties signed between Barue and the Portuguese are between equals. The third polity was interrupted by a kingless time stretch (sixth period), after which the third polity resumed (seventh period) with the inauguration of Inhamaguada. Barue then lost its independence to the Nguni

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TABLE 1 The Kingdom of Barue: a periodization

Period	Year(s)	Definition	Prominent leader(s)
1	later 15th century–1608	subsumed under Mutapa	Mureche/Nyamudzororo
2	1608–± 1659	first polity	not known by name
3	± 1659	first occupation	Lobo da Silva
4	± 1659–± 1794	second polity	Gunguru
5	± 1794–1826	third polity, I	Sazua, Chimbatata
6	1826–± 1830	kingless period	Chidana
7	± 1830–1838	third polity, II	Inhamaguada
8	1838–± 1844	second occupation	Soshangane
9	± 1844–1880/1	fourth polity	Chipapata/Kabudu Kagoro
10	1880/1–1891/2	third occupation	M.A. de Sousa/Gouveia
11	1891/2–1902	fifth polity	Kanga, Cavunda

(eighth period, second occupation), after which the kingdom was reconstituted, as far as the data show, by Chibudu and then strongly consolidated by his cousin Chipapata, before decline set in again due to the intrigue of MA de Sousa (ninth period, fourth polity). De Sousa was able to rule most of the area for about a decade, with this occupation in the tenth period being the longest of the three occupation periods. The eleventh and last period starts with Kanga's war against and ultimate defeat of De Sousa and the appointment of a new series of chiefdom leaders in the beginning of the fifth polity. This lasted only about a decade, ending in 1902 with the annexation of Barue to the Portuguese colonial territory. As the Barue Revolt of 1917–1918 was not successful, 1902 can be considered as the definitive end of the Kingdom of Barue as a separately distinguishable political entity.

To understand the Barue Kingdom's existence as a state, we need to distinguish between its emergence, separation, and perpetuation. Its emergence occurred due to an expansionist event of conquest, but, as said, under the auspices of the wider range of operation of Mutapa. Its separation from Mutapa somewhat more than a century later is, quite obviously, not an act of conquest. In 1608 then, the fate of the kingdom was straight away intimately related to its geographical extension. Judging from the available information the geographical extension of the country does not seem to have changed outwardly in any significant sense in those three centuries, as is visible from the absence of any indications to that effect in the literature about areas surrounding Barue. So far

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I have not encountered any indication that there was any annexation of the 'Amasose' mentioned above by Barue in or after 1608. The label 'expansionist' is only applicable with certainty in the first period indicated in Table 1, and less so concerning periods of conquest after Barue had lost its independence in the three occupation periods, when the country was to be re-established. This is something different from annexing territories and subjugating populations at a long distance from one point of origin. There is in Barue history no equivalent of the expansionist activities of such states as the Rozvi of Changamire Dombo or the Gaza of Soshangane.

As for the perpetuation of Barue as a state, let us contrast this with another standard picture of precolonial politics. Newitt (1973, p. 30) stresses the 'segment[ary]' character of Shona and Marave societies, in which the existence and political cohesion of villages and clans were quite independent of the fate of larger political units, with the former more enduring than the latter. Such a depiction does not seem to hold for Barue. Certainly, there were economic and political crises, such as in the 1750s-1760s and the first half of the nineteenth century. There existed political competition between members of the royal family, sometimes more violent, other times less so. But never does the cohesion of Barue as embodying an *idea of a state* seem to have been seriously threatened. Moreover, the division of Barue around the turn of the century (± 1900) was seen by those involved as an intermezzo until a solution for the leadership problem was found, not a permanent split of the country. Having emerged as a split-off from the larger Mutapa state, Barue did not itself experience significant break-ups due to independence movements within its territory. The northeastern corner underwent some territorial fluctuations, but even here we encounter problems with the Portuguese rather than with the Tonga populations south of the lower Zambezi. Indeed, the various crises themselves show that Barue was capable of stabilizing again after periods of chaos. Furthermore, the rapid turnover of *individual* Makombe kings, who each reigned on average during periods of no longer than around eight years since Gunguru, as determined in Appendix 3, demonstrates that the perpetuation of the kingdom did not so much depend on the personality of the kings as on the connection between the country and the kingship *as institution*. The successful resurrection of the Barue state in periods 4, 9, and 11 in Table 1 indicates that the perpetuation of Barue was dependent on oral remembrance of its previous historical manifestations. The Baruese tried to perpetuate their state, which *others* tried to annihilate. They had no need to 'imagine' a political community because they knew they had already had one.

Political crises were often the result of strife within the royal family rather than pre-existing geographical or social divisions in the kingdom's population.

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Unfortunately, little is known about most of the instances of power struggle within the Makombe family. However, that such strife could have more far-reaching political motives than just the lust for power of individuals is clear from the better-known events of the last decades before the kingdom's final demise. Maintaining Barue's independence vis-à-vis the Portuguese was a major factor in Barue politics. I have restudied and added more data to Bhila's (1982, p. 125) argumentation about how Gunguru undertook a 'nationalist' policy. We see this not only through his apparently successful efforts to regain lost territory but also his insistence that the Quiteves working for the Portuguese there should leave the area. This shows the existence of a clear idea of who is part of the Barue political community and who is not. The situation quite resembles that of twentieth-century Mozambique in terms of Frelimo's nationalist dilemmas about the question of whether inhabitants, or their ancestors of European and Asian origin, who had immigrated within the framework of Portuguese colonialism, could count as Mozambicans or not. Gunguru's proactive anticolonial stance in these matters of territory and population, which he would not have been able to effectuate without at least some military and moral support from the Baruese population, was such that Arnold's interlocutors could remember him as the Makombe making the Barue people 'united and powerful'. As for later Barue politics, resistance or adaptation to Portuguese political dominance remained an important factor. Chibudu and his sons Chipitura and Cassiche were more inclined to submit to Portuguese encroachment than Chipapata and his son Kanga. That such political outlooks were, however, not wholly dependent on lineage politics is clear from the fact that Samacande was pro-Portuguese while Cavunda was not. These outlooks also influenced the support these individuals had among their subordinates.

The deposition of Cassiche in favour of Cavunda in 1900 must have been dependent on the actions of lower-level leaders. The leadership of Makombe Nongwe-Nongwe and spirit medium Mbuya in 1917 appears to have been dependent on a general popular desire to rise up against Portuguese colonialism. This is a strong indication of the durable legitimacy of the Makombes as rulers (Ranger, 1963) and by extension of the existence of Barue as a state and a nation, and hence as a nation-state. But already the revolt of 1608 resulting in independence from Mutapa is difficult to understand without reference to popular will. Substantial parts of the general population must have known or even initiated the tribute strike and been willing to fight against the Mutapa army to defend the strike's political association of refusal to submit to Mutapa. It may be recalled that precolonial Barue never knew political parties as organizers of the state, an aspect that made it different from most present-day states. However, we can speak of a phenomenon of nationalism over about

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three centuries, with the population and the Makombe dynasty cooperating to instate, preserve, or reinstate the independence of their state. The title of Isaacman's (1976) book, 'tradition of resistance', is very well chosen. The enduring legacy of 'Makombe' in Barue District today reminds us of the importance of the connection between the dynasty and the population. Data from my fieldwork show that both Frelimo and Renamo have referred to 'Makombe' as a historical symbol of independence and the good life.

How the population could influence the selection and/or deposition of more local chiefs in precolonial times is rather unclear from available information. In their writings, governors and travellers focussed more on the royal family than lower-level chiefs. Indeed, such more local processes were a focus of my fieldwork precisely because rather little was known about these (though perhaps future archival research may reveal more historical data). After times of chaos, chiefs might have been installed by a Makombe in a top-down way, as fieldwork data suggest was the case with some of supporters of Kanga when he had defeated De Sousa in the period 1890–1892. Popular involvement in the selection of a chief would then, as a rule, only have first been possible with the selection of the successor of an initial chief when the existence of several brothers (the first chief's own brothers or, more likely, his sons) would require the settlement of a competition for the post.

Overall the Makombe dynasty does not seem to have been systematically brutal towards the population. Oral tradition collected by Jacobs (2010, p. 40) seems to imply this for the Gorongosa area, but here the Makombes are associated with atrocities for which they were almost certainly not at all responsible, with Gorongosa being under Quiteve and then Portuguese jurisdiction. I hypothesize that oral tradition may attribute atrocities to 'Makombe', which were in fact committed by or under former *prazo* holders who are no longer remembered as such. (Such forgetting is not unique to Gorongosa: Mozambique, 2005b, pp. 7–8, 44 associates the history of Massangano with 'Macombe' without devoting a single word to the notorious Da Cruz family; see also Newitt & Garlake, 1967, p. 143.) For more details, see Van Dokkum (2015, pp. 313–315, Appendix B, § 7). Furthermore, except for the indicated episode at the end of the seventeenth century, the Barue state does not appear to have been engaged in the slave trade that so impacted on other parts of Mozambique; agreements between the Portuguese and Makombe were concerned with transit possibilities for the Portuguese through Barue territory rather than trafficking in people (e.g. Santana, 1967, pp. 445–446). Other sources also do not indicate any systematic state-organized slave trade.

Oral tradition provided by Fopense Binze (collected by Artur, 1996, p. 25) indicates that the population was to work for the Nyangulu (pig totem,

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indicating here the Makombe family). This is more reliable information, but we can still add more information that can place compulsory labour in a different light. At least at some time a sort of social security system appears to have existed. My interlocutor Tapera J Mutamvu mentioned that during the time of Makombe people who had a shortage of food would go to Makombe to ask for a food subsidy. Such food originated from the general population's cultivation efforts. *Régulo* Seguma added during this interview session that such efforts were made on a 'communal field'. *Senhor* Mutamvu confirmed that such food reserves originated from the population's efforts.[29] Thus in Barue there was compulsory labour in the form of work on state fields, but the produce thereof at least partly provided for surpluses that could serve as food security for the population and was therefore also in the interest of Baruese themselves, in so far as risk spreading constituted their interest. In this sense the Baruese are better viewed as taxpayers within a pre-existing impersonal state rather than as clients within personalized patron-client relationships. The Barue state emerges from history as a political entity where the average inhabitant was probably better off relative to the ever more encroaching *prazos* and where most of the leadership and the general population had a shared interest in keeping their country independent. Its most serious crises were due to external factors (drought; invasions by Nguni and Portuguese foreigners) rather than civil wars or totalitarian political leaders. We can consider the reverence that the memory of 'Makombe' enjoys today in Barue, as something that makes much sense.

29 For the Shona Beach (1994a) mentions that people worked part of their time on rulers' fields for sustaining the court and its visitors, but Mudenge (1988, p. 166) suggests the tribute construction in relation to relief reserves (thus in line with *Senhor* Mutamvu's food subsidy information). Coutinho (1904, p. 39) does note that the Barue people paid tax (*mussoco*) not in kind but in the form of labour on fields (*colimas*) that existed in diverse fertile parts of the territory. Beach (1994a, p. 103) implies that Shona people may have worked 7 out of 23 working days on rulers' fields.

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INTERMEZZO–From Precolonial Barue to Postcolonial Mozambique

In 1963, Ranger commented about the Barue Revolt: 'Whatever form African opposition takes today in Zambezia we may be sure that it derives very little from 1917 except perhaps a heroic memory' (1963, p. 80). This assessment has proven to be correct. The struggle of Makombe against the Portuguese is widely remembered and celebrated in Barue District today. There is now a Makombe museum and a Makombe monument, inaugurated by President Nyusi on 28 March 2017 (pers. comm. Joaquim MM), 100 years after the Barue Revolt. But when Mozambicans struggled to end Portuguese colonialism in the 1960s and 1970s, there was no possibility or even intention to do so using any of the precolonial states as focal points for resistance, nor was there any desire to resurrect such states, Barue in particular. Of the Barue state we can meaningfully assert that it no longer exists, even if certain chiefdoms deriving from it still exist because colonialism was capable not only of destroying the physical and governmental aspects of the Barue state, but also of destroying any actionable self-referential idea of the Barue state. When my assistant and I asked *Régulo* Melo Mpanze, descendant of the famous Makombe Kabudu Kagoro, what he thought of the idea of reinstating the Kingdom of Barue, he literally did not comprehend what we were talking about.

The ethnicity associated with Barue and, say, Quiteve had become largely residual at Mozambique's independence, that is, still existing but stripped of any state-political connotations as a result of colonial destruction. Colonialism subordinated these and other ethnic groups under the Portuguese state. When colonialism collapsed, the issue for ethnic groups was not primarily self-reference only as an ethnic group but (also) self-reference as belonging to a postcolonial state. If resurrection of precolonial ethnic states is not entertained, it follows that a multi-ethnic state is to be formed if a state organization has to be defined (leaving aside the establishment of a situation in which one ethnic group encompasses more than one state within it). One might say with Venâncio (2000, p. 63) that this was the case for many of the newly independent states in Africa, who did not comprise a 'national unit' in the sense of Gellner (2006[1983]) and knew the nation only in a discursive sense. (This, in my view, is *not* to say that discourses could not refer to existing situations.) Add to this that neither precolonial (defunct) nor colonial (illegitimate) history could serve as a model for inter-group interaction in the postcolonial situation, with the concomitant influences of the regional and world economies (see e.g. De Bruijn, 2008; Van Hoyweghen, 2008). The projects of 'nation-building'

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> …comprised a vocabulary, and sometimes a practice, of inclusion, but both implicitly and explicitly shaped assumptions about how members of the nation should live, behave and identify themselves…

and those assumptions could eventually produce 'exclusionary tendencies' (Dorman, Hammet, & Nugent, 2007, p. 8). I add that the assumptions mentioned may not apply only to matters of ethnicity but other aspects of life as well, such as party politics. Indeed, the latter will feature below as being of great importance.

There was a theoretical alternative for the colonial borders in the form of Pan-Africanism as a form of 'macro-nationalism' (Thiam in Funada-Classen, 2013[2012], pp. 139–141), implying even more than with the colonial entities, the lumping together of the diverse populations of Africa. This was seen as an alternative to 'micronationalism', the sticking to the colonial borders, which would jeopardize solidarity between Africans (Zerbo, 2005). The idea of uniting the entire African continent into one single political entity has so far never been realized (Abbink, Van Dijk, & Van Dokkum, 2008, pp. 10, 14n5). Davidson argues that federalism should have been introduced in postcolonial Africa and that this was frustrated by the European powers, who had no interest in considering alternatives to nation-states and by the circumstance that the colonial borders, once preserved in the postcolonial situation, enforced themselves on the new leaders who then had little incentive to make changes to them or to the nation-states they implied (2007[1992], pp. 113–114, 183–184).

What Europeans brought to Africa was destruction or alteration of the precolonial political organizations as independent polities (Mondlane, 1972[1964]; Mondlane in Tricontinental (1971[1969], p. 234). Most of them could not or would not be resurrected as states when colonialism ended (Lesotho and Swaziland may be considered exceptions confirming the rule – Birmingham, 1995, p. 73). On the other hand, it is also not clear whether Davidson's idea of federalism would have functioned better than the average postcolonial state in Africa, for example concerning political accountability towards the population. He proposes that a 'rational federalism' might be organized through

> …organic unities of sensible association across wide regions within which national cultures, far from seeking to destroy or maim each other, could evolve their diversities and find in them a mutual blessing.
>
> 2007[1992], p. 286

Davidson's federalist idea is reminiscent of the Iroquois Confederacy, which coordinated common decisions across different nations without employing a statist political set-up. Indeed, the Confederacy seems to have been a

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self-perpetuating system promoting mass participation and avoiding centralist concentration of political power (cf. Van Dokkum, 2017b). In the case of Barue, such federalism would have been a construct without precolonial justfication just as the postcolonial Mozambican purported nation-state has no precolonial precedent. Barue had exactly separated from Mutapa in 1608 to form a state of its own, and then tried to maintain that independence. One can wonder why the Barue nation should have been resurrected as an 'organic unity' only to be absorbed into a larger federation. Moreover, borders other than national ones can just as well give rise to conflicts (Abbink and Van Dokkum [eds.] 2008). Which mechanisms people have in place to resolve sociopolitical complications is just as much a matter of importance as the existence of any nation, state, or nation-state, and the borders between and within them.

The perpetuation of most of the colonial borders was also a choice made by Africans themselves (Červenka, 1977, pp. 6, 9, 13). As for Mozambique's internal political development, we will see below that Frelimo had no interest in placing the country in regional federalist contexts on the basis of people's 'sensible association' in a non-centralist way. Rather, it thought of itself as the indispensable guide of the Mozambican nation. In this sense, accepting that Mozambique would not be established as a nation-state would imply that Frelimo would be willing to become irrelevant after the defeat of colonialism. This was certainly not Frelimo's outlook on the postcolonial situation. The organization did not at all view the postcolonial situation of the country as problematic; it simply assumed that it smoothly embodied the Mozambican nation due to the anticolonial struggle, and consequently was entitled to rule the country by itself on the basis of that embodiment. That this assumption was not shared by all Mozambicans has made Mozambique a politically problematic country, but the aspect of Mozambique being, or perhaps we should say people claiming Mozambique to be, a nation-state cannot be viewed as the main culprit concerning Mozambique's internal political problems. Although in precolonial Barue there were sometimes disagreements about who should be the top leader, neither the royal family nor the general populace seem to have had a fundamental disagreement about the set-up of the state as such. At least in this sense, precolonial Barue makes for a more straightforward example of a nation-state than postcolonial Mozambique. How the internal political development of independent Mozambique could become so less-than-straightforward in terms of becoming a stable nation-state will now be the subject of the following chapters.

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To conclude this intermezzo, it is useful to devote a few words to the colonial period. Portuguese legislation imposed on Africans a racialist ordering of society. In 1899, the Portuguese government official António Enes formulated an 'obligation to work' for *indígenas* (indigenous people) in the Labour Law of that year. The law also mentions the requirement for local government institutions to use indigenous authorities for controlling purposes (art. 40). Although this Labour Law was not formally enforced in Mozambique, its ideas guided local regulations (Penvenne in Newitt, 1995, pp. 410, 490; Portugal, 1899; cf. Serra ([Ed.] 2000[1982], pp. 206, 211; for forced labour in Barue in the colonial period, see Guthrie, 2017). Hence, rather than exporting ideas of freedom, democracy, and self-determination, colonialism brought repression, discrimination, and the demand to work for other people's interests to Mozambique. The desire for political independence must (also) be seen against this background.

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CHAPTER 3

Frelimo and Other Anticolonial Organizations until 1975

With the defeat of the Barue Kingdom, one of the last strongholds against Portuguese colonialism vanished. Twentieth-century colonial Mozambique is not a main topic of the present book, and so we will now pick up its history with the start of the struggle against colonialism in the 1950s/1960s. In this chapter, I will deal with the development of the most salient anticolonial organizations, as well as with how Frelimo evolved into an embodiment of only a section of its initial membership, leading to a situation at independence in which Frelimo was not only unwilling to cohabit with other movements or parties but also unwilling to encompass different currents within itself. It was this narrow political attitude that formed one aspect, in addition to the aspect of the hostility of the 'white' minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa, of the subsequent Frelimo-Renamo war. How that attitude became foremost within Frelimo is a contested issue, and it is necessary to formulate a position. Because Frelimo has played such a decisive role in Mozambique's history over the last half-century, some background must be provided about the organization's development. Mozambique's history of the last half-century cannot be understood without a description of Frelimo's eventful trajectory.

1 Early Frelimo History

A problem with the earlier literature, much of it of Euro-American origin, is that it was often written from an ideological rather than a historical-critical stance (De Bragança & Depelchin, 1986; Dinerman, 2006, pp. 15, 17; Igreja, 2010, p. 790). I count publications like Christie (1989[1988]), Isaacman & Isaacman (1983), and Munslow (1983) among such earlier literature. My own reconstruction below is based on a re-reading of original material of the 1960s and incorporation of newer publications, particularly since 2000. I will propose solutions for certain chronological problems that affect the interpretation of Frelimo's political history and the analysis of conceptions of 'nationalism' within Frelimo.

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1.1 *Early Activities*

After the Barue Revolt it was difficult to conceive of any successful method to end Portuguese colonialism (Mondlane, 1972[1964], pp. 395–396). African resistance consisted of localized protests, such as strikes. Rural defiance was rather limited (Isaacman & Isaacman, 1983, pp. 69–72). Mondlane (1965b, p. 30) speaks of 'nationalist sentiments' expressed through 'para-political' associations (cf. Simango, 1966, pp. 53–54). The *Associação dos Naturais de Moçambique* and the Mozambique African Voluntary Cotton Society of Lázaro Nkavandame (~ Kavandame), established in 1957, ought also to be mentioned. It was in this context that eventually anticolonial movements would arise. In 1954, some Makonde Mozambicans in Tanganyika founded the Tanganyika Mozambique Makonde Union, an ethnic-cultural self-help organization. Other organizations were the Makonde[1] African Association (MAA) and the Makonde African National Union (MANU). In (Southern) Rhodesia EAPA (East African Portuguese Association) was set up in 1959 by Uria Timóteo Simango, a Presbyterian pastor.[2]

1.2 *The Mueda Massacre*

On 16 June 1960, a meeting was called in Mueda to discuss work issues pending between the population around Mueda and the colonial government (Chipande in Mondlane, 1969, pp. 117–118). The colonial government made no concessions, and Faustino Vanomba and Kibirite Diwane were arrested in front of 5000 people. Shots were fired in the ensuing tumult, killing between nine and about 500–600 people (Cahen, 1999, p. 31; Mondlane, 1969, pp. 117–118, 124; exact numbers unclear). The Mueda massacre tragedy is recognized as 'a symbol, a catalyst, for armed struggle' (Henriksen, 1983, p. 19).

1.3 *MANU, UDENAMO, and UNAMI, and the Frelimo Merger*

In October 1960, UDENAMO (*União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique* was founded in Bulawayo, Rhodesia, led by Adelino Gwambe, soon involving Uria Simango.[3] In Nyasaland (now Malawi) the *União Nacional Africana de Moçambique Independente* (UNAMI was formed under José Baltazar da Costa

1 Or 'Mozambique' (Cahen, 1999, p. 34).

2 This paragraph, where not indicated: Cabrita (2000, p. 8); Isaacman (1982, pp. 11, 17); Marcum (1969, pp. 195–196); Mondlane (1963, pp. 16–17, 1966, pp. 201–203); Munslow (1983, p. 71); Ncomo (2009[2003], pp. 70–72); Vail & White (1980, pp. 394–395).

3 Cabrita (2000, p. 5); Marcum (1969, p. 196); Ncomo (2009[2003], p. 73). For long overdue descriptions and assessments of Gwambe's activities, the recent works of Labrentsev (2015, Ch. II) and Marcum (2018, pp. 21–27) are recommended.

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Chagong'a's leadership in 1960. UDENAMO and UNAMI moved their headquarters to Dar-es-Salaam in February 1961 (Marcum, 1969, pp. 196, 198). MANU had meanwhile changed the word 'Makonde' in its name to 'Mozambique' (Ncomo, 2009[2003], p. 84),[4] and was led by Matthew Mmole and Lawrence Malinga Millinga.

Marcelino dos Santos and Gwambe met in Casablanca in April 1961, after which Gwambe appointed Dos Santos as deputy secretary-general of UDENAMO (Cabrita, 2000, pp. 6–7; Marcum, 1969, p. 197; Mondlane, 1966, p. 203; 1969, p. 119; cf. 1963, p. 19). UDENAMO and MANU were to merge into Frelimo but it is still not entirely clear how this happened. Dos Santos reportedly came up with the suggestion and actual planning started in March 1962 (Henriksen, 1978, p. 169; 1983, p. 20). The united organization's name was proposed by Fanuel Mahluza (Cabrita, 2000, p. 9; Moyana, 2000): '*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*' (Mozambique Liberation Front; abbreviated FRELIMO or Frelimo).[5] At that time, Frelimo appeared a rather loosely organized cooperation programme between UDENAMO and MANU (without UNAMI), probably under Gwambe's leadership. After interference by Tanzania's interior minister Oskar Kambona, UDENAMO and MANU publicly announced on 24 May 1962 the formation of a common front. Frelimo's name was made public in Ghana on 25 May,[6] the latter date confirmed by PIDE/DGS (1962), see also Mondlane (1963, p. 25).[7]

Eventually, on 25 June, UDENAMO and MANU (*not* UNAMI, as so often stated) would merge in a 'consolidation' (Henriksen, 1978, p. 170) during a meeting of several days with the election of Eduardo Mondlane as president (Cabrita, 2000, p. 11; Frelimo, 1962). Thus, Frelimo as a coalition may be considered to have been founded under Gwambe's leadership in a period up to the end of May 1962, but Frelimo as an entity that envisioned being a unique anticolonial organization on its own in Mozambique emerged under Mondlane's leadership on 25 June. In that sense '25 June' indeed signifies a new beginning.

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4 The name change would imply a Mozambique-wide nationalist stance rather than a focus on one ethnic group only. Confusion abounds around MANU's history; see different versions by Cabrita (2000, p. 8), Cahen (1999), Mondlane (1969, p. 119), and Ncomo (2009[2003], p. 84).

5 The acronym is officially 'FRELIMO' (e.g. Frelimo, 2006, art. 4), but it is widespread practice to write 'Frelimo'.

6 Cabrita (2000, p. 9; source dated 25 May); Henriksen (1978, p. 169); Laweki (2011a); cf. Mondlane (1966, p. 205); Moyana (2000); Ncomo (2009[2003], p. 87). Mahluza's claim concerning early June must be inaccurate (Moyana, 2000; also Simango in Davidson, 1970, p. 340n1).

7 PIDE: Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (International and State Defence Police; later DGS: Direcção-Geral de Segurança (Executive-General for Security), the Portuguese secret political police in the time of Salazar and Caetano. The two abbreviations are usually mentioned together as they concern the same institution.

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1.4 *Mondlane's Rise as Frelimo Leader*

Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane was born in the (then) district of Gaza in 1920 (Cabrita, 2000, p. 14; for recent biographical studies, see Ronguane, 2010, and Faris, 2014). He came to study at the Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg. In 1949, however, the South African government refused to prolong his study residential permit, after the racist National Party had won the May 1948 elections. Back in Mozambique, Mondlane and others set up the Nucleus of Mozambican Secondary Students (NESAM).[8] Thereafter he studied at the University of Lisbon (in 1950) and at Oberlin College in Ohio, obtaining a BA degree in letters in 1953. Subsequently he obtained an MA and eventually in 1960 a PhD degree in sociology at Northwestern University in Evanston (IL), and lectured at several universities. He also worked at the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations from 1957 to 1961.[9] He represented that entity during the referendum about the future of South Cameroon on 11 February 1961 (*Notícias* 1961).[10] Thereafter, he visited Mozambique to assess the situation there (USA, 1961). Mondlane preferred 'a non-violent solution in Mozambique' (USA, ibid., pp. 1–2). He wanted to educate Africans so as to prepare for the situation after independence. Mondlane visited Tanganyika in June 1962 (USA, 1962a, 1962b). Meanwhile, a fusion committee had been set up between UDENAMO and MANU headed by Simango to prepare for a formal meeting, the already mentioned 'consolidation' meeting.[11]

1.5 *The Consolidation Meeting*

UDENAMO, MANU, and UNAMI convened from 20 to 25 June, but only UDENAMO and MANU would formally merge.[12] On 25 June the leadership of Frelimo was elected. Mondlane is reported to have obtained 126 votes, Simango 69, and Chagong'a 9 (PIDE in Ncomo 2009[2003], pp. 94n134). Simango became

8 Mondlane (1960, CV, p. 1; 1963, pp. 20–21; 1966, pp. 204–205; 1969, p. 113); Chilcote (1972, p. 609); Chissano (2011, pp. 157–167); Henriksen (1973, pp. 38–39); Munslow (1983, p. 66); Tobias (1977–1978). Mondlane (1972[1964], p. 412) implies NESAM's establishment to have been in 1948 rather than 1949.

9 Mondlane (1955, p. 244; 1960; 1963, pp. 21–23; 1966, p. 205; 1972, p. 414); lecturing: (1960, CV, p. 1); Henriksen (1983, p. 20); Kitchen (1967, p. 31); Shore (1992, p. 46).

10 The referendum was about the choice between becoming part of Nigeria or of the Republic of Cameroon (Konings, 2008, p. 80).

11 Details are unclear; compare Davidson (1968a, pp. 23–24), Frelimo (≤ 1963, p. 3), Manghezi (1999, p. 219), Ncomo (2009[2003], pp. 89–90), Mondlane in USA (1962b, p. 2), and USA (1962d, p. 2).

12 Convened: Henriksen (1983, p. 20); merged: USA (1962c, 1962d); Janet Mondlane (1972[1963], p. 405).

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vice-president.[13] Groups associated with MAA and MANU still existed after 25 June (Cahen, 1999, p. 42), and UNAMI did not formally merge at all. There was no national unity in the sense that there would be only one organization that organized Mozambicans.[14] Mondlane does not seem to have had a firm grip on Frelimo at the time, although Gwambe's influence drastically diminished.[15]

1.6 *Frelimo's First Congress*

Frelimo's 'First Annual Conference' or Congress was held from 23 until 28 September 1962 (Chilcote, 1965, p. 85; USA, 1962i). According to USA (ibid., p. 3), Mondlane stated that each Mozambican was to subject himself 'completely (to the party's direction) without questioning […]' but the printed version of Mondlane's speech (1977[1962]) does not mention this. Congress elected a National Council, which elected a Central Committee, including the president. According to Blacken, an 11-member Central Committee was established, of which three members were appointed directly by Mondlane, bypassing the statutes[16] (USA, ibid., pp. 5–6).

The statutes contained two noteworthy articles (though rarely discussed together):

> To attain its goals, FRELIMO:/a–Proclaims the necessity of union of all of the Mozambican people./b–Organizes, unites and mobilizes all Mozambicans.
>
> FRELIMO, 1963, art. V; this article cf. Alpers, 1979, p. 271, who focuses on parallels with UDENAMO statutes

Concerning Frelimo-membership, the statutes stipulate later:

> Members of the FRONT can be all Mozambicans who agree with the Statutes and the programme of FRELIMO and who commit themselves to carrying out daily the policy of FRELIMO.
>
> FRELIMO, 1963, art. VII

13 Byrne in USA (1962d, p. 2) reported differently: Mondlane 116, Simango 13, and Chagong'a 6 votes, cf. Cabrita (2000, p. 12); the PIDE result is more likely to be correct, fitting better with other elections with slightly more than 200 voters, see Correia (2017, p. 131). USA (1962c); cf. USA (1962b, p. 2).

14 See Gwambe, Mmole, & Sigauke (1972[1963], p. 475); Chilcote (1972, p. 458); Frelimo (1963, p. 9).

15 See data in USA (1962d, pp. 1, 3; 1962e; 1962f; 1962g, pp. 2, 4; 1962h, p. 2); cf. Gwambe (1962).

16 For the adopted statutes: USA (1962i, p. 5); Frelimo (1963). Another version of the statutes is given by PIDE/DGS (1963b.).

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Article V targets 'all Mozambicans' but Article VII implies that there may be Mozambicans not within Frelimo. The statutes do not explicitly say or logically imply that Mozambicans who are not Frelimo-members would be obliged to carry out Frelimo's policies. This idea would nevertheless be made public later, as we will see below. For future reference, it must be mentioned here that Lázaro Nkavandame became provincial chairman (or secretary) of Cabo Delgado in December 1962 and acted as Frelimo's director of the Department of Commerce in Cabo Delgado.[17]

1.7 *Some Preliminary Notes on 'Definitions of the Enemy'*

It is convenient to make a few preliminary remarks here on who Frelimo considered its enemy to be (to be elaborated more in detail below). A distinction can be made between formulations of the 'enemy' as an abstraction and as people. Abstract types of enemy were 'colonialism' and 'imperialism' (Frelimo, 1963, art. IV-a). Enemy people were 'Portuguese colonialists' (Frelimo, 1966a) or 'Portuguese' also identified as 'Whites' (Frelimo in De Bragança & Wallerstein [Eds.], 1982a). The Second Congress considered deserters from the struggle as enemies. From 1969 on, Frelimo still considered Portuguese colonialism as the enemy, but the formula to fight 'exploitation of man by man', mentioned in a resolution of the Second Congress, was interpreted by Mondlane's successor Machel as 'class struggle' (as opposed to 'racial struggle'). In Machel's interpretation, 'blacks' could be enemies while 'whites' would not necessarily be. Finally, 'enemy' might just mean 'the Portuguese colonial army or government'.[18]

2 Developments within Frelimo 1962–1966

Several individuals were expelled from Frelimo, such as Mmole and Millinga.[19] Leo Milas, secretary for information and publicity, later secretary for defence and information, and initially loyal to Mondlane, appeared reckless, and Mondlane had Milas expelled from Frelimo on 25 August 1964. Milas was accused of 'not [being] a Mozambican'.[20]

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17 Cahen (1999, p. 44); Vail & White (1980, p. 395); Isaacman & Isaacman (1983, p. 96).

18 Frelimo (1977d[1968], pp. 95, 103; 1977f, p. 130; 1977g, pp. 149, 155); Machel, 1970; Machel in Muiuane ([Ed.], 2006, p. 377).

19 USA (1962e, 1962f, 1962i, p. 6); cf. Chilcote (1972, p. 192).

20 Cabrita (2000, pp. 12, 28); Frelimo (≤ 1963, p. 2); Manghezi (1999, p. 227); Ncomo (2009[2003], pp. 116–120, 123); Vines (1991, p. 11). On Milas's name, Frelimo (1964), but see USA (1962b, p. 2).

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In 1963, the Mozambique Institute was set up in Dar-es-Salaam to educate Mozambicans, specifically secondary school students. It was led by the Mondlane couple (Eduardo and his US wife Janet).[21] 1964 marks the beginning of Mozambican anticolonial armed struggle. The first shot was apparently fired by Gwambe-associates in Zambézia in July (Cahen, 1999, p. 45n26; 2010). MANU, with Lucas Fernandes, fired its 'first shot' on 24 August 1964, killing Dutch missionary Daniel Boormans.[22] Mondlane condemned the latter action but promised Mozambique would be free within five years (*Africa Report* 1964b). Frelimo undertook several operations on or around 25 September 1964, which is the date of Frelimo's proverbial 'first shot' (Cahen, 1999, p. 45n26).[23]

Meanwhile (presumably after the expulsion of Milas), Filipe Magaia had become Frelimo's security and defence secretary (Christie, 1989[1988], p. 34). On 10 October 1966, Magaia died after an incident during a mission in Niassa, shot by Frelimo soldier Lourenço Matola.[24] Recently Moisés (2016, pp. 274–275) has stated that Matola himself revealed to him in the 1980s that there had been a plot to kill Magaia, involving Machel himself (cf. Murupa in Marcum, 2018, p. 141). Machel became Magaia's successor as top military commander, giving him a position on the Central Committee (Munslow, 1985, p. xiv; cf. Matsinha in Sampaio, 2012, p. 27). Christie writes that Machel was appointed only in November (ibid., pp. 42, 44; cf. Frelimo, n.d.-a) but this dating such a relatively long time after the death of Magaia is problematic, as it will now be my task to analyse.

3 The October 1966 Meeting of the Central Committee

The literature is unclear about the dating of an important Central Committee 'meeting (or session) of October 1966', around Magaia's death. The very vagueness of the formulation 'October 1966', without specific dates, signals difficulties as to its exact proceedings. Yet crucial decisions were made regarding the

21 Cabrita (2000, p. 18), Mondlane (1969, p. 179); Sellström (1999, p. 455; 2002, pp. 73, 74n4).

22 Cahen (1999, p. 45); Henriksen (1978, pp. 186–187). Not 'Boorman' as sometimes written (cf. <www.graftombe.nl>). MANU was possibly 'tired of waiting for Frelimo's initiative' (Cabrita, 2000, p. 29; cf. Christie, 1989[1988], p. 35; Mondlane, 1965a, p. 1; *Africa Report* 1964a).

23 The start of the war would trigger movements of Mozambican refugees into Tanzania; see Panzer (2013).

24 See Cabrita (2000, p. 47); Christie (1989[1988], p. 43); Frelimo (1966d); Manghezi (1999, pp. 270–271); Muianga (1995); Ncomo (2009[2003], pp. 151–152, 154); Opello 1975, p. 73n21; Pachinuapa (2009, pp. 27, 48) and Matsinha in Sampaio (2012, pp. 37–40).

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reorganization of the army and the involvement of students in the armed struggle (Christie, 1989[1988], p. 44; Janet Mondlane in Panzer, 2009, p. 815). Christie clearly supposes the meeting was before Magaia's death. Hanlon (1984, p. 30) and Munslow (1985, p. xiv) imply the meeting was after Magaia's death and with Machel's participation (cf. Machel in Muiuane [Ed.], 2006, p. 247).

The dating problem is relevant for the question of which policy changes in October 1966 were (partly) due to Machel. Christie's chronology implies that Machel just 'put […] into operation' earlier decisions (1989[1988], p. 44). However, if the meeting and its decisions were after Magaia's death, some policy changes may be specifically attributable to Machel. More recently, the meeting's occurrence after Magaia's death has been confirmed by Cândido Mondlane and Mariano Matsinha in Mussanhane (2012, pp. 264, 566). Interestingly, Armando Guebuza (2004, p. 38) states that the meeting started before Magaia's 'murder' (*assassinato*), but ended after his death, implying that some topics dealt with in proceedings with Magaia's participation had to be redone. This seems to be confirmed by Paulina N'kunda, who also places the Central Committee meeting after Magaia's death but adds that certain 'proposals' were made before his death (in Mussanhane, 2012, p. 640). These 'proposals' may be the decisions Christie referred to, but the fact that a reprise of the Central Committee gathering was needed can only indicate that many of the 'proposals' had initially been rejected. I interpret this in the following way: Mondlane had more influence over Magaia, but Machel more over Mondlane. This would have consequences for the manner in which Frelimo thought it should represent Mozambique.

The report of the 'October 1966' meeting mentions 'deficiencies in the coordination of general action' and 'insufficiencies in general orientation', which had 'impeded the adequate development of the struggle' (Frelimo, 1977b[1966], p. 37). Education was no longer aimed at forming cadre for an independent Mozambique but to achieving 'the tasks imposed by the revolution' (ibid., p. 38). The Central Committee appointed Armando Guebuza as secretary of the Department of Education and Culture. The military was criticized as well. The alleged tendency of the military to consider themselves better than civilians was condemned (ibid., p. 41; cf. Cabrita, 2000, pp. 46–47). The two-sided criticism indicates tension between the military and the civilian leadership. Criticism concerning *general* action and *general* orientation indicates dissatisfaction with Mondlane. This leads to questioning to what degree Mondlane's political association with Machel (and Dos Santos) was entirely according to Mondlane's own ideals–and vice versa. Ronguane (2010, p. 172; cf. 155) has argued that Mondlane's days as leader were 'numbered' because he represented a bourgeois ideology. A practical result of the October meeting, or meetings,

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was that the Department of Defence and Security was split into one department for defence under Machel and one for security under Chissano (Christie, 1989[1988], p. 44). A Politico-Military Committee was established; one reason was to end the situation that Defence seemed 'just another department' (Borges Coelho, 1989, p. 47). As for relationships within Frelimo generally, these would seriously sour after the October 1966 meeting.

4 Frelimo's Difficulties with Students in 1967 and 1968

Tension between pursuing an education and serving in the struggle would emerge in conflicts between Frelimo and students in Dar-es-Salaam and between Frelimo and students of UNEMO (*União Nacional de Estudantes de Moçambique*–National Union of Mozambican Students) in the United States (cf. Mondlane, 1969, pp. 179–180) in the period 1967–1968. These two conflicts may be dealt with simultaneously. I will argue that the tension was largely a product of Frelimo's own shift in emphases after October 1966, although the background was provided by the apparent incompatibility of studying and military training or struggle-related participation. The conflicts are need to be dealt with in some detail as they have been incorporated in much of the earlier historical writing about Frelimo in which the so-called 'revolutionary' group represented a sort of historically inevitable main current of Mozambican nationalism against allegedly aberrant individuals. In contrast with this, I will argue that this antagonism can be seen as a premonition of Frelimo's apparent incapability after independence of realizing that not every Mozambican might appreciate its claims to national representation and ways of decision-making. This point, although in itself perhaps not new (Ncomo, 2009[2003]), is made here in more detail, with a special focus on nationalism, and through reinterpreting many already existing sources, revealing how history was unduly distorted in earlier depictions of the episodes.

I will start with the conflict between Frelimo and UNEMO, which directly involved the question of whether Frelimo embodied the Mozambican 'depository of national sovereignty' (Wheeler, 1969, p. 328). Students abroad had set up UNEMO[25] in 1961, later cooperating with Frelimo without becoming subsumed under the latter.[26] By January 1966, UNEMO had established that 'a minimum of fifteen students must return every year during their holidays to work

25 Below, I will be concerned with the USA branch only.

26 Chissano (2011, pp. 324–370); Christie (1989[1988], p. 21); Hall & Young (1997, p. 11); Mondlane (1972[1964], p. 160); Munslow (1983, pp. 65, 98).

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inside Mozambique' (Munslow, 1974, p. 158). A new leadership, however, 'refused to be subordinated to […] FRELIMO' (Serapião, 2004, p. 379). Frelimo thereupon produced a document reprimanding UNEMO (late 1967, translated by Wheeler, 1969). Cabrita (2000, p. 52) questions Mondlane's authorship of the reprimand, giving Dos Santos as a more likely author. I also doubt at least the sole authorship of Mondlane, although he may have been a co-author, and will argue Machel probably had a hand in it. A strong reason for doubt is the treatment of education.[27] The document declares that 'THE STRUGGLE IS THE […] BEST TRAINING SCHOOL […]' and that 'REVOLUTIONARY INTELLECTUALS […] CAN GET MORE OF AN EDUCATION IN THE REVOLUTION THAN IN THE UNIVERSITY' (in Wheeler, 1969, pp. 331, 332). This contrasts with Mondlane's view on education as such as contributing to 'preparing ourselves to be free' (Kitchen, 1967, p. 49; cf. Frelimo, 1966c, p. 2). Even if Mondlane was not against armed struggle, the focus of his and his wife's own activities was more on the educational programmes, diplomatic relations, fundraising, etc. (Sellström, 1996). Mondlane had also little direct experience with the situation within Mozambique since the start of Frelimo's armed activities and did not visit any liberated/semi-liberated area until February 1968 (Sellström, 1996, p. 297; 1999, pp. 486–487). The quote resembles more Machel's vision that '[a]rmed struggle […] is a wonderful university' (Kaufman, 1977; cf. Machel, 1970, p. 11). Mondlane deemed the armed struggle positive but not necessary for broader social goals and not 'in itself the means of rallying and mobilizing the people' (Shore, 1992, pp. 41–42; cf. Mondlane, 1969, p. 220; contra Kruks, 1987, p. 244; 366n44).

