Mongol loyalty networks: cultural transmission and Chinggisid innovation

Jones, T.X.

Mongol Loyalty Networks:
Cultural Transmission and Chinggisid Innovation

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van

de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,

op gezag van rector magnificus prof.dr.ir. H. Bijl,

volgens besluit van het college voor promoties

te verdedigen op dinsdag 24 januari 2023

klokke 10.00 uur

door

Tobias Xavier Jones

geboren te Puyricard, Frankrijk

in 1987

Promotor:

Prof. dr. G.R. van den Berg

Copromotor:

Dr. E.G. Paskaleva

Promotiecomissie:

Prof. dr. J.J.L. Gommans

Prof. dr. P.M. Sijpesteijn

Prof. dr. R.E. Breuker

Dr. J.M.C. van den Bent (Radboud University)

Dr. M. Favereau (Paris Nanterre University)

Dr. M. Hope (Yonsei University)

Abstract:

This dissertation focuses on the creation of loyalty networks in the Mongol Empire and its successor states during the 13th and 14th centuries. It uses the framework of 'categories of loyalty' to examine how political actors made loyalty decisions. These categories can be broadly divided into two types: ideal loyalties and loyalties of self-interest. This work shows how these loyalties interacted, and how people explained their decisions, as well as how contemporary historians framed these actions. It analyses the methods in which Persian historians in particular talked about loyalty, the language they used and the Turco-Mongol customs which they sought to explain. This study indicates how these historians made use of Mongolian words in Persian in order to elucidate the actions of their rulers, giving us a glimpse into the complex world of Mongol ritual and ceremony, as well as Mongol rulers' expectations of their subjects.

The thesis goes on to show how Turco-Mongol custom was adapted through the actions of the founder of the empire, Chinggis Khan, who created new institutions and ideals which competed with existing norms, such as the *törü*, the unwritten divine law passed down through various steppe empires. It contends that these new institutions, which arose out of necessity, gave the Mongol Empire its youthful vigour when they worked in tandem, but also provided avenues for political actors to create their own loyalty networks, which contested with each other and served to break down the unity of the Mongol Empire.

Finally, this study analyses one of the successor states to the Mongol Empire, the Ilkhanate of Iran (1265-1335 CE), and how the loyalty networks there adapted to the new situation of being faced with several hostile, but genealogically related, Mongol states. It contests many of the recently posited views about the propagandistic efforts of the most famous Ilkhanid historian Rashīd al-Dīn, using the categories of loyalty to show how Turco-Mongol elites undermined the rule of the Chinggisid family in Iran. The assertion of non-Chinggisid power would pave the way for later rulers such as Temür, who created the Timurid Empire (1370-1506), to create their own states, which paid lip service to Chinggis Khan and his family, but ruled on their own terms. This study of loyalty gives us a better understanding of steppe cultures and the social dynamics which underpinned them. Through it we gain a viewpoint of the intrinsic mechanisms of power, stability and adaptation in Eurasia.

Acknowledgements

PhD dissertations at the best of times can be a stress-filled experience, but throw a two year COVID on and off lockdown into the mix and it's a recipe for disaster. Luckily, I had the support of a great project team, whose presence, even if only online, was vital to me finishing my thesis and maintaining a degree of sanity. We suffered together, and somehow that made it easier!

To my supervisor Gabrielle van den Berg, thanks go to the opportunity to join this wonderful project in the first place. Your advice, constructive criticisms and encouragement of me have always been a positive influence in my career, and you are always looking out for me.

To my second supervisor Elena Paskaleva, thank you for your precise examination of my work to make sure the finer details are in order. This is an underappreciated merit, but one that is of immense help when composing a large work such as this.

To my colleague and fellow Yank(ish) Nicholas Kontovas, thank you for your sense of humour and ability to make me smile at the most inopportune moments. Your great help with the many languages I struggled with in this dissertation was invaluable, and you bore with my horrible pronunciation of many names and places! Also thanks for your wonderful Chaghatai class and contributions to our courses.

To my colleague and *murshid* Sara Mirahmadi, I don't think I could have done this without you! Your help with examining the minutiae of Persian texts and correcting my constant issues with translation and transliteration cannot be underestimated. I also very much enjoyed your Classical Persian class, I would love to do that every day!

To the members of the Serving the Khan workshop, Anne Broadbridge, Bruno de Nicola, Florence Hodous, Michael Hope, Stefan Kamola, and Josephine van den Bent, thank you for participating and providing me with great feedback, career advice and fascinating conversation, as well as all of your excellent contributions to the field of Mongol studies. Hopefully soon we can meet again!

To my family far and wide, your love for me has shown itself time and again when I needed a pick up or excitement about my work. It has been so tough to be separated from you all for so long, but I know how deeply you care for me.

And last, but as far from least as can be, to the love of my life, Sarah Moine, not only have you made the necessity of working from home a delight, you have given me love, encouragement and a shoulder to cry on every step of the way. You have also shown a tremendous interest in my work, even though it is not your field, and shown me the best way to improve it from an outsider's perspective.

Contents

Transliteration

Transliteration is somewhat of a minefield when working on the Mongols due to the multiplicity of source languages, many of which penetrated each other at this time. For Arabic and Persian I have conformed to the *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*' system. Mongol names however have been spelled in their more 'Mongol' form rather than the Persian: ie, Öljeitü and not Ūljāytū. Similarly, for Turco-Mongol terms appearing in Persian I have used Gerhard Doerfer's *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen* transliteration in the English text, but I have stayed faithful to the Persian original in the transliterated sections. However for certain terms, I have adapted to current conventional usage: so khan instead of *qan*, qa'an instead of *qaghan*, and khatun instead of *qatun*. For other Mongolian terms, I have made use of Igor de Rachewiltz' translation of the *Secret History of the Mongols*. For Chinese I have used modern pinyin. For well-known dynasties and place names I use the simple forms, thus the Timurids and not the Tīmūrids, and Khurasan, not Khurāsān. I have preserved the original transliteration forms of translations and secondary works in quotation.

List of Figures and Maps

Figures

Maps

1. Introduction

The Mongol Empire which ruled over much of Eurasia for most of the 13th century and its successor states of the later 13th and 14th centuries have long captured the imagination of travellers, historians, linguists, and anthropologists, to name but a few.[1] Many scholarly works and products of popular culture have been fascinated with how this nomadic people on horseback conquered such a vast swathe of land. Over time, those researching the Mongols have come to appreciate the impressive political acumen which those who ruled this empire possessed. Gone are the days where the Mongols are portrayed simply as savage barbarians, to be replaced by an impressive volume of literature on a diverse range of aspects of Mongol rule. As we have come to understand this period better, the Mongols' political and administrative system of the imperial era has been explored by many different scholars, while works on various successor states (often called khanates) have further developed our knowledge of Mongol adaptations to rule in regions across Eurasia.[2] These works and many others have shown how the Mongols structured their empire, what methods they used for ruling over subject populations, and how they dealt with the idea of the lands they conquered as a shared patrimony of not just the great Chinggis Khan, but of his family as well. We are now in a better place than ever to navigate what can be a minefield of names, sources, and power shifts.

Standing on the shoulders of such giants, this work seeks to focus on a topic that is often mentioned, but rarely considered in any great detail, namely that of loyalty. Loyalty in the Mongol Empire is regularly discussed primarily focusing on incidents of disloyalty, or in examples of extreme loyalty. Take the work of Morris Rossabi, who discusses the case of the Southern Sòng dynasty (1127-1279 CE) artists who refused to join Qubilai Qa'an's (r. 1260-1294) Yuán court: 'the painters, for the

[1] This research was funded by the NWO (Dutch Research Council) VICI grant for the project 'Turks, texts and territory: Imperial ideology and cultural production in Central Eurasia', Project Number 277-69-001, at Leiden University.

[2] For works on the united Mongol Empire, standout contributions are T.T. Allsen, *Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) and P. Jackson, *The Mongols and the Islamic World: From Conquest to Conversion*, (Cumberland: Yale University Press, 2017). For the Yuán Dynasty in China, M. Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan,* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). For the Ögödeid and Chaghadaid realms, M. Biran, *Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia*, (Richmond: Curzon, 1997). For the Ilkhanate (and the earlier united empire), M. Hope, *Power, Politics and Tradition in the Mongol Empire and the Īlkhānate of Iran* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). For the Jochid *ulus* (Golden Horde), M. Favereau, *The Horde: How the Mongols Changed the World*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2021).

understandable and praiseworthy notion of loyalty to a native dynasty, declined Khubilai's offers.'[3] Here we are given a clear dichotomy, between loyalty to one's nation or going over to a foreign invader. Take also the statement by George Lane regarding the choice of steppe leaders to follow Chinggis Khan: 'independent-minded tribal chiefs remained with him not out of fear but out of choice'.[4] However, there are countless instances where loyalty decisions were not so cut and dried, even if we accept that the above examples count as such. The goal of this dissertation is to get to grips with loyalty in the Mongol world, in an attempt to understand some of the nuances in loyalty decisions and competing forces at work for political actors who had loyalty choices. What will be shown is that such choices were not always easy, and posterity often judged and judges these decisions without full comprehension of what such decisions entailed.

While loyalty is of great social importance in every society, a specific focus on Mongol political loyalty reveals a great deal about other aspects of Mongol cultural and societal norms. Despite the fact that the lenses through which we view the Mongol world are regularly not Mongols themselves, through comparison and the use of our 'Mongol' source covering the rise of the empire, the *Secret History of the Mongols*, we can find some fascinating trends.[5] In our study of loyalty, we also come to understand much about the Mongol approach to family, law, religion and obligations to one's ancestors. Again, these are concepts that have been dealt with before, but I believe that this look at loyalty fills out this picture provided by many excellent scholars. It is of critical importance to understand how political actors in the 12th-14th centuries made loyalty decisions, as it gives us a better understanding of Mongol culture and how it affected and was affected by the societies that it came into contact with. In looking at this, we see not only the reasons that our sources give us, but also the other potential influences that pushed or pulled people one way or another. In looking at these cases, we can see the fabric that made the Mongol Empire what it was, and how this fabric eventually tore under the stresses of these loyalty decisions. This breakdown of the loyalty network of the greater Mongol Empire in the 1260s forced a readjustment of how political loyalty was seen by actors in the various khanates which emerged out of this system. Of course, the Mongol Empire was not made up of only Mongols, and thus we must also consider how those who came under Mongol rule adapted to the cultural norms of loyalty which the Mongols brought with them.

Understanding Mongol loyalty networks is not only applicable for this period either. Long after any true 'Mongol' power had disappeared, the ideas that they brought with them permeated many other societies. Dynasties such as the Timurids (1370-1506) in Central Asia and the Mughals

[3] Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan*, p. 166.
[4] G. Lane, *Daily Life in the Mongol Empire*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006), p. 21.
[5] For information on this text, see the Primary Sources section.

(1526-1857) in India were the inheritors of Chinggisid concepts of governance, and the loyalty networks that the Mongols had brought with them were transferred into new societies and situations.[6] These dynasties willingly embraced many of the ideas that Chinggis and his family propagated, and many of the same issues surrounding loyalty cropped up again among later states.[7] Even regions further afield that had a much more negative memory of the Mongols, such as in Muscovy or in Míng China, adopted many of the institutions and ideas which had bolstered the Mongol state apparatus.[8] Only by truly understanding Mongol ideals and cultural norms can we figure out why their legacy was so powerful, even in sedentary states whose primary view of the Mongols was as barbarian destroyers. Thus, while it is outside the scope of this thesis, a consideration of Mongol loyalty networks and the bonds that held them in place gets us closer to understanding this legacy among later societies.

1.1 The Concept of Loyalty

Before addressing the framework of this study, perhaps it is important to address what exactly we mean by 'loyalty'. Loyalty is a term which has many different meanings which people ascribe to it, based on the context in which we use it. Most loyalties are informal, such as to one's friends or to one's football team, while others are contractual, sealed by an oath, vow, or pledge. Marriages often, but not always, include an exchange of vows pledging loyalty to the other person. Politically, in western Europe we tend not to officially vow loyalty to the nation or to a party, but in my childhood in the United States, every school morning began with the class chanting together with hand on heart, 'I pledge allegiance to the flag, and to the republic for which it stands…'. Considering what people choose to be loyal to indicates what political, cultural, societal and religious values they care to be seen upholding.

What sort of attributes make up loyalty then? Again, this seems to depend on context. For example, working at a company for many years is considered loyalty, though perhaps that employee

[6] For Mongol influence on the Timurids, see M.E. Subtelny, *Timurids in Transition: Turko-Persian Politics and Acculturation in Medieval Iran*, (Leiden: Brill, 2007). For an understanding of the Mughal relationship to the Mongol legacy, see J. Gommans and S.R. Huseini, 'Neoplatonism and the Pax Mongolica in the making of ṣulḥ-i kull. A view from Akbar's millennial history', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 56, No. 3, (2022), pp. 870-901.

[7] See for example pp. 10-18 of this thesis.

[8] Considering Mongol influence on Muscovite political institutions, see C.J. Halperin, 'Muscovite Political Institutions in the 14th Century', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History,* Vol. 1, No. 2, (2000), pp. 237-257. For Mongol influences on the Míng, see D.M. Robinson, 'The Ming Court and the Legacy of the Yuan Mongols', in (ed.) D.M. Robinson, *Culture, Courtiers, and Competition: The Ming Court (1368-1644),* (Boston, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008), pp. 365-421.

was happy with his/her pay and never was offered anything better by another company. If the company suddenly reduced salaries and extended hours, most people would not begrudge the employee changing positions. In friendships usually no contract is signed or oath made, and we do not expect monetary benefit, yet we expect loyalty in the sense of something far less concrete, perhaps a feeling of support which we derive from that person.

Loyalty is a two-way street of course, and the two parties often feel quite differently about what is expected of the other. A politician for example, may feel loyalty towards his/her party, but if the party makes a stand on an issue that disagrees with that politician's conscience, he/she may vote the other way. The party leadership may see this as disloyalty, while the politician would rather see it as loyalty to his/her own beliefs. This example also raises the issue of multiple loyalties. Perhaps this politician was elected by his/her constituents on an anti-war platform, and his/her party votes to go to war. Is this politician being disloyal to constituents if he/she votes with the party, or disloyal to the party by opposing the war? In this case and in many others, loyalty is not a black and white issue.

Loyalty in a political sense nowadays seems to have quite a different meaning than in a mediaeval context. We tend no longer to describe loyalty as personal loyalty to the ruler and his dynasty, but rather to a more abstract concept of a nation. One can betray a leader or a party without being seen as a traitor to the country, while in a mediaeval context personal ties were often the only measurement of loyalty, as the abstract idea of a nation often is hard to find if it existed at all, though, as we will see, there was some notion of loyalty to the realm which transcended personal ties. Likewise, nowadays we have a much more specific notion of what constitutes a lack of loyalty. A criminal who consistently flouts a law against breaking and entering may be considered many negative things, but we are unlikely to dub that criminal a traitor to his/her country.[9]

However, in a mediaeval context where the ruler was seen as divinely ordained and was also the lawgiver, one who broke any of his laws having given oaths of loyalty to the ruler was frequently described as disloyal, an oath-breaker, or as betraying his rightful lord. The extent of the disloyalty was considered of course, bringing us to another point. Thomas Welsford (whose 2012 book on loyalty in a Central Asian context will be discussed shortly) relates the story of a ruler of Bukhara and Samarqand, Pīr Muḥammad, and his amir (commander) Bāqī Muḥammad's extremely different notions as to what loyalty entailed in the 16th and 17th century.[10] The amir takes a very formal view, saying that he has remained loyal in that he has not pronounced himself the new ruler, issued coinage in his own name, or had the Friday prayers read out in his name. This interpretation permits

[9] M. Grodzins, *The Loyal and the Disloyal*: *Social Boundaries of Patriotism and Treason*, (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing Company, 1956), pp. 31-3.
[10] Foreign terms and titles can be found in the Glossary, along with the languages in which they appear.

greater leeway in action for the amir, while the ruler labels certain actions that we would not necessarily deem disloyal as sedition, bringing in a wider conception of loyalty which justifies strong action against the amir.[11]

What amount of loyalty was expected by the ruler, and to what extent was conformity to these expectations possible or desirable on behalf of the ruled? Clearly this also depended on power. The landless peasant working a farm presumably had to contribute his time and produce to his landlord and not become a brigand or flee his land to meet his loyalty quota, while a powerful amir would have significantly more demands from the ruler in order to show his loyalty, though one should not forget that the amir served his ruler with the expectation of benefit. Suffice it to say that loyalty today is seen in quite different ways than a thousand years ago, and that different conditions affected both the perception and the practice of loyalty. Historians are sometimes tempted in a mediaeval context to see those who facilitated conquests of invaders and later served them as 'betraying' their country or homeland. These judgments are inherently linked to nationalism and the nation-state's conceptions of loyalty. For countries such as China, Iran and Russia, the Mongols have often been portrayed as foreign destroyers with no appreciation of local culture who represented an existential threat to the nascent nations. Those who worked for them on the ground are thus judged as collaborators. Perhaps some contemporaries would have seen it this way, but I believe we need to look closely into the specifics of loyalty in the Mongol Empire and one of its offshoots, the Ilkhanate (c. 1265-1335), before casting judgement on those actors who sought to bridge the gap between the conquerors and those they ruled.

1.2 Categories of Loyalty

To analyse the concept of loyalty in the Mongol Empire, the framework has been set by three important works focusing specifically on loyalty and dealing with geographical regions quite distant from each other and temporal settings across several centuries, but all with some relevance to or effect on the Turco-Mongol world of the 13th and 14th centuries. Roy Mottahedeh's seminal work *Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society* (1980) established the framework for the discussion of loyalty, in the context of the weakening of ʿAbbasid caliphal rule (750 -1258) and the

[11] T. Welsford, *Four Types of Loyalty in Early Modern Central Asia: The Tūqāy-Timurid Takeover of Greater Mā Warā al-Nahr, 1598-1605*, (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 94-6.

coming to the fore of the Buyids (934-1062) and eventually the Seljuqs (1037-1194).[12] A more recent work by Thomas Welsford, *Four Types of Loyalty in Early Modern Central Asia: The Tūqāy-Tīmurid Takeover of Greater Mā Warā al-Nahr* (2012) addresses the changeover in loyalty from one branch of the Chinggisid house to another in Central Asia in the 17th century. The last text considered here is that of Naomi Standen, titled *Unbounded Loyalty: Frontier Crossing in Liáo China* (2007).[13] This work focuses on the rivalries between dynasties in the north of modern-day China during the 10th and 11th centuries. While this is at quite a far remove from the region of Mottahedeh's focus especially, it is extremely useful conceptually, as it analyses the way in which authors of later Chinese dynasties, like the Southern Sòng, calcified what loyalty meant in an earlier period, though this was not the view of those on the ground in the 10th century, whose loyalties changed quite regularly. As this same process happened in the course of the breakup of the Mongol Empire, Standen's book can provide us with a comparative framework to address these changes. These three works will be considered in turn.

Roy Mottahedeh considers loyalty from the point of view of individual actors in the ʿAbbasid and Buyid realms in the areas of modern day Iraq and Iran. With the weakening of the Abbasid Caliphate as a political force with the ability to coerce, several dynasties emerged in the Middle East. These dynasties were not able to maintain the religio-political legitimacy of the ʿAbbasid caliph, who could claim to represent and rule all of the Islamic world. As political fragmentation occurred, the dynasties which emerged could not command people's loyalties in the same way. The presence of several different dynasties competing for power also meant that individual actors had greater agency and ability to choose their loyalties. The point of view of the individual therefore has pride of place in Mottahedeh's work. Even in the discussion of kingship, he emphasises that despite the lack of a strong central power in Baghdad, it was individual people who 'yearned to be ruled' that saw to it that the non-Islamic institution of kingship emerged and was maintained.[14] There are certainly issues with this individualistic analysis of loyalty, but the author's arguments need discussing, and his different categories of individual loyalty are certainly relevant both for the society he studies and the same area three centuries later under Mongol rule.

Mottahedeh divides loyalties into two types; acquired loyalties and loyalties of category. Thomas Welsford simplifies these categories neatly: they are 'described in terms of what one does

[12] R. Mottahedeh, *Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).
[13] N. Standen, *Unbounded Loyalty: Frontier Crossing in Liáo China*, (Honolulu, HA: University of Hawaii Press, 2007).
[14] Mottahedeh, *Loyalty and Leadership*, p. 176.

[…] and who one is.'[15] Mottahedeh's framework then can be utilised for loyalties in general rather than simply for the Buyid realm. He then dives into describing acquired loyalties, that is, what a man decides to commit himself to.[16] According to the author, these loyalties were 'positive' and 'predictable'; positive in the sense that people cooperated even when not threatened, and predictable in that people knew what the implications were due to the formal nature of these loyalties.[17] Mottahedeh elaborates on some of the more formal expressions of loyalty, such as the *bayʿa*, the original oath of allegiance to the prophet Muḥammad, then given to the caliphs, which subsequently came to be used for amirs, sultans and others. He argues at some length that while oaths, both to the caliphs and to other rulers, as well as more generally, were not always totally effective in ensuring someone's loyalty, they were seen to be important, as shown by their repeated usage both in the ʿAbbasid and Buyid worlds and beyond. He gives the example of the general Tuzun who in 944 made repeated oaths of good conduct to the caliph al-Muttaqi (r. 940-944) and made obeisance to the caliph, before arresting him and blinding him. Mottahedeh emphasises that contemporary accounts of Islamic historians express great shock and horror at this wilful perjury and disloyalty and claim that Tuzun regretted this until his death, caused by God in revenge for Tuzun's betrayal.[18] Oaths were made between people at many levels, tying society together. It is this web of acquired loyalties which Mottahedeh claims held much of Islamic society in the post-caliphate world together.

While in regards to acquired loyalties, people were, in a sense, choosing their loyalties, with Mottahedeh's loyalties of category, one's lineage, association and participation in a particular group were the determining factors of one's loyalty. In the mediaeval Islamic world, just as in Europe and elsewhere, one's lineage (*nasab*) largely determined how others saw you and how you saw yourself. This and your actions (*ḥasab*) showed your worth. Therefore it was assumed that, for example, a man from a family of administrators would naturally have abilities that made him a good administrator, though his actions might prove otherwise. Therefore, Mottahedeh notes, certain roles and professional classes tended to become the preserve of certain families.[19] In this sense, actors often saw their loyalties as to the group to which they belonged, though these would not be 'classes' in the way we see would understand the word nowadays. Sometimes it was one's occupation, one's ethnicity, one's religious school or one's neighbourhood which received loyalty, though the positive

[15] Welsford, *Four Types of Loyalty,* p. 20.
[16] Women's loyalties are rarely if at all considered in these works, and are often hard to determine. A significant amount of work has been done with regards to women's loyalties in the Mongol world by Anne Broadbridge, *Women and the Making of the Mongol Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
[17] Mottahedeh, *Loyalty and Leadership*, p. 40.
[18] Idem, pp. 46-8.
[19] Idem, pp. 98-101.

nature of these loyalties is not often apparent. Rather members of one category often looked out for each other in times of stress. Mottahedeh provides examples of when the professional class (*ṣinf*) of the clerks was threatened they intervened on each other's behalf, or when Turkish slave-soldiers (*ghulām*) of different armies refused to carry out their rulers' orders against their compatriots to protect members of their own *ṣinf*.[20] He goes on to argue that the different loyalties which acted against each other could negatively affect society if one became too prominent. In his words, 'if loyalty to one category overwhelmed other feelings of obligation, then the interest which created that loyalty would feed itself at the expense of the rest of society, which would be oppressed.'[21] It is for this very reason that local amirs and kings (*malik*, pl. *mulūk*) were necessary as arbiters of these different loyalties in his view, not allowing any to gain too firm a foothold.

While Mottahedeh's categories and framework of loyalty has a broad acceptability for many societies, there are some issues with the conclusions he draws from his arguments. Certainly he gives a great amount of agency to those he discusses while barely mentioning the large amount of the population who would have had little in the way of decision-making ability with regards to their loyalties. While it was undoubtedly applicable to certain groups of people and classes, the landless peasants and others are not incorporated into his network of loyalties, or at least he fails to explain how they were. Society is greater than those who are able to make political decisions about their own lives, and while not much is written about these people, failing to discuss them in any way significantly weakens any broad analysis of 'society' in any context.

Mottahedeh is also overly focused on towns and cities. His urban standpoint neglects people of the country, bar large landowners, to the detriment of his argumentation. Unfortunately the author only really mentions those classes that can represent themselves throughout his work, leading to a lopsided view of society. Take for example his analysis of why kingship was necessary. He quotes the historian Ibn al-Āthīr (d. 1233), using the example of Damascus, which had driven out its Fatimid governor.[22] The *aḥdāth* (landless young men) had taken over the city, and could not be controlled by the *ashrāf* (nobles) or *aʿyān* (city leaders). The disenfranchised parties turn to the Turkish commander of the Buyids, Alftakin (Alp Tegin), asking him to come rule the city. Ibn al-Āthīr

[20] Idem, pp. 110, 112. This is echoed in an episode recounted by Rashīd al-Dīn, whereby Shams al-Dīn Juvainī, the vizier of the previous Ilkhanid ruler Aḥmad Tegüder (r. 1282-1284), begs Buqa, the vizier of the current Ilkhan Arghun (r. 1284-1291), not to teach Arghun to kill viziers, or he may find himself next, which naturally ended up happening. If this episode did occur, it is interesting to note that Juvainī, a Tajik, appeals to Buqa, a Mongol, on the basis of their *sinf*. It may also have been Rashīd al-Dīn's attempt to forestall any such actions being taken against him, the vizier, by his Ilkhanid employers, see Rashiduddin Fazlullah, *Jamiʿu't-Tawarikh, Compendium of Chronicles: A History of the Mongols,* (trans.) W.M. Thackston (Cambridge, MA: The Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, 1999), Vol. III, p. 564.

[21] Mottahedeh, *Loyalty and Leadership*, p. 175.

[22] For more on Ibn al-Āthīr, see p. 15 of this thesis.

states that Alp Tegin drove out 'the destructive elements', and that 'all the people were in awe of his authority […] and gladly obeyed him'.[23] Mottahedeh believes that society in general could not function without this ruling figurehead, but surely this is too blithely accepting the voice of his source. All the people clearly did not gladly obey Alp Tegin, as he was forced to drive out those who were perfectly happy controlling the city. It seems to me rather that the *aḥdāth* had upset the apple cart by taking control away from those that normally held it. While this was shocking to those disenfranchised groups and Ibn al-Āthīr, the *aḥdāth* were part of society, and clearly wanted to exert their own position. We do not know what the causes of their discontent were, but to say as Mottahedeh does that this was a society which could not function without some ruler to quell this rabble and restore the order of things ignores the desires and needs of a significant part of the population. The ruling classes were of course delighted that Alp Tegin came in and restored their positions.

Beyond difficulties with Mottahedeh's conclusions, there are issues with his conception of loyalty as well. He relies a great deal on the formal oath, the *bayʿa*, as an expression of loyalty to the ruler. When these existed of course, they showed a formal commitment. However, even his own examples seem to fail the test of how powerful oaths were. The episode previously mentioned of Tuzun giving oaths to the caliph al-Muttaqī was one of his examples of how infuriated historians were by oath-breakers. It may be true that oath-breakers were castigated, but even in this instance, al-Muttaqī has Tuzun give him repeated oaths of assurance. There are instances of this in Mongol history as well.[24] The unsure ruler or commander tries to bind his followers to him, but the fact that they have these oaths performed repeatedly shows that it was more in hope than in confidence that these men would not prove to be unscrupulous and go against their written or sworn oath. However, history is full of unscrupulous people, and as was the case for Tuzun, continued to be the case for many of those who made oaths in the Mongol world. The shock of the historian is perhaps the shock of a religious man seeing someone break a covenant sworn to God and leader.

Further issues arise when we consider that many loyalties were not formally acknowledged. If an oath or contract exists, we can analyse what was expected of both parties, however, when we do not have a copy, or nothing was written, it is difficult to know what exactly was expected of the two parties. As Mottahedeh tends to view loyalty from the point of view of the one being loyal to something or someone, we also fail to have a clear picture of what rulers expected from their 'loyal' subjects. He mentions cases of clear treachery, for example a rebellious amir going over to another

[23] Mottahedeh, *Loyalty and Leadership*, p. 176. Translations by other scholars in this thesis are indicated by a reference to their work, as here, otherwise translations are my own.
[24] See p. 132 of this thesis.

dynasty, but often disloyalty was more nuanced. Inactivity as much as rebellious activity could be considered disloyalty. Therefore, while his study is of vital importance in setting the scene for a discussion of loyalty and its categories, a broader set of these categories and a greater understanding of the importance of the lineage of Chinggis Khan, crucial for the Mongol Empire, is necessary. We can then turn to our second author's work. It is Welsford's study which will form the basis of this dissertation, while Mottahedeh's categories will only be discussed in passing.

Thomas Welsford's book deals with a later time period and the Chinggisid rulers of Central Asia, the Uzbeks. The Uzbek royal family were descended from Chinggis' grandson Shiban, the son of Chinggis' firstborn son Jochi (d. 1227), while their subjects were largely Turkicised and Islamicised nomads, as well as the sedentary Turk and Tajik population. In the late 16th to early 17th century, power shifted from the descendants of Shiban, called the Shibanids or Shaybānids (r. 1505-1599) to the descendants of another son of Jochi, Toqa-Temür, called the Tūqāy-Tīmurīds (r. 1599-1711), (Figure 1).[25] While these events are several centuries after the 12th-14th centuries which I will focus on, Welsford's analysis of loyalty itself is extremely useful, and considers what loyalty meant in a Chinggisid context. Throughout much of Eurasia, the idea of Chinggisid legitimacy still held great power, and many Chinggisids still held control in different regions. Welsford also considers loyalty from the point of view of the ruled, or at least decision-makers in society who had the ability to make choices about who the khan should be. Our sources largely prevent us from knowing what the general population thought about their rulers, though there are instances which give us a glimpse into popular feelings on this matter. Welsford is largely concerned with the point of view of those who gave their support to one candidate for the throne or another, rather than the khan's own views on the matter.

[25] Regarding the spelling of these names, while the original Mongol names of Jochi's sons were Shiban and Toqa Temür, the historians of the Uzbek khanates changed Shiban to the Arabic *nisba* (a name based on where someone is from) Shaybān and the descendants of Toqa-Temür were given the more Persianised form Tūqāy-Tīmūr. See S. Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 149.



Figure 1: The Jochid House © Tobias Jones

Welsford's definition of loyalty is a simple one: '*an individual's self-subjugation to something which is not him, whether this be to an individual, a group or any other entity*.'[26] He then goes on to categorise loyalty into four types which can be independent of each other, but more often are competing or jostling factors in the decision-making process of his actors. Indeed it is Welsford's aim to understand a complex society, in which people had different reasons to support their rulers, as well as different feelings towards them, which cannot be expressed in simple terms like 'legitimacy'. For one person a dynasty may be entirely legitimate, while for another not so. While it is important to realise that agency is extremely limited in a pre-modern Central Asian context, in more chaotic times in history there was greater scope for individual choices when it comes to loyalty, as we shall see when we look at Standen's work as well. Welsford indeed argues that history is too often consigned to the actions of great men, and that agency is removed from the general populace. In discussing loyalty he seeks to address the chosen courses of action of people beyond the ruling house.[27] The four loyalties that he describes are charismatic, clientelist, inertial, and communal loyalty. Some of these types are more straightforward than others, but they adequately capture the

[26] Welsford, *Four Types of Loyalty*, p. 17, original italics.
[27] Idem, pp. 12-13.

sort of push and pull factors that affect decision making in this period. Arguably, these four categories can be used not just for Chinggisid political entities, but for many states throughout history.

The first type of loyalty is that of charisma in the Weberian mould.[28] Welsford describes this as one motivated by principle, in which actors thought it right and necessary that they be ruled by the right type of rulers; in Welsford's chosen case, a dynasty with descent from Chinggis Khan, and more specifically, the Shibanids. This type of loyalty is one in which the actor recognises the worthiness of a ruler or dynasty to rule, based on factors sometimes alien to us in the present day. While we may acknowledge the suitability of a certain person to rulership, we tend to base this on the person's character and actions. These were naturally important to people in the 16th century as well, but in addition to, or perhaps because of, the ruler's divine glory and fortune.

This concept has a longstanding tradition in the Persian, Turkic and Mongol worlds. In Persia under the Sasanians (224-651) it was known in Middle Persian as *khvarrah* (New Persian: *khvarnah* or *farr*), made known by one's lineage and military successes.[29] The Kök Türk Qaghanate (552-603 and 682-744) developed many of the religio-political ideas (likely influenced by Chinese political thought) which later appeared in the Mongol Empire and its successors. The ruling clan possessed a heavenly mandate through the support of the sky god (Tengri) and the mother god (Umay). This heaven-provided support was known as *qut*, which also showed itself in a ruler's success. This resided in the blood of the royal clan alone.[30] A dynasty such as that of Chinggis Khan by the time of the Shibanids, was known to possess a great deal of *qut*, or *suu* in Mongolian, though individual rulers could possess more or less of it. If two Chinggisids were competing for the throne, their respective lineages were also taken into account as to which possessed the greater *qut*. However, as in the case of the

[28] Charisma in a Central Asian Timurid context has been extensively looked at in Maria Subtelny's work, *Timurids in Transition*; Najam Haider has shown how this charismatic loyalty could be converted into both a political and religious bond (*walāya*) for ʿAlī and his successors, N. Haider, *Shīʿī Islam, An Introduction*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 32-4. Indeed, the North African traveller of the 14th century, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, believed that this was why the Ilkhan Öljeitü converted to Shīʿīsm in the early 14th century. A Shīʿī theologian, Jamal al-Din al-Hasan, explained that in the Shīʿī system, descent from the charismatic household was key, which matched the Chinggisid ideas of fortune, *The Travels of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, A.D. 1325-1354* (trans.) H.A.R. Gibb, Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 302.

[29] A. Soudavar, *The Aura of Kings: Legitimacy and Divine Sanction in Iranian Kingship* (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2003) p. 79; T.T. Allsen, 'A Note on Mongol Imperial Ideology', in (eds.) V. Rybatzki, A. Pozzi, P.W. Geier and J.R. Krueger, *The Early Mongols: Language, Culture and History, Studies in Honor of Igor de Rachewiltz*, (Bloomington, IN: Denis Sinor Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 2009) pp. 1-8. According to the Ilkhanid historian and geographer Ḥamdallāh Mustawfī Qazvīnī's *Ẓafarnāma*, *farr* could even be seen in one's countenance, Mustawfī, *Ẓafarnāmah*, f. 585A; tr. Ward, vol. II, p. 13, quoted in G. Lane, *Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran: A Persian Renaissance*, (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 16.

[30] P.B. Golden, 'Imperial Ideology and the Sources of Political Unity amongst the Pre-Chinggisid Nomads of Western Eurasia', *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, Vol. 2, (1982), pp. 44-6. The sanctity of royal blood is here shown, something the Mongols were keenly aware of.

Shibanids, *qut* could be seen to have deserted a family line. A significant issue with analysing this concept is that often whether or not one possessed enough *qut* was only made clear by events, if they were not successful and ended up losing control, it was shown that they did not. Young Chinggisid princes were given opportunities by their fathers to show themselves as successful in warfare and administration, and it was success in these ventures that showed their adherents that they possessed this *qut*.

Welsford's example of a loss of *qut* is upon the death of the Shibanid Khan ʿAbdallāh in 1598. His son, ʿAbd al-Mūʾmin, seized the throne, but went on to alienate many of his constituents by his executions and mistreatment of many who had been loyal to ʿAbdallāh. After just a year in charge, he was ambushed and assassinated, in all likelihood by amirs angry about their treatment. Three other rulers were put forward, but variously their age, character and inability to rule proved that *qut* had largely abandoned the Shibanid line.[31] With the presence of another Chinggisid lineage, the Tūqāy-Tīmūrids, made up of men such as Dīn Muḥammad and his grandfather Yār Muḥammad, who had served ably as military leaders and governors under ʿAbdallāh and ʿAbd al-Mūʾmin, the Shibanids began to appear far less attractive from a charismatic point of view. While this factor was not the sole reason for the Shibanids' loss of 'khanal' authority, the weakening of people's charismatic loyalty to them certainly contributed to their replacement despite the existence of several dynastically suitable candidates. However, the fact that their takeover was hotly contested indicates that for many people, Shibanid candidates were still preferable, having ruled in Central Asia for over a hundred years.[32]

Types two and three, namely, clientelist and inertial loyalties, are described as loyalties motivated by self-interest. Clientelist loyalty entailed supporting whoever was most likely able to further one's own goals. This idea illustrates the agency of certain actors. An amir need not blindly follow a dynasty or pretender already established if they thought doing so would not positively affect his livelihood. To some extent this was built into the Mongol dynastic system, which contained an element of tanistry.[33] While succession often passed to the eldest son of the previous ruler, there was scope for consideration of another outstanding candidate, whether a younger son, a brother, or even a nephew or cousin. It is rare in a Turco-Mongol context to see a child ruler, as a child would

[31] Welsford, *Four Types of Loyalty*, pp. 43-7.

[32] Idem, p. 64.

[33] This term relating to Celtic practises of election of the king and his successor is commonly applied to the Mongols, though it does not easily fit. The Celtic system involved the election of both king and successor at the same time and it was commonly held that the eldest of the same blood as the king would be the tanist (heir). Neither of these elements was common in Mongol succession practises. 'Tanistry', *Britannica Academic, Encyclopædia Britannica,* 8 Feb. 2019. academic-eb-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2443/levels/collegiate/article/tanistry/71183, Accessed 13th June 2019.

find it difficult to engage this clientelist loyalty. Of course, to the eventual victor in a succession struggle, this type of loyalty would not be considered, and supporting the wrong side often had fatal consequences. Welsford does indicate that in a risk/reward analysis, throwing support behind a pretender early was far riskier, but led to greater rewards; while waiting to see who was most likely to succeed was the safer option, but would probably not be met with great enthusiasm by the successful claimant. Beyond a certain point, a failure to throw one's support behind the claimant in a timely enough manner would be seen as disloyalty.[34]

Inertial loyalty is in some way the opposite force, based on an unwillingness to risk change that could potentially upset the system and threaten an actor's way of life.[35] Welsford argues that even should an actor find another potential ruler who was more likely to further his needs in the long term, in the short term sudden change had 'transaction costs' such as factional warfare, economic disruption, and depopulation. The prospect of these short term damages could prevent an actor from aligning himself with a potentially fruitful new ruler.[36] Again, we see that there was an important risk-benefit analysis which influential amirs and shaykhs had to consider before making a decision regarding who to support. If one's inertial loyalty was weak, perhaps due to a lack of favour shown to him by the khan, this would strengthen his clientelist loyalty towards another option who would be more willing to reward his supporters. On a more general level, for the great majority of the population it is likely that the risk of change far outweighed its benefits, except in extreme circumstances. Rural populations would be subjected to the passage of troops, possibly several armies supporting different claimants to power. Urban populations would likely be worried that their city be involved in a siege and all the attendant calamities that could befall them.

The final type is that of communal loyalty, a loyalty based on affection towards other individuals and groups, which could decide why a region or city would tend to support one group or pretender over another, perhaps comparable to group identity.[37] Welsford's examples show that Timurid pretenders in the region of Badakhshan continued to cause problems for the Tūqāy-Tīmūrids

[34] Welsford, *Four Types of Loyalty*, pp. 94-7.

[35] The political scientist Morton Grodzins describes this as 'residual loyalty', saying 'These persons are loyal because they are not disloyal. And they are not disloyal because the entire weight of society repels them from open acts of national disloyalty', Grodzins, *The Loyal and the Disloyal*, p. 30.

[36] Welsford, *Four Types of Loyalty*, p. 151.

[37] Idem, pp.22-23.It is perhaps possible to equate this idea with the great 14th century North African scholar Ibn Khaldūn's concept of *ʿaṣabiyya*, which Josephine van den Bent has described as 'group solidarity', and is at the heart of Ibn Khaldun's theory of the rise and fall of nomadic empires, J. van den Bent, '"None of the Kings on Earth is Their Equal in *ʿaṣabiyya":* The Mongols in Ibn Khaldūn's Works', *Al-Masāq*, *Journal of the Medieval Mediterranean*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2016), p. 176. Morton Grodzins describes communal loyalties in this way, 'One is loyal to the groups that provide gratifications because what serves the group serves the self; what threatens the group threatens the self', Grodzins, *The Loyal and the Disloyal*, p. 7.

in the 17th century, as the area had long-held affection and loyalty to Timurid rulers. It is somewhat a question of familiarity. A city like Bukhara or a region like Badakhshan were more likely to attach themselves to figures who were active in that area, or whose lineage held a particularly strong place in the imagination of those who made up the Bukharan or Badakhshani communities. Indeed, Welsford argues that it is clear in a Central Asian context, as well as in many other parts of the pre-modern world, urban and regional identities have greater longevity than the more abstract 'imperial' identity.[38] For example, the support of a locally respected *shaykh* for one ruler over another could also be decisive in that community's loyalty. If a ruler was successfully able to attract both the charismatic and clientelist loyalties of these local figures, their path to control in that city or region could be considerably smoothed.

Perhaps linked to communal loyalty is another loyalty which should be discussed, if not added to our list, is ethnic or cultural loyalty. While there are problems with both of these terms, it should be noted that at least one major source on the Mongol period regularly mentions the importance of this idea, that is the chronicle of Ibn al-Āthīr.[39] Ibn al-Āthīr, a scholar from modern Cizre in Turkey who spent much of his time in Mosul and Syria, wrote a universal history around 1231 and was regularly made use of by later chronicles in Persian and Arabic.[40] He was one of the most dramatic authors when discussing the calamitous Mongol invasions of the Islamic world in the early 13th century, but he regularly focused on shared cultural background as a reason for loyalty decisions. When the Mongols were besieging Samarqand in 1220 for example, Ibn al-Āthīr states that the Turkic soldiers of the Khwarazmshāhid dynasty (1077-1231) inside the city refused to fight the Mongols, saying 'We are of their race (*jins*). They will not kill us.' Thus they opened the gates and let the Mongols in, who killed them anyway.[41] This story is echoed in the history of the Mongol governor of Baghdad, 'Aṭā Malik Juvainī (d. 1283), who adds that the Turks and the Tajiks (Persian-speakers) were separated after the conquest of the citadel of Samarqand, and the Turks had their heads shaved in Mongol fashion to show them they would be a part of the Mongol army, yet they were still killed on the spot.[42] In another instance, Ibn al-Āthīr states that a *mamlūk* (military slave) from Tabriz, one Aqush, gathered Turcomans and Kurds and went over to the Mongols based on common

[38] Welsford, *Four Types of Loyalty*, p. 210.
[39] Ibn al-Āthīr, *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athīr for the Crusading Period from* al-Kāmil fi'l-ta'rīkh: *Part 3, The Years 589-629/1193-1231: The Ayyubids after Saladin and the Mongol Menace* (trans.) D.S. Richards, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).
[40] Idem, pp. 1-2.
[41] Idem, pp. 209-210.
[42] Juvainī, 'Ala-ad-Din 'Ata Malik, *The History of the World-Conqueror*, (trans.) J.A. Boyle, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), Vol. I, p. 121.

ethnicity to attack the Georgians.[43] In one of the most famous incidents, the chronicler reports that the Mongols encouraged the Turkic Qipchaqs to abandon the Iranic Alans, as the Mongols and Qipchaqs as 'Turks' had a shared ethnicity (*jins*). The Qipchaqs duly obliged, the Alans were destroyed, and the Mongols turned on the Qipchaqs immediately.[44]

What are we to make of Ibn al-Āthīr's assessment of so-called 'ethnic' loyalties? It is certainly the case that people in the Islamic world generally saw all residents of the northern climes of the world as of the same origin, and dubbed them all 'Turks'.[45] At least one Mamluk historian, Abū Shāma, related that when the Mongols lost the battle of ʿAyn Jalūt in 1260 to the Mamluks, largely Turkic-speaking military slaves from the Qipchaq steppes, that they were defeated by 'sons of their own ethnic group of the Turks' (*abnāʾ jinsihim min al-turk*).[46] Even those with direct access to Mongol records, such as the early 14th century Persian historian Rashīd al-Dīn (who will be discussed in the Sources section), claimed, 'Although all the tribes and branches of the Turks and Mongols resemble each other, and although they all originally had one name, the Mongols were one type of Turk, and there are great differences among them.' [47] This may indicate that the Mongols themselves believed that they were related to the Turks. With these widely-held notions, it is no surprise that Ibn al-Āthīr and the Mamluk historians following him saw ethnic and cultural similarities between the Mongols and Turkic groups in Eurasia. However, it is certainly questionable what affinity a Muslim Kurd who had long lived in Islamic lands, as mentioned by Ibn al-Āthīr in one of the examples above, would have shared with a non-Muslim Mongol, given centuries of living in very different parts of the world under quite different situations. Yehoshua Frankel shows that even after the Turks had long been

---

[43] Ibn al-Āthīr, *Chronicle*, p. 214. Boris James has shown that in the dispute between the Ilkhanid Mongols and the Mamluks, the Kurds regularly switched sides, showing that this 'cultural affinity' was likely simply opportunism, B. James, 'Mamluk and Mongol Peripheral Politics: Asserting Sovereignty in the Middle East's 'Kurdish Zone' (1260–1330)' in (eds.) C. Melville and B. de Nicola, *The Mongols' Middle East: continuity and transformation in Ilkhanid Iran*, (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 277-305.

[44] Ibn al-Āthīr, *Chronicle*, p. 222. J. van den Bent, 'Mongols in Mamluk Eyes: Representing Ethnic Others in the Medieval Middle East', PhD Dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 2020, p. 20 shows that this story was repeated in the accounts of Mamluk historians such as al-Nuwayri, Ibn Wāṣil and Ibn al-Dawādārī, while it also appears in Rashīd al-Dīn's Persian chronicle on the Mongols.

[45] Y. Frankel, 'The Turks of the Eurasian Steppes in Medieval Arabic Writing', in (eds.) R. Amitai and M. Biran *Mongols, Turks and Others: Nomads and the Sedentary World*, (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 201-241; Van den Bent, 'Mongols in Mamluk Eyes', Chapter 1.

[46] Van den Bent, 'Mongols in Mamluk Eyes', p. 18. This dissertation deftly delves into the thorny issues of 'ethnicity' in the complex world of Mongol-Mamluk relations, where it shows that Ibn al-Āthīr was one of the main sources for Mamluk ideas about the Mongols, and thus that this point about *jinsiyya* (ethnic solidarity), was regularly mentioned by Mamluk historians. However, as she later goes on to show, Mamluk sultans regularly intermarried with the *wāfidiyya*, the refugees from Mongol lands, who entered Mamluk service, and that one of the greatest early Mamluk sultans, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, was thus half Mongol, and the sultan Kitbugha was a Mongol himself, 'Mongols in Mamluk Eyes', p. 211-2. Thus even while these historians emphasised ethnic issues, the distinction between 'Turk' and 'Mongol' was hardly so clear on the ground.