The reprimand attempted to convince UNEMO students, even when unrelated to Frelimo, to comply with Frelimo's requirements, arguing that

> …FRELIMO and only FRELIMO knows [and] understands the real motivations of the People and clarifying their historic objectives; [only FRELIMO knows how] to organize, to unite, to educate the people politically.
>
> cf. WHEELER, 1969, p. 327, capitalizations omitted, brackets in Wheeler's version

27 Another reason for doubt is a dating error, giving Mondlane's PhD graduation in '1956' instead of '1960'. This is a common error, but Mondlane would not have made it in the text's formulation (unless he is flatly lying, which I do not believe): '[…] he received a Doctorate in 1956 (Ph.D.)' as translated by Wheeler (1969, p. 323); cf. e.g. Pachinuapa & Manguedye (2009, p. 19). This evidently false statement possibly originates from Mondlane's formulation elsewhere to have 'studied from 1951 until 1956' (e.g. in Angola Comité, 1967, p. 6), or the circumstance that he started his PhD research activities in 1956 (Manghezi, 1999, p. 132).

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> FRELIMO [...] appears as the incarnation of the will and aspirations of the Mozambican masses, the depository of national sovereignty and leadership for the Fatherland. // Thus, to obey FRELIMO is to obey the Fatherland.
>
> in WHEELER, 1969, p. 328, capitalizations omitted

From these premises, the conclusion then follows 'logically':

> It is not necessary to be a member of FRELIMO for there to be a duty to obey the decisions of FRELIMO

with the corollary that

> ...its [FRELIMO's] leadership cannot be questioned.
>
> in WHEELER, 1969, p. 328, capitalizations omitted, emphasis original; 'logical': Wheeler's word in 1970, p. 169

The 1962 statutes had not required non-members to obey Frelimo, but now this principle is explicitly established.

UNEMO reacted with a coherent vision on Frelimo:

> [D]oes he [the author] want to identify himself with Mozambique in the sense that whoever is not a Frelimo member [...] is not a Mozambican?
>
> in WHEELER, 1970, p. 175

> We do not deny that the Mozambican masses are depositories of national sovereignty [...]. But what we object to is that FRELIMO in its present condition poses as 'the incarnation of Mozambican will and aspirations'. This truth, these aspirations, do exist, it is true, but that FRELIMO is their 'incarnation' is what [...] we do not see clearly.
>
> in WHEELER, 1970, p. 176

That Mozambicans should obey Frelimo was not necessarily different from Mondlane's thinking (cf. above), but the argumentation has a distinct character in the document criticizing UNEMO. Frelimo's document signals a tendency away from a vision of the (armed) struggle as a necessary evil (see Mondlane, 1965a, p. 1) towards the exaltation of it. Such a vision stresses the role of the army within Frelimo, above the academically oriented outlook of Mondlane. If this was Machel's point, he was able to advertise it as Frelimo policy, while Mondlane bore the brunt of the predictable counterattack by UNEMO.

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The UNEMO students' challenge to Frelimo's declarations remained without reply. When Mondlane was asked by António Zengazenga (2013, pp. 284–285) whether he might write a reaction to UNEMO's response because 'nobody had the courage to do so', Mondlane answered that 'documents of them do not deserve a response'. The situation indicates Mondlane's inefficacy as a leader at that time. On the one hand, he is humiliated by the document of the UNEMO students; on the other, in the original reprimand to them he signed off under arguments maintaining that academic knowledge was inferior to experience gained in 'the revolution' while he and his wife had been the ones who had promoted scholarships foremost as a means of creating cadre for a post-independence situation (more on this below).

There is a significant logical problem associated with Frelimo's document, despite Wheeler's judgement about its being 'logical'. Indeed, we may speak of a veritable Batesonian double bind with Frelimo rebuking the students on one level but asserting that it represented them on another (Bateson, 2000[1972], pp. 206–207). Frelimo asserts that it is the 'incarnation of the will and aspirations of the Mozambican masses', but then it is unclear why Frelimo would have a dispute with the students, who must be considered being part of those Mozambican masses, and having their 'will and aspirations'. The conclusion must be either that there exist wills and aspirations among the Mozambican masses that Frelimo does not represent, or that people with wills and aspirations divergent from Frelimo's are not Mozambicans. Since Frelimo in its document did not seem to be prepared to accept either of these possible results, its communication was contradictory in standard logic. The students' reaction to this logical fallacy, although imprecise, was not illogical.

The conflict between the Frelimo leadership and the secondary school students at the Mozambique Institute indicates a shift in Frelimo policy that resulted in antagonizing students. Much of the dispute was due to changes in Frelimo's demands on the students concerning active participation in the armed struggle. The background of this was some years old already. The PIDE (1967, pp. 12–13) reported that Mondlane requested Chagong'a in May 1963 to send a number of students to the recently established Mozambique Institute. On arrival in Dar-es Salam, the group of 25 youngsters were sent to the training camp in Bagamoyo. Chagong'a protested and eventually the students went back to Nyassaland (now Malawi). So, while it is true in this early case that Mondlane was intending to send at least some (prospective) students for military training, it appears that this was *not* communicated to the students concerned. Futhermore, for some years after this episode Mondlane does not seem to have pressed the point. After the episode with Chagnong'a, any military involvement of Mozambique Institute students was not Frelimo public policy,

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and was not effectuated by Mondlane and his wife Janet until 1966. In fact, Gwambe, Mmole, and S. Sigauke (1972[1963], p. 473) complained that Mondlane put education as precondition for independence. In September 1963, Janet Mondlane was in conflict with the 'Department of Defence' (sic) about the issue of sending students for military training (Manghezi, 1999, pp. 241, 268). After 1966, however, she defended, or had to defend, the idea of letting students participate in the struggle (Panzer, 2009, p. 815). Christie (1989[1988], pp. 49–50) summarizes the opinion of those who were against the focus on education thus: students prepared for 'top jobs' while soldiers bore the dangers of the struggle. This ignores that aspiring to a 'career' was encouraged by the Mondlanes themselves.[28] Janet Mondlane reported in 1968 that Frelimo's Central Committee had decided in October 1966 that students should devote time and energy to the liberation struggle during school holidays (Panzer, 2009, p. 815). Later it was held that students should devote a whole year.[29] However, nothing in Janet Mondlane (1967) indicates that participation in the struggle was a standard condition for students up to August 1967.

The students resented the increased demands for participation in the struggle, which, as is argued here, had not been formulated to them when they entered the school. Their resentment would be made manifest by Father Mateus Gwenjere, who came to the school in September 1967, initially welcomed by Mondlane. Gwenjere purportedly also demanded that lessons should be in English, as opposed to Portuguese.[30] The Mozambique Institute had earlier been educating for a Cambridge Certificate–i.e. an English-oriented diploma (Angola Comité, 1965a). In 1962 and 1963 it had been a *problem* for Janet Mondlane that Mozambican students could not speak English (Manghezi, 1999,

28 PIDE/DGS (1963a); SCCI (1963); cf. Janet Mondlane (1967, p. 3); Pachinuapa & Manguedye (2009, p. 71).

29 Cabrita (2000, p. 51), cf. Janet Mondlane (1972[1963]). See also Manghezi (1999, p. 260); Laweki (2011c, p. 7); Frelimo (1977b[1966]); Frelimo in Wheeler (1969, p. 329) and Cabrita (2000, p. 51) on Guebuza. For material on the distinction between students and guerillas, see Manghezi (1999, p. 241); Pachinuapa & Manguedye (2009, p. 49); Panzer (2009, p. 815). See contrast within Mondlane (1969, pp. 128 & 179–180); similarly Frelimo (1977c[1968], pp. 79 & 81–82 with 'so-called intellectuals', a phrase unlikely to be formulated by Mondlane as a PhD degree holder).

30 Houser & Shore (1975, p. 44); Laweki (2011c, p. 7). It is unlikely that Gwenjere was a 'Portuguese agent' (cf. Panzer, 2009, p. 818n61). He sent hundreds of students to Frelimo (Munslow, 1983, p. 101n24), risking instead *persecution* by the PIDE (Laweki 2011a). On making manifest: Laweki (2011c, p. 7); Opello (1975, p. 74); on Gwenjere as supposed instigator: Janet Mondlane in Gonçalves (2011); Manghezi (1999, p. 279); Panzer (2009, p. 818). For criticism: Laweki (2011b). On language issues: Frelimo (1977c[1968], p. 79); Frelimo ([Ed.], 1977, p. 26); Janet Mondlane (1972[1963], p. 407); Munslow (1974, p. 157; 1983, p. 98); Saul (1973, p. 389).

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pp. 217, 238; Janet Mondlane, 1972[1963], p. 407), for they would eventually have to go to the United States for tertiary education, as pointed out by the Central Committee at Frelimo's Second Congress (Frelimo, 1977c[1968], p. 79). She added that students 'have a purpose in life', that 'the future of Mozambique depends' on them, and that 'they are asking only for the help to send them along their way' (Janet Mondlane, ibid., pp. 408–409). In her report she also gives no indication whatsoever of any future trade-off between studying and participation in armed struggle (1972[1963]). It is likely that Gwenjere made manifest already existing opinions among school students (Opello, 1975, p. 74; cf. Manghezi, 1999, p. 270) due to changing expectations put on them. As Laweki (2011b) indicates, it presupposes some naïveté on the part of the students to state that they only became discontent because of manipulations by Gwenjere (cf. Manghezi, 1999, p. 279; Panzer, 2009, p. 818; Janet Mondlane in Gonçalves, 2011). Several authors write or imply that Gwenjere maintained that students' lives should not be put at risk.[31] Apparently the ensuing conflict became explicit during Frelimo's Christmas party end 1967 (Meisler, 1968), without, however, arriving at a solution. The failure of Anderson's (1991[1983]) theory about 'imagined communities' becomes manifest here: first, the Portuguese language could not create national solidarity if its use was itself under dispute; second, whatever means of communications the people had at the school, they shared it, but this also did not by itself forge national solidarity.

That we are dealing with a *shift* in Frelimo's own policies has been confirmed by Dos Santos, talking (in 1970) about a 'new policy which Frelimo is advancing' saying that 'today' students were not allowed to study abroad without first 'work[ing] in the revolution' (in Adjali, 1971, p. 8). In fact, Mondlane himself directly admitted that the 'difficulties' resulted from a new direction 'since the end of 1966' in a letter dated 2 April 1968 to A.C. Mwingira, chairman of the Commission on the Mozambique Institute, about disturbances at the Mozambique Institute in early March 1968. Gwenjere had been removed as teacher in February 1968. Some students, led by among others Daniel Chatama, demanded four 'white Portuguese' teachers be removed. On 5 March at night, Machel, Joaquim Chissano, Aurélio Manave, and other Frelimo cadres got into the student dormitories in an attempt to arrest the protesting student leaders. Instead, Machel and Manave were kept in police custody for the night (Cabrita, 2000, p. 54; Panzer, 2009, pp. 804–805; UNEMO in Wheeler, 1970, p. 171). The details need not concern us here; what can be said is that virtually all students

31 Finnegan (1992, pp. 108–109); Munslow (1974, p. 157, 1983, p. 98); cf. Christie (1989[1988], p. 49); Isaacman & Isaacman (1983, pp. 96–97); and Saul (1973, p. 389). None of these gives any source.

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seem to have disliked virtually all Frelimo leaders, matters got completely out of hand, almost all students left the secondary school, and Frelimo had to close it in or around April 1968.[32] In the letter cited that deals with the disturbances, Mondlane indicated that the initial emphasis had indeed been on training in English, which emphasis then changed to Portuguese, 'but maintaining' educational standards comparable to elsewhere in the world (Mondlane, 1968a, pp. 2–3). He degraded his own project, writing that

> …[u]ntil the end of that year [1966] the purpose and direction of the education of a young Mozambican at the Institute was vague and unclear,

adding that

> …[a]n impression was therefore given that the education acquired by our students was for their own private use and unrelated to the total struggle of the people of Mozambique.

Note that the earlier educational situation which Mondlane describes so self-deprecatingly existed only until the end of 1966, when Machel had emerged as army leader, as analysed above. Mondlane further admitted that the new rules were 'implemented more or less smoothly until the students began to note some practical applications of it' (1968a, p. 3). Hence the students were confronted with demands from Frelimo, which that organization had never made before. That this led to a loss of authority over them rather an increase is not very difficult to fathom.

5 The Assaults on Frelimo's Office in May 1968

In March 1968, Frelimo successfully re-opened a front in the Tete area (Borges Coelho, 1989, pp. 21–22). However, problems back in Dar-es-Salaam would continue partly due to the escalation of the situation in Mozambique's interior concerning the relationship between the Frelimo army and the population. In the same month of March, a reported 800 people held a demonstration against

32 See Cabrita (2000, p. 54); Christie (1989[1988], p. 50); Houser & Shore, 1975, p. 44; Laweki, 2011c, p. 7; Manghezi (1999, pp. 280–281); Meisler (1968); Moisés (2012a, 2012b, 2016, pp. 281–285); Munslow (1974, p. 160); Opello (1975, p. 74); Panzer (2009, pp. 804, 818); PIDE/DGS (1968a); Saul 1973, p. 385; Simango in Ncomo (2009[2003], p. 386) on 'white teachers' (cf. Samuels 1971, pp. 69–70).

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Mondlane in Dar-es-Salam, demanding a fresh presidential election (UNAR, 1968a, p. 3). Machel's own report of the Department of Defence to the Central Committee mentioned 'great conflict between the chairmen [Frelimo leaders in the Cabo Delgado area usually associated with Nkavandame], the people and the military forces of FRELIMO' and that soldiers of Frelimo had been incapable of enduring various deprivations and 'steal the food of the people [and] rape [*violam*] women in the villages' (written August 1968, PIDE/DGIS, 1968d, pp. 5, 11, mentioned but not reproduced in Frelimo, 1977e[1968], p. 111; on rape cf. UNAR, 1968b, p. 4). Against this background, it is not very surprising to read about a 'total discontentment of the populations' and efforts by Nkavandame in early 1968 to appeal to the leadership in Dar-es-Salam to address the desperate situation (PIDE/DGS, 1969, pp. 1–2).

Nkavandame's efforts were to no avail. In May 1968, Frelimo's office was assaulted by a group of people, which the literature does not agree as to who they were, but who were obviously unhappy with Frelimo. The group was able to close the office. A few days later, another or the same (unclear) group violently stormed the reopened office, resulting in Mateus Muthemba losing his life.[33] The *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* reported that Simango blamed Gwenjere for the disturbances (in Angola Comité 1968). If this is true then this indicates that until about mid-May 1968 Simango could not yet be viewed as the odd man out within Frelimo as he was to become later (cf. Pollet, 1970). In any case, the events concerning the students and the office indicate great dissatisfaction with Frelimo. I conclude that in the earlier years Frelimo had had disputes with *individuals* but by 1968 had managed to antagonize *entire sections of the population*. If there was any '"traditionalist" faction of Nkavandame' within Frelimo (Derluguian, 2012, p. 99), it was not a default entity but something that had grown in response to developments, which Machel and associates were responsible for, by way of the changes in attitude and actions discussed above. A Congress was to be convened from 20 to 25 July to address the conflicts.

6 Frelimo's Second Congress

I will now analyse both the antecedents and results of the Second Congress, and argue that it failed to solve the existing problems but laid the foundation for the future supremacy of Machel.

33 This description of the attack compiled from: Cabrita (2000, p. 55); Christie (1989[1988], p. 50); Houser & Shore (1975, p. 44); Manghezi (1999, pp. 284–285); Meisler 1968; Moisés (2012a); Ncomo (2009[2003], p. 157); Opello (1975, p. 75); and PIDE/DGS (1968a, p. 'tif' 155).

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6.1 *Planning for the Second Congress*

Either Nkavandame or Simango insisted on a Congress (Christie, (1989[1988], p. 49 resp. Ncomo, 2009[2003], p. 158). With Simango hesitating (Cabrita, 2000, p. 55), it was probably Nkavandame who pressed for the Congress and convinced Simango to cooperate with him. That Nkavandame and Simango were not cooperating by default has been indicated by Dos Santos who mentioned that the two 'eventually' teamed up (in Adjali, 1971, p. 2). Mondlane announced the 'reunion' in a press conference on 25 May 1968, thus in the aftermath of the troublesome office events (Frelimo, 1968a, p. 6). Afterwards Frelimo also mentioned the May assault, suggesting it did play a role in triggering the Second Congress (1968b, p. 1). The literature echoes Mondlane's reluctance.[34]

A dispute arose as to where the Congress was to be held. Mondlane decided to have it held in Niassa, within Mozambique, which was to Nkavandame's (and Simango's) disadvantage as Nkavandame would be better able to mobilize support if the venue had been in Tanzania or Cabo Delgado. Nkavandame and several others boycotted the congress, fearing they might be killed.[35]

6.2 *Procedural Aspects and Results of the Second Congress*

The Second Congress has been described as an event where 'a "revolutionary line" prevailed' (Isaacman & Isaacman, 1983, p. 97; cf. Kruks, 1987, p. 245). This analysis is difficult to maintain. The Congress emphasized the organization of the Mozambican population along military principles, which strengthened Machel's position as army commander (cf. Henriksen, 1983, p. 149). It affirmed the value of 'socialism', but did not abandon a racialist interpretation of the struggle, as I will discuss further below (Frelimo, 1977d[1968], p. 105; cf. Munslow, 1983, p. 108).

At the Second Congress, the president was elected by the Congress itself, not by a National Council–Mondlane won the presidential vote (more on this below). The Central Committee was expanded from 22 to 42 members (*Africa Report*, 1968, p. 42). For executive matters, a specific Executive Committee was formed consisting of the president, the vice-president, and secretaries of departments (Mondlane, 1969, pp. 171, 192). Every four years there was to be a Congress.[36]

Mondlane called the Second Congress 'far more democratic than the first' (1969, p. 171; cf. 1966, p. 206), applying two criteria. First, he invoked representativeness, with delegates being elected through local party networks in liberated

34 Muiuane (Ed.) (2006, p. 248); cf. Munslow (1983, p. 107); Panaf (1972, p. 103); Hanlon (1984, p. 32).

35 This paragraph: Cabrita (2000, p. 56); Hanlon (1984, p. 32); Chalalangache and C. Mondlane in Mussanhane (2012, pp. 162, 266); Ncomo (2009[2003], p. 188).

36 Mondlane (1969, pp. 171, 188); not mentioned in Muiuane ([Ed.] 2006, pp. 104–111).

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and non-liberated areas. Second, he used a structural criterion, writing that the decisions by the Congress 'were in keeping with its composition [signifying] a move towards a more democratic structure' (1969, p. 171).

As for the first criterion, there appear to have been 143 delegates (PIDE/DGS 1968c). PIDE/DGS gives a breakdown of the origin of delegates (see Table 2 below). Not all delegates were listed according to their provincial origin, but where provincial origins are stated the numbers of the delegates do not always match the population data. Moçambique (now Nampula), the most populous province, was drastically underrepresented with only seven delegates, while Niassa (the least populous province where the Congress was controversially held) was drastically overrepresented with 16 delegates (not counting

TABLE 2 Breakdown of delegates at Frelimo's Second Congress

Province/organ	**Delegates**	**Delegates % (provinces)**	**Population %[d]**
Tete	16	16	7
Niassa	16[a]	16	4
Zambezia	15[b]	15	21
Manica e Sofala	10[c]	10	12
Moçambique	7	7	22
Cabo Delgado	6	6	8
Gaza	10	10	10
Inhambane	10	10	9
Lourenço Marques	10	10	6
Central Committee	18		
Heads of national sections	7		
Frelimo's foreign reprentatives	6		
Frelimo's foreign regional delegates	8		
Lifemo	4		

Notes: a) not including Wills Kadewele; b) not including Alexandre Magno; c) not including Samuel Dhlakama; d) the total in the right-most column adds up to 99% due to rounding.

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Kadewele).[37] The number of Tete delegates was also highly disproportional. Moreover, Mondlane does not mention that, as indicated, a number of Cabo Delgado delegates were not present. Since Mondlane (1969) does not elaborate on these points, it is not possible to follow him here.

PIDE data from November 1965, probably proposals for statutes, reveal that around that time Frelimo's Congress was supposed to consist of six delegates from each province, apart from members and representatives of other organs (PIDE/DGIS, 1965, p. 1). The Internal General Regulation of 1968 (PIDE/DGIS, 1968b) mentions (art. 9) that each province should send 17 delegates (1 secretary, 1 adjunct-secretary, 10 representatives of political structures, and 5 representatives of military structures). As this was a Regulation approved at the Second Congress, it could not have been a guide for sending delegates to that same Congress. Both these cases do, however, indicate that within Frelimo the numerical aspects of the composition of a congress (in fact stipulating that all provinces should send an equal number of delegates) were considered. The results of the congress, on the other hand, do not show any overall systematicity as to the numbers of delegates. This raises questions concerning the recruitment of delegates and the impact of the congress's composition on the presidential vote.

Mondlane's second criterion for declaring the Second Congress 'more democratic' than the First was that decisions would have reflected matters of structure. Here again we cannot follow Mondlane because the only aspect of any 'structure' he (minimally) elaborates is geographical representativeness. But the Congress did not apply procedures for reaching decisions according to geographical considerations. If no 'unanimity' could be reached, decisions were reached through a 'majority' vote, irrespective of geographical considerations (Frelimo, 1968b, p. 2). Furthermore, with the overrepresentation of Niassa in the number of delegates, Mondlane's second criterion fails to be convincing, just as the first. We will see below why this matters.

Davidson initially implied that the congress never discussed any of the grave problems at hand, an impression he would gradually change later, without providing any details (see 1968a, 1968b, 1970, p. 341; 1972, pp. 225–230; 1979, p. 129). That deadly violence within Frelimo may have been discussed at the Second Congress is, however, suggested by a Frelimo commander and later

37 See PIDE/DGS (1968c, pp. 'tif' 361–366). Population data for 'Non-Civilized' people (the greater part of Mozambique's inhabitants) per province ('district' in colonial parlance) for 1960 can be found in Spence (1963, p. 26).

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Lieutenant-General, José Moiane, who was not present at the Congress but was informed about

> …the problems that were discussed in relation to the contradictions that existed within Frelimo, how these disputes were overcome […] [Still after the Congress] the *chairmen* and some militiamen were 'poisoned' with these contradictions and because of that there were constant massacres and persecutions [*matanças e perseguições*].
>
> MOIANE, 2009, p. 88

Though we are not told what these 'contradictions' were, and who were the perpetrators and victims of the 'massacres', three things can be concluded: first, at least some discussions at the Second Congress were rather severe and somehow associated with intra-Frelimo murder; second, some used the discussions to define Nkavandame and associates as separate from Frelimo, a separation that *failed* to become official policy at the Congress; third, the Second Congress did not resolve the problems. Moiane's formulation is such that these would have occurred after the Second Congress rather than before. Indeed, Paulo Kankhomba was murdered by people associated with Nkavandame (cf. below). Muianga (1995), however, suggests Lino Abraão, Rui Vilanamuali, and Barnabé Tawe were earlier murder victims because of resistance against Machel's reorganization of the army. UNAR (1968b, pp. 3–4; 1969, p. 4) complained about violent infighting and executions within Frelimo. That Frelimo killed local people who had fled from the anticolonial war has been confirmed by Hassani in Funada-Classen, (2013[2012], p. 304; cf. Van Dokkum, 2018, p. 4).

6.3 *The Presidential Vote at the Second Congress*

In this section, history and technicalities coincide. As said, Congress would choose the Frelimo president. This was done by means of a vote between Mondlane and Simango. This vote is one of the greatest mysteries in Frelimo's (and therefore Mozambique's) history. I hope to shed more light on the subject by investigating technicalities. I know of no source that has a confirmed exact outcome of the vote. Ncomo (2009[2003], p. 188) states that the difference in favour of Mondlane was only two votes, but gives no source. Davidson gives no clue whatsoever (1968a; 1968b; 1970; 1972; 1979). Cabrita implies that the 'absence of 12 Cabo Delgado delegates' would have cost Simango the presidency (2000, p. 56), which would confirm that the vote was rather close. A United States cable refers to an interview of Simango by *Notícias de Beira*, quoting him indirectly as saying that he

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> …would have won last Frelimo elections for president if 12 of his supporters had not been forced to vote against him because of threats to their lives.
>
> USA, 1974, p. 2

Assuming 143 voting delegates and no blank votes, this would suggest the result was at most 83 for Mondlane (58%) and at least 60 for Simango (42%), if we take the USA report. This means that Simango's support (as reflected in the votes) had indeed increased relative to that of Mondlane since Frelimo's consolidation meeting in June 1962 (Ncomo, 2009[2003], p. 188), not considering Chagong'a. However, whether the difference was 23 votes (and not less) is still unclear, since it is not clear what the background is of the different reports about the 12 delegates/supporters and whether blank votes played any role. With, added to this, the problematics of the numbers and composition of the gathering, an exact assessment of the presidential vote so far remains elusive. However, this elusiveness itself indicates how ineffectual the vote was in settling the profound division within the organization.

Unclear from the sources is also why only Mondlane and Simango were presidential candidates. Matsinha (in Sampaio, 2012, p. 45) remains vague on this issue. I propose the following explanation of the binary character of the presidential vote. This hinges basically on the phenomenon, mentioned by Mackie (2003, p. 5), that plurality contests tend to reduce the number of candidates to two. At the Second Congress the election was formally independent of any discussions about matters of content (Z. Maurício in Ncomo, 2009[2003], pp. 191–192). More specifically, the election result is reported as being *solely* dependent on a counting procedure with votes as input. Mondlane and Simango's own candidacies can be understood by considering that each of them, as incumbent president and vice-president, genuinely desired to be president. It was therefore to be expected that they wanted to stand for election. The fact that there were only two candidates may then be explained by pointing out that two other main antagonists, Machel and Nkavandame, had at the time of the Congress allied themselves with Mondlane and Simango, respectively. Standing as candidates too would have split the votes of their supporters. The strongly antagonistic situation makes this voting different from that in June 1962.

Now if the outcome was close, the relatively high number of Niassa and Tete delegates raises questions (recall that Frelimo was supposed to be 'the incarnation of the will and aspirations of the Mozambican masses', not just its own members, so one might expect some numerical congruence between delegates and population, or else a uniform number per province, cf. above). It

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was not the Simango/Nkavandame faction but the Mondlane/Machel faction which had, to Nkavandame's regret, control over Niassa during the preparations of the Congress. With the recent opening of the Tete front, such a control may also be assumed for that province. As apparently there were no criteria for the provincial numbers of delegates, it is not inconceivable that the high numbers of Niassa and Tete delegates (the highest for all the provinces) are due to invitations by the Mondlane/Machel faction in the field during the preparations (cf. Ncomo, 2009[2003], p. 187, quoting 'AS' from Niassa who complains about not being called to the Congress). Wide differences in the number of delegates across provinces, the absence of Nkavandame's group, and the apparent closeness of the vote (close enough for such factors to have possible impact, even without threats) give the crucial presidential vote a highly *arbitrary* character.

7 Aftermath of the Second Congress

7.1 *The Second Session of the Central Committee*

After the Second Congress, the Second Session of the Central Committee[38] was held from 24 August until 1 September 1968 (Frelimo 1977e[1968]). Here also, there was still no resounding victory for some 'revolutionary line'. '[P]roblems of the struggle for national liberation' were still to be 'stud[ied]', just as the 'process of the formation of the Mozambican Nation' (ibid., p. 107, 109). As Machel would admit in 1970:

> [W]e try to define our line, *or better to redefine* the line laid down by the Second Congress [sic] of the FRELIMO Central Committee.
>
> MACHEL, 1970, p. 8, emphasis added

Machel would not have to redefine a line if Mondlane and he himself had already formulated a satisfactory line (cf. Frelimo [Ed.], 1977, p. 181).

My interpretation of the Second Session is that it represented a long overdue formalization of Mondlane as army commander, while in return Machel got an increased influence over non-combatants by pulling them into military training structures. These decisions were symptomatic of a power balance

38 The First Session (after the Second Congress) was held immediately following that Congress (Pachinuapa, 2009, p. 97). I know of no minutes of it.

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between Mondlane and Machel and were not necessarily a spontaneously shared common policy.[39]

7.2 *Nkavandame's Expulsion from Frelimo*

In August 1968, a meeting between Mondlane and Nkavandame was held, in which Nkavandame produced a list with names of people he claimed were executed by Frelimo (Cabrita, 2000, p. 56). He threatened to try to separate Cabo Delgado from the rest of Mozambique (Christie, 1989[1988], p. 56). No actual agreement was reached at the meeting. Nkavandame would set up 'road committees' to control Frelimo movements in Cabo Delgado. Eventually Paulo Kankhomba was killed on 22 December 1968, although Nkavandame's own involvement remains unclear. Machel accused Nkavandame of profiteering in his economic activities, while Mondlane had mentioned Nkavandame's work positively.[40] Mondlane expelled Nkavandame from Frelimo on 10 January.[41] Once again Frelimo removed someone who Mondlane had specifically trusted earlier. Nkavandame defected to the Portuguese authorities (Ncomo, 2009[2003], p. 197).

8 Mondlane's Assassination and Subsequent Developments within Frelimo

On 3 February 1969, Mondlane was killed by a bomb hidden in a mailed book, in circumstances not publicly known.[42] Nowadays the party blames the PIDE/DGS for the assassination (Frelimo n.d.-b). A specific individual, Casimiro Monteiro, is sometimes mentioned in this context.[43] Simango would substitute for Mondlane as interim-president according to Article 40 of the Internal General Regulation. The establishment of a Council of the Presidency consisting of a triumvirate of Machel, Dos Santos, and Simango (as coordinator) was decided at the Third Session of the Central Committee of 11 until 21 April 1969. This gave Machel and Dos Santos a presidential position without

39 Frelimo (1977e[1968], pp. 111–112); Manghezi (1999, p. 336); Mondlane (1969, p. 152); cf. Frelimo (1977b[1966], p. 42).

40 On these disputes and events: Cabrita (2000, pp. 56–57, 61); Christie (1989[1988], p. 56); Hall & Young (1997, p. 17); Hanlon (1984, pp. 32–33); Ncomo (2009[2003], p. 194); PIDE/DGIS 1969; Vail & White (1980, p. 395).

41 Cabrita (2000, p. 57); Houser & Shore (1975, p. 45); Ncomo (2009[2003], pp. 196–197).

42 Cabrita (2000, pp. 57–58); Frelimo (1969d, p. 22); *New York Times* (1969); *Time* (1969).

43 Neves de Souto (2007, p. 213n40). For Janet Mondlane's inscrutable position concerning potentially culpable people, see Manghezi (1999, p. 304); *Metical* in *Allafrica* (1999).

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ever having been appointed as such by a Frelimo Congress. Election of the president by Congress upon *proposal* by the Central Committee was at that moment the constitutional procedure. In case of death, a Central Committee appointment would have to be subject to ratification by another congress.[44] However, Frelimo's Third Congress was held only in 1977. The Statutes adopted then no longer mentioned the requirement of congressional ratification, so that Machel was never formally approved as party and country president by more people than the number of members of the Central Committee (art. 21-e of Statutes in Frelimo, 1977a, p. 49).

After the Third Session, Frelimo announced the 'elimination of erroneous conceptions' as 'something completely new' at the meeting (implying: such a 'fresh wind' had never happened in Mondlane's time). Frelimo now put the goal of quick independence as secondary to the Mozambican people's being 'politically mature'. Thus the idea of 'protracted war' became official Frelimo ideology and was strongly associated with Machel and the group around him.[45] The Third Session had decided that Machel himself would have direct control over many civilian policy areas, which came under the Department of Defence. More than 40 individuals were expelled and LIFEMO was merged with the Women's Detachment, Frelimo's women's combat group.[46] Silvério Nungu, who had been Central Committee member for Administration, was executed (Henriksen, 1978, p. 180; Marcum, 2018, p. 135; Cuvelo in Mussanhane, 2012, p. 338n79; Simango 1969).

Early November 1969, Simango made public his pamphlet *Gloomy Situation in Frelimo* (Simango, 1969; cf. Ncomo, 2009[2003], pp. 229, 385–401). Of particular historical interest is the claim that there had been conspiratorial meetings of people originating from the south of Mozambique in Janet Mondlane's house in February/March 1969 (cf. ibid., pp. 393, 398). When asked about them recently, Janet Mondlane did not deny the existence of such meetings (Gonçalves, 2011). Simango gained no concrete advantage by his pamphlet, and the Executive Committee suspended Simango from the Council of the Presidency (Frelimo, 1969d). Tanzania expelled him, according to Moisés (2012c) because the Tanzanian government did not like his erratic behaviour (first denying

44 From 'Simango would …': Frelimo in (PIDE/DGS, 1968b, specifically art. 8[d]); Frelimo (1977f[1969], p. 134); Mondlane (1969, p. 171); Muiuane ([Ed.], 2006, pp. 107, 109–110); Ncomo (2009[2003], p. 208; cf. Z. Maurício, p. 224).

45 Frelimo (1977f[1969], p. 129; 1969b, p. 2); Manning (2002, pp. 45–46).

46 Frelimo (1977f[1969], pp. 134–135, 141, 145); Frelimo (1969c, pp. 26–27); cf. Ncomo (2009[2003], p. 216); LIFEMO: Mozambique Women's League; cf. Frelimo (1966b); Manghezi (1999, p. 221); Josina Machel (1969). LIFEMO had been under the leadership of Selina Simango, Uria Simango's wife.

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Gwenjere's information about 'killing fields' of 'the Mondlane group' while now confirming this in *Gloomy Situation*). Simango was formally expelled from Frelimo at the Fourth Session of the Central Committee in May 1970 (Frelimo, 1977g, pp. 158–159). The Fourth Session elected Machel and Dos Santos as President and Vice-President 'until the next Congress' (ibid., p. 159), which, as indicated, did not occur until 1977.

In November 1969, another high-profile defection had occurred, that of Miguel Murupa, Frelimo's External Relations secretary and personally appointed by Mondlane. He declared that

> …FRELIMO had fallen under a 'communist takeover' and that 'no real nationalism existed in Mozambique but rather exasperation over racial inequalities and slowness with which Portuguese applied their principles of racial integration'.
>
> *New York Times* in HENRIKSEN, 1978, p. 181

The issue of 'racial inequalities' was much relevant for the approach Frelimo – including Mondlane–initially took towards the independence struggle, as we will now investigate.

9 'Race', Ethnicity, and Nationality with Frelimo and Mondlane

In this section, problems of 'race' and ethnicity and their respective connections with nationality, specifically in relation to discussions within Frelimo, are discussed in separate subsections.

9.1 *'Race'*

Since there is no *a priori*, automatic way of determining who is a Mozambican (see Appendix 1), this topic became an issue within Frelimo. The problem of 'who is a Mozambican' was initially related to 'race' issues and Mondlane's interpretation of the struggle. I will show that Mondlane remained attached to a predominantly racialist interpretation of the struggle.

On 25 June 1962, Frelimo did not reach a decision on 'race' issues related to membership of the organization. Nevertheless, the US Embassy interpreted the situation as Frelimo fighting 'against colonialism, not against the white community' (USA, 1962i, p. 5). In September 1963, Frelimo stated in *Why We Fight* that '[a]lmost all the commerce […] is in the hands of Whites and Indians' and that 'Mozambique is only for the Mozambicans and we do not accept the intervention of any outsider. […] We are going to expel the Portuguese!'

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suggesting that 'Whites', 'Portuguese' and 'Indians' are 'outsiders' (De Bragança & Wallerstein [Eds.], 1982a, pp. 12–13). Such racialist interpretations of 'Whites' as opponents were not strange to Mondlane. Only recently authors have picked up what Mondlane's PhD thesis was about: 'race' relations. Ncomo (2009[2003], p. 165) and Ronguane (2010) briefly deal with the thesis, and here I wish to press the point a bit further.

In his PhD thesis, making use of Merton and Rossi's (1968[1950]) theory on reference groups, Mondlane showed with admirable clarity a racialist bias with some of his respondents in being lenient or punitive towards hypothetical exam cheaters (Mondlane, 1960, pp. 58–59). Mondlane reached the following conclusions:

> [T]he racial or caste membership of a cheater provides a reference point in relation to which a given proctor [i.e. Mondlane's respondent] is able to formulate his values [...]. The regional origin of the proctor, like the school which he attends, provides a cultural setting in which the racial identity takes meaning.
>
> 1960, p. 96

> [T]here is a significant relationship between low academic standards [of the school as perceived by respondents] and racial bias, [but] race or caste is important only when it is set against the background of [...] the collective experiences of the groups tested.
>
> 1960, pp. 96–97

Mondlane went on to write that the South of the United States knows 'negative relations between the two racial groups', which 'solidify themselves into antagonistic camps whose individual members resent each other' (1960, pp. 97–98). This anticipates a comment by Mondlane about eight years later:

> [T]here is a class system which clearly runs along racial/cultural lines [...] in Mozambique [leading to] conflicts between groups also following the same racial grooves. When finally the explosion takes place it will necessarily be mainly between the members of those communities which have the most antagonistic and contradictory interests [namely] those of the settler class [...] and those of [...] the African people.
>
> MONDLANE, 1968b, p. 18[47]

47 Probably a variant of a paper presented at a United Nations seminar in Lusaka in 1967 (cf. Henriksen, 1973, p. 42n12).

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If one should accept that students at the Mozambique Institute secondary school were 'anti-white racists', Mondlane's theorizing provides a virtually perfect explanation: trouble apparently only arose concerning the use of the Portuguese language and participating in the struggle, which lessened students' identification with the leadership and lowered their evaluation of the academic standards of the school, leading to racialist bias. This does not prove that the students were necessarily racists; Mondlane's theory also works when we substitute 'nationality' for 'race' and treat 'Africans' and 'Portuguese' as 'antagonistic camps' within the Mozambican context (this would not apply to Janet Mondlane, but her position as a director was a unique case). A comment by Simango would suggest this:

> To them [the students] it was not a problem of race but a group of people who could be in the organization on the Portuguese government mission.
> SIMANGO, 1969; cf. NCOMO, 2009[2003], p. 386

I argue here that it is doubtful that the students specifically had the Portuguese government in mind, but some students may have identified Portuguese-Mozambican teachers as opponents in the way Mondlane's theory explains. In fact, the students may have had some difficulty squaring what was said to them in the school with Frelimo's own propaganda, which disseminated in 1966 the wish that all Portuguese colonialists be blown to pieces (conclusion of Frelimo, 1966a). On the other hand, while attacks on Dos Santos and Simango also occurred, the stance against the Portuguese-Mozambican teachers came to be singled out as point of criticism (by some analysts in the earlier literature, cf. above) against the students, Gwenjere, and Simango. However, the literature has been rather silent on Mondlane's own racialist interpretation of the struggle that is clear from the quote above.

True, in (1969, p. 182) Mondlane mentions 'white Mozambican doctors working with Frelimo'. Whether they are to be seen as representative or exemptions is to be examined now. In 1964, Mondlane mentioned 'a Moçambican nationalism that unites all […] regardless of their […] races' but in the same essay he stresses the suffering of the 'masses of the black people' who serve 'white interests' (1972[1964], pp. 396, 399). In 1967, Mondlane stated that 'we are not fighting against the Portuguese people [but] the Portuguese Government' and that 'Portuguese whites […] are welcome',[48] but a week before his death he said:

> The real problem is how to integrate white Mozambican-born nationalists [because] the settler class is overwhelmingly against us. […] Even if

48 Kitchen (1967, p. 32); cf. Meisler (1968); cf. Cornwall (1972, pp. 37–38) for 1968.

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> […] there are one or two younger people who are for us, […] we have to be cautious […]. [As for] whites; we accept them to work in technical jobs […]. They can be members of FRELIMO, […] but they cannot be members of the Central Committee, and so on […].
>
> Mondlane in *Tricontinental*, 1971[1969], pp. 229–230

Mondlane was not prepared to accept *any* 'white' as welcome in Mozambique. When 'whites' are taken as 'Portuguese', it is clear that Mondlane did not anticipate a future reconciliation with them. To Cornwall he said in 1968:

> [T]he Portuguese must be *out*, except for those who are part of Mozambique.
>
> Mondlane in CORNWALL, 1972, p. 101; emphasis original[49]

Thus Mondlane never abandoned a racialist interpretation *of the liberation struggle*, which is not to say he was a racist. This idea of 'the Portuguese' as enemy was a Frelimo-wide understanding (Mondlane in Tricontinental, 1971[1969], p. 237; see also Serapião, 1985, pp. 3–4).

The report of the Central Committee to the Second Congress confirms that Frelimo had no official view then on 'whites' as 'Mozambicans'. The report analyses 'the Mozambican population' into three groups:

- the peasants, the overwhelming majority;
- the migrant workers, 15% of the 'Mozambican black' population, who originate from the same population as the peasants (so that, I conclude, the peasants were also 'Mozambican black');
- urban proletariat, the greater part of whom work in private homes of 'white and Asian settlers [*colonos*] of Mozambique', and stevedores (Frelimo, 1977c[1968], p. 62).

'Whites' and 'Asians' are mentioned as 'settlers', not as part of the 'Mozambican population'. This fits very well with what Mondlane had written in 1964, namely that

> African nationalism has also had to include a reaction against local cultural and socio-economic barriers created by members of. [European and Asian] non-African communities.
>
> 1972[1964], p. 392

49 This comment probably dates from October 1968 (thus after the Second Congress), compare Cornwall (1972, p. 70) with INDE (2009, pp. 24–25), and Cornwall (1972, p. 86) with Frelimo (1969a, p. 7).

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The three-fold division of 'the Mozambican population' overlaps with the socio-economic condition of the groups, corresponding well with Mondlane's (1968b) analysis of 'race' relations, suggesting he wrote this paragraph of the report (see also Mondlane in Pachinuapa, 2009, p. 91). After the Congress, Frelimo (1968b, p. 3) still used 'whiteman' (sic) and 'white' as valid analytical categories. It is thus *not* true, at least up to 1968 included, that 'Frelimo [...] stressed [its] opposition to the criterion of race as such' (Minter, 1994, p. 65).

The issue of 'whites' within Frelimo being unresolved at the Second Congress, the Central Committee debated it at its session of 24 August-1 September 1968. Simango reported:

> The meeting [...] discussed [...] employing foreigners [...] for technical tasks. [...] [N]obody was against having white people help in the organization [...] [T]hey (Portuguese) wanted to be members of the Central Committee. To say that there is racism in FRELIMO is not true, but there is the spirit of vigilance in order to prevent imperialist infiltration and interference [...].
>
> SIMANGO, 1969; cf. NCOMO, 2009[2003], pp. 386–387

Some of Simango's phrasings resemble some by Mondlane in the Tricontinental interview (e.g. on 'technical' jobs/tasks), suggesting a common origin in Central Committee discussions, which is less clear in Frelimo (1968c, p. 6; cf. Frelimo, 1977e[1968], p. 120).[50]

Simango reported that Dos Santos tried to break the ban on 'Portuguese' as members of Frelimo's Central Committee (in Isaacman & Isaacman, 1983, p. 97).[51] With Mondlane dead and Simango expelled, the ban could be lifted. Just before independence, Machel explained:

> They [those with reactionary ideas] wanted to make our struggle a racial struggle, between black and white. But our struggle is a class struggle.
>
> in MUIUANE [Ed.], 2006, p. 377

50 Cf. also Second Congress on technicians (Mondlane, 1969, p. 193; Frelimo, 1977d[1968], p. 97) and medical personnel (Frelimo, 1977e[1968], p. 124).

51 In Mozambique, a version of *Gloomy Situation* seems to circulate that is damaged at this spot in the text (cf. Simango, 1969; Ncomo, 2009[2003], p. 386). I rely on Isaacman & Isaacman's version here.

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Thus, where Mondlane (1968b) had conflated antagonisms between 'races' and between 'classes', Machel presented these interpretations as mutually exclusive and the first wrong. This stance had consequences for who would be 'enemies' and 'friends'. After the Third Session of the Central Committee Frelimo reported the existence of different conceptions of 'nationalism' within the Central Committee. Certain comrades, the report said, had an

> …empirical conception of nationalism [making it] impossible for them to distinguish our friends from our enemies. For them, all Mozambicans of African origin were 'Nationalists', and as such should be accepted in our movement, without any investigation of their political orientation […] [W]hen enemy agents like Mateus Gwenjere appeared in our midst […] these comrades […] alleg[ed] that 'they are also nationalists'.
>
> FRELIMO, 1969b, p. 2

The stance on membership criticized in the quote was very much Mondlane's, who had maintained that Frelimo membership was 'open to every adult Mozambican' (1969, p. 168). By mentioning Gwenjere instead of Mondlane in relation to it, this stance could be rejected without having to accuse the late president of having had an 'erroneous conception'. The 'correct' conception of the 'struggle for National Liberation' was given as 'the subordination of all activities to the armed struggle' (1969b, pp. 2–3). The process of incorporating civilian life under the auspices of the army, Machel's terrain, was now completed. As for the question of who was friend or enemy, Machel, already in the time of the triumvirate, declared that 'those who do not want to define our struggle as a revolutionary struggle […] cannot be members of Frelimo' (1970, p. 8). Still later, in June 1975, Machel said:

> [An] enemy does not have colour. It is your brother, reactionary […] [T]he black [person] places himself close to you with the pistol behind his back.
>
> in MUIUANE [Ed.], 2006, pp. 404; cf. 338

Businessman Jorge Jardim, initially involved in anti-Frelimo military operations (Neves de Souto, 2007, pp. 287, 292), later came to affirm the existence of 'white Mozambicans' (*moçambicanos brancos*–Jardim, 1976, p. 231; cf. Cabrita, 2000, p. 75ff). However, Mondlane's doctrine that most 'Portuguese' should be '*out*' was not necessarily suspended. It was just augmented by an unfavourable attitude towards non-'Portuguese' who did not comply with Frelimo. This will be elaborated in the next chapter. There remains one comment to be made,

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namely that Machel's ideological interpretation of the enemy was not reported by the former Frelimo anticolonial combatants I interviewed in Barue. They were not recruited for ideological reasons and fought on the supposition that they did so against 'the Portuguese' (Van Dokkum, 2015, pp. 192–193, 290).

9.2 *Ethnicity*

In Mozambique–exceptional and so far ineffectual cases threatening separatism notwithstanding–the territory of the country was pretty much a given upon independence, albeit necessitating some mutual understanding of the diverse ethnic groups, with or without a successful definition of the 'nation'. Disputes have arisen many times not (predominantly) about whether ethnic groups should have their own states or belong to other states but more frequently about the equitable distribution of power and access to services within the state and (often much the same) within the Frelimo party system (see Chichava, 2008). Ncomo (2009[2003]) puts forward the suggestion that the winning protagonists in the Frelimo crisis won on the basis of ethnic solidarity, or more generally on the basis of regionalism–'south' versus 'central' and 'northern' Mozambique–see also Simango (1969), and Cahen (1988, pp. 9, 12) on Maputo as capital in the extreme south of the country, which can easily reinforce the idea that people from the south rule the country. Such discussions involve 'ethnicities […] as cockpits of debate' (Lonsdale, 1994, p. 140; cf. Brinkman, 2001, p. 137; Hastings, 1997, Ch. 6). However, the present book does not endorse Ncomo on the said point. Not all southerners were necessarily enjoying good relationships with Frelimo (Marcum, 2018, pp. 58, 61). But perhaps more importantly, focussing on ethnic solidarity as a prime explanation for the eventual success of the so-called 'revolutionaries' in gaining control of Frelimo (and Mozambique) misses the point that Mondlane had an odd positioning within the winning group, as I discuss below. Ncomo's ethnic framework glosses over this issue just like authors interpreting the crisis in terms of ideology did. Specifically, the vote at Frelimo's Second Congress cannot exhaustively be explained by ethnic considerations. Marcum writes, 'Simango […] lacked a Nyanja ethnic support base inside a lightly populated area that could facilitate a successful bid for power' (2018, p. 129). It may very well be that Simango had no ethnic support among inhabitants of Niassa. But it cannot explain the result of the presidential vote because we do not expect Mondlane to have any specific ethnic support in Niassa either, since being 'totally a Tsonga' (Mondlane in Manghezi, 1999, p. 64) he was from a rather different ethnic background, while Niassa inhabitants were, apart from a few Nguni (~ Ngoni), mostly Yao, Nyanja, and Makhuwa. Unless Nguni, whose ancestors came from the south, were indeed specifically selected to represent Niassa in a southern ethnic fashion, it

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must be assumed that the Niassa representatives were ethnically diverse and did not imply an *ethnic* advantage for Mondlane relative to Simango (ethnic data: Cahen, 1994, p. 250; Funada-Classen, 2013[2012], pp. 97, 132n81).

Machel, (1985[1980], p. 77) would declare that '[w]e killed the tribe to give birth to the nation' (cf. Berman, Eyoh, & Kymlicka, 2004, p. 8), but aspects of regionalism, a reference framework more general than ethnicity, kept cropping up, such as recently when Renamo-leader Dhlakama announced he would establish a 'Republic of Central and Northern Mozambique' (Allafrica, 2015; see also Macamo & Neubert, 2003/2004, pp. 65–66). Voting data from 1994 onwards do show geographical differences across parties (indeed, I discuss these in Appendix 4 for 1999), and some people may have described their own party-adherence in ethnic terms (EMS 1995, p. 64), but the actual statistical distribution of party affiliation is more dispersed than a straightforward one-to-one correspondence of ethnicity and party affiliation would suggest (Pereira 2008). As for Barue District, I have found no indication that its inhabitants engage in political mobilization on the basis of Barue ethnicity; indeed, it is extremely difficult to see why they would as the biggest political issue is of a party-political nature: the desired or rejected dominance of Frelimo. This argument can be generalized: suppose, as a thought experiment, that Renamo were able to split Mozambique into two countries along the Save River. The southern country would remain largely (even if not exclusively) Frelimo, but the northern country, although probably a Renamo majority area, would retain a substantial amount of Frelimo adherents (even if unduly skewed in Frelimo's advantage as analysed in Appendix 4, we may use the 1999 presidential election as an overall guideline for dichotomous Frelimo vs. Renamo adherence–IESE 2016). Party antagonism would pretty much continue in the hypothetical northern country. So ethnic/regional division may to a certain extent be a predictor for party affiliation in the south of Mozambique, and at times it is certainly a factor in disputes, but it cannot exhaustively explain Mozambique's party-political problems for the country as a whole.

Pan-Africanism in the sense of a concerted effort by African countries to end Portuguese colonialism through military action eventually appeared to make little practical difference (Marcum, 2018, pp. 73–75). As for Frelimo and its split-offs, both the faction of Machel and his adherents, as well as their opponents, appear to have been 'micronationalists' in the sense that they did not motivate their fight for a free Mozambique using an appeal to unite all of Africa. Only a few instances of 'revisionist nationalism', the idea of border redrawing (Zerbo, 2005, pp. 23–25), have occurred, in the case of Nkavandame threatening to separate Cabo Delgado (Christie, 1989[1988], p. 56), the proposal of UNAR to create an independent 'Rumbézia' mostly north of the Zambezi

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River (Chilcote, 1972, pp. 192–193), Cabrita, 2000, p. 40–see below), and the mentioned idea of Dhlakama that he would separate north and central Mozambique from the south (Allafrica, 2015). These areas may have incorporated some ethnic calculation, but they are nonetheless far from ethnically homogeneous.

9.3 *Nationalism with Mondlane, Dos Santos, and Machel*

Mondlane stated a few months after the start of Frelimo's military operations that

> …Moçambican nationalism, like practically all African nationalism, was born of direct European colonialism. Moçambique's most specific source of national unity is the common experience (in suffering) of the people during the last one hundred years of Portuguese colonial control.
>
> 1972[1964], p. 391

For Mondlane, African nationalism was not a result of the introduction of certain ideas by Europeans but a reaction *against* European interference in Africa (ibid., p. 392). Mondlane defined 'nationalism' as

> …a consciousness on the part of individuals or groups of membership in a nation or of a desire to develop the strength, liberty, or prosperity of that nation,

adding that this definition

> applies to nationalism in all circumstances or stages of development of any people.
>
> ibid., p. 391

Note the set-theoretical aspect ('membership') in the definition. That not all people living in Mozambique might be considered Mozambicans is something I have already dealt with above. Mondlane added that 'African nationalism' also aimed at self-government and independence, and went on to associate Frelimo with the said strength and independence. Mondlane realized that apart from 'African nationalism' as defined in the way indicated by Mondlane, there existed also 'cultural nationalism' comprising 'all sorts of theories concerning the African man' such as 'Négritude'; such 'sorts of theories' were apparently not much to Mondlane's taste (ibid., pp. 391–392, 398–400). Mondlane concluded:

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> The Moçambican peoples [have] coalesced into one solid people […]. The Moçambican people have come to consider themselves a nation in the same way that the peoples of India, China, the Soviet Union, and other multilinguistic and multireligious societies now consider themselves one nation.
>
> ibid., p. 399

Here we see a conception of 'nationalism' that does not require a nation to be culturally uniform (as also commented in the introductory chapter). However, the contingent character of highly pluriform nations is also evident, as the Soviet Union no longer exists.

After his death, Mondlane's approach to nationalism would be replaced by the approach of the 'revolutionary' group. Let us observe some comments by Dos Santos on this in an interview with Joe Slovo (1973):

> [T]here are different types of nationalism. There is the elementary, primary one–what is called primitive nationalism. But there is also revolutionary nationalism. […] [W]hen we speak about the limitations of national consciousness we mean limitation by those who use the ideology of bourgeois nationalism to prevent liberation from moving on to the revolution.
>
> in SLOVO, 1973, p. 44

One of the main targets of this comment of Dos Santos must have been Simango, who had specifically accused Dos Santos of trying to let 'Portuguese nationals' 'infiltrate the Central Committee' and had stated that 'if there is an indigenous bourgeois class at the moment and if it is willing to contribute for the liberation of the country we must accept its cooperation' (1969). This shows there was a genuine ideological difference about 'bourgeoisie'. Materially, however, it was a futile dispute, since both Dos Santos (in Slovo, 1973, p. 32) and Simango (1969) maintained that there was hardly, if any, Mozambican bourgeoisie. More salient is Dos Santos's description of Frelimo's stance towards the struggle as shifting over time towards criticism of economic interests favoured by colonialism, which came to include 'not only the interests of some white people but could also be the interests of some Black people' (in Slovo, 1973, p. 45). This innovation in Frelimo's interpretation of nationalism away from Mondlane's African interpretation allowed Dos Santos to reconcile a contradiction in his conversation with Slovo: on the one hand he maintained that in Frelimo 'all the social groups are represented' while on the other hand people such as Nkavandame, Simango, Gwenjere, and Murupa, who no longer

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belonged to Frelimo as a result of the internal disputes, represented 'certain types of social groups', being 'priest' or 'a man from a university' so that 'we could say perhaps that they represent different elements of the petty bourgeoisie' (in Slovo, 1973, p. 35 resp. 46). Note that the contradiction is very similar to the one identified above with the UNEMO dispute: in both cases Frelimo pretends to represent all Mozambicans while simultaneously admitting that some are not represented.

In a speech about one month after independence, Machel added another aspect to what it means to be Mozambican, namely religion, or better the distancing from it. Catholics, Presbyterians, and Methodists would be associated with Vatican City, Switzerland, and the United States rather than Mozambique:

> I [Machel], when someone asks me, say, 'I am Mozambican', in the first place! The rest is not important. [...] So, as a Mozambican, I only obey FRELIMO. FRELIMO is father and mother, to me. [...] [Some] are Presbyterians, linked to Switzerland. They think about Switzerland, instead of thinking about Mozambique. The head is in Switzerland, the body is in Mozambique.
>
> in REIS & MUIUANE (Eds.), 1975, pp. 28–29

Naturally, we can argue that this contrast between faith and Mozambican identity must have been an affront to Mozambicans who felt no such opposition. But another point to derive from the quote is that Machel completely erased Mondlane's Christian background here. It appears that Mondlane was a convinced Christian, with strong links to the Swiss Presbyterian mission (Faris, 2014). He visited Switzerland several times (2014, pp. 16, 133, 181). Since it is difficult to believe that Machel was not aware of this aspect of Mondlane in 1975, we may ask whether there were not more erasures concerning Mondlane's legacy after his death.

9.4 *Nationhood: The Case of Rumbézia*

UNAR (*União Nacional Africana de Rumbézia*), founded in January 1968, intended for a short while to create an independent state called 'Rumbézia' consisting of what are now the Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Nampula, Zambézia, and Tete provinces, mostly between the Rovuma and Zambezi Rivers. In this way the 'Rumbezians' (*Rumbezianos*) would be free from Portuguese colonialism, 'capitalist and communist imperialists', and 'the deadly activities of Frelimo', where UNAR saw Frelimo as serving the interests of the people of southern Mozambique (UNAR, 1968a, pp. 2–3; 1968b, pp. 2, 4). Rumbézia forms an interesting case of a

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referred to, yet non-existent, nation: although multi-ethnic, it would be smaller than Mozambique and hence more homogenous; in Anderson's sense it would be 'imagined' by being big enough so that not all people would not know each other and by sharing means of communication–if only through UNAR's periodical. But these criteria are not decisive; Rumbézia has never become a nation because the great majority of the people *referred to* as 'Rumbezians' have never used that name as a *self-reference*, nor would they intend to perpetuate a collective existence as 'Rumbezians'. This makes the case of Rumbézia different from Mozambique on the day of independence. On 25 June 1975, a Mozambican nation was really created in these latter senses. The sociological character of that nationhood, and the psychological intensity of the nationhood as felt by individuals, may certainly be matter for discussion. However, should one insist on the non-existence of any Mozambican nation on 25 June 1975 (cf. Hastings, 1997, pp. 161–162), one would still have to acknowledge that such non-existence is of an entirely different nature than the non-existence of the Rumbezian nation. 'Rumbezians' could simply ignore being addressed as such, while Mozambicans could not.

10 Mondlane and Marxist Ideology

One influence of the Machel-Dos Santos duo on Mondlane appears to have been his willingness to declare shortly after the Second Congress that

> …FRELIMO has a political line that is much clearer than previously. […] [T]here were some elements within FRELIMO who brought these ideas with them to the struggle. […] [I]t [is] possible for me to say, and I do believe it, that FRELIMO […] now tends more and more in the direction of socialism of the Marxist-Leninist variety. […] Without compromising the Party which has not yet made an official declaration asserting it is Marxist-Leninist, I think FRELIMO can be said to be inclining more and more in this direction.
>
> DE BRAGANÇA & WALLERSTEIN [Eds.], 1982b, pp. 121–122

From the quote, however, if not already from the Congress reports themselves, this is clear: shortly after Frelimo's Second Congress, Frelimo had *not* officially declared itself Marxist-Leninist. Poppe (2009, p. 295) points out that Mondlane's reference to 'some elements within Frelimo' does not seem to include himself. Ronguane (2010, pp. 148–149) argues Mondlane simply wished to please his interviewer (De Bragança). That Mondlane did not wholeheartedly

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share the 'direction' is also evident from the following fragment of an interview by Nesbitt and Edmunds with Bill Sutherland in 2003:

> SUTHERLAND: Mondlane. He told me one time, […] I [Mondlane] know they're going to try to push me aside as this thing goes on. I don't represent the true Marxist position, he [Mondlane] said. […] He said […] that he realized that they would probably do that to him.
>
> NESBITT: 'They' would be? Meaning the rest of FRELIMO?
>
> SUTHERLAND: Well, the Marxists, the Marxist element there. And that they thought he was useful at the stage that the revolution was, but they would not consider him the most reliable person to be head of the state.
>
> Minter [Ed.], 2004

This was correctly assessed by Mondlane. As early as 1963, Marcelino dos Santos confided to Latyp Maksudov, a Soviet diplomat:

> We decided […] to let Mondlane be at the head of the movement […] Later [if needed] it would be possible to replace Mondlane.
>
> SHUBIN, 2008, p. 122, bracketed 'if needed' Shubin's; pointed out by Marcum, 2018, p. 146

Another time Mondlane stated he was 'against a strict ideological line for its own sake' and that '[t]he question is not one of socialism or capitalism' (Cornwall, 1972, pp. 100–101). Such statements indicate Mondlane and Machel and other Marxists within Frelimo did not have the same political agenda. Contrary to Mondlane, Machel identified with Marxism, saying it was something that had grown naturally in himself from childhood onwards (Christie, 1989[1988], p. 123).

We can now sum up differences between Mondlane and Machel as in Table 3.

The above makes *very* problematic the often repeated analysis that Mondlane represented a 'radical' or 'revolutionary' approach together with Machel and Dos Santos, in contrast to a 'reformist', 'narrow nationalist', 'racialist', or 'tribalist' agenda of a group containing Simango, Nkavandame, and Gwenjere (Isaacman & Isaacman, 1983, pp. 83, 97; Christie, 1989[1988], p. 54). It has been shown extensively above that Mondlane had a racialist view of the struggle, with a few sympathetic 'white Mozambicans' being only exceptions confirming the rule. Mondlane (1968b) equated 'classes' with 'racial groups', maintaining Africans were victimized through certain historical political events (not class struggles in the Marxist sense). He stated that Frelimo accepted any adult Mozambican, formulating no political criteria. The 'narrow nationalist' agenda was pretty much Mondlane's own, but after his death this was not acknowledged by Frelimo itself or some Euro-American authors such as those just referred to.

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TABLE 3 Differences between Mondlane and Machel on certain key issues

Issue	Mondlane	Machel
Academic education	serves the struggle by itself	is second to practical activity in the struggle
Frelimo membership	open to all adult Mozambicans	restricted to those with revolutionary ideas
Struggle necessitated by	racial antagonism	class antagonism
Enemy	Portuguese settlers, except some	class opponents and reactionaries
Protracted struggle	useful but not essential for social transformation	essential for social transformation
Marxism	brought in by some elements; not yet officially declared	developed from childhood experience

Furthermore, initially Mondlane certainly had no foresight, nor desire, for any 'protracted struggle'. He was not against military action, but he considered that Mozambique would be independent soon enough through negotiation, and that after this quick independence he could populate the Mozambican government offices with graduates of his educational programme. Only after the 'October 1966' meeting of the Central Committee, when Machel entered that body, did Mondlane's students become subject to accusations of not acting according to requirements of the armed struggle. Mondlane was unable to resolve the resulting contradiction between the views on studying as serving the struggle in its own right or being secondary to military activity, and did not take the lead in these matters (in fact, a similar point concerning Mondlane's inertia was already made in 1963 by Gwambe, Mmole, & S. Sigauke, 1972[1963], pp. 470, 473, but his inaction now had more severe consequences).

11 Conclusions Concerning Frelimo's Internal Crisis

'The crisis within Frelimo' may be viewed as a complex of verbal and physical confrontations that only gradually gained some degree of coherence. Simango for instance changed tack rather late, in May 1968. But even more intriguing is the position of Eduardo Mondlane. With hindsight, he has been mentioned in a trinity with Samora Machel and Marcelino dos Santos (Isaacman & Isaacman,

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1983, p. 97). Moreover, a book like Ncomo's (2009[2003]) does not problematize the *differences* between Mondlane and the other two.

In May 1968, Mondlane's position as president still derived from elections before the start of the armed struggle and was buttressed by money flows specifically through the Mozambique Institute (Ncomo, 2009[2003], pp. 170–174; cf. below). As long as he remained president before actual independence, the group around Machel could use him to pursue certain policy objectives, as I have argued is visible with the document reprimanding UNEMO. This explains why Mondlane on the one hand and the group around Machel on the other were reluctant to have a congress: it could bring with it the possibility of defeat (cf. Z. Maurício and A. Mutusso [pseudonym] in Ncomo, ibid., pp. 189–191). Nonetheless their cooperation was more a result of coinciding positional strategies than of shared ideological convictions.

The events known as 'the crisis within Frelimo' can be interpreted as a struggle for Frelimo by the so-called 'revolutionary' group (Machel and Dos Santos, with some others associated with them such as Guebuza). It is quite probable that without Mondlane's winning the presidential vote at the Second Congress they would not have been able to secure a victory. The Second Congress was no doubt foundational for the later historical development of Frelimo and with that of Mozambique. The 'revolutionaries' would win the struggle for Frelimo, but their revolution was a palace revolution rather than the inevitable result of a default ideological development within Frelimo and/or Mozambican communities generally. The effects became clear in 1970: Frelimo did reformulate its definition of the enemy, but it also reformulated its definition of who was a friend, and there was no longer even the pretence that Frelimo was an organization open to all Mozambicans, also still denying the legitimacy of other Mozambican organizations. The increasing power of Machel and his associates within Frelimo changed the organization's view on what sort of nation Mozambique was to become after independence. The identification of the nation with Frelimo had become so extreme that quick independence had become a disadvantage. When independence eventually came, the circumstance that not every Mozambican shared Frelimo's vision of the nation would crop up again, as we will see below. The theoretical issue to highlight at this point is that disputes about the character of a nation may not depend on the magnitude of the number of cultural items that happen to be shared. In Mozambique's case, it depends on deliberate attempts of an organization to impose itself as the 'incarnation' of the Mozambican 'masses' onto the population, while simultaneously refusing to accommodate opinions which may deviate from 'the correct political line' and which it knows exist. Such a contradictory

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attitude is bound to lead to problems one way or the other if that organization overwhelms others in the exercise of political power. In Mozambique, the issue of nationalism was a question of how to achieve nation-wide solidarity when one is supposed not to show solidarity with those whom the most powerful organization declares enemies according to criteria defined by itself alone.

12 COREMO and Other Non-Frelimo Anticolonial Organizations

It has already been indicated that apart from Frelimo other anticolonial organizations existed before the Portuguese coup on 25 April 1974, which would dislodge the New State regime, the fascist government under prime ministers António de Oliveira Salazar (1932–1968), and Marcello Caetano (1968–1974) (MacQueen, 1997, Ch. 5; Newitt, 1995, pp. 445, 470–478, 529, 538). There were quite a few such organizations, and those most frequently mentioned in the literature may best be represented in a table; see Table 4 below.

The establishment of a new organization by older ones did not necessarily indicate dissolution of those older organizations (e.g. FUNIPAMO, 1972[1963], p. 436, art. 6). Often these non-Frelimo organizations were very small. The most important organization mentioned in Table 4 was COREMO, which was able to execute the only military anticolonial operations of any significance apart from Frelimo. Although certainly smaller than the latter's, these operations should not be forgotten as they did form part of the anticolonial struggle and disprove the often encountered idea that Frelimo was the 'sole' liberation movement in Mozambique (e.g. Van den Bergh, 2009, p. 15). COREMO was a united organization based on earlier movements such as the two UDENAMOs of Gumane and Gwambe (cf. Table 4), resurrections of the UDENAMO that had dissolved into Frelimo. As for Gumane's UDENAMO, studying its publications is revealing because they put intra-Frelimo discussions in a different light than emerges from a 'revolutionaries vs. reactionaries' interpretative framework. Also, reviewing UDENAMO and COREMO enables us to elaborate on the question of multipartyism in Mozambique at the time of independence.

At one time UDENAMO did maintain that 'Mozambique is a black-man's [sic] country' and that '[w]e shall not rest until we have a democratic form of government' which meant that '[t]he Africans who are the majority, must rule' (UDENAMO, 1964a, p. 2). One month later, however, UDENAMO took a more universalist stance on 'race', alluding to Lincoln's famous definition of 'democracy', and promoting 'non-racial democracy' (UDENAMO, 1964b, p. 5). However, 'white man/people' kept being used as an analytical category.

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TABLE 4 Some non-Frelimo anticolonial organizations

Name/abbreviation	Formed	Leader(s)	Comments
UNAMI[a]	1960	Chagong'a	Did not formally merge with Frelimo, reported existing in 1967
Mozambique African National Congress (MANC)[b]	1962	Balamanja, S. Sigauke	
UDENAMO-Monomotapa[c]	1962-1963	Gwambe	
UDENAMO-Moçambique[d]	May 1963	Mabunda, Gumane	
Frente Unida Anti-imperialista Popular Africana de Moçambique (FUNIPAMO)[e]	21 May 1963	Gwambe, Mmole	Front of Gwambe's UDENAMO-Monomotapa, Mmole's MANU, and MANC
Mozambique Revolutionary Council (MORECO)[f]	25 September 1964	Sumane, Chiteje	Result of expulsion of members of Central Committee of Frelimo
Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO)[g]	Over a period from 1964 finalized June 1965	Gwambe, later Gumane	Merger of MORECO, UDENAMO-Moçambique, MANU and UDENAMO-Monomotapa
Partido Popular de Moçambique (PAPOMO)[h]	1966	Gwambe	After Gwambe's expulsion from COREMO
União Nacional Africana da Rumbézia (UNAR)[i]	January 1968	Sumane	Separatist breakaway group from COREMO
Mozambique Liberation Movement (MOLIMO)[j]	Mid-1970	Nyankale	

Note: When an organization ceased to exist is often difficult to determine, but in any case, all of these can be considered to have gone extinct during the transitional period of 1974-1975, certainly at the time of the Nachingwea proceedings early 1975, described below in the main text.
Sources: a) cf. this book above, Marcum (1967: 20), Ncomo (2009[2003]: 89-90n125), Sampaio (2012: 26); b) Cabrita (2000: 17), Chilcote (1972: 192), Sampaio (2012: 31); c) Cabrita (2000: 17); d) Gibson (1972: 287), Cabrita (2000: 17); e) Cabrita (2000: 17), Opello (1975: 78), Mmole, Gwambe and S. Sigauke (1972[1963]); f) Chilcote (1972: 192), Opello (1975: 78), Cabrita (2000: 28); g) Whitaker (1970: 28), Chilcote (1972: 192), Marcum (1967: 20), Opello (1975: 78), Cabrita (2000: 28); h) Marcum (1967: 20), Opello (1975: 79), Cabrita (2000: 40); i) Chilcote (1972: 192-193), Cabrita (2000: 40); UNAR (1968a: 2); j) Henriksen (1978: 182)

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The 'nucleus of democracy' was to be understood as 'socialism'. There was to be a planned economy and industry was to be undertaken by the state. Political 'democracy' and economic 'socialism' together would 'fight exploitation of man by man and domination of class by class or nation by nation' (1964b, p. 5). With respect to political organization, Gumane's UDENAMO stuck to a conception of 'unity' as 'being subsumed under one organization': it called on Mozambicans to unite, but only under UDENAMO (Gumane, 1964, p. 11). Unsuccessful attempts were made to unite Frelimo, UDENAMO, and other groups in 1964 and 1965. However, the attempts did result in the eventual establishment of COREMO, uniting several non-Frelimo organizations (Cabrita, 2000, pp. 37–38; cf. UDENAMO, 1965a).

At the end of 1964, UDENAMO propagated the following vision on political parties:

> [T]o achieve [African unity], it is necessary that the question of having unnecessary oppositions have [sic] to be ruled out […], especially in countries which have achieved their independence. // [O]ppositions [are] products of colonialist and imperialist subversion, aimed to cause confusion among African people […]. // [In] African history […] there was no opposition […] because, our Kings were ruling according to the will of the people, and that, meant Democracy. // […] The new democracy […] was brought by colonialists and imperialists which [needs] oppositions […] // If ONE PARTY SYSTEM, is for the benefit of […] the African people, it is welcome.
>
> UDENAMO, 1964c, pp. 10–11

Using ethnographic arguments, 'democracy' was seen as indigenously African, referring to the 'will of the people'. There are at least three problems with UDENAMO's ethnographic assessment. First, in precolonial Africa, opposition could exist between aspirant monarchs, or between monarchs and councils and/or religious leaders. Second, Portugal had not brought multiparty systems to her colonies (UDENAMO, 1964a, p. 5, itself complained about this). For Zimbabwe, UDENAMO advocated a system of 'majority rule through one man one vote' (1965c, p. 9)[52] This would not necessarily imply a

52 With 'vote' written by hand above a struck 'gun' of the UDENAMO slogan 'one man one gun'. Cf. UDENAMO (1965b).

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multiparty system, but for the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean situation it is difficult to interpret otherwise. Third, UDENAMO did not foresee the possibility that the existence of more than one party in Mozambique could be the result of *Mozambique-internal* political developments, and would have to be dealt with. The UDENAMO writings do provide some context for political discussions *within* Frelimo. Although the post-1962 UDENAMO and its adherents would be later labelled as 'reactionary', it is illustrative that UDENAMO aired principles that would be considered as specific for the 'revolutionary' line of Machel and his associates, such as references to 'class' and 'exploitation of man by man'.

UDENAMO's successor COREMO would show military action, predominantly in the Tete region, with backing of Zambia and China (PRC). Its operational effectiveness peaked in January 1971 in an action near the construction site of the Cahora Bassa dam (Gibson, 1972, pp. 287–290; Cabrita, 2000, pp. 38–40). COREMO and Frelimo clashed with each other (Cabrita, 2000, p. 40). Simango would eventually join COREMO in August 1971 (Ncomo, 2009[2003], p. 245).

COREMO aimed for 'democratic government for the African peoples of Moçambique' (1972[n.d.], p. 440, art. 4.1); on the other hand '[a]ll people of Moçambique may become members of COREMO' provided they honour the policies of COREMO (ibid., art. 6). It is not clear whether or not the 'white colonists' could be considered to belong to 'all people of Mozambique'. In its Programme, COREMO (1972[1965]b, p. 485, art. XV) stated as an objective:

> To liquidate the imperialist officials and the colonialist culture, by expulsion or by their reduction to a normal level, which will not discredit or destroy the customs and the culture of Moçambique.

This would suggest that some Portuguese settlers would be allowed to stay in an independent Mozambique, though only a reduced number of them. COREMO did not seem to demand to be the only Mozambican organization, referring to a possible 'unified alliance' (1972[n.d.], p. 440, art. 5.2) and to 'associate members' from other organizations (ibid., p. 441, art. 7). Elsewhere, however, COREMO stated that it is 'the only and sole body to guide the armed struggle' and 'not a united front, but an absolute organization' (1972[1965]a, p. 482). How COREMO envisaged the party-political set-up of an independent Mozambique, however, does not become clear from the three documents cited. It was a problem that Frelimo would resolve without COREMO adherents being able to assert influence.

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13 Portuguese and Western International Reactions to the Anticolonial Insurrection

It is illustrative to look at the diverse ways in which the United States and western European countries ('the West', for short) reacted to the colonial situation and Frelimo to see how the nation-state as practised in the West was *not* seen as a universal ideal in the West. As for Portugal, the regime of Salazar had anticipated insurgencies at least since 1960 (Cann, 1997, pp. 39–40), and tried to promote African support for Portugal by implementing social programmes (education, health), executing psychological operations, and resettling the population in *aldeamentos* ('protected villages'), the latter predominantly to deny guerrilla forces access to the population (Borges Coelho, 1989, pp. 30–35, 39–40; Cann, 1997, pp. 143, 145–159; cf. Thompson, 2013; Portugal, 1967). Despite this psychosocial action, the Portuguese regime also relied on military force to counter anticolonial insurgencies. In Southern Africa this was done together with the minority regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia in the secret Alcora military alliance (Afonso, 2013; Neves de Souto, 2007, pp. 302–321), so that these regimes would remain, as formulated by Salazar, an 'anchor of the Western civilization'. Euro-American countries did little to challenge that attitude or even positively cooperated, for example, within the framework of NATO or the construction of dams for hydroelectric power (Meneses, 2013).

US policy was ambiguous. In early 1963, Frelimo-leader Mondlane had good relationships with Robert Kennedy, who believed anticolonialist movements should be helped but covertly so that the relationship with Portugal would not be disrupted. In this way the United States could develop relations with future African leaders. The CIA provided a subsidy of USD 60,000 through the African-American Institute (AAI) to Mondlane. The Ford Foundation provided USD 99,700 also through the AAI for the Mozambique Institute (Schneidman, 2004, pp. 43–46; cf. Rita 2013). However, under President Johnson US support for Frelimo would end, although there would be support from Western European countries like Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands (Schneidman, 2004, p. 83; for the US, see Minter, 1972). Within the NATO framework, however, Portugal could count on significant support from several Western governments (Meneses, 2013, p. 51).

From the above, it can be stated that there was some but not much support in the West for the idea that the Mozambican nation definitely should have its own state–a confirmation that general nationalism as defined in the introductory chapter was not a widely held attitude. Portugal could continue to militarily counter anticolonial insurgencies. Several massacres against the population

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were also carried out, such as the one at Wiriyamu on 16 December 1972, which finally severely damaged Portugal's moral standing within the West (Henriksen, 1983, p. 130; Neves de Souto, 2007, pp. 271–273; cf. Cann, 1997, p. 120).

14 Euro-American Reactions to the 1966–1970 Crisis within Frelimo

Whereas western governments had no robust stance about how, or even whether, Mozambican nationalism should come about, western sympathizers with Frelimo had no robust stance on the question of how Mozambican nationalism could encompass all Mozambicans, as is clear from reactions to the troubles within Frelimo, which could not stay hidden from the outside world. The Swedish government, which had funded the Mozambique Institute during the period 1965–1968, suspended this funding after and because of the school incidents (Sellström, 1999, pp. 455–456). A 1971 memo by SIDA (the Swedish governmental international aid institution) official Anders Forsse describes Frelimo as 'evolving from Danton to Robespierre'. Nevertheless, the Swedish government decided to resume aid to Frelimo that year (Sellström, 2002, pp. 75, 83–84, 86).

Euro-American authors have in most cases downplayed Frelimo's internal crisis and/or treated the eventually losing individuals as aberrant persons. One example is that of the Angola Comité in the Netherlands (Van Beurden & Huinder, 1996). The Comité had earlier communicated that the Mozambique Institute was the Frelimo school 'that is to educate the administrative cadre of the independent Mozambique' (Angola Comité, 1965b). This evaluation changed drastically after the events of March 1968. Now the Comité stated that

> …a much more important cause [of the March disturbances; than 'tribal antagonisms'] is the phenomenon that people who have learnt something apparently have the tendency to become freeloaders instead of the *avant garde* of the struggle for renewal.
>
> Angola Comité, 1968, p. 5

The Angola Comité (1968) gives no explanation for the change in its evaluation after 1965 and no proof that the students had become 'freeloaders'. The Angola Comité did not hide internal difficulties within Frelimo, but it capitulated when it implied that the liberation movement could not unite 'the wishes of all currents' (Angola Comité, 1969). Euro-American journalistic and academic literature has rarely been investigative concerning the crisis within Frelimo. For

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criticism of academic work, see Igreja (2010, pp. 782, 790, 795) and White (1985, p. 321 on 'apologist literature').

15 Conclusion

In this chapter, a summary of Frelimo's early history was presented. It was shown that disputes about 'who is a Mozambican' and 'who is the enemy' played a role in Frelimo's notorious internal crisis. It was denied that Frelimo's Second Congress in 1968 was a great victory in ideological terms for the group later known as the 'revolutionaries'. 'It would be hypocrisy to say that the serious crisis of 1968 is resolved in our movement', Simango wrote in (1969), and he was certainly right in this regard as far as the lack of resolution is considered. The Congress was nonetheless foundational in the sense that Mondlane rather than Simango was elected president in a vote that can be called 'contingent' at best. This presidential vote was analysed, using information obtained by PIDE/DGS on numbers of provincial delegates, suggesting these numbers were disproportionally high for Niassa, which quite possibly was advantageous for Mondlane against Simango in an artificial way. The conclusion that 'Mondlane won the vote', even when it is unknown with what margin, made it possible for the 'revolutionary' group and later analysts to gloss over the fact that Frelimo was at that moment a deeply divided organization and continued to be so after the Congress. The Congress enabled a greater militarization of Frelimo's activities, which strengthened Machel's position. Mondlane was associated with the 'revolutionary' group, but ideology cannot explain this association. Some disaffected former Frelimo members eventually came to form COREMO, which managed to carry out military operations against the Portuguese, although on a modest scale. During the time period covered in this chapter, neither Frelimo nor COREMO envisioned a multiparty system for an independent Mozambique, and Frelimo's Western sympathizers also do not seem to have pressed this point.

In terms of logic, the attitude of Frelimo after October 1966 shows a most intriguing belief in the possibility of representing all Mozambicans *and* simultaneously *not* representing all Mozambicans. It is natural that this flat contradiction should have given rise to repression, reaction, or both. In any case, Frelimo had a prolific capacity to produce enemies and manifested ideas and practices about 'the enemy', central to its conception of the nation, aptly characterized as *manichaeistic* by Meneses (2015). In fact, repression started even before independence with the 'disappearance' without trial of many of Frelimo's real or supposed political opponents, as we will study in the next chapter.

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Renamo itself also directly showed continuity with the internal conflicts within Frelimo in some of its personnel, as pointed out by Meneses (2015, p. 37n58). Certainly, Rhodesian and South African aggression was a factor on its own in the post-independence war. Still, the antagonisms within Mozambique itself revolving around Frelimo before and, with Renamo, after independence were largely expressions of one and the same problematic phenomenon. The multiparty system has so far not been able to resolve this.

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CHAPTER 4

After Independence: Frelimo's Struggle for a One-Party Nation

In this chapter, I will investigate the effects of the end of the New State in Portugal in 1974 on Mozambique's political situation, and how decolonization put Frelimo in a position in which it could dominate the state for four decades. The chapter's main theme is Frelimo's evolution from anticolonial movement to a political party in a one-party system and then, after and due to the war with Renamo, to a party in a multiparty system. Frelimo has, however, shown difficulty and/or unwillingness to accommodate other political parties and non-party organizations (including hereditary leaders) within Mozambican political life up to this day (writing mid-2017). The chapter views *political parties* in a way different from the view that political parties seek authorization from the public (Lawson, 1976, p. 3), namely as organizations that may also try to subsume the public under their political authority. I will argue that the peace process, which put an end to the Mozambican civil war of 1976–1992, did not change Frelimo's characteristic self-definition of being the default leading political entity in Mozambique and consequently has failed to provide most non-Frelimo Mozambicans with any adequate means to challenge that party's influence on their lives.

It will be seen that such hegemony is independent from Marxist-Leninist ideology, which Frelimo formally endorsed in the 1977–1989 period. Ncomo (2009[2003]) has asserted that ethnic solidarity (mostly among Frelimo leaders from the south of Mozambique) is essential for understanding Frelimo's present hegemony. This I also do not see as decisive in explaining Frelimo's continued hegemony. Rather, I will argue that Frelimo's handling of the legal and multiparty systems is much more significant.

1 The End of the New State and Related Events

Marcello Caetano was Salazar's successor as leader of Portugal after the latter suffered a stroke in September 1968. Little changed relative to the Salazar era (MacQueen, 1997, pp. 64–72; Neves de Souto, 2007, pp. 46–49). Nevertheless, '[w]ith hindsight it is clear that already by 1971 the colonies were living on

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borrowed time (Newitt, 1981, p. 242), and some events can be identified that would have seemed impossible under Salazar. In September 1973, Jorge Jardim conceptualized his 'Lusaka Plan' in consultation with Zambia's President Kaunda, a scheme that comprised a multiparty system that would include Frelimo, though also with the intention of safeguarding existing capitalist interests. Serious negotiations about the plan never came about. Some very modest political organization by Africans became possible. People such as Máximo Dias and Joana Simeão (~ Semião, Simião) were active before the 1974 coup through the *Grupo Unido de Moçambique* (GUMO, ~ GUM – United Group of Mozambique) founded in early 1974 after preparatory activities in 1973.[1] As Cabrita (2006) points out, Simeão's 1974 ideas were not dissimilar to those of Mondlane in 1965 (cf. Cabrita, 2000, p. 43; see also Howe, 1969, p. 161).

PIDE/DGS (1973–1974, p. 'tif' 91) maintained that Simeão's 'grand ambition' was 'a free and independent Mozambique'. The establishment of GUMO fits within this pattern, and the party should not be seen as an extension of the Caetano government. PIDE/DGS (1973–1974) files show that this organization saw GUMO as an independently constituted institution. Meanwhile, the military situation had grown worse for the Portuguese colonial order. By January 1974, Frelimo was able to threaten the colonial population in Central Mozambique, killing the wife of a commercial agriculturalist. This raised doubt about the colonial army's ability to protect the colonial population, and fear of uncontrollable acts of mutiny originating in that population increased (Neves de Souto, 2007, pp. 276–279).

After the coup in Portugal on 25 April 1974, it was clear that Mozambique would change political direction, but it was not immediately clear what that new direction would be (MacQueen, 1997, Ch. 5). Machel even regretted that the 1974 Portuguese coup came before 'the entire country [was] transformed' (Kaufman, 1977), implying that for him the specific political shaping of Mozambique through his war efforts was more important than the country's quick independence from colonial rule. For Mozambique two main questions had to be resolved. One was whether or not a referendum would be held, in which people would be able to express themselves on total political independence or a continuation of bonds with Portugal within some sort of federal construction. The latter was the default option of General Spínola, Portugal's president after the coup. The group of army officers known as the MFA (*Movimento de Forças Armadas* – Movement of Armed Forces), the main protagonists

1 Cabrita (2000, p. 72); Hanlon (1984, p. 44); Jardim (1976); Leonard (1974, p. 41); Neves de Souto (2007, p. 124); PIDE/DGS (1973–1974); cf. Opello (1975, p. 82n 45).

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of the coup, favoured independence for Mozambique without any such intermediate process.

The second question was whether Frelimo would be the only party in Mozambique's political process or other political organizations would be involved as well. The two questions are not logically coupled but at the time they were related in practice. COREMO and Frelimo were both against any federal solution, but while COREMO wished to be included in negotiation talks with Portugal, Frelimo claimed such negotiation activities for itself alone. Frelimo did not want a referendum as this would imply public political discussion. Portugal's Mário Soares confirmed this, saying 'it is only Frelimo which is fighting [...] and we will talk only to them' (MacQueen, 1997, p. 133). Portugal's Constitutional Law 7/74 of 27 July 1974 removed all talk about a possible referendum (MacQueen, 1997, pp. 135, 136; for text see Parlamento 1974b) because it recognized by default the 'right to self-determination', including as a consequence independence, of the hitherto overseas territories. Law 7/74 stated that it sought to clarify the scope of Article 8 of section B of the Programme of the MFA, which was included in the earlier Law 3/74 of 14 May 1974 (Parlamento 1974a). Now, this is problematic because that Article 8 had stated that the overseas policy of the Provisional Government (of Portugal) would be guided, among other things, by the principle of 'creating the conditions for a free and open debate' at national level of the 'overseas problem'. MacQueen (1997, pp. 79–80) reconstructs this as a compromise 'dilution of the commitment to decolonization' of an earlier version of the MFA Programme to satisfy Spínola and other more conservative members of Portugal's post-revolutionary government. In any case, the text of the later Law 7/74 seeks to give the impression that the Law 'clarifies' the said earlier Article 8 but its effect was that it *cancelled* the debate clause of that article.