[47] Rashiduddin Fazlullah, *Jamiʿu't-Tawarikh, Compendium of Chronicles: A History of the Mongols,* (trans.) W.M. Thackston (Cambridge, MA: The Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, 1999), Vol. I, p. 18.

Islamised and become part of the Middle Eastern world, stereotypes about their barbarity and violence remained amongst Muslim authors.[48]

Despite these differences, it may well have been the case that nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples may have fit the Mongol military system better, given their greater familiarity with Mongol fighting styles.[49] However, in the above examples, the Mongols regularly did not make use of these opportunities. Even if there may have existed some idea of cultural solidarity between nomadic peoples, or a vaguely held idea of a common ethnic background in the early stages of the Mongol conquests which made some decide to go over to the Mongols, their subsequent treatment surely did not make this a common trend. In most instances, nomadic and semi-nomadic Turkic groups such as the Qipchaqs, Volga Bulghars, and Bashghird refused to submit, and preferred to flee to the sedentary lands of the Rus' or Hungary to escape Mongol domination.[50] There does seem to have existed some cultural affinity between the Khitans who served the Jīn dynasty (1115-1234) and who spoke a Mongolic language, and the Mongols, as many of these Khitans went into Mongol service early. However, this may also have had to do with their dislike of the Jīn, who had destroyed the Khitan Liáo dynasty (916-1125) and attempted to force sedentarisation on the Khitans.[51] Therefore, it seems that we can perhaps consider cultural affiliation, or the unity of an ethnic group, part of the broader idea of communal loyalty, rather than as a separate category for loyalty decisions.[52]

---

[48] Frankel, 'Turks in Medieval Arabic Writing', pp. 221, 230.

[49] J.M. Smith, Jr., 'Mongol Manpower and Persian Population', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Oct. 1975), pp. 284-6.

[50] Cultural affinity certainly did affect the way the Mongols viewed loyalty. They demanded the submission of all of 'the people of the felt-walled tents', thus, nomads of the Mongolian steppe, SHM/de Rachewiltz §202, p. 133 and 'Philological Commentary', p. 760. However, this did nothing to prevent the Mongols from destroying those people if they did not submit without a fight.

[51] P.D. Buell, 'Yeh-lü A-hai, Yeh-lü T'u-hua', in (eds.) I. de Rachewiltz, H. Chan, H. Ch'i-ch'ing and P.W. Geier, *In the Service of the Khan: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period (1200-1300),* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993), pp. 112-114. Bettine Birge has also highlighted that much like the Mongols, many who were followers or subjects of the Khitans took on the name as well, which blurs the lines as to ethnicity and identity, B. Birge, *Marriage and the Law in the Age of Khubilai Khan*: *Cases from the* Yuan dianzhang, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), p. 18. This 'common kinship' can of course be overstated, as when Qubilai organised his four classes in Yuán society, the Khitans were neither part of the top class with the Mongols, nor even the second class of *sèmùrén*, but were included in the third class of northern Chinese (*hànrén*), just like their Jīn 'oppressors', C.P. Atwood, *Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire,* (New York: Facts on File, 2004), p. 319.

[52] Reuven Amitai provides a fascinating analysis of communal vs. 'ethnic' loyalties in his work R. Amitai, 'The Mongol Occupation of Damascus in 1300: A Study of Mamluk Loyalties', in (eds.) A Levanoni and M. Winter, *The Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society*, (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 21-41. In it he shows how a Mamluk officer Sayf al-Dīn Qipchaq, who was ethnically Mongol, was captured by the Mamluks and given high position. However, after a dispute with the Mamluk Sultan al-Manṣūr Lāchīn (r. 1296-1299), Qipchaq was welcomed by the Ilkhan Ghazan (r. 1295-1304), given the region of Hamadan as his *ʿiqtā*, and Ghazan's sister-in-law in marriage. Not only this, but he found his father and brother still serving the Mongols. Eventually, Ghazan made him governor of Damascus once he retook it in 1300, but Qipchaq returned to the Mamluk fold, where he also had family, but also the idea of brotherhood (*khūshdāshiyya*) with the Mamluks he was raised

The four types established by Welsford allow us to understand that one's loyalty was not as fixed as rulers would perhaps desire. They also serve to show that competing motivations were at play; for example, someone might have self-interest at heart when deciding who to support, while another may do so for a more idealistic reason. Welsford has shown that this approach is suited to the complexities of Central Asian society in this period, but his categories also have a broader application that will help us to understand why certain characters in the Mongol imperial context acted in the way they did. The same push and pull factors can certainly be seen in the Chinggisid Mongol Empire of the 13th century as well as its successor khanates. One should not forget though, that from a ruler's point of view, these nuanced factors were unlikely to have held much importance. Welsford himself notes that there was an ideological gap between the ruler and his subjects. It is this gap that has been the focus of another work on loyalty, that of Naomi Standen, *Unbounded Loyalty: Frontier Crossing in Liao China.*

Standen's work, while less conceptual in nature, addresses an extremely important issue within this topic, namely that of shifting ideas as to what loyalty entailed. She deals with the somewhat chaotic period of the 10th century, focusing on the exchanges of officials that served the competing dynasties in what is now northern China. This book stands out not simply as an excellent historical account of a little-studied period, but also as an important contribution to the investigation of how national identities are formed.[53] She argues that within a nationalist framework, loyalty is inextricably linked to ethnicity, stating that 'the nationalist trope assumes and requires ethnic identity to be of determining importance in all historical periods.'[54] Thus, Han Chinese should have banded together against the foreign Khitan Liáo dynasty based on their shared ethnicity, showing their loyalty to 'China' rather than the barbarian outsiders.[55] However, this conception of loyalty in fact emerges from histories written in later periods, by dynasties with a more bipolar view of the

---

with. These communal and ideal bonds outweighed any ethnic connection to the Mongols. See also, A. Mazor, 'Sayf al-Din Qipchaq al-Manṣūrī: Defection and Ethnicity between Mongols and Mamluks', in (eds.) M. Biran, J. Brack and F. Fiaschetti, *Along the Silk Roads in Mongol Eurasia: Generals, Merchants and Intellectuals*, (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2020), pp. 102-119.

[53] For further information on this in regards to China, Prasenjit Duara's book, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995) examines closely the interplay between history-making and the nation.

[54] Standen, *Unbounded Loyalty*, p. 26.

[55] This is comparable to the situation in the Islamic world, where there was an assumption that 'Muslims' as an entity would present a unified front against the pagan Mongols. However, as Devin DeWeese has shown, narratives emerged among Sufi groups of the Mongols as liberators from the oppressive 'normative' Muslim hierarchy, even with legends emerging of the Mongols led by saints, D. DeWeese, ''Stuck in the Throat of Chingiz Khan:' Envisioning the Mongol Conquests in Some Sufi Accounts from the 14th to 17th Centuries', in (eds.) J. Pfeiffer, S.A. Quinn, E. Tucker, and J.E. Woods, *History and historiography of post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East: studies in honor of John E. Woods*, (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006), pp. 23-61. Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, p. 195 notes that the Alids of the city of Hilla saw the Mongols' coming as prophesied by ʿAlī himself to destroy the evil city of Baghdad.

world, namely the Chinese Sòng dynasty and its rival to the north, still the Khitan Liáo after the crystallisation of borders in the Chányuān Treaty of 1005 CE. The hardening of borders is shown in mapmaking of the Sòng period, where the Great Wall is shown to separate the nomads from 'China Proper', or rather what Sòng cartographers wanted China to be.[56] Nonetheless, Standen's research indicates that in previous periods, Han officials willingly left the service of Han dynasties in the south to the Liáo court, and many times returned and were once again taken into the service of the dynasty they had left. The frequency of transfers of allegiance and the apparent success these officials had on the whole indicates that views on what loyalty entailed are not uniform across historical periods. Later Sòng historians condemned these movements as disloyal and dishonourable, lacking in their idea of *zhōng*, 忠, a Confucian concept of undying loyalty to a single dynasty. Even this definition only developed over time, while it is important to note that many of the early Sòng officials themselves had switched dynasties, and it was only later in the Sòng period that more fervent condemnation of these 'traitors' emerged.[57]

Standen sees loyalty in Confucian thought in this period as two competing types, relational and idealistic. Relational loyalty was understood as an official's relationship to a ruler, while their idealistic loyalty was the official's obligations to higher considerations, such as moral imperatives and the *dào*, 道, the right order of things in Daoist and Confucian thought.[58] During the Warring States period (722-453 BCE) Confucius argued that ministers should stop serving their ruler if the *dào* was not being followed. This led to rulers not wanting to employ Confucian ministers, as they could not be guaranteed of these ministers' relational loyalty. In times of empire, where there was a lack of other rulers to turn to, relational loyalty became strengthened, as a minister's only option was to resign from office should he disagree with the ruler's actions. When there were multiple possible targets of loyalty, such as in the 10th century, the minister's hand was strengthened, in that he could give his allegiance to another ruler. This was a more significant threat to rulers, causing a shift in the balance of power towards the ministers. This give and take was affected by the work of Xúnzǐ (316-237 BCE) who in his *Chén dào,* 'On the Way of Ministers', argued that the interests of the state and those of the ruler were one and the same, and logically, that the ruler was the state. The development of this idea did not definitively sway the loyalty issue in the rulers' favour, but it could be used to highlight ministers' disloyalty in times of more central rule. [59]

[56] Idem, p. 22.
[57] Idem, pp. 18, 32-3, 58.
[58] Idem, p. 43.
[59] Idem, pp. 45-8.

What we see through the illumination of Standen's work is not only how loyalty is viewed in retrospect, but also the dynamic of power shifting between a ruler and his ministers. This would certainly apply in how Confucian-trained officials saw their obligations to Mongol rulers as well. What may be trickier is that Standen clearly delineates ruler and minister here, so her assessment of loyalty is limited to a ruler/ruled division. She does not address how members of the ruling family acted in this period. In a Mongol context this becomes extremely important early on, as there are divisions in houses, with one holding power to the exclusion of the others. How can loyalty be seen when there are multiple possible rulers, all with their own lands, households and supporters? It becomes more complex than simply analysing the actions of one minister who decided to give his support to another dynasty. The idea of the sanctity of the *dào* and loyalty to it as a concept is one that echoes in the Mongol world as well. There are enough instances where the *jasaq* (Mongol law) is invoked to justify someone's actions that it appears there was some idea that the *jasaq* had a similarly pervasive role in Mongol society. This idea and its effects on relational loyalty as defined by Standen will be analysed in the following chapter.

1.3 Aims and Methods

Therefore, in combining Standen's analysis with that of Welsford, I believe that we have a suitable framework for categorising loyalty in the Mongol period, or at least the reasons that actors with a degree of agency had for giving their loyalty to a certain person, group of people, or role. If we consider the four types as given by Welsford, namely charismatic, clientelist, inertial, and communal, and add Standen's concept of idealistic loyalty which affects individuals' personal loyalty decisions, then we can better understand the motivations of these individuals overall. Thus, perhaps we can edit Welsford's definition of loyalty to suit this thesis: 'an individual's self-subjugation to something which is not him *or her*, whether this be to an individual, a group, *an institution or an ideal'*.[60] This idealistic loyalty is one that should not be downplayed. Standen uses the idea of *dào*, but for every society, there is one or indeed several ideal standards which some people choose to hold themselves to. In modern pluralistic societies these could be many, but in the Mongol world religious belief and adherence to Chinggisid *yasa* or Mongol customary law (*törü*) seem to have been the stand-out candidates for idealistic loyalty which affected one's choices as to who to follow and support.[61]

[60] Welsford, *Four Types of Loyalty*, p. 17, with my own additions in italics.
[61] L. Munkh-Erdene, 'The Rise of the Chinggisid Dynasty: Pre-Modern Eurasian Political Order and Culture at a Glance', *International Journal of Asian Studies*, Vo. 15, No. 1, (2018), p. 70 even indicates that in medieval

This idealistic loyalty interacts with the other types as well. Many may have supported a candidate for the khanate due to his charisma, a part of which many would have seen as his adherence to a certain code; in the Mongol case, knowledge of the *jasaq* was considered a key ingredient rendering someone a legitimate potential ruler. Idealistic loyalty could strongly contribute to inertial loyalty as well, as within many religions, such as Christianity and Islam, there are politically quietist trends. Take the Book of Romans: 'For the one in authority is God's servant for your good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for rulers do not bear the sword for no reason. They are God's servants, agents of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer.'[62] Also the Qur'an: 'O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result.'[63] Verses such as these led to significant theological and legal debates about the extent to which earthly authority should be supported, tolerated, or challenged.[64]

Idealistic loyalty may also act in complete opposition to the loyalties of self-interest, where people choose to stick to their principles even when their lives and livelihoods are threatened. We can see countless modern examples, so why should we not consider this type of loyalty in the Mongol period as well? We should not underestimate the power of idealistic loyalties. In every society there are those for whom these ideals significantly affect the way they make decisions. These are often indicated in the sources as the reasons for actions, though modern historians tend to want to explain away these idealistic reasons by analysing the more self-interested rationale behind one's actions. Both need to be considered in my view, and this idealistic loyalty and its effects on the way that actors in the Mongol world are justified will be analysed throughout this study. Of course, the opposite effect can take place as well. Ideal loyalties can be changed, through conversion for example, in order to gain access to greater economic, social, cultural and political advantages.[65] We shall see however, how multiple types of ideal loyalty were expressed by certain Mongol actors, sometimes quite paradoxically.

Mongol translations of Chinese texts, the *dào* was rendered in Mongolian as *törü*, indicating the quite encompassing nature of customary law in the minds of Mongols at the time.

[62] Romans 13: 4, NIV, https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Romans+13%3A2-7&version=NIV

[63] Surah An-Nisa, (4:59); These trends and their development have been more significantly considered by K. Abou El Fadl in his work, *Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[64] El Fadl, *Rebellion and Violence*, p. 116 *et passim*; M. von Bruck, 'Political Authority: A Christian Perspective', *Buddhist-Christian Studies*, Vol. 30, (2010), pp. 159-170.

[65] Jackson, *Mongols and the Islamic World*, p. 328; D. DeWeese, 'Islamization in the Mongol Empire', in (eds.) N. Di Cosmo, A.J. Frank and P.B. Golden, *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 120.

This thesis will make use of textual analysis in order to come to grips with loyalty in the Mongol Empire. Primary source material in diverse language traditions such as Persian, Chinese, Mongolian and European will be considered to achieve this. Wherever possible, information from other disciplinary fields will be made use of as well to fill out this understanding: thus numismatic, linguistic, art historical, and anthropological studies also contribute to the findings in this dissertation. The work will cover a wide geographical area, incorporating information about the Mongol Empire across its breadth, but with a larger focus on the areas of the Mongolian steppe, Central Asia, and the Islamic world, (Map 1). The time period which I will deal with begins with the founding of the Mongol enterprise in the mid-12th century and continues until the dissolution of most of the successor khanates to the Mongol Empire in the mid-14th century.



Map 1: The united Mongol Empire at its zenith. This map is found in *The Horde: How the Mongols Changed the World* (2021), reproduced here with the kind permission of its author Marie Favereau.

In discussing the Mongol period in history, I subscribe to the thinking of David Sneath and Lhamsuren Munkh-Erdene regarding the usage of terms such as 'tribe' and 'clan'.[66] These terms, while well-established for Eurasian nomads, are singularly unhelpful in achieving a better understanding of the Mongol polity and its formation. Due to the influence of 19th and 20th century anthropological works however, these terms are quite pervasive in translations of Mongol-era texts of various languages.[67] The unnecessary connotations of these words can lead us to make assumptions about the type of society that we are dealing with, and create an 'Othering' of nomadic societies more generally. Therefore, in this text I prefer different terminology which could equally be used for a European society, thus 'house' for a ruling family which had many people under its control, or 'people/people group' for a named group of uncertain familial connections.[68]

It is also important to state, that while I have used the term 'Mongol' many times already, and will continue to do so, the Mongol Empire was as much a Turkic enterprise as it was a Mongol one. While the Chinggisids, the ruling house descended from Chinggis Khan, were Mongols, many of their early followers and a great deal of their military might was made up of Turkic peoples from across Eurasia. Turkic-speaking groups such as the Öng'üt and Kerait were rapidly absorbed into the Chinggisid aegis, and were key members of the ruling elite. As the Mongol conquests expanded westward, more and more Turkic speakers were drafted into the military, while Qipchaq Turkish eventually became the primary form of communication for many areas of the empire, particularly in the Jochid *ulus* on the Russian steppes. Therefore, while I will use the term 'Mongol Empire' due to the Chinggisid ruling dynasty being Mongols, it is perhaps equally accurate to call the Chinggisid

---

[66] D. Sneath, *The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society and Misrepresentations of Nomadic Inner Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); L. Munkh-Erdene, 'Where Did the Mongol Empire Come From? Medieval Mongol Ideas of People, State and Empire', *Inner Asia*, Vol. 13, No. 2, (2011), pp. 211-237.

[67] Sneath, *The Headless State*, pp. 63, 106-7 shows how translators like Igor de Rachewiltz insert the term 'clan' when no Mongol word which could be translated as such (*obog/yasu*) appears in the text of the Secret History of the Mongols; Wheeler Thackston uses the word 'tribe' to translate Rashīd al-Dīn's word *qawm*, which is a generic term meaning a people group of any size; Christopher Dawson translates John of Plano Carpini's term *dux* as 'duke' for a European lord, but uses 'chief' when it is applied to a Mongol. Many of the issues of translation of terms in diverse sources were already noticed by the anthropologist Anatoly Khazanov, A.M. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World* (trans.) J. Crookenden, 2nd Edition (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994), p. 121.

[68] Munkh-Erdene shows that in the SHM for example, the terms that could possibly be translated as 'clan' and 'tribe', *oboq* and *ayimaq,* are used quite infrequently. The terms *ulus* and *irgen,* however, are very common, and can be tentatively labelled 'state' and 'people', while the *oboqtan* he prefers to translate as 'house, lineage, or surname', Munkh-Erdene, 'Medieval Mongol Ideas', pp. 212-221. This is part of a trend of greater deconstruction of Mongol-era terminology used in modern historiography, see further K. Shiraiwa, 'On the *Ötegü Bogol* in the *Jāmiʿ al-Tavārīkh* of Rashīd al-Dīn', *Acta Orientalia, Societas Orientales Danica, Fennica, Norvegica, Svecica*, Vol. 47 (1986), pp. 27-31; T. Skrynnikova, '*Boghol,* A Category of Submission at the Mongols', *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, Vol. 58, No. 3, (2005), pp. 313-319; C. Atwood, 'Mongols, Arabs, Kurds and Franks: Rashīd al-Dīn's Comparative Ethnography of Tribal Society', in (eds.) A. Akasoy, C. Burnett and R. Yoeli-Tlalim, *Rashīd al-Dīn. Agent and Mediator of Cultural Exchanges in Ilkhanid Iran*, (London: The Warburg Institute, 2013), pp. 223-250.

project ‘the Turco-Mongol Empire’. The multi-ethnic and multi-lingual nature of Chinggis’ earliest band of followers would continue throughout the dominance of Chinggis and his descendants, and thus should not be forgotten when we think about the culture of the empire and its sucessor states.

1.4 Thesis Structure

This thesis therefore, will apply the framework of Welsford and Standen’s categories of loyalty to the Mongol period. In order to approach the topic of loyalty, it is first incumbent on us to consider the language that is used to describe loyalty. Chapter Two approaches the language of Persian source material and how historians of the period talk about topics such as submission, obedience, fealty, and rebellion. This chapter assesses not only Persian vocabulary that can be classed as discussing loyalty, but also the Turco-Mongol terms that were adopted into Persian to deal with the new concepts that were being introduced into Perso-Islamic society by their Mongol rulers. Three of these terms in particular, *soyurghamīshī, tikishmīshī*, and *uljamīshī* are considered in a quantitative analysis of Rashīd al-Dīn’s history of the Mongols, as they relate to the performance of and reward for loyalty. The different characters who perform these actions allow us a glimpse of the two sides of the coin, both the ruler and the ruled, and what they expected of each other.

Chapter Three moves to the heart of the topic itself. In this chapter, several people and institutions, which I have termed ‘objects of loyalty’, are considered for the Mongol imperial period.[69] These objects represent figures of political authority in the Mongol world, namely the khan, *qa’an*, regent, *aqa*, *quriltai*, and lord/*khatun* of the *ulus*. All of these figures are mentioned in the source material as someone or something that those under Mongol dominion *should* be loyal to, and had significant input into how loyalty was defined. The categories established above will be applied to these various objects, in order to comprehend what motivations people had when deciding where their loyalties lay. These multiple nodes of loyalty will also be set against each other, and the different pulls that they exerted on Mongol imperial subjects will be explored, showing how these loyalty decisions were not so black and white. This chapter also looks at the different societal and legal compunctions that were brought to bear in order to try and ensure loyalty to one or more of these authority figures.

[69] T. Jones, ‘The Objects of Loyalty in the Early Mongol Empire (Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries)’, *Iran*, (2021), DOI: 10.1080/05786967.2021.1915701, pp. 1-25.

In Chapter Four we move from the united Mongol Empire to a case study of loyalty in one of the successor khanates, the Ilkhanate. This chapter tries to illuminate the changing political atmosphere of the more limited realm based in the Persian-speaking world. It first addresses the issues which surround the founding of the Ilkhanate and the current scholarly debate about the succession of Hülegü's son Abaqa and his lineal descendants, as this is a key question in understanding political loyalties in the Ilkhanate. As a case study, it does not follow such a strict adherence to the categorical structure of Chapter Three, but rather seeks to follow the careers of certain amirs whose loyalty decisions shaped the development of the Ilkhanate. Two of these cases in particular, those of Taghachar and Nawrūz in the late 13th century, show us how the fracture of Mongol unity and the assertion of non-Chinggisid authority caused major issues for the Ilkhans, but also paved the way for later dynasties such as the Jalayirids (1335-1432) and Timurids to establish themselves without recourse to Chinggisid lineage.

In Chapter Five, I conclude by providing a summation of my findings throughout my research. In this chapter, I connect some of the important themes which I have highlighted in my work to a larger scope, showing how Mongol ideas about loyalty were passed on to or appropriated by later dynasties in order to bolster their own legitimacy, or simply as an expression of ideas which were now a part of the common culture of the post-Mongol world. Many of these dynasties had some connection to the Mongols, if not always genealogically, but in their ideas about rulership or their cultural background.

1.5 Primary Sources

While this study covers a wide range of geographical areas, from China to the Middle East and Russia, following the expansion of the Mongol Empire, I focus in two chapters on terminology in Persian and the Ilkhanate, and thus the main sources for this work are Persian histories of the 13th and 14th centuries. For much of the early Mongol period, two of the main sources are 'Aṭā Malik Juvainī's *Tārīkh-i Jahāngushā* and Rashīd al-Dīn's *Jāmiʿ al-tavārīkh*, specifically his volume on Mongol history, known as the *Tārīkh-i Mubārak-i Ghāzānī*.[70] These works contain a great deal of information

[70] ʿAṭā Malik Juvainī, *Tārīkh-i Jahāngushā*, (ed.) Mohammad Qazvini, (Tehran: Dunya-yi Ketab, 2011), hereafter Juvainī/Qazvini; English translation, Juvainī, 'Ala-ad-Din 'Ata Malik, *The History of the World-Conqueror*, (trans.) J.A. Boyle, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), hereafter, Juvainī/Boyle; Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmiʼ al-tavārīkh*, (*Tārīkh-i Mubārak-i Ghāzānī)* (ed.) Mohammad Raushan and Mostafa Mousavi (Tehran: Mīrās̲-i Maktūb*,* 1395/2016), hereafter, RAD/Raushan; English translation, Rashiduddin Fazlullah, *Jamiʿu't-Tawarikh, Compendium of Chronicles: A History of the Mongols,* (trans.) W.M. Thackston (Cambridge, MA: The

about the Mongol world, from scholars who worked alongside the Mongol rulers and even had access to Mongol documents. Juvainī's work is the earlier, completed in the 1260s, focusing on the early Mongol conquest, the reigns of several Mongol *qa'an*s, and the administration of the province of Khurasan up to the coming of Hülegü to the western regions. Juvainī's position as governor of Baghdad under the early Ilkhans and his proximity to key Mongol officials such as Arghun Aqa, renders him a vital source for this period. His father Bahā' al-Dīn, who had previously served the Khwarazmshāh Sultan Muḥammad, was the *ṣāḥib-dīvān*, minister of finance, for Arghun Aqa, allowing his son to serve as Arghun's personal secretary.[71] In this capacity, Juvainī visited the Mongol capital Qara Qorum on several occasions in the 1240s and 1250s, while his brother Shams al-Dīn Juvainī then took the position of *ṣāḥib-dīvān* for the Ilkhans Hülegü (r. 1260-1265) and Abaqa (r. 1265-1282).[72] The Juvainī family became exceedingly wealthy through their official positions and their great influence in the Ilkhanate helped to solidify loyalty networks for their rulers.[73] Both brothers met ignominious ends however, with the Ilkhans Abaqa and Arghun torturing and imprisoning them on suspicion of embezzlement. Shams al-Dīn was executed by Arghun in 1284, while 'Aṭā Malik died shortly before after a long period of imprisonment.

Juvainī's work was used as a primary source by the later historian Rashīd al-Dīn. Rashīd al-Dīn served as a physician to several Ilkhans in the 13th century, before working for the Ilkhans Ghazan (r. 1295-1304) and Öljeitü (r. 1304-1316) as a vizier/advisor in the late 13th and early 14th centuries.[74] He was a convert to Islam from Judaism, and was regularly forced to defend his theological positions against Muslims who questioned his beliefs.[75] Rashīd al-Dīn, much like the Juvainīs, became fabulously wealthy during his career, and built a quarter of the Ilkhanid capital, Tabriz, called Rabʿi Rashīdī. In this area he set up religious endowments which would reproduce and illustrate his

---

Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, 1999), hereafter RAD/Thackston. I have chosen the Qazvini edition of Juvainī and the Raushan edition of Rashīd al-Dīn primarily for logistical issues, as these were the editions available to me. However, the Qazvini edition is the main edition in use by scholars who do not have access to the manuscripts. The Raushan edition of Rashīd al-Dīn has its detractors, but again, is one of the most commonly used editions. For the issues with this edition, see C.P. Atwood, 'Rashīd al-Dīn's Ghazanid Chronicle and Its Mongolian Sources', in (eds.) T. May, D. Bayarsaikhan, C.P. Atwood, *New Approaches to Ilkhanid History*, (Leiden: Brill, 2021), p. 55.

[71] S. Kamola, *Making Mongol History: Rashid al-Din and the* Jamiʿ al-Tawarikh, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019), pp. 14-16.

[72] G. Lane, 'Jovayni, 'Alā' al-Dīn', *Encyclopædia Iranica,* Online, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/jovayni-ala-al-din, Accessed 19th January 2022. For more on the Juvainī family, see Lane, *Early Mongol Rule,* Chapter 6.

[73] E. Ravalde, 'Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, Vizier and Patron: Mediation between Ruler and Ruled in the Ilkhanate', in (eds.) C. Melville and B. de Nicola, *The Mongols' Middle East: Continuity and Transformation in Ilkhanid Iran,* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 55-78.

[74] I have chosen the commonly accepted version of the name 'Ghazan'. In Persian sources it is rendered *ghāzān*. The original term was *kazan/kazğan*, meaning a cauldron or large kettle, G. Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth Century Turkish*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 682.

[75] Kamola, *Making Mongol History*, p. 106.

writings annually, which contributed greatly to his later fame, though Rabʿi Rashīdī was largely destroyed after his death.[76] Rashīd al-Dīn, again like the Juvainīs, as well as a large number of other Ilkhanid officials, was executed by an Ilkhan. Rashīd al-Dīn's death was ordered by the Ilkhan ʿAbū Saʿīd in 1318, on suspicion of poisoning his former patron Öljeitü.

Rashīd al-Dīn was commissioned by Ghazan to write a history of the Mongols. When Ghazan was succeeded by Öljeitü, Öljeitü requested that Rashīd al-Dīn expand his history to a world-history, including accounts of diverse regions and peoples such as China, India, Europe, and the Jews; thus the 'compendium' (*jāmiʿ*) aspect. The Mongol section retained in its title the dedication to Ghazan, being called the *Tārīkh-i Mubārak-i Ghāzānī*, 'The Blessed History of Ghazan'. Rashīd al-Dīn used primary source material from many different regions to create his world history.[77] Christopher Atwood has shown that for his history of the Mongols, Rashīd al-Dīn had access to a plethora of Mongolian-language source material, not least of these being the *Altan Debter*, or Golden Book, a chronicle usually only accessible to Mongols.[78] Both of the works of Juvainī and Rashīd al-Dīn have their issues, one of the most significant of these being their propagandistic purposes promoting the line of Chinggis' youngest son Tolui (d. 1231), whose descendants came to rule the Ilkhanate, where both men served. Thus, we must analyse how the authors did this, and what we can learn from these attempts.

Completing the set of Persian historian-administrators serving the Ilkhans considered here is Rashīd al-Dīn's contemporary, Vaṣṣāf.[79] Vaṣṣāf's work, *Tajziyat al-amṣār wa-tazjiyat al-aʿṣār*, more commonly called *Tārīkh-i Vaṣṣāf*, is a continuation of Juvainī that covers the Ilkhanid period up until after the death of Öljeitü in 1316, terminating in c. 1323.[80] Vaṣṣāf was a protégé of Rashīd al-Dīn, and served as a tax administrator in the Ilkhanid administrative region of Fars. Rashīd al-Dīn presented four parts of Vaṣṣāf's work to Öljeitü in 1312, and earlier had introduced Vaṣṣāf to Ghazan,

---

[76] Idem, p. 110.

[77] At least one of the major sources for Rashīd al-Dīn's work, ʿAbd Allāh Qāshānī, complained of Rashīd al-Dīn's appropriation of his own world history, and that the significant financial reward should have gone to Qāshānī instead, see Kamola, *Making Mongol History*, pp. 95-103. Kamola argues that Rashīd al-Dīn would have had little time to write this work in 1307-1310 as he was running the state and published three theological compendia. This and the similarities of the work with Qāshānī's own world history entail that it is likely that Rashīd al-Dīn simply copied Qāshānī without crediting him.

[78] Atwood, 'Ghazanid Chronicle', *passim*.

[79] Vaṣṣāf Shīrāzī, Shihāb al-Dīn 'Abd-Allāh, *Tārīkh-i Vaṣṣāf*, (ed.) Muhammad Iqbal, (Lahore: Karīmī Press, 1929), hereafter Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal; 'Abd Allāh b. Fażl Allāh Vaṣṣāf-i Hażrat, *Taḥrīr-i Tārīkh-i Vaṣṣāf*, (ed.) Abd al-Muhammad Ayati (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Bunyād-i Farhang-i Iran, 1346/1967-68), hereafter Vaṣṣāf/Ayati. In using the *Taḥrīr*, which is a simplification of Vaṣṣāf's work, we must acknowledge that this is not the exact text, however, a lack of good editions of Vaṣṣāf and his somewhat inaccessible writing style have rendered this a necessity.

[80] S.S.D. Bolhasani and J. Tajlil, 'A Brief Introduction to the Book of Tarikh-i Vassaf and Its Author', *Journal of Basic and Applied Scientific Research*, Vol. 3, Issue 4, (2013), pp. 963-967.

presenting him with a part of the work in an earlier form.[81] Vaṣṣāf's work naturally does not greatly contradict Rashīd al-Dīn's and indeed, praises his vizier and patron regularly, while Rashīd al-Dīn's own work seems to have been based in part on Vaṣṣāf's account.[82] Vaṣṣāf does however have focuses and opinions that differ from the Rashīd al-Dīn's work, providing us with a more nuanced view of the Ilkhanate.[83]

In addition to these three main Persian sources, there exist a large number of key texts in diverse languages that contribute to the work in this thesis. One of the most notable of these is the *Secret History of the Mongols* (referred to hereafter as *SHM*), the semi-legendary account of Chinggis' rise to power on the steppe, likely from the mid-13th century.[84] While there is ongoing debate as to the exact production date, authorship of the work and later editing, it is indubitably a Mongol text despite its transcription in Chinese characters. It was produced by an unknown member of the Mongol ruling elite, therefore its value is unique.[85] Its candid approach to issues that seem to have been ignored by the standard Persian and Chinese accounts provides us with another view of the early rise to power of Chinggis and his descendants.

This work also seeks to make use of Chinese texts whenever they can be found in translation.[86] The *Yuán Shǐ* (hereafter referred to as *YS*) was the official chronicle of the Mongol Yuán dynasty (1271-1368) compiled in the Míng dynasty period (1368-1644). The work is often based on similar source material as Rashīd al-Dīn's work and the *SHM*, with significant differences.[87] Many Mongolian writings were translated into Chinese during the Yuán period, though a large amount of these are no longer extant. The *YS* and other Chinese sources were affected by Qubilai's editing process, which framed Mongol history in a light that accentuated the lineage of Qubilai's father Tolui, Chinggis' youngest son. As such it can be seen as part of a project by historians in China and Iran,

[81] S.S. Blair, '"The Mongol Capital of Sulṭāniyya, 'the Imperial'"', *Iran*, Vol. 24, (1986), pp. 139-152; Bolhasani and Tajlil, 'A Brief Introduction', p. 964. Thus, while Rashīd al-Dīn's 'completed' work emerged earlier than Vaṣṣāf's, much of the latter's text was already known to Rashīd al-Dīn when he was writing his text.
[82] Kamola, *Making Mongol History*, p. 76.
[83] P. Jackson, 'Mongol Khans and Religious Allegiance: The Problems Confronting a Minister-Historian in Ilkhanid Iran', *Iran*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (2009), p. 117 notes that Vaṣṣāf treats the Ilkhan Aḥmad Tegüder much more generously than Rashīd al-Dīn for example.
[84] *The Secret History of the Mongols: A Mongolian Epic Chronicle of the Thirteenth Century*, (trans.) I. de Rachewiltz, (Leiden: Brill, 2004). Hereafter SHM/de Rachewiltz.
[85] C. Atwood, 'The Date of the 'Secret History of the Mongols' Reconsidered', *Journal of Song-Yuan Studies,* No. 37 (2007) pp. 1-48; I. de Rachewiltz 'The Dating of the *Secret History of the Mongols*- A Re-interpretation', *Ural-altaische Jahrbücher / Zeitschriftenband* (2008), pp. 150-184.
[86] For example, *The History of the Yuan, Chapter 1*, (ed. and trans.) C.P. Atwood, *Mongolian Studies,* Vol. 39, (2017/18) pp. 2-80. Hereafter YS/Atwood; or 'The Biography of Yelu Chucai, *Yuanshi*, 146.3455-65', (trans.) G. Humble, Unpublished, pp. 1-14.
[87] Atwood, 'Ghazanid Chronicle', pp. 62-5, 74.

whose rulers were also descended from Tolui, to properly show the legitimacy of Toluid rule in their respective regions and over the whole of the Mongol Empire.

Beyond the Persian, Mongol and Chinese texts, we have significant literature in other languages which contribute to our knowledge of the Mongol Empire and its later Ilkhanid incarnation. European traveller monks such as John of Plano Carpini in the 1240s and William of Rubruck in the 1250s wrote of their travels and their experiences in the Mongol world.[88] Despite the shock to their Christian sensibilities, these men captured what Mongol life on the steppe itself entailed, the 'pure' Mongol way of life as the monks saw it, rather than other sources' experience with the Mongols in settled areas. A great wealth of information on the Mongols, and particularly the Ilkhanate, comes from Armenian sources. Armenian historical writing thrived in this period and the Armenians, as first victims of the Mongol conquests, then as vassals and allies, have a unique perspective with which we can see the Mongol Persian world.[89]

The Syriac chronicler Gregory Bar Hebraeus composed his *Chronicon* in the 1280s before his death in 1286, but the work was continued by his brother and another anonymous continuator. This work is also extremely useful for the entry of the Mongols into the Persian world and Near East and the changes which took place.[90] A physician to the Mongols who composed works in Arabic as well as his native Syriac, he offers a fascinating glimpse into the Christian world under the early Ilkhans. Another extremely interesting and useful Christian source is the travelogue of the Turkic Christian monk Rabban Bar Sauma and his colleague Markos.[91] Travelling from China to the Ilkhanid realm on pilgrimage, they eventually settled and served the Mongols in different capacities, with Rabban Sauma being sent to Europe by the Ilkhan Arghun (r. 1284-1291) to try and gain allies in the Ilkhanid war with the Mamluks. Markos became Patriarch of the Church of the East as Mar Yahbh-Allaha in 1281 and sought to positively influence the Ilkhans with relation to Christians, though as they converted to Islam his role became much more difficult.[92]

---

[88] *The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (trans. and ed.) C. Dawson, (London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955).

[89] Eg. *History of the Nation of the Archers by Grigor of Akanc' Hitherto Ascribed to Matak'ia the Monk* (trans. and ed. R.P. Blake and R.N. Frye) *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 12, Nos. 3 and 4, (Dec., 1949), pp. 269-399.

[90] *The Chronography of Gregory Abû'l Faraj, the Son of Aaron, The Hebrew Physician Commonly Known as Bar Hebraeus, Being The First Part of His Political History of the World*, (trans.) E.A. Wallis Budge, Vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 1932). Hereafter BH/Budge.

[91] *The Monks of Kublai Khan, Emperor of China: Medieval Travels from China through Central Asia to Persia and Beyond*, (trans.) Sir E. A. Wallis Budge, New Introduction by D. Morgan, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014).

[92] For more on these two monks and their voyages, see M. Rossabi, *Voyager from Xanadu: Rabban Sauma and the First Journey from China to the West*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010).

The scope of the Mongol Empire and the diverse historical traditions which produced significant scholarship about it entail that there are sources that cannot be addressed or are not given the space they deserve in any work which deals with the Mongol Empire on a broader scale. This thesis is no different in that regard. Language limitations as well as reasons of scope mean that important source material, such as the Mamluk histories or the Rus' chronicles, are thus given short shrift in this dissertation, though their narratives do often provide a significant counterweight to those listed above. Even with regard to the Persian texts, the focus here is on the most famous court histories, while many local chronicles may provide a different perspective. This view from the centre is thus incomplete, and it is therefore hoped that this thesis can contribute something to the greater topic of Mongol loyalty that can be built upon or challenged through an extensive analysis of other historical traditions and works from the periphery of the Persian world. Nonetheless, even through this centrist viewpoint, there are new perspectives which can be gleaned from these works which have regularly been made use of. Thus, it is to the Persian historians' framing of loyalty in the Mongol world that we now turn.

2. The Language of Loyalty in Persian Sources

2.1 Introduction

In order to understand how loyalty was viewed in the source material, it is necessary to understand what language they used when discussing it. Due to the broad scope of the Mongols' geographical reach, a comprehensive study of the terminology of loyalty in the many different languages of the sources about the Mongols is beyond the scope of this study and the skills of this scholar, though would certainly be a fine addition to the scholarship on the Mongols. A case study of a selection of the language on loyalty in Persian sources on the Mongols can contribute to this work however, as it will help us to understand how these works framed loyalty decisions. Again, this is not to categorise loyalty terminology throughout all of Persian historiography, but to give examples of the type of phrases and words that our Persian authors use when discussing what we may refer to as loyalty decisions. The limitations of this research also extend to the manuscript tradition: in considering Juvainī and Rashīd al-Dīn, I am reliant on edited copies.[1] As we shall see, this terminology rarely conforms to our English word 'loyalty', so to espy the sort of choices actors make, we have to look a little deeper into our sources to find the right type of information.

In this chapter, I will first address the way in which Juvainī talks about loyalty, and the terms he uses to convey this meaning, both Arabo-Persian and Turco-Mongol. As a case study, Juvainī's account of the rebellion of Maḥmūd Tārābī in the environs of Bukhara in 1238 contributes to a better understanding of how Juvainī phrased loyalty choices he considered to be the wrong ones. I will also consider the physical indicators of loyalty which Juvainī mentions in his work, which show the changing nature of expressions submission and obedience with the advent of Mongol power. In order to do this, I analysed certain sections of Juvainī's work where he discussed either transfers of loyalty, or where moments of outstanding loyalty were noted in his text. I will then switch focus to the work of Rashīd al-Dīn, first looking at the words and phrases he uses in general to talk about loyalty, eventually focussing more specifically on three Turco-Mongol terms which appear quite often in the volume on the history of the Mongols, *Tārīkh-i Mubārak-i Ghāzānī*, namely *soyurghamīshī*,

[1] See p. 25, note 69 of this thesis.

tikishmīshī, and *uljamīshī.*[2] I will provide a quantitative analysis of these terms and what they mean for our understanding of loyalty in the Mongol world. I arrived at this step by searching the index of the Raushan edition of Rashīd al-Dīn's text. As I encountered the term *soyurghamīshī* quite frequently, I also noticed that it was regularly coupled with the two other terms mentioned here, *tikishmīshī*, and *uljamīshī.* The data on these three terms has been compiled in Appendices 1-3.This led to a pursuit of these terms in other source material, as well as an analysis of other ritual behaviours which seem to match up with what we expect of those corresponding to these terms. These behaviours attended noteworthy loyalty exchanges, often at key moments in Mongol history, and thus deserved further analysis.

2.2 Juvainī's Loyalty Terminology

First, let us turn to loyalty terminology in Juvainī's *Tārīkh-i Jahāngushā*. It is often in a negative context that loyalty is referred to in Juvainī's account, and the terms he uses are often with regards to disloyalty. While submission and obedience are often referred to, our clearest references to changes in loyalty are when that scourge of the Islamic world, rebellion, is mentioned.[3] One of the more shocking moments to Juvainī is the 'rebellion' (خروج, *khurūj*) of the sieve-maker Sufi Maḥmūd Tārābī, who in 1238-9 led a common revolt against Mongol rule and against the wealthy of Bukhara (see Map 2), when many rich people were killed and their property taken.[4] In another incident, he relates that the Uighurs, under the *idiqut* (*Idiqut* is the title for the Uighur ruler, meaning the one who holds *qut*, or divine fortune) Salindi, were involved in 'treachery' (غدر*, ghadr*) against Möngke Qa'an (r. 1251-1259) by wanting to slay all the Muslims in Besh-Baligh.[5] Juvainī similarly mentions *ghadr* when discussing the actions of Khoja and Naqu, two Chinggisid princes and sons of the previous ruler Güyük Qa'an (r. 1246-1248), who vied for the succession with Möngke, see Figure 4. Batu, grandson of Chinggis through his eldest son Jochi and ruler of the Jochid *ulus* from 1227-1255, called a meeting in his own *ulus* where the princes would discuss the succession after the death of Güyük in 1248. Khoja and Naqu did not attend but apparently sent their representative, Temür Noyan, to witness and agree with the common decision. They were unhappy with this result and

[2] These terms are difficult to transliterate according to one system, given the layering of Mongolian, Turkic and Persian within one word and the many variations of these words present in the sources.
[3] See El Fadl, *Rebellion and Violence*, *passim* for the theological debates which dealt with the topic of rebellion.
[4] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I pp. 108-114; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, pp. 84-90. See below for further discussion.
[5] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I p. 48; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 34.

sought to ambush Möngke, releasing the 'arrow of treachery' (تیر غدر, *tīr-i ghadr*) but were unsuccessful due to Möngke possession of the support of divine fortune.[6]

Map 2: The key cities of the western Mongol Empire. This map is found in *The Horde: How the Mongols Changed the World* (2021), reproduced here with the kind permission of its author Marie Favereau.

Juvainī is more specific when referring to the situation in Otrar during the Mongols' attack on Khwarazm. He states that Ghayir Khan, the governor of the city, told another commander, Qaracha Khāṣṣ Ḥājib, that:

> اگر بی وفائی کنیم عذر غدر را چه محل نهیم و از ملامت و تقریع مسلمانان بکدام بهانه تفصی نمائیم, *agar bī-vafā'ī kunīm uẕr-i ghadr rā chi maḥal nahīm va az malāmat va taqrīʿ-i musalmānān bi-kudām bahāna tafaṣṣī namā'īm*.[7]

[6] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 264; Juvainī/Qazvini Vol. I, p. 219.
[7] Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I. p. 65.

> If we are unfaithful (*bī-vafā'ī kunīm*), how shall we excuse our treachery (*ghadr)* [against their ruler Sulṭān Muḥammad Khwārazmshāh (r. 1200-1220)], and under what pretext shall we escape from the reproaches of the Muslims? [8]

Qaracha Khāṣṣ Ḥājib had no such qualms or fervent religious reason to stay and fight, as he fled Otrar and was captured by the Mongols. On account of his actions, i.e. 'having been unfaithful' (وفا ننمودی*, vafā nanimūdī)* to his ruler Sultan Muḥammad*,* he was put to death by them.[9] As we shall see, this brings to mind many of the episodes in the *SHM* when Chinggis castigates those who were unfaithful to their rightful lord.[10] The appearance of this in Juvainī perhaps indicates that this was more than a simple literary trope apparent in the *SHM*, or that the trope was cross-cultural. These terms, *ghadr*, *vafā*, *bī-vafā'ī kardan*, are close to what we would expect when discussing loyalty, what is called *vafādārī* in modern Persian, but does not appear to be used as a stand-alone word for loyalty in 13th and 14th century sources.

With regards to more positive contexts for loyalty, often the language of obedience is used. Juvainī talks of the completeness of the 'obedience and subjection of the army' (طواعیت لشکر و انقیاد عسکر*, ṭavāʿīyyat-i lashkar va inqīyād-i ʿaskar*) to Ögödei Qa'an (r. 1229-1241). The extent of their obedience was such that a group of military commanders, possibly of the Oirat, did not lift a finger when Ögödei ordered the public rape and abduction of girls and women related to them, whom they had betrothed to other men when Ögödei had plans for their marriages.[11] He uses similar language, in a different form, when talking of the regency of Ögödei's widow Töregene Khatun (r. 1241-1246), saying that most of her family and the army 'obediently and willingly submitted to her' (اورا بطوع و رغبت منقاد و مذعان شدند*, ū rā bi-ṭaw' va righbat munqād va miẕʿān shudand*).[12] Juvainī seems to believe that in this period of regency however, loyalty was not common. Töregene apparently held a grudge against two of Ögödei's chief ministers, Chinqai and Maḥmūd Yalāvach, who both fled to the refuge of Ögödei and Töregene's son Köten.[13] Töregene attempts to convince their colleague, 'Imād al-Mulk Muḥammad of Khotan to slander them in the forthcoming *quriltai* (an assembly of the Mongol ruling class). He refuses, because he is possessed of 'loyalty and generosity' (وفا و کرم*, vafā va karam*) which are qualities of great men, but are 'as non-existent in this present age as the *simurgh* or the philosopher's stone' (درین روزگار چون سیمرغ و کیمیا ناموجود, *darīn rūzgār chun sīmurgh va kīmīyā*

[8] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 84. Boyle's translation, modified to understand the text better.
[9] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 84; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 65.
[10] Jones, 'The Objects of Loyalty', pp. 3-4.
[11] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, pp. 235-236; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 191. This is quite a confusing passage, perhaps also mentioned by the SHM §281, Vol. I, p. 217, where the women are referred to as Temüge Otchigin's.
[12] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, pp. 240-241; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 196. Translation from Boyle.
[13] For more information on these key officials in the early Mongol world, see the various biographies found in *In the Service of the Khan: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period (1200-1300),* (eds.) I. de Rachewiltz, H. Chan, H. Ch'i-ch'ing and P.W. Geier (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993).

nāmawjūd).[14] Thus, loyalty is shown in terms of extremes, where only certain men (and always men in Juvainī's vision) possessed this rare quality.