For Frelimo, the cancellation of a referendum meant it did not have to compete in an election process (MacQueen, 1997, p. 136). Although Frelimo would only formally declare itself a 'party' with a Marxist-Leninist character at its Third Congress in 1977 (Meneses, 2007, p. 24), for all intents and purposes it can be considered to have been a political party that represented sectional interests in 1974, since Machel had announced in 1970 that only 'revolutionaries' could join the organization. Couto (1974) describes Frelimo's principled rejection of a 'multiparty system after a west European standard' thus: Frelimo would have to make compromises with political competitors, which could 'betray a great part of the population concerning the fruits of its liberation struggle–under the protection of the appearance of a democratic choice' (1974, p. 74). In Couto's formulation, the political functioning of a multiparty system (leading to 'betrayal') is conflated with its supposed geographical origin (Europe) (cf. Hansen & Stepputat, 2001, p. 10). We will now see that this was not

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the outlook of all Mozambicans, but those promoting a multiparty political system experienced difficulty in advancing their point of view in public (see New York Southern Africa Committee, 1974, p. 20).

'Conservative white settlers' formed Fico ('I stay'), while on the other hand pro-Frelimo 'radical white liberals' organized themselves in the Mozambican Democrats.[2] Simango, Simeão, and others established the Partido de Coligação Nacional (PCN–National Coalition Party) on 23 August 1974 (Cabrita, 2006). PCN stated that '[n]o organization should claim the right to be the sole and legitimate representative of the Mozambican people without being put to the test of democratic process' (Cabrita, 2000, pp. 73–74). However, Frelimo reached an agreement with the post-coup MFA-dominated Portuguese government on 7 September 1974 in Lusaka (Lusaka Agreement–text in Frelimo 1974). This agreement delivered power over Mozambique into Frelimo hands without any need for a referendum or elections (MacQueen, 1997, pp. 146–147). Protests ensued, but had no effect except for the death of more than 100 people by October (Cabrita, 2000, p. 80; Hanlon, 1984, p. 45).

On 20 September 1974, a Frelimo-dominated Transitional Government took office, and on 25 June 1975 Mozambique's independence was declared (Muiuane [Ed.], 2006, pp. 233, 460). In this event, Frelimo and Machel thus obtained governmental and presidential power without any sort of plebiscite or even a party congress. That Frelimo wanted a one-party system is not surprising given its earlier history. However, Frelimo still violated Mondlane's promise 'that the personnel of the executive and Central Committee [of Frelimo in an independent Mozambique] are freely elected and may therefore change' (Mondlane, 1969, p. 221).

2 Multipartyism, State-Building, and the 'Third Wave' Hypothesis

Hanlon (2005, p. 274) remarks that Frelimo 'followed the fashion of the late 1970s and adopted a one-party state'; however, what was fashionable in Mozambique in 1974 was the establishment of political parties distinct from Frelimo (Fauvet, 1984, pp. 110–111). To assess the assertion of one-party fashion, we can take a critical look at Huntington's (1991) theory of 'democracy' as being adopted in 'waves', periods with many transitions from 'non-democracy' to 'democracy' and few vice versa (1991, p. 15). Huntington (1991, p. 3) concluded there was a 'third wave of democratization' starting with the 1974 revolution in

2 MacQueen (1997, pp. 137–139); Neves de Souto (2007, pp. 340–342, 359–381); Newitt (1995, p. 539); Veloso (2011[2006], p. 96).

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Portugal, incidentally the event just discussed which was connected to Mozambique's independence. Because 1974 was just the beginning of the alleged 'third wave', one might be led to believe that Frelimo's refusal to introduce a multiparty system at independence was a normal thing to do in the world at that time. I will now argue that this was not the case.

Doorenspleet (2005) has re-examined Huntington's arguments and data with a straightforward but insufficiently analysed method, coding 'non-democracy' with 'N' and 'democracy' with 'D' (with 'democracy' interpreted as 'minimal democracy' satisfying competition and inclusiveness (cf. 2005, p. 177). Now, Doorenspleet maintains the existence of Huntington's 'third wave'. However, this conclusion is not warranted if the effect of decolonization is taken into account. Using Doorenspleet's data, it can be shown that there existed in the world a trend towards multiparty political systems ever since the end of the Second World War. Doorenspleet assigns to a country's 'transition to democracy' ('N' to 'D') a score '+1', while '-1' is assigned to a reverse 'transition' (I take Doorenspleet's 'I'–not self-governing, p. 177–mostly as 'N'). Adding up such country scores in a year in the collection of considered countries, a 'wave of democratization' can then be defined as a period stretching over several years with substantially higher scores than some other periods. Doorenspleet considers former colonies scoring 'D' at independence as *not* contributing to 'democratization' for the year of independence (in contrast with Diamond, 2008, p. 54). Her motivation for this is that '[p]rocesses of state building should be separated from processes of [democratic] transition' (2005, pp. 43, 52n1). This is a remarkable choice, first because introducing a multiparty system might be part of state building and the two might thus be inseparable, second because if they were separate events, this could not be a motivation for refusing to make the corresponding judgement about a 'transition to democracy' when there was, in fact, such a transition (in a decolonization process resulting in 'democracy', as so defined, almost certainly inclusiveness must have increased).

After scoring 162 countries as given by Doorenspleet, adding 10 countries with a population of around 250,000 or more, omitting 17 which no longer exist, and applying a few minor modifications, but especially incorporating 'transitions to democracy' at independence fully as 'transitions' (cf. Van Dokkum, 2015, pp. 297–298),[3] the *cumulative* net amount of 'transitions to democracy' during the period 1940–2000 then shows a trend of steady 'democratization'

3 Such 'transition to democracy' at independence concerns 22 countries in the period 1917–1973, including (as scored by Doorenspleet) Finland (1917), Lesotho (1966), and Mauritius (1968). Some of Doorenspleet's scorings in her Appendix 2 are curious, like assessing India for 1950 but not for 1947, but these do not affect the overall conclusions.

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after the end of the Second World War. One conclusion is that there was no 'third wave of democratization' as Huntington conceived it. Instead, there was a slow but steady process of 'democratization' in the period from about 1950 until 1989 (followed by a distinct process associated with the collapse of the Soviet empire). Doorenspleet (2005) does not check for this effect of becoming independent on 'transition to democracy', but it is evident that this effect is significant. A second conclusion then is that Frelimo was going *against* this trend of introducing inclusive multiparty systems and thus did not follow some 'one-party fashion'. How Frelimo dealt with opposition in practice will now be described.

3 Suspension of *Habeas Corpus* and the Nachingwea Proceedings

It did not take long before the Transitional Government formulated legislation to have a free hand in the execution of its interpretation of 'decolonization'. Under Salazar and Caetano, Portugal had known, at least on paper, *habeas corpus* provisions.[4] This legislation was suspended by the Transitional Government on 2 November 1974, when Portuguese High-Commissioner Victor Crespo signed (Mozambican, still colonial) Decree-law 12/74 that stipulated that *habeas corpus* would not be applicable to those detained on the suspicion of practicing so-called 'crimes against decolonization' (Portugal, 1974b; Muiuane [Ed.], 2006, p. 557; cf. Trindade, 2003, pp. 102–103). Curiously, a representative of the Portuguese state in Mozambique signed legislation that suspended Portuguese national law giving.[5] In any case, with the backing of Decree-law 12/74, and of Decree-law 11/74 (on the custody of 'suspects' of 'crimes against decolonization'–Portugal, 1974a), Frelimo could hold prisoner anyone whom it deemed against its objectives in decolonization as specified in the Lusaka Agreement (Decree-law 11/74; i.e. including that Frelimo is the sole Mozambican actor in the decolonization process).

In the first half of 1975, more than two hundred prisoners, many of them associated with COREMO or other non-Frelimo organizations, were shown to thousands of spectators in Nachingwea, the former Frelimo training location in Tanzania. Available information indicates there were several such events in

4 Article 8, § 4 of Constitution of 1933; Portugal (1933, 1971, 1973, pp. 11–75); cf. Gonçalves (1978, p. 419). See also Decree-law 35 043 (Portugal 1945). Criminal Procedure Code (*Código de Processo Penal*)–Decree-law 185/72 (Portugal, 1972), Article 315 of Code.

5 Cf. Law 5/72, the 1972 version of the *Organic Charter* (Portugal, 1973, pp. 365–402); see *Bases* III-*b*, XXIII. Compare Gracias ([Ed.], 1894, p. 38, art. 15–12).

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the period March-May.[6] Simango and others had to read out before the spectators a 'confession' concocted or extracted under duress by Sérgio Vieira and his staff.[7] Simeão was also among the prisoners (Cabrita, 2000, p. 82). Machel assured the prisoners that they would not be killed (*Africa Research Bulletin*, 1975). However, it is generally accepted that many of them, specifically well-known persons like Simango and Simeão, were in fact killed later, although exactly when remains unclear (Africa Watch, 1992, p. 158; Cabrita, 2000, pp. 100–101). There were also prisoners at the Nachingwea proceedings, who had no political prominence whatsoever. One of them was José Eugénio Zitha, whose fate is now not publicly known. His case was brought before the African Commission on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR) in 2008–2011 (for details, see ACHPR 2011; cf. *Canal de Moçambique*, 2012a; 2012b).

The reaction at the time of two solidarity organizations on the Nachingwea proceedings is revealing. The Angola Comité (1975, p. 6) quotes Jorge Rebelo as saying that 'we should not think that our enemies have a white skin' (implying: the 'blacks' shown here in Nachingwea today can be enemies) and concludes:

> After having listened to these testimonies it was absolutely clear that these prisoners were directly responsible for a large number of deaths [...] But Samora Machel said: 'We shall never contemplate to kill any one of them' [...] It was as if he wanted to say 'Today we have used you, but you have used the suffering of the people of Mozambique for years for your own egoistic plans. But nevertheless we still put trust in you [...]'.
>
> ibid., p. 7

In this way the Angola Comité (1975) depicted people as 'egoistic' who had devoted a large part of their lives to the freedom of Mozambique (Ncomo, 2009, p. 25).

The New York Southern Africa Committee (1975) judged:

> As can be expected in the process of every political metamorphosis Mozambique has its traitors, defectors and murderers, people who have

6 Cabrita (2000, p. 82); Ncomo (2009[2003], pp. 312–313); New York Southern Africa Committee (1975).

7 Cabrita (2000, pp. 82–83); for Simango see Ncomo (2009[2003], pp. 318–319, 403ff). It is unclear what Simango actually 'confessed' concerning his supposed 'involvement' in Mondlane's murder. Compare *Africa Research Bulletin* (1975); Ncomo (2009[2003]); New York Southern Africa Committee (1975); and Henriksen (1978, p. 180). Still different: Aquino de Bragança (Neves de Souto, 2007, p. 213–214n40), the Tanzanian police (Henriksen, ibid.) and Sérgio Viera (Ncomo, 2011).

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> lived their entire lives in poverty, and betray their own people for something small and ephemeral.

Concerning Gumane, it was alleged that '[t]he CIA was deeply involved' (ibid.). This was an ironic thing to hold against him, since Mondlane, when Frelimo president, had received money from the CIA (cf. Ch. 3). Apart from this, the quotes show no awareness that the 'confessions' at the Nachingwea proceedings were obtained in a situation of captivity without anything looking like 'due process'. Certainly, solidarity movements in the Netherlands, or individuals within them, could be critical about their Southern African counterparts (e.g. Paulussen, 1983, pp. 60–62), but criticism was ineffectual and loyalty of a party-political character remained dominant (cf. Van Beurden & Huinder, 1996, pp. 152–153, 156, 192; De Wit, 2008, pp. 56–57.) These reactions, viewed in combination with the reaction of the new Portuguese power holders and with the reactions of the West to the situation before the Portuguese revolution of 1974, show that one cannot speak of a simple copy-paste of some prototypical Western European multiparty state onto the Mozambican situation. Before 1974, Western governments tended to condone colonialism, and, after 1974, Frelimo's Western associates tended to condone Frelimo's one-party state. Concerning the latter aspect, Chabal comments that 'the West never construed the FRELIMO regime as ideological foe, an ally of the Cold War enemy' (2002, p. 118).

4 Events Shortly after Independence

As stipulated in the Lusaka Agreement, Mozambique became independent on 25 June 1975, Frelimo's thirteenth formal anniversary. On the day of Mozambique's independence, Machel, now Mozambican president, said in a 'message to the nation': 'In Mozambican history, the fight for a revolutionary political line has been intrinsically bound up with the fight for unity' (Machel, 1975, p. 19). The 'political line' referred to is that of Frelimo which evolved during the anticolonial struggle not only as against an external enemy but also as against 'national opportunist and reactionary forces' (ibid.). Machel continued in the referenced speech:

> Through practice and its action, FRELIMO has asserted itself as the leading force in our society. For this very reason, the broad masses, from the Rovuma to the Maputo, have quite spontaneously fully identified with FRELIMO's principles and fight.
>
> 1975, p. 21

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One might say with Anderson that Machel 'imagined' his national community, but in terms of the historical significance of his movement as anchor point for Mozambicans' identification, and not the Portuguese language or means of communication.

Around the time of independence, many left Mozambique by their own initiative, but those who chose to stay were not necessarily viewed as 'part of Mozambique'. The deadly violence alluded to above stimulated further emigration (Hanlon, 1984, p. 45). On 18 August 1975, Guebuza formulated a policy that enabled Frelimo to define anyone as 'foreigner'. Known as '20/24' (~ 24/20), the measure entailed that unwanted people would have 24 hours to leave Mozambique with 20 kg luggage. This was not done in one shot but applied in any case as was deemed necessary (Guebuza, 2004, pp. 74–75). Though not the only ones, 'Portuguese' were specifically targeted (Cahen, 2009, p. 48n145). Ana CFD explained there were no written indications. 'They got to people's home with weapons' with the demand the family should leave. Later, in 1990, one member of the Popular Assembly defended the principle that the year 1498 (the arrival of Vasco da Gama) was to be considered the reference point for discussions on nationality, an idea never proposed, as far as I know, by any of the alleged 'racist reactionaries'. Van den Hoogen (1990) states that member was Guebuza; Cistac (2009, p. 34n70) describes the incident but provides no name.

This is not to say *all* people of Portuguese descent were required to leave. Ana CFD's own family does not seem to have experienced political problems. Her husband José JD saw his private company terminated at independence, but he was also invited to sit on the Municipal Assembly of Nampula. He reported he was himself involved in the establishment of communal villages. Such development of communal villages was under the guidance of two people participating in *Grupos Dinamizadores* (Dynamizing Groups) established after independence. In one specific case, people were forced (and did not want) to cultivate a large area of sunflowers (JJD). *Grupos Dinamizadores* were somewhat loosely structured teams that had multiple functions: mobilize the population to support the policies of the new government, act as a tribunal, perform governmental functions, and manage industries (Meneses, 2007, 2011; Isaacman & Isaacman, 1983, pp. 116–120, 124–125).

A characteristic phenomenon of Mozambican politics in the first years after independence was its dual character concerning the interaction between citizens and the Frelimo state. On the one hand, people cooperated in large projects such as vaccination and education campaigns (Trindade, 2003, p. 110). On the other hand, there was the system of 're-education' camps. People imprisoned here included Jehovah's Witnesses, political dissidents, and people indicated as involved in 'prostitution and banditry' (ICJ 1981). Most of them were detained without being charged or brought to trial. Some camps had a mild

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regime, but in others hard labour, abuse, illness, and death through bad conditions and execution were common (Africa Watch, 1992, pp. 19–20; cf. Cabrita, 2000, pp. 95–99; Hall & Young, 1997, pp. 47–48).

5 Frelimo and Hereditary Leaders in Rural Areas

The official Frelimo policy was to remove the hereditary leaders (*régulos* [chiefs], *chefes de grupo* [headmen] etc.) from office. This policy seems to have been carried out to a large extent, though not entirely, in the first years after independence. After a few years cooperation between Frelimo and (former) *régulos* resumed again in certain places even if not officially endorsed, according to Dinerman (2006). According to Geffray, discontent about the removal of the *régulos* and Frelimo's alleged negative attitude towards people's ritual beliefs and habits were reasons for the success of Renamo at certain places (1990, Ch. 3). I will elaborate on this topic on the basis of my own fieldwork below. It will be seen that, in Barue, *régulos*, where existent at the time of independence, were not so much deposed as restricted in their political and judicial functions. Spirit mediums simply continued, and those I spoke with actually had some connection with Frelimo.

6 The Emergence and Development of Renamo, 1976–1986

After Frelimo had rendered political opponents harmless through the Nachingwea proceedings and by other means, it had to suppress a coup attempt on 17 December 1975 by a group of Frelimo soldiers (Cabrita, 2000, p. 105). Thereafter opposition was limited to such organizations as FUMO of Domingos Arouca and MONAMO of Máximo Dias, which had little concrete activity (Cabrita, 2000, p. 142; Darch ≤ 2013; cf. Fauvet, 1984, p. 113). This situation without opposition did not last long. In June 1976, Amós Sumane (of MORECO and UNAR) founded the oppositional *Partido Revolucionário de Moçambique* (PRM, also called *África Livre* [Free Africa]), which was militarily operative within Mozambique from not later than 1978 until 1982, when it merged with Renamo.[8]

8 Cabrita (2000, pp. 128–130, 202); Fauvet (1984, p. 116); cf. Africa Watch (1992, pp. 19, 21); the recent chapter by Chichava (2018) suggests that PRM was, in fact, already militarily active

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The anti-Frelimo organization that was to provoke the infamous 'war of sixteen years' (1976/1977–1992) was the Mozambique [~ Mozambican] National Resistance (MNR), later more commonly known as *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Renamo [~ RENAMO]).[9] Renamo had two origins as well as two outcomes. Its coming into being resulted from an overlap in interests to oppose Frelimo, between the Rhodesian racist government (facing an armed insurrection against itself which Frelimo would support; Emerson, 2014, pp. 27–29) and Mozambicans who had grievances against Frelimo's political behaviour (Cabrita, 2000). Its outcomes were on the one hand to introduce a grisly climate of violence in a general sense intended to weaken Frelimo and on the other to provide a political home for people dissatisfied with Frelimo, often because of the latter's own violence (Africa Watch, 1992).[10] It was Geffray's (1990) book that drew broad attention to the fact that entire populations sought the cooperation of Renamo because of Frelimo policies, although this point had already been made by White (1985). The exact number of victims of the war is not known, but as the effects included hunger and disease due to the disruption of regular life apart from direct killings, the death toll was substantial and is given by Africa Watch (1992, p. 41) as 600,000, while a number of one million has also been cited (Hanlon in Dinerman, 2006, p. 155). More than four million people were uprooted (Dinerman ibid.).

As with Frelimo, the chronology of events in Renamo's early history is not always clear. The role of André Matsangaíce (~ Matsangaissa) can be seen as that of the person around whom the movement was able to consolidate and gain momentum. Elígio MB, a Renamo security officer during the war, called Matsangaíce the 'pioneer' (*pioneiro*) of the 'war against Frelimo'. Matsangaíce was interned by Frelimo in Sacudzo 're-education' camp in September 1975. He escaped in 1976 and no later than October 1976 he went to Rhodesia (Africa Watch, 1992, p. 20; Cabrita, 2000, p. 144; Ncomo, 2005) and discussed the possibilities for an armed insurrection against Frelimo with the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) (Cabrita, 2000, p. 144).

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against Frelimo in 1976 before Renamo, somewhat mirroring the situation with the several 'first shots' in the anticolonial war; cf. Legrand (1993).

9 As with 'Frelimo', the writing in capitals only is the organization's prescribed way (<www.renamo.org.mz>, accessed 17 June 2014), but the form using lower-case is the commonly accepted way.

10 For an overview of the complexities involved, see Seibert (2003). Nordstrom (1997, p. 47) reminds us that Frelimo and Renamo were not the only entities engaged in violence. Nevertheless the war is best characterized as one between two entities, as is clear from the peace process that ended the war. This was between Frelimo and Renamo only.

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The Rhodesians facilitated the setting up of the radio broadcaster *Voz da África Livre* (Voice of Free Africa–not to be confused with África Livre), initiated by the disaffected Portuguese-Mozambican Orlando Cristina and former Frelimo fighters Jacob Chinhara and Janota Luís. The station broadcast anti-Frelimo propaganda to Mozambique, starting from 5 July 1976 (Cabrita, 2000, pp. 133–134, 139–143). An exact date for Renamo's founding seems difficult to establish; Minter (1994, p. 156) gives '1977', but events in 1976 could just as well be considered relevant, and probably Renamo's establishment (like Frelimo's) is better seen as a process rather than a single action in a day.

Matsangaíce attacked the Sacudzo camp in December 1976 without success. Reportedly he made another unsuccessful attempt in January 1977. On 6 May 1977, he finally attacked the Sacudzo camp successfully (with Manuel Mutambara and Marcos Amade) and freed 50 inmates, many of whom followed him straight to Rhodesia to join Renamo. The radio station was now dedicated to supporting Renamo as a resistance movement (Africa Watch, 1992, pp. 20–21; Cabrita, 2000, pp. 144–149; Ncomo, 2005; cf. Cahen, 2009, p. 55). Seibert (2003, p. 261) mentions an attack on a bus on 3 February 1977.

Matsangaíce's initiative notwithstanding, there would have been no Renamo without the Rhodesian regime. Facing its own armed struggle from ZANU, this regime had an interest in opposing Frelimo. The Rhodesians carried out military operations on Mozambican soil against Zimbabweans, such as in Barue near the Nhazónia (~ Nyadzonia) River on 9 August 1976. The remains of the fallen are enshrined in a monument at the place now called Massacre de Nhazónia (field observation, 3 April 2010).

In August 1976, the CIO set up a training camp at Odzi, near Mutare (Africa Watch, 1992, p. 21), suggesting the CIO did not passively wait for Matsangaíce's success in operations in order to begin hostilities. On the other hand, the movement must be seen as Mozambican as its initial personnel consisted of volunteers from Mozambique. There was no necessity for the Rhodesians to have a Mozambican proxy since they were perfectly capable of carrying out military operations by themselves, as the example of Nhazónia shows. Mozambicans were fleeing 'to Rhodesia' from Frelimo's own 're-education' camps, as Machel himself admitted in a speech early 1980 (1985[1980], p. 76; pointed out by Igreja, 2010, pp. 788–789). Matsangaíce was killed near Gorongosa on 17 October 1979 (Cabrita, 2000, pp. 160–161). Afonso Dhlakama would become his successor; it is not clear exactly how (compare Cabrita, 2000, pp. 161–163; Vines, 1991, pp. 16–17; Hanlon, 1984, p. 222). In any case, Dhlakama's leadership does not seem to have been subject to a congressional meeting of any kind.

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In the period 1977–1979, Renamo operated mainly in the centre of Mozambique, attacking Frelimo garrisons but also civilian targets such as roads and towns (Cabrita, 2000, pp. 154–155). Meanwhile, developments in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe changed Renamo's operational environment. In February 1980, ZANU won the elections, which meant Renamo could no longer count on Rhodesian support. Apartheid South Africa would now take over sponsorship of Renamo (Minter, 1994, pp. 34, 40). It was especially after 1980 that Renamo would develop its ghastly behavioural repertoire of cruelly killing and mutilating civilians indiscriminately (Africa Watch, 1992, pp. 27–28). These cruelties are well documented. There seems, however, to have been some regional differentiation in Renamo's mode of operation, Renamo's conduct being crueller in the south of the country than in the north (1992, p. 50; cf. Wilson, 1992, pp. 530, 534). The biggest massacre generally attributed to Renamo occurred in Homoine town, Inhambane Province, on 18 July 1987, when 424 people were killed (Africa Watch, 1992, p. 50). South Africa itself was also militarily directly involved, such as in January 1981 and in October 1986. Zimbabwe became involved in the war on Frelimo's side, and on Mozambican soil, in 1982; Tanzania in or around 1986 (Minter, 1994, pp. 40, 44, 47, 137). As for Renamo's motives for fighting, Elígio MB maintained that Frelimo had been against 'the white Portuguese' at the time of independence, ordering them to leave within 24 hours (cf. above). This was bad according to Elígio MB because the know-how of the Portuguese could no longer be utilized.

7 Other Developments 1977–1987

Frelimo's Third Congress was held in 1977, when it formally declared itself a Marxist-Leninist party, after the Eighth Session of the Central Committee in 1976 had called for the destruction of the 'colonial-capitalist machinery' and its concomitants (Meneses, 2011, pp. 159–160). The party was to control the state, while party membership was not open to everyone but guided by the idea of vanguardism; not just anyone could become a member, with candidate members subjected to specific scrutiny of their behaviour. Party cells would gradually take on more prominence and dynamizing groups less (Isaacman & Isaacman, 1983, pp. 121–125). Cahen (1993) points out that the Marxist character of Frelimo was equivocal. It did comprise such items like a 'discourse against exploitation directed equally at colonialism and capitalism' (1993, p. 48). On the other hand, banks were nationalized quite late (in 1978) and major private companies could continue to operate, while small entrepreneurs were suppressed (1993, pp. 51–52).

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In 1977, an electoral law was promulgated and elections held that same year.[11] Popular assemblies were defined at different geographical levels in a tiered system from local to national. The general population could elect individuals for local assemblies out of a list of candidates defined by the Frelimo party or Dynamizing Groups (art. 15). Lower-level assemblies elected people for higher-level assemblies (art. 21). The assemblies had as tasks, among other things, to reinforce state power, make known the decisions of the Third Congress, fight against 'saboteurs and agitators', and 'solve concrete problems of the people' (art. 4). The electoral law only provided for the election of personnel, *policies* were not to be defined by lower-level assemblies, and higher-level assemblies had the power to overrule or even dissolve lower-level ones (cf. Hall & Young, 1997, pp. 77–79). As mentioned above, in practice members of the National Assembly were selected by the Frelimo Central Committee rather than freely chosen by provincial assemblies (Egerö, 1987, p. 123). Other rounds of elections were held in 1980 and 1986 (ibid., pp. 124–126).

In 1982, Mozambique applied for membership of the IMF, eventually resulting in an agreement with that institution in 1987 (Newitt, 1995, p. 566; Trindade, 2003, p. 113). The year 1983 may be noted for the organization of Frelimo's Fourth Congress. Peasant families were to produce more, but such an exhortation might also be accompanied by corporal punishment (Egerö, 1987, pp. 164–165). Furthermore, the so-called 'Operation Production', widely considered useless, was set up in 1983, led by Guebuza. City people who could not show they were employed were displaced to remote rural areas for agricultural work (Egerö, 1987, p. 188; Hall & Young, 1997, pp. 104–105; Trindade, 2003, p. 111n32; Quembo, 2012).

The war of Renamo and its South African ally against the Frelimo government had its own dynamics. South Africa used Renamo to 'destabilize' Mozambique, not so much to replace the Frelimo-regime but to keep it weak (Newitt, 1995, pp. 560–563, 574). On 16 March 1984, the Nkomati Accord was signed, which comprised that Mozambique and South Africa would stop supporting armed insurrection in each other's countries. Tanzania and Zimbabwe sent troops to support Frelimo. However, from documents found in the Renamo base in Gorongosa in 1985 it became clear that South African support for Renamo still continued (Newitt, 1995, pp. 565, 567–568). On 19 October 1986, Machel was killed in an air crash in unclear circumstances.[12] Joaquim Chissano

11 Law 1/77 of 1 September; Mozambique (1977); Egerö (1987, pp. 120–130); Meneses (2007, p. 23); Trindade (2003, p. 108).

12 The hypothesis now generally entertained is that the South African apartheid regime indeed knocked the plane off course with a false signal – *Sowetan Sunday World/Cape Times* in Mozambique History Net (2013[2003]).

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took office as president without any conflict within Frelimo (Newitt, 1995, p. 569).

As for Renamo, Cabrita reports that the movement first released a formal programme of action in February 1979. Frelimo's 'oppressive regime', centrally planned economy, communal villages, and 're-education' camps had to be ended, and 'multiparty democracy' and economic free enterprise be introduced (2000, pp. 169). In 1981, with the assistance of André Thomashausen, Renamo formulated the idea of establishing a 'government of national concord with Frelimo' and 'the reinstatement of traditional rulers' (2000, pp. 186, 188). Militarily, neither Frelimo nor Renamo could gain the upper hand, resulting in a rather patchy occupation of territory by Renamo at the end of the hostilities in 1992 (see map in *MPPB*,[13] 1995b).

8 The Peace Process

The first attempts to come to a politically negotiated end of the Frelimo-Renamo war seem to date from 1984 (in a meeting in Frankfurt between Frelimo's Fernando Honwana and Renamo's Evo Fernandes). Jacinto Veloso met Fernandes and the South African general Van der Westhuizen in Pretoria in July 1984. Early October, a meeting was held in Pretoria and a declaration formulated, which had no practical impact (*Accord*, 1998, p. 37; Veloso, 2011[2006], pp. 188–192; cf. Hall & Young, 1997, pp. 148–159). At the end of 1987 the United States passed on to Frelimo a document sent by Renamo, which contained five conditions for negotiation, among which 'democratic, free and transparent elections' without a requirement of a government of national unity (Veloso, 2011[2006], pp. 243–246).

Around the time of its Fifth Congress (July 1989), Frelimo produced a document that was delivered to Renamo through a delegation of Mozambican church representatives in Nairobi in August 1989, facilitated by the Kenyan government.[14] Renamo answered, also through the church representatives, with a document containing 16 points (see *Accord*, 1998, p. 39). The sequel of the negotiations was to take place in Rome, aided by the Sant'Egidio religious community, the Italian government, and Archbishop of Beira Jaime Gonçalves (Veloso, ibid., pp. 252–257). The US government presented a 'Seven Point Proposal' to Dhlakama in December 1989, which mentioned 'democracy',

13 *MPPB*: *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*; later *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin*.

14 Kenya had cooperated with Renamo during the war, training Renamo officers. ElígioMB was one of them; cf. Minter (1994, p. 137). (For Frelimo's document, see Veloso, 2011[2006], pp. 250–252; *Accord* 1998, p. 38; cf. Hall & Young, 1997, pp. 207–208.).

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describing it as based on 'freedom of expression, association and economic opportunity'. Elections were not mentioned, although people had 'the right to make decisions involving their governance' (*Accord*, 1998, p. 39). The presidents of Zimbabwe and Botswana also contributed towards the peace process, for example, through a meeting with Dhlakama on 4 July 1992 (cf. 'Joint Declaration' of 7 August 1992). The UK businessman 'Tiny' Rowland of the Lonrho Company was also involved (Vines 1998).

Eventually the *General Peace Agreement* (GPA) between Frelimo and Renamo was concluded on 4 October 1992.[15] Some points may be specifically highlighted. First, political parties were to 'provide for democratic participation' based on 'electoral processes at *all* levels of State organization' (GPA, Protocol II, 1-a; emphasis added). The GPA did not specify whether these electoral processes should be held for the executive, the legislative, or both, at all levels. In any case, we will see below that this aspect of the GPA has so far never happened in full for either of them. Second, freedom of residence for citizens was to be guaranteed (Protocol III, III), something that has subsequently been qualified, as we will see below. Third, decisions of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC), which was to overlook the GPA, were to be taken by consensus between the (Frelimo and Renamo) parties (Protocol V, II-3, cf. Protocol I, 5), a method for reaching collective decisions that became largely neglected after the first multiparty elections of 1994. Fourth, the government (i.e. the Frelimo government) was not to hold lower-level elections before the general elections, that is, those eventually held in 1994 (Protocol V, III-9[f]). This clause may have been meant to prevent Frelimo from consolidating itself in a large part of the country, but later developments were to foster just that. This is connected with a fifth point, namely that Renamo was to be allowed to continue to exercise administration of areas under its control until such a time as the new government took office (Protocol V, III-9[d]). In a sixth point, the (Frelimo) government was to 'respect […] the traditional structures and authorities' (Protocol V, III-9[e]), a prelude to the 'recognition of traditional authorities' later culminating in Decree 15/2000 (Carrilho [Ed.], 2009, p. 553). In a seventh, the GPA did not define 'democracy' but simply referred to 'the internationally recognised principles of democracy' (Joint Declaration, commitment [i]) without any elaboration about what these were. In the preamble of Protocol II, it is declared that Frelimo and Renamo

> …agreed on the necessity of guaranteeing the workings of a multi-party democracy in which the parties would freely co-operate […] and in

15 Texts in *Accord* (1998, pp. 40–60).

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> promoting democratic participation by the citizens in the Government of the country.

It is difficult to pin down what *concrete* effects this quote was supposed to have. It might be interpreted as a call for a 'government of national concord', as Renamo had wished. But this is not what happened, and I know of no commentator who has maintained that the eventual result in 1994 with a Frelimo-only government was in violation of the GPA. This leads to the conclusion that the GPA's understanding of 'democracy' is probably one that allows for a winner-takes-all approach to elections. But it does not *say* so. That this was indeed a main issue is shown by the discussions in 1993 and 1994 between political parties about the electoral process, where '[a]t the core [...] was again the question of political power, and guarantees of participation in power' (Mazula, 1996, p. 38).

Thus while the GPA and subsequent events were themselves based on reaching consensus between Frelimo and Renamo (Mazula, 1996, pp. 27, 30, 47–50), the resulting political structure of Mozambique was not to be so conceived, as is clear from a discussion by ONUMOZ Executive Director Dirk Salomons who commented in 1993 (thus after the GPA but before the first multiparty elections):

> [In Mozambique] people simply sit and remain until the consensus is formed. The idea that a majority can overrule a minority is not a very commonly accepted one. [...] In the Western democracy you can have elections on the basis of winner-takes-all. [...] [O]ne party wins, the other party moves into opposition and waits patiently till its turn comes. [...] But in the Mozambican situation this concept of loyal opposition [...] does not exist. [...] [A] situation may occur in Mozambique where the winner takes all and the loser is pushed into a corner. [...] Is there going to be [...] some formula for power sharing? [...] That is some way to keep the concept of consensus [...] in order to avoid a polarisation of society.
>
> in HANSMA & ROSKAM [Eds.], 1993, pp. 37–38

Just how prophetic Salomons' words were is to be studied in the sequel, but here it can be pointed out that if Salomons had any doubts about the political trajectory that Mozambique was to take, it was far too late for these to be expressed, as both the new Constitution (discussed below) and the GPA were already defined. The Electoral Law of 1993 would formally adopt majority rule for electing the national president (Mozambique, 1994a), and since the president would be entitled to appoint all members of government, the national government was to be expected (as Salomons did expect) to be a one-party

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affair. Salomons' ethnographic depiction of Mozambique seems to rule out the idea of rotation of power in Mozambique, while acknowledging its existence as a possible outcome in the West. However, below we will encounter practical instances of this principle, at least on the lineage level, in Barue District. Somewhat in line with Salomons, Cistac (2009, pp. 95–100) makes a contrast between the 'European-western' majoritarian set-up of the Mozambican republic and 'traditional customs'. I would agree with the contrast at a very general level, but propose formulating it differently. Precolonial practice in Mozambique had some idea of majority versus minority; we can deduce this from the decision to initiate the Barue Revolt in 1917, which was not unanimous. But reaching collective decisions like that was not, or not usually, done through the exact counting of votes.

9 Constitutional Change

It was obvious that there would have to be a constitutional change in Mozambique, if Renamo was to be recognized as a political force because Frelimo's ideas pervaded the 1975 Constitution in terms of directing Mozambican society and government. A major problem now became whether or not Frelimo and Renamo could be simultaneously in one government of national unity. Constitutional change would have to accommodate the answer to this problem. In any case, Frelimo went on with a process of transforming itself from a political party, claiming a monopoly, towards one among others. At its Fifth Congress in July 1989, Frelimo abandoned Marxism-Leninism as its ideology. The road towards constitutional change was now also open (Minter, 1994, p. 53) and effectuated with the new constitution of November 1990 (Mozambique, 1990). Allowing a capitalist economy and the existence of other political parties would not imply that Frelimo was willing to give up its political hold on Mozambique. As Sitoe remarks, for Frelimo 'the goal of state nationalism, grounded in the logic of state centralisation and modernisation, would now be pursued under the discourse of neo-liberal economics' (2003, p. 26; cf. Cahen, 1988, p. 12). As we will see, not just state nationalism and centralisation, but also party influence attached to these would be taken up again after the conclusion of the peace.

The Municipalities Law 3/94, adopted just before the 1994 multiparty elections, had provided for local elections to be held before 1 October 1996 (art. 71.1–Mozambique (1994b). In November 1995, three bills introduced by the Frelimo government to arrange for such elections were, however, unanimously declared unconstitutional by the parliamentary affairs committee

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(*MPPB,* 1995c, 1995d). This implied the original Law 3/94 was also to be seen as unconstitutional. One major problem seems to have been the stipulation in the 1990 Constitution that mayors were to be 'appointed' (*designados*) and this was interpreted in the sense that they could not be elected according to the Constitution (Mozambique, 1990, art. 186.3; discussion by Cistac, 2009, pp. 56–59). Renamo also objected to the gradual nature of the introduction of municipalities foreseen in the law (Lachartre, 1999, p. 164; see art. 69–2 of Law 3/94). The legal stalemate indicated that local elections could not be held any time soon (cf. *MPPB,* 1995d).

In 1996, the Constitution was changed (cf. law 9/96; Mozambique, 1996). The new formulation changed the goal or function of the 'local organs of the State' from 'participation of the citizens' (art. 185.1 [1990]) to 'the representation of the State at local level' (art. 185 [1996]). However, the idea of 'Local Power' (*Poder Local*) was introduced, which now comprised citizen participation (new art. 188.1). Local self-governing entities (*autarquias*) were to be set up, constituting two types: 'municipalities', a categorization applicable to cities and towns, and 'settlements', which were defined as the 'territorial circumscription of the head community of the administrative post' (new art. 188–190). The latter description would suggest that the Constitution would not require that there should be 'local power' in all of Mozambique's territory. The 'local power' was to comprise the possibility for citizens to elect mayors and representative assemblies (new art. 192). At the moment of writing, no settlement has had any such elections, and the 2018 local elections only comprised 53 municipalities (*MPPB*, 2018d). Thus the majority of the adult Mozambican population has no prospect of electing its local representatives and mayors, and is for a large part under appointed District Administrators. Moreover, the new constitutional set-up for local government was not submitted to public debate and a referendum, as required by the 1990 Constitution:

> If a proposed amendment implies fundamental changes in the rights of citizens or in the organization of public powers, the proposal, after adoption by the Assembly of the Republic, shall be submitted to public debate and to a referendum.
>
> Mozambique 1990 [Constitution], art. 199.1; translation as in published version

Thus, the current situation is against the GPA (because conflicting with Protocol II, 1-a) and unconstitutional (because not submitted to a referendum as stipulated in the then prevailing 1990 Constitution). If Law 3/94 was in contradiction with the 1990 Constitution, *then the GPA was likewise* if elections on 'all levels' were to be understood as comprising the election of district executives.

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There seems to be little comment on this in the literature, although Orre (2010, p. 11) does allude to Law 3/94 as 'reflecting the peace accord'.

After the constitutional change of 1996, Law 2/97 was adopted in 1997 by the Frelimo and União Democrática parties versus a Renamo boycott of the parliamentary vote concerning this law. It reasserted much of the power of the central government relative to Law 3/94 (Mozambique, 1997; Trindade, 2003, pp. 120–121). De Brito (2010, p. 12) mentions that the abolition of the district municipalities was advantageous for Frelimo because of Renamo's success in many districts in the 1994 elections, and he highlights Renamo's support for the constitutional change. Two events must be separated, however: Renamo's support for the abolition of the original formulations and its rejection of Law 2/97. It was unable to block the latter due to the principle of (simple) majority, as Law 2/97 was not a constitutional stipulation (requiring a two-thirds majority) but a regular law. It was not necessarily entirely irrational for Renamo to agree to the earlier changes (even if it did not insist on carrying out the GPA as might be expected), but as matters stand the party apparently did not realize beforehand that whatever influence it might have vis-à-vis the Constitution, it did not have when it came to regular laws. We see here how 'mere' technical definitions of 'majority' can and do have a major impact on the political process; see also De Brito (2013).

Thus government was to remain, for the greater part of Mozambique's territory and population, a centrally coordinated affair, formalized in 2003 in the Law of the Local Organs of the State, with its tiered system of provinces, districts, administrative posts and localities, and appointed executives.[16] Since Frelimo controls the national government, this effectively blocks Renamo or any other third parties from occupying executive functions where no elections exist. In 2004, a new Constitution was adopted, which largely confirmed the already existing legal architecture concerning local government (Mozambique, 2004), although Renamo had proposed the idea of popularly elected provincial governors (Cistac, 2009, p. 88).

10 Legislation on 'Traditional Authorities' and 'Community Authorities'

As for hereditary leaders (as most 'traditional authorities' are), the situation may be summarized as follows. The 1975 Constitution stated that one of the

16 Law 8/2003; Carrilho ([Ed.], 2009, pp. 399–410); Serra ([Ed.], 2009, pp. 162–172). In 2012 'settlement' was added below locality (Nuvunga, 2013, p. 44n7).

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goals of the People's Republic of Mozambique was to eliminate 'colonial and traditional structures of oppression and exploitation and the mentality that lies beneath them' (Mozambique, 1975, art. 4-a). Technically the text does not say that hereditary leaders should disappear altogether, but this would for a large part be the case in practice in the first years after independence. As mentioned already, the GPA (Protocol V, III-9[e]) provided for a recognition of 'traditional authorities'; this was formalized first in the abortive Law 3/94 (art. 8) which envisaged that such authorities would work within the framework of the district municipalities.

Article 28 of Law 2/97 mentions 'traditional authorities' within the framework of the *autarquiais locais* (Carrilho [Ed.], 2009, pp. 509–510), but only in so far the *autarquias* 'may hear' the 'traditional authorities'. Policy frameworks came some years later in the form of Decree 15/2000 and its accompanying regulation,[17] which were applicable to the local organs of the state, that is, the centrally coordinated state entities. Four years later, the cooperation between *autarquias* and community authorities including 'traditional authorities' was formally defined in another regulation.[18] The 2004 regulation recycles much of the content of the one of 2000 without, however, addressing this very aspect, that is, the overlap between the two regulations, which both deal with *local* leaders. These would now be subject simultaneously to 'articulation' by Local Organs of the State and *autarquias locais*. In a multiparty framework, these may not be headed by the same political party, and thus such articulations may diverge in a party-political way. Indeed, this situation was what more or less emerged in Angoche (Nampula Province) even before 2004, after Renamo had won the local elections there, as analysed by Meneses and Santos (2008). They describe how the Renamo municipal government 'decided to create its own neighbourhood delegates with the same functions as the secretaries' of Frelimo who continued to function (2008, p. 20). In Angoche, Renamo showed a similar wish to control the population as Frelimo had done earlier: one interviewee reported how the party forbade a woman to sing in a local ritual because she was from Frelimo (2008, pp. 21–22). Since institutions such as local courts and police also came to be organized along party lines, the paradoxical result of the multiparty system in Angoche has turned out to be that 'the institutions in charge of settling disputes become a source of conflict themselves, in disputes created by them to be settled elsewhere' (p. 28). Thus a *dual state* emerged in Angoche (p. 21–cf. West & Kloeck-Jenson, 1999, p. 479n80). This situation entailing disputes about disputes shows that shared cultural concepts

17 Ministerial Directive 107-A/2000; Carrilho ([Ed.], 2009, pp. 554–558).

18 Ministerial Directive 80/2004; Serra ([Ed.], 2009, pp. 219–222).

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do not necessarily result in coherent cooperation and solidarity among people.

Decree 15/2000 formalized the recognition of 'traditional authorities' but it did so by recategorizing them as 'traditional chiefs' and recognizing them alongside an equivalent recognition of 'neighbourhood or village secretaries', together with a miscellaneous category, all subsumed under the heading of 'community authorities' (*autoridades comunitárias*). This meant that the national Frelimo government 'recognized' its own *party* secretaries within a supposed framework of administrative decentralization. This development seriously limits the impact of the 'revitalization of traditional authorities'.

The 'recognition of traditional authority' has known antecedents in anthropological research projects. Christian Geffray's work (1990; cf. Geffray & Pedersen, 1986, 1988) has already been mentioned. A research project specifically targeted at data collection on hereditary leaders started in 1991 (Lundin & Machava, 1995; Lundin, 1995). 'Local African Authority' would contribute to 'decentralization in the exercise of authority' (1995, pp. 11, 26) and to a 'democratic' way of choosing leaders, specified as election by electoral colleges of elders (1995, p. 27; cf. Kyed, 2007, pp. 85–118). The aspect of 'decentralization' is mentioned by Decree 15/2000, but instead of 'democracy' the Decree stresses more the role of the community authorities concerning centrally conceived policies. 'Traditional authority' was recognized in the 2004 Constitution (Mozambique, 2004, art. 118).

It is also relevant to note in this context collective bodies for coordinating collective action such as local councils (existing at least since 2000[19]), community committees, consultative councils, and local forums defined in 2005 (Decree 11/2005, art. 100–2, 103–1, 110–113),[20] cf. Orre (2010, pp. 302–303). 'Traditional authorities' are entitled to participate in local councils (Arizcurinaga Zeballos, 2008, p. 59; Carrilho [Ed.], 2009, p. 555), but in my interviews this aspect was rarely given any prominence in hereditary leaders' self-description.

11 The Earliest Multiparty Elections

With some exceptions, the sequel deals predominantly with the earliest multiparty elections in 1994, 1998, and 1999. For the argumentation of this book, it is not necessary to repeat all the details of subsequent elections (cf. Van Dokkum,

19 Ministerial Directive 107-A/2000, art. 1–6; Carrilho ([Ed.], 2009, p. 554).

20 Regulation of the Law of Local Organs of the State (8/2003); Carrilho ([Ed.], 2009, pp. 411–458).

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2015, pp. 182–184; IESE 2016). At the moment of writing, Frelimo remains in charge of the government of the Republic of Mozambique, although as of 2018 nine municipalities are under Renamo and MDM mayors (*MPPB,* 2018d).

11.1 *The 1994 General and Presidential Elections*

The first multiparty elections for parliament and the presidency in independent Mozambique were held on 27–29 October 1994. Voter turnout was 88% of registered voters, with reportedly many invalid ballots (together 8.5% and 11.7% for the presidential and legislative elections, respectively–EMS, 1995, p. 80). A disturbing event was Dhlakama's sudden announcement the night before the first polling day to boycott the elections, charging 'widespread irregularities'. International pressure on Dhlakama made him reverse the boycott (*MPPB,* 1995a). Renamo came out with a 'surprisingly strong showing' (Sumich & Honwana, 2007, p. 16n16), a result not expected by Frelimo or indeed virtually anybody else (Hansma, interview).

The respective parliamentary/presidential election results are summarized as follows (EMS, 1995, p. 79):

Frelimo	44.33%
Renamo	37.78%
União Democrática	5.15%
Others	12.74%
Chissano	53.30%
Dhlakama	33.73%
Others	12.97%

The result for the União Democrática (UD) is usually explained by the fact that its name was at the bottom of the ballot papers for the parliamentary elections, while Chissano's name was at the bottom of the presidential elections, confusing many voters (EMS, 1995: 80). Should the UD votes be interpreted as intended for Frelimo, we obtain the result that a maximum of 49.48% of the valid votes were for Frelimo, signifying that less than half of the votes cast were for the party that had claimed to embody the 'will and aspirations of the Mozambican masses'.

11.2 *The 1998 Local Elections*

The 1998 local elections in 33 municipalities had a turnout of 14.58% (CNE [*Comissão Nacional de Eleições* or National Elections Commission] in *MPPB*, 1998, annex p. 15). Renamo and many other parties boycotted these elections,

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so that Frelimo won a majority in all contested municipalities. Reasons stated for the boycott were 'lack of confidence in the impartiality and competence of the [STAE]' (*Secretariado Técnico da Administração Eleitoral* or Technical Secretariat for Electoral Management), an attitude that 'was nurtured by reports, accepted by government representatives, of faults in the voter registration process and in other electoral preparations', coupled with claims by Renamo of being unsatisfactorily represented in the STAE (Braathen & Jørgensen, 1998, pp. 33, 36).

11.3 *The 1999 General and Presidential Elections*

The results of the 1999 elections, specifically for the presidency, are shrouded in mystery. According to Luís de Brito,

> …[a] strong sign of loosing [sic] hegemony for Frelimo were the results of the 1999 general elections. […] [T]he official result was of 52% for Chissano and 48% for Dhlakama. In fact these figures do not correspond to the real results of the election. Among other indications of fraud it should be noted that the Supreme Court refused the opposition call to recount c. 370 000 votes (mainly from Zambézia province, a stronghold of Renamo) not considered due to technical problems with the tally sheets. In fact Chissano had most probably lost the election.
>
> DE BRITO, n.d., p. 1

De Brito (2008, p. 6n13) also mentions Sofala and Nampula as provinces with troublesome tally sheets. My analysis in Appendix 4 of the presidential election of 1999 confirms this.

Renamo had made a deal with other opposition parties to combine forces in the parliamentary elections, leading to the Renamo-UE (*União Eleitoral*–Electoral Union) combination. In return for third parties' hitchhiking with Renamo in the parliamentary elections, Dhlakama would be the preferred presidential candidate for these parties. Several presidential candidates from still other parties did not make it through the registration requirements. This situation led to a presidential contest with only two candidates, Chissano and Dhlakama (*MPPB* 2000e). In the presidential election system used in Mozambique since 1994, voters are requested to give only their first preference (in the first round of a possible two-round election). In 1994, many of the voters indicating a third candidate (not Chissano or Dhlakama) as first choice may have had Dhlakama as second choice, preferring him more than Chissano, but this would not be apparent because voters were not asked to indicate this. The real

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difference between Chissano and Dhlakama in 1994 may therefore not have been as large as the first-choice results indicated in that year. The close call between Chissano and Dhlakama in the 1999 result would confirm such an interpretation.

Just how close the call between Chissano and Dhlakama was in 1999 will probably never be known exactly because a large number of ballots were declared invalid (Pt: *nulos*), with a tendency for incidences of *nulos* at the district level to be biased against Dhlakama. Moreover, hundreds of *editais* (tally sheets; summaries of election results at poll station level) were not counted in the end result (making turnout difficult to establish as well–*MPPB*, 2000a, p. 1). The statistical uncertainties highlighted in Appendix 4 lead to the conclusion that *there is indeed no certainty that Chissano won the presidential election* according to voters' intentions.

In the 1999 parliamentary elections, Frelimo won 48.5%, Renamo and Electoral Union 38.8%, and others 12.7% of the valid votes. On the basis of this, Frelimo took 133 and Renamo 117 of the 250 parliamentary seats. Blank votes comprised 9.6% and invalid votes 4.9% of the total votes. However, as in the presidential elections, there were a large number of *editais* not considered: 727 (more than 8.7% of the polling stations–*MPPB,* 2000a). With more than two parties in the election, the expectation is far less than with the presidential elections that the missing votes might have altered the majority position of Frelimo vis-à-vis Renamo-UE.

Still, declaring Chissano winner of the presidential election is not possible with the argument that 'given the official data, the excluded *editais* could not have changed the overall result'. On the contrary, the official data provide ample reason to reckon with a Dhlakama victory as a serious possibility. Given the uncertainties in the results, a conclusion is that the voting exercise in 1999 failed Mozambican voters in terms of representing their intentions beyond any doubt. The comment by the Carter Center (2000, p. 30) that

> …the fact that [Renamo] contested the final results through established legal channels, and that due procedure was followed in addressing Renamo's complaint, are positive signs of a nascent democracy…

must be viewed as naïve. Mozambique's electoral democracy was destroyed in 1999 when a mockery was made of hundreds of thousands of voters' efforts to participate in the electoral process. The effects of this failure are still relevant today.

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11.4 *Credibility of Elections*

The uncertainty of the count diminishes the legitimacy of the result. Lehoucq (2003, p. 249) suggests that loss of legitimacy caused in that way may reduce turnout in subsequent elections and increase cynicism. Official turnout in the 2004 presidential elections was 36.42% (STAE 2004). The real turnout might have been somewhat higher due to problems with voter registration, but still probably did not reach more than 43%, a drastically downward difference compared to 1999. *MPPB* admits that voter abstention was more predominant among Renamo adherents, but does not link this to Lehoucq's implication that such a level of abstention might have been induced by the events of the 1999 elections (*MPPB*, 2004a, 2004b). Responses by interviewees in a study conducted by Mazula and others do include references to 'fraud', '[v]oting [being] a farce to mislead the people', and 'tiredness of seeing Frelimo win all the time', among other reasons.[21] Turnout in 2009 was 44.63%; in 2014, it was 48.64% (*MPPB*, 2009, 2014d). The latter election occurred after Renamo had become militarily active again (Allison, 2014, see also below). Dhlakama's official poll performance improved, but Frelimo remained in power. The 2014 election was again jam-packed with problems (*MPPB*, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c), despite having two decades of experience with organizing elections. Arguably, the basis for this quagmire is to be attributed to the uncertainties in 1999, along with the soothing assurances that these uncertainties could not, or were unlikely to, have changed the result. Observer missions were reluctant, if not unwilling, to straightforwardly declare the 1999 presidential election invalid. The Carter Center (2000, pp. 26–29) was critical of the vote count, pointing out that the number of uncounted votes of the excluded *editais* was larger than Chissano's margin of victory and that the provincial distribution of those *editais* was unclear, but maintained that the end result of the election was not affected. The Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC countries was even less critical about the counting issues (Kadima, p. 1999). After the 2014 elections, the European Union Election Observer Mission (EUEOM), professed that post-1992 elections in Mozambique were 'deemed credible by the international community' and EUEOM (2014, p. 11) showed no inclination to take seriously the opposition's difficulty with 'irregularities and fraudulent acts during the tabulation process' as undermining actual results. The Freedom House (2012) shows more firmness when it flatly states that 'Mozambique is not an electoral democracy', even if still confirming that 'international observers have deemed that the

21 Mazula et al. (2006, pp. 13–14, 33–35, 94, 164; cf. 56, 65–70, 95–97, Anexo 2): translations of this source mine.

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overall outcomes of Mozambique's national elections reflected the will of the people'.

12 The Emergence of MDM and the Re-emergence of Frelimo/Renamo Hostilities

In the 2003 local elections, Daviz Simango, son of Uria Simango, became mayor of Beira for Renamo. In 2008, Simango was again elected mayor in that city (*MBBP*, 2008b), after running as an independent because Renamo did not nominate him as the party candidate, apparently because Dhlakama felt threatened by Simango's success (*MPPB*, 2008a; for background, see Cahen, 2009, pp. 65, 72–73). In 2009 the *Movimento Democrático de Moçambique* (MDM) founded and led by Daviz Simango contested the elections for the National Assembly for the first time. It was excluded from the contest in seven provinces by the National Electoral Commission, which alleged MDM had not submitted enough valid candidates to run in these provinces. The exact documentary proof of this allegation has remained shrouded in secrecy (*MPPB*, 2009, p. 3; Manning & Malbrough, 2012, pp. 6–8). On 7 December 2011, MDM's candidate Manuel de Araujo won the by-election for mayor of the city of Quelimane with 62% of the vote. This made Quelimane the second city under MDM leadership after Beira (Lee 2011).

On 8 March 2012, there was a shoot-out between riot police and Renamo supporters in which one policeman and one Renamo member were killed. On 29 March 2013, Renamo announced it would 'not allow elections'. From April 2013 onwards, more hostilities were reported, with several deaths (Hanlon, 2013c, 2013d, 2014). Renamo expressed dissatisfaction over its lack of veto power in the National Elections Commission and with Renamo's being 'marginalized' in national politics (Hanlon, 2013a, 2013b). On 21 October 2013, Renamo declared the GPA annulled (Mucari, 2013).

Results of the 2013 municipal elections, without Renamo's participation, were that Frelimo won the mayoralty and the majority of the assembly in 49 municipalities and MDM in 4 (the important cities of Beira, Quelimane, and Nampula, and [after a retake of the election in 2014] Gúruè). Turnout was 46%. During campaign time as well as on polling day, MDM supporters and delegates were disproportionally affected by police arrests, many of them apparently unjustified. Three people were reported killed (Hanlon, 2013a, 2013b; *MPPB*, 2014a, 2014b.).

Hostilities carried out by Frelimo and Renamo would crop up from time to time also after the 2013 municipal elections. Barue District was one of the areas

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affected, with several incidents (AIM in Club of Mozambique, 2016a, 2016b; VOA Português in Club of Mozambique, 2016c; Zitamar in Exxafrica, 2016). In 2014, Filipe Jacinto Nyusi was elected president (Presidência 2018). An agreement between President Nyusi and Renamo-leader Dhlakama was reached on 7 February 2018, involving the idea of introducing district elections in 2024 (long overdue, cf. above) and the selection of provincial governors, district administrators, and mayors according to which party or coalition will gain a plurality (*maioria*–here: greatest number) in the elections of the constituency concerned. Decentralization of powers, however, appears to remain rather limited.[22] Dhlakama died soon afterwards on 3 May (*O País* 2018). Meanwhile, recent hostilities have led to renewed or reinforced distrust. Chekwa (2018) reports that people in Mussianhalo in Barue District are no longer provided with healthcare because in that area they were suspected of being Renamo adherents. A noteworty aspect of the 2018 local elections was that, in the southern city of Matola, Renamo won (according to the official count) 47.28% of the valid votes (CNE, 2018, p. 49), definitely attenuating the idea that the dichotomies 'south vs. central/north' and 'Frelimo vs. Renamo' necessarily correlate.

13 Conclusion

The hegemony of Frelimo in Mozambican political life since independence was challenged during the 16-year war with Renamo but made a remarkable comeback after that. Although it can be said that the peace process transformed Renamo into a political party among other political parties, at least until 2013, Frelimo never really accepted the idea that it too was to be only one party among others. There are strong indications that it manipulated elections so as to secure its own position to the largest extent possible at least on the national level.

Although Renamo must be held responsible for its own actions during the war, its emergence is hardly surprising, considering what has been described in this and the previous chapter. Frelimo had a great capacity to generate enemies. Renamo is one manifestation of opposition against Frelimo, which also already existed in organized form during the time of the anticolonial resistance. It is therefore prudent to view the physical confrontations within Frelimo, between Frelimo and COREMO (cf. Ch. 3), and between Frelimo and Renamo as cognate events, resulting at least partly from one continuing cause,

22 Mozambique (2018, [adjusted] art. 270-M-2, 270-Q-2, 275–4A, 279–2, 283–2, 289–5); *MPPB* (2018a, 2018b, 2018c).

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namely the contradiction which Frelimo brought to Mozambique, that is to represent as well as not to represent all Mozambicans.

The link with the idea of a multiparty system is readily made because representing different sections of society is what such a system is supposed to do. However, Frelimo's acceptance of a multiparty system was half-hearted at best. The cancellation of Law 3/94, which would have facilitated administrative decentralization and the expansion of party-political pluralism in Mozambique, enabled Frelimo to re-establish its grip on the country. The slow pace of the formation of municipalities is subject to the will of Frelimo who can define such formations through its parliamentary majority, and it is difficult not to have the impression that Frelimo wanted to avoid Renamo gaining power in Mozambique's rural areas, where that party has been strong (De Brito, 2010, p. 12; also Forquilha, 2006, Ch. 5; Open Society Institute Network, 2009, p. 142). On the other hand, Renamo showed little cunning in defending the stipulation in the GPA that there should be elections at all levels of the state. In this sense the GPA has, so far, never been carried out in full. This failure to be fully achieved is not a weakness of the GPA itself (although it did fail to define dates for elections at all levels) but of the impossibility of the majoritarian political set-up such as it exists in Mozambique to resolve the problem of Frelimo's contradictory character of being simultaneously sectional and monopolistic.

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INTERMEZZO–Barue District's Political Predicaments

After having studied early Frelimo and the postcolonial situation for Mozambique in general terms, we will now return to Barue, at least present-day Barue District, and study Frelimo's impact on life on the district (and lower) level, amidst other political actors such as spirit mediums and predominantly hereditary chiefs. This will contribute to one of the general purposes of the present book, namely to compare Mozambique in general with Barue, which is now part of Mozambique. While kingdoms had been mostly destroyed by colonialism, the phenomenon of chiefly rule was widespread in colonial Southern Africa, though it could be perceived as corrupted (Mamdani, 1996). Chiefly rule has also been perceived as an eroding phenomenon, either in colonial times due to administrative changes or 'modernizing processes' (as in Rhodesia–Holleman, 1969, pp. 152, 351) or, more commonly, under postcolonial governments (cf. Meneses, 2007, pp. 20–23). Recently, however, this perception of erosion has changed. Not only is it recognized that chiefly rule was never totally eclipsed but it is also hailed as something to be officially promoted. In Mozambique, Decree 15/2000 of 2000 is an example of such official promotion of chiefly rule. This change in attitude, together with its practical consequences, is touted as the 'revival of traditional leadership' (Oomen, 2005, p. 11) or some similar phrase. The backgrounds of such processes of 'revival' have been studied by, among others, Buur and Kyed (2006), Dava, Macia, and Dove (2003), and, for the Ndau specifically, Florêncio (2005).

It might look as if chiefly rule, now without its association with colonial political structures, amounts to a 'resurrection of precolonial powers' with a valuation of the popular checks on those powers involved (Davidson, 2007[1992], pp. 61, 73). With the said 'revival', the existence of chiefdoms provides an opportunity to study the processes of selecting chiefs. Examples exist of situations where there are several candidates to choose from when there is a vacancy for a chief. Though information is scarce about precolonial and colonial Mozambique, there appear to be instances where multiple candidacies existed in chiefdoms in colonial Rhodesia. Some publications in *The Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department Annual* (NADA) provide intriguing examples of succession disputes (Fowle, 1973, p. 31; Fynes-Clinton, 1972, p. 61; Howman, 1966; Jenkinson, 1959, p. 46; see also Gelfand, 1966). There is little reason to believe that similar situations never existed before the emergence of the multiparty system in Mozambique. From the precolonial data, it is clear that within the

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Barue royal family there were often several contenders for the throne. Hence the claim that Mozambique 'had a tradition of consensus *rather than* competition' (Van den Bergh, 2009, p. 10, emphasis added) would seem to ignore the fact that Mozambique had known competitive politics before 1994. How such competition works within present-day Barue District will be studied in the next chapter. The 'traditional leadership', which exists today in Barue District, is not fully a revival of the precolonial past because the leaders involved operate under supervision from the Frelimo government rather than the Makombe dynasty. Nevertheless, besides showing how competition works Chapter 5 also shows how the precolonial past can still be relevant, despite colonial destruction of the Barue Kingdom as an actual, existent political entity.

Having demonstrated that 'traditional' leadership does, at least at times, allow for popular involvement, Chapter 6 then looks at the nature of the mentioned supervision by Frelimo. It turns out that Frelimo's recognition of 'traditional' authorities is rather half-hearted, and that the party tries to entrench its own party officials much more forcefully as leaders of local communities, despite all the rhetoric about, and some attempts at, legal and party-political pluralism. Hence the data and analyses presented in Chapter 6 form an intersection of the thread in this book concerning Barue history and the topic of Frelimo's imposition of itself upon the Mozambican nation.

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CHAPTER 5

Chiefdom Politics in Barue District

This chapter deals with the political history of what is now Barue District after the Barue Revolt of 1917–1918, specifically in terms of the chiefdoms. It shows how the legacy of the former kingdom has not entirely disappeared, even if there is no movement to resurrect the kingdom itself. For the sake of completeness and to provide context, all chiefdoms are dealt with, but one major objective of the chapter is to demonstrate how historical arguments, political competition, and public discussions can influence the *territorial* shaping/reshaping of political entities in an African environment.

After the Barue Revolt, the Portuguese power holders tried to persuade Baruese exiled in Rhodesia to return, on the condition that their leaders would not claim any authority. Few responded to the call (Azambuja Martins, 1937, p. 25). During the years thereafter, the Barue area was sparsely populated, even by contemporary standards; Junod (1936, p. 310) reports 1.9 inhabitant/km^2 for 1932. We will see in this chapter that some chiefly lineages in present-day Barue District can still trace their origins (as chiefly leaders) to the time of Kanga's war against the Portuguese. Other chiefdoms are of colonial or postcolonial origin (see Map 3 for their location, cf. Pires, 2006; Pitrosse, 2009). We will see in this chapter how historical arguments are employed by people in order to justify claims to chiefly areas, especially in western Barue, indicating that processes usually associated with nationalism concerning independence and control over territories can be discerned in lower-level political entities too. Concerning western Barue, a similar point has been made by Virtanen (2001, 2005), but I have additional data to substantiate the argument.

Below, there are in most cases two diagrams that explain the genealogical relations of the chiefly families, one based (usually) on a study made in colonial times (Portugal, 1967), and another based (usually) on the author's interviews. Numbers indicate reconstructed succession orders. When genealogical relations are not completely clear, they are indicated by dashed lines. I will first discuss some administrative history after the Barue Revolt, and three spirit mediums.

1 Administrative Developments

Barue became an area under the 'Office of the Government of Barue' (*Intendência de governo de Báruè*) in 1928, only to become a 'civil borough' (*circunscrição*

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civil) again in 1931 (Rafael, 2001, p. 19). From information in Rafael (ibid.) and Portugal (1942), it appears that the area of Barue at that time extended more northward than when it was a kingdom. The area now included Changara, which was not in the area of operation of the Mozambique Company (compare map in Serra [Ed.], 2000, p. 210). In 1942, the concession to the Mozambique Company expired, enabling the Portuguese government to redefine administration in central Mozambique. The Province of Manica and Sofala was created, consisting of two districts: Beira and Tete. Barue became part of the Beira District, while Changara became integrated into the *concelho* of Tete (Portugal, 1942, art. 3–3). In 1958, Mandié and Mungari were split off from Barue. Barue became a *concelho* in April 1964 (Fernandes, 2006, p. 103; Rafael, ibid.). After independence, in 1986, Macossa was split off to become a district of its own. Barue District now has a surface of 5821 km² (Rafael, ibid.), only a fraction of the original kingdom. Catandica got its original name back during Samora Machel's tour from the Rovuma to the Maputo on the occasion of Mozambique's imminent independence (Artur, 1996, pp. 57–58n35).

2 Spirit Mediums

Ioanes Cative Nhamucaia, born in 1932, became the medium of the *mhondoro* spirit of Nyamukucu (~Nhamacocho) in 1952 (ICN). Nyamukucu was a person of the Samanhanga family, discussed below. One daughter of Nyamukucu, Kunga, had had a medium (female), but that medium had already passed away at the time of my research (CSG).

Herbert SG, born in Barauro 1 estimated as being in the 1940s, stated that he is the medium of the *mhondoro* spirit Nyanhau. He is a healer specializing in reproductive health. Around 1974, before the independence war had ended, he initially suffered from the personal disturbances known in the literature that describes the onset of spirit mediumship (e.g. Garbett, 1969, p. 115; Spierenburg, 2004, p. 147). At that time Frelimo was active in the Chôa area and Herbert SG cooperated with Frelimo soldiers, informing them of Portuguese positions (intelligence–*conhecimento*). In 1975, after the war had ended, he started working as a medium (HSG).

Caibossi SG, also known as Magodo, is the elder brother of Herbert SG and was also born in Barauro 1. He stated that he is a medium of the *mhondoro* spirit Saunyama Nyaruembere, who was a ruler in Nyanga, Zimbabwe. Nyaruembere's wife was Nyanhau, Herbert's spirit. Caibossi's spirit had been with him since childhood, but started afflicting him in the first half of the 1960s when he worked in Bulawayo at a maternity hospital. Eventually Caibossi SG

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came back to Barue in 1973. In 1976 the spirit finally 'came out' (*kubuda*). The 'spirit province' (term of Garbett, 1969), extends into Nyamaropa in present-day Zimbabwe, has borders with Katerere (Zimbabwe) and Tangwena, and overlaps with the present area of Sahatsiro. Between Makombe and Saunyama, there was an affinal relation of unknown exact nature (CSG).

3 Mpanze

In 2010, *Régulo* Melo Mpanze Nhadziuo was generally recognized to be a descendant of Makombe Kabudu Kagoro. Melo MN mentioned Nyadziwo (~ Nhadziuo, Nhazio) as son of Makombe Kabudu Kagoro and as chief of 'the entire region of Makosa' (for genealogy: Portugal, 1967, p. 2; Figures 2 and 3 below).[1] He later also stated that Nyadziwo demarcated a border with Makosa, thus separating what is now Mpanze Chiefdom from Makosa (but associating this more with cultivation than with administrative structure). Portugal (1967, pp. 16–17) suggests such separation happened during the reign of Nhagumbo/Mpanze. Portugal (1967, p. 2) also mentions that the areas of Nhauata and Nhaungo, in present-day Macossa District, were partitions of Makosa's area after the 1917–1918 revolt. This suggests at least a pre-1917 origin for the larger chiefdom, with the partitions after the revolt. The persistent reference to Makosa allows dating of the creation of the larger chiefly area in the period a bit earlier, in the period 1890–1902. Interconnecting the information from the colonial administration and the *régulo*, it is probable that Nhagumbo was the first colonial chief in the area after the 1917–1918 revolt.

For Nhagumbo and Nyadziwo's grandsons Joaque, Bero, and Melo, we see a fine pattern of adelphic succession, with the chieftaincy rotating (*makombe*–lower case 'm') across three different descent lines (Figure 3). *Régulo* Melo Mpanze gave an explicit verbalization of the principle: within the family there is

> …equality [so that it is] all right, enter this one rotation-wise, enter this one, leave this one, enter this one, enter this one, enter this one, every house, house, like that.

1 Portugal (1967, p. 141) gives Nhagumbo as 'cousin' (*primo*) of Nhampale (~ Nyaupare = Hanga) but this contradicts (ibid., p. 2) and oral tradition; possibly 'cousin' and 'nephew' have been mixed up in the colonial data.

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

FIGURE 2 Chiefdom Mpanze until 1967, according to colonial administration



FIGURE 3 Chiefdom Mpanze, until 2010

At least until 1967, the chiefs of Sanhantamba, Seguma, and Samanhanga, along with others outside what is now Barue District, were subordinated to the chief of the Mpanze area because the latter was a direct descendant of Kabudu Kagoro (Portugal, 1967, p. 2). Paulino F. Sanhantamba confirmed this for Zuze Sanhantamba, who was installed by Nhagumbo/Mpanze. As for himself, Melo MN stated that he became *régulo* during the last phase of the war between Frelimo and the Portuguese. He said he was installed without a voting process (*mavoti*) due to the fighting in the area. Melo Mpanze reported not to have experienced any problems when Frelimo came to power. However, during the Frelimo-Renamo war, he is said to have affiliated himself with Renamo (Luís MS; Vasco BN), although he is also reported to have been in Catandica while his younger brother Kenneth was an acting *régulo* near the Txatora River at the southeast border of Barue District, cooperating with Renamo (Francisco JB; cf. VBN; see map in Alexander 1995). According to *Régulo* Mpanze himself, he lived like a regular person, waiting to see which of them, Frelimo or Renamo,

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would 'come out' (i.e. as winner) of the conflict. Kenneth died some time after the GPA (FJB). On 25 June 2002, *Régulo* Melo Mpanze was officially recognized within the Decree 15/2000 framework (Mozambique, 2005a, p. 50).

4 Sanhantamba

Bhila (in Rita-Ferreira, 1982, p. 145) mentions a subordinate leader 'Sanhamutamba', whose name can almost certainly be taken as ~ Sanhantamba,[2] at the end of the eighteenth century. Though probably indicating the existence of a chiefdom with such a name then (perhaps in another location), the present-day *lineage* Sanhantamba seems not to be related to the eighteenth-century leaders of concern here. Neither Portugal (1967) nor the present *Régulo* Sanhantamba referred to such an early time. Portugal (1967, p. 141) mentions Gatze as first chief of the Sanhantamba chiefdom, acting during the 'war of the Makombes'. *Régulo* Tomás Suite Campira Sanhantamba (also known as Charles) indicated that his ancestor was assigned the chiefdom by Makombe (unspecified) at the end of the 'war of Makombe', which fits in with the period 1890–1892 (genealogical linkage with the earlier 'Sanhamutamba' is therefore unlikely). Zuze, grandson of Gatze, appeared as chief in colonial times (Portugal, 1967, p. 141; see Figures 4 and 5 for genealogies). Zuze was installed by Nhagumbo/Mpanze (cf. above).

Zuze was succeeded by Gimo sometime in the 1940s or early 1950s (Chadreque FS). Gimo's brother Fopenze was a *cipaio* (colonial policeman) (Paulino FS), dying in 1976 of a disease (CFS). Gimo was killed by Frelimo because he cooperated with the Portuguese (CFS). This would suggest a death date during the period 1972–1974 when Frelimo was militarily active in Barue before independence.

After Gimo, there seems to have been a chiefless period for a while; apparently under the colonial government no new chief was installed, and later Frelimo *secretários* performed the leadership role (Tomás SCS; PFS; Francisco JB). Paulino FS added that the Frelimo-Renamo war made living in the area very difficult, and he fled to a place south of Barue protected by Frelimo, around 1986. During the interview Paulino FS first indicated that Charles/Tomás became Gimo's successor after the end of the Frelimo-Renamo war. But

2 The letter combination 'mut-' may correspond with 'nt-' (compare Sena words as given in SIL and LIDEMO, 2010, p. 39 and corresponding Shona). Rita-Ferreira (1982, p. 145) states that a chiefdom with this name (with 'mut-') still exists, which almost certainly has to do with Sanhantamba.

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later he indicated that he himself had to be chief (*mambo*) because, he stated, 'until now' there is a 'list' in Catandica that would indicate him as being the rightful leader. He also mentioned a 'book' (*bhuku*) containing such a list, which had been consulted by some people confirming the claim ('the book' as also encountered in other literature–Buur & Kyed, 2006, p. 855; Kyed, 2007, p. 144). After the Frelimo-Renamo war he had coordinated the distribution of food and agricultural implements among the population, with the aid of his sister who had a car, and therefore people said he had to be *mambo*. Later in the interview, he did consider himself *régulo* at that time, starting sometime in the period 1992–1995. Mariano TP confirmed this information on distribution of 'products', stating it was in cooperation with, and by the initiative of, the Frelimo government.

However, about two years later (i.e. sometime in the period 1994–1997) Paulino's elder brother Chadreque FS would become chief (CFS). The latter's greater age ostensibly played a role in this (CFS; PFS). The Frelimo government in Catandica took the initiative for the change, Paulino FS explained. Chadreque FS stated moreover that the population did not want Paulino but him (Chadreque). Chadreque FS's chiefly status can be estimated from the fact that when Robert Mugabe once visited Barue to commemorate the Nhazónia massacre of 1976, the Zimbabwean delegation met with Chadreque in this context (CFS; MTP). The then District Administrator Costa F Charles was responsible for Chadreque's installation after the Frelimo-Renamo war (CFS; PFS). While Paulino seems to have appreciated Renamo's promotion of *régulos* (PFS, MTP), Chadreque had more affinity with Frelimo (CFS). However, Costa F Charles denied the Frelimo government picks *régulos*:

> It is the family of that lineage that [said], 'That is our real representative', and the population [...] agrees, 'Yes, it is that one'. Then they communicate to the government, the government goes there. [...] There was not any process in which the government arrives to say like, 'It's that one', no.

As with Paulino FS, Chadreque FS's reign as a *régulo* also ended when still alive. Charles/Tomás Suite Campira Sanhantamba was recognized as *régulo* by the Frelimo government on 12 August 2002 (Mozambique, 2005a, p. 50). Chadreque FS maintained he voluntarily handed over the portfolio to his younger cousin because he was tired of the job. Tomás SCS himself maintained he was Gimo's rightful successor but that Paulino and Chadreque were competitors. He insisted he was chosen by the people; there had been a meeting in which the majority of the population gathered there chose him as *régulo* because of his

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

FIGURE 4 Chiefdom Sanhantamba until 1967, according to colonial administration



FIGURE 5 Chiefdom Sanhantamba until 2010

good record of interacting with the people. Nanipenzi A maintained that neither Paulino nor Chadreque was entitled to the chieftaincy because their father Fopenze had allegedly committed adultery, an aspect not mentioned by other interviewees.

Mariano TP stated voting was never used in selecting a *régulo* but he did confirm the existence of popular consent in the selection and deposition of leaders:

> [It is the] population that gives the portfolio [to] mandate him [i.e. a *régulo*]. [...] [W]hen [the] population does not like [him], the chief is not going to work [...] When Chadreque was in charge, [...] [he] only receive[d] little respect from the population. So therefore [the] population deposed [him] and installed the known Charles.

5 Sanhatunze

According to Portugal (1967, p. 143), the origins of the Sanhatunze chiefdom lie in the time of the 'revolt of the Makombes', but it is not clear which episode is referred to. For reconstructions of genealogies, see Figures 6 and 7. *Régulo*

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

FIGURE 6 Chiefdom Sanhatunze until 1967, according to colonial administration



FIGURE 7 Chiefdom Sanhatunze until 2012

Luís Machado Sanhatunze considered Muantswa (probably ~ Muzimuasso in Figure 6) as the founder of the chiefdom.[3] Makombe gave the chiefdom to the founder of Sanhatunze because the latter's family helped in the fight against the Portuguese. The origin of the family was in the Saunyama area in present-day Zimbabwe.[4]

Muantswa, Cambene, Machado, and Miquitaio (~ Miquitai) were *régulos* in that order (Portugal, 1967, p. 143). Sigareta was elected in 1978, according to Luís MS. During the Frelimo-Renamo war, Renamo occupied part of his area, and he stayed in Catandica because he did not have a good relationship with Renamo. Chadreque Machado was *régulo* from 1985 until his death in 2008 (Luís MS). Alexander (1994, p. 50) quotes him as mentioning that after independence the rain rituals continued. The present *Régulo* Sanhatunze was inaugurated in 2009 (no exact date available), being selected within the family and then presented to the population. He reported no competition for the post, and I have not encountered information to the contrary.

3 According to Luís MS, the Mazuabende-Meque lineage mentioned in Figure 6 has no connection with the Sanhatunze chiefdom.

4 This follows from information given by Luís MS, Portugal (1967, pp. 2, 143), and (for background) Isaacman (1976, pp. 51–52).

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6 Samanhanga

An early rivalry that is remembered in Barue District was the one between 'Makombe' (usually identified as Kabudu Kagoro) and the first Samanyanga, Chivembe. If such a rivalry is historical, it would have occurred somewhere in the nineteenth century. There is a possibility that the remembered rivalry is a starkly condensed form of the disagreements between Kanga and Chipitura and the latter's successors, and in any case the establishment of the chiefdom under the current Samanhanga family is more likely to have been after De Sousa's arrest in 1890 than before.[5]

Portugal (1967, pp. 17, 146) and Artur (1996, pp. 16, 20, cf. 17) mention that the original Samanyanga, Chivembe, migrated from Mbire (~ M'bire) with his elder brother Kabudu Kagoro (~ Cabudocagolo) or Chipapata, also known as Makombe. Portugal (1967, p. 146) goes on to link Chivembe with descendants of the first half of the twentieth century, with only a few generations in between (Figure 8), a relatively short historical depth also implied by Ioanes/*Nyamukucu* (Figure 9) (considering that Nhamacocho ~ Nyamukucu and that the colonial investigator(s) probably mistook 'Mbunze' for 'M'Panze'). Ioanes CN held that Chivembe was a son of Mutota. One possibility is that we are (again) dealing with a conflation of Kabudu Kagoro and his son Kanga, combined with a telescoped genealogical relation with Mutota. 'Makombe' and 'Chivembe' would have to be understood as more distant relatives than 'brothers', assuming Kanga lies at the *actual origin* of the story rather than Chipapata/Kabudu Kagoro being *intended*. What supports this interpretation is that Pangaia in Artur (1996, p. 16) mentions that 'Makombe' is associated with war and Samanyanga with avoidance of war. This fits in with Kanga's and Chipitura's stance *vis-à-vis the Portuguese*; see also Arnold (1995[1901], p. 244). Interpreting 'Makombe' as Kanga, the Chivembe/Samanyanga lineage started ruling the area during or after the war with De Sousa. When I mentioned the Chibudu and Chipitura (~ Shupatora–Arnold, 1995[1901], p. 244) of the literature to Sueta AC, he associated Samanyanga with them. Ambrósio DC made the intriguing suggestion that a chiefdom under the Sahatsiro family complex would have been established in the Chôa area under the auspices of Samanyanga. This squares well with Chipitura's (~ Chipatula) rule over western Barue after De Sousa's defeat (see Peters, 1902, p. 89; cf. Van Dokkum, 2015, p. 316, Appendix B, § 9).

5 For more elaboration, see Van Dokkum (2015, p. 305, Appendix B, § 3, and 328–331, Appendix E).

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Adjunct-*Régulo* Luís Nhamugodzo Cruzamento Macossa confirmed that Makombe and Samanyanga came from Mbire in present-day Zimbabwe. They split at Tumbula (cf. Ch. 2). Chivembe controlled part of Barue and Makombe could not get hold of Chivembe due to a magic cloth belt, which prevented Makombe and/or his soldiers from entering the area of Chivembe because of the formation of clouds (mist). Makombe sent his wife to the wife of Chivembe and the former tricked the latter into telling the secret of the magic cloth belt. Makombe's wife then exchanged the magic cloth belt for one of her own. Makombe and/or his soldiers were then able to seize Chivembe. As a punishment for Chivembe's intransigence towards Makombe, the latter cut off one of Chivembe's fingers, but spared his life. Because of the cut finger he obtained the nickname 'Mbimbicala'.

Ranger (1963, p. 79) tells about a 'chief Samanyanga' who cooperated with Makosa during the 1917–1918 revolt near the Kaeredzi River. *Régulo* Gribete T Samanhanga and Ediasse SS stated that Tsimbo had been 'the first' chief, which probably refers to the first in colonial times. Relating this information to the colonial genealogical data in Figure 8 has so far been impossible. During my visit in 2012, *Régulo* Samanhanga proposed to ask the spirit of Ioanes CN, Nyamukucu, to provide the information about the genealogy of the Samanyanga family. A *mhondoro* spirit is almost by definition supposed to know the local chiefly genealogy (Bourdillon, 1974, p. 34). A description of the trance session can be found in Van Dokkum (2015, p. 332, Appendix F); the information obtained then constitutes the greater part of Figure 9.

Tsimbo's successor Zauazaua is reported to have abdicated in 1955, after which Caliche took up the post (Concelho do Barué, 1967; cf. 1966). Portugal (1967, p. 147) and Ioanes CN mention Waci (~ Uache) as a *chefe de grupo* (chief of a group of settlements), or *mpfumu*. His son Matene ruled when there were no *régulos* (ICN; cf. Concelho do Barué, 1967). After Matene it appears there was a chiefless period until the end of the Frelimo-Renamo war.

The chiefdom as it is today results from the merger, in several steps, of smaller segments during colonial times resulting in the relatively large area it is today. To the area of Samanhanga were annexed the former chiefdoms of Nhamagoze (~ Nhamugodzo), Chingaia, Uache, and Comacha, which came to belong to the category *grupo de povoações* (group of settlements). We know that the merger with Comacha in 1948, at least, was ordered in a top-down way (unspecified) from within the colonial governmental hierarchy (Concelho do Barué, 1967; Portugal, 1967, pp. 17, 147).

According to MS the beginning of Tenesse's reign was in 1995 or 1996. Ioanes CN mentioned that it was he himself who installed Tenesse after the Frelimo-Renamo war, being requested (by unspecified persons) to arrange for a new

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régulo, but he also indicated Tenesse went by himself to Catandica to declare himself *régulo*. Tenesse is mentioned by Fry (1997, p. 19) as the incumbent chief, and he was recognized by the Frelimo-government on 17 July 2002 (Mozambique, 2005a, p. 50).

After Tenesse's death in 2009 (MS), Gribete TS became *régulo* in August 2009 at the age of twenty (GTS). Tenesse was said to have been Gribete's uncle (GTS), but the genealogical distance is probably more distant than father's brother because Gribete's father's father is unequal to Tenesse's father (cf. Figure 9; more information unfortunately not available). Gribete's father Thaulo had already died, so he took his father's place in the lineage system. Gribete's selection and recognition process consisted of three crucial meetings (GTS). First the family held a meeting in which the spirit medium (*svikiro*) Ioanes CN was also present. During this meeting, the spirit 'came out' (i.e. the medium gets into a possession trance allowing the spirit to talk to the gathered family). The spirit then indicated that Gribete should be the next chief. This is considered the spirit's decision, not the medium's. The spirit's motivation for choosing Gribete was that his father had kept certain objects (*midzi*–roots) of Samanyanga during the war (unspecified) but had never been a chief when he died; Gribete could now occupy his place (ICN; Ioanes/*Nyamukucu*[6]). After about one or two weeks, the general populace gathered in a second meeting to hear the spirit's decision about the new chief. Thereafter, the necessary documents for the government were prepared and the recognition ceremony (the third meeting) was about a month after the second meeting.

The straightforward acceptance of the spirit's decision by the population was confirmed by MS. The *régulo* himself indicated that he did not want the job, but had no choice other than to obey the spirit. Although he was young, *Régulo* Gribete Samanhanga's authority was firmly established, and people I approached were reluctant to talk to me without his explicit permission, which I had no opportunity to obtain when I approached people for interviews (MS eventually agreed to talk but only unrecorded). Indirectly, the *régulo*'s status points to the wide acceptance of the status of the spirit medium across the population of the chiefdom. That such acceptance is not a given we will see below with Mr Magodo in the Chôa area. The *mhondoro* spirit's role as 'the mouthpiece of the *vox populi*' (Mudenge, 1988, p. 352) is not clearly evident in Gribete T Samanhanga's case with the data available. The existence of disputes

6 Ioanes/*Nyamukucu*: information obtained during trance session of Ioanes CN. I use the Fry convention to indicate 'Ioanes possessed by the spirit Nyamukucu' with the name of the spirit in italics after the slash (Fry, 1976, p. viii). In a possession seance the spirit, not the host, is supposed to speak.