Juvainī also made use of Mongol words in his descriptions of submission. This is related to the Mongol terms for loyalty and submission (M. *el*, rendered into Persian as *īl*) and disloyalty and rebellion (*bulqa*, rendered into Persian as *bulghāq*), though Juvainī does not use the term *bulqa/bulghāq*.[15] For example, when Chinggis Khan advanced on Balkh, the great men of the city came out 'showing submission' (*iẓhār-i īlī*). In this instance, we see that often when rendering a Mongol word, Juvainī pairs it with a Persian one, thus the great men also 'submitted' (*bandigī kardand*).[16] Unfortunately their submission was not trustworthy enough for the Mongols, and the city was still put to the sword. On the road from Bukhara to Samarqand, Chinggis spared the villages which 'submitted' (ایل می شدند, *īl mī-shudand*).[17] Similarly, when the Mongols approached Tirmiz they sent messengers to ask the people for their 'submission and obedience' (بایلی و مطاوعت, *bi-īlī va muṭāvaʿat*) but 'they did not accept submission' (قبول ایلی نکردند, *qabūl-i īlī nakardand*) due to their confidence in their fortifications and armies.[18] This format is used by Juvainī elsewhere, saying that a ruler from another country wanted to render his 'submission and obedience' (بایلی و مطاوعت, *bi-īlī va muṭāvaʿat*) to Ögödei, and sent him gifts to accomplish this.[19]

While Juvainī does not use *bulqa*, he prefers the Turkic equivalent *yāghīgarī/yāghī*.[20] For instance, he states that 'the people of Nishapur were openly revolting' (اهل نشابور یاغی گری صریح می کردند, *ahl-i nishābūr yāghīgarī-yi ṣarīḥ mī-kardand*). He makes a clear distinction between the

[14] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, pp. 242-243; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, pp. 197-198. Or perhaps the railings of an old man about the current generation…

[15] These words and their use in Mongol history has been analysed by Michael Hope in his forthcoming work: '*El* and *Bulqa*: Between order and chaos in the formative years of the Mongol Empire (1206-1259)'; *Bulqa* could also be applied to those who had never been under Mongol control, as their diplomatic correspondence with the Mamluks and others shows, see R. Amitai-Preiss, 'Mongol Imperial Ideology and the Ilkhanid War against the Mamluks', in (eds.) R. Amitai-Preiss and D. Morgan, *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp.57-72; submissive people were labelled *il-irgen* and those who rejected Mongol offers of submission were labelled *bulgha-irgen*, T. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism, The Policies of the Grand Qan Möngke in China, Russia, and The Islamic Lands, 1251-1259* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987), p. 64. These terms were translated into Latin in Güyük's general order of submission transmitted via the commander in the west, Baiju, as *provinciis nobis obedientibus* (*il irgen*) and *provinciis nobis rebellantibus* (*bulgha-irgen*), D. Aigle, 'The Letters of Eljigidei, Hülegü and Abaqa: Mongol overtures or Christian Ventriloquism?', *Inner Asia*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2005), p. 147.

[16] However, this may also be a more defined ritual that took place, as will be discussed below.

[17] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 117; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 92.

[18] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 129; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 102.

[19] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 208; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 164.

[20] This is often the case in Persian histories of this period, as shown in Na'ama O. Arom, 'Arrowheads of Hülegü Khan: Envoys and Diplomacy in His Invasion of the Middle East, 1255–1262', in (eds.) T. May, D. Bayarsaikhan, C.P. Atwood, *New Approaches to Ilkhanid History*, (Leiden: Brill, 2021), p. 253, note 21. Rashīd al-Dīn however, uses both the Turkic and Mongol terms interchangeably.

‘countries that were far and rebellious/not submissive’ (بلاد بعید و یاغی, *bilād-i baʿīd va yāghī*) and ‘the regions that were near and loyal/submissive’ (دیار نزدیک و ایل, *dīyār-i nazdīk va īl*) during the reign of Ögödei.[21] In the usage of these words, Juvainī ports Mongol ideas of submission and obedience into Persian prose. The language is in essence not that of loyalty, but that of expected obedience. This is a concept that is well documented in the Mongol world.[22] For the Mongols, loyalty was in complete submission.

An important part of becoming *el* was accepting a Mongol representative, what Juvainī labels a *shiḥna* or *basqaq*, who was both a military and civilian official, responsible for collecting taxes and keeping the local population in line.[23] Therefore when the legendary Mongol generals Jebe and Sübetei were sent in pursuit of Sultan Muḥammad Khwarazmshāh in the early 1220s, several local rulers tendered their submission rather than be attacked. ʿAlā’ al-Dawla of Hamadan was one such who ‘submitted’ (ایل شد, *īl shud*), offered up many gifts and ‘took (accepted) a *shiḥna*’ (شحنه بستد, *shiḥna bistad*). At this point, submission had occurred and loyalty was expected. However, due to the lack of governance and control, figures in the area continued to act independently and resented the acceptance of Mongol over-lordship. One Jamāl al-Dīn Āyba again began ‘disorder and unrest’ (فتنه و آشوب, *fitna va āshūb*), killing the *shiḥna* of Hamadan and imprisoning the leader of the city, ʿAlā’ al-Dawla, for his submission to the Mongols.[24] Jebe soon returned ‘for the purpose of avenging the killing of the *shiḥna*’(بر انتقام قتل شحنه, *bar intiqām-i qatl-i shiḥna*). Jamāl al-Dīn Āyba tried to submit himself, but was executed by Jebe.[25] One could also receive a *paiza* (a passport and badge of authority), as a symbol of one’s submission and loyalty, as did the *qāżī* of Sarakhs, who handed over the city and presented gifts to Jebe, and received a ‘wooden *paiza*’ (پایزهٔ چوبین, *pāiza-yi chūbīn*) from Chinggis Khan. However, for this sign of submission to the Mongols, he was executed by Mujir al-Mulk, an amir of the Khwarazmshāhid sultan.[26] Territories and people groups could apparently be partly submissive. Juvainī refers to the Bulghar, Ās and the Rus peoples as ‘not completely submitted’

[21] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 203; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 160.
[22] See for example, T.D. Skrynnikova, 'Relations of Domination and Submission: Political Practice in the Mongol Empire of Chinggis Khan', in (ed.) D. Sneath, *Imperial Statecraft: Political Forms and Techniques of Governance in Inner Asia, Sixth-Twentieth Centuries*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 85-115; A.F. Broadbridge, *Kingship and Ideology in the Islamic and Mongol Worlds*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
[23] Often used by the Persian sources, equivocated to the Turkic term *basqaq* and the Mongol term *darugha/darughachi*, though Juvainī does not use the latter term.
[24] The term *fitna* could have several meanings, one conveying a more general unrest/disorder, but in a more specific sense, a person could begin a *fitna*, perhaps best described as an uprising or rebellion.
[25] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, pp. 147-148; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, pp. 115-116.
[26] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 158; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 124.

(بکلّی ایل نشده بودند, *bi-kullī īl nashuda būdand*) and thus Ögödei and the Mongols decide they need to take care of 'the remaining rebels' (بقایای طغاة. pl. of طاغی, *baqāyā-yi ṭughāt*).[27]

Juvainī's description of the conquest of Merv elaborates several terms for loyalty and disloyalty. He describes the situation in Sarakhs first, saying that an amir of Sultan Muḥammad, one Shams al-Dīn, son of Pahlavān Abū-Bakr Dīvāna, 'started an uprising' (فتنه آغاز نهادست, *fitna āghāz nahādast*). The Mongol-appointed governor of Merv, Żīyā' al-Dīn ʿAlī, was forced to meet this uprising. This left the Mongol *shiḥna*, one Barmas, in charge of Merv. The people of Merv 'revolted' (*yāghī shudand*) when it appeared that Barmas was fleeing the city. Barmas, despite threats and executions, was not able to retake Merv, and retired to Bukhara where he died. Żīyā' al-Dīn returned to Merv and when he realised what was expedient, 'he joined that group and rebelled' (با آن جماعت عصیان کرد, *bā ān jamāʿat ʿiṣyān kard*). He kept playing a double game however, joining with some Mongols who arrived at that time. Another representative of the sultan, Kush Tegin, arrived, seized Żīyā' al-Dīn and killed him, with Żīyā' al-Dīn accusing his supporters of treason (*ghadr*) for going over to Kush Tegin. Kush Tegin himself was killed by a Mongol general Qaracha, but an interesting loyalty follow-up to this story is that Merv had to be besieged yet again because many people, out of 'love for their homeland' (حبّ وطن, *ḥubb-i vaṭan*) had returned to the city. This 'patriotism', if we decide to go along with John Andrew Boyle's very modern translation of this phrase, cost these people dearly, as they were all put to death by the Mongols. Merv still went through yet another seizure by an unspecified Turcoman, able to rally the townspeople to his cause, before the city was retaken again by the Mongols.[28] In this extremely turbulent time, the lines between loyalty to the Mongols, Sultan Muḥammad, and to independent rulers of no/unspecified allegiance seem easily crossed, but with often fatal consequences for those caught up in the action. Apparently an idealistic loyalty, the love of one's homeland, still could have a powerful influence on people's decision-making.

[27] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 269; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 224

[28] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, pp. 164-8; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, pp. 128-134. Juvainī has the population of Merv go from 100,000 to 4, then 10,000 to 100 in the various captures and re-takings of the city. In this case, 'the people' seem to have been relatively united in their defence of Merv. Communal loyalties could be far more divisive of course. John Woods shows that in the Mongol siege of Isfahan in 1235/6, the city was divided into Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī factions, who tried to use the Mongols to destroy their rivals, with the Shāfiʿī faction opening the gates for the Mongols, only for both sides to be wiped out, J.E. Woods, 'A Note on the Mongol Capture of Iṣfahān', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Jan., 1977), pp. 49-51.

2.2.1 Case Study: The Tārābī Revolt

It is perhaps worth comparing this account with that of the Tārābī revolt, as it is one of the few examples we have of non-ruling elites and their loyalty decisions in the Mongol period, and Juvainī talks about it quite differently.[29] Firstly, Juvainī describes the rebellion from the outset as heretical, saying that due to the conjunction of the planets, 'the astrologers had determined that a *fitna* would break out and that it was possible a heretic would rebel' (منجمان حکم کرده بودند که فتنه ظاهر شود و یمکن مبتدعی خروج کند*, munajjimān ḥukm karda būdand ki fitna ẓāhir shavad va yumkin mubtadi'-ī khurūj kunad*) who wore 'the dress of the people of the *khirqa*' (در لباس اهل خرقه*, dar libās-i ahl-i khirqa*[30]).[31] Maḥmūd Tārābī himself Juvainī describes as 'in stupidity and ignorance he had not his equal' (در حماقت و جهل عدیم المثال*, dar ḥimāqat va jahl 'adīm al-miṣāl*).[32] Juvainī also associates Tārābī with a trope commonly told about women in the Mongol period, namely, their association with witchcraft.[33] He says that Tārābī's sister taught him in the ways of the *parī-dārān* (those who can call on spirits, magicians). Juvainī later met several respectable people who were adamant that Tārābī had healed blind people in their presence.[34]

What is most interesting however is Juvainī's descriptions of Tārābī's followers. At first, he says that it was the 'common people' (عوام*, 'avām*) who flocked to Tārābī, and that 'what can the

---

[29] This revolt has been considered and compared to the Sarbadar movement in the 14th century by Mansura Haider, M. Haider, 'The Revolt of Mahmud Tarabi and the Sarbadar Movement', *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, Vol. 52 (1991), pp. 939-949.

[30] Idem, p. 84. The *khirqa* is the Sufi initiate's robe.

[31] Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 85. The repeated use of the term *khurūj* by Juvainī for this rebellion is interesting. It recalled to me the religious aspect of the Kharijite rebellion, G. Levi Della Vida, 'Khāridjites', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition,* Online Edition, (2012) http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0497, Accessed 7th March 2022. However, Sara Mirahmadi pointed out to me that the term was regularly used in early Persian histories such as Balamī with no religious connotations, Mirahmadi, Personal Correspondence, 2022. On the other hand, the term *khurūj* was important to Zaydi Shīʿīs as a sign that an Imam had the necessary charisma to rule by rebelling against an oppressive ruler, N. Haider, *Shīʿī Islam, An Introduction*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 40. Khaled Abou El Fadl has shown that many Sunni jurists made a moral distinction between resisting an unjust ruler's commands, *imtināʿ* (امتناع) and an aggressive rebellion which overthrew the ruler, *khurūj*, K. El Fadl, *Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 283. Interestingly in this case, Maḥmūd Tārābī did declare himself Sultan of Bukhara, and had the *khuṭba* read in his name. Juvainī's emphasis on the religious ignorance of the revolt and Tārābī's association with Sufis does seem to indicate to me that he chose this word very specifically.

[32] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 109, Boyle's translation.

[33] See the trial of Fāṭima during Güyük's in Juvaini/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 245 or the execution of Toghachaq Khatun, wife of the Ilkhan Arghun, in RAD/Thackston, Vol. III p. 575. As noted in K. Golev, 'Intra-Mongol Diplomacy and Witch-Hunt during the Dissolution of the Empire: the Witchcraft Trial at the Court of Hülegü', *Eurasian Studies*, Vol. 17, (2019), p. 355, Rashīd al-Dīn states that 'the Mongols have a horror of sorcery', RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 550. RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, p. 1128, *chūn mughul siḥr rā bi-ghāyat munkar mi-bāshand*. So this story seeks to legitimise Tārābī's destruction both from a Muslim and a Mongol point of view.

[34] Idem, pp. 109-110. Interestingly, his sister would turn on him later, saying he was too preoccupied with women and money.

vulgar do but follow their ignorance?' (عوام الناس را خود چه باید تا تبع جهل شوند, *'avām al-nās rā khud chi bāyad tā taba'-i jahl shavad*).[35] But eventually, Maḥmūd seems to have healed enough people that he convinced 'most of the people […] both noble and common' (اکثر ایشان...از خاص و عام, *akṯar-i īshān…az khāṣṣ va 'āmm*). In Bukhara itself, the ruling classes apparently got behind him in order to betray him, but it was the massed common people who protected him, so desperate for his blessing they wanted him to spit on them.[36] The revolt takes a specifically anti-Mongol turn later, when Maḥmūd tells his followers 'the world must be cleansed of those without religion' (دنیا را از بی دینان پاک می باید کرد, *dunyā rā az bī-dīnān pāk mī-bāyad kard*[37]) and to take up anything at hand, 'weapon or tool, staff or club' (سلاح و ساز یا عصا و چوبی, *silāḥ va sāz yā 'aṣā va chūbī*). Juvainī later describes Tārābī's followers as 'ruffians' *runūd va awbāsh*, an almost stereotypical phrase for poor people who performed any sort of violent action, in this case robbing the wealth of Bukhara.[38] Tārābī eventually defeats a Mongol army called upon by the amirs of Bukhara, and the Mongol forces flee, only to be set upon by 'the rural population from their villages using shovels and axes' (اهالی رساتیق از دیههای خویش با بیل و تبر, *ahālī-yi rasātīq az dīh-hā-yi khvīsh bā bīl va tabar*[39]). A larger number of Mongols then arrived, defeated and killed Maḥmūd, and set to massacring the Bukharans, re-establishing Mongol control.

For Juvainī, the hero of the piece is Maḥmūd Yalāvach, the administrator of Turkestan. Despite being unable to prevent Tārābī's takeover, it is Yalāvach who managed to stop the Mongol army from massacring the people of Bukhara, saying that only a few were involved, and thus not all should be punished.[40] We can perhaps argue that Juvainī is acting out of communal loyalty here, or loyalty to his *ṣinf*, the administrative class who formed a ruling stratum between the Mongol overlords and their subjects. On a more personal level, his brother, Shams al-Dīn, performed a similar role in trying to limit Abaqa's revenge attacks on territories like Anatolia and Khurasan.[41] As the governor of Mongol Baghdad, our historian may be looking for inevitable comparisons with his own role and the difficulties he faced in trying to prevent the voracious Mongols from despoiling the population. He also shows that Yalāvach (and perhaps by implication, Juvainī himself) has the best interests of the common people at heart, and that they should not be overtly blamed for their ignorance.

[35] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 110, Boyle's translation.
[36] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 111.
[37] Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 87.
[38] J.T.P. de Bruijn, 'Rind', *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, Online, http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_6300, Accessed 20th May 2022.
[39] Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 89.
[40] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 115.
[41] Ravalde, 'Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī', p. 66.

No doubt this stance of Juvainī's is also linked to his patronage of works which portray him in the same light. Sara Nur Yıldız has elaborated on the portrayal of Juvainī in the Seljuq court official Ibn Bībī's late 13th century work *al-avāmir al-ʿalā'iyya fi'l-umūr al-ʿalā'iyya* (*The most exalted orders regarding the most sublime affairs*), a work of Seljuq history commissioned by and dedicated to ʿAṭā Malik Juvainī.[42] Yıldız shows that Ibn Bībī's work goes to great lengths to show the Juvainī brothers as righteous Muslim administrators who guided the community of Islam during the overlordship of the pagan Mongols. This thinking is developed throughout the text, and the author even goes so far as to call ʿAṭā Malik Juvainī the heir to the Rightly Guided Caliphs, (*vāriṯ al-khulafāʿ al-rāshidīn*). This was apparently not simply empty flattery, as Yıldız points out that Juvainī in fact married Shams al-Ḍuḥā, the widow of Abū'l-Abbās, the son of the last Abbasid caliph executed by Hülegü, al-Mustaṣim. Juvaini's nephew Hārūn, son of Shams al-Dīn, also married an Abbasid princes, Shams al-Ḍuḥā's daughter Rabīʿa. The Juvainīs clearly sought to enhance their legitimacy in an Islamic context.[43]

It is clear from the titles that Ibn Bībī gives Juvainī, his marriage policy, as well as his history which revels in the destruction of the heretical Ismāʿīlīs, that he also saw the role of the administrator of the Mongols as guiding them towards the protection of orthodox Islam.[44] Therefore, the point of the above anecdote, as well as Ibn Bībī's praise of Juvainī's governorship of Baghdad, was to show that through the intercession of wise administrators such as he and Maḥmūd Yalāvach, the Mongols' wrath could be pointed in the right direction, away from Sunni orthodox Muslims, and towards those believed to be apostates and heretics.[45] Meanwhile these administrators could restore and revitalise the Islamic community which took such a hit with the destruction of the Abbasid Caliphate. Thus Juvainī attempts to show his ideal loyalty to Islam being maintained while his political loyalties remained firmly with his Mongol rulers.

Returning to the Tārābī revolt, Juvainī makes a significant difference here between the people of Merv, who fought for love of their homeland, and the people of Bukhara, who out of ignorance followed a heretic. The constant interjections of Qur'anic verses are common in Juvainī,

[42] S. N. Yıldız, 'Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Seljuk Anatolia: The Politics of Conquest and History Writing, 1243-1282', PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2006, p. 415.
[43] Idem, pp. 503, 528, 551, 556.
[44] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 719. Juvainī was in some sense judge, jury and executioner when it came to the Ismāʿīlīs, as it was he who entered the library of their stronghold at Alamut and decided which books could be saved and which should be burned as heretical texts. Lane, *Daily Life*, p. 88 and *Early Mongol Rule*, p. 26 points out that Juvainī in fact made extensive use in his own work of the biography of Ḥasan-I Ṣabbāḥ, founder of the sect, and other Ismāʿīlī works, which may indicate that not all of these 'heretical' books were destroyed.
[45] See also M. Biran, 'Baghdād under Mongol Rule, in (eds.) J. Scheiner and I. Toral-Niehoff, *Baghdad: From Its Beginnings to the 14th Century*, (Leiden: Brill, 2022), p. 295. Juvainī was apparently very strict when dealing with heterodoxy, and had the leeway to take this approach (for an alternative vision, see note 44). Jackson, *Mongols and the Islamic World*, p. 322 says that Juvainī executed a prophet in Tustar (modern day Shushtar in southwestern Iran) who claimed to be Jesus.

but in this section they appear directly after some of Tārābī's most heretical claims, those of healing the afflicted. Juvainī also repeatedly insults Tārābī, calling him *jāhil*, 'ignorant, illiterate, barbarous'. He shows how well-respected men, such as the Bukharan Shams al-Dīn Maḥbūbī, pandered to Tārābī, and told him that he was destined to conquer the world.[46] Juvainī warns against this flattering of a demagogue, and tries to indicate that reason, or at least the trust in rational men like Juvainī or Yalāvach, are the only ways to combat such madness.[47] Throughout this text it appears as if Juvainī seeks to highlight both his own ideal loyalty to true Islam, his loyalty to his homeland in his protection of the people he is responsible for, but also his loyalty to his patrons, by indicating that resistance to them was useless, even if they were not Muslims.[48]

2.2.2 Physical Signs of Loyalty

Juvainī also talks about loyalty in terms of the way it was manifested in physical form. This was the most obvious way to show both the subject population and the ruler that you were his vassal. In the Muslim world, the expression of loyalty by a vassal to a suzerain was physically shown in two ways which are consistently mentioned in historical works in this period. This would be the inclusion of the name of the suzerain in the Friday prayers, the *khuṭba*, and the striking of coinage, *sikka*.[49] Thus Juvainī explains the transferral of loyalty of the sultan of Samarqand, Sultan 'Us̲mān from the *gür-khan* of the Qara-Khitai dynasty of Central Asia (1124-1218) to Sultan Muḥammad Khwarazmshāh.[50] Sultan 'Us̲mān sent a messenger to 'declare his approval of/sympathy to him' (موافقت او اظهار کرد, *muvāfiqat-i ū iẓhār kard*[51]) i.e. Sultan Muḥammad, and in order to show his sincerity, 'performed the *khuṭba* and *sikka* in his (Sultan Muḥammad's) name in Samarqand' (خطبه و سکّه در سمرقند بنام او کرد, *khuṭba va sikka dar Samarqand bi-nām-i ū kard*) and 'made clear his (Sultan

[46] Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 86.
[47] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 110. Juvainī here after hearing the accounts of the respectable people who saw Maḥmūd Tārābī's miracles, says 'As for me, if I should see such things with my own eyes, I should concern myself with the treatment of my eyesight'.
[48] This is echoed by Ibn Bībī, who encouraged the Rum Seljuqs to accept Mongol rule as part of God's plan while maintaining their own just Islamic government, Yıldız, 'Mongol Rule in Seljuq Anatolia', p. 587.
[49] For more on these terms, see the Encyclopaedia of Islam entries: A.J. Wensinck, "Khuṭba", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_4352, Accessed 9th April 2021; C.E Bosworth, Darley-Doran, R.E. and Freeman-Greenville, G.S.P., "Sikka", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_1076, Accessed 9th April 2021. For a more in-depth consideration of the *khuṭba*, see L.G. Jones, *The Power of Oratory in the Medieval Muslim World*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012).
[50] According to Michal Biran, the Qara-Khitai did not demand that their vassals acknowledge them in their *khuṭba* and *sikka*, thus the Qarakhanids claimed magnificent titles there despite their relative weakness.
[51] *Muvāfiqat* is translated by Boyle as 'loyalty', which contextually is correct but the word does not quite have this English meaning.

‘Us̲mān’s) opposition and enmity to the *gür-khan*’ (مخالفت و معادات کور خان ظاهر گردانید, *mukhālifat va muʿādāt-i kūr khān ẓāhir gardānīd*). Sultan Us̲mān went a step further and fought the *gür-khan* when he besieged and captured Samarqand. Us̲mān does not seem to have faced any serious punishment for his actions, and was in fact able to surrender Samarqand to Sultan Muḥammad later when the *gür-khan* was forced to leave the city.[52]

For the Mongols, their expectations of the physical signs of loyalty were slightly different, though they did not do away with existing concepts such as the *khuṭba* or *sikka*, but rather added their own layer of loyalty expectations. A story from Juvainī captures quite well what the Mongols demanded in these terms. Juvainī tells us of the *idiqut* of the Uighurs, Barchuq, who was a vassal of the Qara-Khitai. The Qara-Khitai used the *shiḥna* system whereby a sort of overseer sent from the central state served as the link between the rulers and those areas not under their direct control. This system was adopted by the Mongols, with the overseer being called the *darugha/darughachi* in Mongolian, while Juvainī goes with the Turkic word *basqaq* and/or the Arabo-Persian word, *shiḥna*.[53] As a vassal of the Qara-Khitai, Barchuq accepted a *shiḥna* from his suzerain. Barchuq apparently spotted a sea change with the coming of Chinggis Khan and sought to choose the right side. His first act was to visibly cast off loyalty to the Qara-Khitai by killing the *shiḥna*. Barchuq then sent ambassadors ‘to announce his rebellion against the Qara-Khitai and his obedience and submission to the world-conquering Emperor Chinggis Khan’ (باعلام یاغی شدن با قرا ختای و مطاوعت و متابعت کردن پادشاه جهانگیر چنگز خان, *bi-iʿlām-i yāghī shudan bā qarā khitāy va muṭāvaʿat va mutābiʿat kardan pādshāh-i jahāngīr chingiz khān*).

This was not enough however. Chinggis honoured Barchuq’s ambassadors but demanded Barchuq’s submission in person. Barchuq paid Chinggis homage, and Chinggis showed his appreciation, Juvainī saying that Barchuq ‘returned with honours’ (با سیورغامیشی باز گشت, *bā suyūrghāmīshī bāz-gasht*[54]). What honours Barchuq received however did not come without a price. Thomas Allsen noted that according to the *SHM*, the Uighurs were required to provide tribute in the form of luxury clothing; gold brocade and damasks.[55] Yet Barchuq’s hardest tasks to prove his loyalty were still to come. These came in the form of participation in Chinggis’ campaigns. Three are

[52] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, pp. 359-60; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. II, p. 91.
[53] D. Morgan, ‘Who Ran the Mongol Empire?’, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 2, (Jan, 1982), p. 129; P. Buell, ‘Sino-Khitan Administration in Mongol Bukhara’, *Journal of Asian History*, Vol. 24, No. 2, (1979), pp. 131-3. For an alternative viewpoint claiming that these were distinct offices, see D. Ostrowski, 'The *tamma* and the Dual-Administrative Structure of the Mongol Empire', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and Asian Studies*, Vol. 61, No. 2 (1998), pp. 262-277.
[54] This Turco-Mongol term *soyurghamīshī* will be discussed in the subsequent section.
[55] T. Allsen, *Commodity and Exchange in the Mongol Empire: A Cultural History of Islamic Textiles, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997),* p. 28; SHM/de Rachewiltz, §238, p. 163.

mentioned by Juvainī; first, the Mongols' campaign against the rebel Küchlüg- where Barchuq participated with 300 men; secondly, Chinggis' invasion of the lands of the Khwarazmshāh; and finally, Chinggis' last campaign against the Tanguts. Chinggis did not fail to recognise Barchuq's loyalty and 'these praiseworthy services' (این خدمات پسندیده *īn khadamāt-i pasandīda*) over more than ten years; he bequeathed Barchuq one of his daughters, Al Altan (called by Juvainī Altun Beki). It is Ögödei who has to fulfil Chinggis' order and 'he bestowed Altun Beki to him (Barchuq)' (التون بیکی را بدو سیورغامیشی فرمود *altūn bīkī rā bidū suyūrghāmīshī farmūd*). Clearly the duties of the lord to his faithful servant were not ignored after that lord's death.[56]

Twice now we have come across the Turco-Mongol term *soyurghamīshī*. This term seems to represent the physical expression of the ruler's satisfaction with his servants' loyalty, and came in the form of titles and gifts.[57] Gerhard Doerfer shows that this and the related term, *soyurghal*, which appears in the *SHM*, meant a reward given by the ruler.[58] Both words stem from the early Turkic word *tsoyurka*, meaning 'to have pity on someone, to be compassionate', and in Mongolian the verb came to mean 'to bestow favour', which was re-borrowed into Turkic with this meaning.[59] The form *soyurghal* eventually came to mean a hereditary tax-free land grant given by the ruler to his amirs and soldiers, and was used heavily by later dynasties such as the Timurids, and even later by the Safavids and the Mughals.[60] Juvainī does not use the word *soyurghal*, and indeed its meaning as a hereditary fief may have appeared toward the end of the Ilkhanid state in the 14th century, though it was used in most Chinggisid successor states. [61] Juvainī only uses *soyurghamīshī* a handful of times across his work, but its significant usage in Rashīd al-Dīn indicates that the idea of a ruler bestowing

[56] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, pp. 44-7; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, pp. 32-4.
[57] G. Clauson, *Etymological Dictionary,* p. 556.
[58] G. Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen,* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1963) Band I, #228 and #229, pp. 351-354.
[59] Clauson, *Etymological Dictionary*, p. 556.
[60] The word was used in the *SHM* meaning 'favour from the khan' more generally, see, SHM/de Rachewiltz, §202-204, pp. 133-136, and the attendant commentary by de Rachewiltz, 'Philological Commentary', Vol. II, pp. 762, 770, 778. In its noun form it appears three times in the 14th century Jalayirid chronicle *Tārīkh-i Shaykh Uvays*, which the English translator J.B. van Loon consistently translates as 'fief', though I believe in two of the cases it means a more general 'favour', following standard uses of *soyurghamīshī* in Rashīd al-Dīn, who was al-Ahrī's primary source, *Ta'rikh-i Shaikh Uwais (History of Shaikh Uwais): An Important Source for the History of Adharbaijan in the Fourteenth Century* (trans.) , J.B. van Loon ('s-Gravenhage: Excelsior, 1954), English translation, pp. 41, 47, 63; Persian text, pp. 139, 145, 163.
[61]For an overview of *soyurġal* in post-Mongol Empire states, R. Yu. Pochekaev, 'The Evolution of Soyurghal in Chinggisid and Non-Chinggisid States during the Post-Imperial Period', *Golden Horde Review*, Vol. 6, (2018), pp. 729-740; for a detailed analysis of its presence in the Timurid state, Subtelny, *Timurids in Transition, passim*. Rashīd al-Dīn does not use the term either, rather he uses the Arabo-Persian word *iqṭāʿ*. Doerfer mentions that the word *soyurġal* with this meaning only appears in the *Tārīkh-i Shaykh Uvays* of the Jalayirid period, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente*, p. 351, though it still seems to have maintained a more general meaning as well, viz note 64. Naṣir al-Dīn Ṭūsī describes what we would think should be called *soyurġal* in his work on finance for the Ilkhans, but uses the term *ḥurr* instead, M. Minovi and V. Minorsky, 'Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī on Finance', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, Vol 10, Issue 3, (Oct. 1940), p. 773.

favour in the form of gifts, immunities, land grants, marriages and titles was seen as an outward show of satisfaction with service and reward for loyalty.[62]

In my view, this term corresponds to another Turco-Mongol term used at times by Juvainī, *tikishmīshī*.[63] While *soyurghamīshī* was the ruler's response to good service, *tikishmīshī* applied to the gifts given by subordinates as an indication of their loyalty to the ruler, as well as the physical act of making obeisance to the ruler.[64] According to Juvainī, this was a necessary step to take in becoming *el*, though it was not the first step. In discussing the Ismāʿīlī ruler Rukn al-Dīn Khūrshāh, Juvainī states that he came personally to Möngke in Qara-Qorum in 1257 to perform *tikishmīshī*, but Möngke 'did not allow Rukn al-Dīn to offer gifts' (رکن الدین را اجازت پیشکش نفرمود*, rukn al-dīn rā ijāzat-i pīshkash nafarmūd*). Here we see again Juvainī's pairing of a Persian word, *pīshkash*, with the Turco-Mongol word, a sign of erudition amongst Persian scholars, but also likely for his readers' benefit.[65] At this stage, Möngke claimed that Rukn al-Dīn wished to become *el*, but had not taken the obligatory preliminary step, namely refraining from resistance to the Mongols, in this case by destroying two of his major fortifications, Girdkuh and Lamasar. Only after this step had been taken would Rukn al-Dīn 'again have the honour of performing *tikishmīshī',* (بار دیگر شرف تکشمیشی یابد*, bār-i dīgar sharaf-i tikishmīshī yābad*).[66] A similar case is mentioned by the Armenian historian Kirakos regarding the Mongol siege of the Georgian city of Kayean in 1236. Its prince, one Awag, gave gifts and even his own daughter to the Mongol commander Chormaghun, but the siege continued. It was only Awag's surrender of the city and physical attendance on Chormaghun which ended the siege and saw Awag feasted by Chormaghun, who gave him great honour above the Mongol nobles themselves.[67] This action seems to correspond to our ideas of the terms above, though they are not used directly.

The term *tikishmīshī* is used elsewhere by Juvainī where he indicates some physical symbol of submission. The case that Juvainī deals with is that of the recalcitrant Ögödeid princes and their

[62] The word even found its way into at least one Armenian text, Grigor of Akner's *History of the Nation of Archers*, Chap. 7, where he discusses the '*sghamish'* received by Constable Smbat on behalf of King Het'um I of Cilicia from Güyük, which included a *jarligh*, golden *paiza*, and Tatar khatun with a headdress, Grigor of Akner, *History of the Nation of Archers,* (trans.) R. Bedrosian, Chapter 7, http://www.attalus.org/armenian/ga1.htm#8, Accessed 25th May 2021.
[63] I have used Juvainī's spelling here, though there are many forms of the word, deriving from the Turkic *tegiš* 'exchange', Clauson, *Etymological Dictionary*, p. 488; Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente*, Band II, *alif* bis *tā, #*921, pp. 531-3.
[64] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 579, note 87.
[65] Anne Lambton has shown how the term *pīshkash* came to be used for a form of tribute from an inferior to a superior in 15th century Iran onwards, A. Lambton, '"*Pīshkash*": Present or Tribute?', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, Vol. 57, No. I, (1994), pp. 145-158.
[66] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 724; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. III, p. 277. For more on this incident, see Lane, *Early Mongol Rule,* pp. 23-6.
[67] Kirakos Ganjakets'i's, *History of the Armenians,* (trans.) R. Bedrosian, http://www.attalus.org/armenian/kgtoc.html, Accessed 25th May 2021, pp. 217-220.

submission to Möngke, after long contesting his right to succeed Güyük. After Shiremün and Naqu's forces approached those of Möngke, Mengeser Noyan was sent out with the army and surrounded them. They realised they were surrounded and went with Mengeser to the *ordu*. Before entering however, the princes and their amirs were forced to perform *tikishmīshī*, nine at a time.[68] If we consider that the princes were outside the *ordu* under duress and Möngke's presence is not mentioned, this situation does not seem to suggest any gift-giving scenario, but rather their symbolic submission to Möngke and his justice, which they surely knew would fall upon them quite swiftly. These terms were further elaborated by Rashīd al-Dīn, and will be considered at greater length below.

Another physical sign of loyalty was the signing or writing of pledges. Juvainī mentions these most often when referring to a new ruler's succession. Juvainī describes Ögödei's accession in terms of 'obeying the command of his father' (امتثال فرمان پدر, *imtiṯāl-i farmān-i pidar*).[69] He states that it was 'according to their (the Mongols') custom' (بر عادت خود, *bar 'ādat-i khud*) that those who chose the *qa'an* 'gave written statements' (خطها بدادند, *khaṭ-hā bi-dādand*) saying they would not change his words or commands.[70] The giving of these written statements occurred on the accession of both Ögödei and Güyük. Rashīd al-Dīn also mentions this giving of pledges, though he uses the Mongol word *möchelge* for these actions, including specifically the accession of Güyük, 'all (the convened princes and amirs) agreed and gave *möchelge*s to the effect that "as long as a piece of flesh from your lineage remains that when wrapped in fat or grass a dog or a cow would not accept, we will not give the khanate to anyone else."' [71]

[68] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 579; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. III, p. 46. We are not entirely sure what this entailed, Boyle hypothesised that this was 'standing to attention', though how he arrives at this meaning is unclear. See below for the physical representation of this rite. This may be linked to the punishments meted out to these princes also, as crimes like theft had to be paid for nine times over by the criminal party in Yuán China, see Lane, *Daily Life*, p. 216.

[69] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 187; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 147.

[70] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 252; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 207.

[71] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 393; RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, p. 715. همگان باتفاق موچلگا دادند تا از نسل تو پاره ای گوشت باشد که در پیه و علف پیچیده سگ و گاو آن را قبول نکند خانیت به دیگری ندهیم, *hamigān bi-ittifāq mūchalgā dādand tā pāra-yi gūsht bāshad ki dar pīh va ʿalaf pīchīda sag va gāv ān rā qabūl nakunad khāniyyat bi dīgarī nadahīm.* This phrasing echoes of course the poems found in *SHM*, one of the reasons to believe that Rashīd al-Dīn either had access to the *SHM*, or some tertiary source, possible the *Altan Debter*, existed for both as well as for some of the Chinese sources as well, SHM/de Rachewiltz, §255, pp. 187-8. Atwood states that Rashīd al-Dīn's primary source was the lost Mongolian-Chinese '*Authentic Chronicle of Chinggis Khan*', which either drew on the *SHM* or had a shared source, Atwood, 'Ghazanid Chronicle', pp. 62, 74. For more on the sources for Rashīd al-Dīn's Mongol history see, Allsen, *Culture and Conquest*, pp. 89-90 and K. Shiraiwa, 'Rashīd al-Dīn's Primary Sources in Compiling the *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*: A Tentative Survey', in (eds.) A. Akasoy, C. Burnett and R. Yoeli-Tlalim, *Rashīd al-Dīn. Agent and Mediator of Cultural Exchanges in Ilkhanid Iran*, (London: The Warburg Institute, 2013), pp. 39-56.

Maria Subtelny has argued that the word *möchelge* came into development slightly later, as neither the *YS* nor the *SHM* make use of it, nor is it to be found in Juvainī, who rather uses the Arabo-Persian term *khaṭ*.[72] Both Subtelny and Michael Hope have noted that the *SHM,* when referring to oaths, employs the term *üge baraldu*, meaning to pledge one's word, and that these were likely oral pledges.[73] Subtelny argues that Juvainī was also well-versed in Mongolian terminology, as can be seen from his regular usage of this terminology within his work.[74] However, if we consider the fact that Juvainī also did not use the term *bulqa*, which was certainly in existence (such as in the *SHM*) before his work was written, this point is a little thin. However, it seems plausible that given its absence in other contemporary sources, the idea of the *möchelge* developed later, perhaps stemming from a combination of the *üge baraldu* oral oaths and the *khaṭ* written statements. The Mongols presumably quickly realised that a written oath was more easily verifiable than an oral one.

From another source we are provided with a possible additional physical sign of loyalty. The Persian historian Jūzjānī, who fled from the Mongol advance in 1226 to the Delhi Sultanate, there penned a chronicle for his patron, the Delhi Sultan Naṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūdshāh, the son of Iltutmish.[75] His work, the *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣiri*, provides an extremely negative portrayal of Mongol rule and conquest. Jūzjānī is particularly critical of collaborators and those who did not fight the Mongols. Jūzjānī claimed that when the Mongols advanced on the city of Lahore In 1241, many merchants who lived in the city had already been provided with *paiza*s by the Mongols. They refused to help in the defence of the city organised by its ruler Malik Kara-Kush, unwilling to harm their business interests, in part leading to the capture of the city.[76] These merchants formed a sort of vanguard of the Mongol conquest, softening the ground ahead of their armies to discourage resistance. It may be that this was the tactic attempted by Chinggis Khan when he sent 400 merchants to the city of Otrar, to show what could be gained by an early submission to the Mongols. While this attempt backfired spectacularly, the Mongols' brutal response may have shown others, such as the merchants of

[72] M.E. Subtelny, 'The binding pledge (*möchälgä*), A Chinggisid practice and its survival in Safavid Iran', in (ed.) C. Mitchell, *New Perspectives on Safavid Iran: Empire and Society* (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 10-11.
[73] SHM/de Rachewiltz, 'Philological Commentary', Vol. I, p. 457; Hope, '*El* and *Bulqa*', pp. 15-18. Subtelny notes that during the reign of the Ilkhan Arghun the *awbāsh* (ruffians) of Qazvin were made to give *möchelge*s to the effect that they would not rise up again, Subtelny, 'Binding pledge', p. 15. It seems unlikely that the dregs of the city would have been literate, but it is one of the few instances where we have a statement about the lower echelons of society's loyalty choices.
[74] Subtelny, 'Binding pledge', p. 11.
[75] C.E. Bosworth, 'Ṭabaqāt-e Nāṣeri', *Encyclopædia Iranica*, Online, https://iranicaonline.org/articles/tabaqat-naseri, Accessed 10th March 2022.
[76] Maulana Minhaj-ud-Din, Abu-Umar-I-Usman Jūzjānī, *Tabakat-i Nasiri: A General History of the Muhammadan Dynasties of Asia, Including Hindustan; from A.H. 194 (810 A.D.) to A.H. 658 (1260 A.D.) and the Irruption of the Infidel Mughals into Islam* (ed. and trans.) H.G. Raverty Vol. II (New Delhi, 1970), pp. 1133-5. Hereafter Jūzjānī/Raverty.

Lahore, that cooperation was the logical way forward to protect their self-interests and livelihoods.[77] These *paiza*s avowed the protection and authority of their bearers, so the residents of Lahore would have known the punishment awaiting them should they interfere with Mongol commercial interests.[78]

All of these physical signs of loyalty were incorporated into the political terminology of authors writing in Persian in the 13th century, even when these authors had a particularly negative view of Mongol culture as Jūzjānī did. Juvainī shows himself to be adept at understanding what these symbols meant, explaining them using Persian terms when they were complex ideas. In this manner, he also legitimates these signs of loyalty, by showing that they already existed in the Perso-Islamic world, and that the Mongols were not completely changing the way loyalty was shown. The normalisation of Mongol political concepts would continue in the works of the Ilkhanid historians of the 14th century also. One of them, Rashīd al-Dīn, provided us with a great deal of information on Mongol loyalty, and showed how certain rituals were key aspects of it. It is to this later historian we now turn.

2.3 Rashīd al-Dīn's Language of Loyalty

Rashīd al-Dīn often uses similar language as Juvainī (one of his main sources) in relating loyalty obligations in the Mongol world. One of the more interesting case studies is that of al-Malik al-Kāmil (r. 1247-1260), the Ayyubid ruler of Mayyafariqin. Al-Malik al-Kāmil, and his cousin al-Malik al-Nāṣir Yūsuf (r. 1236-1260), ruler of Aleppo, had previously submitted to Möngke Qa'an.[79] However, in the course of Hülegü and his general Ket Buqa's campaigns in Syria, al-Naṣir Yūsuf's loyalties were questioned, with suspicions he sought to assist the Mamluk sultan Quṭuz (r. 1259-1260). Shortly after Hülegü established al-Naṣir Yūsuf as governor of Damascus, he sent troops after

[77] Ibn al-Āthīr states that the money and goods that the Khwarazmshāh seized from the murdered merchants was given to the merchants of Bukhara and Samarqand. Perhaps he was trying to ensure their loyalty to him, Ibn al-Āthīr, *Chronicle*, p. 205.
[78] Kirakos, *History of the Armenians*, p. 239 confirms this, saying that no one dared to harm merchants bearing the Mongol *tamgha* (seal). These *paiza*s could be taken away of course, as a sign of the ruler's displeasure or the subject's potential disloyalty. The Syriac Catholicos Mar Yahbh-Allaha had his *paiza* removed by the Ilkhan Aḥmad when he was suspected of supporting Aḥmad's nephew and rival Arghun, and writing treasonous letters to Qubilai in China. It was restored to him once the matter was investigated and the Catholicos cleared of the charges, *Monks of Kublai Khan*, pp. 158-161.
[79] Atwood, *Encyclopedia of Mongolia,* p. 323.

him and murdered him during a drunken feast.[80] Here we have a disagreement as to what constituted loyalty. Al-Malik al-Kāmil claimed that the Mongols had 'acted in contrast to promises and pacts' (عهد و پیمان خلاف کرد, *ʿahd va paymān khilāf kard*)[81] to various rulers across the Muslim world such as the Ismāʿīlī ruler Rukn al-Dīn Khūrshāh, the caliph and in particular, al-Malik al-Nāṣir, who 'came under your protection' (به زنهار شما آمد, *bi zinhār-i shumā āmad*)[82]. These betrayals, in al-Malik al-Kāmil's eyes, meant that he would never submit to Hülegü and continue to fight him, preventing the people of Mayyafariqin from surrendering or fleeing.

However, according to Hülegü, al-Malik al-Kāmil had already attended Möngke's court, and 'received favours and returned with a *yarligh* and a *paiza*' (سیورغامیشی ها یافته با یرلیغ و پایزه بازآمده, *suyurghāmīshī-hā yāfta bā yarlīgh va pāiza bāz āmada*) [83] and this was met with al-Malik al-Kāmil's 'rebellion' (عصیان, *ʿiṣyān*). Essentially, from this perspective, al-Malik al-Kāmil had entered into a loyalty agreement with the Mongol Empire, and had broken it. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, al-Malik al-Kāmil had (unsuccessfully) sought to join forces with his cousin and defend Baghdad from Hülegü, and it was Hülegü's attack on the caliphate which saw him rebel.[84] Interestingly, we have it from Juzjānī that al-Malik al-Kāmil had accepted Mongol *shiḥna*s, again, another proviso of Mongol suzerainty, but put them to death upon hearing of Hülegü's execution of the Caliph.[85] It may be here that we have here an expression of ideal loyalty. Rashīd al-Dīn says that the *malik* was very religious man and perhaps it was the Mongols' excessive violence with regards to the caliph and his family, as well as towards his own cousin, that saw al-Malik al-Kāmil cast off his allegiance to the Mongol Empire and refuse to surrender the city. If so, this ideal loyalty came at a high cost, both for himself and for his subjects, who were reduced to cannibalism during the long siege. Al-Malik al-Kāmil himself received particularly ghastly punishment, being forced to eat his own flesh until he died.[86]

[80] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 506. BH/Budge, p. 438. Van den Bent 'Mongols in Mamluk Eyes', p. 178 shows that Mamluk historians disagreed as to the manner of al-Naṣir Yūsuf's death, with Ibn Kathīr claiming that according to one account, Hülegü had his body suspended between four trees and then cut the rope which held the trees together. Neither Rashīd al-Dīn nor Bar Hebraeus mention any particularly cruel aspect to his death.
[81] RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, p. 917.
[82] Ibid.
[83] RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, p. 920.
[84] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 508.
[85] Jūzjānī/Raverty, pp. 1265-6.
[86] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 508.