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

FIGURE 8 Chiefdom Samanhanga until 1967, according to colonial administration



FIGURE 9 Chiefdom Samanhanga until 2010

about chiefly succession was reported, but these were decisively and immediately terminated by the spirit's decision (MS).[7] So, popular endorsement of Gribete Samanhanga as a *régulo* can, apart from the second meeting mentioned above, only be inferred from the fact that Ioanes CN's status as a medium remains intact after the decision (see Bourdillon, 1974, pp. 35–37; Lan, 1985, p. 67; and Spierenburg, 2004, pp. 148, 170, 172, 228 for discussions of status loss of mediums). To conclude this section, the Samanhanga chiefdom provided the only clear example of a politically motivated marriage in Barue during the

7 I have no information that would indicate that such disputes were very severe, such as the ones in the Chôa area to be discussed below. Moreover, Gribete's inauguration was in the same year as Tenesse's death, implying a rather smooth succession process.

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field research: medium Ioanes CN married a woman of the Samanhanga family (Enélia S, exact genealogical position unknown to me).

7 The Former Tangwena Chiefdom in Barue

For a full understanding of some of the chiefdoms discussed below, it is appropriate to discuss the former chiefdom of Tangwena first. This chiefdom no longer exists in Barue, although it continues in Zimbabwe. Tangwena's precolonial area probably extended from southern Chôa slightly onto the Barue plateau (compare maps of Arnold, 1901, and Companhia de Moçambique, 2010[1902]). The area was split by the Anglo-Portuguese border, and Chief Dzeka Tangwena moved with his people from the Mozambican to the British side of the chiefdom in 1902 (Christian Action Publications, 1972, p. 3; Warhurst, 1978, p. 221). *Sabhuku* Matias S Njanji confirmed this. Isaacman (1976, p. 66) suggests Tangwena defected. Moore (2005, p. 314) implies that Tangwena was driven out by Makombe. If this Makombe was Kanga, the latter suggestion is not very likely: Kanga had prepared for a Portuguese attack (Isaacman, 1976, p. 62); driving out Tangwena would have left the kingdom's south-western area without its recognized ruler and a coordinated defence. Moore (2005, p. 153) quotes a colonial administrator from Nyanga who reported as early as 1899 that Chief Tangwena 'is most eager to belong to this [i.e. 'British'] territory and complains to me of the Portuguese officials worrying him'. Hence it is not very likely that Kanga chased Tangwena away, and Isaacman's interpretation of Tangwena's movement as a defection is a robust one here.



FIGURE 10 Tangwena family

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Portugal (1967, p. 145) mentions one Dique, 'son of [the] Tanguene' who 'fled to South Rhodesia', as a chief between (Dzeka) Tangwena and the first Chief Seguma. This coincides with the report by Moore (2005, p. 132) that around 1906 many of Tangwena's people went to the Portuguese side of the Rhodesian/Mozambican border to evade taxes. The chiefly status of Dique is difficult to ascertain because Dzeka was still alive at that time, and so far I have found his name in no other documentation. A reconstruction of part of the genealogy of Tangwena family is given in Figure 10. Noteworthy is that Rekayi Tangwena aided Robert Mugabe in escaping to Mozambique across his territory apparently into what is now Macufa territory in April 1975 (Moore, 2005, pp. xii, 16–17, 39–40, 214–215).

8 Seguma

What is now the Seguma area was part of the Tangwena area before the Portuguese occupation (Portugal, 1967, pp. 16–17, 142, 145–146). The first Chief Seguma was put in place by the colonial government after the suppression of the 'revolt', probably around 1918 (Portugal, 1967, p. 142; cf. Figure 11).

Régulo Oniasse Bernardo Seguma stated that the first Seguma, also known as Kofi, was a son of Makombe Kabudu Kagoro (who according to Oniasse BS was also named 'Nyandoro'; see Figure 12). Later chiefs in the area were Nhandoro/Sixpence, Bernardo, Niquisse, Cipriano, and the current chief, Oniasse BS. The practice of adelphic succession across generations can be traced here, but with just two descent lines it is less prominent than with Mpanze.

Sixpence became *régulo* in the 1960s (Cipriano NS; cf. Portugal, 1967, p. 142). Sixpence's reign terminated in 1974/1975 (CNS), dying somewhat later in 1978 (Marcelino SN). Nyandoro/Sixpence's son Bernardo became the next *régulo* (see Figure 12), but he was killed by Frelimo during the Frelimo-Renamo war. This fact is not mentioned by other Barue researchers, Alexander (1994, 1995, 1997), Bertelsen (2003), and Virtanen (2001, 2005), but clear from comments by Marcelino SN, Francisco JB, and Vasco BN. The latter stated Bernardo helped Renamo with food supplies. According to Marcelino SN,

> …Bernard […] worked for Renamo. […] Frelimo found any means to get that man. They [Frelimo] assassinated him, because he was not allowed to work for the enemy, who's been sent by Portugal [sic] […] to destroy Mozambique. […] [Bernardo Seguma was a] betrayer [of] the Frelimo party. […] He was tortured and killed […] in front of the whole majority [i.e. multitude] in Catandica.
>
> MSN, original English

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According to Francisco JB, Bernardo Seguma was shot dead (*fuzilado*), indeed in public at the mango trees behind the 'Mbuya Lena' lodging complex in Catandica. This shows that the literature existent thus far may not be exhaustively knowledgeable concerning violent acts by Frelimo during the civil war, in this case as an example of the 'theatrics of violence' (Abbink, 1995, p. 67; also Igreja, 2010, p. 783), in a public meeting. Vasco BN estimated the event to have occurred sometime in the period 1985–1987.

After Bernardo's death, there must have been a chiefless period (Soda GC). Soda GC, affiliated with Frelimo, claimed that at the end of the war he led the area for a while on behalf of Niquisse. Then Niquisse was *régulo* from 1993 until 2002 (OBS; Cipriano NS). Niquisse's son Cipriano was briefly *régulo* in 2002. *Régulo* Oniasse B Seguma was recognized in August 2002 (Mozambique, 2005a, p. 50; OBS). His becoming *régulo* was only possible after Cipriano NS's deposition and reveals political antagonism, as I will now discuss.

Cipriano NS claims he was chosen (Sh: *kusarudza*–to choose) by the general populace to become *régulo*; Lucas J confirmed this. 'The inhabitants of the entire place here did it' because '[t]hey saw how I behaved' (CNS). In Cipriano's case there was a meeting (*sangano*) in the local school building. Cipriano confirmed that Oniasse was an alternative individual for the post at that time. Cipriano obtained a flag and emblem, which he had to fetch himself in Catandica, but no uniform (OBS; CNS). However, after some months of waiting for a recognition ceremony, the post was assigned to Oniasse BS (CNS). Cipriano stated he willingly left the post to Oniasse BS:

> I came to see that [we were] crowding each other out […]. Consequently I saw that […] it was better that I would leave […] [W]e were creating a little clash ahead, therefore I said 'you're doing the job', but I gave him [the job] wholeheartedly […].

When asked how the people reacted to the change while they had, according to the earlier information, earlier chosen him, Cipriano NS said that 'some' (*outros*[8]) were not in favour of his handing over the portfolio. This word indicates a less than unanimous support for him, though it also implies no unanimous rejection.

Oniasse BS maintained that he initially refused to become chief out of fear, and did not want to take power 'by force' (*com a força*). He continued that

8 '*Outros*' probably influenced by Shona '*vamwe*': 'others' but also 'some'.

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> …I had knowledge that the population would not accept to go on with him [Cipriano] as a *régulo*. [T]herefore I [was] refusing so as not to induce blame on me. Should he want to blame, he would go blame the community, population. Because it is not me who gets to his house: 'Hey, you, why do you remain as a *régulo*?'

Oniasse BS insisted there had been a meeting of judges at Cipriano's house, which decided the post should be given from the latter to him. Soda GC, a judge in the Seguma area and now president of the recently established community court there, did not remember any such meeting.[9] Soda GC did confirm that Cipriano was willing to give up the post. Soda GC added that women within the family had protested that the post had been passed on within the same 'house' (*nyumba*), that is, from father Niquisse to son Cipriano. Soda GC then verbalized the prohibition to do so as follows:

> [I]t is our law all around. [With] *régulos*, it cannot be that the very same house should enter.

This idea is consistent with the idea of adelphic succession (although *Régulo* Melo Mpanze gave a stronger, positive version of the principle [cf. above]). Concerning Cipriano's fitness to be a *régulo* for the people, Soda GC maintained that Cipriano had been in office too short a time to evaluate this.

Both Niquisse and Oniasse Seguma claimed they had popular support. Soda GC stated that difficulties with the population were not the reason for Cipriano's deposition. The case of Seguma then shows that besides popular support the principle of rotation can be invoked as an independent argument for a change of chiefs. This contrasts with those election systems, such as in Mozambique, where a change of president (i.e. change according to party affiliation) can only occur as a result of having different winners in successive elections.



FIGURE 11 Chiefdom Seguma until 1967, according to colonial administration

9 My assistant and I tried to locate another potential witness to the asserted meeting but were unsuccessful in locating the individual we were looking for.

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

FIGURE 12 Chiefdom Seguma until 2010

9 Sabão

Like Sanhatunze, the Sabão area lies partly within the Catandica municipality. Catandica is named after a person, living around or somewhat before 1900.[10] Arnold (1901) mentions such a person on his map, but Coutinho (1904, p. 45) already speaks of his 'former' lands, describing him as being allied to Chipitura. If the place Chingaia is ~ Chingara (see Coutinho, 1904, pp. 227–228 on Chingara's location relative to the Nhazónia River), the area of Catandica extended into the area of present-day Samanhanga. The present Sabão lineage does not seem to have a clear connection with the Makombe era as rulers. According to Ambrósio DC, the Sabão are, together with the Macufa of the Chôa area, related to the Saunyama family of Zimbabwe (interview in 2018 by Joaquim Mantrujar Meque). Fosco, a member of another lineage (Figure 13), became 'the first leader of Sabão' under colonial rule (Portugal, 1967, pp. 16, 143 compare Hatanga in Figure 14, where so far the order of succession could not be established exactly; the role of Caripassamba and Saussenga also remains indistinct). The area in Fosco's time seems to have been larger than it is nowadays, extending into the Chôa area, at least encompassing Chinda. Indeed, the *regedoria* (colonial jargon for 'chiefdom') of Sabão was originally called 'Sachinda'. When the chiefdom of Bango in the Chôa area was created, the chief thereof was dependent on the chief of Sabão for approval to rule (Portugal, 1967, pp. 16,

10 Compare Arnold (1901, map); Artur (1996, p. 57n35), Báruè (n.d., p. 11), Coutinho (1904, pp. 259; cf. 262–263), and Mozambique (2002, p. 143).

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

FIGURE 13 Chiefdom Sabão until 1967, according to colonial administration



FIGURE 14 Chiefdom Sabão until 2010

144); *Régulo* José N Sabão still mentioned the Kaeredzi River as the western border of his area (also mentioned by SAC).

According to two independent sources, the first Sabão managed to get hold of the chiefdom by marrying his daughter Suzana to a certain Portuguese (Adolfo SS; Quenesse JS), called Lucas, who was an interpreter (ASS). According to Adolfo S Saluanza, the chiefdom today known as 'Sabão' was expanded into what is now ASS's territory when Sabão was chief. Quenesse J Sahatsiro maintained that what is now Sabão belonged to an area he claims his own family was ruling (QJS did not mention Fosco). Sabão was succeeded by his son Zuze while he was still alive. Zuze in his turn was succeeded by Pita, Fosco's son (Portugal, 1967, p. 143). The existence of another chiefly lineage including Pita was confirmed by Muchabande N. Pita's name has been crossed out in the copy of Portugal (1967) I consulted, and another comment written with pencil mentions Sabão's son Notice as *regedor* (leader). From this we know that Notice's inauguration was in 1967 or later. Tique Z stated that Notice was chosen during a meeting (*banja*) of a group of elders (*wakulu*) from among several sons of Sabão of a similar age (*saizi ibodzi*).

Notice seems to have been respected by Frelimo. According to Tique Z and Pita PC he was not allowed to perform administrative functions, but Alice C reported that Notice was administratively active during the Frelimo-Renamo war though on a limited scale: 'The *régulo* ruled, but Frelimo ruled more'. In any case the rain rituals under his responsibility appear to have continued

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(TZ, AC). Alice C associated Notice with Frelimo rather than Renamo but according to Tique Z he just saw who was going to win the war (which eventually was Frelimo). Notice died on 13 November 2009 (FN^s 14/11/2009).

After public approval in a meeting on 30 April 2010, Notice's son José was inaugurated on 12 May 2010 (see Van Dokkum, 2015, pp. 221–223 for the approval and inauguration events). There were no competitors for the post, although José's half-brother Jaime (son of an ex-spouse of Notice) had in the past made himself known to District Administrator Chimoio as being interested in the post. Mr Chimoio had refused his candidacy on the ground that Jaime was an adherent of Renamo. Jaime died soon after this episode (FN^s 03/09/2010, source José NS). Another half-brother, Fernando, was first secretary of the district committee of Frelimo in Changara District in 2010 (JNS; FN^s 03/09/2010).

10 Bango/Macufa (Chôa)

As mentioned above, the area of Chôa was originally at least partly under the Tangwena family. The current *Régulo* Macufa, Pita Macufa Muchairi, stated that his father Macufa was originally a local leader[11] who was appointed to supervise the forced labour activities in the Chôa area in colonial times, becoming *nyakwawa* (Bw, or Sh: *mambo* – chief) Bango, probably around 1957 (cf. *Registo* 1942–1960 [AHM]). This may have been connected to the creation of the *Posto Administrativo* of Chôa, which was in that year 1957 (Rafael, 2001, p. 19; cf. Fernando VGT). As noted above, despite the chiefly status the chief of Bango was dependent on the chief of Sabão at that time. Pita MM's great-grandfather Mudzedzera came from Zimbabwe to the Chôa area from Nyanga in present-day Zimbabwe. For genealogies, see Figures 15 and 16. Mudzedzera's son Muchairi secured a leadership position. Pita Macufa M stated that his father Macufa had five *sabhuku*s under him; this fits in with information from Portugal (1967, p. 146) given here between parentheses: Sagoro (Sagoro), Njanji (Jange), Marombedza (Caereze), Mabeca (Mussipa), and Sanhamáuè (Sanhamagué). Pita MM did not mention Sahatsiro as *sabhuku* under Macufa. We will see below that the areas of Sanhamáuè and Sahatsiro alike have been split off from what was in colonial times the Bango chiefdom.

Macufa did not report to the colonial government that someone had died in a fight (Ambrósio DC; see also Virtanen, 2005, p. 239). For this omission, the colonial government arrested him but he managed to escape. He hid in

11 Sh: *sadunhu*; in Barue this could be an equivalent of a *sabhuku* (headman), or somebody with a much more confined area; cf. Moore (2005, p. 276).

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

FIGURE 15 Chiefdom Bango until 1967, according to colonial administration



FIGURE 16 Chiefdom Macufa until 2010

Musvipa until he died shortly later around the time of the arrival of Frelimo (ADC). Pita MM maintained his father 'worked with the Portuguese' until 1973, dying in Musvipa on 5 December of that year. According to Ambrósio DC there was no chief from that time on. Pita MM confirmed this, adding that his elder brother Rapson took up the post of their father in 2002. However, Macamo (2006, p. 140) and Virtanen (2005) would suggest there was at least one chief Macufa during the time PMM implied there was a chiefless period. The identity of that chief remains unclear.

Rapson was apparently never recognized by the district government because it was Sérgio Sahatsiro, of an entirely different family, who ascended to *régulo* leadership status for the entire Chôa area during the period 2002–2003 when the Frelimo government installed *régulos* within the Decree 15/2000 framework. The Macufa family defended their position by referring to colonial administration ('the book', cf. above):

> We asked them to open the book, just because all these chiefs […] are registered on the book by the […] Portuguese. […] [These] are the very chiefs who are [i.e. should be] working at this present moment.
>
> Pita MM, original English

Eventually the area would be split into three. Virtanen (2005, p. 236) reports there has been talk, at least since 1999, of splitting the Bango chiefdom. Historical references do not provide clear motivations for the threefold split,

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although Micheque F Sahatsiro and Quenesse J Sahatsiro used the Tangwena area as a reference for the southern border of Sahatsiro. Colonial era data as provided by Portugal (1967) also do *not* provide solutions for claimants of the entire former Bango Chiefdom (despite assertions to the contrary) because it would then have to be accepted that the *régulo* of Sabão would have deciding power, something not seriously contemplated by anyone among the present-day competitors for the mountainous area.

A first step towards the split was realized in 2002, although this does not show in Mozambique (2005a, p. 50), which mentions Chôa under the leadership of Sérgio J Sahatsiro only. Pita MM indicated 2002 was the year that there was a vote between Sahatsiro and his elder brother Rapson, with Sahatsiro declared the winner. According to PMM people in Musvipa had conspired (*vanhu vangataurirana*) to vote for 'someone of the side of Musvipa' (i.e. Sahatsiro, north of Chinda, Pita MM's residence). Later in the interview, PMM added people from Barauro to the alleged plot and stated it was under the leadership of Mabeca Musvipa, a *sabhuku* of his father. The fact that Pita MM mentions this vote, which was to his brother's and his own disadvantage, is a strong indication for its historical trustworthiness. James IM confirmed there had been a vote, but he gave the result as being equivocal:

> There at that meeting [the participants] were divided; there was a competition [*makwikwi*].

The reported equivocal vote between Sahatsiro and Macufa indicates that the numbers of adherents of the respective lineages were not drastically different, even if not equal. During my fieldwork, it became clear that the Macufas were unpopular in the central Chôa area, and this circumstance makes it understandable that people in this area contemplated that Sahatsiro should split off from Macufa. *Chefe do Posto* of Chôa Henriques Quiraque stated that it was the population who had conceived of the solution that there should be a division (between specifically Macufa and Sahatsiro). It is not entirely clear to what debates Henriques Q referred, but because Virtanen, as indicated, reported debates already in 1999, there had probably been a series of debates over the years, in which several participants have suggested the division.

After the arrival of Luís Alberto Chimoio as Barue's District Administrator in 2007, the Macufa family lobbied him to revive the issue. According to Pita MM 'the book(s)' at the district government office substantiated his claim that only Macufa is the unique chief in the area. Pita MM himself was inaugurated 12 December 2008 (PMM), after his elder brother had suffered a heart attack. Dudzai MS confirmed in 2012 that the people in the Chôa area were divided concerning the rulership of Macufa or Sahatsiro. Dudzai MS himself was

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content with Macufa, who had helped him successfully because the *régulo* had organized the police to recuperate Dudzai MS's sheep, which had been stolen. On the other hand, Pita Macufa is reported to have tried to assert his authority in the Nhacapanga area (central Chôa area) in 2009 (Filimone WN and Matias FD; Samuel M). According to Filimone WN and Matias FD, he came to Nhacapanga to organize a meeting with the population and to propose to resolve disputes (against payment of goats and chickens). He was then chased away by someone referred to as the *sabhuku* of Nhacapanga, without having been successful with the population in the mid-Chôa area. Self-imposition did not work.

11 Sahatsiro

The name 'Sahatsiro' is used not only for one specific twentieth-century individual but also for a family complex comprising several lineages (cf. Figure 17). According to Ambrósio DC, the broader Sahatsiro family originated in Mukota (Mutoko in present-day Zimbabwe) and emigrated from there when Nyakudzi was alive. They were given a place by the then Chief Samanyanga. According to Ambrósio DC, Samanyanga, not Makombe, gave the family a leadership position. Caibossi SG indicated 'Sahatsiro Chirikubindu' as the one who founded the 'chiefdom' (*nyika*). Virtanen's (2005, p. 234) information would suggest that Sahatsiro's father would have been a ruler already before 1917.[12] As alluded to above, comments by Quenesse JS and Micheque FS suggest that they consider Tangwena's northern border to be Sahatsiro's southern border (though for Quenesse JS this did not imply chiefly status for Macufa). Vasco MM added that such a border is near Chinda. These data fit in with a comment by Coutinho (1904, p. 261) about Chinda being 'near' Tangwena (this would imply *Régulo* Macufa lives a little bit to the north of the area of Tangwena as it was around 1900). Vasco MM provided the information that the border with Sanhamáuè (in the north) lies near Chozvo.

According to Quenesse JS, Sahatsiro was arrested when he encountered Boers (sg. Sh: *Bhunu*), who were killing one or more elephants, and served three months in prison. He temporarily went to Nyamaropa in present-day Zimbabwe and left the area to Mankhati, who was close family (not exactly clear, but probably a brother). Few details are given, but neither Quenesse JS

12 Unfortunately, neither I myself nor Virtanen (2005) has any information about this person's name.

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nor Vasco MM considered Mankhati *régulo*, and thus he apparently only played a role as temporary caretaker until Sahatsiro's return.[13]

Ambrósio DC had information about a Sahatsiro, who from parallel information of Vasco MM may be identified as Janeiro, son of Sahatsiro. When collecting tax, this Sahatsiro hit a person in the eye with his *chamboque* (whip). For this reason, he was put in prison (ADC). Vasco MM confirmed Janeiro S had indeed 'done something wrong' and 'consequently was expelled from the whole place'. Ambrósio DC, Vasco MM, and Henriques Q mentioned Macufa, who was not of the Sahatsiro family, as (Janeiro) Sahatsiro's successor as the main ruler in the Chôa area. This implies that Jofrisse, Janeiro's brother, was a lower-level leader. Virtanen's (2001, p. 148; cf. 2005, p. 234) sources (family of Janeiro) also mentioned this change and placed it in the 1940s, but explained it as resulting from 'a conflict of interests' without mentioning the eye-incident.

The creation of the Bango *regulado*, with *Régulo* Sabão appointing Macufa/Bango as the new chief, probably followed Janeiro Sahatsiro's arrest and apparent deposition as a leader by the colonial government (cf. Portugal, 1967, pp. 2, 16; Rafael, 2001, p. 19). Portugal (1967, p. 144) mentions one Sancassiro (~ Sacatsiro, Sahatsiro), classified as a '*chefe de grupo*' under Sabão (cf. Ambrósio DC). According to Vasco MM, Janeiro ruled for only about two years and was succeeded by his brother Jofrisse (confirmed by Crecia JS), who governed into the time of the anticolonial war, so the hypothesis that the Sancassiro of Portugal (1967) was Jofrisse S may be contemplated. Jofrisse died and was succeeded by Sérgio with the status of *régulo*, but only in the 2000s (Vasco MM, cf. Crecia JS). According to Mozambique (2005a, p. 50), Sérgio JS was 'recognized' by the government in August 2003, although his selection had probably already occured in 2002 (cf. Pita MM).[14] Sérgio JS died in 2008 (VMM), leaving a power vacuum in the centre of the Chôa area in an already complicated political situation, to be discussed below.

13 The background of this episode is not entirely clear from the interview with QJS, but since the Boers are mentioned so explicitly, it appears that Sahatsiro had some conflict with Afrikaner people, which ended to his disadvantage (Rita-Ferreira, 1999, pp. 64n18, 65n31 mentions Afrikaners being present in the Chôa area at least before 1942; cf. Pélissier, 1994[1984] Vol. 2, p. 355; cf. Isaacman, 1976, p. 57, who reports Kanga gave a land concession to Boers–unclear where and when). My hypothesis is that Quenesse JS presented the story to me in order to make clear that Sahatsiro did not voluntarily give up the post, an argument that might be used against his descendants living today.

14 The '3' in '2003' might be a typographical error in the source, as all the other recognition ceremonies mentioned there are dated 2002.

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

FIGURE 17 Sahatsiro family complex

12 Sanhamáuè

In 1967, the area of Sanhamáuè (~ Sanhamagué, Sanyamahwe) was ruled by a *chefe de grupo* subject to the chiefdom of Bango in the Chôa area (Portugal, 1967, p. 146). When I visited Roberto Jorge Chiputamassango in July 2012, he was waiting to receive his uniform to take up the post of chief, although he said he had already been inaugurated on 25 June. He reported no popular involvement in his selection, just that his family chose him. I have no governmental documentary evidence available that the Sanhamáuè area has the status of chiefdom, but because of Roberto JC's own use of the word *mambo* (chief) and the frequent talk in Barue, already discussed, of the split of the Chôa area in three, it is classified as such here.

Roberto JC's grandfather Muocha was a predecessor as leader of the area (see Figure 18), with his period of rule unknown (RJC). Virtanen (2005, p. 238) reports a female ruler (not mentioned by RJC) without giving genealogical details. Muocha was succeeded by Pita, who was officially recognized by the government in 2007, though Roberto JC indicated that Pita had been serving in this function since his own early childhood, which was in the 1970s. This is confirmed by former combatant Mutarato LC, who was in the area during the



FIGURE 18 Chiefdom Sanhamáuè until 2012

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independence struggle (around mid-1973), when this part of Barue was a zone controlled by Frelimo. Mutarato LC identified Pita as a *mambo* and a 'chief of the people', with whom Frelimo cooperated. According to Virtanen (2005, pp. 238–239), he was abducted by Renamo in 1986 and escaped a year later. Pita served in this function until his death in 2011 (RGC). Roberto JC confirmed that there was a partition concerning chiefdoms of the Chôa area in three parts.

13 The Chôa Area Leadership Competition Problem and Involvement of the Population

As indicated, considerable discussion has been on-going for years concerning the question of who should rule the Chôa area. At the time of the author's field research, the disputes involved predominantly the Macufa and the Sahatsiro families, with the latter including the Macaza and Chekwa lineages. The position of Sanhamáuè, now ruling in the northern part of Chôa, seems to trigger less controversy (cf. e.g. Quenesse JS). For the exposition to follow, it is useful to keep four names in mind: Micheque FS, Ambrósio DC, Vasco MM (see Figure 17), and Pita Macufa M (Figure 16). In an interview in 2010 with Micheque F Sahatsiro (at the time expected to become *régulo*), with his uncle Quenesse J Sahatsiro present, the latter maintained that Macufa was only a *sabhuku*, but Micheque FS then said that Macufa was a *régulo* (*mambo*).

Vasco Macaza Magaço was known to be a candidate-*régulo*. He referred in an interview with me to other people's wishes rather than his own actions when asked whether and how he was to be a *régulo*: 'I do not know what I am doing. People wish that I should be *régulo*'. Still, he would like to be one, although he had the disadvantage of having diminished eyesight. He mentioned the mediums Caibossi SG (Magodo) and Herbert SG among others as supporters of his candidacy; for Caibossi SG this is confirmed by himself. There is no family relationship between Vasco MM and the family of Caibossi SG. Caibossi SG stated that Vasco MM was entitled to the chiefly position (*ushe*) because his house, or lineage, (*imba*) had not yet ruled in contrast with other houses.

The background of this situation is the claim that Vasco MM's grandfather (father's father), Magaço, should have been *mambo* (chief). Vasco MM stated that in the 1940s Magaço was asked to come from Manica to be *mambo*, but he arrived too late in Barue and by then the position had already gone to a relative, Janeiro Sahatsiro. Vasco MM added that several houses have not taken their turn yet in occupying the post of *mambo*, specifically those of Ngoviro (genealogy unknown to me), Mankhati, and Magaço. Vasco MM suggested that the descendants of Janeiro S are just trying to maintain the *mambo* position among themselves. They also try, according to Vasco MM, to block the aspirations of

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Chekwa (Ambrósio DC's lineage). (Note the word '*mambo*' applied by Vasco MM to the 1940s; this would not square with the Fosco and Sabão lineages ruling the area; cf. above.)

The Chekwa lineage, in the person of Ambrósio Deniasse Chekwa, succeeded in occupying the post of *régulo* for a while. Samuel M explained that the Sahatsiro family wanted to have somebody of their own in the position of *régulo*, but someone who would live in Nhazónia village, that is, on the plateau and not in the mountainous area. As this location was unacceptable to the local population in the mountains, Ambrósio DC, who originated from the Chôa area, was approached. His becoming *régulo* with uniform was happily anticipated, according to Samuel M. He was in office for the period of February-July 2009 (ADC; cf. Samuel M). Successful in suppressing theft in the area, he was nevertheless deposed before any governmental recognition ceremony was held (Samuel M). Samuel M reported that there was the idea that Ambrósio DC was not of a ruling family, a situation which was 'not done' (*hazviiti*– Samuel M),[15] but later in the interview he revealed that Ambrósio DC was seen as a representative of the Sahatsiros and acted with their consent. The Sahatsiro family however continued to exercise influence, and Ambrósio DC allegedly did not cooperate optimally with the Sahatsiros (Samuel M).

Just as Ambrósio DC was about to receive the government uniform, he was removed from the post. Samuel M reported that in 2009 a meeting was held with about 200 people to discuss matters. This was the meeting where it was decided that Ambrósio could no longer be *régulo*. In August 2010, another meeting was held,[16] but this time there were only 80 people because people felt they were being toyed with (*kutamba*), since a new *régulo* had not been inaugurated since the last meeting in 2009 (more on this below). At the 2010 meeting, Micheque was introduced as the new *régulo*-to-be. When asked, Micheque FS confirmed that his acceptance of the division (of the old Bango area) was subject to popular wishes because

> …Sahatsiro should rule in the middle so as not [to have] bickering tomorrow with the population. […] I fear to say 'the entire area [is] mine' […]. [Better] stay away from this problem.

15 Note that Vasco MM did not reason in this way when it came to Ambrósio DC. The relevant situation is that unlike Micheque FS and Vasco MM, Ambrósio DC is not a descendant of Chirikubindu; cf. Figure 17.

16 I confess I missed this meeting, learning about it only shortly after it had already been held.

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Caibossi SG/Magodo held that Ambrósio DC would not be eligible. No exact reason was given, but it is probably related to his assertion that 'Sahatsiro Chirikubindu' founded the chiefdom. If this 'Sahatsiro Chirikubindu' is to be identified with the Chirikubindu of Figure 17, indeed this makes (in Caibossi SG's approach) Vasco MM eligible and Ambrósio DC ineligible, if only descendants of Chirikubindu could be chiefs. From the information available, it becomes clear that Caibossi SG/Magodo actively campaigned against Ambrósio DC (ADC, Samuel M). This episode reveals the ambiguous status of Caibossi SG himself as a spirit medium. Caibossi SG had adherents, a situation which worked against Ambrósio DC, even if Caibossi SG's status as a *mhondoro* medium was not universally recognized.

Samuel M also recognized Caibossi SG's spirit not as relevant for politics but only for healing. Here we have one instance of the circumstance that the legitimacy of a medium's status depends on recognition of that status among the populace (see Bourdillon, 1974, pp. 30, 35–37; Fry, 1976, pp. 119, 130n17; and discussion by Lan, 1985, p. 67). Ultimately individuals decide for themselves whether a medium's spirit is a *mhondoro* spirit or not; and Caibossi SG's spirit was not universally recognized as a *mhondoro* spirit in the way Ioanes CN's spirit was. Nevertheless, Samuel M held Caibossi SG and his group of adherents responsible for the deposition of Ambrósio DC from the chiefly position ('[T]hey had the spirit that expelled [ADC]'). However, Caibossi SG had a Pyrrhic victory, as Ambrósio DC's deposition strengthened the position of the Sahatsiro group, while Vasco MM was not subsequently generally accepted.

Asked about Caibossi and Herbert SG, Ambrósio DC explained:

> [Both] of them are without lion spirit, which they say command the people. But […] it is not this. This spirit […] which commands the people must be a spirit from that region where it comes out in a person of that region. […] Magodo is a Zimbabwean of Katerere, therefore his spirit says that [it is] from Saunyama there at Nyanga. Therefore […] I do not accept to belong to that group, because it brings with it strange politics. It is politics that misleads the people.

However, after Ambrósio DC was expelled, no new *régulo* was inaugurated. Samuel M complained that he could not market his agricultural produce because of the lack of transport in the (rather desolate) area. According to him a *régulo* could arrange such things with the government. He revealed that around where he lives (around Chôa *Sede*) people favoured Ambrósio DC but in Barauro people favoured Sahatsiro more than Ambrósio DC. Samuel M revealed furthermore that *Régulo* Macufa is certainly unwanted and confirmed

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the story of the latter's expulsion when he tried to assert his authority in the mid-Chôa area.

An interesting aspect of the leadership competition is also that a female member of the Sahatsiro family, Crecia Janeiro Sahatsiro, was mentioned (by Vasco MM) to be a contender for the post of chief. She herself explained in my interview with her that as a woman she could not be, however. Her vision was that her brother's son Micheque would cooperate with her. Later in the interview, however, she said I could consider her a '*mambo*'.

Sahatsiro family elder Quenesse JS, certainly wanting the Janeiro lineage to be ruling in the Sahatsiro area, promoted Micheque (not someone else) because he maintained that Micheque is good in communicating with people ('I am not a scoundrel [Pt: *malandro*]', QJS commented). However, the 2010 presentation of Micheque, which had concluded his selection process against other candidate *régulos*, has so far not been followed by his installation. Interviews done in February 2018 by Joaquim Mantrujar Meque revealed that Micheque FS had still not been inaugurated, leading to a situation where Pita Macufa was effectively ruling the area that a member of the Sahatsiro family was supposed to rule. Although he still was expected to be inaugurated some day, disagreement among the Sahatsiro family themselves was indicated as the cause of Micheque FS's non-installation. (Vasco MM was also still mentioned as a potential, but due to illness not likely, candidate for the chiefly position.) Ambrósio DC provided the information that Micheque's mother does not want him to be enthroned because she fears for his death due to the quarrels associated with the chiefdom. This is intriguing information because the aspect of killing or being killed for the sake of one's community was identified above (cf. Malešević, 2013, p. 115) as being characteristic for nations. (Albertino D, Majone KC, Caifa JD, Ambrósio DC).

14 Saluanza

Adolfo Saimone Saluanza, born in 1920, had already abdicated for his son (Bartolomeu) two years before I interviewed him in 2009. He insisted his status had been that of *nyakwawa* (Bw, i.e. *régulo*, chief) but this is not mentioned as such in Mozambique (2005a, p. 50). One Saluanza is mentioned, like Sahatsiro, as a *chefe de grupo* under Sabão by Portugal (1967, p. 144).[17] Since at the time of

17 Genealogy unclear, probably this Saluanza was Adolfo SS's father. Saluanza is to be taken ~ Saruadza as cf. Virtanen (2005, pp. 234–235).

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the fieldwork Saluanza did not appear to reside under any other *régulo*, the Saluanza area is classified here as a chiefdom. Adolfo SS mentioned that his family got the area from Makombe (unspecified). Virtanen (2005, p. 235) states that Saluanza's ancestor had come four generations ago from as far as Chuabo (Zambézia). Adolfo SS maintained the chiefdom of what is today Sabão was in the past expanded into what is now Saluanza's territory. He furthermore mentioned that the area of Saluanza had also been subject to a dispute with the Sahatsiro family. First Adolfo SS claimed 'the people' wanted both Sahatsiro and Saluanza (implying: their territories should be apart), but later in the interview it emerged that the (definitive) division between Sahatsiro and Saluanza was a result of a decision by the District Administrator during the time of President Chissano (i.e. in or before 2004–although evidently such a division was not formalized in 2004 as appears from Mozambique, 2005a, p. 50); these interpretations are not necessarily inconsistent.

15 Conclusion

There exists quite a variety in the ways chiefs, or prospective chiefs, are selected in Barue District. Not all of them emerge as leaders through popular consultation, but there have been some. It is also clear that political competition is not unheard of. Table 5 sums up the political backing of incumbent *régulos* (or prospective *régulo* in the case of Sahatsiro) in the 2010–2012 period.

Besides invoking reference to the wishes of the population–at least sometimes–to buttress the claims of an individual, ruling lineages as a collectivity need to have their chiefly position legitimized by historical claims. From Table 6, which sums up the historical origins of the chiefdoms in present-day Barue District, we can draw some conclusions about these chiefdoms. First is that most of them are rather new, as far as the ruling families are concerned. No chiefly lineage, as they appear today, has an obvious connection with history before 1890 (the Mpanze and Samanyanga lineages concern only genealogy, not the current chiefdoms). Sanhantamba and Sanhatunze link the origin of their chiefdom explicitly with 'Makombe', and their claims seem plausible. Their precolonial origin does not make them more 'traditional' in the sense of 'centuries old', however. They came into being after a period in which MA de Sousa appears to have wrought considerable havoc, destroying the earlier setup of chieftainships. Second, the chiefdoms have known dynamics that continue to develop in recent times and are certainly not just copies of colonial regulations. Although some claimants to chieftaincy invoked 'the book' to back

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TABLE 5 Political backing of incumbent *régulos*

Régulo	Reference to population invoked for legitimation	Selection subject to public gathering(s)	Competition, factionalism, or pluralism	Comment
Macufa	no	yes (with brother)	yes	Chôa-case
Mpanze	no	no	no	
Sabão	no	yes	no	
Sahatsiro	yes (by QJS)	yes	yes	Chôa-case
Saluanza	yes	unclear	yes	
Samanhanga	no	yes (second meeting)	yes	spirit selected, overruling all competition
Sanhamáuè	no	no	yes	Chôa-case
Sanhantamba	yes	yes	yes	
Sanhatunze	no	no	no	
Seguma	yes	unclear for OBS	yes	

up their claims, such invocations were either not successful at all (Paulino FS) or irrelevant (Crecia JS) because the colonial situation differed from the desired one.

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TABLE 6 Historical origins of chiefdoms in Barue District

Chiefdom	Created under	Creation period	Background
Macufa	colonial government	± 1950s, probably 1957	southern part first under Tangwena, then split-off from Seguma; under Sabão incorporating all Chôa area; later split up
Mpanze	Makombe leadership (larger area)	larger area under Makosa probably 1890–1902	partitioned from Makosa's area probably after Barue Revolt of 1917-1918 in colonial times
Sabão	colonial government	± 1918	first under Fosco; included (part of) the Chôa area, later reduced
Sahatsiro	Frelimo government	2007 (mid-Chôa)	precolonial status unclear; from colonial era headmanship
Samanhanga	Chivembe	1890–1902	Chivembe belonged to the Makombe family; hypothetically a residual of Chipitura's area; colonial area initially smaller than now, later expanded

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Chiefdom	Created under	Creation period	Background
Sanhamáuè	Frelimo government	2007 (north-Chôa)	precolonial status unclear; from colonial era headmanship; *de facto* chiefdom since 1972-1973
Sanhantamba	Makombe Kanga	1890–1902	name 'Sanhamut-amba' mentioned at the end of the 18th century; allocated to the present-day ruling family at the end of the 'war of Makombe'
Sanhatunze	Makombe Kanga	1890–1902	Shona origin; reward for anti-Portuguese war
Seguma	colonial government	± 1918	successor of Tangwena chief-dom created under unidentified Makombe; later reduced

(Remark: no clear data on Saluanza, except for the indication that Saluanza's ancestor got the concerned area from a person indicated as 'Makombe').

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CHAPTER 6

Aspects of Frelimo Party Politics in Barue District

In this chapter, it will be shown how, in Barue, Frelimo has been capable of almost perfectly monopolizing power relations with the population. In this way, the present chapter continues with Barue political history as well, since, in doing so, it presents Barue District as an empirical example of Frelimo's mode of operation in a Mozambican, mostly rural, environment. Crucial for Frelimo's monopoly is the party's organization as a hierarchy of cells (*células*) and higher-level organs such as circles (*círculos*) and zones (*zonas*) that form linkages with the government, which is itself under control of Frelimo. A description of the cell system will be given, which shows how non-representative (with few exceptions) it is in terms of party-political diversity, using actual cells that I studied during my fieldwork and which then shows how it controls people using bureaucratic methods.

1 Background of the Cell/Circle System

At its First Congress, Frelimo had defined the *círculo* (circle) as its most basic organizational unit (Frelimo, 1963[1962], art. XII). However, nowadays the cell (*célula*) is the basic structure of the party, where several cells form a circle. The statutes established at the Ninth Congress of 2006 (relevant at the time of my fieldwork) stipulate that apart from a secretariat a cell has a General Assembly (*Reunião Geral*), which meets every fortnight (Frelimo, 2006, art. 30.4, 30.6). A cell should have at least three members and be established in residential areas as well as in work environments (2006, art. 30.2, 30.3). The *Cell Manual* of July 2010 adds that a cell can have at most fifteen members (Frelimo, 2010, art. XV.3), the exceeding of which number may induce a redefinition of cells (2010, art. XVII.1). Decree 15/2000 does not seem to know 'cells' or 'circles' and speaks of 'neighbourhood' (*bairro*) and 'village' (*aldeia*) when dealing with secretaries. Circle Secretary Roberto TP revealed that the establishment of circles (as they are today) is indeed a relatively new phenomenon. This is consistent with De Brito's (2010, pp. 14–16) indication that the 'revitalization' of party structures has been due to Guebuza rather than Chissano.

Cells are not only directed to party members but also to the general population, and not only in the sense of gaining new members: they must (*devem*– note obligation) organize meetings with 'sympathizers and other members of

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the community' to listen to their opinions about national questions and to enable the formulation of party goals and programmes (Frelimo, 2006, art. 31.1), promote solutions for 'problems of the community in which they are incorporated', promote 'political education' of the members and the 'citizens in general', and promote solidarity between party members and members of society (2006, art. 31.3c, d, f). On the other hand, however, the cell is supposed to combine two objectives that may be contradictory in some circumstances, considering that cells target both members and non-members:

> The Cells, in general, contribute to the definition of the collective will and execute the political line of the Party.
>
> FRELIMO, 2006, art. 31.2

The *Cell Manual* explicitly states that a cell's actions must 'have impact in the community' and that 'residents or work colleagues must feel that their lives are influenced by the nearest Cell' (Frelimo, 2010, art. XVII.4; cf. XXIV.4). The cell 'mobilizes and organizes the People' against poverty and is the link with the people, implementing 'in the field' (*no terreno*) the decisions and orientations of the Party (2010, art. XVIII.5 and 6; cf. art. XXVIII, XXIV.10e). The *Cell Manual* also suggests Frelimo members of a cell may form a campaign team during (non-internal) elections (2010, p. 31). What follows below assesses aspects of the extent and quality of the interaction between 'the Party' and 'the community' in twelve cells in the Tongogara and Sabão neighbourhoods (*bairros*) in Catandica.

2 Leadership in Cells and Circles, and Party-Political Representativeness of a Sample of Cells

In 2010, there were in the adjacent Tongogara and Sabão *bairros* six and eighteen cells, respectively. Together these make up the circles of Tongogara and Sabão, where each circle of the Frelimo party corresponds with a government *bairro*. Each cell is headed by a *secretário da célula* (cell secretary–'*secretária*' is the female variant), and each circle by a *primeiro secretário do comité de círculo* (first secretary of the circle committee). For ten cells in the Sabão and Tongogara neighbourhoods where an estimate could be made for the number of plots (for living) they contain, the average is about 60 plots, where each plot is more or less square with a side of about 25 meters. In 2010 all of Sabão and Tongogara together made up around, I estimate, one square kilometre.

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I visited all six cells in Tongogara and six of the eighteen in Sabão. In most of the cases I studied, cell secretaries were chosen from among a number of candidates in a voting contest within the cell. There is rather considerable variation in how cell secretaries are selected (for more details, see Van Dokkum, 2015, pp. 250–251). From the collected data it becomes clear that a 'first past the post' system is applied; voters express their first preference and the candidate with the greater number of votes wins immediately without the need for a second round (explicitly confirmed by Girasse L). That non-members (of Frelimo) would be able to vote is excluded by the *Cell Manual* of July 2010 (Frelimo, 2010, art. XXII-4, XXVI-1). All elections studied were, however, before that date, and two were reported to have included non-Frelimo members as voters. In any case, it is characteristic that no cell secretary ever mentioned to me the Frelimo Statutes or similar documents as motivating selection, the way of voting, or the task portfolio within cells. Though the fact that only Frelimo-adherents would be able to participate in a vote for Frelimo secretaries is in conformity with the *Cell Manual*, from a perspective of participation of the general populace this fact creates a dilemma when it is considered that Frelimo secretaries can influence the lives of non-Frelimo people, a topic that will be discussed below.

Overall, there exists a correlation between the number of voters (inclusiveness) and the background of voters, although the difference between Frelimo members and Frelimo sympathizers alone does not fit such a pattern neatly. However, if Frelimo members and sympathizers are taken together, a clear correlation among eight cells for which data are available emerges as in Table 7:

There is, at least judging from Table 7, a robust correlation in that when the number of voters is greater, the less the vote depends on Frelimo exclusivity. There is no indication that cell demographics influence this general conclusion (see Van Dokkum, 2015, pp. 252–255, for a detailed argumentation).

TABLE 7 Correlation between background of voters and the number of voters for cell secretaries

Background of voters	Voter numbers (if known)	Voters, average of mid column
other Frelimo leaders	6	6
Frelimo members/ sympathizers	39, 43, 38, 74, 52	49
any, Frelimo or not	93, 260	177

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Asked why their cells (cases *iii* and *viii* in Van Dokkum, 2015, pp. 254–255) allowed all to vote while others did not, the cell secretary of the first answered that '[t]hey say it's because they are all citizens' (Tongogara case *iii*–Alberto SM), but the cell secretary of Sabão case *viii* elaborated only that one could not discriminate in polygynous households, where different wives could each have a different 'position' (*posição*), and it would be inappropriate to discriminate between wives of one household in such cases (Tonito MM). Neither of these two answers explains the exceptionality of their case. On the other hand, the cell secretary of Tongogara case *v* straightforwardly denied that it would be a good idea to let non-Frelimo inhabitants vote for cell secretary. On the suggestion that the secretary works with people of other political affiliations, the answer was that

> …we of the cell have the right to talk with [a person] or supporter of another party […] to be together with us.
>
> Tongogara case *v*–André AG

(cf. Frelimo, 2006, art. 9.2d, which mentions this as a duty). A bit later, the same cell secretary explained that people can become Frelimo member at the age of 18 and then stated:

> Thus they are member always just as they are lords of that cell; they are lords who can play with this country.
>
> ibid.

The cell secretary of case *i* (Frelimo voters only) answered the question of whether it is not difficult to work with members of other parties as follows:

> No, the Frelimo party joined all […]. The party that is in power is the Frelimo party. [H]ere in the neighbourhood there is neither Renamo nor Frelimo, it is all the Mozambican people, it is the people of Frelimo.
>
> Tongogara case *i*–Arnoldo MC

The latter two quotes unambiguously portray Frelimo as master of the country Mozambique and of its inhabitants, the Mozambicans. According to the last quote, any party-political difference is otherwise irrelevant. Another cell secretary commented that Frelimo is in power anyway (Bw: *wanyantsimbawa*–Pita GN).

Reported tasks of cell secretaries were: handling settlement of people who move house to the cell and deciding on approval for the establishment of such items as mills within the area (Tonito MM).

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3 Circle Secretaries of Tongogara and Sabão

Cells may be grouped into circles (*círculos*), which, like zones, districts, and provinces, have a Conference (*Conferência* [*do Círculo*]), a Committee (*Comité* [*do Círculo*]), and a Secretariat (*Secretariado* [*do Comité do Círculo*]–Frelimo, 2006, art. 32, 33; cf. 35, 37, 38). A Conference is composed of elected delegates plus members of the respective Committee (2006, art. 40.1), the Committee itself of people elected by the Conference[1] plus the first secretaries of the committees of the level immediately below[2] and the executive director of each social organization of Frelimo at the same level (2006, art. 43), such as for youth (2006, art. 79, 80.4).

The 2006 Statutes stipulate that a first secretary of a committee is elected by that committee (Frelimo, 2006, art. 42). Roberto TP and Raúl VR were elected in 2007; Roberto TP stated that he was elected by 'residents' (in practice Frelimo members only), in a contest between two candidates, with the other being Sueta AC. Raúl VR reported fifteen candidates; the voters were also Frelimo members here. Asked what the tasks of a circle secretary are, Roberto TP answered that these comprise 'conquering' (*conquistar*) citizens to become Frelimo members. Raúl VR spoke of a 'struggle' (*luta*) to gain new members.

4 Community Leaders (*Líderes Comunitários*)

Five community leaders (*líderes comunitários*) were interviewed in Tongogara, Sabão, Chuala, Honde, and Sanhatunze. Their status in Decree 15/2000 is rather obscure (see also Nuvunga, 2013, p. 44), yet in the field they are very visible as they may wear a uniform and have the national flag hoisted on their premises. The term '*líder comunitário*', in practice often shortened to '*líder*', is not to be confused with '*autoridade comunitária*', since the latter can denote any local leader, 'traditional' or not, who is 'legitimized' and 'recognized'. The main text of the Decree does not mention the term '*líder comunitário*' at all; it is only introduced without definition in the accompanying Regulation of 25 August

1 For this apparent circularity, the Frelimo (2006) Statutes provide no explanation. Perhaps only the elected delegates in the Conference elect Committee members in a secondary election, who may or may not be in the original Conference group (i.e. of earlier elected delegates).

2 This cannot hold for circles, since cells do not have committees. This is not made explicit by the Frelimo (2006) Statutes.

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2000 (*Regulamento do Decreto N.º 15/2000*),[3] in the stipulation about 'State recognition', which is described as 'formal act by which [...] the State identifies and registers the *líder comunitário* already legitimized or enthroned' (*Regulamento*, art. 2). (The Decree does use '*outros líderes*', but without '*comunitário*' as the Regulation does.)

The Regulation mentions the term also in art. 11, again in relation to 'recognition'. In the Regulation it may seem that the term '*líder comunitário*' would be just an everyday synonym for '*autoridade comunitária*', inadvertently inserted without observing juridical propriety. Interpreting the Regulation with the aid of field data, it may be hypothesized, however, that this insertion was a deliberate move rather than a clerical lapse in terminological strictness. A *líder comunitário* is a very specific authority whose position can affect citizens' chances in life. They have often been Frelimo secretaries and, by mentioning them in the Regulation, it has become impossible to argue that they are not covered by the Decree. On the other hand, the legal construction makes formally invisible the *líderes*' secretary background (although also covered by the Decree), making them look like genuinely neutral government officials for all and 'legitimized' by party-neutral 'communities'. Let us now study the field practice.

The average age of the *líderes* at the time of interview was about 56, ranging from 41 to about 78; the average age at the time of recognition as *líder* was about 52, ranging from 35 to about 78. These ages are mostly higher than for the secretaries above, consistent with a political career in which *líder*-ship presupposes an earlier position as secretary. The cases of Tongogara and Sabão are less clear-cut in terms of their ascendency as *líderes*, as these *líderes*, Sueta AC and Francisco L, respectively, were 'recognized' as late as 19 March 2010 (nine days before Makombe Day to celebrate the anti-colonial struggle by Makombe), although Sueta AC did say he had already been *líder* for ten years, thus since about 2000. This situation is compatible with the distinction between *legitimation* and *recognition*. As said, Roberto TP reported Sueta AC had been a candidate for circle secretary in 2007; this does not necessarily contradict Sueta AC's being *líder comunitário*, but may indicate that in an 'unrecognized' state the position of *líder comunitário* was less preferable than that of circle secretary. Isaque T referred to Sueta AC as being *líder* back in 2008.

The *líderes* in Honde and Chuala, Simão GT and Zacarias NG, respectively, told a remarkably similar story (even overlapping in wording) about how they became *líderes*:

3 Ministerial Directive 107-A/2000; Carrilho ([Ed.], 2009, pp. 554–558), cf. above.

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> [T]here came a team from the district, in every zone, to know: 'Who [is] the person in charge here?' Well, when the community said that 'our person in charge, whom we know here, is the gentleman', that is when I became [...] legitimized as community leader.
>
> Simão GT

> [W]hen there came a district team they called a meeting just to say: 'Who leads you here, your representative of this community?' Well, the population [indicated] to legitimize me, because they knew that I was the representative of this community. It was by a legitimation by the population.
>
> Zacarias NG

It is not clear exactly when these district team visits occurred, but it was not many years after the introduction of Decree 15/2000. Simão GT and Zacarias NG made clear the close connection of their *líder*-ship with being *secretário*: Zacarias NG even insisted he was a *secretário do bairro* even though he also described himself as '*líder de primeiro escalão*' (first-tier authority also usually associated with *régulo*). Zacarias NG stated he became cell secretary in 2000, while the 'recognition' took place in 2003. Simão GT reported he was first a cell secretary, then a circle secretary, and from that position became a *líder comunitário*. He indicated that the visit of the district brigade was in 2002.

The interviews with Simão GT and Zacarias NG indicate that the Barue district government was already busy installing *líderes comunitários* at least around 2002–2003. Adjunct-*Régulo* Maurício J Chapanga, who lives much more to the north than Zacarias NG and Simão GT, confirmed that *líderes comunitários* were former party (i.e. Frelimo) secretaries but dates their introduction to around 2007. Henriques Quiraque identified '*Líder Comunitário*' Matias FD of Nhacapanga also as a 'secretary with uniform' of the *primeiro escalão* (FN^s 10/09/2010).

As said, Francisco L and Sueta AC were both 'recognized' as *líderes comunitários* on 19 March 2010. In this regard, I was privy to a document addressed to Sueta AC that mentioned this for him, dated 10 March, from the *Técnico Superior* (Senior Staff Official) of the Catandica municipal government. Another document I observed showed Sueta AC's own signature, where he stated that he would duly perform his duties (FN^s 13/04/2010). Francisco L indicated that in 2008 there was a vote with paper ballots with the participation of the general population under the auspices of the (Frelimo) party. Francisco L won this vote from one other candidate, the late Mr Niza. That he was *líder comunitário* in the period 2008–2010 (i.e. before the 'recognition') is implied by a comment of Raúl VR who stated:

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> [O]ur *líder*, [FL], before having a uniform, before that whole ceremony had been done, he worked without prestige. Now he works with prestige because now he has a flag at his house.

An intriguing aspect of the quote is that it suggests that the 'prestige' does not follow from a bottom-up indication by the 'community' but from the 'recognition' by the government in a top-down procedure, exemplified by the national flag, in contrast with what Decree 15/2000 seems to identify as the 'valorization' of the 'social organization' of 'local communities'.

Areas of *líderes comunitários* vary considerably. Francisco L and Sueta AC have rather compact areas, which together are about 1 km^2, but the less densely populated area of Zacarias NG is in the order of about 200 km^2.

5 Other Local Leaders within the Frelimo Party or the Government

At the time of interview (September 2010), Lúcia Conforme had been appointed five months earlier by the mayor of Catandica, Mr Lambo, as the *chefe de localidade n°. 2* (chief of locality number two) within the municipality, comprising seven out of a total of twelve neighbourhoods in Catandica. She had been a member of the Municipal Assembly and an alderman for, among other things, health (Mozambique, 2002, pp. 143–144). In 2010, she was *presidente* for a group dealing with health issues (including the OMM leader, church leaders, and AMETRAMO[4] members) comprising *localidades* one and two. She supervised *líderes comunitários* as well as *Régulo* Sabão.

The *chefe* represents efforts to increase women's involvement in government. She thinks it good for Mozambican women in general and also for herself to show her capabilities (Lúcia C). I was present at a neighbourhood meeting with Sra Lúcia C in *bairro* Samora Machel on 7 August 2010. There were about 30 women, some 10 men, and a dozen or so children. There she was presented with a chicken as a courtesy gift from the people; this was accompanied by a Christian prayer. My assistant, who lives there, told me it is to thank God for having a leader from their own community and to stress that although she is a woman she must be listened to (FN[s] 07–08/08/2010).

4 OMM: Organização da Mulher Moçambicana (Mozambican Women's Organziation); AMETRAMO: Associação dos Médicos Tradicionais de Moçambique (Association of Mozambican Traditional Doctors).

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There are a variety of other local leaders. *Adjuntos* (adjuncts, vice-secretaries) of a cell take over a secretary's tasks in case the latter is absent (Pedro MN). *Chefes de 25* (*10, 5*) *casas* (leaders of 25 [10, 5] houses) are Frelimo party officials responsible for a corresponding (approximately) number of compounds within a cell. They may be elected by party members (Maria F), or appointed (Rosalina M). The reported task setting of *chefes de 10* (*5*) *casas* consists of motivating people to go to meetings where neighbourhood problems such as the functioning of the water pump are discussed (Maria F), along with settling fights and mediating in marital problems (Rosalina M). *Régulo* Seguma indicated that the system of *chefes de 10 casas* was used a lot in work with the population.

Isaque T was a scribe (*escrevão*) for *Líder Comunitário* Sueta AC, as well as president of the *Conselho Local* (Local Council)[5] of Tongogara. Isaque T explained the voters in his election were 'members' or 'representatives' (of the *líder* Sueta AC), *círculo* and *célula* secretaries, and *chefes de 10* (*5*) *casas* within Tongogara neighbourhood. Since a *líder comunitário* is generally seen as a government official, this means that Isaque T's position as a government scribe had been dependent on election by Frelimo party officials. Structurally the connection between party and government exists through the scribe Isaque T because information from the *células* is transmitted through him to the *líder*. The Local Council has a president, vice-president, and a secretary. Members further consist of local entrepreneurs (*negociantes*) 'all of Frelimo'. The Local Council is responsible for such things as the coordination of the maintenance of local water pumps and roads (the actual work being done by inhabitants of the neighbourhood).

Ernesto TM was president of the *Conselho Consultivo* (Consultative Council) of Sabão, established in 2010 (see Decree 11/2005; cf. Ch. 4). The task portfolio of the *Conselho Consultivo* overlaps with that of the *Conselho Local*: water provision, cleaning the neighbourhood, but also the provision of electricity.

Jorge S had been *secretário de verificação* (secretary of checks) of the Tongogara circle since 2007. He was elected with 28 votes out of 37, while there were seven candidates. The voters were identified as Frelimo members and members of OMM. The task of a control secretary is to check documents and

5 'Local councils' are defined in Ministerial Directive 107-A/2000, art. 1–6 (see Carrilho [Ed.], 2009, p. 554) as 'consultative organ[s] of the authorities of local administration, concerning the search for solutions for fundamental problems affecting the life of populations […]', in which 'also the community authorities participate'. They are not to be confused with community courts for administering justice; see e.g. Open Society Foundation (2006) and Igreja (2012).

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intervene when the circle secretary makes a mistake. He may also write a declaration (*declaração*–formal document; cf. below) for a citizen from Tongogara if need be.

Leadership is no guarantee against serious problems; former District Administrator Luís Alberto Chimoio received death threats through phone messages from around six persons (apparently including influential people within Frelimo). At the time of my return to Barue on 22 March 2010, Mr Chimoio had been transferred to Mossurize District and been replaced by Joaquim Zefanias. According to a source close to Mr Chimoio, who was known as the 'Administrator of the people', a motive for the threats may have been his cooperation with non-Frelimo people. Mr Chimoio himself stated that his replacement was a decision of the government because of a new vacancy for Administrator in Mossurize (FN^{s}28/03/2010; 30/05/2010; Chekwa, 2010; Luís AC).

Cell and circle secretaries do not seem to get a salary for their work. *Régulos* do get salaries or other remunerations, but the low level and irregular payment of these trigger dissatisfaction (Luís MS). *Régulo* Sanhatunze explained that *primeiro escalão* (first tier; mostly *régulo* level) gets MZN 2400 per six months and *segundo escalão* (second tier; mostly headman level) MZN 1600 per six months. People in third tier get nothing (FN^{s} 17/07/2012). Adjunct-*régulo* Chapanga reported MZN 6 (six) per year as compensation for tax collection efforts ('thank you very much', he commented), plus MZN 1500 per six months regular salary. *Régulo* Seguma reported MZN 400 per month. *Líder Comunitário* Francisco L reported MZN 1500 per three months. One *sabhuku/mpfumu* (anonymized here) reported receiving no salary at all.

6 Bureaucratic Devices Employed by Frelimo to Control the Population

There are specifically two phenomena, encountered during the fieldwork, which are not mentioned in the 2006 Frelimo Statutes or the 2010 *Cell Manual* but which indicate how the Frelimo party intends to *control* the population (whether member or not) rather than *serve* it, an idea that would emerge from formulations in the 2010 *Cell Manual* (e.g. p. 5) and Roberto TP's vision of his own job as circle secretary ('I am serving the people in general'). The first is engineering 'contributions' to the party. *O País* in Hanlon (2011) reported that teachers at a primary school in Nampula had to pay 'fees' to Frelimo. I have seen receipts for such payments (indeed, the monthly payments were duly acknowledged) already dating from 2008 (field observations April and May 2010). This example shows that Frelimo is not simply exercising a patron-client

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system, although this can also be said to exist.[6] In such a system, clients can at least expect to obtain immediate gains, but with the described payments one just avoids obliterating *possible* gains in an undetermined future while the 'patron' has the immediate gains.

The second non-statutory way of controlling the population (member or not) that I encountered is demanding a 'declaration' (Pt: *declaração*; Bw: *tsamba*) to be used in bureaucratic situations (here to be understood as paperwork necessary for certain government approvals or services) but to be processed first within the Frelimo party system. At least in Maputo, these 'declarations' must have been in existence since 2004 because Fumo (2007, p. 122) mentions them briefly (for a more recent mentioning of attestations (*atestados*) of residence, see Nuvunga, 2013, pp. 51–52). My information about such declarations indicates that they are issued by secretaries of the neighbourhood in which one lives. Declarations may be needed for various purposes, such as moving house,[7] getting a subsidy, and so on. Such a declaration may be a handwritten paper with a text drawn up by the *secretário* of someone's neighbourhood. From what I have observed, the document's opening contains the words '*Partido Frelimo*' and further down it states '*Frelimo–a força da mudança*' ('the powerhouse of change'). The declaration would require a *carimbo* (stamp) of the Frelimo party; after receiving such a stamp, the informant would in principle be able to achieve the desired goal (FN^s^ 13/04/2010). Although a declaration is issued by Frelimo, a person needing it may not be a member of that party, and Renamo members may be refused such a document (FN^s^ 14/07/2010; Bonifácio TQ). Even the recognition of a *régulo* seems to require a party *declaração* (José NS).

Here is one case of presenting a declaration I witnessed in action. My assistant and I were having a chat with *Líder Comunitário* Sueta AC in his *gabinete* (office) when an elderly lady came in. She handed over some documents to the *líder comunitário* who passed them on to my assistant (not at my request). I could see then that one of the documents was a Frelimo *declaração*, handwritten on an A4 sheet. My assistant explained later on the basis of the event that it was about obtaining a government subsidy in the framework of *acção social* (social welfare for the sick and elderly). The secretary responsible for the declaration was Roberto TP, thus the circle secretary. At least in this case, the

6 Cf. discussion by Machohe (2011, p. 27–32); Nuvunga (2013); Orre (2010, pp. 331–332) on district development loans; Sumich (2008, p. 113); on neo-patrimonialism more generally: Chabal & Daloz (1999); cf. Abbink & Van Dokkum (2008).

7 This conflicts with the GPA, since that guarantees free settlement for people and does not mention the need for any document issued by a political party.

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líder comunitário was the link between the party and higher-level government: the request with the declaration was submitted to the *líder comunitário*, who after giving his own approval would pass the material on to the government in the *Vila* (Catandica centre).[8] Apparently the documents were not wholly to the *líder comunitário*'s satisfaction because they were returned to the lady, who would, according to my assistant's summary of the conversation, come back later (FN[s] 20/05/2010).

Sueta AC later revealed another case, namely that he was busy processing a declaration from someone who came from Munene (outside of Catandica municipality) and wanted to settle in his area. The party secretariat in Catandica still had to be informed about this (FN[s] 11/07/2010). Several cell secretaries confirmed to me that that if people want to move house, they need to get a *declaração de transferência* (transfer declaration) from their old neighbourhood and submit it to the cell secretary of their new one. Some cell secretaries explained that they should be presented a declaration issued by the cell secretary of the previous cell of the person who moves house (Pita GN, Tonito MM). The *líder comunitário* of Tongogara stated that the declaration should be submitted to him, not to just any cell secretary, who would have nothing to do with it (Sueta AC in FN[s] 27/05/2010). On the other hand, it was also reported that a cell secretary passes the declaration on to the *líder comunitário* (Girasse L). Tax payments associated with moving house were mentioned (by an in-migrant: MZN 150–Girasse L; by a vendor of a plot: MZN 100–Sueta AC in FN[s] 27/05/2010).

7 Other Forms of Checking the Population

Two men in their late thirties/early forties indicated the possibility that one's children may be victim of politically improper behaviour (from Frelimo's perspective) of a parent (interviews May and September 2010). One of them gave this as motivation not to reveal to me how he had voted at the last elections, invoking the principle of the secrecy of the vote. The other stated the following about dealing with the Frelimo government and party apparatuses:

> [T]here it's like the eye of the party. Thus, all information that they find [people] submit, they think that '[…] it's information of my enemy', and not of a citizen […] who lives in the neighbourhood with the others, no.

8 I do not know whether this is the municipal or district government; I suspect the latter since it is more likely to have such social funds available for distribution.

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> 'That man is not one of us'. […] And [they are] prepared to pursue your child at school to make it fail its tests, because […] its father is not 'one of us'.
>
> Man, 40s, anonymized

I myself came under the scrutiny of people associated with the Frelimo election campaign team in Cagole, where I stayed for a while in a temporarily abandoned rural shop (*banca fixa*) some time before the 2009 general elections. This may give an indication of how Mozambicans are under scrutiny. On 16 October, I visited a quite big election party of Frelimo in Cagole with, I estimate, around 500 visitors and electronically amplified music. The next day, 17 October, the Renamo election campaign team convened behind my *banca fixa*, and I spoke with them. After nightfall, somebody from Frelimo came to me at the *banca fixa* and explained that I would have to 'apologize' to Frelimo. It was OK to visit Frelimo election parties (which I had done at the party on the 16th), but it was not allowed to visit Renamo election parties, he continued. Frelimo was also afraid, I was told later, that I was trying to convince the *régulo* to vote for Renamo (FN[s] 16–17/10/2009).

8 Conclusion

The above data show that as far as Barue is concerned there is some difficulty in speaking of a genuine reconciliation between Frelimo and Renamo (and anyone not showing allegiance to Frelimo for that matter). At the time of fieldwork (in fact, also afterwards, judging from news received), the existence of this situation is unambiguously a result of Frelimo's exploitation of its power at the national, district, and local levels, enhancing that power even more with means solely of its own fabrication. No Frelimo official interviewed was ever apologetic to me as a foreign investigator about the treatment their party meted out to fellow Mozambicans by way of *declarações*, *quotizações* (payments), neighbourhood registrations, and exclusion from elections, which they cannot influence but which influence them. One *líder comunitário* declared:

> [W]hen the population came out of the war it suffered intimidation […] from the other parties […] but from 2000 until now I believe that the population now has a vision […] that they are […] in victory, are free.
>
> Zacarias NG

In 2000, the interviewee became cell secretary, but it may also be considered the beginning of a period in which, as we have seen in this chapter, Frelimo's

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hold on the population in Barue has greatly increased and consolidated, among other things, through the leadership framework of Decree 15/2000.

An overview of Frelimo's power apparatus at the local level was given. The network of secretaries and community leaders, connecting party and government, is able to penetrate deeply into the countryside and into people's lives. The method of working with documents is effective in controlling citizens. An individual's association with non-Frelimo parties may be disadvantageous when dealing with the government. All in all, the local data from Barue District make manifest how there is no national cohesion, not for ethnic reasons, but for party-political reasons, which cuts across ethnic boundaries.

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CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

I have argued that the Kingdom of Barue had a prolonged existence as a territorially rather circumscribed political entity, not only as a historical phenomenon which just happened to be there but also as an idea which was willed as such by the members of it. A short way of describing this situation is to say that the Kingdom of Barue was a nation-state. We are now in a position to compare precolonial Barue with postcolonial Mozambique. In the literature, the method for deciding that some political entity is a nation-state is often an enumeration of certain aspects. For the Kingdom of Barue, we can establish the following:

(1) It comprised a rather uniform, compact culture, except perhaps for language differentials, which were inconsequential.
(2) It comprised social groups larger than kin groups or totem groups.
(3) Its people had a self-awareness of being a people.
(4) Its people knew histories of themselves as a people.
(5) Its people generally wanted to remain an independent people in the future, and were prepared to risk their lives in order to secure this.
(6) It had fixed borders; there were conflicts but these did not concern secession.
(7) It had a capital, not located very eccentrically.
(8) It had an internal political morphology and functionality characteristic of states, with centrally coordinated laws and regulations.
(9) It knew a strong connection between the royal (leading) family and the general population, which facilitated countrywide cohesion.
(10) Its people did not write it all down.

The conclusion seems inevita3ble: the Kingdom of Barue, at least for some points, was a nation-state, according to aspects (1)-(9). Should one insist that writing is essential, one should admit that this would be rather arbitrary, since in Barue writing apparently had no added value whatsoever in the functioning of the other nine aspects mentioned, which worked perfectly well with an oral means of communication. Another thing is that we have seen that not all Barue inhabitants, even some (lower-level) leaders, were born within Barue. If one insists on ethnic purity for a nation-state, one might use this against any assignment of nation-statehood to Barue. But many present-day nation-states include immigrants as well, so the argument from immigration would not be decisive. Moreover, the expulsion of the Quiteves by order of Gunguru only fits

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in with the requirement of ethnic purity. Such a requirement cannot be used *against* the assessment that Barue was at least sometimes a nation-state. From the considerations made so far it follows that the assumptions that nation-states could only arise because of European print-capitalism, or the Westphalian peace of 1648, or the industrial revolution, or the French Revolution, or late colonialism must be abandoned.

The development of theory about nationalism, I would say, might better focus on how European nation-states have been specific cases among similar cases around the world, rather than how they served as prototypes for postcolonial states in other continents. Neither precolonial Barue nor postcolonial Mozambique can be seen as positive European products. Of the two, Barue struggled (and succeeded for some time) in maintaining its independence *against* European colonialism using its national cohesion, while postcolonial Mozambique is only a result of European colonialism in a negative sense, and then also as a result of efforts *against* European colonialism. In the latter case, national cohesion had to be constructed somehow at the time of independence, and the ways in which Frelimo chose (and still chooses) to achieve such cohesion has proved to be both logically and sociopolitically contradictory. But this shows that postcolonial Mozambique, with its intertwinement between the state and the most powerful anticolonial organization, is not a European product. Arguing that nationalism must be a relatively recent product with certain European characteristics (e.g. 'print-capitalism', 'nineteenth-century nationalist rhetoric') and subsequently applying that argument to postcolonial Mozambique, as we have seen two authors suggesting, is both insufficiently appreciating the variety in which nationalism can manifest itself (also within one country) and misunderstanding the political history of Mozambique.

As for postcolonial Mozambique, we might evaluate a list as follows:

(1) It comprises a very diverse array of distinct cultures.
(2) It comprises social groups larger than kin groups or totem groups.
(3) Its people have a self-awareness of being a people, but the attachment to such awareness is not necessarily very strong.
(4) Its people know that in the not so distant past there was no Mozambican people.
(5) Its people generally wanted to end colonialism, and many were prepared to risk their lives in order to secure this.
(6) It has fixed borders, but splitting the country has been proposed.
(7) It has a capital, but its eccentric location reinforces the idea of 'Southerners' ruling the country.

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(8) It has an internal political morphology and functionality characteristic of states but is endowed with a professed legal pluralism that facilitates state and society being overwhelmed by a strong organization of the party in power.
(9) There is no widespread deep connection between the general population and the leaders of the party in power, a circumstance that diminishes countrywide cohesion.
(10) The party in power controls people through written documents, and secures its own power position through written laws and regulations.

We see that, except for the writing aspect, precolonial Barue fits the standard picture of a nation-state far better than postcolonial Mozambique. But the tallying of checklists is not the main point to be made here. In this book a nation-state is seen mainly as an intersection of criteria of territory, a few sociopolitical aspects, and self-definition, to be further specified by the criteria of those who believe they belong to a nation. Shared cultural items are not decisive because, even if we would speak of Mozambican nationalism as resulting from resistance against colonial overrule, it is evident that such nationalism did not depend on cultural uniformity within Mozambique, which did not (and still does not) exist. It is precisely the attempt by the party in power to impose political uniformity in a rather top-down way, which has been detrimental to solidarity among Mozambicans.

As said, in both precolonial Barue and anti- or postcolonial Mozambique, nationalism was much connected with resistance against the Portuguese. In Barue, however, the unity among Baruese was not further complicated by debates of a party-political character as it was in Mozambique. Political competition existed and was often connected with the question of whether or not the Portuguese should have much influence in the country, but many of those who were considered favourites by the Portuguese apparently had no or limited success within Barue society, as with Chibudu (defeated by Chipapata), Samacande (unpopular and defeated by Kanga), and Cassiche (deposed by his own subordinates). In 1768, Gunguru appeared as a staunch defender of Barue sovereignty, and in 1900 he still occupied a position as such in collective memory, even if this memory came to be replaced by that of Chipapata/Kabudu Kagoro. At the end of his life Chipapata had to accept some influence from M.A. de Sousa (the India-born lord of the former *prazo* Gorongosa), but this situation seems not to have been of his own volition. The case of Cassiche (the Makombe who had willingly accepted Portuguese rule in Barue territory) shows that people in precolonial Barue could critically monitor their own leader's actions and were willing to act on such evaluations. From information from Ranger, Isaacman, and my interlocutor *Dona* Suzana Calhancambo, it appears that the

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Barue Revolt of 1917–1918 was a popular movement which gathered around the leadership of Nongwe-Nongwe and the spirit medium Mbuya. I have also argued that the independence of Barue from Mutapa in 1608 can be interpreted as the result of a popular effort, where, however, some involvement of the Makombe dynasty must also be assumed, as they are known as the leaders of the country. Consequently, over the centuries there appears to have been some connection between the internal political fate of the leadership and the international fate of Barue as an independent country. The surviving present-day historical memory in Barue is an appreciation of those times when the Portuguese were still safely outside and life was good under the protection of Makombe. This living memory in Barue District today in the form of a yearly ceremony, a museum, a monument, frequent references to Makombe (and related to it the Barue Revolt of 1917–1918), and the historical legitimacy of at least some of the chiefdoms testifies to the importance Makombe still has, about a century after the end of the kingdom, for Baruese as embodying independence and the good life.

Living memory also plays a role in the disputes about territory and belonging in the Chôa area in the west of Barue District. Here we see at a sociological level below nationhood how such disputes are African-internal (even if the 'nation' may be incompletely determined, we can still say that it encompasses the several chiefdoms, and thus represents a higher level). I have maintained that such disputes concerning borders, chiefly communities, and rulership can be judged as equivalent to disputes concerning these aspects of the level of nationhood. There is therefore no reason to assume that such disputes are derived from European political concepts, the French revolution, etc. European colonialism largely destroyed the old political systems in Mozambique, specifically kingdoms such as Barue. There is an irony in the view that the nation-state should be seen as a product of European historical developments, while the existing Barue nation-state was *annihilated* by European colonialism.

Colonialism neither brought, nor aimed to bring, a functioning multiparty system in Mozambique. It certainly did not conceive of a Mozambican nation-state. It did, however, evoke the emergence of (anticolonial) movements that were necessarily entirely new phenomena (indeed, one can consider them as having been established rather late, around the time that other African countries were already becoming independent). Being *against* colonialism, they were movements that were not functioning within colonialism; but they were also not products of the dominant political systems of precolonial times (the kingdoms) because the latter no longer existed. Such movements, and/or their personnel, evolved into proto-political parties at the time after the coup in Portugal of 25 April 1974. The Lusaka Agreement of 7 September 1974 was

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characteristic in that it was largely an agreement between two army movements; the Portuguese state was represented by an MFA-dominated delegation. In the case of Frelimo, there did not yet exist a state at all, which by definition had to be created. Frelimo was ontologically prior to Mozambique as a state, and this was to heavily influence the subsequent events in independent Mozambique, as the state came to be moulded according to the proto-party's and then party's actions rather than that the party adapted itself to events within the state (see also Cahen, 1993; though I have stressed Machel's personal role more). This alone makes it problematic to take the state by default as the primary unit of analysis in studying politics.

As I concluded earlier in this book, the Baruese at several points in time had no need to 'imagine' a political community because they knew they had already had one. For Frelimo during the independence struggle and thereafter, this becomes more complicated. Certainly, at the end of the 1960s the leaders of the organization had to present a certain picture of the past, as I have analysed above. But it also had to rewrite the future several times, presenting pictures of the future (often just as distorted as those of the past) of Mozambique that served to perpetuate Frelimo's power holders' grip on Mozambique's state and society. First the anticolonial struggle's goal was changed from a desire for quick independence within a racialist framework to an interpretation that stressed the resolution of class struggle in a 'protracted' setting. In the 1990s, the impression was given that politics would move from a one-party system to multiparty democracy and political decentralization. Despite these changes, stark economic and political differentiation has persisted in Mozambican society.

Frelimo's historical development as an organization can be described as a sequence of no less than five characterizations. It started, first, as a rather loose *umbrella organization* of two movements, UDENAMO and MANU. This situation lasted only a few months at most. Then on 25 June 1962, Frelimo became, second, a *movement* on its own–being an association of people who wanted independence but had divergent ideas and activities. In this period, Frelimo put much stress on educational activities, and the army was subsumed under a secretariat among other secretariats. From October 1966 on, this situation changed gradually until the Third Session of the Central Committee in April 1969, when Frelimo's internal organization was redefined. At that time it is best characterized, third, as having become an *army* where the military was *supervising* most civilian tasks rather than being a division separate from other (civilian) organizational components. From early 1970 on, Frelimo evolved, fourth, into a *vanguard political party* within a one-party political system (intended and for a while real), a situation that was formalized at the Third

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Congress of February 1977. Fifth and finally, in 1990 Frelimo became a *political party* within a formal multiparty system. Thus at least five phases with four transformations can be distinguished in Frelimo's history.

It is revealing to see how not all four transformations went smoothly for those involved. Gwambe was reluctant to have UDENAMO merged with MANU and was unable to adjust to the new situation after 25 June 1962 when the merger had become an irrevocable reality. Mondlane was reluctant to see Frelimo transformed into an organization that was predominantly an army, stuck to focussing on education, and kept believing in a diplomatic means to achieving independence (at least up to 1965, but quite probably until his death). The second transformation was achieved by army commander Machel, who promoted his cause from October 1966 onwards but could not achieve it fully as long as Mondlane and Simango remained in top positions. However, Frelimo's Second Congress was an intermediate but crucial step towards achieving such a goal through the re-election of Mondlane rather than Simango as president; I have argued that the presidential vote underwent a great degree of arbitrariness. Machel himself was in charge of Frelimo's third transformation from army to vanguard political party. As for Frelimo's fourth transformation, that from a vanguard party within a one-party system to a party within a multiparty system, there is the question of whether the Frelimo leadership has been reluctant to carry it out, just as was the case with Gwambe and Mondlane in the first two transformations.

While the fourth transformation seems to have been carried out enthusiastically at the time, it was done when most were reasoning based on the supposition that Frelimo would easily win versus Renamo (or other parties) in elections. When it turned out that that supposition was false, Frelimo had to resort to other means to secure its dominant political position. One is the manipulation of election results. I have argued (with an elaborate analysis in Appendix 4) that manipulation very likely happened in the presidential elections of 1999 to an extent that it is uncertain that the official result represents the majority of the intended votes in that election. A second way for Frelimo to secure, or even expand, its dominant political position has been the use vis-à-vis citizens of formalities defined outside state law with the aid of a party network penetrating deeply into rural areas, as shown using empirical data in Chapter 6. While there were a few exceptions, most Frelimo secretaries in the field study were only selected by Frelimo members and possibly sympathizers. Yet Frelimo secretaries have a major impact on the lives of Mozambican citizens who are not Frelimo adherents. Consequently, in Mozambique a political hierarchy *among the citizens themselves* has been created, in violation of definitions of 'nation-state' that include a notion of equality between people, for

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example, in Malešević (2013, p. 65). Apart from evaluations of a political nature, this observation invalidates the use of equality as a distinguishing feature for deciding that the characterization 'nation-state' could not possibly apply to precolonial Barue while it could to postcolonial Mozambique. Of course, Barue had hereditary leaders (just like, say, the Netherlands today), but it did not have political parties who appropriated the state system in order to make distinctions between ordinary Baruese.

To be sure, in the Weberian sense Mozambique was not a state in the 1977–1992 period because there was no monopoly of the exercise of physical coercion (legitimate or not). But Weber's definition of *state* is too limited. To explain the Frelimo-Renamo war, one necessarily has to invoke Mozambique as an existing state, where *ideas about* that state are variant. Renamo fought Frelimo *as entangled with the state*, and the state *as entangled with Frelimo*, in order to change the character of the relationship between Frelimo and the state. The existence of the Mozambican state was not undermined by the war, even if there was no monopoly of violence. Machel has demonstrated in practice where the theory of Weber fails in terms of the legitimate *monopoly of violence*. Weber sees this principle as a central feature of the *state*, but Machel showed that it could just as well be applied to an *organization* like Frelimo, which is not a state. The idea of 'protracted struggle' was the expression of an ideology (and practice) in which education was equivalent to experience in armed struggle and where the desire for quick independence could be associated with 'erroneous conceptions'. Where people or organizations like Mondlane, Simango, and Gumane's UDENAMO saw Mozambique as becoming, sooner or later, independent as a state, to be endowed with a one-party system, Machel put the internal functioning of Frelimo first and assumed independence would come as a by-product of the 'protracted struggle'. Ideological issues, although not absent, were not the main point in the 'crisis within Frelimo', despite all the rhetoric about it. This is obvious when the comments of the Frelimo fighters whom I interviewed are considered. They were not at all recruited for ideological reasons, and acted on the supposition that they were fighting 'the Portuguese'. The main point was that Machel had the insight that the state need not be the prime locus for exercising control, even when there is, or might be, a state. Through his position as army commander, Machel brought about the transformation of Frelimo as such a locus. When Mondlane and Simango each in his own way realized this, they were too late to exercise much influence on this process.

The creation of an independent Mozambique was a feature in *addition* to Frelimo's earlier existence, in contrast with the emergence of political parties in pre-existing states that Weber seems to have had in mind. Naturally, Frelimo's

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modes of operation might well have changed with the creation of the new state, but instead the old tendencies towards monopolistic politics as nurtured within an army have remained to a large degree. As for Renamo, in its first years of existence the organization cannot be classified as a political party. Apart from serving external interests, it had a Mozambique-internal sectional interest (at least to fight Frelimo, for those voluntarily adhering) but no durable organization (strong dependency on different external suppliers), and apparently Renamo did not initially aim at participation in the executive and/or the legislative. By 1984, this latter point had changed to the extent that Renamo wanted to form a government of national unity with Frelimo. Still dependent on South African support, it had no self-supporting organizational structure yet. Moreover, as an army it subordinated civilians and civilian institutions rather than being controlled by civilians. It was only with the peace process that Renamo was finally transformed into a political party. As the events in 2013 and later have shown, this transformation from army to party, however, cannot be considered as having wholly succeeded. The peace process transformed the duopoly of violence ('legitimate' or not) into a monopoly. In a Weberian sense, the Mozambican state was resurrected after an absence of about 16 years. However, such an analysis is imprecise because during the war Mozambique as a state still existed in people's minds as an idea, and government by Frelimo also continued, even if in a reduced way. Indeed, Renamo would not have continued fighting if the Frelimo government had stopped occupying the government of the Mozambican state before 1992. In this sense, when applied to Mozambique the Weberian approach is logically problematic. Still it can be said that in 1992 a monopoly of violence was achieved with the GPA.

It is more difficult to affirm that the GPA, or rather the way it was implemented, has succeeded in establishing a well-working multiparty system. In a technical sense it has, since there are elections and a multiparty parliament, which is why Doorenspleet (2005) can evaluate the year 1994 as one in which a 'democratic transition' took place in Mozambique. But when more details are considered, this success is not that clear. I have discussed how Frelimo asserts itself onto citizens in a way that is not open to other parties, using Barue District as a case in point, letting the theme of Barue history intersect with contemporary political practice. I have also pointed out that the GPA was not, in fact, carried out in full when it comes to having elections at all levels of the state. This specific aspect is a not a fault of the GPA but rather of its implementation (although a weakness was that it did not define dates for all these elections). The result is a heavily disproportional influence of Frelimo in Mozambique's politics and indeed society because the national government, as dominated by Frelimo, has been deciding the appointments of provincial

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governors, district administrators and lower level government officials, irrespective of the distribution of party-political affiliations in those sub-national government levels across the population. How the recent agreements will be carried out, at this moment of writing, remains to be seen.

As for nationalism, I have argued in this book that this does not necessarily equate to cultural uniformity. On the contrary, if a nation is to be associated with a group of people of some size in numbers, one should expect that a well-functioning nationalism will successfully encompass societal diversity to create unity, since a reasonably big society will in most, if not all, cases consist of subdivisions which are distinct from each other. I say 'not necessarily', meaning that some interpretations of 'nation' may demand uniformity after all. Machel's interpretations are a case in point, when he declared that the birth of the nation implies the death of tribal pluriformity or when, in a party-political approach, he associated national unity with Frelimo's leading position. Paradoxically, the manner in which Frelimo developed as a powerful movement for resistance against colonialism made it inevitable that Mozambique would become a multiparty nation, due to Frelimo's own self-contradictory vision of the Mozambican nation, when claiming both to represent and not to represent all Mozambicans. As long as this contradiction continues to exist within Frelimo as ruling party, Mozambique's politics will remain divisive. Precolonial Barue had a more stable nationalism in the sense of national unity, even if civil war occasionally cropped up. These wars concerned mostly strife within the royal family and in most cases did not seem to have lasted very long. As far as we know, nobody questioned the legitimacy of the Makombe dynasty to rule, and contestants within the family did not present their claims, though antagonistic, to the Barue population in the form of a contradiction in the way Frelimo has done to the Mozambican population. Generally, the Barue population and the dynasty seem to have realized that for them cooperation was essential to safeguard their political independence so as to be able, as Makombe Gunguru reminded his Portuguese interlocutors, to be friends with neighbouring populations and eat peacefully at home. Viewed in this way, Barue nationalism can be a model for the present.