2.3.1 Rashīd al-Dīn's Turco-Mongol Loyalty Terms

We see above a repetition of certain keywords that indicate that a vassal had established a loyalty contract with his suzerain. Particularly, the granting of *soyurghamīshī* by Möngke to the Ayyubid *malik* signifies in the Mongol/Persian world of the early 14th century the expected actions of a lord to his vassal who had already made the trip to Qara Qorum and accepted the Mongol *shiḥna*s. However, this did not necessarily have to pertain to a non-Mongol ruler and his Chinggisid overlord, but also could apply within the Chinggisid family. Two of Chinggis' grandsons, Güyük and Köten (sons of Ögödei) in 1225 requested 'honour/a robe of honour and favour/reward' (تشریف و سیورغامیشی, *tashrīf va suyurghāmīshī*) from Chinggis.[87] He foisted them off onto his youngest son Tolui, saying he has given him the *yurt* and everything he owns already. Tolui obliged the young princes, presenting them with robes and other favours, while Chinggis bequeathed a *shiḥna* on Güyük to care for the prince's illness.[88] In the context of the text, several campaigns have just been carried out and presumably the princes were involved in these. In this case, apparently it was possible for Chinggisids to request *soyurghamīshī* if they thought their service warranted such. Perhaps then we should not understand it as a single moment when submission was tendered and favours returned, but as a constant reaffirmation of a subject's loyal service.

Similarly, *tikishmīshī* was an expression of the subject's continued service to the ruler. Rashīd al-Dīn provides us the history of one of Chinggis' most famous generals, Jebe of the Besüt, who were distant relatives of the Chinggisid family. Jebe was famously given his name, meaning 'arrow' by Chinggis when Jebe shot and killed Chinggis' horse from under him.[89] According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Jebe was on the run, friendless and apparently poverty stricken when he finally 'came and submitted' (بیامد و ایل شد, *biyāmad va īl shud*) to Chinggis. This may have been why Jebe was only made a commander of ten at this time, simply due to his bravery. 'He served well' (نیکو خدمت کرد, *nīkū khidmat kard*) such that he was eventually made a commander of a hundred, then a thousand, then ten thousand (*amīr-ī tūmān*). Upon his initial submission, Jebe begged to be pardoned and given *soyurghamīshī*. Here Jebe promised to repay Chinggis for the horse he killed many times over. He had nothing to offer at this stage as *tikishmīshī*, but offered his loyal service. Immediately, Chinggis' faith in Jebe was repaid, as after a campaign against Küchlüg Khan of the Naiman, Jebe presented his new lord with a thousand horses as *tikishmīshī*.[90]

---

[87] RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, p. 480. Though *tashrīf* may also represent 'honour' more generally, in the following sentence they are given robes, *jāma*, so it is likely that this refers to the specific garment.
[88] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 261.
[89] SHM/de Rachewiltz, 'Philological Commentary', Vol. I, p. 534.
[90] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, pp. 109-110; RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, pp. 190-2.

This story is also found in the *SHM*, with a slightly different explanation. In §147 Chinggis questions who shot the arrow which killed his preferred war horse, to which Jebe admits he was to blame and proposes two options for Chinggis: either to kill Jebe, or to favour him. Jebe states 'if I be favoured' (*soyurqaqda' asu*), he swears to fight his utmost on Chinggis's behalf. As de Rachewiltz notes, the favour here is to spare Jebe's life and to take him into service.[91] Often the first act of *soyurgha/soyurghamīshī* by the ruler was the pardon of the subject's life. We see here the incorporation of the request for favour in Jebe's poetical oath promising service. Clearly there were different requirements for people of different social and political stations. For those with great wealth and power, whether in terms of lands, people or herds, a suitable gift was expected. For those of a lower standing, only their life was required. Service begat position and reward, but greater forms of *tikishmīshī* were expected as the servant's station advanced.

In order to come to a better understanding of how Rashīd al-Dīn made use of Turco-Mongol ideas of loyalty, submission and obedience, considering certain words or phrases that entered the Persian lexicon at this point will be useful. Therefore this section will include a quantitative analysis of three connected Turco-Mongol words used to varying degrees by Rashīd al-Dīn. Two of them have already been discussed to some degree, *soyurghamīshī* and *tikishmīshī,* while a third, *uljamīshī* will be added as well.[92] This final term, *uljamīshī*, has been translated by Thackston as 'an oath of allegiance'.[93] However, it represents a performative ritual that appears quite similar to that of *tikishmīshī*. The two terms' interconnectedness will be discussed in the subsequent section, as well as their relationship with *soyurghamīshī.* All three words are predominantly used in verb constructions in Persian. *Tikishmīshī* and *uljamīshī* are regularly used with *kardan*, 'to do'. *Soyurghamīshī* was often used with *kardan* as well, but also with *farmūdan*, a synonym for 'to do' when discussing a ruler's actions. However, for supplicants to the ruler, Rashīd al-Dīn uses *suyurghāmīshī yāftan*, 'to receive *soyurghamīshī*'. These words could also be used as stand-alone nouns, though this is less common.

[91] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §147, p. 69; 'Philological Commentary', Vol. I, p. 536.
[92] *Uljamīshī* is also frequently transcribed as *huljamīshī.*
[93] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 767.

2.3.2 The Usage of *Soyurghamīshī*

The term *soyurghamīshī*, according to the index of the Raushan edition of Rashīd al-Dīn's history of the Mongols, appears in the work some 116 times.[94] What we shall see is that it was at the heart of the great principle of a social contract between a lord and a servant, and as seen in the case of Jebe above, it also featured in the oaths that were exchanged upon the establishment of submission.[95] What did *soyurghamīshī* consist of? Unfortunately the term is often used to mean a general reward, so it is not always made clear what this reward entailed. It can be compared to the expression, 'to find favour' or 'to favour', which do not clarify any specifics, but are regularly used to translate this term. However, if we look more carefully at our many cases, we can perhaps show what could be expected.

Considering double and overlapping mentions, we have 107 unique uses of the word *soyurghamīshī* by Rashīd al-Dīn (Appendix 1). It is used for the action of a Chinggisid great khan (*qa'an*) 43 times. This includes the reigns of Qubilai and Temür Qa'an, both referred to by Rashīd al-Dīn as *qa'an*. The word is applied to regional rulers some 60 times, almost always for Ilkhans, though there are single instances applied to Batu of the Jochid *ulus* and Baraq of the Chaghadaid *ulus*.[96] At times, the word is used for *future qa'an*s/regional rulers as well as sitting ones. The five instances where the word is *not* applied to a Chinggisid ruler are interesting. In three cases, Chinggisid rulers refer to the *soyurghamīshī* of 'the God of the world' (خدای جهان, *khudā-yi jahān)* or 'eternal God' (خدای جاوید, *khudā-yi jāvīd*). Rashīd al-Dīn uses the Persian word *khudā*, presumably this would have referenced the favour of Tengri. The other two cases apply to different prestigious figures in the Turco-Mongol milieu. The first refers to Toghril of the Kerait, the famous Ong Khan, who seeks to tempt Chinggis' younger brother Jochi Qasar to his side through the promise of various forms of *soyurghamīshī*. The only figure to whom this word is applied by Rashīd al-Dīn who could not be considered an outright ruler is Arghun Aqa. This famous administrator and governor in the western regions of the Mongol Empire under several *qa'an*s and regents is portrayed as handing out different types of *soyurghamīshī* to *malik*s, amirs, scribes and servants under his control. Tellingly perhaps, the

[94] RAD/Raushan, Vol. III, p. 2413; Abū al-Qāsim ʿAbdallāh ibn Muḥammad al-Qāshānī, *Tārīkh-i Ūljāytū*, (ed.) M. Hambali, (Tehran: Shirkat-i Intishārāt-i ʿIlmī va Farhangī (Science and Culture Press), 1384/2005), p.30 (hereafter Qāshānī/Hambali) shows that this term also was used by Qāshānī, where Öljeitü bestowed *soyurghamīshī* on his amirs and viziers on his accession.

[95] Hope, *El* and *bulqa*, pp. 15-18.

[96] The one digit discrepancy emerges from a case where it seems that both a *qa'an* and a regional ruler are giving *soyurghamīshī* in the same instance.

word is never used for a woman, despite the rulership of regents such as Töregene Khatun (r. 1241-1246) and Oghul Gaimish (r. 1248-1251).[97]

If we look at what forms *soyurghamīshī* took, they are manifold, though Rashīd al-Dīn often does not deign to mention what it consisted of. His stock phrase which accompanies his use of the word *soyurghamīshī* is *bi anvāʿ*, which can be translated as 'of different kinds/various'.[98] However, we do have plenty of cases where our author specifies at least part of the reward or favour. The first favour bequeathed was frequently the person's life. This put the subject in the ruler's debt from the outset, an important tipping of the 'great principle' in the ruler's favour, crucial in ruler-subject relations across Eurasia.[99] Favour begat service, service brought protection and compensation and when this service was outstanding or over a long period of time, greater reward followed. The Armenian historian Kirakos Ganjakets'I (d. 1271) tells of his personal experience of this 'contract'. He states that when the town of Gandzak was taken, Kirakos was spared by one 'Molar Noyan', who says he will honour him and give him a wife. Molar then proceeds to give Kirakos a tent and two servants, saying 'Tomorrow I shall give you a horse and make you happy. Stay loyal.' Kirakos was not interested however, and fled the same night.[100]

In several cases, the favour is the forgiveness of a transgression by the subject. In these cases, the ruler shows his largesse by granting mercy to a rebel or an enemy, even when they have not earned any reward. However, the right type of gift which accompanied submission or penitence could encourage the ruler's forgiveness. Sultan ʿIzz al-Dīn (r. 1246-1262) of the Rum Seljuq dynasty (1077- c. 1308) thought of a novel way to gain Hülegü's favour and to apologise for his earlier failure to submit to the Mongols: he presented the khan with a magnificent pair of boots with the sultan's own face imprinted on the sole, hoping that 'the *pādshāh* will elevate this slave's head with his royal foot.'[101] This gift, along with presumably the much more significant backing of Hülegü's powerful wife, Doquz Khatun, saved the sultan's life. According to George Lane, the presentation of clothes was a common occurrence when one party sought peace and reconciliation with another, so this scenario fits well with this trend.[102]

[97] It is unclear whether this was because that as women, they could not be considered 'true' rulers, and thus could not perform the same functions, or if Rashīd al-Dīn chose not to use the word for their actions.
[98] Eg. RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, p. 444.
[99] E. Flaig, 'Is Loyalty a Favor? or: Why Gifts cannot oblige an Emperor', in (eds.) G. Algazi, V. Groebner, and B. Jussen, *Negotiating the Gift: Pre-Modern Figurations of Exchange* (Gottingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003) pp. 29-62.
[100] Kirakos, *History of the Armenians*, p. 214.
[101] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 501; RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, p. 906.
[102] Lane, *Daily Life*, p. 46.

We have many instances of a change in rank or status, where a subject is given a high position in the army or officialdom. The governorship of a province, the command of a troop of soldiers, and the rights to the tax collection of a given area are all listed as forms of reward. Attendant with these new commands were the physical confirmations of their new position, a *paiza* and/or *jarligh.* The last four mentions of *soyurghamīshī* in Rashīd al-Dīn's work appear in Ghazan's 1303 *farmān* to his army. In these instances, the form which royal favour took was the giving of land grants, called by Rashīd al-Dīn *iqṭāʿ*, which became known as *soyurghal* in the post-Mongol world.[103] Giving a person *darqan* status was a special honour, coming as it did with freedom from taxation and prosecution for up to nine offences. This status was also passed down to the holder's children.[104] We even have a few mentions of the favour being bestowed as when someone was given pride of place in the seating arrangements during *quriltai*s, a favour which cost the khan nothing but was of immense meaning to the recipient. One notable example of favour found not in Rashīd al-Dīn, but rather the *SHM*, involved Chinggis' *ba'urchi* (cook) Önggür, who was allowed to restore his *aqa* and *ini* (elder and younger brothers) of the Baya'ud lineage into the same thousand, as they had been dispersed among different groups. Önggür himself was made commander of this new Baya'ud thousand.[105]

Soyurghamīshī often came in the form of physical gifts, either in addition to other forms or on their own. The most notable type of physical gift was human, whether entire people groups or lineages, wives, or officials. In case 11 (Appendix 1) a group of Jochi Qasar's descendants were given as *soyurghamīshī* to Chaghadai by Ögödei. Most of the cases of human gifts involve a wife being given to the subject in question, and at the very highest level, some of Chinggis' own daughters and wives, such as to the Uighur *idiqut* Barchuq, case 5 (Appendix 1, p. 192)A connection with the Chinggisid family naturally meant an elevation of status, and marrying a female descendant of Chinggis brought men into the *güregen* (son-in-law) class, which formed a sort of social stratum between the Chinggisids and other lower members of the ruling classes. Officials could also be handed over as part of this gift, as we see in case 23 (Appendix 1, p. 193), where Chinggis bestows a *shiḥna* on Güyük. Beyond the human, there are many other types of physical gifts, of which horses are a common inclusion in this list. Gold, silver, coins, jewels and pearls all feature as well. In case 102, one official, Saʿd al-Dīn, was given the Mongol royal yak-tail standard, the *tugh,* as well as a drum, a *kahvarga,* by the Ilkhan Ghazan, indicating his stewardship of the state.

[103] Pochakaev, 'The evolution of *soyurghal*', pp. 729-740.
[104] Atwood, *Encyclopaedia of Mongolia,* p. 133.
[105] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §213, p. 134; P.D. Buell and J. Kolbas, 'The Ethos of State and Society in the Early Mongol Empire: Chinggis Khan to Güyük', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 26, Nos. 1-2, (2016), p. 55; Favereau, *The Horde*, p. 39.

One notable kind of favour mentioned six times by Rashīd al-Dīn was the conferral of robes of honour and/or belts. Thomas Allsen and Eiren Shea have noted the role that investiture and the taking of robes and belts from a ruler had in physically showing loyalty obligations and submission in the Mongol world, a concept that is echoed through much of Eurasian history.[106] In the Mongol case, the removal of belts and hats before a superior was a sign of powerlessness and awe in front of their ruler, while the forced removal of a belt or hat indicated the lord's displeasure with his subordinate.[107] If we turn to the *SHM*, we can see a fascinating example of the ruler's own submission to a higher power. The young Temüjin hid from his enemies, the Merkit, at the sacred mountain of Burqan Qaldun, the legendary birthplace of the Mongols.[108] Once his enemies had moved off, Temüjin thanked the holy mountain, saying:

> 'Every morning I will sacrifice to Burqan Qaldun, every day I will pray to it: the offspring of my offspring shall be mindful of this and do likewise!' He spoke and facing the sun, hung his belt around his neck, put his hat over his hand, beat his breast with his fist, and nine times kneeling down towards the sun, he offered a libation and a prayer.[109]

Thus, the ruler himself shows his submission to the higher forces in the Mongol world, who protected him from his enemies and sustained him. Thus the lord and servant here are recast, with Temüjin representing the earthly servant, and the mountain serving as the lord. His ritual performance was one which could be described as the ideal which his descendants would follow. Indeed, every aspect of this performance would be noted by other sources on the Mongols when

---

[106] Allsen, *Commodity and Exchange*, pp. 49-50, 80 etc.; T. Allsen, *The Steppe and the Sea: Pearls in the Mongol Empire,* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), p. 58; T. Allsen, 'Robing in the Mongolian Empire', in (ed.) S. Gordon, *Robes and Honor: The Medieval World of Investiture*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001) pp. 305-313; E.L. Shea, *Mongol Court Dress, Identity Formation, and Global Exchange*, (Routledge: New York and London, 2020), pp. 27-9, 61-5. Shea also discusses the *tirāz*, used by various Middle Eastern dynasties such as the Sasanians, Abbasids, and eventually the Ilkhanids, which was the embroidered names and titles of the ruler in the *khil'a* robes, pp. 99-100. For the importance of investiture across Eurasia in the medieval world, see other articles from Gordon's book, such as G.R.G. Hambly, 'From Baghdad to Bukhara, from Ghazna to Delhi: The *khil'a* Ceremony in the Transmission of Kingly Pomp and Circumstance', S. Gordon (ed.) *Robes and Honor: The Medieval World of Investiture*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 193-223. Jackson has also shown that the Mongols sometimes enforced their own hairstyles on their subjects, Jackson, *Mongols and the Islamic World*, p. 93.

[107] Lane, *Daily Life*, pp. 46-7. Lane provides the example of Chinggis removing the hat and belt of his brother Jochi Qasar indicating his distrust in him. The story emerges in SHM/de Rachewiltz §244, pp. 168-9, where Hö'elün, the mother of the two brothers, comes across Chinggis having his brother interrogated and restores Jochi Qasar's hat and belt to him and castigates Chinggis himself. SHM/de Rachewiltz, Vol. II, 'Philological Commentary', p. 873 discusses that this removal of the clothing indicates Jochi Qasar's total submission to his brother.

[108] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §1, p. 1. It is here where the blue-grey wolf ordained with destiny by Tengri settled with his wife, the fallow doe, and where Batachiqan, the ancestor of the Mongols, was born.

[109] SHM/de Rachewiltz, Vol. I, §103, p. 33. For more on this incident, see L. Moses, 'Triplicated Triplets: The Number Nine in the "Secret History" of the Mongols', *Asian Folklore Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 2, (1986), pp. 290-2.

discussing rituals surrounding submission, loyalty and the establishment of a contract between rulers and ruled.[110]

The next questions that this quantitative analysis can help to answer are who received *soyurghamīshī* and why? To the first question we can respond, basically anyone. From Chinggisid princes to ferrymen of the Amu Darya River, from foreign rulers to poor travellers, all could be bequeathed royal favour. If Chinggis and his descendants could only receive their *soyurghamīshī* from God/Heaven, it stands to reason that all others should receive their favour from Chinggisid khans as the next step down the ladder.[111] The most commonly mentioned recipients of royal favour were amirs and state officials, as well as submissive foreign dignitaries. The actions which saw the agent receive favour or reward were also myriad. A preponderance of the examples relate to submission, either by a new subject or by someone who had rebelled. The fact that many of these met with Mongol favour indicates that the Mongols used plenty of carrot alongside the stick they are better known for. Many of these examples of submission also included *tikishmīshī/uljamīshī* (discussed in the subsequent sections). Besides this, we have examples of people receiving favour for notable feats of arms, faithful administrative service, loyalty in difficult situations, honesty, admitting a mistake, refusing bribes, presenting booty, bringing interesting gifts from afar, and even by way of apology by the khan.

There are three notable uses of the term *soyurghamīshī* that I wish to highlight here due to what they can tell us about Mongol custom and the political standpoint of the author, Rashīd al-Dīn. The first is in case 17 (Appendix 1, p. 193). In this instance we have two treasurers of the city of Jungdu (Zhōngdū, the Jurchen capital), Qailiq and Qadai, who offered gifts and treasures to Chinggis' representatives to take the city: Önggür Ba'urchi, Harqai Qasar, and Shigi Qutuqu, Chinggis' adopted son. While the first two *noyan*s (commander, lord) accepted, Shigi Qutuqu rejected the gifts. When questioned by Chinggis, he claims that the whole city belongs to Chinggis, and Shigi Qutuqu could not steal what belonged to his ruler. Chinggis rewards his adoptive son with double what had been offered to the others, saying that Shigi 'recognised the great custom' (یوسون بزرگ دانسته, *yūsūn-i buzurg dānista*). This incident is notable for several reasons, including that it was apparently quite a famous one in the Mongol world. The story appears in a very similar form in the *SHM*, where Shigi receives favour because he was 'mindful of the great norm (*yeke yosu*)'.[112] Here it seems we have Chinggis making an example of how loyalty to the *qa'an* could bring great reward, while disloyalty

[110] On the removing of belts and caps, see pp. 67 of this thesis; on libations and facing the heavenly bodies, see pp. 62-4; on the ritual number nine, see pp. 58-9.
[111] Qāshānī/Hambali, p. 33 indicates that a lesser Chinggisid ruler, in this case, Dua of the Chaghadaid *ulus*, could receive *soyurghamīshī* from his superior, Temür Qa'an, ruler of the Yuán Dynasty.
[112] SHM/de Rachewiltz, Vol. I, §252, p. 180, and Vol. II, 'Philological Commentary', Vol. II, p. 919.

would be punished. This example certainly seems to have made its mark. This 'great norm/custom/principle' would govern the social contract between rulers and ruled throughout the Mongol period.[113]

The second case that has been mentioned already above, case 23 (Appendix 1, p. 193) relating to Güyük and another Chinggisid prince's appeal for favour from Chinggis.[114] The identity of this Chinggisid prince is not entirely clear based on different manuscripts and editions. According to Thackston's translation, largely reliant on the Karimi edition, this person was Kölgen, Chinggis' son by a concubine.[115] However, Thackston admits that the text in fact has داکیان, perhaps 'Dakyan'.[116] According to the Raushan edition however, it was '*pisarān-i ögödei güyük va köten*' who went to Chinggis for *soyurghamīshī*.[117] The plural here, *pisarān*, sons, indicates that there was more than one son of Ögödei involved. The name Köten seems equally plausible from Thackston's edition, as both names seem very far away from the text's '*dākyān*'. This argument may seem academic, but if we analyse this closer there may be some important groundwork being established by Rashīd al-Dīn here.

If we accept for the moment that these two were Güyük and Köten, then we have an appeal by two of Chinggis' grandsons for favour, possibly due to their participation in a 1225 campaign against the Tanguts. This is hardly out of the ordinary, but the next sections are key. Chinggis responded saying:

> مرا چیزی نیست. هرچه هست به تولوی تعلق دارد که خداوند خانه و یورت بزرگ است, او دانست. *ma-rā chīzī nīst. Harchi hast bi tūlūī taʿalluq dārad ki khudāvand-i khāna va yurt-i buzurg ast, ū dānist.*[118]
>
> I have nothing. Everything there is belongs to Tolui, who is the lord of the house and the great yurt. He knows best.[119]

Tolui then proceeded to reward his nephews with robes and other assorted goods, while Chinggis gives Güyük someone to prepare his food due to his illness. In this passage I believe we have

[113] Hope, *El* and *bulqa*, p. 7.
[114] See p. 49 of this thesis.
[115] RAD/Thackston, Translator's Preface, p. xvii. Using Karimi, Tehran Iqbāl 1362. Thackston also makes use of two Russian editions (1965 and 1980), as well as Blochet's French translation of 1911.
[116] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 261.
[117] RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, p. 480. پسران اوگتای, گیوگ و کوتان The Raushan edition is based on several manuscripts, including the Topkapi and Suleymaniyya MS. RAD/Raushan, **اشارت**, هشتاد و نو- نود.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Thackston translates *ū dānist* as 'He commands', which is also possible in this context, RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 261. Even though *dānist* would indicate the past tense, the meaning here is present.

a backdating of Toluid claims to the throne, as well as their superiority over the Ögödeid line. Firstly, we have the image of Chinggis handing over a privilege of the lord, namely the distribution of favour and reward, to his youngest son while Chinggis was still ruling. If we look at the instances where this word is used, in all cases but one (excluding the three related to God), *soyurghamīshī* was handed out by a ruling *qa'an* or a regional ruler. Using this term for Tolui then elevated his status to that of Chinggis', a ruler in his own right. It also highlighted Tolui's superiority over Ögödei's sons. On principle of seniority, this was true, but it also seems to presage Möngke's seizure of the throne from the Ögödeid line in 1251: two of the contenders to succeed Ögödei in 1246 are here reduced to subjects of Tolui. For good measure, Rashīd al-Dīn throws in a mention of Güyük's illness, which he elsewhere states as a reason Güyük should not have been chosen as *qa'an*.[120] The undermining of Ögödei's offspring and their claim to the throne occurs often in Rashīd al-Dīn's chronicle (and other Toluid-sponsored works), but this seems to be an interesting case, coming as it did before Chinggis' own death and with his explicit approval.

The other case I wish to touch on here is case 37 (Appendix 1, p. 195) relating to the great Mongol administrator Arghun Aqa's possible *soyurghamīshī*. This is the only case we have where the word is used for neither a Chinggisid, nor a *qa'an* or regional ruler (again excluding God). Stefan Kamola has put forward that Rashīd al-Dīn sought to tarnish Arghun Aqa's name due to his son Nawrūz's recent 'rebellion' against Rashīd al-Dīn's patron Ghazan Khan.[121] Therefore, Rashīd al-Dīn claims that Arghun Aqa was traded by his father for a leg of beef to a Jalayir commander Ilüge Qada'an, while Juvainī describes him as the son of Taichu, a prominent Oirat commander.[122] However, this case of *soyurghamīshī* casts significant doubt on Rashīd al-Dīn's downplaying of Arghun Aqa's status. As we can see, he is quite careful with how he uses the term *soyurghamīshī*, and barring some scribal/editing error, he was apparently keen to equate Arghun Aqa's position to that of an independent ruler in the Mongol world.[123] Arghun Aqa does receive *soyurghamīshī* himself

[120] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 305.

[121] Rashīd al-Dīn tells a convoluted story whereby letters were forged in Nawrūz's name which attempted to make contact with the amirs of Mamluk Egypt and Syria, blaming not Ghazan, but his amirs for blocking the propagation of Islam. Nawrūz was eventually captured and killed, in all likelihood in order to rid Ghazan of his overbearing patron, RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, pp. 637-640.

[122] S. Kamola, 'Rashīd al-Dīn and the making of history in Mongol Iran', PhD Thesis, University of Washington, 2013, p. 160.

[123] It is also possible that in this instance, Arghun Aqa in fact only determined the type of *soyurghamīshī* that was granted, and did not give out these favours himself. He was at the court of Möngke at the time, and the Persian text (Rashīd al-Dīn/Raushan, Vol. II, p. 747) states کسانی که از ملوک و امرا و نواب و بیتیکچیان در خدمت او بودند بر وفق صواب دید او سیورغامیشی یافتند, *kasānī ki az mulūk va umarā va nuvvāb va bītīkchīyān dar khidmat-i ū būdand bar vifq-i ṣavābdīd-i ū suyūrghāmīshī yāftand*. 'Anyone of the kings, amirs, deputies, and secretaries who were in his service were rewarded according to his (Arghun Aqa's) opinion'. Nonetheless, his involvement in the granting of these favours is unprecedented in Rashīd al-Dīn's text. Persian grammar is somewhat confusing in this regard, as we do not know who the *ū* (he/she) is referring to, but given that the previous sentence

from Möngke (case 38), having performed *tikishmīshī* to his sovereign. Therefore, we should not overemphasise Arghun Aqa's status, but clearly the great respect and honour afforded him remained into Ghazan's reign and beyond.

2.3.3 The Usage of *Tikishmīshī*

The word is used 37 times, while if we remove double mentions and the repetition of the story of Amir Sechektu we are left with 32 unique occurrences of the word (Appendix 2). In only two of these occasions is it applied to someone besides a *qa'an* (13 times) or a Chinggisid regional ruler (17 times). One is to the Ögödeid prince Qipchaq (a relative of Qaidu, but not a ruler in his own right), while the other refers to the ruler of the Naiman, Narqish Tayang. In around a third of the instances, we see that the person performing *tikishmīshī* was likely already a subject of the *qa'an*/ruler in question, or was acknowledging a successor. This leaves us 21 instances where it was performed to a new lord, or was an acknowledgment of rebellion against one's 'rightful' lord in Rashīd al-Dīn's perception. In only eight instances can we see what form the gift, or part of the gift, took; mostly animals such as horses or hawks, though fine clothing is also mentioned. The reciprocity of these gifts is shown by the fact that in 11 instances, the ruler responded with *soyurghamīshī* of his own. In four cases, the ritual number nine appears, with three cases (2, 6, 11) of someone performing *tikishmīshī* nine by nine, and another case (7) where Chaghadai gives his brother Ögödei nine horses.

We have noted already several times where the number nine has been mentioned in connection with these rituals. It is well-known that this number was important to the Mongols, given its regular appearance in a plethora of different language sources about them. However, it is not always evident why this is. According to Larry Moses, the number was part of shamanistic ritual. Therefore, there are nine stages of heaven, and only in the ninth stage could Tengri be found. It was here that only the most powerful shamans could reach in their ecstasy.[124] This number, which also appeared in the Türk, Uighur and Khitan empires, was one which had relevance even into the Qīng Dynasty, where the emperor received nine white animals from Mongol rulers as tribute.[125] Moses

mentions Arghun Aqa receiving most of the lands of the Middle East to govern, and the subsequent sentence discusses his return to the province of Khurasan, there is a strong case for it being Arghun Aqa's *ṣavābdīd* (opinion), that is crucial here. My thanks to Sara Mirahmadi for her advice on this section.

[124] Moses, 'Triplicated Triplets', p. 287.

[125] Idem, pp. 287-8.

also notes that in the *SHM*, the number is exclusively used for the sections talking about Chinggis, always at significant moments in his life.[126] Its relevance is thus one bound up in the religious and cultural life of steppe peoples over centuries, but it is also a legitimising force, showing who had the possession of divine support. In the performance of obeisance nine times, or with nine gifts, that divine support is reflected back upon the ruler by his subjects.

In this regard then, let us turn to one of the more interesting references for *tikishmīshī,* where Rashīd al-Dīn relates the story of Ögödei's hunts (case 5). This *qa'an* set up his winter quarters at Ong Qin, near the Bulangu and Jalingu mountains.[127] At these quarters, Ögödei set up a sort of hunting lodge-*cum*-festival area which Rashīd al-Dīn terms a *chihik*.[128] He ordered that a wall be built, which took some two days to circumnavigate, made of clay and wood, with several gates on all sides. His army then formed the famous *jirga*, or hunting circle, from a month's distance away from this venue, and drove the prey through the open gates.[129] Then he and all his followers would set to hunting within the *chihik*, according to priority. Thus first Ögödei and his personal retinue, then the princes and amirs, then the common soldiers would take turns hunting. All prey was subsequently collected, and divvied up among the participants, again according to rank. The princes and amirs then performed 'the ceremony of *tikishmīshī'*, which was followed by nine days of banqueting. After this, everyone returned to their own yurts.[130]

This fascinating recounting, which given Rashīd al-Dīn's use of the now archaic past imperfect (eg. *kardandī*, *bāzgashtandī*) throughout the passage, indicates that this event was not considered a one off, but rather occurred regularly.[131] Here we see the ritual which attended the formal affirmation of the loyalty agreement. The *qa'an* ritually collects the bounty which his servants had gathered, and divides it up among these servants, showing himself as the beneficent ruler providing for his subjects. They, in turn, ritually present themselves and their gifts to him, in a specific location

[126] Idem, p. 289.
[127] Thomas Allsen states that the Ong Qin River was in central Mongolia, some ways south of the capital of Qara Qorum, T. Allsen, *The Royal Hunt in Eurasian History,* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), p. 44; RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 413 says that Möngke spent the winter there after his election in 1251.
[128] According to Christopher Atwood, this was the *ji'ig* in Mongolian, possibly attested in YS 3:49, C.P. Atwood, 'Pu'a's Boast and Doqolqu's Death: Historiography of a Hidden Scandal in the Mongol Conquest of the Jin', *Journal of Song-Yuan Studies,* Vol. 45, (2015), p. 241, note 7; the building of a wall to facilitate the capture of game is also mentioned in Juvainī, Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 29; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 21.
[129] For more on the hunt, see Lane, *Daily Life*, pp. 107-114.
[130] RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, p. 602; RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 328. *rasm-i tikishmīshī*.
[131] Thackston translates as such, saying 'they would enter' or 'he would let' etc. This is a theme noted in anthropological studies of rituals also. For example, in A. Dencher, 'Comemmorating Conquest: The triumphal entry of William III of Orange, King of England, into The Hague in 1691', PhD Thesis, Leiden University, 2020, p. 13, he notes: 'One charasteristic of rites that makes it possible to study their mechanisms is that they are defined by repetition. This suggests that a one-time event is not a ritual, since repetition is what gives ritual its social function and power.'

tied to this ceremony. We have seen in several instances that *tikishmīshī* was performed nine by nine by the *qa'an*'s subjects, or the gifts given in groups of nine.[132] This may also have been the norm here, and the sacred number appears in the next phrase, when all the attendees feast for nine days before departing. The recurring nature of this event shows that the *qa'an* sought repeated assurances both that his subjects were provided for but also loyal to him, shown not just in their presence but also the gifts that they brought. However, we cannot ignore that while Rashīd al-Dīn is fulsome in his praise of this action by Ögödei, as pointed out by Christopher Atwood, this is labelled as one of the ruler's four major faults in the *SHM*. Apparently Ögödei was being greedy by restraining the animals, and not wanting his brothers to have them.[133] Whether Rashīd al-Dīn simply misunderstood this as a transgression of Mongol custom or whether the *SHM* is continuing its generally anti-Ögödeid vein is unclear here.

2.3.4 The Ritual of *Tikishmīshī*

In contrast to *soyurghamīshī*, it seems as if there was a specific ceremony which was involved with the performance of *tikishmīshī*. We only have bits and pieces of information about this ceremony, but let us collect what we know about this typical display of loyalty in the Mongol world. First, Rashīd al-Dīn calls it a *rasm* (custom, rite, ceremony, tradition).[134] Second, on several occasions Rashīd al-Dīn specifies that kneeling accompanied the performance of this ceremony (Appendix 2, cases 6, 14, 19 pp. 203-4). Third, we have some instances where the performer also gave a bowl of wine to the receiver of this rite (cases 30, 31, 34) in a custom known as *kāsa-gīrī*.[135] Fourth, in one case (14), the performer, or offender (*gunāhkār* according to Rashīd al-Dīn), was made to kneel with tent flaps on his shoulders during the ceremony. Rashīd al-Dīn says that this act was a custom in such cases (معتاد چنان است که در چنان قضایا, *muʿtād chinān ast ki dar chinān qażāyā*), this case being Ariq

[132] Het'um the Historian confirms that in order to find favour, one had to give the Mongols gifts in groups of nine, Het'um the Historian's, *History of the Tartars, [The Flower of Histories of the East]*, (trans.) R. Bedrosian, http://www.attalus.org/armenian/hetumtoc.html, Accessed 20th December 2020. p. 39.

[133] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §281, p. 218; Atwood, 'Pu'a's Boast', p. 241.

[134] RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, p. 602, رسم

[135] A. Soudavar, 'The Saga of Abu-Saʿid Bahādor Khān. The *Abu-Saʿidnāmé*', in (eds.) J. Raby and T. Fitzherbert, *The Court of the Il-khans, 1290-1340*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 120. According to Soudavar, this was a ritual by which Chinggisid princes honoured each other. While this seems to be partly the case, it was not exclusive to Chinggisid princes, and could be performed by non-Chinggisid commanders or Tajik administrators. Soudavar's work also points to an illustration of the rite in the 'Demotte' *Shāhnāma* relating to Zāv, the son of Tahmāsb (Figure 18). In it the person offering the bowl is kneeling in front of the enthroned monarch. Perhaps here we have some idea of how *tikishmīshī* was performed.

Böke's surrender to his brother Qubilai after their civil war.[136] Fifth, on various occasions, (cases 2, 8, 11, 14) the performers were allowed to be closer to the ruler after their *tikishmīshī*, whether that be into the ruler's arms, his inner apartments, or his *ordu* more broadly. Sixth, in at least 3 cases (11, 32, and 33) the ceremony was performed during a *toy* (banquet/feast) or *quriltai*. Seventh, in one case (34), *tikishmīshī* was performed at a banquet not just to Ghazan, but to his amirs, the princes, and notably, the khatuns, the Mongolian royal women.[137]

In these snippets of information we find the different physical and symbolic aspects of the ritual, apart from gift-giving. It is unclear whether all or any of these aspects were always part of *tikishmīshī*, but at least some of them were considered inappropriate in certain situations. In case 14 for example, when Ariq Böke performs the ceremony with the tent flaps on his shoulders, we are notified that Hülegü sent an envoy to his older brother Qubilai to complain about the manner in which Ariq Böke was forced to perform *tikishmīshī*. According to Hülegü, it was against the *jasaq* to allow a Chinggisid to be treated in this way and that this action humiliated the *aqa-ini*. Qubilai apparently accepted this criticism of his actions.[138] In all of the cases where someone was made to perform *tikishmīshī* in order to enter the ruler's presence, this person (or persons) was a relative of the ruler. This ceremonial act seems to have functioned in these cases as a sort of cleansing before a brother or cousin is accepted back into the ruler's good graces and physical presence. One is reminded of the ritual purification demanded by the Mongols of passing between two fires mentioned by John of Plano Carpini and others.[139]

The permission of physical closeness to the ruler is also notable. Not only does this signify a return to the inner circle, but also shows that trust is again restored in the recalcitrant subject.[140] Another aspect to note is that like any good ceremony, the act almost always seems to be performed publicly, showing both the debasement of the supplicant and the ruler's generosity and forgiveness to the world. This idea is linked to social constructions of rites of passage. As noted by Alexander Dencher, paraphrasing the anthropologist Arnold van Gennep, the rite of passage is 'defined as a

[136] RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, p. 785.

[137] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 661; RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, p. 1170. What is also noteworthy here is that the performer, Saʿd al-Dīn Sāhib Dīvān, presents goblets to all of the attendees at the same time performing *tikishmīshī*, which seems to indicate that the ritual took some time. صاحب خواجه سعد الدین آنجا طوی عام کرد, و ساطان اسلام و تمامت خواتین و شهزادگان و امرا را کاسه گرفت و تگشمیشی کرد.

[138] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 433; RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, p. 786.

[139] Dawson, *The Mongol Mission*, p. 10. Other incidents are mentioned in the *Tatar Relation*, R.A. Skelton, T. E. Marston and G. D. Painter, *The Vinland Map and the Tartar Relation* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 88-90. The Mamluk Sultan Baybars' (r. 1260-1277) envoy to the Ilkhan Abaqa was also made to do this, see Broadbridge, *Kingship and Ideology*, p. 24.

[140] Khwāndamīr/Thackston, p. 88 says that in 1303 Chupan, Qutlughshah and other amirs who had been defeated by the Mamluks were punished not only by three blows, but were not allowed in the *ordu* for a period of time by Ghazan. They were subsequently restored to favour and given robes.

process of re-assimilation or reintegration that begins with the separation of the individual from the group, followed by a liminal period during which the individual's status is uncertain and ends with their reintegration into society'.[141] Thus the elements of political loyalty and submission which the rite of *tikishmīshī* shows is also bound up in the social concept of being excluded, then regaining one's place in the society. Thus, the inclusion of some element of humiliation shows the wayward Mongol subject the social cost of transgressing imagined rules or customs. These moments were heavily laden with cultural meaning.

2.3.5 *Tikishmīshī* and *kāsa-gīrī*

This social element is even further accentuated by the relationship of *tikishmīshī* with *kāsa-gīrī* (offering a bowl of wine). As we only have the latter term used with *tikishmīshī* three times, we cannot be sure if it was consistently attached to this ritual. The term is not one generally acknowledged in Mongol scholarship, but is the subject of a study by Mahmoud Abedi, who discusses it in relation to its use in the *dīvān* of Ḥāfiẓ and the Ilkhanid histories.[142] It is not entirely clear if this term originated in the Mongol period, with Abedi stating that it was 'current' in the time of Ḥāfiẓ.[143] Abedi has tracked the use of the verb *kāsa giriftan/dāshtan* through the three major Ilkhanid historical works, those of Juvainī, Rashīd al-Dīn, and Vaṣṣāf. In Juvainī and Vaṣṣāf, the word is often used as part of descriptions of accession ceremonies, where Mongol princes acknowledged their submission to their *qa'an*.[144] Juvainī describes one such incident where Tolui 'gave a bowl' (*kāsa dāsht*) to his brother Ögödei after he was raised to the throne by Chaghadai and his uncle Temüge Otchigin, while the princes and amirs present knelt and offered up prayers for their new leader.[145] This incident, according to Abedi, was immortalised in a miniature for Rashīd al-Dīn's history, while this image has become one of the more commonly used to display Mongol political culture, see Figure 2.[146]

---

[141] Dencher, 'Commemorating Conquest', p. 12, paraphrasing A. van Gennep, *Les rites de passage*, 1990, p. 13.
[142] Mahmoud Abedi, '*Kāsa giriftan*', in *Nashriyya-yi Zabān va Adabīyāt-i Fārsī* (Journal of Persian Language and Literature), Summer, Autumn and Winter 1374/1995, Nos. 9, 10, and 11, pp. 89-104.
[143] Idem, p. 89.
[144] Idem, pp. 94-96.
[145] Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 147; Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 187. It is unclear to me whether the verbs *dāshtan* (to have) and *giriftan* (to take) function differently in these phrases, as both seem to mean the same thing. Perhaps one can think of 'having a cup' as toasting, however as Abedi mentions, it is key that the ruler takes the cup to signal his favour to the supplicant. In all cases we can see, whether using *dāshtan* or *giriftan*, it is the supplicant/lesser in rank who performs the original action.
[146] Abedi, '*Kāsa giriftan'*, p. 91. According to Abedi, and his source for the image, Abbas Iqbal Ashtiyani's *Comprehensive History of Iran*, there is a goblet of wine (*jām-i sharāb*) here, though the image is not clear

This wine-offering ceremony was not solely reserved for the accession of a new *qa'an*, but was regularly used by supplicants to a Mongol ruler to try and gain his favour. The ruler's reaction at this point was key, should he accept, the supplicant's request would be granted and he would find favour. Should the ruler not accept the proffered potable, it was a sign of his displeasure with the supplicant and that the request would not be granted.[147] We are provided a telling example of this by Vaṣṣāf, who relates that Shams al-Dīn Juvainī, the vizier of Abaqa accused of embezzlement by a rival named Majd al-Mulk, three times attempted to offer a cup (*kāsa girift*) to the Ilkhan but was refused. He tried a fourth time, on bended knee, kissing the ground, before the Ilkhan finally accepted and drank the cup and Shams al-Dīn Juvainī was restored to power and favour.[148] Offering a cup is mentioned in other source traditions as well, and on the spirit-path stele of the famous Khitan official of the Mongols, Ila Chucai, it is twice recorded that Ögödei offered a goblet to his official as a great sign of respect, once at a *quriltai* of 1236.[149]

The importance of the cup of wine is elsewhere indicated also. Toqto'a Beki of the Merkit in one instance swore an oath to Chinggis' rival Jamuqa by taking a golden goblet of *kumiss*, and pouring it on the ground, promising not to harm Jamuqa and return his possessions to him.[150] In a later example, the Ilkhan Baidu and the pretender Ghazan met to make peace in 1295. Both men sent delegations to establish a truce. In order to make a covenant and pact, wine was brought with gold dissolved in the goblets, before being poured on the ground. By this point, allowances were also made for Muslims, who simply took each other by the hand to swear their oaths not to harm each other.[151] The historian Qāshānī also mentions that the Ögödeid ruler Chapar was shocked by his

---

enough to establish this. The image features on the frontispiece of Michael Hope's *Power, Politics and Tradition in the Mongol Empire and the Īlkhānate of Iran*.

[147] Abedi, '*Kāsa giriftan'*, p. 92.

[148] Vaṣṣāf, p. 96, cited in Abedi, '*Kāsa giriftan'*, p. 95.

[149] Song Zizhen, 'Spirit-Path Stele for his Honor Yelu, Director of the Secretariat', in (trans. and ed.) C.P. Atwood, *The Rise of the Mongols: Five Chinese Sources*, (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2021), pp. 142, 146. I use here Ila as his personal name based on Atwood, *Rise of the Mongols*, p. 133, who indicates that Ila was the name he used, while it was Sinified to Yelu/Yehlü.

[150] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 107. Peng Daya elaborates some of the superstition around this ritual, saying that the Mongols believed that emptying the vessel completely were said to be cutting off their descendants, 'A Sketch on the Black Tatars', p. 113. The former Jīn official Zhang Dehui, who was summoned to Qubilai's *ordo* in 1247, mentions that on the auspicious ninth day of the ninth moon, Qubilai and all those under his banner would sprinkle white mare's milk on the ground, Zhang Dehui, 'Notes on a Journey', in (trans. and ed.) C.P. Atwood, *The Rise of the Mongols: Five Chinese Sources*, (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2021), p. 173.

[151] Abedi, '*Kāsa giriftan'*, pp. 92-3; RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 615. The importance of drinking a shared cup is also linked to the *anda* (blood-brother) relationship, whereby a supposedly unbreakable bond was formed by spilling one's blood into a cup of *kumiss* and sharing it, as took place between Baraq of the Chaghadaids, Qaidu of the Ögödeids, and Möngke Temür of the Jochids at the *quriltai* at Talas in 1269, M. Biran, 'The Battle of Herat (1270): A Case of Inter-Mongol Warfare', in (ed.) N. Di Cosmo, *Warfare in Inner Asian History*, (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 184-5. This is also the definition of the *anda* relationship given by Atwood in his encyclopaedia, *Encyclopaedia of Mongolia*, p. 13. Interestingly however, in the 'classical case' of the *anda* relationship, that of Jamuqa and Temüjin, the blood/drinking ritual element is not mentioned by the *SHM* or Rashīd al-Dīn. The

betrayal by the Toluid Malik Temür, saying that they had sworn solemn oaths on a golden cup, how could these possibly be broken?[152] Thus we can see that the term *kāsa-gīrī* often signified an expression of obedience and a reaffirmation of one's oaths of service to the ruler.[153] In this way this ritual has similarities with *tikishmīshī* and its connotations.

SHM rather mentions the gifts that the two boys and later men exchanged to form their allegiance, SHM/de Rachewiltz, §116-118, pp. 45-6. The *YS* also translates the term *anda* saying '*anda* means in our language "friends who have exchanged gifts"', YS/Atwood, p. 12. However, Agnes Birtalan has noted that the term itself derives from the Turkic *ant ič*, which means 'to drink on the swearing' in ancient and Middle Turkic sources, A. Birtalan, 'Rituals of Sworn Brotherhood (Mong. *anda bol-*, Oir. and, *ax düü bol-*) in Mongol Historic and Epic Tradition', *Chronica: Annual of the Institute of History, University Szeged*, Vol.7-8 (2007-2008), pp. 45-6.

[152] Qāshānī/Hambali, p. 39.

[153] Abedi, '*Kāsa giriftan*', p. 93.

Figure 2: Ögödei's Accession, from a manuscript of the *Jami' al-Tawarikh* of Rashid al-Din Fadl-Allah (MS Sup Persan 1113, folio 133v). © Bibliothèque Nationale de France

In my view the Persian expression *kāsa giriftan/dāshtan* is equivalent to, and may often describe, a Mongol ceremony known as *ötök*. According to Igor de Rachewiltz, this Mongol term appears in the *SHM* with a Chinese translation given in the interlineal gloss as 'wine which is offered'. It derives from the Turkic word *ötüg*, meaning 'prayer, request to a superior.' In the Mongol world,

ötök was a formal invitation to drink, performed according to specific rules.[154] The importance of this ceremony is evident in some of the discussions of it in the *SHM*. In one instance, Chinggis' half-brother Belgütei was banned from participating in the *ötök* after letting slip Mongol battle plans to their enemies.[155] On another occasion, during the western campaign of 1236, strife arose between Chinggisid lineages due to perceived contravention of norms surrounding the *ötök*. Büri, a Chaghadaid prince, and Güyük, Ögödei's eldest son, became angry at Batu, the eldest son of Jochi, for partaking of the *ötök* before them. Although he was said to be the eldest of the Mongol princes on this campaign, as acknowledged by Ögödei, the two princes seem to have been questioning Batu's lineage due to his father Jochi's illegitimacy.[156] This slight would not be forgotten, and Batu later had Büri put to death during Möngke's reign. It was also a significant honour to be a part of, and participation in it was given to those who were elevated to *darqan* status, such as Sorghan Shira of the Suldus.[157] Clearly, this ceremony was not to be taken lightly.[158]

Returning to our Persian author, Rashīd al-Dīn does not use this word with its Mongol meaning, but does on one occasion use it with meaning of a request to a superior, when the official Majd al-Mulk writes a petition (*ötügī*) to Abaqa Khan protesting his treatment by Shams al-Dīn Juvainī.[159] Given that Rashīd al-Dīn is not shy in using Mongol terminology throughout his work, it seems likely that overall he prefers the Persian calque (*kāsa-gīrī*) of the term *ötök* in its meaning as wine given at ceremonial occasions. For many of the instances of *kāsa dāshtan/giriftan* in his work, it refers to a notable incident such as a banquet, an official meeting or a change of allegiance.[160] Consider, for example, the acclamation of Möngke as *qa'an*:

> تمامت شهزادگان و نویnان به موافقت کمر گشاده و کلاه برداشته زانو زدندن , و باتو کاسه گرفت و خانی را در محل خویش قرار داد *Tamāmat-i shahzādigān va nūyanān ba muvāfiqat kamar gushāda va kulāh bar-dāshta zānū zadand, va bātū kāsa girift va khānī rā dar maḥal-i khvīsh qarār dād.*[161]

[154] SHM/de Rachewiltz, Vol. I, 'Philological Commentary', Vol. I, p. 573. The hierarchies and complex social relations around drinking rituals are addressed by Sòng envoys to the Mongols in the 1220s and 1230s, Zhao Gong 'A Memorandum on the Mong-Tatars', pp. 90-2; Peng Daya and Xu Ting, 'A Sketch of the Black Tatars', pp. 100, 113, both found in C.P. Atwood, *The Rise of the Mongols: Five Chinese Sources*, (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2021).
[155] SHM/de Rachewiltz, Vol. I, §154, pp. 77-8.
[156] Idem, §275-§276, pp. 206-7. Orda was also in attendance, but is not mentioned in this context.
[157] Atwood, *Encyclopedia of Mongolia*, p. 133; SHM/de Rachewiltz, §219, p. 149. It is unclear if this occurred with all of those who received *darqan* status, or if this was a specific case.
[158] Judith Kolbas believes that these rituals governed the social cohesion of the ruling elite and were key in ensuring loyalty, J. Kolbas, 'A Dirham for Your Drinking Cup: Calculating Monetary Value', in (eds.) T. May, D. Bayarsaikhan, C.P. Atwood, *New Approaches to Ilkhanid History*, (Leiden: Brill, 2021), p. 198.
[159] RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, p. 986. اوتوگی
[160] RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, p. 603, Vol. II, p. 952; RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 330, Vol. III, p. 525.
[161] RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, p. 731.

> All the princes and *noyan*s together removed their belts, took off their caps and knelt. Batu offered wine and put the khanate in its rightful place.

The term could also have retained both meanings of *ötüg/ötök* together, given the supplicatory nature of the instances of *kāsa dāshtan/giriftan* and the fact that they appear at times alongside *tikishmīshī*. Therefore, I tentatively propose that the Persian phrase is used by Rashīd al-Dīn where the *SHM* uses *ötök* and that the two ceremonies being described are one and the same. It seems that this ceremony could also be included in the performance of *tikishmīshī*, but it was not done in exclusively this context.

2.3.6 *Tikishmīshī* and Submission

We have seven quite interesting cases of the usage of the word *tikishmīshī* which do not seem to fit the idea of an affirmation of loyalty to one's ruler (Appendix 2, cases 26-32, pp. 204-5). Significantly, all seven are applied to Ghazan, Rashīd al-Dīn's patron and sovereign. Five of these relate to the period of Ghazan's power play against the Ilkhan Baidu (cases 27-31). In three of the cases (29-31), Baidu voluntarily sends a member or members of his retinue to Ghazan, and this person(s) promptly performs *tikishmīshī* to the young prince. If we look at the status of the people who were sent, it seems highly unlikely that Baidu willingly had them submit to Ghazan. One of them was Baidu's own son, Qipchaq, another was one of his key amirs, Doladai, and the last was his herald, Na'uldar. It is clear from the text that Baidu is not submitting to Ghazan, but rather seeking to delay him and turn him back towards Khurasan. In another instance (case 26), during Gaykhatu's reign, he sends his son Anbarchi, as well as three influential amirs, Doladai (who as we can see later served Baidu), Qunchuqbal, and Il Temür to reinforce the army of Khurasan, when they perform *tikishmīshī* to Ghazan. It seems likely that the prince and the amirs were simply acknowledging Ghazan's governorship of Khurasan, and not deserting the Ilkhan Gaykhatu. We have seen with regard to the Ögödeid prince Qipchaq that one could perform *tikishmīshī* to a Chinggisid who was not a khan. Cases 27 and 28 relate to the submission of Nawrūz to Ghazan, despite the fact that Ghazan was not yet the Ilkhan. With these six uses of the word, perhaps Rashīd al-Dīn is simply retrojecting Ghazan's rule to render that of his predecessor, Baidu's, illegitimate.[162]

[162] Khwāndamīr/Thackston, p. 81 claims that Ghazan still saw Baidu as his *aqa* however, and it was only Baidu's plot to kill Ghazan that rendered Ghazan willing to overthrow him.

The last instance (case 31) is perhaps the most puzzling. Rashīd al-Dīn claims that envoys from both the Mamluks and the Jochid khan Toqto'a came to court in 1303 and performed *tikishmīshī* to Ghazan, by now the recognised Ilkhan. Given that neither the Mamluks nor the Jochids ever acknowledged or accepted Ilkhanid suzerainty, what are we to make of this claim? That the Jochids gave great gifts on the occasion of this embassy to Ghazan is confirmed by Vaṣṣāf, who claims that they brought 21 gyrfalcons, to which Ghazan responded with a pearl worth 1000 dinars for each bird. However, Vaṣṣāf also notes that this embassy was sent by Toqto'a to claim the lands of Arran and Azerbaijan which were his by right of Chinggis' dispensation, Map 3.[163] Vaṣṣāf does not use the term *tikishmīshī* here, though he does elsewhere in his work.[164] Given these instances, we may decide, as Doerfer does, to translate this term as simply gift-giving to the khan.[165] However, the preponderance of the usage of this word in accompanying submission means that if we accept this definition, a caveat must be added that it almost always denotes subservience and submission (at least within the Ilkhanid historical works).



Map 3: Chinggis' dispensation to his four sons by Börte. This map is found in *Making Mongol History* (2019), reproduced here with the kind permission of its author, Stefan Kamola.

[163] Vaṣṣāf/Iqbāl, pp. 398-401; Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, pp. 240-2; Allsen, *Steppe and the Sea*, p. 25.
[164] Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente,* p. 170.
[165] Idem, pp. 531-533.

Another possible option is that Rashīd al-Dīn sought to denigrate the Jochids and the Mamluks as mere vassals of the Ilkhanate, paralleling the usage of the word for Baidu's envoys to Ghazan. Qiu Yihao in his work on Mongol diplomacy and gift-giving claims that the Mongols saw all gifts from foreign rulers as tribute.[166] This, I believe, is a misunderstanding of Mongol diplomatic practice. The Mongols were perfectly aware when a foreign ruler was submissive or not, and when their gifts were tribute or formed part of the normal communication between rulers. Take for example, Juvainī's account of the Mongols' treatment of the Ismāʿīlī ruler Rukn al-Dīn Khūrshāh in 1256. This ruler, who tried to delay his surrender for as long as possible, sent several of his relatives to Hülegü, and even gave gifts to Hülegü which were accepted, before he eventually went on to Möngke's court. However, Rukn al-Dīn's submission was rejected, and he was not allowed to perform *tikishmīshī* or give gifts, due to his failure to destroy fortresses that Möngke had requested him to destroy.[167] The Mongols clearly understood the significance of this type of gift-giving, and would not let its significance be downgraded by a ruler who had failed to meet the requirements of submission.

Vaṣṣāf's account of the embassy from Toqto'a is also nothing we would not expect to see of communications between rulers who saw themselves as equal. Toqto'a sends valuable gifts to help improve the chances of the embassy's success, though extremely unlikely, and Ghazan responds with equally worthy gifts, but also a very firm 'thanks, but no thanks'. That the Mongols could *choose* to interpret gifts from foreign rulers as tribute is in no doubt, when it served their political ends. The experiences of William of Rubruck on his journey to Qara Qorum, as well as the well-known exchanges with the Pope are indicative of this political posturing.[168] The Mongols' military successes were their backing for their often extremely arrogant diplomatic style. Other Eurasian rulers were well aware of these victories however, so they were usually forced to play the Mongols' game. Rashīd al-Dīn's very different account of Toqto'a's (and the Mamluks') embassies could be another example of such diplomacy. The use of this word may also have been an attempt to coddle his patron and elevate his reputation for posterity, if we choose to accept that *tikishmīshī* necessarily involved acknowledgment of the receiver's suzerainty.

Tikishmīshī therefore was a crucial element in the performance of loyalty and obeisance. Scholars have not addressed this issue on the whole, but one who does is Stefan Kamola. Kamola argues that the *ṣāḥib-dīvān* of the province of Khurasan under the governors Chin Temür and Arghun Aqa, Bahā' al-Dīn Juvainī (father of the illustrious Juvainī brothers), performed *tikishmīshī* to Arghun

[166] Q. Yihao, 'Gift-Exchange in Diplomatic Practices during the Early Mongol Period', *Eurasian Studies*, Vol. 17 (2019), p. 208.
[167] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, pp. 713-717, 724.
[168] A.J. Watson, 'Mongol inhospitality, or how to do more with less? Gift giving in William of Rubruck's *Itinerarium', Journal of Medieval History*, Vol. 37, (2011), pp. 90-101.

Aqa in the region of the Amul on the latter's return from the court of Güyük in the winter of 1247/8. Kamola states that through this ceremony, Bahā' al-Dīn showed his personal loyalty to Arghun Aqa.[169] While Kamola is absolutely correct in showing the importance of the ritual of *tikishmīshī* in establishing loyalty ties in the Mongol world, the devil is in the details here. Kamola's source for this story is none other than Bahā al-Dīn's son and Arghun Aqa's personal secretary, ʿAṭā-Malik Juvainī. It is worth reproducing this section in full to understand what is happening here:

> چون بخدود آمل رسید پدرم با اموال و نفایس مرصعات و جواهر که ترتیب کرده بود از ممالک اذربیجان برسید و فرش و بسط و آلات مجالس با آن ضم گردانید و یک دو روز جشن ساخت
> *chun bi-hudūd-i āmul rasīd pidaram bā amvāl va nafāyis-i muraṣṣʿāt va javāhir ki tartīb karda būd az mamālik-i azirbayjān birasīd va farsh va busuṭ va ālāt-i majālis bā ān żamm gardānīd va yik du rūz jashn sākht*.[170]
>
> When he (Arghun Aqa) reached the Amul country my father came to meet him with all kinds of valuables, jewel-studded objects and precious stones which he had prepared in Azerbaijan. To these he added rugs and carpets and all the paraphernalia of banqueting, and for a day or two he held a feast.[171]

While Bahā' al-Dīn brings gifts that would be wholly appropriate for the ritual of *tikishmīshī*, Juvainī does not use that word himself. As this section has shown, the performance of this ritual was directed at Chinggisid rulers, and not at non-Chinggisid officials, no matter their status. Juvainī does use the word for Arghun Aqa and other officials of the realm in his following section on Arghun's attendance on Möngke Qa'an, saying that they 'received the honour of performing *tikishmīshī*' (شرف تکشمیشی یافت, *sharaf-i tikishmīshī yāft*).[172] As I have shown above, the Mongols were very protective of this ritual and would not allow it to be performed if the right conditions were not met and it had to be performed to the right people.[173] Therefore, Bahā' al-Dīn was taking part in the common ritual of gift-giving to a superior to show obedience and loyalty, but this was not part of the very specific ceremony of *tikishmīshī* to a supreme ruler, whose symbolic power would be significantly reduced if the Mongols allowed it to be performed to a non-Chinggisid official.

[169] Kamola, *Making Mongol History*, pp. 14, 16.
[170] Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. II, p. 247.
[171] Juvaini/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 511, Boyle's translation.
[172] Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. II, p. 253.
[173] See above p. 44.

2.3.7 The Usage of *Uljamīshī*

Uljamīshī appears in the *Tārīkh-i Mubārak-i Ghāzānī* 19 times, with two repeated stories, meaning that we have 17 unique occurrences of the word (Appendix 3). The receiver of this action was a Chinggisid *qa'an* on 11 occasions and to a Chinggisid regional ruler on four occasions. The other two occasions are notable. The first (case 7, p. 206) is the attempt of the deputies of the city of Jungdu to bribe Chinggis' representatives there and perform *uljamīshī* to them. The two amirs who accepted this, Önggür Ba'urchi and Harqai Qasar, were punished for their actions, while Shigi Qutuqu, who refused, was rewarded. The other (case 13) is when the rulers of the Bulghars and Alans of the Qipchaq steppe submitted to the Mongols. Rashīd al-Dīn states that they performed *uljamīshī* to the princes present on the western campaign of 1236. He is not specific but given who participated in this, a regional ruler, Batu, as well as two future *qa'an*s, Güyük and Möngke, we can assume that as Ögödei's representatives on this campaign, nothing was remiss in performing *uljamīshī* to these princes. In six cases, the performer was clearly already a subject of the *qa'an*/ruler in question, while in the other 11 cases, the performer was either not yet a subject of that *qa'an*/ruler, or was portrayed as in rebellion. We have specific gifts listed for four of these occurrences. There are also four cases where *uljamīshī* was met with *soyurghamīshī* by the ruler.

We should certainly not overstate the case for this term's relevance. In the Raushan edition of some 1300+ pages, this word is used only 19 times. However, if we look at some of the instances when it is used, we can see that they are often quite important moments in the development of the Mongol Empire: the submission of foreign rulers, the handing over of key cities, and the return of Mongol figures to the fold of 'obedience' after a period of 'rebellion'. We can certainly see some similarities to the concept of *tikishmīshī*, though there do appear to be some differences. The first is one of usage. While Rashīd al-Dīn uses the term *tikishmīshī* some 11 times during Ghazan's reign, he never uses the term *uljamīshī*. Given that this was the period Rashīd al-Dīn himself was most familiar with and wrote the most about, we can surmise that at least under Ghazan, the performance of *uljamīshī* became less frequent. We can only speculate as to why this may have been; perhaps due to the similar nature of the two rituals, one became predominant or perhaps that some ritual aspect of the performance of *uljamīshī* did not conform to Ghazan's (or Rashīd al-Dīn's) religious sensibilities.

The other differences are somewhat speculative, but clear separation of these ceremonial acts is not straightforward. From a statistical point of view, only around a fifth of the mentions of *uljamīshī* include a gift elaborated by Rashīd al-Dīn. For *tikishmīshī*, it is just under half of the mentions which mention a gift (Appendix 2). The importance of gift-giving in Mongol culture may mean that Rashīd al-Dīn simply did not mention the specific type of gift in all cases, and that they

were ubiquitous. Here the semantics are perhaps important. While *tikishmīshī* is based on the Turkic word *tegiš*, meaning 'exchange', the term *uljamīshī*, comes from the Mongol verb *a'ulja*, 'to visit, meet, or greet'.[174] However, as we can see from instances of the verb *a'ulja* in the *SHM*, this meeting was often accompanied by gifts such as one's own children as servants, horses, exotic birds or furs.[175] The relatively small size of the dataset and the similarities of gift-giving practices in both therefore do not allow us to delineate the two on these grounds.[176]

Another difference may be the reason behind the actor's performance of one or the other ritual. If we look at the cases of *uljamīshī* performed by 'subjects' of the ruler, several of them seem to have been after a misdeed of that subject in some form. The last two cases (Appendix 3) apply to Arghun's reign and to two characters whose links to those who had challenged Arghun's rule were not forgiven. The first was Shams al-Dīn Juvainī, whose long support for Aḥmad Tegüder and the accusations of embezzlement against him saw him disgraced. He sought to perform *uljamīshī*, which Arghun accepted initially, but later changed his mind and had the vizier executed.[177] The other character was one Ayachi, a son of the extremely important amir and vizier Buqa. Buqa's 'rebellion' against Arghun was put down heavy-handedly, but the amir Toghan attempted to intercede on Ayachi's behalf so he could perform *uljamīshī*. Arghun rejected this, as he sought to eradicate Buqa's family and supporters.[178]

If this fault/penance theory is tenable, then case 14 (Appendix 3, p. 206) needs to be considered. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Chinggis' sons performed *uljamīshī* to him in the summer of 1223. Which sons were part of this is somewhat unclear due to Rashīd al-Dīn's phrasing, as the line preceding this mention speaks about Chaghadai and Ögödei only, while the line after mentions both of these princes and Tolui as well. This case is, however, a repeat of cases 9 and 10, where Tolui separately, and then Chaghadai and Ögödei together perform *uljamīshī*. Rashīd al-Dīn in neither of these stories indicates a link between an action of the princes and their performance of *uljamīshī*, but in both he does mention problems in the princes' conquest of Khwarazm immediately preceding, which is echoed in the *SHM*. For Rashīd al-Dīn, the issue lay simply in a dispute between Chaghadai

[174] Clauson, *Etymological Dictionary*, p. 488. Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente,* pp. 169, 531-3.
[175] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §137, pp. 59-60; §239, p. 164.
[176] According to Doerfer, they are mentioned together in Qazvīnī as well, Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente*, p. 170.
[177] Khwāndamīr, *Habibu's-Siyar: Tome Three*, *Part One, Genghis Khan- Amir Temür*, (trans. and ed.) W. M. Thackston, (Cambridge, MA: The Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, Harvard University, 1994), p. 71 (hereafter Khwāndamīr/Thackston) states that Shams al-Dīn only returned to court in order to save his sons from death, but in fact they were executed anyway.
[178] Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 233; Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 140. See Hope, *Power, Politics and Tradition*, pp. 136-142. This case is very similar to the Nawrūz/Ghazan dynamic mentioned above, where an amir has become too powerful and the Ilkhan has to find a way to remove them.

and Jochi, which Chinggis solved by putting Ögödei in charge, who made peace between his elder brothers and they took the city of Urgench (often called Khwarazm in the sources).[179] The *SHM* attributes a much more serious crime to Jochi, Chaghadai and Ögödei; they split the booty of the city amongst themselves and did not give a share to Chinggis. Chinggis was furious and refused to see them for three days, with his commanders having to intervene on the sons' behalf so that he would forgive them and show them favour once again.[180] The discrepancies between the accounts, including the presence of either Jochi or Tolui, or neither, do not allow us to state definitively what occurred here, but the similarities do seem to indicate that this was the same incident, where Chinggis' sons had to be chastised by Chinggis for their actions.

There is a possible connection to another ritual here that is elaborated by Lhamsuren Munkh-Erdene. He describes the usage of the word *čimar* in the SHM, saying that it was both a grievance and a penalty which emerged from the breaking of an oath, more specifically 'a […] meaning of penalty or reparation, one derived from a grievance that arose from a violation of commonly accepted norms and, especially, of a formal relationship such as a treaty'.[181] Thus, in §106-108 of the SHM*,* Jamuqa reproached his superior Toghril Khan for failing to adhere to their agreement by being three days late for a planned attack on the Merkit. Toghril acknowledged Jamuqa's grievance and told him it was up to him to punish Toghril as he would.[182] This penalty was called *čimar*. This is relevant to the above case, as it is also the term used for the grievance caused to Chinggis Khan by his three sons, Jochi, Chaghadai, and Ögödei. Munkh-Erdene explains that 'Chinggis Khan berated them with or by *cimar* and *söyü*', *söyü* meaning punishment.[183] In this case then, Chinggis' sons had committed a grievous offence against their father, breaking their oaths or transgressing the *törü*. Perhaps it was only through the process of *uljamīshī* that the brothers could atone for their error. It would be satisfying to connect these two rituals, *čimar* and *uljamīshī*, more consistently, but without a greater amount of correlation we cannot be certain. This isolated incident is fascinating, however, and does seem to indicate that *uljamīshī* had connotations of penance.

Tikishmīshī however, could also be performed as a sort of penance. In cases 7, 11 and 14 (Appendix 2, p. 203) we see how Chinggisid princes in rebellion or who had committed some misdeed performed this ritual and were brought back into the fold. Therefore we cannot immediately split the two ceremonies on this basis either. What does seem clear however is that

[179] For more on the confused narrative about this incident, see C. Atwood, 'Jochi and the Early Western Campaigns', in (ed.) M. Rossabi, *How Mongolia Matters: War, Law, and Society*, (Leiden: Brill, 2017), pp. 35-56.
[180] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §260, pp. 192-3.
[181] Munkh-Erdene, 'Rise of the Chinggisid Dynasty', pp 48-9.
[182] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §106-108, pp. 38-9; Munkh-Erdene, 'Rise of the Chinggisid Dynasty', p. 48.
[183] Munkh-Erdene, 'Rise of the Chinggisid Dynasty', p. 49.

tikishmīshī was performed regularly by subjects of the *qa'an*/regional ruler, without any attachment of guilt or blame to their actions. In many cases, this occurred on the accession of a new ruler, or simply to periodically renew one's loyalty obligations to the sitting ruler. The two performances were separate at one time and had different meanings and rituals attached to them. If we look at case 14 (Appendix 2, p. 203) and case 15 (Appendix 3, p. 207), we see that Ariq Böke performed *tikishmīshī* to Qubilai in 1264, and then only after many trials of his officers and amirs, as well as his own trial alongside Asutai (a son of Möngke), in 1266 the two Chinggisids were permitted to perform *uljamīshī*. As Rashīd al-Dīn gives no clear distinction what the differences between the two rituals were and for exactly what reasons, for now we must treat them as similar but distinct, until further information comes to light, perhaps via other sources.

2.4 Conclusion

Present in all three of these terms (*soyurghamīshī, tikishmīshī*, and *uljamīshī*) is some notion of gift-giving, a notion as important in Mongol society as it was and is in many others. However, while many works on gift-giving and gift exchange in European history exist, this is still a largely underdeveloped field with regard to the eastern side of Eurasian history. A notable step in the right direction was the 2011 publication of *Gifts of the Sultan*, a compendium of articles from an art historical perspective focusing on gifts in a (mostly) Middle Eastern context.[184] While this work covers many regimes and lands, sadly there is no chapter on Mongol gift exchange. We are indebted in this regard to the late Thomas Allsen for two of his works which focus on specific commodities and how they played a role in gift exchange; namely *nasīj* (cloth-of-gold) and pearls.[185] Also in 2019, Qiu Yihao published an article specifically dealing with gift-giving in Mongol diplomatic practices.[186] With these works, as well as myriad mentions of the importance of gift exchange found in studies covering different aspects of the Mongol world, we have some understanding of the topic. More, however, could certainly be done on this. A work analysing the social and political implications of gift-giving across pre-modern Eurasia, such as exists for western European history, would be invaluable in understanding the greater framework and cultural context of Mongol gifting.[187]

[184] L. Komaroff, *Gifts of the Sultan: The Arts of Giving at the Islamic Courts*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011).
[185] For *nasīj*, Allsen, *Commodity and exchange, passim*; for pearls, Allsen, *Steppe and the Sea, passim.*
[186] Yihao, 'Gift-Exchange in Diplomatic Practices', pp. 202-227.
[187] G. Algazi, V. Groebner, and B. Jussen, *Negotiating the Gift: Pre-Modern Figurations of Exchange* (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003).

Nonetheless, what is remarkable about the usage of these words is that they inherently link gift-giving, and its attendant rituals, to expressions of loyalty. This is not new or exclusive to the Mongols, but these three terms seem to convey a double meaning. The first is that of giving a gift, in the case of *soyurghamīshī*, from a ruler to a subject, and in the other two cases, of a subject to a ruler. The second, and more complex meaning, is an affirmation, or perhaps reaffirmation, of the loyalty bonds tying together ruler and subject in a Mongol context. These loyalty bonds were determined often in the form of verbal oaths, later replaced by written ones, called by Juvainī *khaṭ*, while Rashīd al-Dīn used the Mongol word *möchelge*, later taken up by the Safavids as well.[188] These oaths articulated the idea of the *yeke törü* or *yeke yosun*, the so-called 'great principle' mentioned by the *SHM* and Rashīd al-Dīn.[189] This great principle seemingly determined what was expected of a subject to his lord; namely service and fealty, and furthermore, the lord's obligation to his subject; protection and reward. These terms therefore are understood better as the lord fulfilling his duty to a faithful servant (*soyurghamīshī*), a previously recalcitrant 'subject' acknowledging their submission to their new lord and pledging fealty (*uljamīshī*), and the affirmation or reaffirmation of a subject's loyalty to their lord (*tikishmīshī*).

These terms help us to understand how these two Persian historians sought to convey Mongol customs and their ideas about loyalty to their audiences. They also frame to a large extent how we understand the Mongols, given these histories' comprehensiveness and accessibility. The fact that these terms, while they are not used to a very large degree, came to be used by later Timurid historians as well indicates the influence that they had. That they also even passed into Armenian to some extent shows that those ruled by the Mongols began to incorporate Mongol ideas of loyalty into their own languages and cultures. These ideas remained powerful in dynasties which succeeded the Mongols in the Middle East and Central Asia. Getting to grips with some of the concepts which these historians sought to explain gives us a firmer footing on which to base our discussions of Mongol loyalty. A pursuit of these terms in other important source languages such as Chinese or Armenian would certainly complement this study in order to see how historians of the various traditions sought to incorporate Mongol customs into their own history and language.

[188] Hope, '*El* and *Bulqa'*, pp. 2, 7-8; Manz, 'Binding pledge', pp. 10-11. These written oaths tended to be given on the occasion of a ruler's accession, 'as was customary (determined/fixed)' RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 548; *chinānki ma'hūd ast*, RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, p. 995. They did not seem to have been given in cases of *tikishmīshī/uljamīshī*.

[189] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §208, p. 141 and 'Philological Commentary', Vol. II, p. 791; Called by Rashīd al-Dīn *yūsūn-i buzurg*, RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 224; RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, p. 402.

3. Actors and Objects of Loyalty

3.1 Introduction

In Chapter One we established, based on Welsford's work, our categories of loyalty, namely: charismatic, clientelist, inertial, communal, and idealistic loyalties. In Chapter Two we came to a better understanding of how the Persian source material understood Mongol loyalty. We must now determine to whom actors performed loyalty in the early Mongol world, what I have termed the 'objects of loyalty'. In this list, I include more than simply claimants to the throne as Welsford does, as I believe that to understand the complex issues at stake with regards to loyalty in the Mongol world, we must accept that there were many candidates for people's loyalties, whether they be people, institutions, or ideals. For objects of loyalty, I will rely on those established in my 2021 article, 'The Objects of Loyalty in the Early Mongol Empire (Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries)'.[1] This list is by no means comprehensive, and focuses specifically on political loyalties. For the pre-imperial Mongol world, in this article I selected three objects of loyalty: the rightful lord, the *törü*, and the khan. For the imperial Mongols, I chose eight objects: the *qa'an/qaghan*, Chinggis or Chinggis' legacy, the previous *qa'an*, the *jasaq*, the regent, the *quriltai*, the *aqa* and the lord/khatun of the *ulus*.[2]

For actors in the 13th century, loyalties were often expected to multiple of these objects simultaneously, so our examples will consider how and why a certain loyalty may have won out, and the different points of view which frame our understanding of these loyalty decisions. Given that some of the objects mentioned are more abstract, here I will focus on the personal objects of loyalty: the khan, *qa'an*, regent, *aqa, quriltai*, and lord or khatun of the *ulus*.[3] The other objects mentioned

[1]Jones, 'The Objects of Loyalty', pp. 1-25.

[2] The regional objects of loyalty will be dealt with in the next chapter.

[3] In this discussion, the institution of the *keshig* is not addressed, as it was not an object of loyalty itself, though naturally it was a key location where personal loyalties to specific Chinggisids was engendered. For more on this important institution, see C. Melville, 'The Keshig in Iran: The Survival of the Royal Mongol Household', in (ed.) L. Komaroff, *Beyond the Legacy of Genghis Khan,* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 135-16; C.P. Atwood, 'Ulus Emirs, Keshig Elders, Signatures, and Marriage Partners: The Evolution of a Classic Mongol Institution', in (ed.) D. Sneath, *Imperial Statecraft: Political Forms and Techniques of Governance in Inner Asia, Sixth-Twentieth Centuries*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 141-174; C. Beckwith, *Empires of the Silk Road: a history of Central Asia from the Bronze Age to the present*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Favereau, *The Horde*, Chapter 3, pp. 102-6.

will be considered as part of idealistic loyalty decisions. In analysing these objects, we will come to a better understanding of the dynamics of Mongol politics. The cultural and societal framework which provide the backdrop for these loyalty decisions will also be illuminated through this consideration.

Before delving into our objects, let us consider an 'ideal' case study in the early Mongol period, where reasons for loyalty decisions are spelled out in our source material. This is the case of the Je'üriyet sub-group of Mongols, descended from another son of Chinggis' ancestor Tumina.[4] In an episode recounted by both Rashīd al-Dīn and the *YS*, the Je'üriyet, who were followers of Temüjin's relatives and rivals, the Tayichi'ut, complained about their masters' treatment of them and went over to Temüjin's side at some point in the late 12th century.[5] The issues in the source material notwithstanding, we are provided with a fascinating to and fro by our Persian and Chinese interlocutors which highlights the different loyalty considerations of the Je'üriyet.[6] The first mentioned by Rashīd al-Dīn was the Je'üriyet's fear of Temüjin after his defeat of the Tayichi'ut and his boiling of 70 enemies in 70 cauldrons.[7] Here we have their inertial loyalty to their previous masters being undermined. The danger to them from a resurgent Temüjin may have been greater than that represented by their masters should they decide to change their loyalties. At this point, the Je'üriyet moved their tents closer to Temüjin, already a significant social and political step.[8]

The subsequent event which highlighted Temüjin's suitability as a leader mentioned by both sources was a hunt in which Temüjin and his followers participated alongside the Je'üriyet. In the course of this hunt, Temüjin gave over a larger share of the game to his guests than they expected, as well as kettles and fodder. In this instance, Temüjin shows himself as a gracious and generous ruler,

---

[4] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 106.

[5] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, pp. 161-2; The History of the Yuan, Chapter 1, (ed. and trans. C.P. Atwood), *Mongolian Studies*, Vol. 39, (2017/18) pp. 10-11. This incident is not mentioned by the *SHM*, which rarely mentions the Je'üriyet. Interestingly, however, the story in Rashīd al-Dīn and the *YS* about the Tayichi'ut attack on Temüjin appears in a very similar form in the *SHM* §129-130, though here it is Jamuqa who is the main aggressor, with the Tayichi'ut not mentioned. The similarities between the stories, e.g. the numbers of troops involved, Temüjin's location on hearing the news, who brought the news to him, and the boiling of 70 people in cauldrons after the battle, indicate these stories relate to the same incident. However, the differences are noteworthy. Most importantly, in Rashīd al-Dīn and the *YS*, Temüjin wins the battle, while in the *SHM* it is Jamuqa who is victorious. The *YS* and Rashīd al-Dīn accounts report the attack as by the Tayichi'ut *and* Jamuqa. The other major discrepancy lies in the perpetrator of the boiling. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, it was Chinggis who boiled 70 seditious enemies, while in the *SHM* it was Jamuqa who boiled 70 princes of the Chinos group, apparently a branch of the Tayichi'ut, though loyal to Temüjin according to RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 102. The boiling episode is not mentioned in the *YS*. The whole incident is a testament to the difficulties of constructing a consistent narrative using several different source traditions for this early period.

[6] According to Christopher Atwood, these two sources both relied on a Mongolian/Chinese text called the *Authentic Chronicles of Chinggis Khan*, a late 13th century production, Atwood, 'Ghazanid Chronicle', pp. 62-65.

[7] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 161. The *SHM*'s version of events sees groups such as the Mangqut and Uru'ut abandon Jamuqa after his boiling of the Chinos, so this type of cruelty could be viewed in very different ways.

[8] Take Temüjin's wife Börte's advice to Temüjin to move away from Jamuqa because he had become a false friend, SHM/de Rachewiltz, §118, p. 46.

playing up to the charismatic loyalties of a group he hoped to win over. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, 'he is a ruler who takes care of his subjects and knows how to command.'[9] In a much more practical sense, the Je'üriyet were given great rewards by Temüjin, while they stated that the Tayichi'ut 'often seize our soldiers and horses, and rob us of our food and drink'.[10] Temüjin therefore shows them the material rewards which would accrue to them should they join him, in the *YS* promising them all the plunder that their cart trails and footprints would reach.[11]

Finally, the Je'üriyet discussed the ethical grounds for deserting their rightful lords, the Tayichi'ut, and joining Chinggis. According to the *YS*, the Je'üriyet justified their abandonment of the Tayichi'ut by claiming that they are 'without any just measure between the people and their lords' and that Temüjin is the only one who keeps to this 'just measure'.[12] This 'just measure' seems to echo the *yeke törü* of the *SHM* or the *yeke yosun* of Rashīd al-Dīn, meaning 'great principle', which defined the relations between a lord and his subjects.[13] The lord's requirements in this view were the providing of protection and reward for one's faithful subjects. Before the introduction of the Chinggisid *jasaq*, it was the *törü*, customary law, which governed political actions. According to the *YS*, the Tayichi'ut's actions constituted a violation of this principle, and their leader Ülük brought his people en masse to submit to Temüjin.[14] At this stage the Je'üriyet could be seen as taking an idealistic standpoint; their masters had broken the great principle, and therefore should be abandoned. Rashīd al-Dīn, however, provides a dissenting voice. Apparently, Ülük (here called Ölüg Bahādūr) discussed the potential action with Maqui Yadana, another of the Je'üriyet, who did not believe the Tayichi'ut had breached this principle significantly, and that the Je'üriyet would be wrong to turn against their *aqa* and *ini* (elder and younger brothers) without just cause. This character was seemingly unable to convince anyone of this standpoint, and Ülük went over to Chinggis with the Je'üriyet leaders, perhaps indicating that whatever the disagreements, communal loyalties saw the whole group act together. Apparently having broken faith with the Tayichi'ut, the Je'üriyet saw no problem in doing so again, abandoning Temüjin at one stage, only to later return to him.[15]

This incident provides a sort of idealised case study in a political loyalty decision. Some of these themes may be tropes, but the dialogue certainly provides us with 'classical' examples of the considerations of the time, with reasons and justifications for actions provided. Many decisions such

[9] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 162.
[10] YS/Atwood, p. 10.
[11] Idem, pp. 10-11.
[12] Idem, p. 10.
[13] Jones, 'The Objects of Loyalty', p. 3; SHM/de Rachewiltz, 'Philological Commentary', Vol. II, pp. 727, 791, 919; Hope, *'El* and *bulqa*', pp. 2-7.
[14] YS/Atwood, p. 10.
[15] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 162; Hope, *El* and *bulqa*, p. 21.

as this were taken in the history of the Mongol Empire, and this snapshot will give us a reference point for further considerations of these loyalty categories.

3.2 The Khan

One of the most powerful narratives presented in the *SHM* was the abandonment of Yisügei's wife and children by his followers and relatives, leaving his young son Temüjin, with his mother Hö'elün, destitute and helpless. This allows for a portrayal of Temüjin as a betrayed khan predestined to greatness, and Hö'elün as the righteous heroine, fighting to win back her husband's supporters and to keep her young sons provided for and out of harm's way. Take the language of the *SHM* in §76: Hö'elün castigates her sons (Temüjin and Jochi Qasar) and stepsons (Bekter and Belgütei) for their bickering, saying 'when we ask ourselves how to take vengeance for the outrage committed by our Tayichi'ut kinsmen, how can you be at odds with each other [?]'.[16] Therefore, the action of the Tayichi'ut kin of Yisügei, by abandoning his children, committed an outrage worthy of vengeance.[17] However, it is important to consider the loyalty decisions of those who went their own way before or upon Yisügei's death, rather than simply accepting the *SHM*'s idea that Temüjin was their rightful lord.

The *SHM* makes a point that the Tayichi'ut moved away from Temüjin and Hö'elün upon Yisügei's death.[18] This is not what Rashīd al-Dīn or the *YS* state however. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, the Mongols under Yisügei and the Tayichi'ut were at times at war, at times at peace. One Adal Khan, a descendant of Ambaqai Khan (a previous leader of the Tayichi'ut), had supported Yisügei, but his son Tarqutai Qiriltuq did not.[19] This is roughly the story in the *YS* as well, saying that the two had at times been friendly, but under Tarqutai, they had no contact with each other whatsoever.[20] Even if we accept that the Tayichi'ut fought alongside Yisügei during his lifetime, then abandoned his family

[16] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §76, p. 20.
[17] As noted by Morris Rossabi however, loyalties on the steppe at this stage were quite personal, thus, one followed a leader until they showed themselves as ineffective or violating the bond between ruler and servant, or they died. There was no real abstract loyalty to a Mongol 'nation' at this stage, M. Rossabi, 'The Legacy of the Mongols', in (ed.) B. Manz, *Central Asia in Historical Perspective*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 31.
[18] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §70-73, pp. 17-18.
[19] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, pp. 100-1. However, in the section on Chinggis' life, Rashīd al-Dīn tells a story similar to that of the *SHM*, whereby the Tayichi'ut are friendly and obedient during Yisügei's life, but manifested hostility after he died, RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 153. See Atwood, 'Ghazanid Chronicle' for the discrepancies between the 'tribal' section and the life of Chinggis.
[20] YS/Atwood, p. 9.

after his death, this does not mean that they had elected Yisügei as their khan.[21] This is apparent in the titles that were used for Yisügei, *ba'atur* (the Mongolian term for brave or valiant) in the *SHM*, and *bahādur* in Rashīd al-Dīn.[22] Rashīd al-Dīn's terms for Yisügei's leadership are *ḥākim*, *sarvar*, *pīshvā*, *muqaddam* (all meaning something like leader or ruler), never *khan/qa'an*, though he states that Yisügei was 'firmly entrenched as *emperor* of his own *peoples*' (در پادشاهی اقوام خود متمکن بوده, *dar pādishāhī-yi aqvām-i khud mutimakkin būda*).[23] Rashīd al-Dīn elsewhere states that the Tayichi'ut chose their own rulers on the whole, and given that we have met a descendent of Ambaqai titled Adal *Khan*, there seems no reason to believe that the Tayichi'ut had made any formal commitments to Yisügei as their ruler or khan.[24]

Even if we were to accept that Yisügei was a khan, we certainly cannot expect Temüjin to have asserted a role like this at this juncture. There were periods where no khan was appointed, and previous successions had not been linear. Chinggis' ancestor Qabul Khan was succeeded by a lateral relative, Ambaqai Khan, forefather of the Tayichi'ut. Ambaqai himself was succeeded by a son of Qabul Khan, Qutula Khan (Figure 3). Apparently both of these transfers had been according to the will of the previous ruler, eschewing their own sons.[25] If Yisügei did become a khan, this position had previously been his uncle Qutula's. Temüjin himself was nine or thirteen when his father died.[26] None of our sources claim any sort of 'will' for Yisügei appointing Temüjin, as the SHM does for both Qabul and Ambaqai. Rashīd al-Dīn claims that when Yisügei's followers considered him a mere child, they left him.[27] While all of our sources speak of abandonment, rebellion and outrage, none of them go to any great lengths to portray Temüjin as the rightful successor of his forefathers, nor seek to make Yisügei a khan.

---

[21] J. Holmgren 'Observations on Marriage and Inheritances Practices in Early Mongol and Yuan Society, with Particular Reference to the Levirate', *Journal of Asian History*, Vol. 20, (1986), p. 134.

[22] According to de Rachewiltz, this was a common epithet for those of noble lineage and tribal chiefs, SHM/de Rachewiltz, 'Philological Commentary', Vol. I, p. 292.

[23] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, pp. 152-3; RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, pp. 284-5. Thackston's translation with italicised words as my own interpretation. Rashīd al-Dīn was never recalcitrant with backdating the term 'khan' either, doing so for Chinggisid princes such as Tolui and Batu, see H. Kim, '울루스인가 칸국인가 — 몽골제국의 카안과 칸 칭호의 분석을 중심으로 —' ('*Ulus* or *Khanate*?: An Analysis of the Titles of *qa'an* and *khan* in the Mongol Empire'), in 중앙아시아연구 21권2호 (*Central Asian Studies,* Vol. 21, No. 2,) (December 2016), pp. 1-29.

[24] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, pp. 100-1.

[25] According to SHM/de Rachewiltz, §48-57, pp. 10-13, there are differing stories in Rashīd al-Dīn and the *YS*, though the point that sons were not chosen as successors holds.

[26] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §66-68, pp. 15-16 says 9; RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 144 says 13. L. Moses, 'Triplicated Triplets', p. 290 indicates that the *SHM* may be interjecting the symbolic number nine to make the events of Chinggis' life more momentous.

[27] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 144.



Figure 3: Temüjin's Ancestors © Tobias Jones

What does this mean for the loyalty choices of these characters? For starters, the Tayichi'ut look to have gone their own way during Yisügei's majority in any case. They were descended from a khan, Ambaqai, themselves, and at this stage felt under no moral obligation to remain with Yisügei's family.[28] His death and his children's youth at this time could not have improved these prospects. There would seem to be little benefit in following this child of a minor warlord, and indeed may have been dangerous, as other hostile groups in the area such as the Tatars may have capitalised on what would have been seen as weakness. There may have been some charismatic loyalty decisions, but this was based not on Temüjin's charisma, but rather on his mother Hö'elün's. It was she, according to all three sources, who commanded the loyalty of her husband's followers, and took up his standard and brought back half of those who had left.[29] It was Hö'elün who ensured that Temüjin

[28] From a more anthropological standpoint, Sharon Bastug in her study on 'Altaic' lineages states 'Groups "mass" on the basis of genealogical closeness as necessary to respond to specific challenges or threats and dissolve when no longer needed.' S. Bastug, 'Tribe, Confederation and State among Altaic Nomads of the Asian Steppes', in (ed.) K. Erturk, *Rethinking Central Asia: Non-Eurocentric Studies in History, Social Structure and Identity*, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1999), p. 85. We can see this in action with both the Tayichi'ut here vis-à-vis the Tatar and Temüjin's closer blood relatives with regards to the Tayichi'ut below,

[29] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §73, p. 18; RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, pp. 144, 159; YS/Atwood, pp. 9-10.

had any followers whatsoever.[30] The Tayichi'ut had very few reasons, whether moral or opportunistic, to stand by Temüjin, let alone choose him as a khan, and he could hardly be described as their rightful lord, as we have shown above.[31]

For other relatives in Temüjin's immediate family, there may have been an expectation that they would be of greater support to Yisügei's family than the more distantly related Tayichi'ut, who had long been considered a separate ruling house. The most important of Temüjin's male relatives were his grandfather Bartan Ba'atur's brother's descendants, known as the Yürkin or Jürkin, Sacha Beki and Taichu[32]; a son of Qutula Khan, Altan; a son of Yisügei's older brother Nekün Taishi, Quchar; and Yisügei's younger brother Daritai. All of these family members were senior to Temüjin, and several of them had more noble blood, being descended from those senior to Yisügei himself. It is unclear whether these family members originally stayed with Temüjin or departed with the Tayichi'ut, but they seem to have been allied with him (though perhaps not yet his subjects) by the time of the above-mentioned confrontation with Jamuqa and the Tayichi'ut.[33] In the *SHM*, these characters are first mentioned as decamping from Jamuqa and joining Temüjin, who also departed from Jamuqa at this time on the advice of Börte.[34] At this point, the communal loyalty of the Kiyat Mongol family (descendants of Chinggis' ancestor Qabul Khan) seems apparent. They decided to stick together in opposition to Jamuqa and the Tayichi'ut. Doubtless their self-interest was also at stake, as the Tayichi'ut would clearly be in the ascendancy should the Jürkin and others have remained in their orbit.