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APPENDIX 1

Nations as Human Collectivities: Some Theoretical Considerations

This book is specifically concerned with 'nation', but, in order to explain how human collectivities like nations can be both self-referential and contested, it is useful to study the concept of 'culture' first, where certain analytical aspects relevant for 'nation' have been studied already (see Bateson, 2000[1972], 1979; 'Epilogue 1958' of 1958[1936]; Dumont, 1983, p. 228; Sperber, 1992[1981], pp. 36–40; and Van Dokkum, 2004, 2005, p. 131; 2015, pp. 22–28).

1 Culture and Nation as Possibly Contested

For the purposes of this book, it can safely be assumed that behind the many definitions of 'culture' lies a template of two main components, namely of culture dealing with (1) human collectivities, or sets, of which people may or may not be members; and (2) configurations of shared (though not necessarily *universally* shared) actions, thoughts, properties, artefacts, and communications associated with human beings, taking into account human relationships (Brumann, 1999). Here I summarize such actions, thoughts, properties, artefacts, and communications with a general word: 'attributes'.

A regularly undervalued aspect of definitions of 'culture' is that they allude to culture as something of a higher logical order that can *encompass* or *contain* persons or attributes as logically lower-level phenomena. The set-theoretical aspects of such definitions are often not investigated to the degree they could and should be (cf. Van Dokkum, 2005). Let us consider two definitions given by Brumann (1999) and Boyer (1999) to show this. Brumann proposes representing persons and attributes in matrix form in such a way that rows 'stand for individuals' and columns for features or items (I say attributes) (1999, S6). Then,

> …the term ['a culture'] refers to an abstract aggregate, namely, the prolonged copresence of a *set* of certain individual items.
>
> BRUMANN, 1999, S6; emphasis added

Boyer stresses cognition, and his definition runs:

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> 'ideational culture' [is] the *set* of mental representations entertained by *members* of a particular group that makes that group different from others.
>
> BOYER, 1999, p. 206; emphasis added

We see that both use the idea of 'set', where Boyer makes explicit the idea of 'membership'. However, no further specifications are given in the respective (1999) publications as to what the range of application of the sets is. No prohibitions are given against the inclusion of the respective sets themselves into their own range of inclusion (cf. Barwise & Etchemendy, 1987, Ch. 3). With Boyer's definition, this is straightforward: participants of a culture can have a mental representation of their set of mental representations, and thus the set can include itself. With Brumann some elaboration is needed.

Brumann suggests that individuals can be ascribed membership with respect to a culture according to their sharing features in the matrix with others (1999, S6-S7), leading to the identification of (what could be called) sub-matrices. But he also interprets features to be directly able to represent statements about individuals as belonging to social collectivities because 'any observable feature can be included in [...] a matrix, including emic categories [...] and self-categorization' (1999, S6n8). This means that while viewers of the general matrix may ascribe the membership of individuals as drawing conclusions *from* information in the general matrix, using some analytical procedure external to the matrix, such judgements can also be included already *in* the matrix through a feature shared by people in a sub-matrix.

The problem is that there is no guarantee that the two forms of information, the analytical procedure external to the matrix on the one hand and the information already included as features on the other are mutually consistent. Indeed, persons holding 'emic' and 'self-categorizing' ideas about *what* their own culture is or what it should be, and *who* belongs to it or should (not) belong to it, may be in direct opposition to each other. There is no guarantee that all persons use an identical procedure for membership ascription. This is also one reason why the classical 'emic/etic' dichotomy which Brumann alludes to is less than satisfactory for anthropological research. Brumann (1999, S6-S7) acknowledges that cultural demarcations may be vague, but the point here is that they may be flatly contradictory. The same problems hold for Boyer's definition: when he writes that a set of mental representations *makes* a group different from others, he refers to a judgement procedure external to the mental representations. This external procedure may, but also may not, correspond with what people can *declare* in their mental representations as identical or different groups. Again, the mental representations of people may themselves be mutually inconsistent.

The possibility for self-insertion of the definiendum into its own definiens, as allowed for by Brumann and Boyer, resembles certain phenomena encountered in the fields of set theory and logic. What is known as Curry's paradox straightforwardly

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enables one to prove *any arbitrary* statement from self-inclusion or self-substitution when the objective is to explain only a *specific* statement. Applied to culture, this means that it cannot be satisfactorily used to *explain* anthropological phenomena when culture is self-applicable, as in a cultural-relativistic approach where a culture is explained in its own terms. But if it is accepted that culture *is* self-applicable, it follows that culture does not determine anthropological phenomena in unequivocal ways (Van Dokkum 2004; 2005).

A direct demonstration of this possible indeterminacy of culture is given by the following simple model. Suppose two persons, *M* and *N*, have different self-categorizing conceptualizations of a culture *C*, where the references '*M*', '*N*', etc. stand for persons and '*a*', '*b*', etc., and '*C*' for *C* itself (allowing for self-inclusion), for attributes within *C*:

> According to M, $C = \{C, M, N, O, P, Q, R, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h\}$.
> According to N, $C = \{C, N, O, P, Q, R, S, a, c, d, e, f, g, h, i\}$.

The two conceptualizations show considerable overlap in membership of persons $\{N, O, P, Q, R\}$ and attributes $\{C, a, c, d, e, f, g, h\}$, so a procedure external to the two conceptualizations might be proposed that declares that *C* (according to *M*) can be identified with *C* (according to *N*). But then there is a problem because *M* and *N* disagree on the membership of *M* in the group to be associated with the culture. If we follow *M*'s own analysis of *C*, *M* is a member; if we follow *N*'s analysis, *M* is not. Referring back to the idea that it might be derived from *C* itself, whether *M* is a member or not begs the question because it would first have to be established whether *M*'s version of *C* is entitled to participate in the procedure to determine what *C* is, which would depend on an affirmative verdict of *M*'s membership in the group associated with *C*, and so on in a vicious regress.

Hence Brumann's approach, which presupposes a certain straightforwardness in concluding shared culture from similarities, may not be viable for an explanation of differences in collective self-definition across different individuals. Instead of taking *C* as some 'culture', we can take it as some 'nation' and study ideas about it. Then the same objection holds for Anderson's (1991[1983]) approach as 'nations' being identifiable through objects people share (specifically means of communication). *M* and *N* would then have different 'imaginings' about which people and which items[1] they would consider relevant for their respective 'imaginings' of the nation *C*. But from the model above it is easy to see that it does not *follow* from sharing items across the different ideas of what the nation *C* is. *N* might consider *M* as *not* being a 'fellow-member' of the nation *C* because of *M*'s inclusion of item *b* in an 'imagining' about the nation *C*, which *N rejects*, even if *M* and *N* share *a*, *c*, *d*, *e*, *f*, *g*, and *h* in their 'imaginings'.

1 Or *mental representations* (Boyer) of these people and items in a purely cognitive exercise.

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Indeed, people may dispute about such problems using the very 'print-languages' and 'communications technology' that Anderson invokes. Anderson's theory about 'imagined communities' is not helpful because it cannot accommodate disputes *about* 'imaginings'.

2 Delineations of 'Nation'

We are now ready to formulate an approach for delineating, rather than defining, 'nation', acknowledging the possibility for contradictory interpretations among associated people. We first formulate five rules, which do not define 'nation' but set out guidelines for (possibly varying) definitions of 'nation'.

Rule (1): People have the capacity to refer to collections of people.
Rule (2): No *a priori* restrictions exist as to who can be referrer and referent.
Rule (3): References to collections of people may be associated with communicable concepts.

Rules (1)-(3) together ensure that collections of people can be self-referential. Anthropological objects such as, say, *family*, *totem group*, and indeed *nation* need to be further specified with *a posteriori* restrictive definitions in which collections of people are associated with concepts through stipulations of relationships between people:

Rule (4): Communicable concepts concerning collections of people may be specified by referrers through communicable restrictive concepts about relationships between referents.

To complete the basis for our investigations, we need one more rule about the possibility of *debating* social issues concerning, for instance, nations:

Rule (5): Concepts can be discursively communicated using (still other) concepts.

One comment needs to be made to avoid a possible misunderstanding: by presenting 'nation' as something that cannot be rigidly pinned down as a concept, but only delineated, I am not saying that nations do not exist or that any delineation is arbitrary. To argue that nations are not arbitrary, in the sense that any social organization might be seen as a nation, one might refer to descriptions of certain Australian Aborigines. Hiatt states about the Gidjingali that '[t]he evidence is clearly against the existence in aboriginal clansmen of an instinct to occupy and defend their territory' (2009[1968], p. 101). Sharp states that on Cape York Peninsula he 'simply could not find a society' but

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instead 'an ego-centered *set* of societies; no one individual was the center of a system of networks that overlapped with anyone else's' (2009[1968], p. 159, emphasis original). We can safely say that the examples quoted would not be usefully described as nations, since the idea of territoriality, though existing, would not act as a precondition for the social behaviour of groups.

As for a nation, we might say that it deals with a human collectivity which can be referred to as such (Rule 1), concerning which anyone may have an opinion about anyone's membership (or not) of it (Rule 2) and that certain concepts can be associated with it (Rule 3). These stipulations are still too broad, so we require as further restrictions (Rule 4) that a nation (*a*) must have a name; (*b*) is associated with a more or less compact territory within which the purported human collectivity lives or should live; (*c*) has a substantial number of members who wish what they see as their own nation to continue to exist into future generations; (*d*) is larger than and comprises human collectivities such as *family*, *totem group*, etc. (which are themselves subject to specifications of rules [1]-[4]), in other words, there is an aspect of maximality to nation, although a nation (*e*) is smaller than all of humanity. As for Rule (5), people may associate a nation with certain concepts that are themselves interrelated. For Frelimo, the experience of the independence struggle 'under [its] guidance' has been a self-evident basis for 'national unity' (cf. Mozambique, 1975, arts. 1, 5), a conceptual connection not shared by all Mozambicans. Naturally, Rules (1)-(5) do not pin down what is a nation in an unambiguous way, and this is precisely the point because in the observed world matters of nationhood are often fuzzy. Any theory about nations and nation-states should be able to accommodate fuzziness. Therefore Rule (4), as applied to 'nation', should contain the least number of requirements possible; for example, the idea that a nation should have a homogeneous culture should not be taken as a restrictive requirement when applying Rule (4), although of course it may crop up in discussions between people when they apply Rule (5).

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APPENDIX 2

The Wieschhoff/Shungano List of the Makombe Dynasty

In 1929, Heinz Wieschhoff obtained a list of 35 people considered to have been ancient kings of the Kingdom of Barue. Ad. E. Jensen discovered the list in the notebooks left by Wieschhoff (Von Sicard 1954). The informant on the list was Shungano (~ Shangano) (Wieschhoff, 1941, p. 97).

The Wieschhoff/Shungano list as given by Von Sicard (without comments):

1. Nyabumudu
2. Daughter of the King Nyadepa
3. Nenduwuta
4. Nyamiciti
5. Ningira
6. Nyamaranu
7. Kapanga
8. Cibudu
9. Nutopwe
10. Cimukaka
11. Cibutora
12. Karici
13. Cabvunda
14. Nakossa
15. Pekani
16. Cidaskwa
17. Zere
18. Nbira or Mbira
19. Citumbu
20. Kabudukagwe
21. Kapini
22. Kapsakanesi or Kawasi
23. Cisekene Nyakureka
24. Nyamutukwa
25. Cinama*u*eri
26. Ganye
27. Cimore
28. Kapanga
29. Tenere

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30. Kabudu Kagore
31. Samakande
32. Nyamaringa
33. Nyipare Langa
34. Nongwe-Nogwe
35. Kasado

Some names on the Wieschhoff/Shungano list can be linked to information from other sources. As Von Sicard comments, the 'Daughter' (Number 2) reminds us of the Murexe of Pacheco (2013[1883], pp. 46–47n10). On the other hand, it is not clear why she is mentioned in the second and not in the first place. The possibility that a different woman is meant cannot be excluded. In general, it is not certain that the list should be interpreted as enumerating people in an exactly chronological order. When chronological, the Wieschhoff/Shungano list would show partiality to the Chipapata branch, not mentioning people from the Chibudu branch after Chipapata. The identification of Numbers 5–8 and 10–14 is difficult in this approach. If we abandon the idea that the list should be (wholly) chronological, we may propose resolutions for the problems of identifying the said numbers with the following hypothetical identifications:

5. Ningira ~ Nengisa (Arnold, 1995[1901], p. 244);
6. Nyamaranu ~ Nyamawanu, Inhamauano (Arnold, ibid.; AHU #6219);
7. Kapanga ~ Capanga (Isaacman, 1976, p. 204; Arnold, ibid.);
8. Cibudu ~ Chibudu (Isaacman, 1976, p. 53; Arnold, ibid.);
10. Cimukaka ~ Mucaka (Coutinho, 1904, p. 17);
11. Cibutora ~ Chipitura (Coutinho, ibid.; Isaacman, ibid.; cf. Arnold, ibid.);
12. Karici ~ Cassiche (Coutinho, ibid.; Isaacman, ibid.)
13. Cabvunda ~ C(h)avunda (Coutinho, ibid.; Isaacman, ibid.);
14. Nakossa ~ Makosa (Isaacman, 1976, p. 160).

If these interpretations have any merit, Numbers 8 and 10–14 may indicate the 'Chibudu branch' of the royal family, and Makosa's position in the list may indicate his association with this branch as interpreted by Ranger (1963) and Isaacman (1976). However, there is still Number 35 (Kasado), a person difficult to interpret other than as Makosa. The latter situation would mean the Makosa person is mentioned twice in the list, which possibly also occurs with Kapanga (Numbers 7 and 28), once grouped with his siblings Ningira and Nyamaranu, and again much lower in the list with his brother Cimore (27; Shimari or Shimori of Arnold 1995[1901], p. 244). These duplications are possible, but not certain.

Mbira (18) is probably the Imbira mentioned as one of the 'descent group of the Gonguros' who were Chimbatata's enemies in 1811 (Santana, 1967, p. 447). Kapsakanesi

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(22) we can take ~ Katsvaganyidze, a name with which this person is remembered nowadays in the District of Barue. In this work, I formulate the hypothesis that one can identify him with Gunguru, who reigned in the decades 1750–1760. Ganye (26) is almost certainly ~ Gange who was Makombe until 1794 or 1795 (Rita-Ferreira, 1982, p. 144). Kapanga (28) is almost certainly ~ Capanga mentioned by Isaacman, 1979 [1976], p. 329) as Makombe in 1820. Kabudu Kagore (30; ~ Kabudu Kagoro) must be identified with the Chipapata of Alpers (1970, pp. 212–213), Coutinho (1904, p. 17) and Eça (1953, p. 291). Samakande (31) is Coutinho's Samacande (ibid.). Nyamaringa (32) is probably Coutinho's Inhamecinga (~Inhamesinga) (ibid.). Nyipare Langa (33) is the Canga of Coutinho (ibid.) and Isaacman's Kanga ~ Hanga (1976); the name 'Nyipare' is known today in Barue as 'Nyaupare' (Ranger, 1963, p. 60 gives 'Nyapaure-Hanga'). Nongwe-Nogwe (34) is also known as 'Nongwe-Nongwe' and Kasado (35), being the last person mentioned in the list, is, as said, difficult to interpret if not as Makosa, the last Makombe (Ranger, 1963, pp. 78–79; cf. Von Sicard 1954). Tenere (29), as well as the numbers 1, 3, 4, 9, 15–21, and 23–25 I have not been able to identify so far as known Barue kings in other sources.

It is possible that the list includes people who were not reigning Makombes, such as Nyamaringa (32) and Tenere (29). The Makombeship of Mbira (18) is also uncertain on the basis of other data. Nyamaringa ~ Inhamesinga is mentioned as '*macombe*' by Da Costa (1939[1902], p. 313), but Isaacman (1976, p. 53) reports that in 1892 he just did not recognize any of his elder brothers as leader, which probably describes the situation better. Tenere (possibly ~ Tenesse) is referred to by Von Sicard (1954) as the father of Wieschhoff's informant, Shungano. Tenere, being relatively recent, is difficult to interpret as a ruler around the mid-nineteenth century. For example, if Shungano was 70 years old at the time he worked with Wieschhoff around 1929 (cf. Macamo, 2006, pp. 76–78), he would have been born in 1859, and at this time Kabudu Kagoro was Makombe. Supposedly still alive in 1859, Tenere could only have reigned when he abdicated or was defeated by another Makombe sometime before 1853, but unless other data emerge, it is difficult to associate such events with the information we have.

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APPENDIX 3

Partial Overview of Reigning Makombes

With the information discussed above, it is possible to formulate a partial summary of the people who were rulers of the Kingdom of Barue, as given in Table 8. The left column indicates names known from the literature; in the second column are indicated alternative names derived from oral tradition of the 20th and 21st centuries, specifically the information obtained by Cor. Arnold, the Wieschhoff/Shungano list, and the author's research. The third column offers judgements about the certainty of the identity of the names mentioned in the first two columns. The column at the right indicates the years in which a person would have been Makombe as far as is clear from the information collected. With the frequent occurrence of aliases, the possibility that some people are duplicated in the list below cannot be excluded (cf. Appendix 2); for example, on the basis of currently available information we cannot be sure that the 'Sazua' of 1794/5 is not identical with Nyamawanu, or Nengisa with the unknown Makombe of 1782, or Mocuzucuto with Shimori. Even taking into account three possible duplications, the average length of a Makombe's reign was not very long: in the period 1757–1918 (161 years) there were at least 24–3 = 21 Makombes, averaging about eight years of reign for each Makombe.

TABLE 8 Partial overview of reigning Makombes

Name	Alternative datum	Certainty of the identity	Year(s)
Mureche	Nyamudzororo	hypothetical (note (x))	± 1450…1480
Makombe		(note (y))	± 1480
Gunguru	Katsvaganyidze	there are arguments in favour	± 1757/8, 1767–1770
Mutukunya			± 1757/8, ?-1767
[name unknown]			1782
Nengisa	Ningira	hypothetical	difficult to establish
Gange	Ganye	almost certain	until 1794/5
Sazua			from 1794/5
Nyamawanu	Nyamaranu	hypothetical	1811
Chimbatata			1811
Shimari/Shimori	Cimore	hypothetical	difficult to establish
Mocuzucuto	Muzucutto	probable	1818

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TABLE 8 Partial overview of reigning Makombes (*cont.*)

Name	**Alternative datum**	**Certainty of the identity**	**Year(s)**
Capanga	Kapanga	almost certain	1820
Sazua			1822
Bingo			1826
Inhamaguada			1830
Chibudu	Cibudu	hypothetical	1844
Chipapata	Kabudu Kagoro	certain	± 1853–1880/1
Mucaka	Cimukaka	hypothetical	1880/1-?
Kanga/Hanga	Nyaupare	certain	1892, 1894/5–1902
Samacande	Samakande	certain, trivial	± 1893–1894/5
Chipitura	Chivembe	there are arguments in favour	1894/5–1898
Cassiche	Karici	hypothetical	1898–1900
Cavunda	Cabvunda	hypothetical	1900–1902
Nongwe-Nongwe	Chikuwore	certain	1917
Makosa	Kasado	difficult to explain otherwise	1917–1918

Notes: (x) Compare stories about a woman associated with the origin of the Kingdom of Barue, of ICN, of Pacheco 2013[1883]: 46-47n10) and of Abraham (1962: 65)
(y) Identified as son of Mureche in oral tradition in Abraham (1962: 82n38).
Other sources: cf. this book, specifically Arnold 1995[1901]); Coutinho (1904); ICN; Isaacman (1976); Newitt (1973); Ranger (1963); Von Sicard (1954)

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APPENDIX 4

The 1999 Presidential Election in Mozambique

While the 1999 presidential election had only two candidates, the parliamentary election had 12 contesting parties and coalitions. Renamo had made a deal with other opposition parties to combine forces in the parliamentary elections, leading to the Renamo-UE (*União Eleitoral*–Electoral Union) combination. In return for the third parties' hitchhiking with Renamo in the parliamentary elections, Dhlakama was designated the preferred presidential candidate for these parties. Several presidential candidates from yet other parties did not make it through the required registration procedures, leaving only Chissano and Dhlakama as candidates. The official results are given in Table 9 (*MPPB,* 2000a; 2000d):

Dhlakama's share in the vote increased sharply from 1994 to 1999; probably many adherents of third candidates would have had Dhlakama as a second choice in 1994 and voted for him in 1999 (assuming most voters' preferences did not change). In 1999, Chissano won with a relatively small margin in the official results. In fact, the difference between Chissano and Dhlakama was smaller than uncertainties in the vote count, to be studied below. A large number of ballots were declared invalid (in Portuguese: *nulos*), or blank (*brancos*). Moreover, hundreds of tally sheets (*editais*; summaries of election results at polling station level), each with hundreds of votes, were *entirely* disregarded in the end result. Whether it is possible, given the existing data, that

TABLE 9 Official election results in 1999

	Presidential		**Parliamentary**		
	Chissano	**Dhlakama**	**Frelimo**	**Renamo-UE**	**Others**
Valid count[a]	2,338,333	2,133,655	2,005,713	1,603,811	522,799
% of valid	52.3%	47.7%	48.5%	38.8%	12.7%
Blank votes (%)	6.5%		9.6%		
Invalid votes (%)	2.9%		4.9%		

a) The total of presidential votes taken into consideration was 4,934,352; the total of parliamentary votes taken into consideration was 4,833,761.

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this changed the result from a real Dhlakama win into an official Chissano win is to be investigated. According to Luís de Brito (no date: 1), the official figures of the 1999 presidential elections

> …do not correspond to the real results of the election. Among other indications of fraud it should be noted that the Supreme Court refused the opposition call to recount c. 370 000 votes […] not considered due to technical problems with the tally sheets. In fact Chissano had most probably lost the election.

Most analysts (examples below) continue to maintain that the uncounted *editais* would not, or would not likely, have altered the result. From this kind of analysis, two sorts of misconceptions about Mozambican politics are perpetuated: first, that the specific result of the 1999 presidential election was legitimate beyond doubt, even if procedurally problematic; second, that overall Frelimo's power has had a continuous electoral legitimacy beyond a doubt. The 1999 election was fraught with tampering. This needs no specific argumentation, since the existence of such tampering has been confirmed by the Mozambican Technical Secretariat of Electoral Management, or STAE (*MPPB,* 2000a); there is little reason to assume that only the parliamentary election was affected.

1 Approach

In the absence of data on the individual ballots that were discarded, analysis of regression and variation of data can yield numerical outcomes that by their magnitude can justify or disturb certain conclusions about elections even when individual ballots cannot be studied (cf. Powell, 1989). It can be shown that it is not certain that the official outcome of the 1999 Mozambican presidential election represented the intention of the majority of the voters.

Some of the individual ballots initially discarded by polling stations were revalidated in a reassessment by the National Elections Commission – CNE (*MPPB*, 2000a, p. 6), indicating a bias against Dhlakama in ballots initially considered invalid (*nulos*), but later declared valid. There were also large amounts of blank votes, *brancos*. Neither *nulos* nor *brancos* show a uniform distribution across Mozambique (Van Dokkum, 2015, Appendix G). The large number of discarded tally sheets (*editais*), already alluded to, formed the bulk of lost information about voters' intentions. High incidences of individual *brancos* may correlate, to some degree, with problems with *editais* (a motivation for this will be given below). It may then be established that the discarded *editais* could indeed have been such that the difference in *intended* votes between Chissano and Dhlakama was smaller than the officially reported difference, if not in fact

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inverted (i.e. constituted a Dhlakama win). Other problems have been reported as well (*MPPB,* 2000c; Cahen, 2009, p. 40n117, n121). These problems do not form part of the present analysis, but if they followed the trend against Dhlakama, this would lessen the numerical burden put on the methods described below.

2 Data

The IESE (*Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos*; Institute of Social and Economic Studies) has made detailed voting data available (2016; cf. Hanlon 2015), down to the level of *local de votação* (voting place; *local* for short; plural *locais*). A *local* consists of one or a few polling stations (stations for short), the lowest aggregate level apart from individual voters. A station is represented by an *edital* (tally sheet; plural *editais*), but data from individual *editais* are not publicly available; indeed, this is part of the problem concerning this election. In addition to others, a second source of data already referred to is the *MPPB* periodical, edited by Joseph Hanlon.

I will follow *MPPB* about the end result of the official total, where Chissano had 204,678 votes more than Dhlakama (*MPPB*, 2000a). The analysis below concerning statistical trends is mostly based on the recent IESE data without the 'revalidated votes' mentioned above, as the latter are not included in the *local*-level 'valid' results in these data. For the analysis of bias in those results, this has little, if any, impact. At provincial level, we are dealing with 11 provinces, consisting of ten provinces proper plus the city of Maputo. 'District level' refers to 128 administrative districts proper, ten provincial capitals, three other cities not subsumed under proper district data,[1] and five 'urban districts' of the national capital Maputo, in total 146 districts to be considered. There were 8322 stations (Carter Center, 2000, pp. 21, 27), distributed over 3428 *locais* (excluding 24 *locais* with zero registered *and* zero actual voters), about 2.4 stations per *local*. The IESE database gives 7,099,105 registered voters, a number also announced *before* the elections (*MPPB,* 1999), and therefore a rock-solid basis for our investigations concerning discarded votes. There were 78 *locais* with registered voters but without any submitted votes (an estimated 103 stations–estimated numbers of stations per *local* are here obtained by taking the next highest 1000 in a *local* and then dividing that number by 1000), representing 71,729 registered voters. These estimated 103 stations are presumed here to be part of the body of 550 excluded stations, as they do represent registered voters.[2] Below this collection of 78 *locais*/103 stations is called the 'small'

1 Maxixe, Ilha de Moçambique, Nacala-Porto; compare IESE data with list of municipalities in Machava (2013, p. 7n2).

2 Carter Center (2000, p. 19) reports 11 polling stations never opened. This information is ignored, as they cannot be located. Since there is, as we shall see, on average a bias against

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group. The remaining registered voters amount to 7,027,376 across 3350 *locais* and an estimated 8219 (from 8322–103) stations. This latter collection is called the 'big' group.

3 Trends in the Data

Before making some calculations, we need descriptive information on the counting and related subsequent processes concerning the 1999 presidential ballots and the high number of *brancos*. *MPPB* (2000a, p. 4) gives revealing information:

> Ballots went into the wrong piles or people lost count. After midnight, the temptation to cut corners became overwhelming. [...] Up to 20% of *editais* had errors, and this caused serious delays in the provincial and national counts. [...] Where the totals [of *editais*] did not add up, the number of votes for president or parliamentary parties was normally taken as correct, and the number of blank votes adjusted to make the sums correct.

Overall the percentage of the 1999 presidential *brancos* (6.5%) is high compared with 1994 (5.8% – *MPPB*, 2000a, p. 2) and 2004 (2.9% of all ballots–IESE 2004). From the last sentence of the quote, it appears that many of the *brancos* in the final official results may refer to ballots that were not *brancos* at all, but *nulos* to be studied or valid ballots that were not counted as such. This is likely because in most cases it was not the number of votes cast that was adjusted but the number of *brancos*. Since the reported incidence of *brancos* was relatively high, their number can be expected to have been raised rather than lowered. Consequently, a higher incidence of *brancos* is an indicator for a higher chance of problems having occurred, as it was *brancos* that were invoked to get the math straight in case of discrepancies.

4 *Brancos* in Included *Editais*

I have shown elsewhere that the incidence of *brancos* per district had a tendency to be higher around a share for Dhlakama (in a district) of around 59% (Van Dokkum, 2015, pp. 334–337). With the IESE data, this result can be strengthened at the *local* level, just one level above the stations, in the big group of 3350 *locais*. Using a spreadsheet or similar computer programme, the incidence of *brancos* in a *local* as a dependent variable versus Dhlakama's share in valid votes in a *local* as an independent variable can be

Dhlakama, excluding these 11 stations makes the analysis almost certainly more conservative, not more lenient.

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approached by a second-degree polynomial (inverted parabola) as a regression curve with a peak at 65.35% for Dhlakama's share in the officially valid votes:

$$\text{predicted ratio } brancos = -0.0837 \times ([\text{share Dhlakama}] - 0.6535)^2 + 0.0755.$$

Establishing statistical significance for the regression curve has no importance here because we are not dealing with a sample from a yet larger statistical population. However, we can apply Spearman's rank correlation coefficient r_S and determine the statistical significance of the permutations of rank orderings of the incidence of *brancos* around 65.35% for Dhlakama's share in the votes. We take the *local* with the lowest difference (ignoring sign) between Dhlakama's score and 65.35% first (rank 1) and the *local* with the highest such difference last (rank 3350). The *local* with the highest incidence of *brancos* is given rank 1. This yields $r_S = 0.263$, by normalization $z = 15.2$, $p < 0.000\,000\,1$ (one-tailed).[3] It may be recalled that the data here are *not* a sample but form the *total population of locais with actual voters* in the big group as officially reported; the skewed incidence of *brancos* is not a parameter with which we might estimate bias concerning the risk of *brancos* occurring across *locais*; it *is* the bias.

5 Excluded *Editais*

So far it has been established that, if the incidences of *brancos* indicate counting problems, these problems were (*a*) not statistically random and (*b*) making results more unclear in areas where Dhlakama was stronger than Chissano. This concerns only the officially *counted* votes. However, as indicated, there is *another* problem of *hundreds of entire* editais (*polling station tally sheets*) not being counted at all. Here we have anecdotic reports provided by election authorities themselves that foul play was involved:

> The Supreme Court [...] cited 'unexplained erasures and corrections' in some *editais.* In an interview in *Notícias* (10 January [2000]), [António] Carrasco [STAE Director General] said 'some *editais* show evidence that something happened outside the polling station, and that someone tried to change the results'.

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3 I use $z = r_S \times \sqrt{(n-1)}$, where $n = 3350$. Ties in ranks are eliminated as much as possible. For tied percentages of *brancos*, a lower absolute amount of *brancos* (if equal, the higher absolute number of valid votes) will get a higher rank-number (i.e. lower on the listing). For tied distances in percentages from the peak of the *brancos*, higher differences of actual votes between Dhlakama and Chissano get a higher rank-number. Remaining tied ranks are replaced by the mean between them; they are few and the original Spearman rank-correlation coefficient is used. Statistics literature consulted: Hays (1981[1963], pp. 596–598); Noether (1991, pp. 236–237).

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For unexplained reasons, the Supreme Court (*Tribunal Supremo*) did not initiate a further analysis of the collection of 550 excluded *editais* (*MPPB*, 2000a, p. 5). Especially the quote from Carrasco indicates that foul play occurred concerning these *editais* (news reports do not distinguish here between excluded presidential and parliamentary *editais*, but presumably the problems concerned both categories).

MPPB reports that the Supreme Court maintained that

> the irregularities really were unresolvable. [...] Taking the average turnout at other polling stations, the Tribunal [Supreme Court] estimates that at most 377,773 voters were excluded.

Then *MPPB* analyses:

> The Tribunal does not do the rest of the calculation, but to win the presidency, Dhlakama would have needed 77% of those [377,773] votes, and he only did that well in Sofala province.

MPPB, while agreeing that the *editais* would have been in Dhlakama's advantage, assumes that the estimated 377,773 rejected votes would reflect the statistical tendencies of the officially accepted results (*MPPB,* 2000b). Although admitting that it would not have been impossible, Manning considers it 'statistically unlikely' that the result for the presidency could have been altered by the rejected *editais* (Manning, 2002, p. 195). This probabilistic interpretation of winning the presidency is remarkable because the purpose of counting votes in an electoral democracy is to produce a *certain* outcome instead of a 'likely' one. I have shown above that problems in the counting of individual ballots were not statistically neutral. By extension, it does not have to be so with *editais* either, since these are summaries based on individual ballots. Certain *editais* with many *brancos* were only relatively more acceptable than the 550 rejected ones, even if, as argued, they might just as well represent problems with counting. What is more, *MPPB* gauges the necessary 77% against results at the *province* level. However, statistically, the *editais* involve a much more localized level of reporting, where more extreme outcomes may be expected. In 1994, 'there were great variations, with individual stations voting totally differently from nearby ones' (Hanlon in EMS, 1995, p. 27),[4] and this may have applied to 1999 as well. More fine-grained data can show starker effects

4 IESE (2016) data for the 1994 presidential elections show indeed that stations within the same local could have very different outcomes, for example reversals in advantage for Chissano vs. Dhlakama in Nampula, 'Código PA' 30302, *local* Alua Sede or Zambézia, 'Código PA' 40201, *local* Caiaia, among other places.

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concerning the spread of vote shares for candidates across voting populations. For example, in Tapaca *Posto Administrativo* (lower-level 'Administrative Post' within Malema District, Nampula), the two *locais* had 16% and 81% for Dhlakama, respectively.

6 Reconstructing Excluded *Editais*

We can study the relationship between Dhlakama's share in officially valid votes on the one hand and turnout on the other (as reported in the IESE data). The turnout data are interesting at least because these are the only data for which the stations concerned (rejected because their *editais* were not admitted) are *actually included* in the official results because they are still counted with respect to their registered voters. We can reason that when 550 stations/*editais* are excluded except for their registered voters, this should have downward effects on the officially reported turnouts per *local*.

About the estimated 550 – 103 = 447 excluded stations in the big group, there are no specific data available concerning their distribution across provinces. However, we can make a reconstruction that will not be far off from the real situation. First, we make estimations for the number of stations per *local*. Unfortunately, there are 42 *locais* with zero registered voters in the big group. These are estimated to have had one station each, except two with an estimated two stations. Few of these 42 *locais*, if any, will have had stations excluded. To reach a total of 8219 stations in the big group, we need to assume that for the other *locais* in the big group new stations have often been created when registered voters became more than multiples of around 1034.5 rather than exactly 1000 (in the small group this issue does not crop up). The 42 *locais* without registered voters just mentioned are now excluded from consideration concerning turnout, as this cannot be determined for them. Otherwise, for each *local*, we divide the number of registered voters by the estimated number of stations to obtain an average number of registered voters per station.

Now, apart from the said 42 above, we can leave those *locais* with exactly one (estimated) station *and* reported turnout out of consideration in the big group because these are *locais* that have no excluded stations. There remain 2055 *locais* or 6922 stations to consider. To estimate the number of excluded *editais* per *local*, we devise a factor, f, to be applied uniformly across all the said 2055 *locais*. We suspect that a station in the big group has been excluded when the number of cast ballots (*votos na urna*) is smaller than $f \times$ (the total number of registered voters in a *local* minus the average number of registered voters per station in that *local*), where the number of stations in a *local* is as estimated by the method just described. For an additional excluded station in a *local*, we check whether the number of cast ballots is smaller than $f \times$ (the total number of registered voters in a *local* minus *two* times the average number of

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registered voters per station in that *local*), and so on for more possibly excluded *editais*. If *f* is set 0.796, the sum of excluded *editais* in the big group is 447, which together with the earlier established 103 makes 550, referred to below as the 'reconstructed' excluded *editais* (or stations). The distribution of these 550 reconstructed *editais* is as given in Table 10 (observed [in the reconstruction] and expected across 8322 stations according to those stations' estimated distribution across provinces):

We see that Nampula and Sofala are vastly out of proportion in their share of reconstructed excluded *editais* ($\chi^2 = 172$, $p < 0.000\,01$).[5] Zambézia represents many excluded *editais* in absolute terms. Hence the Supreme Court's assertion that 'the discarded tally sheets came from stations in almost all provinces, suggesting that this indicated that there was no inherent bias against Renamo' (Carter Center, 2000, p. 27) is mere rhetoric; the southern region (Maputo City until Inhambane), where Chissano is strong, has fewer excluded *editais* in the reconstruction than expected (75 versus 142), while the central and northern regions of the country have more. Recall that the reconstruction method was applied uniformly; there should be no large differences across provinces in a situation without bias.

TABLE 10 Observed (in the reconstruction) and expected frequencies of excluded *editais*

Province	Observed (in the reconstruction)		Expected
Maputo City	0	(0% of total of 550)	33
Maputo	21	(3.8%)	32
Gaza	7	(1.3%)	39
Inhambane	47	(8.5%)	38
Sofala	98	(17.8%)	46
Manica	7	(1.3%)	34
Tete[a]	33	(6.0%)	42
Zambézia	112	(20.4%)	104
Nampula	153	(27.8%)	104
Cabo Delgado	42	(7.6%)	47
Niassa	30	(5.5%)	31
TOTAL	550	(100%)	550

a) Expected frequency of Tete is rounded off downwards to obtain 550 expected excluded *editais*.

5 Hays (1981[1963], pp. 537–541); for *p*-value: <http://www.socscistatistics.com/Default.aspx>, accessed 16 January 2018.

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Let us now study the possible effects of excluding *editais* with presumably high percentages for Dhlakama. Suppose we have a hypothetical *local* with three stations of equal size involving actual voters with 37%, 58%, and 79% for Dhlakama, respectively; 58% on average. Excluding the 79% station, we get a result of 47.5% for the *local*, a seeming Chissano win (for an analysis of the data concerning this issue, see Van Dokkum, 2017a, pp. 16–18). It would be misleading to refer to the 47.5% average of the remaining stations, or even to the 58% of the earlier value, as a proxy for the missing station. We could only do such a thing on average for large numbers of missing stations, *provided the exclusions could be assumed to be random*, and this is not the case.

We can ask whether the data of the 3428 *locais* at least make it *possible* for Dhlakama to have 77.1% of the votes in the excluded *editais* reconstructed here. The answer is yes, at least at the district level. The number of 377,773 mentioned by the Supreme Court can be attained if a turnout for the reconstructed *editais* of slightly more than 79% is taken. (This would have included invalid and blank votes, but I have argued elsewhere that the effect of these would more or less cancel out against anti-Dhlakama bias among the officially counted *brancos*, not taken into consideration here; see Van Dokkum, 2015, p. 340n271.) Within a district, a score for Dhlakama can be considered *possible* when it occurs at the *local* level within the district or is lower than that. A *possible* value for the score for Dhlakama for reconstructed excluded stations in a certain *local* can be taken as the highest score for Dhlakama occurring in the district of the *local*, with the following limitations: only consider (to be conservative in the analysis) *locais* where Dhlakama has less than 70% and use the highest district score only when it is higher than 50% for Dhlakama. Otherwise, the average percentage for Dhlakama in the *local* as implied by the official results (or, in the small group, a higher level if no *local* data are available) can be used. Multiplying the estimated number of registered voters per station in a *local* with the reconstructed number of excluded *editais* in the respective *local*, with about 79% turnout as mentioned and with the proposed score for Dhlakama, we can sum the votes for Dhlakama and Chissano across the reconstructed 550 excluded *editais*. This gives 295,770 votes[6] for Dhlakama (78.29%) and 82,002 for Chissano (21.71%), a difference of 213,768 votes, higher than the difference of 204,678 between Chissano and Dhlakama in the official results. Ignoring the conservative 70% threshold would only make the difference larger, allowing for relaxation of other assumptions. So, district-level data do make it a possibility that a Dhlakama victory represented the intention of the majority of the voters. It is certainly not unreasonable to take highest values for Dhlakama in a district, rather than averages. By Carrasco's own indication, foul play occurred. One expects foul play to be targeted at *editais* with extreme percentages of votes rather than at moderate ones. Since the

6 Small rounding-off differences not affecting the general outcome may occur.

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irregularities studied so far are biased against Dhlakama, one must reckon with the possibility that the excluded *editais* represent high values for Dhlakama.

7 Conclusion

I have argued that, for the Mozambican presidential election of 1999, the variation in the officially reported incidence of blank votes can be interpreted as an indicator for the variation in the existence of problems in the determination of the outcome of voting processes. Together with information about the exclusion of hundreds of station tally sheets, and the indications that problems were detrimental to Dhlakama rather than to Chissano, the supposition that Dhlakama was the favoured candidate of more than half of the voters in December 1999 constitutes a realistic possibility. This conclusion contrasts with comments made by the Carter Center, EU representatives, and others who maintain or imply that including the tally sheets concerned would not or not likely have changed the outcome. Such assurances cannot be maintained on the basis of the available information. It would, therefore, have been fitting to have the election declared void and the official outcome not accepted by 'the international community' because no candidate could definitively have been determined as being the preference of the majority of all the voters.

The supposition that distributions of votes in the excluded tally sheets would have been similar to that of officially reported distributions in provinces is unwarranted because (*a*) the distribution of problems (blank votes and excluded tally sheets) was not due to statistically random processes, hence it is imprudent to project average official results onto unknown tally sheets; and (*b*) the more fine-grained the information is, the larger variation it may show in voting results across analytical units, making results contained in the excluded tally sheets contingent on which particular sheets were excluded in the count.

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Maps



MAP 1 Mozambique: provinces and approximate area of the Kingdom of Barue
MAP CF. VAN DOKKUM (2015, PP. 347–349); INDE (2009)

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

MAP 2 Approximate contours of the Kingdom of Barue

Sources: Arnold (1901; 1995[1901]); Barretto (1964[1667], pp. 482, 487–488); Coutinho (1904, pp. 9, 17); Companhia de Moçambique (2010[1902]); Galvão da Silva (1954[1790], pp. 323–324n*); De Castilho (1891, p. 17, Documento T); Harvard (≤ 2017[1897]); INDE (2009); Isaacman (1976, p. 64); Küss (1882, p. 374); Mauch (1969[1872], p. 245, Map 1); Maxwell (1999, p. 10); Montez (1941, p. 120); Mousinho de Albuquerque (1934[1899], pp. III-XI, Documento II, pp. XIX-XXIII, Documento VII, taking Beuê ~ Bewe); Newitt (1973, p. 259; 1995, p. 226); Paiva de Andrada (1885; 1886, pp. 4, 5; 1888–1889, pp. 413, 418); Peters (1902, p. 58); RGS (1886, p. 508); Portugal (1967, p. 2); Randles (1975, maps concerning 'Macombe'); Rita-Ferreira (1982, pp. 73, 118); Thiele & Wilson (1915); USA (1957[1942]; 1964a[1937]; 1964b[1944]); *Régulo* Melo Mpanze; Carlos Firmino Mutapa

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

MAP 3 Approximate contours of chiefdoms of Barue District, 2010–2012
MAP CF. VAN DOKKUM (2015, PP. 345, 354). LEGEND: NAMES IN CAPITAL LETTERS INDICATE CHIEFDOMS; NAMES IN LOWERCASE LETTERS INDICATE RIVERS

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References

Abbreviations

GJSS	*Graduate Journal of Social Science*
IJAHS	*The International Journal of African Historical Studies*
JAH	*The Journal of African History*
JMAS	*Journal of Modern African Studies*
JSAS	*Journal of Southern African Studies*
MPPB	(*Mozambique Peace* [*Political*] *Process Bulletin*; *Boletim sobre o Processo Político em Moçambique*)
NADA	*The Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department Annual*
n.d.	*no date*
n.p.	*no place*
ROAPE	*Review of African Political Economy*

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