The later actions of these relatives of Temüjin are somewhat more difficult to fathom. Despite their own seniority, Altan, Quchar and Sacha Beki apparently discussed and agreed to raise Temüjin as khan.[35] Perhaps this is a similar episode to the later dispute between Chinggis' sons Jochi and Chaghadai as to the succession, whereby they settled on a compromise candidate, their younger brother Ögödei. The elder Kiyat may have been unable to come to an agreement on which of them should lead, and therefore decided for the more junior Temüjin, who they may have hoped to

[30] For more on Hö'elün, see Broadbridge, *Women*, pp. 45-54; B. de Nicola, *Women in Mongol Iran: The Khatuns, 1206-1335* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), pp. 47-8.
[31] See pp. 79-80 of this thesis.
[32] For the issues with the descent of these two characters, see C.P. Atwood, 'Six Pre-Chinggisid Genealogies in the Mongol Empire', *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, Vol. 19, (2012), pp. 5-7.
[33] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 161; YS/Atwood, p. 11. This is the first major battle of Temüjin's career mentioned by these two sources. RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 133 says that Daritai was originally faithful when the Tayichi'ut deserted Temüjin, though after a while Daritai joined them.
[34] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §122, p. 48.
[35] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §123, p. 49; YS/Atwood, p. 19; RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 189. Atwood, 'Six Pre-Chinggisid Genealogies', p. 39 says that the title *beki* implied seniority, thus Sacha Beki was the most senior of the Kiyat Mongols.

control.[36] We can only speculate here, but all of these men at some point distanced themselves from Temüjin, backed other khans and were eventually killed for their actions.[37]

Sacha Beki and the Jürkin departed after a perceived insult by Temüjin's chief steward to Sacha Beki's father's wife Qu'urchin during a drinking ceremony. This incident led to a physical confrontation between the Jürkin and Temüjin's men, with Temüjin's half-brother Belgütei sustaining an injury in the fracas.[38] This was compounded by the Jürkin's failure to appear in a planned campaign against the Tatar. They then attacked and humiliated a group of Temüjin's soldiers sent to recruit them for a campaign against Naiman rebels. Temüjin at this point attacked the Jürkin and captured Sacha Beki and Taichu, who according to the *SHM*, admitted that they broke their oaths to Temüjin and accepted the need for their own execution.[39]

What is interesting about this event is that the *SHM* shows the Jürkin as taking a principled stand against a slight (intended or otherwise) against one of their khatuns. The significance of drinking ceremonies I have already discussed in Chapter Two and this incident seems to fit the pattern of the importance of the protocols behind these ceremonies and the great offence which was taken if precedence was ignored. The sequence of events is somewhat complex, but the meaning is clear. Qu'urchin, who was the chief wife of Sacha Beki's father Qutuqtu and possibly Sacha Beki's own mother, was served her *kumiss* after a junior wife or concubine of Qutuqtu's, Ebegei. Qu'urchin responded by having Temüjin's chief *ba'urchi* (steward) Shiki'ur beaten, who they saw as responsible for the insult. Temüjin's troops promptly seized Qu'urchin and another of Qutuqtu's wives. Though the khatuns were restored to the Jürkin, the insult was not forgiven, as the aforementioned incident with the Tatar shows.[40] The Jürkin seem to have been acting on their idealistic loyalties to the *yosun* which determined seniority in familial relations and rites. It may also be the case that Temüjin, aware of his own junior status, sought to provoke a conflict with rivals to get them out of the way.[41] In any case, the Jürkin are portrayed as betraying their oaths and joining rebels against Temüjin, justifying his execution of his family members.

---

[36] Munkh-Erdene, 'Rise of the Chinggisid Dynasty', p. 52 suggests that it was primarily to oppose Jamuqa's growing power that Temüjin's elder relatives agreed on Temüjin, thinking that as the youngest of them, he could be easily manipulated.

[37] Again, see note 26 and Bastug's analysis of the fusion and fission of groups based on need, and her criticism of theories which assume that close family members naturally stick together in these societies, p. 78.

[38] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §130-2, pp. 54-56; YS/Atwood, p. 11; RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, pp. 163-4.

[39] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §136, p. 59.

[40] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §130, p. 55; YS/Atwood, p. 11; RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, pp. 163-4. I have chosen de Rachewiltz's version of names in this section.

[41] Munkh-Erdene, 'Rise of the Chinggisid Dynasty', p. 52 sees Temüjin's actions as regularly seeking to provoke mistrust and jealousy between his rivals.

Temüjin's other relatives, namely Quchar, Altan, and Daritai, maintained good relations with Temüjin for a while longer. The first sign that all was not well appeared in a campaign against the Tatars, wherein Temüjin, along with these three, issued a joint command not to stop for booty until the enemy were defeated.[42] These relatives then ignored their own command, and Temüjin had their plunder stripped from them, which according to Rashīd al-Dīn, angered them and drove them to side with the Ong Khan, To'oril of the Kerait.[43] At one stage, Temüjin complained to his relatives about their actions, saying that he had appealed to all of them to become the khan due to their superior lineages, but they had rejected this and chosen him instead, so they should follow him. These relatives apparently were not content to be mere liegemen of either Temüjin or Ong Khan, as they conspired against Ong Khan and held their own council with Jamuqa and leaders of the Tatars to become rulers themselves. However, their plots were found out, and Daritai was forced to submit to Temüjin, while Altan and Quchar joined the Naiman.[44] Interestingly, here the *SHM* and Rashīd al-Dīn's narratives diverge. According to the *SHM*, Daritai was punished but his life was spared.[45] However, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, his constant opposition to Temüjin's house saw him executed and his descendants made slaves of Eljigidei Noyan.[46] Altan and Quchar also were executed after Temüjin defeated the Naiman.[47]

While the actions of the Tayichi'ut and Temüjin's senior relatives have been discussed by a few scholars, it is important to consider *why* these characters may have acted the way they did.[48] As such, Temüjin's elder relatives clearly were happy to ally themselves with him and support him when it suited them. Bizarrely, they seem to have lent him greater support in an earlier period when he was less powerful and under attack. It seems that at this stage a communal loyalty to the greater house, which had already been in conflict with the Tayichi'ut, may have seen them take Temüjin's part, as well as their own vision of their ability to manipulate their younger relative for their own ends. However, as he came into his power, he limited the other Kiyat's own power to a significantly greater degree. His removal of their plunder and slights on their seniority may have been calculated

[42] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §153, p. 76; YS/Atwood, p. 15; RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 182. Only the *SHM* mentions the joint issue of the command, the other sources state that it was Temüjin who issued the command. This may have become a permanent law, as John of Plano Carpini says it was punishable by death in his time, a rule he believed European armies should also adopt, Dawson, *Mongol Mission*, p. 47.
[43] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 183.
[44] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 190, YS/Atwood, p. 19.
[45] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §154, 242, pp. 78, 167. See also 'Philological Commentary', Vol. II, p. 652.
[46] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 133.
[47] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 67. SHM/de Rachewiltz, §246, p. 174 mentions that these two were killed in the past, but the incident is not described.
[48] Holmgren 'Observations on Marriage', pp. 133-5; Hope, *Power, Politics and Tradition*, pp. 26-41; P. Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan: His Life and Legacy*, (trans. and ed.) T.N. Haining (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1991), First Edition 1983, *passim*.

moves to antagonise his senior relatives. As they saw their chances of material reward decrease, their clientelist loyalties may have been rather given over to Jamuqa or Ong Khan, arguably stronger figures on the steppe at this point. Their inertial loyalty to stay with Temüjin was worn away by his actions that they perceived as targeting their own wealth and status. If they did indeed take oaths of loyalty and set up Temüjin as their khan, they certainly were prioritising their loyalties out of self-interest over their communal loyalties, but they may also have seen Temüjin's actions as contravening the *törü*, the set of divine principles which had governed social and political actions on the steppe for centuries, with relation to their claim of plunder, or communal rituals.[49] In considering above some of the language of the sources, we can understand this story beyond the *SHM*'s portrayal of the Kiyat's constant betrayals.

Once Chinggis had established himself of course, absolute loyalty to him was both expected and recounted by many of our sources. Christian writers and travellers heard tell of the famed discipline of Chinggis and the loyalty his people showed him. Simon of Saint-Quentin, the Dominican envoy of Pope Innocent IV in Anatolia in the 1240s, reported that the Tatars were all obligated to Chinggis until death, and that they have forever remained loyal.[50] The Armenian general known as Het'um the Historian, writing in the early 14th century, reports that once Chinggis assembled the seven Tatar peoples, he sought to test their loyalty, and thus ordered that the general of each people behead his own son, which each followed.[51] John of Plano Carpini said that the Mongols were more obedient to their masters than any other men in the world and that their emperor had remarkable power over everyone.[52] Marco Polo and Het'um both noted the Mongols' extreme obedience to their khan, comparing this obedience favourably to that of any other nation.[53] As we have seen, loyalty to Chinggis was much more nuanced than these examples suggest, but it was clearly part of the Mongol

[49]For more on the *törü* see C. Humphrey and A. Hurelbaatar, 'Regret as a Political Intervention: An Essay in the Historical Anthropology of the Early Mongols', *Past & Present*, Vol. 186, (2005), p. 25; R. Yu. Pochekaev, '*Törü*: Ancient Turkic Law 'Privatised' by Chinggis Khan and His Descendants', *Inner Asia,* Vol. 18 (2016), pp. 182-195; C. Humphrey and A. Hurelbaatar, 'The term *törü* in Mongolian History', in (ed.) D. Sneath, *Imperial Statecraft: Political Forms and Techniques of Governance in Inner Asia, Sixth-Twentieth Centuries*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 265-293; L. Munkh-Erdene, 'The Rise of the Chinggisid Dynasty: Pre-Modern Eurasian Political Order and Culture at a Glance', *International Journal of Asian Studies*, Vo. 15, No. 1, (2018), pp. 39-84.

[50] Simon of Saint-Quentin, *Simon of Saint-Quentin: History of the Tartars*, (ed. and trans.) S. Pow, T. Kiss, A. Romsics, and F. Ghazaryan, www.simonofstquentin.org, Accessed November 25th 2020, Book XXX, p. 69.

[51] Het'um the Historian, *Flower of Histories*, p. 34.

[52] Dawson, *Mongol Mission*, pp. 14, 27.

[53] Marco Polo, *Travels*, p. 100; Het'um the Historian, *Flower of Histories*, p. 73.

propaganda machine to ensure that they presented a united front behind a single khan to the outside world.[54]

3.3 The Qa'an

This position has been separated from that of khan for two reasons. The first is that the adoption of the new title, qa'an/qaghan, mimicking the grander title of the earlier Kök Türk dynasty, was a significant step taken by Chinggis' successor Ögödei to convey a more imperial style, now that the Mongols truly ruled a vast empire.[55] The other is that during much of Temüjin's career, there were other choices one could make as to one's khan: we have already seen that his relatives threw their support behind others who had been appointed khans, Ong Khan of the Kerait, and Jamuqa of the Jajirat. Once Ögödei came to power, however, there was no 'alternative choice' for actors in the Mongol Empire. There may have been some dispute after Chinggis' death as to who was to succeed him, with Tolui perhaps using his position as regent to make a play for the throne.[56] Once these issues were settled however, this weakened actors' ability to make loyalty decisions. As Naomi Standen has observed, the power of those serving rulers was heightened when there were several possible rulers in their cultural orbit who they could choose to serve.[57] With only one well accepted ruler, loyalty was largely a matter of degree of compliance rather than of complete departure.[58]

The *qa'an* himself may not have had to be loyal to anyone else, but this did not mean he was free of idealistic loyalty obligations. Indeed, it was these considerations which were perhaps the strongest limitations on his power. Let us consider the first *qa'an* Ögödei in this regard. Firstly, it seems that Ögödei was required to maintain loyalty to the *törü* which his father had constantly reminded his subjects of, according to the *SHM*. In the *SHM*'s list of Ögödei's four faults, Ögödei admonishes himself for secretly injuring Doqolqu of the Mangqut, who had diligently observed the

[54] See for example, Öljeitü's 1305 letter to Philip the Fair of France indicating the unity of the Mongols behind the Great Qa'an, Temür, B. Baumann, 'Whither the Ocean? The *Talu Dalai* in Sultan Öljeitü's 1305 Letter to Philip the Fair of France', *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, Vol. 19, (2012), pp. 59-80.
[55] Jones, 'The Objects of Loyalty', p. 4; Jackson, *Mongols and the Islamic World*, p. 81; I. de Rachewiltz, 'Qan, Qa'an and the Seal of Güyüg', *East Asian History*, Vol. 43, (2019), p. 96.
[56] Atwood, 'Pu'a's Boast', pp. 266-273; de Rachewiltz, ''Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, Yeh-lü Chu, Yeh-lü Hsi-liang', in (eds.) I. de Rachewiltz, H. Chan, H. Ch'i-ch'ing and P.W. Geier, *In the Service of the Khan: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period (1200-1300),* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993), p. 199.
[57] Standen, *Unbounded Loyalty*, p. 46
[58] This would not have been the case in the frontier area between the Jīn state and the invading Mongols, where several characters were able to forge a career serving both states intermittently, and even the Sòng, eg. C.C. Hsiao, 'Yen Shih', in (eds.) I. de Rachewiltz, H. Chan, H. Ch'i-ch'ing and P.W. Geier, *In the Service of the Khan: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period (1200-1300),* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993), pp. 60-74.

törü in service of Chinggis.[59] In so doing, Ögödei was himself in contravention of the *törü* by injuring a loyal servant. Whether or not the *SHM* is trying to condemn Ögödei in this 'faults' section is of lesser importance than the way it seeks to criticise him, i.e. by portraying him as betraying the ideals his father had adhered to. His other faults seem to be those of character, such as addiction to wine, greed and lust. However, there also seem to be criticisms of his failure to live up to his father's standards. In this, Ögödei had to consider his loyalty to his predecessor's legacy, and to the *jasaq* and *bilig*s (wise sayings) which this legacy consisted of.[60]

If we consider his fourth fault as ruler, this has to do with the construction of walls to herd game mentioned in Chapter Two. In the *SHM*, this action is one of greed, preventing game from reaching the domain of his brothers.[61] It is not stated, but this may have been in contravention of Chinggis' *jasaq*. According to Juvainī, Chinggis was greatly preoccupied with the hunt and its procedure, to the extent that those who failed in corralling the animals, even important army officials, could be beaten or even put to death for this failure.[62] Rashīd al-Dīn also mentions that Temüge Otchigin, Chinggis' younger brother, was punished by Chinggis for his failure to join the hunting circle on time.[63] This indicates that even the family of the ruler could not contravene norms and regulations with regards to the hunt. Both Juvainī and Rashīd al-Dīn mention Ögödei's construction of these walls, but no approbation is included in their accounts. If the hunt was so strictly regulated, Ögödei's actions seem to have contravened these regulations. In Juvainī's words, the hunt is part of preparing for warfare, suffering hardship and becoming used to the bow.[64] If Ögödei made this whole process much easier, it could be said to have undermined the army's overall effectiveness, making them more used to comfort and ease. Thomas Allsen has shown that the hunt, for many dynasties across Eurasia, and especially in the Turco-Mongol tradition, was of vital importance in showing the ruler's political dominance and military might, and it carried with it ritual significance as well as helping to form loyalty bonds between his troops, but also to their ruler.[65] So while the *SHM* merely criticises Ögödei's greed, there may have been some serious contravention of Chinggisid law and Turco-Mongol traditions. The lack of condemnation by the Persian historians for

[59] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §281, p. 218 and 'Philological Commentary', Vol. II, pp. 1036-7; Atwood, 'Pu'a's Boast', p. 242. Christopher Atwood has delved into the reasons behind Doqolqu's murder and it's cover-up in Chinese and Persian sources.
[60] See pp. 89, note 70 below for more details on the *bilig*.
[61] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §281, p. 218.
[62] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 28; de Rachewiltz, 'Philological Commentary', Vol. II, p. 1037.
[63] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 260-1; RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, p. 479; Allsen, *The Royal Hunt*, p. 205.
[64] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 27.
[65] Allsen, *The Royal Hunt*, pp. 8, 153, 205, 211, 219.

this action is interesting. Did they have a sufficient understanding of traditions surrounding the hunt, or was this action simply less problematic than the *SHM* would have us believe?

Nonetheless, we are elsewhere informed of incidents in which the contemporary sources claim that Ögödei seemed to have trouble remaining loyal to his father's actions and maxims. One of these involved Ögödei's reassignment of troops which had been allocated by his father. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Ögödei gave troops of the Sonit and Suldus who had belonged to Tolui and his sons to his own son Köten. This apparently angered key *noyan*s who had served Chinggis, such as Shigi Qutuqu, and protests were made to Tolui's widow, Sorqoqtani Beki.[66] Tolui's eldest son, Möngke, and his *aqa* and *ini*, stated 'The two *hazaras* of Suldus troops belong to us by virtue of Genghis Khan's *yarligh*. Now they are being given to Köten. How can we allow Genghis Khan's order to be changed?'[67] It is Sorqoqtani who quelled the dissent, responding that they all belonged to the *qa'an* for him to do with as he chose, 'whatever he orders is law, we will obey.'[68] Fascinatingly, Rashīd al-Dīn provides Sorqoqtani's self-contradiction in the same section, stating that Ögödei delivered a *jarligh* announcing that she was to marry his eldest son Güyük, in conformity with Mongol customs regarding widows. Sorqoqtani however rejected Ögödei's *jarligh*, and apparently for this reason she was preferred to Hö'elün, Chinggis' mother, who remarried Father Mönglik, Chinggis' advisor and father figure after Yisügei's death, according to Chinggis' wishes.[69] Rashīd al-Dīn here provides two examples of figures who ignore the *jarligh* of a *qa'an*, and ignore previous tradition, but one of them comes out of both examples with praise and the other with thinly veiled condemnation.

Notwithstanding the overtly Toluid stance of our primary sources and their keenness to denigrate Ögödei and his family to prepare the ground for the later Toluid takeover, these examples

---

[66] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, 282.

[67] Idem, p. 387.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid. Father Mönglik was also the father of Chinggis' early religious ally Kököchü, alias Teb Tengri, who predicted Chinggis' rule over the steppe. He was later killed by Chinggis' brother Temüge in a staged wrestling match after he rebelled against Chinggis, see SHM/de Rachewiltz, §245, pp. 170-2. The marriage incident is *not* however mentioned in the *SHM*, though the dying Yisügei did entrust his family to Mönglik, saying he must take care of his 'widowed elder sister-in-law' SHM/de Rachewiltz, §68, p. 16. De Rachewiltz argues in his commentary that the terms in this section are figurative, and that Mönglik could very well have married Hö'elün, especially given that he refers to Temüjin as 'son', while Yisügei's children call him 'father', 'Philological Commentary', Vol. I, pp. 339-340. Broadbridge and Holmgren note that Hö'elün was not married through levirate to Daritai or Temüge Otchigin, perhaps given her poverty at the time. However, neither address Rashīd al-Dīn's claim that she was in fact remarried to Mönglik, Broadbridge, *Women*, pp. 51-3; Holmgren, 'Observations on marriage', p. 134. İsenbike Togan states that the treatment of Hö'elün and Sorqoqtani Beki in the Mongol world was indicative of the development of a 'mother cult' due to women being cut off from their emotional support networks by Chinggisid policy and forced to channel their energies into their sons, I. Togan, 'In Search of an Approach to the History of Women in Central Asia', in (ed.) K. Erturk, *Rethinking Central Asia: Non-Eurocentric Studies in History, Social Structure and Identity*, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1999), pp. 180-1.

do show us some of the issues regarding loyalty to tradition and Chinggis' legacy for a sitting *qa'an*. This was most pertinent to Ögödei, who immediately succeeded his father and was surrounded by a retinue of people who knew Chinggis, had heard his words, participated in his government and fought alongside him. There was also great respect afforded to those who knew the *biligs* (wise sayings) of Chinggis.[70] Given this, there were many that could and apparently did question Ögödei when his policies did not match with what they expected or wanted. However, the fact that Ögödei reigned for 12 years in relative peace, without any serious attempts that we know of to undermine his rule, should indicate that on the whole he was able to placate his father's coterie.[71] A *qa'an* had to have some scope to manoeuvre with regards to both the *jasaq* and Mongol tradition, but if he pushed too far, he would undermine the ideal loyalties of his followers. To an extent, infringing ideals could be accepted as long as the *qa'an* was successful in ticking the boxes with regards to people's loyalties of self-interest. If plunder kept rolling in and military success continued, these idealistic loyalty infringements could be put to one side. They were not forgotten, as our primary sources indicate, but they were tolerated on the whole. We will see in later examples when such loyalties were undermined to the extent that it caused actors to cast off their loyalty obligations to their rulers.

For a case study of a *qa'an* who played a fine line with this sort of action, we turn to Möngke's reign. Möngke took power in 1251 after two regencies sandwiching the short reign of Güyük (1246-1248). His play for power has been well documented and much discussed, but there are some noteworthy loyalty considerations here. The Toluids and Jochids, represented by Sorqoqtani Beki and Batu, made use of a whole range of methods to attract support based on these different categories of loyalty. Assertion of Möngke's suitability for rulership, bribery, promise of advancement, threats, appeals to Mongol solidarity, and a raft of guarantees that they were in fact doing the right thing according to Chinggisid law and custom all make an appearance in our sources. We shall examine in what ways these were played out, and the actions of those who chose or chose not to align themselves with Möngke.

Our Toluid apologists provide us with explicit reasons for Möngke's accession, namely his charismatic leadership. Juvainī claims that it was Möngke's success in the western campaign of 1236

[70] The importance of knowledge of Chinggisid *bilig* has been noted in M. Hope, 'The Transmission of Authority through the *Quriltai*s of the Early Mongol Empire and the Ilkhanate of Iran (1227-1335)', *Mongolian Studies*, Vol. 34 (2012), pp. 87-115, *passim* and in G. Lane, 'Intellectual jousting and the Chinggisid Wisdom Bazaars', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 26, Nos. 1-2, (2016), pp. 246-7. Rashīd al-Dīn claims that it was the superior knowledge and recitation of the *bilig* that decided the succession of Temür Qa'an over his elder brother Kammala in Yuán China, RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 464.

[71] Hope, *Power, Politics and Tradition*, p. 53.

against the Qipchaqs and their leader Bachman, who Möngke captured and killed, that 'provide a reason for the transfer of power and the key of empire to the World-Emperor Mengu Qa'an such as requires no further demonstration.'[72] Immediately contradicting his statement that no further proof is necessary, Juvainī, in a longer passage that bears quoting in full, has the *aqa* (elder brother) of all the Chinggisid princes, Batu, say to the assembled princes in 1249 that the khanate can go to

> only such a person [...] as has known and experienced the *yasa* of Chingiz-Khan and the customs of Qa'an (Ögödei), and in the race-course of wisdom and the hippodrome of manliness has borne off the reed of excellence from all his peers and equals, and has in person supervised important affairs and been in charge of weighty matters, and in the overcoming of difficulties and the crushing of rebels has provided unanswerable proofs. Now of the lineage of Chingiz-Khan is Mengu Qa'an, who is famous for his shrewdness and bravery and celebrated for his sagacity and valour.[73]

Here we see Juvainī lending his eloquence to the suggestion that Möngke is the ideal charismatic ruler in a Mongol prince, highlighting his lineage, his knowledge of Chinggis' *jasaq*, his military successes, and his wisdom. Rashīd al-Dīn, who at this stage follows Juvainī, echoes many of these attributes, having Batu add at the *quriltai* a more comprehensive list of Möngke's military achievements and that Ögödei and the other commanders trusted him. Rashīd al-Dīn claims that Batu sent envoys to the Ögödeids and other key khatuns and commanders in the Mongol world to the effect that 'the one prince who has seen with his own eyes and heard with his own ears Genghis Khan's *yasaq* and *yarligh* is Möngkä.'[74] Despite the factual inaccuracy of this statement, we see that Rashīd al-Dīn is trying to frame Möngke as the right man to rule based on his closeness to Chinggis, which the other princes could not hope to match. This was perhaps a targeted attack on the Ögödeids, which Juvainī makes explicit, saying that when Batu heard complaints that leadership should stay in the line of Ögödei, he responded that 'the administration of so great an empire [...] is beyond the strength and knowledge of mere children.'[75] We later hear the Ögödeid response to this thinking in Vaṣṣāf, who was the continuator of Juvainī. Vaṣṣāf states that Qaidu, the grandson of Ögödei who was in opposition to the Toluid rulers of China and Iran, sent envoys to both Qubilai and Hülegü saying

[72] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 554.
[73] Idem, pp. 559-560.
[74] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 402.
[75] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 563.

pādshāh-i jahāngushā-y chingīz khān dar yāsā-yi khud ta'kīd karda ast ki tā az nasl-i ūktāy ṭiflī shīr-khvāra zinda bāshad ū dar khūr-i tāj va rāyat-i shāhī bāshad[76]

the world-conquering emperor Chinggis Khan in his *yasa* made clear that as long as of the lineage of Ögödei a suckling babe still lived, he would be deserving of the crown and royal standard.[77]

Both Juvainī and Rashīd al-Dīn, however, rejected the child-ruler idea, (somewhat ironically given their portrayal as the young Temüjin as the rightful ruler) and presented Möngke as the only logical choice as ruler, given that Batu supposedly refused the job himself.[78]

These claims about Möngke's suitability to rule were not the only arrows in the Toluid-Jochid quiver however. They also sought to play on the clientelist loyalties of the Chinggisids and their respective supporters. Sorqoqtani was the primary driver in this regard. It was she who 'began to cultivate strangers with all kinds of attention and favour and to win over kinsmen and relations with all means of courtesy and diplomacy.'[79] Rashīd al-Dīn uses very similar language, talking of her 'kindness' (تلطف, *talaṭṭuf*) to her relatives.[80] This type of language notwithstanding, this was clearly the same type of soliciting which Töregene Khatun had employed when seeking to become the regent after Ögödei's death, however in this case, Rashīd al-Dīn's phrasing shows his feelings on the difference between the two khatuns' actions:

توراگنه...به لطایف حیل به دل خود بی کنگاچ آقا و اینی ملک را در قبضه تصرف آورد و دل خویشان و امرا به انواع تحف و هدایا صید می کرد *Töregene […] bi laṭāyif-i ḥīyal bi dil-i khud bī-kingāch-i āqā va īnī mulk rā dar qabża-yi taṣarruf āvard va dil-i khvīshān va umarā' bi anvā'-i tuḥaf va hadāyā ṣayd mī-kard.* [81]

Töregene, through clever tricks and of her own volition, without consulting the *aqa* and *ini*, seized the kingdom, and through all manner of presents and gifts captured the hearts of her relatives and the commanders.[82]

---

[76] Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 66; Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 37.

[77] Qāshānī/Hambali, p. 235 indicates that Qaidu went so far as to claim the khanate himself, *qaidū ki daʿwayi qānī mī-kard*. I do not see, as Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, p. 80 does, any evidence that Qāshānī 'supported' Qaidu's claims apart from mentioning their existence.

[78] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 559.

[79] Idem, p. 562.

[80] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 402. RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, p. 731.

[81] RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, pp. 709-710.

[82] However, Juvainī does not portray Töregene's becoming regent as anything negative, even saying she went out of her way to get the support of the princes, and that Chaghadai, the only surviving son of Chinggis, supported this move, Juvaini/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 240. This discrepancy is the subject of an as yet unpublished article by Geoffrey Humble, 'Narrating Female Rule at the Mongol Court: Juwaynī and Rashīd al-Dīn on Töregene Qatun'. My thanks to Doctor Humble for sharing his work with me.

Beyond these general attempts to win over support, there were more targeted attempts to solicit the support of members of the Ögödeid and Chaghadaid houses, who on the whole opposed the Toluid candidate. Qada'an and Malik, two of Ögödei's junior sons (Figure 4), as well as Chaghadai's son Mochi and grandson Qara Hülegü, however, threw their support behind Möngke.[83] For this support, the two Ögödeid princes were later awarded an *ordu* from those which had belonged to Ögödei, as well as a *tumen* each of his troops, and their pick of his wives.[84] As more junior sons, they may well have thought that their status and reward could only be advanced by the destruction or exile of their relatives of more senior lines, i.e. Güyük's sons Khoja and Naqu, or Ögödei's chosen successor Shiremün. We also have a confused narrative in both Juvainī and Rashīd al-Dīn where Köten (Ögödei's second/third son) gave support to Möngke. Apparently, because Sorqoqtani did not challenge the transfer of the Suldus troops to Köten, her family was able to maintain good relations with him, and thus when the rest of Ögödei's family rejected Möngke, Köten allied with Möngke. Möngke subsequently gave him lands in the region of Gansu, in the old Tangut kingdom, which was held by his sons after Köten's death under Möngke, Qubilai and Temür Qa'an.[85] However, in his section on the accession of Güyük, Rashīd al-Dīn follows Juvainī's narrative about Köten's death from Fāṭima's witchcraft during Güyük's reign in 1247.[86] Rashīd al-Dīn elsewhere states that Köten's sons were involved in the revolt of Nayan, a descendant of Temüge Otchigin, against Qubilai in 1287.[87] This contradictory narrative does not allow us to determine what actually took place, but if Köten was involved in Möngke's accession, this would have lent significant weight to his campaign, as Köten would have been Ögödei's only surviving son in 1251. It seems clear enough that Köten's sons at least managed to stay on Möngke's good side to hold large appanages in north-western China, so it is plausible that they or their father had lent some support to Möngke.[88]

[83] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, pp. 558, 573; Broadbridge, *Women*, p. 214.
[84] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 595.
[85] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 568; RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 387-8; V. Shurany, 'Prince Manggala- The Forgotten Prince of Anxi', *Asia*, Vol. 71, No. 4, (2017), p. 1173.
[86] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 391; Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 245. This discrepancy was pointed out in May, *Mongol Empire*, p. 241.
[87] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 138.
[88] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 403 lists Köten's son Möngetü as present at Möngke's enthronement in a later section.There seems to have been a division among Köten's descendants as to support for Qubilai or Ariq Böke. Köten's grandson Yesü Buqa was part of the *quriltai* which elected Ariq Böke, while Köten's son Jibik Temür seized Ariq Böke's envoys announcing his accession, was part of the *quriltai* which elected Qubilai, and also helped to try Ariq Böke after his submission, RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 427, 434.



Figure 4: The Ögödeid Line © Tobias Jones

The support of the Chaghadaid prince Qara Hülegü emerged from a dispute over succession to the Chaghadaid *ulus* between himself, a grandson of Chaghadai via his favourite and eldest legitimate son Mö'etüken, and his uncle Yesü Möngke, Chaghadai's fifth son (Figure 5).[89] According to Juvainī, it was Chinggis himself who chose Qara Hülegü as Chaghadai's successor, a move which was confirmed by Ögödei and Chaghadai. Güyük removed Qara Hülegü, and instead chose his own friend Yesu Möngke as lord of the *ulus* based on the principle of seniority; a son should succeed before a grandson.[90] However, Rashīd al-Dīn claims that Güyük chose Yesü Möngke *because* he was opposed to Möngke.[91] Güyük's foreknowledge of Möngke's later usurpation of the throne seems unlikely, so we should perhaps reverse this statement. Qara Hülegü chose to support Möngke *because* Güyük had removed him from the throne and Yesü Möngke maintained his friendship with the Ögödeids.[92] Clearly Möngke promised Qara Hülegü the Chaghadaid *ulus* if he supported

[89] According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Chaghadai's eldest son was Mochi, mentioned above, but he was the son of a servant girl in Yesülün Khatun's camp, while Mö'etüken was born of Yesülün herself, RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 367-8.

[90] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 273. I have suggested elsewhere that this position may have been necessary for Güyük to take, given that he succeeded his father Ögödei, possibly ignoring Ögödei's wish that Shiremün, his grandson, succeeded him, Jones, 'The Objects of Loyalty', p. 8.

[91] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 372.

[92] This is made clear by Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 265.

Möngke's play for the throne. Qara Hülegü received this and further great rewards from Möngke for this support, also being allowed to execute his rival Yesü Möngke and Yesü's wife Toqashi Khatun, whom Qara Hülegü had beaten to a pulp based on an old grudge.[93] The Jochids and Toluids do not seem to have been able to encourage too many Ögödeids and Chaghadaids to their side in this manner, but those that did come over seem to have done so to get out from under overbearing relatives and to establish their own power. Their very attendance at Batu's '*quriltai*' of 1249 however, allowed the Toluid-Jochid alliance to portray all four Chinggisid houses as supporting Möngke's rule.[94]



Figure 5: The Chaghadaid Line © Tobias Jones

What is also notable in the above case is the way that the arguments about Qara Hülegü and Yesü Möngke's rights to the throne are made. Both sides appeal to a sort of higher law or custom

[93] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 274, Vol. II, pp. 588-9, 595. Rashīd al-Dīn tells us that Qara Hülegü was unable to execute Yesü Möngke, as Qara died on the way back to his *ulus*, but his widow, Orghina Khatun, finished the job, RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p.372. Qara Hülegü was also responsible for the execution of Korguz, having his mouth stuffed with stones, Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 505.

[94] The location of this meeting, i.e. not in the Kelüren valley, and its lack of important participants rendered its status as a proper *quriltai* questionable.

when making their case. In Güyük's case, he appeals to the principle of seniority, which was a common deciding factor in Mongol succession in the past. The transfers of power from Qabul Khan to Ambaqai Khan, and from Ambaqai to Qutula seem to have operated on this principle, where succession went from cousin to cousin. But Möngke's support for Qara Hülegü is rather based on Qara Hülegü's selection as successor to Chaghadai by Chinggis, Ögödei and Chaghadai. If the founder of the Mongol Empire said it should be so, it should be so. It seems that here we have a clash between Mongol custom and Chinggisid innovation, notwithstanding the political reasons for Güyük and Möngke's choices. It was Chinggis who determined that his brothers and nephews should not be considered for succession, and forced them to swear to support his descendants for rulership.[95] However, this idea of 'ruler's choice' was regularly ignored by successive generations of Chinggisid princes and the ruling elite. It seems as if Chinggis' attempt to shift Mongol custom towards a more centralised system was not easily accepted.[96]

Returning to our case study, by way of Toluid-Jochid threats, we do not have too much evidence of specifics. Juvainī claims that Möngke and Sorqoqtani only turned to this resort after all other routes were worn out.[97] Eventually, a more specific threat emerges, apparently from the council around Möngke to Shiremün and Naqu, that if they delayed attendance on the *quriltai*, their input would be foregone and Möngke would be elected anyway.[98] This seems to have done the trick, or at least got them to depart their own *ordu*s. Rashīd al-Dīn says that Batu told Berke, 'Seat him (Möngke) on the throne! And any creature that disobeys the *yasa* will lose his head.'[99] The flip side of violent action as a threat was that it could also push people away. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, during the civil war between Qubilai and Ariq Böke, many of Ariq Böke's own commanders who had accepted his rule turned against him, saying 'he ruthlessly kills the Mongol soldiers that Chinggis Khan put together. Why should we not revolt and turn against him?'[100] Notice the language here; an appeal is made to Chinggis Khan's legacy, touching on an ideal loyalty, while the commanders desert Ariq Böke in fear of their own lives, showing their clientelist loyalty.

In the previous example we see the appeal to ideal loyalty as well, with Batu making it a violation of the *yasa* to not accept Mongke as the *qa'an*. What specific *yasa* this refers to is unclear. The Jochids and Toluids certainly would have a harder time trying to appeal to this aspect of Mongol

[95] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §255, p. 188.
[96] Michael Hope's analysis of the collegialist viewpoint of the Mongol ruling elite highlights this issue, *Power, Politics, and Tradition*, *passim*.
[97] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 563.
[98] Idem, p. 567.
[99] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 403.
[100] Idem, p. 431.

loyalty. All of them had given *möchelge*s to the effect that the rule would be kept in the line of Ögödei.[101] We do not know the contents of these pledges, and if there were any provisos attached, certainly none are mentioned. However, the arguments for the morality of a move against Ögödei's descendants are elaborated in our Persian sources. That most emphasised by Juvainī was the position of Batu as *aqa*, saying 'whatever he commands, his word is law.'[102] This, combined with the agreement of the *aqa-ini*, was sufficient for him as a reason to abandon the Ögödeids and support Möngke.

Rashīd al-Dīn's reasoning is more complex and based on both Mongol tradition and Chinggisid law. The argument is twofold.[103] The first is more recent, with Rashīd al-Dīn having Batu say that the Ögödeids went 'against their father's words' (خلاف سخن پدر *khilāf-i sukhan-i pidar*) when they enthroned Güyük instead of Ögödei's choice, Shiremün in 1246.[104] This statement damned the Jochids and the Toluids equally, as they had been full participants (except Batu) in Güyük's election, and were currently in the process of choosing Möngke while Shiremün was still alive. Perhaps in Rashīd al-Dīn's eyes, the contravention of a *father's* command was particularly egregious. Rashīd al-Dīn ignores the pesky issue of the Jochids' and Toluids' involvement on the whole, but he explains away the Toluid treatment of Shiremün by saying that while Ögödei had wished for Shiremün's father Köchü to succeed him, Köchü died before him.[105] He then goes on to state that Möngke raised Köchü's son Shiremün himself, and had it in mind that Shiremün be his successor, but Shiremün plotted against Möngke and was handed over to Qubilai, who killed him. This both shows Möngke's original respect for Ögödei's chosen heir, and his innocence regarding Shiemün's death. Rashīd al-Dīn then moves on to the second prong of his attack on the Ögödeids. This infringement was of 'the ancient *Yasa* and *Yosun*.'[106] According to the historian, the Ögödeids, after the accession of Güyük, had executed a daughter of Chinggis, Al Altan, for the suspected poisoning of Ögödei, without consulting the entire family. Here Rashīd al-Dīn appeals to deeply held societal beliefs and the sanctity of royal blood. It is these legal and societal misdeeds that explain why rulership should not stay in the Ögödeid line.

---

[101] Idem, p. 409. It is Oghul Gaimish who points this out to Möngke, who flies into a rage. For more on the *möchelge,* see Chapter Two.

[102] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 557.

[103] Anne Broadbriage has already neatly summarised these issues, Broadbridge, *Women,* p. 206.

[104] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 361. RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, p. 657.

[105] RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, p. 562. RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 306 states that it was Möngke who chose Köchü as his successor, but this is clearly a mistake as the Persian text uses قاان on its own, which was Ögödei's posthumous title, while Köchü was dead before Möngke came to the throne.

[106] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 361.

What is interesting about these arguments is that none of them are mentioned by the earlier historian Juvainī. Rashīd al-Dīn often follows Juvainī for this period, but in this section, he brings in new claims. Broadbridge says that these claims were the basis for Toluid pretensions for power, but if so, why do they not make an appearance in Juvainī's work?[107] Perhaps Rashīd al-Dīn had more information, as we know he had greater access to Mongol documents than Juvainī, but if this was such a strut for Toluid rule it seems strange that no hint of it is to be found in Juvainī's work. Indeed, Juvainī never mentions Shiremün being chosen as Ögödei's successor, though he does say that he was a potential candidate in 1246.[108] This discrepancy should not be ignored. Rashīd al-Dīn may simply have honed arguments which had developed in the intervening thirty years since Juvainī's work. Atwood believes that a dearth of information on Al Altan was due to the Chinggisids' keenness to protect their most taboo secrets.[109] Whatever the case may be, Batu and his Toluid allies likely picked up on any point which would weaken the Mongols' ideal loyalty to the Ögödeids. They then had the ability to express shock when the Ögödeids resisted their choice of Möngke, apparently contravening the *jasaq* of Chinggis Khan, something that Sorqoqtani and her sons would never do.[110]

3.4 The Regent

Another key figure in the historical developments of the 13th century Mongol world was the regent. Regents ruled the Mongol Empire for most of the 1240s, and in some cases the regional *ulus*es also had regencies for a time.[111] The origins of this position are somewhat unclear, though we have some possible examples of its existence in the *SHM* and elsewhere.[112] The first is Hö'elün, who acted as the leader of Yisügei's household and peoples. It was she who took up his standard and

[107] Broadbridge, *Women*, p. 207.
[108] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 251.
[109] Atwood, 'Pu'a's Boast', p. 242.
[110] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol I, p. 255, Vol. II, p. 573.
[111] E.g. B. de Nicola, 'The Queen of the Chaghatayids: Orghīna Khātūn and the rule of Central Asia', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* Vol. 26, No. 1/2, (2016), pp. 107-120.
[112] De Nicola, *Women in Mongol Iran*, p. 74 believes that there was no specific Mongol tradition of women as regents until Töregene, but rather that this was a general nomadic tradition stemming from the Qara Khitai. As pointed out by Michal Biran, the Qara Khitai were ruled by two women with their own regnal titles in the mid-12th century with one of them, Yelü Pusuwan, nominated to rule by her brother Yelü Yilie in 1163. Biran also states that the Qara Khitai were involved in Mongol politics in the 12th century, and refugees such as Toghril and Küchlüg fled to their realms after defeats on the steppe. Given this, and the ready adoption of several other Qara Khitai institutions by the Mongols, female regency in the Mongol Empire may have been influenced by this policy as well, Biran, 'Qara Khitai', *Oxford Research Encyclopedia for Asian History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 6-9.

brought back many of those who left upon his death.[113] Though Yisügei apparently established Father Mönglik, a close friend of Yisügei's of the Qongqotat, to look after Hö'elün and her children, even marrying her according to Rashīd al-Dīn, it is clear that Hö'elün continued to make political decisions for the people she ruled over.[114] Her influence over her sons would continue into their adulthood as well. The fact that many of Yisügei's people preferred Tayichi'ut leadership to that of Hö'elün's brings us back again to the situation of loyalty with options. If they preferred an adult ruler to the youthful Temüjin, they also preferred a male leader to a female. While the Mongols held royal women in reverence and respect, their society still could be a very patriarchal one, shown further in the discussion of Gürbesü Khatun below.

Other examples of female rule known to the Mongols appear in the SHM, the first is Gürbesü Khatun. While it is unclear if she was the mother of the Naiman ruler Tayang Khan, or his stepmother and wife, she seems to have been considered the ruler in some regard.[115] Her rule is described as harsh, and her 'son' is described by his father Inanch Bilge Khan as 'a weakling', though Tayang certainly made his own political decisions.[116] Granted, these statements in the *SHM* are largely insults directed by the Mongols at a rival, but Gürbesü does seem to have had a degree of independence and power during Tayang Khan's rule. However, Tayang Khan's son and rival Küchlüg insults him by calling him a woman with no courage, and Gürbesü is described as 'only a woman'.[117] These views should make us wary of overstating the overall position of women in the Mongol world, as impressive as their individual roles often are. Another female ruler mentioned by the SHM is Botoqui Tarqun. Her husband, Daiduqul Soqor, had been the ruler of the Qori Tumat people, but he had died, and Botoqui was now the ruler. She was apparently very successful for a time, as her people killed or captured several of Chinggis' *noyat* sent to deal with them, such as Boroqul Noyan, Qorchi Noyan and Qutuqa Beki of the Oirat. It was only after Chinggis appointed Dörbei Doqšin of the Dorbet were the Tumat finally defeated. Botoqui Tarqun herself was given to Qutuqa Beki, whose family were *quda* (marriage-partners) of the Chinggisids.[118]

Jennifer Holmgren and George Zhao have provided us with another example of a Mongolian regent, in this case, Chinggis' third daughter, Alahai (Alaqa *SHM*, Alaqai Rashīd al-Dīn) Beki. Alahai

[113] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §73, p. 18.
[114] Idem, §68, p. 16; RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, pp. 533-4.
[115] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §189, p. 112 says she is the mother of Tayang Khan. RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 149, however has her as the wife. Broadbridge, *Women*, p. 90; De Nicola, *Women in Mongol Iran*, p. 45 accept the reasoning of de Rachewiltz, 'Philological Commentary', Vol. II, p. 679 that the term *eke*, or mother, was not literal, but represented her role as step-mother to Tayang Khan who he married through the levirate.
[116] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §189, 194, pp. 110-111.
[117] Idem, §194, p. 117.
[118] Idem, §240-2, pp. 164-6.

was married three times into the ruling family of the Öng'üt in order to cement their alliance with the Mongols. Over time however, she seems to have become a regent for her deceased husband Zhenguo (Baisbu) and young son Niegutai.[119] She was entrusted by Chinggis with control of northern China, based in Hebei, when he went west, and his general there, Muqali, reported to her. Her bronze seal was found in 1958, with her title 監國公主, *jiān guó gōngzhǔ*, meaning 'princess regent'.[120] The Sòng envoy, Zhao Gong, stated that 'she lives as a widow, managing the affairs of the White Tatar kingdom and reading the canons every day. She has several thousand lady-officials who serve her, but all the decisions about campaigning and executions come from her personally'.[121] Therefore, female regency, while not extremely common, was clearly not unknown to the Mongols, who made use of it when they saw the need.

While we have evidence for the independent, or semi-independent rule of women on the Mongolian steppe and in the Chinggisid family, the first regent of the Mongol Empire was not a woman, but rather Chinggis' youngest son Tolui.[122] However, it does not seem clear exactly how Tolui came to be in this position. The *YS* states that he took control after Chinggis' death, as Ögödei, the heir-apparent was away.[123] Tolui's agency here and the fact that no other names are mentioned, nor any discussion with family or the *noyat*, seems to indicate that Tolui simply filled a power void until Ögödei took over. Indeed the *YS* also claims that Tolui did not particularly want to relinquish power to Ögödei when convening the quriltai.[124] According to Igor de Rachewiltz, based on unspecified

[119] Holmgren 'Observations on Marriage', pp.162-3; G.Q. Zhao, *Marriage as Political Strategy and Cultural Expression: Mongolian Royal Marriages from World Empire to Yuan Dynasty*, (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2008), p. 28. For a comprehensive look at the Öng'üt relationship with the Mongols, see C.P. Atwood, 'Historiography and transformation of ethnic identity in the Mongol Empire: the Öng'üt case', *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol. 15, No. 4, (2014), pp. 514-534.

[120] Zhao, *Marriage as Political Strategy*, p. 37.

[121] Zhao Gong, 'A Memorandum on the Mong-Tatars', in (ed. and trans.) C.P. Atwood, *The Rise of the Mongols: Five Chinese Sources*, (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2021), p. 78.

[122] Jones, 'The Objects of Loyalty', p. 14. Tolui's role is given in Ila Chucai's spirit-path stele as 監國, *jiānguó*, matching Alahai Beki's title, Song Zizhen, 'Spirit-Path Stele', p. 139, though Atwood states that there was no 'official' title for Tolui, Atwood, *Rise of the Mongols*, p. 139, note 36.

[123] YS, Chap. 119, 'Biography of Muqali', *The History of Yuan Dynasty*, Vol. II, (eds.) Q. Zhang and C. Yao, (Taipei: The National War College, 1966-7), pp. 1272-1286; G. Humble, 'The Biography of Yelu Chucai, Yuanshi, 146.3455-65', Unpublished, p. 3, note 17; YS, Chap. 146, *The History of Yuan Dynasty*, Vol. III, pp. 1553-1558; G. Humble, 'The Biography of Yelu Chucai, Yuanshi, 146.3455-65', Unpublished, pp. 3, 12. I am grateful to my colleague Nicholas Kontovas for assisting in the translation of the Chinese material. D. Krawulsky, *The Mongol Ilkhans and their Vizier Rashīd al-Dīn* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang AG, 2011), pp. 19, 25 questions whether Ögödei's position as heir was really so secure as the *YS* and Rashīd al-Dīn make out. It is possible that Tolui ruled on behalf of his deceased father, not his appointed brother, as he seemed not to wish to relinquish power. Christopher Atwood, meanwhile, argues that the Yuán era sources inflate Tolui's role in this period to establish precedent for his descendants' later seizure of power, Atwood, *Rise of the Mongols*, p. 139, note 36.

[124] G. Humble, 'The Biography of Yelu Chucai, *Yuanshi*, 146.3455-65', Unpublished, p. 4.

'Chinese sources', this was due to support for Tolui's own candidacy among the assembly.[125] In Ila Chucai's biography, Tolui's role as regent extends to appointing officials, law and order, and apparently also the convention of the *quriltai* itself.[126] Tolui's own biography in the *YS* claims that while regent, he dealt with bandits in the Yanjing region.[127]

Juvainī does not mention Tolui's regency, but Rashīd al-Dīn possibly confirms it, depending on how we interpret his meaning. After Chinggis' death, the princes and brothers had gone on to their own *yurt*s, and Rashīd al-Dīn states that 'Tolui Khan settled down based in the original *yurt*, which had been the royal residence and great *ordu*s of Chinggis Khan' and also that he 'settled in the original *yurt* and throne of his father, which was his right'(تولوی خان در یورت اصلی که تختگاه و اوردوهای بزرگ چینگیز خان بود متمکن شده بنشست...تمکن و استقرار در یورت اصلی و تختگاه پدر که حق او بود, *tūlūī khān dar yurt-i aṣlī ki takhtgāh va ūrdū-hā-yi buzurg-i chīngīz khān būd mutimakkin shuda binishast…tamakkun va istiqrār dar yurt-i aṣlī va takhtgāh-i pidar ki haqq-i ū būd*).[128] As we can see in the same section, Rashīd al-Dīn refers to Ögödei as the successor (*valī al-ʿahd*), so either this is Tolui simply taking possession of his inheritance (namely, his father's tents), or that he indeed occupied the throne (*takhtgāh*) of his father as a regent. We also should not forget the Toluid sources' strengthening of Tolui's claim to the throne to legitimate later khans; perhaps this is another instance of such efforts. Given that in this section of Rashīd al-Dīn, Tolui occupies the throne *after* his family members have returned to their own lands, if this did mean that Tolui became regent, he seems to have taken this role on himself, not 'was named' or 'was placed in charge'; De Rachewiltz says that Tolui 'had assumed the regency of the empire'.[129]

---

[125] I. de Rachewiltz, 'Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (1189-1243): Buddhist Idealist and Confucian Statesman', in (eds.) A. Wright and D. Twitchett, *Confucian Personalities*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962) p. 199. This is echoed in his biography of Ila Chucai in *In the Service of the Khan*, where de Rachewiltz states, 'We know from the Chinese sources that there was disagreement in the assembly, a section of which supported Tolui's candidature against Ögödei's', de Rachewiltz, 'Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, Yeh-lü Chu, Yeh-lü Hsi-liang', p. 148. However there seems to be no mention of such in YS 146 nor in Chucai's spirit-path stele, though the *YS* does mention disagreement in the assembly. Undoubtedly de Rachewiltz's status as a Sinologist is unquestionable, but we are left a little in the dark by these two passages, neither of which provide us with a reference as to which Chinese source states this. In the 14th century *Debter Marbo* (Red History), a Tibetan chronicle written by Gunga Dorje (1309-1264) of the Tsalba monastic order, it is said that while Jochi and Chaghadai presented letters to Chinggis promising not to contest the throne, Tolui had presented no such letter, and thus contested for the throne, Atwood, 'Six Pre-Chinggisid Genealogies', pp. 15, 52, quoting *Debter Marbo*/Demchigmaa, pp. 59-62.

[126] Humble, 'Biography of Yelu Chucai', pp. 3-4; De Rachewiltz, 'Dating of *Secret History*', p. 163 states that the convening of the *quriltai* was the job of the regent in lieu of a *qa'an*. Jones, 'The Objects of Loyalty', p. 14.

[127] G. Humble, 'The Biography of Ruizong 睿宗, *Yuanshi* 115.2885-87', Unpublished, p. 1.

[128] RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, p. 701.

[129] De Nicola, *Women in Mongol Iran*, p. 65; T. Allsen, 'The Rise of the Mongolian Empire and Mongolian Rule in North China', in (eds.) H. Franke and D. Twitchett, *The Cambridge History of China,* Vol. 6, *Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 367; De Rachewiltz, 'Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, Yeh-lü Chu, Yeh-lü Hsi-liang', p. 147.

According to the *YS* then, Tolui likely acted as regent in the two year gap between Chinggis' death and Ögödei's succession. However, the lack of consultation about this action seems jarring given the Mongols' tendency to establish rulership through an assembly. Even more telling perhaps, is that Rashīd al-Dīn says that before Ögödei was enthroned and after Chinggis' death, 'the princes and amirs who had remained in Chinggis Khan's camp' had launched an attack on an unknown territory. Everyone was arguing about this action, but Ögödei issued a *jasaq* which pardoned any crime or offence committed before his accession.[130] As noted by Jackson, this must have at least included Tolui.[131] The fact that he is not named, while both Güyük, an easy target for Toluid writers, and Eljigidei, who was later put to death by the Toluids, are mentioned by Rashīd al-Dīn seems very much as if he was seeking to cover up Tolui's involvement. If Tolui was indeed the regent at this time, his powers apparently did not stretch to sending out campaigns.[132] If Tolui's acting as regent was merely of his own initiative, it may be that this action itself was not considered legal by many in the Mongol world. Ögödei's pardon of Tolui may well have been a condition of Tolui's support at the *quriltai* of 1229.[133] In essence, this tale leaves us somewhat in the dark as to how a regent was chosen and what was expected of them.

3.4.1 Möge Khatun's Regency

The issues around Tolui's rule may have led to a change to female regency. As Holmgren states, it was much harder to displace a male regent once they were in power and thus the Mongols turned to women to glue the empire together until a successor could be established.[134] Again, however, it is unclear whether this was simply ad hoc or if it was planned by Mongol leadership. After Chinggis' successor Ögödei died in 1241, we have somewhat differing accounts of the regency. Juvainī states that, 'in accordance with precedent, the dispatch of orders and the assembling of the people took place at [...] the *ordu* of his wife Möge Khatun.' (برقرار ماضی تنفیذ احکام و اجتماع انام از خواص و

[130] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 313.
[131] P. Jackson, 'The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire', First published in *Central Asiatic Journal*, Vol. 22, (1978), pp. 186-244., Reprinted in (eds.) D. Sneath and C. Kaplonski, *The History of Mongolia,* Vol. 1, (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2010), p. 320.
[132] T. May, 'Commercial Queens: Mongolian Khatuns and the Silk Road', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* Vol. 26, (2016), p. 103; Zhao, *Marriage as Political Strategy*, p. 62 shows that regents' powers were different, in that they could issue their own decrees called in Chinese *yìzhǐ*, whereas imperial decrees were called *shěngzhǐ*, and princely decrees called *lìngzhǐ*.
[133] Krawulsky, *The Mongol Ilkhans*, p. 27 hypothesises that this was an agreement between Ögödei and Tolui, excluding Chaghadai, who could have expected to succeed as the eldest surviving son of Chinggis.
[134] Holmgren, 'Observations on Marriage', p. 161.

عوام بر در اوردو و بارگاه خاتون او موکا خاتون, *bar qarār-i māżī tanfīẕ-i aḥkām va ijtimāʿ-i anām az khvāṣṣ va ʿavām bar dar-i ūrdū va bārgāh-i khātūn-i ū mūkā khātūn*).[135] Möge had been Chinggis' wife and Ögödei had married her through the levirate, and she was apparently Ögödei's favourite.[136] Neither the *YS* nor Rashīd al-Dīn mention Möge's regency, but it should not be immediately discounted. Juvainī and Rashīd al-Dīn state that she died not long after Ögödei, so her short rule may have been glossed over by the later authors, who skip immediately to Töregene assuming power.[137] In certain respects, Möge was a better candidate for regency than Töregene.[138] As a former wife of Chinggis, she would likely have been considered senior to Töregene, whether or not she was in fact elder, and if knowledge of Chinggis' statements was important for rulers, then she would have been in a better position in this regard. She was also childless, which may have suited the Mongols as a more impartial influence on the succession. Even though Juvainī states that Töregene was able to outmanoeuvre Möge by sending messages to the Chinggisid princes getting them on her side, he also states that she only obtained full control of the affairs of state after Möge had died.[139]

Möge's regency, if we accept Juvainī's account, was based on established precedent in the Mongol world. If the examples of Hö'elün and Alahai are not enough, we should perhaps consider that it was quite normal for Chinggis' wives to run his camps, both on campaign and while he was away.[140] This idea looks to have been extended to the ruler's death as well. Take the statement of John of Plano Carpini for example, regarding the *ordu* of Jochi: 'It is ruled by one of his wives, for it is the custom among the Tartars that the courts of princes or nobles are not destroyed but women are always appointed to control them and they are given their share of the offerings just as their lord was in the habit of giving them.'[141] For Broadbridge, this wife was Sorghan, the mother of Orda, as the camp was in Orda's territory, and this by definition made her Jochi's chief wife, even though her son, Orda, was passed over for succession in favour of Oki's son Batu.[142] However, Carpini's

---

[135] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 240; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 195. Boyle's translation. The key phrase here is *bar qarār-i māżī*, 'according to what is past/has gone before'.

[136] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 218; RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 77. The order of Ögödei's wives is extremely difficult to pin down, as shown in I. de Rachewiltz, 'Was Töregene Qatun Ögödei's "Sixth Empress"?', *East Asian History*, No.17/18, (June/December, 1999), pp. 71-76.

[137] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 240; RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 390.

[138] Broadbridge, *Women*, pp. 168-170.

[139] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 240.

[140] Broadbridge, *Women*, pp. 19-20, 88. Chinggis' wives Qulan and Yisui both did this.

[141] Dawson, *The Mongol Mission*, p. 60.

[142] Broadbridge, *Women*, pp. 230-1. Something that has largely been discounted here is Orda's own desires. Rashīd al-Dīn states that he 'gave consent' to Batu becoming ruler, RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p.348. Perhaps he simply had no interest in ruling the larger *ulus*. According to Ötemish Ḥājjī's 16th century *Jingiz-nama*, Batu and Orda both advanced claims to the succession, and Chinggis settled on Batu for his knowledge of the *jasaq*, T.T. Allsen, 'The Princes of the Left Hand: An Introduction to the History of the *Ulus* of Orda in the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries', *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, Vol. 5, (1987), p. 9.

statement sounds very much like that of Juvainī regarding Möge. What precedent is Juvainī speaking of here? The precedent of regency or the precedent of men's camps going to their wives? We know that Juvainī sometimes misunderstood Mongol customs, such as the position of the *otchigin*.[143] Whether or not Juvainī is confusing these two 'customs', Möge's assumption of this regency role throws into question Töregene's status as sole chief wife.[144]

[143] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 186. Juvainī confused the position of *otchigin*, whereby the youngest son of the ruler receives his father's *yurt* and lands, with the assumption of rule.

[144] Broadbridge, *Women*, pp. 168-9 shows this confusion, saying that Töregene was 'the senior wife', but then on the next page stating that Möge had greater seniority having been married to Chinggis and being favoured by Ögödei publicly, making her of greater status and the one expected to rule as regent. In my view, either we discard or mistrust Juvainī's information about Möge, or we assume that the later sources (Rashīd al-Dīn, *YS*) gloss over her short regency. If the latter, then this must make us question whether Töregene was in actual fact the chief wife, or whether the role of 'chief wife' was always exclusive.

3.4.2 Categorising Loyalty to the Regent

Whatever the case may be, it seems that the Mongols at this stage turned to women to rule once it was realised that giving a Chinggisid prince the regency was a dangerous ploy. Nonetheless, when Töregene became regent, our sources very much indicate this was through her own design. Naturally, we must be wary of our Persian authors here, for whom Töregene and Oghul Gaimish have two major downsides, they were Ögödeids and they were not men. However, as Juvainī states, Töregene was able to win over the key figures in the Mongol state, namely Chaghadai, the only surviving son of Chinggis by Börte, and the other princes to support her regency.[145] This directly contradicts Rashīd al-Dīn's claims that Töregene 'without consulting the *aqa-ini*s, seized control of the kingdom' (به دل خود بی کنگاچ آقا و اینی ملک را در قبضهٔ تصرف آورد, *bi dil-i khud bī-kingāch-i āqā va īnī mulk rā dar qabża-yi taṣarruf āvard*), even going so far as to describe her regency as *bulqaq*, or rebellion (در آن فترت و بلغاق, *dar ān fitrat va bulghāq*).[146] These disagreements are fundamental in understanding loyalty decisions not just for this period, but for Güyük and Oghul Gaimish's reigns as well.

From our analyses of the first three regencies of the Mongol Empire, it seems that the position was not one which was officially established, but rather emerged as a stop-gap, agreed upon by key players in the Mongol world. In the regencies of both Töregene and Güyük's widow Oghul Gaimish, we have the *aqa* (eldest prince) agreeing to their assumption of power.[147] Unlike the selection of a khan then, the regent's power was not established in a *quriltai*, but it did have the backing of another key figure between reigns, the *aqa*. Loyalty-wise, therefore, these periods were more uncertain.[148] From a charismatic loyalty point of view, we know that the Mongols regularly accepted women in positions of power. Hö'elün, Alahai, Sorqoqtani Beki, Töregene and Oghul Gaimish all were accepted as rulers or custodians of power.[149] Töregene in particular seems to have been able to win people over through her dominant personality. Even in Juvainī and Rashīd al-Dīn, she received begrudging respect, a sure sign that she was well thought of in the Mongol world. Juvainī calls her shrewd, wise, capable and cunning and able to show kindness when required also.[150]

---

[145] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 240.
[146] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 390-1; RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, pp. 809-811. Thackston's translation.
[147] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 395.
[148] Jones, 'The Objects of Loyalty', p. 14.
[149] Not to mention women in the regional *uluses* (Orghina Khatun in the Chaghadaid *ulus*, Boraqchin Khatun in the Jochid *ulus* etc.)
[150] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 240.

Rashīd al-Dīn calls her 'totally domineering' (در طبیعت او تسلطی تمام بوده, *dar ṭabīʿat-i ū tasalluṭī tamām būda*), perhaps not intended as a compliment, but certainly a quality necessary for leadership.[151]

With regards to loyalties of self-interest, these were trying times. Mongol actors had to try and stay on the good side of both the regent and potential claimants to the throne. Key officials such as Chinqai and Maḥmūd Yalāvach, who had been favoured by both Chinggis and Ögödei, were removed by Töregene for example. Both turned to the Ögödeid prince Köten for refuge, and were restored to power by Güyük.[152] Clientelist loyalties were played upon by the regents and other actors, like Batu and Sorqoqtani, who plied their relatives with gifts and honours, as well as promise of future advancement. Töregene was able to not only encourage the Mongol ruling classes to support her own regency, but also her own candidate for succession, her eldest son Güyük. Her position as regent significantly aided this ability. Shiremün, Ögödei's chosen successor according to Rashīd al-Dīn and the *YS*, was young and unable to gain much support for himself without the resources of the empire at his disposal and his grandmother in full control of Ögödeid fortunes.[153] Interestingly, Güyük does not seem to have done much in his own 'campaign', relying on his mother to pull the strings on his behalf. Oghul Gaimish was able to gain support originally for her own regency, but was unable to gain support for a successor, as she seems to have been unable to choose between her own sons Khoja and Naqu, and Ögödei's grandson Shiremün.[154] Competing regional power bases, such as those of Batu and Sorqoqtani, together were able to stump up plenty of funds to bribe key figures to support their candidate, Möngke.[155]

If we consider inertial loyalties, naturally on the death of a ruler, some change must occur, and in this regard, those thoughts must have been centred on who could make the smoothest

[151] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 304; RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, p. 559. Thackston's translation.

[152] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, pp. 242, 257, 259.

[153] Shiremün's mother, Qadaqach of the Qonggirat, is rarely mentioned in our sources, but according to Juvainī, she was killed along with Oghul Gaimish after Möngke's enthronement, so she was likely an avid supporter of Shiremün's claim to the throne, Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 588. Her lineage is provided in RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 87.

[154] We have at least one piece of evidence that Güyük in fact named a successor. In Chapter 107 of the YS (the genealogy of the Mongols), Naqu is called 太子, *tàizǐ*, or crown prince. This is the same term used for Shiremün by this source as well, and was regularly used for the designated successors of Chinese emperors, L. Hambis, 'Le Chapitre CVII du Yuan Che', *T'oung Pao*, Vol. 38-Supplement, (1945), pp. 76, 85; Jackson, 'Dissolution', p. 322, note 70. The genealogy of this chapter elsewhere is highly suspect. Nonetheless, it is interesting that this Toluid source would confer this legitimising aspect on one of Güyük's sons. It is regularly argued that Chinese sources on the Mongols attempted to delegitimise Güyük by emphasising Shiremün's position as chosen successor of his father (eg. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, p. 24; Kim, 'Reappraisal of Güyüg Khan', pp. 322, 325). However, this title given by the *YS* to Naqu seems to contradict this aim, in fact delegitimising Möngke's accession, though perhaps Naqu's selection by the usurping Güyük trumps this? If Naqu was named as successor, Khoja clearly did not accept this, perhaps because of his own seniority, and the fact that his mother seemingly never came out in open support of Naqu.

[155] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 402-3.

transition of power. The fact that the Ögödeids continued to have support, even when the Toluid coup was almost a *fait accompli*, indicates that many people were happy with Ögödeid rule until its end.[156] This extended to the regents, who seemed most likely to provide continuity of rule and a successor from within the Ögödeid house. According to Juvainī, Chaghadai and the other princes accepted Töregene's rule on the condition that 'the old ministers should remain in the service of the Court, so that the old and new *yasas* might not be changed from what was the law.'[157] As Geoffrey Humble notes, Juvainī here is setting Töregene up to show exactly that she failed to do this, targeting key ministers of Chinggis and Ögödei like Chinqai and Maḥmūd Yalāvach.[158] Notwithstanding this, those who assumed Töregene would provide continuity would be bitterly disappointed. She put many of her own people in power, and if Rashīd al-Dīn and the *YS* are to be believed, changed the succession from Shiremün to her own son Güyük. We also hear that this period saw many princes acting on their own, issuing their own *jarligh*s and *paiza*s, which Güyük had Arghun Aqa collect during his reign.[159] Clearly, there were some who saw this as an opportunity to advance their own ends, and to test their new regent's authority.

With regards to communal loyalties, to a large extent we see the expected actions from members of a similar group. The different lines largely backed power holders from their own lineages. However, the Toluids and Jochids were better able to pry away individual princes from the Ögödeid and Chaghadaid lines to support them, as we have already seen. The Ögödeids and Chaghadaids do not seem to have been able to win over any Toluids or Jochids to their cause, which suffered from divisions within it, as Oghul Gaimish was unable to settle on any one successor. Another interesting case here is that of the Uighurs. Their *idiqut*, Salindi, had been installed by Töregene Khatun, and he and his people continued to support the Ögödeids, as they came out in support of Oghul Gaimish and her sons Khoja and Naqu against Möngke. When Salindi and the Ögödeids were outmanoeuvred, Salindi was tortured to confession at the Mongol *jarghu*, then executed by his brother Ogunch, who was confirmed as *idiqut* by Möngke.[160] Communal loyalties, even to the regents, could therefore be very powerful. This communal loyalty to the Ögödeids was presumably strengthened by the Uighurs' inertial and clientelist loyalties to the regime which had greatly rewarded them and made them a key part of their empire.

[156] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 562.
[157] Idem, p. 240.
[158] Idem, p. 241; Humble, 'Narrating Female Rule', pp. 1, 8-10.
[159] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 509.
[160] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, pp. 48-53. For more on the institution of the *jarghu*, see I. Vasary, 'The Preconditions to Becoming a Judge (*Yarġuči*) in Mongol Iran', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 26, (2016), pp. 157-169.

On the last type of loyalty, namely ideal loyalty, the issue of regency is a tricky one. Considering the ad hoc nature of the position, how do we establish what one ought to do? Some arguments are lined up by our authors, in line with Mongol expectations on how things should be done. Rashīd al-Dīn, as we have seen, targets Töregene not because of who she is per se, but because she failed to consult the *aqa-ini* and the will of Chinggis.[161] Therefore she ignores Mongol custom in her seizure of power, and Chinggis' legacy by ignoring his choice for Shiremün as Ögödei's successor. This not only calls into question her rule as regent (though Rashīd al-Dīn proposes no other candidate), but it also delegitimises Güyük's reign. However, this reasoning only appears in the 14th century. In Juvainī's work, there is nothing wrong with Töregene's *assumption* of power, but rather in her failure to adhere to the conditions put on it.[162] Neither does Juvainī have any issue with Güyük's ascent to the throne, in fact marking his suitability as a ruler. He even gives it the full Toluid stamp of approval, by saying that Sorqoqtani and her sons were at one with Töregene in her support for Güyük.[163] Oghul Gaimish also seems to have followed procedure, consulting with chief ministers, Sorqoqtani and Batu, who confirmed her in her position.[164] Oghul Gaimish's right to rule similarly was frittered away, by her disputes with her sons and senior kinsmen, as well as her adherence to Mongol shamans.[165] Thus, ideal loyalty to the regent seems to depend on the regent's ability to gain support from the *aqa-ini*, and not lose it by overreaching their more limited powers. We have no information as to whether Chinggis, Ögödei, or Güyük made any provisions for a regent to take over, so consultation seems to be the deciding factor in a regent's legitimacy.

3.5 The Aqa

To move on to a character who has been mentioned several times, the *aqa* seems to have been another figure who demanded loyalty in this period. I have discussed elsewhere the hazy role of the *aqa*, and the uncertainty which surrounds what powers the position entailed.[166] In essence, the

[161] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 304, 390.
[162] Humble, 'Narrating Female Rule', p. 13.
[163] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I. p. 251.
[164] Idem, p. 263.
[165] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 265. While this may seem a reflection not of Mongol preference, but of Juvainī's own religious beliefs, William of Rubruck reported that Möngke said she was a witch who had destroyed her whole family, Dawson, *The Mongol Mission*, p. 203. The accusation of witchcraft was often turned on women who gained too much power, such as Töregene's advisor, Fāṭima.
[166] Jones, 'The Objects of Loyalty, pp. 15-17. There is relatively little discussion of the term in modern dictionaries and encyclopaedias. It is either not mentioned: Atwood, *Encyclopedia of Mongolia*, or dealt with cursorily: P. Buell, *The A to Z of the Mongol World Empire*, (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2003), p. 107; T. May,

aqa was the person recognised as the eldest male member of the Chinggisid house. Thus, when Chaghadai died in 1242, Batu, the second son of Jochi, is described as the *aqa*, even though Chinggis' younger brother Temüge Otchigin was still alive at this point. Batu also had an elder brother, Orda, and it is not altogether clear why Batu became not only the ruler of the Jochid *ulus*, but also the *aqa*. Broadbridge has hypothesised that this may have had to do with their mothers, with Batu's mother Oki being Börte's niece, and thus of higher status.[167] However, we should not discount Toluid manufacturing of this position for Batu. After all, it is Batu's position as *aqa* which is the crux upon which Juvainī's, and Rashīd al-Dīn's following him, arguments for Möngke's succession are almost entirely based.[168] Even Rashīd al-Dīn admits that Orda's name had precedence over Batu's in Möngke's decrees.[169] The anonymous Tartar Relation states that Orda was held in higher honour than Batu among the generals because of his seniority.[170] John of Plano Carpini also noted that Orda was 'the eldest of all the chiefs'.[171] This is not to dispute Batu's control of the Jochid *ulus*, or the great power he held in the realm, but to question his position as *aqa*, and the loyalty obligations owed to

---

The Mongol Empire: A Historical Encyclopedia, Vol. I, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2017), p. 47; D.O. Morgan, 'Aqa', *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, Online, https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/aqa-or-aca, Accessed 12th November 2021. Gerhard Doerfer analyses the term more precisely, but largely from a philological perspective, focusing on it as a term of respect or a title, though he does at some point translate it as '*Sippenhaupt*', or head of the clan, Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente,* Band I, pp. 134-140. F.W. Cleaves, '*Aqa Minu*', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 24, (1962-1963), pp. 64-81 discusses this role further, noting that the term could be widely applied to uncles, brothers, fathers, and as a term of respect. Kaare Gronbech went even further, stating that in Turkic languages 'another special term cutting into the generations is the very common *aqa*, which primarily means "head, chief, elder", but is secondarily (and not vice versa, as is often assumed) used for eldest brother','The Turkish System of Kingship' *Studia Orientalia Ionna Pedersen dicata*, (Copenhagen: Eingar Munksgaard, 1953), pp. 124-129. (p. 127), quoted in Cleaves, *'Aqa Minu*', p. 80.

[167] Broadbridge, *Women*, p. 231.

[168] Thus the Toluid historians' editing of Jochi's role in the Mongol world could not go too far, as opposed to Atwood, 'Early Western Campaigns', pp. 35-56. This is a question that needs to be reconciled. Without Batu's status as *aqa*, the Toluids' coup could not be shown as anything more than a barefaced power grab. In order to show Batu as the *aqa* therefore, Juvainī does not mention Jochi's possible bastardy. Rashīd al-Dīn explicitly states that Börte was pregnant *before* being captured by the Merkit, but does allude to the fact that Tolui never considered him illegitimate, RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 347-8. One might think that mentioning it at all was unnecessary, but as Atwood points out, by Rashīd al-Dīn's time, the Jochids had long been enemies of the Ilkhanids and the Yuán. However, if, as Atwood implies (p. 55), the bastardy claims are simply made up by the Toluid historians in the 14th century, then why is Batu himself not the prime contender for the throne in 1248? He complained about his illness, but he lived for another nine years after this, and regularly asserted his own power, even against Möngke himself. We also must consider the meaning of Jochi's name, 'guest, visitor'. Rashīd al-Dīn puts this down to him being born unexpectedly, RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 347, but it also could have been intended to remind Jochi of his place in the Chinggisid family. Another more prosaic possibility is the tendency in the Mongol world to name sons after the person or thing seen first after the child's birth.

[169] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 348.

[170] *The Vinland Map,* p. 76.

[171] Dawson, *The Mongol Mission*, p. 26; 'The long and wonderfull voyage of Frier John de Plano Carpini, Anno 1246', (ed.) R. Hakluyt, in *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation In Twelve Volumes, Volume I*, (London: MacMillan and Co., 1903), Online Edition, (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 108. '*Ordu verò omnium Ducum senior*.'

him because of the position. Anne Broadbridge has described the attempts to portray the necessity of attending on Batu's word as 'retroactive whitewashing'.[172]

It is indubitable that the Mongols held great respect for age and seniority, as we have seen on several occasions. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the Toluid apologists use this cultural value to explain Batu and the Toluids' actions. However, it was in fact Batu's position as lord of the Jochid *ulus* which allowed him to encourage the coup against the Ögödeids. The charisma he derived from this position certainly helped him to become the khanmaker he later was. As lord of the western *ulus*, he was put in charge of the campaign to the west under Ögödei, in which he performed quite well, at least according to Juvainī. Apparently his fervent prayer and encouragement of Muslims in his entourage to do the same contributed to the Mongols' defeat of the Hungarians.[173] At the siege of Közelsk however, Batu was unable to take the city for two months, and it only fell when Qada'an, a son of Ögödei, and Büri, a son of Chaghadai, arrived.[174] His great power described by later European and Armenian sources stemmed from his support for Möngke and virtual independence in his western *ulus*.[175] Batu also seems to have chosen his allies well, as Sorqoqtani and Möngke were held in high regard. This would have conveyed to him a great deal of charisma. The fact that he was also possibly chosen specifically by Chinggis as lord of the *ulus* would have lent him further support.[176]

Of course, we cannot gloss over the issues with Batu's lineage either. If the allegations about his father Jochi's illegitimacy were well-known at the time, it is likely that many would not have seen his son as a true elder brother.[177] The *SHM* relates an incident where this viewpoint was shown. In the western campaign of the late 1230s and early 1240s, a feast with all the commanders took place. Batu, as the eldest among those princes, was the first to drink of the ceremonial wine.[178] Büri, a son

---

[172] Broadbridge, *Women*, p. 203.

[173] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 270.

[174] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 327.

[175] E.g. William of Rubruck, Dawson, *The Mongol Mission*, pp. 136, 155, or Kirakos, *History of the Armenians*, pp. 263, 293.

[176]Allsen, 'Princes of the Left Hand, pp. 8-9 states that while Bar Hebraeus (p. 389) says that Ögödei chose Batu, and our other sources don't mention how Batu was chosen, we have it from Jūzjānī (pp. 1164-6) that Chinggis chose Batu. This is followed by later sources such as Naṭanzī, Abū'l Ghāzī, and the *Jīngīz-nāma* of Ötemish Ḥājjī. While Allsen is convinced by the veracity of these sources, Jūzjānī's credibility for Mongol history is often extremely suspect, and the other three sources are from centuries later (Naṭanzī 15th century, Ötemish Ḥājjī 16th century, and Abū'l Ghāzī 17th century). It seems strange that none of the 'official' Mongol histories mention this, but in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we can tentatively accept this claim.

[177]This is most clearly shown in SHM/de Rachewiltz, §254, p. 183, where Chaghadai complains about Jochi's possible succession saying 'How can we let ourselves be ruled by this bastard offspring of the Merkit?', referring to the Merkit's abduction of Börte before Jochi's birth. Rashīd al-Dīn has a lighter touch, but states that Tolui always had a good relationship with Jochi and considered him legitimate, RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 348.

[178] As mentioned in Chapter Two.

or grandson of Chaghadai, and Güyük, Ögödei's eldest son, refused to partake in the feast and rode off, but not before levelling insulting words at Batu. Batu reported the event to Ögödei, who was furious with his son, originally planning to put him in the vanguard of his forces for the most dangerous missions, before being talked down by the princes and commanders to commute the punishment to Batu, the head of the campaign.[179]

This feast has been discussed by Hodong Kim and Istvan Zimonyi, who point out that even if this event did happen, the punishment scene would have been impossible given that Güyük returned to Mongolia after Ögödei's death and both princes fought alongside Batu for some time after the supposed feast.[180] While the *SHM* and the *YS* highlight Batu's cowardliness during the western campaign, it is notable that the princes were angry about seniority here.[181] This could hardly have been in doubt unless they are referring to Batu's descent from the illegitimate Jochi. Even if this event's veracity is questionable, the rumours about Jochi were no doubt in circulation at the time, and thus there may well have been many people who did not accept Batu's claim to the position of *aqa*.[182]

3.5.1 Categorising Loyalty to the *Aqa*

From a clientelist loyalty perspective, Batu's power, standing and wealth put him in good stead to both encourage and threaten. His move to hold a convocation of the princes in his own *ulus* in 1249 surely carried an implicit threat to participants to go his way regarding succession. If our

[179] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §275-277, pp. 206-7.

[180] H. Kim, 'A Reappraisal of Güyüg Khan', in (eds.) R. Amitai and M. Biran, *Mongols, Turks, and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World*, (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 315-317; I. Zimonyi, ''The Feast After the Siege of the Alan Capital in the Western Campaign of the Mongols', *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, Vol. 22 (2016), pp. 241-256.

[181] SHM/de Rachwiltz, §275, p. 206, has Büri comparing Batu to 'old women with beards', while the *YS* puts the criticism in the mouth of the general Subedei, who is angry at Batu's performance against the Hungarians, saying 'If you, sire, want to return, go back alone!', YS 121/2977-8, quoted from Kim, 'A Reappraisal of Güyüg', p. 318. The generally negative picture of Batu in the SHM seems to indicate that at least those sections must have been composed after Batu's death. A very different picture is given in John of Plano Carpini, where Batu is the saviour of the Hungarian campaign, through his valour encouraging the Mongols who would have left otherwise, *Mongol Mission*, p. 30.

[182] The narrative concerning Jochi has been challenged in Atwood, 'Early Western Campaigns', *passim*, who shows how Jochi's role was reduced in various Chinese sources, the SHM, and the Persian historians. Indeed, Atwood posits based on RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 53 where Chinggis tells Jochi 'I have stored up all these realms, armies, and peoples for you', that Jochi was Chinggis' heir, 'Early Western Campaigns', p. 45. This is taken up by Marie Favereau, who states that Jochi was demoted based on his poor performance in the Khwarazmian campaign, *The Horde*, p. 61. However, as I show, Batu's position as *aqa* is crucial to the Toluid takeover itself, and thus I believe that this analysis must be taken into account regarding Toluid attitudes to the Jochids.

sources are to be believed, he himself may have been considered by some as a candidate, in which case his potential to reward and punish was heightened. Indeed, even after it was made clear that Möngke was Batu's favoured choice and subsequently was enthroned, Batu was used by Möngke as his executioner, with 'being sent to Batu' almost a euphemism for extrajudicial murders.[183] While it is known that Mengeser Noyan was Möngke's *jarghuchi* (chief judge),[184] it may be that the preservation and enforcement of the *jasaq* was also expected of the *aqa*. It is well known that Chaghadai was seen as the strict enforcer of the *jasaq*, even upon himself, and our sources state that he was assigned as preserver of the law.[185] Juvainī speaks of the legendary 'fear of his *yasa* and punishment' (بیم یاسا و سیاست او, *bīm-i yāsā va siyāsat-i ū*) and that he enacted 'minute *yasa*s' (یاساهای باریک, *yāsā-hā-yi bārīk*).[186]

Batu also is portrayed by various sources as a strict upholder of the *jasaq* and Mongol custom. Carpini shows Batu enforcing Mongol ritual and marriage standards on Rus' Christians such as Duke Michael of Chernigov and the younger brother of Andrew of Chernigov, and on Carpini himself.[187] Juvainī also tells us that Batu was more firm in carrying out the law than Ögödei. In the case of Edigü-Temür, a rival administrator to Korguz for the territory of Khurasan, we are told that Ögödei tried him and found him guilty of breaking the *jasaq* of Chinggis Khan against lying informers. However, Ögödei spares Edigü-Temür, a servant of Batu, with Juvainī saying 'had the case been sent to Batu, even had he been his dearest friend, what mercy would he have shown him?' (اگر آن سخنها بنزدیک باتو رسانیدندی, اگر او خود عزیزترین کسی بودی, برو چه ابقا رفتی *agar ān sukhan-hā bi-nazdīk-i bātū rasānīdandī, agar ū khud ʿaziztarīn kasī būdī, bar ū chi ibqā' rafti?*).[188] A much later source, the 16th century *Tārīkh-i Dūst Sulṭān* by Ötemish Ḥājjī, claims that Chinggis chose Batu for succession to the Jochid *ulus* because his words were in accordance with the *jasaq*.[189] Admittedly, we have a very small

[183] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, pp. 588-90; Kirakos, *History of the Armenians*, p. 294. Büri, Yesü Möngke, Eljigidei were all dealt with by Batu according to Juvainī, though Rashīd al-Dīn states that Orghina Khatun, the widow of Qara Hülegü, killed Yesü Möngke, RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 376.

[184] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 409.

[185] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, pp. 205, 272; BH/Budge, p. 353; RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 304, 374-5.

[186] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 272; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 227. Boyle's translation.

[187] Dawson, *Mongol Mission*, pp. 10-11, 56.

[188] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, pp. 498-9; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. II, p. 235. Boyle's translation.

[189] I. Vásáry, '*Yasa* and *Sharīʿa.* Islamic Attitudes towards the Mongol Law in the Turco-Mongolian World (From the Golden Horde to Timur's Time)', in (eds.) R. Gleave and I.T. Kristo-Nagy, *Violence in Islamic Thought from the Mongols to European Imperialism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018) pp. 70-1. Ötemish Ḥājjī was a historian of the 1550s, whose work was dedicated to the Chinggisid ruler Dūst Muḥammad Khan of the Khwarazmian Uzbek Arabshahid dynasty, and is the first 'internal' history of the Jochid Khanate. It emphasises the Shibanid lineage of Ḥājjī's patron, and is, as stated by the author, a reproduction of stories he was told and were not set down in any chronicle. His account does share many similarities with Mamluk and Persian histories of an earlier period however, D. DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tükles and Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition*. (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), pp. 144-9.

sample size for the actions of the *aqa*, so it is not clear that the *jasaq* was totally within the *aqa*'s remit. It may be that as ruler of an *ulus*, Batu was expected to handle matters of law within his own realm. However, in his khanmaker role, he does seem to have had extra powers of punishment until Möngke's accession, as we see from the quote from Rashīd al-Dīn above.[190]

With respect to inertial loyalties, many Mongol political players may have seen a transition to Jochid and Toluid power as a smoother option than remaining with the Ögödeids. Given the significant military might the two houses contained between them, it certainly would have looked to some an easier transfer of power than to the divided Ögödeids. Indeed, the Jochids and Toluids do not appear to have been divided in any way as to their choice of ruler, unlike the Ögödeids and their supporters. Continued support of the Ögödeids could have led to a civil war between the three candidates, Khoja, Naqu and Shiremün. Naturally, this also occurred with the shift away from the Ögödeids, but the joint forces of the Toluids and Jochids were quickly able to snuff out the Ögödeid response to their coup, without great warfare.[191] It was probably not possible to foresee this, but some may have been hedging their bets that the Ögödeids were less united and more likely to cause a full-scale civil war. There is also a fascinating titbit mentioned by Juvainī which has not received much attention in previous studies. According to him, many people flocked to pay homage to Chaghadai after Ögödei's death.[192] This likely was a case of inertial loyalty, assuming that power would naturally transfer to another son of Chinggis, and the *aqa* of the princes, rather than to Ögödei's sons or his chosen successor, his grandson Shiremün. If Juvainī's information is accurate, the seniority principle was still very strong in this period, and strengthens the image of the *aqa*.

3.5.2 Loyalty Obligations to the *Aqa*

The issue of idealistic loyalty to the *aqa* is a complex one. Certainly, we are on solid ground in saying that the Mongols generally respected seniority, and age was often a determinant of one's social status. However, the idea of the *aqa*'s unquestioned authority vis-a-vis other loyalty objects in the Mongol world, like the regent, is one that perhaps needs further investigation. Juvainī, who is happy to use this term for Batu, does not use it for Chaghadai for example. One instance where he

[190] See p. 95.

[191] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, pp. 578-9; RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 405-6.

[192] Juvainī/Boyle. Vol. I, p. 272. If we accept Chaghadai's death after Ögödei's, I have shown elsewhere that Rashīd al-Dīn put Chaghadai's death before that of Ögödei, Jones, 'The Objects of Loyalty', p. 15. This may also explain why Temüge Otchigin made an attempt to take the throne in 1246, considering that Chinggis' sons were all dead, and he was the most senior of the Borjigin Mongols, now by two generations, but naturally, not of the Chinggisid house.

does use it is particularly interesting. Having established in his chapter on Möngke's accession that Batu is the *aqa*, later in the same chapter, he relates that Khoja, the son of Güyük, had received an envoy from Möngke, and flew into a rage and wanted to kill the envoy. One of his junior wives warns him against such an action, and advises Khoja to respect the position of envoys and to go to Möngke, saying 'Mengu Qa'an is the *aqa* and in the position of a father: thou must go to him and submit thyself to his command, whatever it be.'[193]

We are left somewhat perplexed by this statement, and its potential social and political implications. Why was Möngke now considered the *aqa*? The major change since Juvainī proclaimed that Batu was the *aqa* of all the princes is that Möngke has now been made *qa'an*. Möngke's accession to the khanate then, makes him the symbolic *aqa*. If Batu's status as *aqa* leant him weight in the choosing of the *qa'an*, then presumably this transfer of the position to the elected leader is to ensure loyalty to the *qa'an* himself, otherwise Batu as *aqa* could continue to demand allegiance in this role. Another aspect of the quote from Khoja's wife is the statement that Möngke takes the position of a father. Thus, Möngke, now as *aqa* and *qa'an*, has taken the position of Güyük, Khoja's actual father. In this, the social position of the *aqa* seems to represent a familial authority in the absence of a father figure.[194] Thus Juvainī here is laying on thick the obligations Khoja has to Möngke. To disobey him is not just to disobey his elder brother, but his father figure.

3.5.3 The *Aqa* as Khanmaker

Perhaps then the *aqa*'s position only held compulsive power during an interregnum. In the biography of Ila Chucai, it is notable that Chucai, after telling the regent, Tolui, to call the *quriltai* in 1229, then approaches Chaghadai and tells him that though he is the elder brother, he must act as a servant to the realm. Should Chaghadai accept Ögödei's leadership, none would dare oppose him, whereupon Chaghadai duly leads his entire family and the officials in a salute to the troops.[195] Naturally, this biography's aim is to show Chucai as the only one with the wherewithal to ensure a smooth succession, but it is interesting nonetheless that it highlights Chaghadai's role in this potentially tricky time, as well as his ability to decide matters for the entire Mongol world. We may

[193] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 586.
[194] It also seems that once a senior lineage had been established, all members of that line would have been *aqa* to members of junior lineages, thus Ögödei's descendants could always have been *aqa* to Tolui's, even with generational or age differences, see B. Krader, *Social Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Pastoral Nomads*, (The Hague: Mouton & Co, 1963), pp. 72-3 and this work, pp. 122-3.
[195] Humble, 'Biography of Yelu Chucai', p. 4.

wonder why Chaghadai did not simply seize the throne himself if his status was as high as the *YS* would have us believe.

For another example of an *aqa* who did not become ruler but did influence the choice of successor, we can turn to the Tayichi'ut and one of their leaders, Tödö'en Girte. This character appears in the *SHM*, the *YS* and Rashīd al-Dīn.[196] Only Rashīd al-Dīn gives his lineage, saying that he was either a son of Qada'an Taishi, or a younger brother, making him either a grandson or son of Ambaqai Khan.[197] It was Qada'an Taishi who, along with Qutula, Temüjin's ancestor, was considered for succession by his father Ambaqai, with the rule being settled on Qutula after a *quriltai* of the Mongols and the Tayichi'ut.[198] According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Tödö'en should have been chosen as the ruler of the Tayichi'ut, but was robbed of this by the indecision of his cousins, who failed to agree on a leader, leading to the Tayichi'ut's demise.[199] However, elsewhere Rashīd al-Dīn contradicts himself, saying that the great rival of Temüjin, Tarqutai Qiriltuq, was the *pādshāh*, and that he had been chosen by Tödö'en and the leaders and amirs of the Tayichi'ut.[200] Several times, Rashīd al-Dīn mentions the status of Tödö'en, and his role as a decision maker and influence on his relatives. Firstly, he calls Tödö'en 'their (the Tayichi'ut's) elder', (مهین ایشان, *mihīn-i īshān*), saying that though he did not become ruler himself, he was well-respected as the son of a ruler (either Ambaqai or Qada'an.) and he had sons of his own.[201] It was to Tödö'en that two contenders for the Tayichi'ut leadership, Tarqutai and Baghachi, turned to for mediation of their dispute, and Tödö'en was part of the council that decided for Tarqutai, forcing Baghachi to submit. It is unclear why Tödö'en did not succeed himself, but nevertheless, he maintained an influential role among the Tayichi'ut.

Tödö'en appears again in the course of Mongol history, playing a role in the 'betrayal' of Temüjin by Yisügei's followers. This is captured most emotively by the *YS*: 'Töde'en Qorčin, [...] was also going to rebel, and the emperor (Temüjin), in tears, detained him. Töde'en said, "The deep pool has already dried up, the hard stone is already broken, so what is the use of bringing us back?" and

---

[196] Here I have chosen the *SHM*'s version of his name, though in Rashīd al-Dīn he is called Todo'an Qamurchi, or Today/Toda'a, while in the *YS* he is called Töde'en Qorčin. SHM/de Rachewiltz, §72, p. 18; RAD/Thackston, Vol. I pp. 101, 159; YS/Atwood, p. 9. De Rachewiltz explains that these are to be seen as all the same person, 'Philological Commentary', Vol. I, p. 346.

[197] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, pp. 101, 123.

[198] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §57, pp. 12-13. Rashīd al-Dīn contradicts this statement, saying that Qada'an Taishi succeeded to his father's place, RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 123; RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, p. 223. قدآن تایشی به جای او بنشست, *qadān tāshī bi jā-yi ū binishast*.

[199] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 123.

[200] Idem, pp. 121, 131.

[201] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 101. RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, p. 174. Vol. I, p. 175 تودای اگرچه به پادشاهی ننشست, لیکن پادشاه زاده بود و معتبر و پسران داشته, *tūdāī agarchi bi pādshāhī nanishast, līkin pādshāhzāda būd va muʿtabar va pisarān dāshta*.

led a great number to speed away, leaving Temüjin astonished.'[202] This story is told in Rashīd al-Dīn and the *SHM* as well, in each case with Tödö'en responding with a Mongolian proverb to explain his departure.[203] However, in order to understand this exchange properly, Rashīd al-Dīn's version must be taken into account. The story is much the same, but Rashīd al-Dīn adds the detail that Tödö'en was 'the *aqa* of all', (اقای همه بود*, āqā-yi hama būd*).[204] Thus, Tödö'en is the *aqa* not just of the Tayichi'ut, but of both the Tayichi'ut and the Kiyat Mongols, who had long been united. Therefore, the young Temüjin is a supplicant to his *aqa*, pleading with him to maintain the unity of the groups, and presumably to support his own leadership. Tödö'en's refusal, and the subsequent attack on him by Hö'elün now should be seen in a different light, if Juvainī and Rashīd al-Dīn's claims as to the position of the *aqa* are to be believed. Hö'elün taking up Yisügei's *tugh* (standard) and fighting to 'gain back' Temüjin's people may in fact have been a grave social misdeed, as the *aqa* had made his decision.

Another situation that has been largely previously ignored is the statement by Rashīd al-Dīn concerning Berke as the inheritor of the position of *aqa*.[205] This is partly due to a translation issue. Thackston, when translating the section on Hülegü and Berke's conflict, twice translates the term *aqa* in different ways, saying 'Because Berke was an elder relative, Hülägü Khan tolerated him' and 'even if he is an elder [...] he knows nothing of shame or modesty and addresses me (Hülegü) with threats and violence.'[206] However, if we look at the original Persian, it states:

> هولاگو خان از راه آنکه برکای آقا بود تحمل می نمود. او اگرچه آقا است ... از راه حیا و آزرم دور است و با من به تهدید و عنف خطاب می کند '*hūlāgū khān az rāh-i ānki barkāy āqā būd taḥammul mī-namūd*' and '*ū agarchi āqā ast […] az rāh-i ḥayā va āzarm dūr ast va bā man bi tahdīd va ʿunf khaṭāb mī-kunad*'.[207]

It seems as if Thackston is conveying properly the anti-Jochid sentiment of the Ilkhans, regarding Berke as simply one of several older relatives. However, there seems to be no reason to translate the term *aqa* here as indefinite.[208] Berke was the younger brother of the previous *aqa*,

---

[202] YS/Atwood, p. 9.

[203] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 159; SHM/de Rachewiltz, §72, p. 18.

[204] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 159; RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, p. 295.

[205] This was noticed by Peter Jackson in his work, 'The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire', pp. 330-1.

[206] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 511.

[207] RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, pp. 925-6.

[208] Jackson, relying on Boyle's translation of Rashīd al-Dīn, *The Successors of Genghis Khan*, pp. 59-60, sees Berke as *the aqa*, my italics, Jackson, 'Dissolution of the Mongol Empire', p. 331. This view is also taken by George Lane, who states 'Hülegü's assumption of power in Iran and Azerbaijan was seen as not only a usurpation of power by the Tuluids at the expense of the House of Jochi but was, in addition, seen as a direct challenge to Berke in his role as *aqa*', Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, p. 39. Jackson also notes that the Mamluk historian Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir refers to Berke as *kabīr mulūk al-tatār*, 'the greatest/eldest of the kings of the Tatars'. The geographer Abū al-Fidā' echoed this, saying he was *aʿẓam mulūk al-tatār*, with the same meaning, Van den Bent, 'Mongols in Mamluk Eyes', p. 199. Van den Bent sees this as simply an inflation of Berke's

Batu, who had passed away c. 1255.[209] According to Thackston's translation, Rashīd al-Dīn also mentions that after Möngke's accession, the princes convened to make a *jasaq* to establish precedence. In this discussion 'it was unanimously agreed that Berke should sit because of his gout, [and] that Qubilai should sit beneath him.'[210] Thus, even during Batu's life, it appears that Berke's precedence was firmly established when his brother was absent.[211]

It was not only Rashīd al-Dīn who noted Berke's status as elder of the Chinggisid family. According to Qiu Yihao, the 14th century historian and geographer Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī Qazvīnī in his *Ẓafarnāma* reproduces a *jarligh* sent by Ariq Böke to Hülegü. In it, Ariq Böke claimed 'after consulting with Barkāy, son of my uncle Jochi, who was the patriarch of the clan', that he accepted enthronement.[212] As Jackson noted, Berke later struck coins in the name of Ariq Böke during the struggle between him and Qubilai. Ariq Böke then was clearly relying on Toluid precedent, in which the *aqa*'s backing determined who should be the successor, while Berke looks to have been following Batu's lead in attempting to decide the rulership.[213] In addition to Möngke's sons' support for Ariq

---

position given the Mamluk sources' favourable view of him, but it may also reflect a tradition of respect for Berke's social seniority, rather than his political power.

[209] It is unclear when Orda died. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, he was alive in 1252/3, as he ordered his eldest son Tuli to join Hülegü's campaign to the Middle East, but we do not hear of him again after this, Rashīd al-Dīn/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 361; Allsen, 'Princes of the Left Hand', p. 18. See Favereau, *The Horde*, p. 336, endnote 2 for the issues with the timing of Batu's death.

[210] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 404; RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, p. 733 however tells a different story. The Persian text is بیکی معین کرد که {برکای} به چوک گون بسبب درد پای بنشیند به جای خود, و قوبیلای نیز بنشیند *bīkī muʿayyan kard ki (barkāy) bi chūk gūn bi-sabab-i dard-i pāī binishīnad bi jā-yi khud, va qūbīlāī nīz binishīnad.* Thackston reads the first word as *bi-yikī*, however, the spelling of this word and the structure of the sentence would prefer *bīkī*, which is how Sorqoqtani's title is regularly represented. Thus we have the Toluid matriarch establishing precedence at the *quriltai*, another string to Sorqoqtani's bow, and another indication of elite women's power in the Mongol world. The exclusion of Berke's name in some manuscripts may be an indication of later attempts to reduce his role. Berke sits upon a *chowk-gūn*, which Thackston leaves untranslated. A *chowki* is a Hindi term for a high seat, or platform or bench, while the addition of the suffix *-gūn* meaning '-like', indicates that Rashīd al-Dīn himself was not quite sure of what Berke was sitting on. It is unclear how this term came to be used in Rashīd al-Dīn's work. Thackston also indicates that Qubilai was sitting 'beneath' Berke, naturally indicating his junior status, but the Persian text only says that 'Qubilai should also sit', and then goes on to say that everyone should heed Qubilai's words. The control of the Toluids is emphasised throughout, with Sorqoqtani deciding precedent, Qubilai ordering things, Möngke's brother Möge controlling the entry of the princes and amirs, and Hülegü regulating the *ba'urchi*s (cooks) and *qumuzchi*s (*kumiss* servers).

[211] Interestingly, Jūzjānī claims that after Möngke's death, the *khuṭba* was read out in Berke's name in the lands which would become the Ilkhanate, Jūzjānī/Raverty, p. 1292. Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, pp. 64, 72, accepts Jūzjānī's claim, as well as saying that this was done in recognition of his role of *aqa*. However, it seems highly unlikely that Hülegü would allow such a thing. The *khuṭba* was read for rulers, thus Jūzjānī is making a claim that Berke was the ruler of these regions. As this chapter shows, the *aqa* could not be assumed to be the next ruler.

[212] Q. Yihao, 'Independent Ruler, Indefinable Role: Understanding the History of the Golden Horde from the Perspectives of the Yuan Dynasty', *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée*, Online, Vol. 143, (2018), DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/remmm.10237, Accessed 4th April 2022, 34, quoting *Ẓafarnāma*, Tehran, Vol. 8, p. 177. This consultation must have been via an intermediary if it took place, as Berke was not present at Ariq Böke's *quriltai* in Mongolia.

[213] See also Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, p. 73.

Böke, he also was backed by the ruler of the Chaghadaid *ulus*, Orghina Khatun, which should make us question the narrative that Qubilai was the rightful ruler, and Ariq Böke the usurper.[214]

3.5.4 The Status of *Aqa*

We have other incidents reported in Rashīd al-Dīn's work that deal with the status of the *aqa*, and especially its association with rulership. The first is the accession of Abaqa to the Ilkhanate. Abaqa, already chosen by both Hülegü and a *quriltai* to be the successor, goes through the customary protests of his unsuitability for the throne. One of his complaints is that Qubilai Qa'an, the *aqa*, is not present, and therefore Abaqa could not be crowned.[215] The princes and amirs ignore this plea, and assert the many other reasons why Abaqa cannot wait to accede to the throne. Interestingly, this complaint by Abaqa seems no mere form, as while he accepts the arguments of the *quriltai* attendees, he refuses to take the actual throne, but rather sits on a plain chair until such a time as Qubilai sends a decree for him.[216] What is notable here is that Abaqa does not refuse because of Qubilai's status as the *qa'an*, but because of his status as *aqa*. Again, what does Abaqa mean here? Is Qubilai the *aqa* because he is simply Abaqa's elder within the Toluid branch of the family? The possessive pronoun in Persian is 'my *aqa*', perhaps indicating the personal relationship of Qubilai to Abaqa.[217] Berke was still alive when Abaqa was enthroned (enchaired perhaps?), though he would have been an unlikely decider in Ilkhanid succession. Perhaps we are seeing here the division in Mongol thinking, where an *aqa* of a Toluid could only be a Toluid.[218] It may be that Qubilai's status as *qa'an*, however questionable that may have been for most of the Mongol world, renders him the symbolic *aqa* to Abaqa, as well as his literal elder relative. The addition that Abaqa needs a *farmān* (decree) from Qubilai to be enthroned, however, suggests that it was Qubilai's official standing as ruler that was important.

---

[214] Jackson, 'Dissolution of the Mongol Empire', p. 332 and note 183. This point is also made in May, *The Mongol Empire*, p. 20.

[215] RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, p. 937, آباقا خان گفت: آقای من قوبیلای قا آن است, بی فرمان او چگونه توان نشست, *ābāqā khān guft: āqā-yi man qūbīlāī qā'ān ast, bī-farmān-i ū chigūna tavān nishast*.

[216] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 517.

[217] This is translated by Thackston as 'our *aqa*'. Perhaps this is a manuscript discrepancy.

[218] The amirs' and princes' response is quite telling in this regard. RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, p. 937, با وجود تو که آقای تمامت پسرانی, *bā vujūd tū ki āaā-yi tamāmat-i pisarānī*. The term *bā vujūd* is used here, 'nevertheless, notwithstanding', then addressing that Abaqa is the *aqa* of all the sons, meaning the sons of Hülegü. The potential Abaqaid bias of Rashīd al-Dīn is one thing, but this narrowing to the lineage of Hülegü is a statement by the princes and amirs that they are choosing their own ruler, Qubilai be damned.

We are also provided another highly informative exchange by Rashīd al-Dīn regarding the later ruler of the Jochid *ulus*, Toqto'a, and his relationship with the Jochid prince and famous commander and kingmaker Noghai. After the death of Möngke Temür (r. 1266-1280), the grandson of Batu through his second son Toqoqan, his younger brother Töde Möngke (r. 1280-1287) took the throne. A group of Jochid princes including Möngke Temür's sons Alghui and Toghrilcha, and Töle Buqa (a nephew of Möngke Temür) deposed him and ruled by council for some five years. Another son of Möngke Temür, Toqto'a, was apparently threatened by the council, and thus he turned to Noghai for support (Figure 6). Noghai was the grandson of Boqal (Bo'al/Bo'ol) and had led armies under Batu and Berke, and had his own *ulus* between the Danube and the Dniester.[219] Noghai had been influential in seeing both Töde Möngke and Töle Buqa established as rulers, but he apparently lacked the lineage to take control himself, though he regularly acted independently.[220] Toqto'a, therefore, was going to the right place to organise a coup.



Figure 6: The Jochid family, with specific focus on the line of Batu © Tobias Jones

[219] Favereau, *The Horde*, p. 154.

[220] Idem, pp. 192-4. Favereau posits that Noghai's inability to become ruler was simply because he was not a descendant of Batu, though Berke had shown this could be ignored. John Andrew Boyle notes that Noghai's grandfather's name could be Bo'ol or Bo'al, which both meant slave, or non-Chinggisid, Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 266, note 2. This, added to the fact that we do not have information of the mothers of Bo'ol, his son Tatar, or of Tatar's son Noghai, may indicate that these were concubines. Broadbridge, *Women*, pp. 229-234 emphasises that almost all of the Jochid rulers were of Qonggirat women, so this may have been decisively against Noghai.

The terminology of Toqto'a's approach to Noghai is the most relevant to our study of the *aqa*. In it he states:

> عمزادگان قصد خون من می کنند و تو آقای! التجا بدو می آرم که آقا است تا مرا بر دارد و دست تطاول خویشان از من کوتاه گرداند
> ʿ*amzādigān qaṣd-i khūn-i man mī-kunand va tu āqā-ī*! *Iltijā bi-dū mī-āram ki āqā ast tā marā bar-dārad va dast-i taṭāvul-i khvīshān az man kūtāh gardānad, tā jān dāram maḥkūm-i āqā bāsham va az riẓā-yi ū tajāvuz na-jūyam*.[221]
>
> My cousins are after my blood. You are the *aqa*! I take refuge with him who is the *aqa*, so he can support me and shorten the oppressive reach of my relatives. As long as I live I am subject to my *aqa* and will never do anything to earn his displeasure.[222]

Thus we have here the young prince appealing to the elder statesman for support against his bloodthirsty relatives. However, what is notable is that Toqto'a's own lineage was significantly greater than Noghai's. He was the son of a previous khan, Möngke Temür, and a descendant of Batu. He was also the grandson of Kelmish Aqa Khatun, a granddaughter of Tolui who was influential in Jochid politics.[223] Toqto'a's descent then, was one that Noghai could only aspire to. However, Noghai's age and service to the Jochid *ulus* were seemingly the determining factors in his position as *aqa*, irrespective of his lower birth. This is perhaps also telling for both Batu and Berke's own roles, as their father's possible low birth yet did not prevent them from acting the part of the *aqa*. Noghai was not only seen in this light by Toqto'a. After his sponsorship of Toqto'a, he subsequently called on every *hazāra* of troops and all the Jochid princes to attend him while he doled out wisdom and sought to make peace amongst the Jochid family by convoking a *quriltai*. Even the nominal khan, Töle Buqa, who had no love for Noghai, was forced by his mother to attend to the *aqa*.[224] Noghai thus made use of his position and feigned illness to lure the princes, then Toqto'a arrived with his troops and put to death his princely rivals.[225]

Rashīd al-Dīn later provides a denouement to the relationship between Noghai and Toqto'a. Once Toqto'a had taken the throne, a dispute arose between Noghai and Toqto'a's father-in-law, Salji'udai Güregen over a marriage alliance. Noghai demanded Salji'udai from Toqto'a, but was rejected on several occasions. This led to Noghai declaring himself as khan, and issuing coins with his

[221] RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, p. 661.
[222] For Thackston's slightly different interpretation, see RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 363.
[223] Broadbridge, *Women*, pp. 233-4.
[224] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 363.
[225] For a comprehensive look at Noghai, see Favereau, *The Horde*, Chapter 5.

tamgha, before his defeat by Toqto'a after his amirs deserted him.[226] Again, the language of Rashīd al-Dīn here should be specified. In Noghai's message to Toqto'a requesting Salji'udai, he states:

> معلوم عالمیان است که چه مایه زحمت و مشقت کشیدم و خود را به بی وفایی و بدعهدی منسوب کردم تا با حیلت تخت صاین خان تو را مستخلاص گردانیدم این زمان بر آن تخت سالجیدای قراچو حکم می کند. اگر فرزند توقتای می خواهد که قاعدهٔ پدر فرزندی میان ما ممهد باشد سالجیدای را به یورت خود باز فرستد که بنزدیک خوارزم است *maʿlūm-i ʿālamīyān ast ki chi māya zaḥmat va mashaqqat kishīdam va khud rā bi bī-vafāyī va bad-ʿahdī mansūb kardam tā bā ḥīlat takht-i ṣāyin khān tu rā mustakhlaṣ gardānīdam; īn zamān bar ān takht sāljīdāi qarāchū ḥukm mī-kunad. agar farzand tūqtāi mī-khāhad ki qāʿida-yi pidar farzandī mīyān-i mā mumahhad bāshad, sāljīdāi rā bi yūrt-i khud bāz-firistād ki bi-nazdīk-i khvārazm ast*.[227]
>
> 'All the world knows how much trouble I went to, making myself known for faithlessness and breach of promise, in order to obtain Sayin Khan's (Batu) throne for you through treachery. Now Salji'udai *qarachu* (non-Chinggisid elite) rules on that throne! If my son Toqta wishes the *father-son rule* to continue between us, let him send Salji'udai Güregen back to his own *yurt* near Khwarazm.'[228]

What are the emphases here? Again, we see that, at least in Rashīd al-Dīn's eyes, the *aqa*'s role was that of a father figure, standing in place of Toqto'a's own deceased father. The use of the word *qāʿida* to describe the father-son roles here is noteworthy.[229] It usually means rule, custom, or even institution and thus Noghai is appealing to time-honoured ideas about the relationship between a junior Chinggisid in the ruling position, and an elder in the position of *aqa* who should be respected and consulted, as had existed between Ögödei and Chaghadai, Möngke and Batu, and even Berke and Ariq Böke. Noghai then references a tradition of support and advice that had existed for some time in the Mongol and Jochid realms. He also drives home the point that Salji'udai is a *qarachu*, a word that regularly is translated as commoner, but in fact usually means something like non-Chinggisid elite.[230] Salji'udai has thus usurped the position of not just a Chinggisid, but the *aqa* of the Jochid *ulus*. Tellingly, Toqto'a responds with his own view, saying that, 'He [Salji'udai] is like a father to me, a *patron/tutor* and an *elder amir'* (او مرا چون پدر است و مربی و امیر پیر *ū marā chun pidar ast va murabbī va amīr-i pīr*).[231] Thus Toqto'a is symbolically replacing Noghai in this role with his own father-

[226] Favereau, *The Horde*, pp. 200-202.
[227] RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, p. 663.
[228] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 364. My own additions are in italics, and the word *qarachu* substituted for Thackston's *güregen*.
[229] Thackston translates this as 'relationship', but I believe that this word is not strong enough.
[230] Skrynnikova, 'Relations of Domination', pp. 104-114.
[231] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 364, again with my additions in italics. RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, p. 663.

in-law, a Qonggirat *güregen*, which in Rashīd al-Dīn's eyes was rending the social fabric of Mongol rule.[232] This snub of Noghai's perceived status was also a slap in the face to Chinggisid superiority over their non-Chinggisid amirs, which paved the way for greater control of the *ulus* by these amirs.[233]

A comparable incident emerges from the Chaghadaid *ulus*, and the death of its ruler Baraq in 1271. Baraq had been Qubilai's choice for the Chaghadaid throne, because of his opposition to Qaidu, Qubilai's Ögödeid rival. Baraq and Qaidu had a complicated relationship, at first fighting each other, but eventually coming to terms and even becoming *anda*, or blood brothers. However, their relationship was strained by Qaidu's troops' desertion of Baraq in his campaign against the Ilkhan Abaqa, leading to Baraq's defeat and Qaidu's friendship with Abaqa. Qaidu then sought to rid himself of Baraq, encircling his camp, but Baraq did him the favour of dying first. This allowed Qaidu to show himself as mourning his *anda*.[234] The upshot of all this was that Baraq's people went over to Qaidu. Rashīd al-Dīn states:

> و امرا و شهزادگان که در اوردوی او بودند پیش قایدو آمدند و زانو زدند که تا غایت براق حاکم ما بود. این زمان قایدو آقا پادشاه است, چنانچه فرماید کوچ دهیم *va umarā' va shahzādigān ki dar ūrdū-yi ū būdand pīsh-i qāīdū āmadand va zānū zadand ki tā ghāyat barāq ḥākim-i mā būd. Īn zamān qāīdū āqā pādshāh ast, chinānchi farmāyad kūch dahīm*.[235]
>
> The amirs and princes who were in his camp came to Qaidu, knelt, and said, "Until now Baraq has been our ruler. Now Qaidu is our *aqa* and ruler. We will fight as he commands".[236]

And elsewhere: بعد از امروز قایدو آقا آقای ما است و به هر آنچه فرماید مطیع و منقاد باشیم, *ba'd az imrūz qāīdū āqā āqā-yi mā ast va har ānchi farmāyad muṭī' va munqād bāshīm*.[237]

After today, Qaidu Aqa is our *aqa*. We will obey anything he commands.[238]

---

[232] We also cannot ignore that Noghai and Toqto'a were both active in asserting Jochid rights and claims against the Ilkhans, so Rashīd al-Dīn may be wishing to tar them both with breaches of Chinggisid custom. The irony of Noghai announcing his own treachery, then telling Toqto'a to be faithful to his own agreement is not lost.

[233] Favereau, *The Horde*, pp. 204-5.

[234] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 377-8; Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 25-31.

[235] RAD/Raushan, Vol. I, p. 687.

[236] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 378, though perhaps 'fight' is a loose translation of *kūch dahīm*, a term used for nomadising.

[237] RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, p. 971.

[238] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 535.

The Chaghadaids with Baraq accept Qaidu as their *aqa* and their ruler, relating Baraq's tyranny and confiscation of their wealth as reasons for their willingness to accept Qaidu, though they waited until Baraq's death to go over to Qaidu. This would certainly make a strong case for the position of *aqa* and that of ruler going hand in hand. However, the immediate departure of Baraq's eldest son Beg Temür and Alghu's sons to Qubilai, as well as the previous ruler Mubārakshāh's flight to Abaqa indicates that most of the prominent candidates for the Chaghadaid Khanate did not recognise Qaidu's status as *aqa* and his right to determine succession to Baraq. Going back to their ancestors of course, Mubārakshāh's line (from Chaghadai, Chinggis' second son) was senior to that of Qaidu (from Ögödei, Chinggis' third son). Qaidu was forced to turn to more marginal descendants of Chaghadai as his client khans until he was able to form a partnership with Du'a, another son of Baraq.[239]

We are also given a perplexing statement by the historian Vaṣṣāf, talking about the situation in the Ilkhanate. The recently crowned Ilkhan, Aḥmad Tegüder, in 1282 sent an official called Tash Möngke to govern in Shiraz, which had experienced several uprisings against Ilkhanid rule.[240] Tash Möngke arrived and set about his task, however, according to Vaṣṣāf, 'he used to write at the top of his correspondence 'Ahmad *aqa*' and in the *yasa* of the Mongols, it has never occurred that the name of the khan should be written in this way'.[241] What this meant for Aḥmad's authority will be discussed in the following chapter, but for the purposes of this discussion, what is interesting is that Vaṣṣāf sees this move as a contravention of Mongol law. The usage of the title *aqa*, while recognising that Aḥmad was indeed the most senior Hülegüid, is a step down from that of khan, which was granted in a full *quriltai* of the Ilkhanid realm. The first recognises a social relationship, but seems to deny the political implications of rule. The term *aqa* itself devalued over time, whereby it came to be used as a generic term for Chinggisids, or even high ranking amirs and officials. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa noted that in the late Ilkhanid period, all relatives of the Ilkhan Abū Saʿīd (r. 1316-1335) were called *aqa*.[242]

Therefore, we are left in somewhat of a quandary regarding ideal loyalty to the *aqa.* There seem to have been times where his input and cooperation were vital to the success of the Mongol enterprise. However, the creation of a new institution, that of female regency, seems to have

[239] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 378; Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 32-3.
[240] For these uprisings, see Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, pp. 126-136.
[241] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 123; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 211, او بر سر مکتوبات احمد آقا می نوشت و در یاساء مغول نیامده که اسم خان بر این منوال نویسند *ū bar sar-i maktūbāt aḥmad āqā mī-nivisht va dar yāsā-yi mughul nayāmada ki ism-i khān bar īn minvāl nivīsand*.
[242] Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *Travels*, p. 433.

confused things somewhat.[243] In an ideal world, presumably with the *aqa* and the regent's cooperation, everything ran smoothly, such as between Chaghadai and Töregene. However, once these two figures were in opposition rather than in concert, Mongol actors now had a choice to make between which object of loyalty trumped the other, if they were only thinking of the 'right' thing to do vis-a-vis Mongol custom and the Chinggisid legacy. Certainly things do not seem as black and white as Juvainī would have us believe regarding the *aqa*'s status. For historians more accustomed to male dominance and who saw women's rule as insidious, perhaps they did believe it to be a simple decision, however, as we have seen in Mongol history, women's rule or management of their late husband's affairs was very common. Even if we hypothetically accept that the *aqa*'s position was as powerful as the Persian historians made out, Jochi's potential illegitimacy clearly rendered both Batu and Berke's position as *aqa* as tenuous. For members of other lines, they may well not have accepted this claim, though this position is only hinted at in the sources. It seems that in these instances of a clash between regent and *aqa*, other types of loyalty were more powerful in swaying decision-making, though this did not prevent our sources from attempting to justify people's actions through an appeal to Mongol custom or Chinggisid law.

If we consider the social structures of later Turco-Mongol people groups, we can see that the position of *aqa* (or its equivalent) continued to play a vital role in the family and more broadly in society. Benjamin Krader in his study on these structures shows this for different groups. Among the 17th century Volga Kalmuks for example, a village of 10-12 families, called a *xoton*, was led by the *xotoni aqa*, whose job it was to adjudicate disputes among the *xoton*, whose members all paid respect to him.[244] In the 18th century, among the Great Horde Kazakhs, elders called *bii*s, whose seniority was unquestionable, were responsible for managing conflicts. Villages had their own *bii*s or *aksakal*s (white-beards), regarded by Russian contemporaries as judges who regulated pasturage and marriage.[245] According to a Buriat Mongol genealogy of 1847, a common ancestor was one Sagan, whose three sons, Bushal, Botoi and Abagan created different lineages among the Buriats. The descendants of Botoi continually called the descendants of Bushal, *mani axa* (our elder brother) for generations.[246] What we see here and in many other nomadic groups of the pre-modern/modern era

[243] For example, George Lane claims (based on Jackson, 'Dissolution', p. 322) that it was the 'recognised right' of the *aqa* to summon the *quriltai*, *Early Mongol Rule*, p. 66. However, as I have shown elsewhere (Jones, 'Objects of Loyalty', p. 15) in fact the two previous 'election' *quriltai*s, for Ögödei and Güyük, had been summoned by Tolui and Töregene respectively, the regents at the time. Interestingly, in the Salghurid client state of Shiraz under Ilkhanid rule, the regent Terken Khatun was also responsible for calling the notables of the country together to decide on a successor to Atabeg Muḥammad in 1263, Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, p. 127.
[244] B. Krader, *Social Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Pastoral Nomads*, (The Hague: Mouton & Co, 1963), pp. 134, 148, 164.
[245] Idem, pp. 208-210. *Bii* is the Turkic *bey* or *beg*.
[246] Idem, pp. 72-3.

is no surprise, namely, a great respect for seniority. Such sentiments were also common in many other societies around the world. However, what is of interest here is the special position of the *aqa* with regards to dispute settlement. This echoes the cases of Tödö'en, Chaghadai and Batu. The Buriat example also shows that the recognition of seniority also could continue even when lineages had become separate elements, though admittedly their political proximity was much greater than those of the distinct Mongol khanates.

3.6 The *Quriltai*

Our next object of loyalty is a little trickier to understand, as it was a body rather than a single person, and it included within it all the previously mentioned figures. The *quriltai* also only met occasionally, perhaps twice a year, so it was not always 'present' as an object of loyalty. However, there were political and legal decisions taken at the *quriltai*, and these decisions were considered binding.[247] Charismatic loyalty is not exactly easy to define with this regard, but the presence of the entire family of Chinggis and his most successful generals and officials certainly imbued the gathering with the charisma of the entire nation. The elective function of the *quriltai* also rendered the chosen successor with the charisma of the approval of all such powerful figures in the Mongol world. In addition, the *quriltai* was established by the *jasaq* of Chinggis, giving the convocation a powerful symbolic nature.[248]

With regards to loyalties of self-interest, it apparently was worth a shot in attending a *quriltai*, for good or for ill. The *quriltai* was where appointments were made, but also where judicial decisions, trials and punishments took place. Let us take here the example of Chinggis' younger brother Temüge Otchigin. Temüge had been a participant in the Mongol Empire and was given significant lands by Chinggis, while he took part in the enthronement ceremony of Ögödei in 1229. However, in the interregnum before Güyük's accession, during the regency of Töregene, he apparently made a play for the throne. He was faced down by Malik Oghul, another son of Ögödei, and this action forced Güyük to return more speedily to his father's *ordu*. Temüge thus repented of

[247] F. Hodous, 'The *Quriltai* as a Legal Institution in the Mongol Empire', *Central Asiatic Journal*, Vol. 56, (2012/2013), pp. 91-3.

[248] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 573. This I believe is what Juvainī is trying to say when he says that the members of the 1251 *quriltai* electing Möngke could not imagine 'that the *yasa* of the World-Emperor could be changed or altered, and there had been no disagreement amongst them'. Thus, if a *quriltai* agreed on something unanimously, it could not be questioned, see Hodous, '*Quriltai*', p. 92.

his action.[249] Despite this, not long after, Temüge attended, along with his children, the very *quriltai* which elected Güyük to the throne. At this *quriltai,* Temüge was questioned by Möngke and Orda, then put to death by a group of amirs in accordance with the *jasaq*.[250] Temüge seems to have gambled in attending the *quriltai*. Perhaps he hoped that his excuse of mourning a disaster would be accepted, or that he would be treated leniently given his seniority. We do note that his sons were active in later years, supporting Möngke's claim to the throne and later coming to prominence in a rebellion against Qubilai.[251] It may have been for their benefit that he accepted the decision of the *quriltai*. What is notable is that Temüge did not try to flee or avoid the *quriltai*.

At some stage however, Mongol actors lost trust in the process of the *quriltai*, and began avoiding it to save their own skin. The actions of the Ögödeid princes during the Jochid-Toluid coup indicates that they were entirely aware of what could occur to them and their hopes of success if they attended. Only after a failed counter-coup did the Ögödeid princes realise that non-attendance would surely seal their fate. For some, like Güyük's eldest son Khoja, there was a chance for mercy, and he was apparently not sent on dangerous campaigns, but rather given lands near Qara Qorum. Others, like his brother Naqu and his nephew Shiremün, were put on the front lines of Mongol campaigns, with Shiremün being killed by Qubilai.[252] Möngke's struggles to get his recalcitrant relatives to join led to him having his *jarghuchi*, Mengeser Noyan, issue a decree stating that non-attendance and holding one's own *quriltai* was punishable by decapitation.[253] Despite the legal obligation to attend, the pattern was now set. Qubilai and Ariq Böke were wise enough to steer clear of each other's *quriltai*s, while Qaidu repeatedly refused to attend Qubilai's various *quriltai*s.[254] The Ögödeid ruler Chapar in the early 14th century also rejected numerous summons to a *quriltai* by the Chaghadaid ruler Dua despite their previous allegiance.[255] Attending the *quriltai* organised by a rival in their own territory was essentially a signal that you were submitting to that person and their judgement. Essentially, it became a last resort for Chinggisid princes, hoping to be spared because of their blood. For non-Chinggisids, there was little hope of escaping with one's life. The long standing

[249] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, pp. 244, 248.
[250] Idem, pp. 249, 255.
[251] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 568; RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 454.
[252] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 592; RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 306, 409.
[253] YS, 2:33, 124:3055, referenced in Hodous, *'Quriltai*', p. 91.
[254] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 307.
[255] Qāshānī/Hambali, pp. 33-5.

servant of the Mongol Empire, Chinqai, was executed for his non-attendance at Möngke's *quriltai* at the age of 83.[256]

From a communal loyalty aspect, the first *quriltai*s represented the gathering of all significant players in the Mongol world, so their legitimacy was not questioned, though naturally there would have been different factions which supported different candidates or programmes. However, these early *quriltai*s seem to have been largely successful in achieving full support. By the 1240s however, loyalty to specific Mongol houses seems to have caused some tension in even the time and location of the *quriltai*. Batu's excuse of illness to delay Töregene's *quriltai* may have been a more personal reaction given his animosity to Töregene's eldest Güyük, the most likely successor. The presence of Batu's brothers at Güyük's enthronement *quriltai* and involvement in the trial of Temüge seems to indicate that the Jochids on the whole had no issues with attending the gathering itself.[257] However, with Batu's assembly at Ala Qamaq in 1249, the location of the *quriltai* began to be relevant to the outcome.[258] To attend meant to put oneself in the power of the convenor of the *quriltai*, and Batu's swaying of the whole Jochid and Toluid lines to his support meant that other attendees were put in a precarious position. The *quriltai*s of Ariq Böke in the Altai region and Qubilai in Shàngdū represented a communal division, whereby those in Mongolia supported Ariq Böke, and those in northern China supported Qubilai. Even Jumghur, a son of Hülegü, supported Ariq Böke, though as noted by Rashīd al-Dīn, there was likely little choice for Jumghur given that he was in Mongolia near Ariq Böke at the time.[259]

The territorial choices of *quriltai*s and their convenors has caused some scholars to put forward the idea of a 'traditionalist' party that represented the Mongols of Mongolia and their preference for a nomadic lifestyle. Take for example David Morgan, author of one of the most comprehensive overviews of the Mongol world, who says:

---

[256] P.D. Buell, 'Činqai', in (eds.) I. de Rachewiltz, H. Chan, H. Ch'i-ch'ing and P.W. Geier, *In the Service of the Khan: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period (1200-1300),* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993), pp. 108-9.

[257] May, *The Mongol Empire,* pp. 11-12; Allsen, 'The Princes of the Left Hand, p. 14; Favereau, *The Horde*, p. 97 indicates that there was a division between approaches of Orda and Batu, where Orda supported the empire as a whole, while Batu sought to promote Jochid independence. However, the presence of five of Batu's other brothers (Shiban, Berke, Berkecher, Tangqut, and Toqta Temür) and leading *noyan*s and amirs, all sent by Batu, seems to indicate a personal issue (animosity or illness, depending on the sources) rather than a policy, Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 249; RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 392.

[258] De Rachewiltz, 'Dating of *Secret History*', pp. 163-7 shows that some *quriltai*s were labelled great (大, *dà/tà*) in Chinese sources or *buzurg* in Rashīd al-Dīn, while others were not. The Ala Qamaq meeting is not called *buzurg* by Rashīd al-Dīn, and Juvainī does not use the term *quriltai* for it, while the 1251 *quriltai* in the Mongol homeland was called a *qūrīltā-yi buzurg* by Rashīd al-Dīn.

[259] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 428, 431, 473.

> Ariq Böke can be seen as representing an influential school of thought among the Mongols, which Qubilai through his actions and attitudes after 1260 opposed. Some Mongols felt there was a dangerous drift towards softness, typified in those like Qubilai who thought there was something to be said for settled civilization and for the Chinese way of life. In the traditionalist view, the Mongol centre ought to remain in Mongolia, and the Mongols' nomadic life be preserved uncontaminated. China ought merely to be exploited. Ariq Böke came to be regarded as this faction's figurehead.[260]

There was indeed at least one *quriltai* which apparently explicitly condemned Qubilai's Sinification, that at Talas in 1269, attended by Baraq, the Chaghadaid ruler, Qaidu, the Ögödeid ruler, and Berkecher, the representative of Möngke Temür, the Jochid ruler. According to the *YS*, they sent an envoy to Qubilai to announce their displeasure with his adoption of Chinese practices, such as building cities and adopting Han laws.[261] Rashīd al-Dīn also mentions this *quriltai*, though in his account the princes largely complain about Qubilai's large appanage compared to their own, especially considering their descent from prestigious Chinggisids.[262] As Michal Biran has noted, it is only in this single mention by the *YS* that there was any opposition to Qubilai's policies, while the location and limited attendees of the Talas *quriltai* itself was a departure from Mongol tradition.[263] There does seem to have formed around Qaidu a steady growth of princes fleeing China. For the Ögödeid descendants who joined Qaidu, this was largely out of communal loyalty to their own house, rather than a desire for a more nomadic way of life. For the descendants of Ariq Böke and Möngke who rebelled against Qubilai, their own houses had notable grudges against Qubilai's rule and may have thought they would prosper more in Qaidu's territory. The *quriltai*s of the successor khanates were limited affairs, those not from that regional khanate or the relevant Chinggisid line were not included, and the communities involved were closed off.

Respecting ideal loyalty, the *quriltai* could have a claim to represent the highest standard of earthly authority. Its participants usually included the foremost political and spiritual figures in the Mongol Empire, including the *qa'an*/khan himself.[264] As noted above, it also looks to have been supported by Chinggisid law. Consultative assemblies were ubiquitous in steppe tradition, found among the Xiongnu, Kök Turks, and Khitans, and practised by the Mongols as far back as their oral

---

[260] D. Morgan, *The Mongols*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 118.
[261] Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 26-8.
[262] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 521.
[263] Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 28. Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, p. 94 argues that the main purpose of this *quriltai* was to check the ambitions of the Chaghataid khan Baraq.
[264] De Rachewiltz, 'Dating of *Secret History*', p. 164 believes that the attendance of the right people was what made the *quriltai* 'great' or not.

tradition went.[265] Therefore the *quriltai* was supported by the Chinggisid *jasaq*, Turco-Mongol custom, and the living ruler himself, while shamans and holy men of other religious traditions also participated in order to ensure its success.

However, what was the *quriltai*'s status with regards to the *qa'an*? Michael Hope has argued that under Chinggis, the *quriltai*s were simply a venue for him to assert his authority by issuing decrees there, but that under his successors the *quriltai* had a more consultative function.[266] Thomas Allsen also claims that major appointments were supposed to be collegial decisions, but that *qa'an*s such as Möngke ignored this.[267] On the whole, it seems as if the *quriltai*s which took place while there was a *qa'an* in power tended to be consultations, followed by the issuing of the *qa'an*'s decrees. However, in a later instance, we are told that the *quriltai*'s decisions did not always simply confirm the *qa'an*/khan's wishes. According to Vaṣṣāf, Aḥmad Tegüder, the ruling Ilkhan (r. 1282-1284), disagreed with the *quriltai*'s decision to pursue war with the Mamluks, which he announced to the Mamluk Sultan Qalawun (r. 1279-1290).[268] Naturally, we do not have the proceedings from this *quriltai*, nor is this incident mentioned by Rashīd al-Dīn. Was Aḥmad simply appeasing his grandees and agreed to something he later repented of, or did the *quriltai* take an independent decision without the khan's approval? The answer is unclear, and without further examples it is impossible to determine whether a *quriltai* could in theory act against the wishes of the ruling *qa'an*/khan with him present.

As precedent for *quriltai*s without certain Chinggisid figures involved had already been set, dissenting *aqa-ini* could simply set up their own without the person present, and make decisions thus. Vaṣṣāf and Rashīd al-Dīn claim that Arghun, the other Chinggisid princes, and the key amirs took counsel where they discussed Aḥmad's succession and his failures as a ruler.[269] According to Qāshānī, a *quriltai* was held in the Jochid *ulus* by dissenting amirs to the rule of Özbek (r. 1313-1341), who had forced them to convert to Islam. At this *quriltai*, Özbek was not present, and the amirs chose a son of the previous ruler, Toqto'a (r. 1291-1312), as a successor, then invited Özbek to a *toy*, or feast,

---

[265] Hope, '*Quriltai*', in May, *The Mongol Empire*, p. 32; E. Endicott-West, 'Imperial Governance in Yüan Times', First Published, *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 46, No, 2, (1986), pp. 523-549, in (eds.) D. Sneath and C. Kaplonski, *The History of Mongolia*, *Vol I: The Pre-Chinggisid Era, Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Empire* (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2010), pp. 479-480. Aḥmad Ibn Fadlān mentioned them taking place amongst the Bashghird and Bulghar also, Aḥmad Ibn Fadlān, *Mission to the Volga* (trans.) J.E. Montgomery, (New York: New York University Press, 2017), pp. 10, 18-19.

[266] Hope, 'The Transmission of Authority', p. 88.

[267] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, p. 105.

[268] Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 113; Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 70.

[269] Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 132; Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 78; RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 558. Neither author however uses the term *quriltai*. Rashīd al-Dīn uses *kīngāch*, while Vaṣṣāf says that Buqa 'took counsel with the princes and some of the amirs', (*bā shāhzādigān va barkhī umarā' ba mushāvirat pardākht*). با شاهزادگان و برخی امراء به مشاورت پرداخت

plotting to kill him. Özbek was made aware however, and turned the tables on these amirs, having them executed.[270] The previous system was clearly no longer in operation, as the earlier *quriltai*s had relied on having all key members present, but in the breakdown of the empire, it became much more common for *quriltai*s to exclude more than include, leaving them open to criticism as illegitimate. This did not prevent some from seeking to protect this tradition. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa related the tale as he heard it of the deposition of the Chaghadaid Khan Tarmashirin by his amirs. The traveller states that Tarmashirin's subjects and amirs held a council (*al malā*[271]), choosing one Buzan as the new khan, as Tarmashirin had broken the *jasaq* of Chinggis by failing to hold a *toy* once a year.[272] Though Ibn Baṭṭūṭa calls this a *toy*, thus more a ritual feast or festival, it is clear from his description of the elective, legal and judicial proceedings of this event that this also represented the *quriltai*, which of course had a festive aspect as well. Thus, in at least one part of the former Mongol Empire, there was a strong reaction to the abandonment of an effective *quriltai*, even though those fighting for its maintenance themselves contravened its traditions by holding a council without Tarmashirin present. Even the supposed 'traditionalists' represented here, and in the Talas *quriltai*, undermined their own position by weakening the perceived legitimacy of these events.

3.7 The Lord/Khatun of the *Ulus*

The Mongol Empire, as we well know, was not the domain of the *qa'an* only, but rather was considered a family project, parcelled out among the key family members of the Chinggisid house. The lands, property and people given out to Mongol princes and khatuns were theoretically their own private property, while these figures were still under the power of the *qa'an* and *quriltai*. As Hodong Kim has put it, 'these lords were politically two-faced: they were subordinates to Chinggis Khan and his successors, the lords of the Center *ulus* (*ghol-un ulus*), but at the same time they were the lords in their own *ulus*es.'[273] In my previous article, I unreservedly termed the lords of *uluses* who were also Chinggis' sons as khans, however, this looks to be in need of review.[274] Timothy May has

[270] DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion*, pp. 107-9 referencing Qāshānī/Hambly, pp. 144-5.
[271] ملا
[272] Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *Travels,* p. 560; M. Biran, 'The Chaghadaids and Islam: The Conversion of Tarmashirin Khan', *Journal of the American Oriental Society,* Vol. 122, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 2002), pp. 748-9; P. Jackson, 'Reflections on the Islamization of Mongol Khans in Comparative Perspective', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient,* Vol. 62 (2019), p. 371.
[273] H. Kim, 'Formation and Changes of *Ulus*es in the Mongol Empire', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, Vol. 62, (2019), p. 282.
[274] Jones, 'The Objects of Loyalty', pp. 2, 17-18.

questioned whether the lords of the *ulus* were called khans in their own lifetime, an issue that certainly needs clarification.[275] The European travellers who met Batu during Güyük and Möngke's reign for instance, do not use the word khan for him, despite all of the power they attribute to him. Rather they use the terms 'chief' or 'prince', withholding their 'Cham' for the rulers of the whole empire.[276]

Hodong Kim in a recent article also questions whether any of Chinggis' sons were actually called khan while they lived. Chinese sources regularly referred to the rulers of Iran as *kö'ün*, the Mongol word for son, matching the Turkic *oghul* as a term of respect for a royal prince.[277] Judith Kolbas has shown that Hülegü did in fact mint coins with the titles Möngke Qa'an and Hülegü Qan in 659 AH (1259-60).[278] However, Kim mentions that while the Ilkhans, Jochids and Chaghadaids did use this term within their own realms, they did not do so when dealing with the Yuán.[279] The last word on this can be given to Juvainī, who in praising the Chinggisids' lack of flowery titles (ironic given his own predilections for such), states:

> هر کس که بر تخت خانی نشیند یک اسم در افزایند خان یا قاان و بس زیادت از آن ننویسند و دیگر پسران و برادران او را به همان اسم موسوم به هنگام ولادت خوانند *har-kas ki bar takht-i khānī nishīnad yik ism dar afzāyand, khān yā qā'ān, va bas zīyādat az ān nanivīsand va dīgar pisarān va barādarān ū rā bi-hamān ism mawsūm bi-hingām-i vilādat khvānand.*[280]
>
> Whomsoever sits on the throne adds one name, khan or *qa'an*, they do not write more. The other sons and brothers they call by the names they were given at the time of their birth.

Juvainī himself uses specific terms of respect for Chinggisid princes such as Jochi (*ulush-idi*[281]) or Tolui (*ulugh-noyan*[282]), which were used in place of their original names, which became taboo for a

[275] May, *The Mongol Empire*, p. 47.
[276] Dawson, *Mongol Mission*, pp. 10-11, 55. *Dux* or *princeps*.
[277] H. Kim, '*Ulus* or *Khanate?*', pp. 8-10. I believe however, that the term *oghul* when used for a Chinggisid prince, may indicate that the prince was born of a concubine. I hope to analyse this in a further article.
[278] J. Kolbas, *The Mongols in Iran: Chingiz Khan to Uljaytu, 1220-1309*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 161. Kirakos, *History of the Armenians*, p. 313 says that everyone honoured Hülegü *like* a khan while Grigor of Akanc' states that Möngke ordered that the judges make Hülegü a khan, Grigor of Akanc'/Blake and Frye, p. 339.
[279] Kim, '*Ulus* or *Khanate?*', pp. 12-13.
[280] Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 19.
[281] Lord of the *ulus*.
[282] Great commander.

time.[283] It seems as if by Rashīd al-Dīn's time, the term khan had been applied to princes such as Batu and Chaghadai as an honorific, leading to our confusion. Juvainī also calls Chaghadai a khan however, so this trend may have begun early.[284] Therefore, perhaps this term should be amended for the more accurate *ejen*, or 'lord' of the *ulus*, at least until Hülegü and his descendants began using the term khan for themselves.

Terminology aside, it is clear that the rulers of these *uluses* commanded loyalties of their own, which could be at odds with the demands of the centre, though their own loyalties were ideally given to the *qa'an*. With regards to charismatic loyalty, these rulers could command plenty. They were family members of Chinggis himself, often hardened battle commanders, or in the case of the women, able administrators who had long managed *ordu*s.[285] Presumably this charisma would be secondary to that of the *qa'an*, however in several cases this may have been unclear. Chaghadai's status as *aqa* during Ögödei's reign, as well as Batu's own role during Möngke's, would likely have put a doubt in the minds of actors who had to choose between regional lord and central *qa'an*. According to the *SHM*, Ögödei consistently referred decisions to Chaghadai during his reign, even allowing his elder brother to set imperial policy at times.[286] William of Rubruck noted that it was customary for Batu and Möngke's men to applaud each other's envoys upon receiving them, but that Batu's men were proud and did not do so at times.[287] For Batu's men at least, they were unwilling to concede Möngke's superior charisma.

If we think of the loyalties of self-interest, these were most potent for actors in the individual *ulus*es. The lord of the *ulus* was both much closer, and more likely to be aware of their actions, depending on their status. If we consider the above example given by Rubruck about the envoys, it is unlikely that Möngke would punish any of the specific men involved in their non-committal applause. It is more likely that he would rather take up the case with Batu directly. Batu however, may have remembered such a powerful assertion of his primacy and rewarded his men in some way. This localised loyalty was guaranteed by two linked principles. The first was that the *ulus* of these lords meant primarily the people who were given them to rule in perpetuity, not necessarily any land itself. In Rashīd al-Dīn's account of Chinggis' dispensations to his relatives, it is people and

[283] J.A. Boyle, 'On the Titles Given in J̌uvainī to Certain Mongolian Princes', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1/2, (June 1956), pp. 146-154; Kim, 'Formation and Changes of *Ulus*es', p. 272.
[284] Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 226, چغاتای خانی بود, *chaghātāī khānī būd*.
[285] De Nicola, 'Queen of the Chaghatayids', pp. 107-120 shows that Orghina Khatun had such sway in the Chaghadaid *ulus* that contenders for the throne fought to get her onside.
[286] Eg. SHM/de Rachewiltz, §269-271, §276-279, pp. 201-2, 207-215.
[287] Dawson, *The Mongol Mission*, p. 136.

commanders given to them who are listed, not the lands they were supposed to control.[288] The second principle was a military one, to remain fixed to one's unit. Juvainī states that any soldier who tried to move to another would be executed in front of the others, and that no commanders or princes were allowed to accept any refugee from another unit.[289] This installation of military discipline created a chain of command, in which an individual soldier had to follow the commander of 10, the commander of 10 to follow the commander of 100 etc. Naturally, troops assigned to a certain *ulus ejen* were thus more bound to this lord than to the *qa'an* himself.[290]

3.7.1 Limitations on Regional Lords' Power

Of course the *qa'an*s realised that this could lead to overly puissant regional lords, so there were limits on such grants. Firstly, the overall numbers of people dispensed to the princes and khatuns was not enormous, usually around 3,000-5,000, meaning that no single ruler had an overwhelming number of troops.[291] If one went rogue, like Chinggis' younger brother Temüge in 1246, there were enough supporters of other princes and khatuns who could be mustered to counter any single regional ruler. Chinggis was also sure to provide a larger number of forces to the *qa'an* himself; both the guard corps (*keshig*) and the troops of the centre (*ghol-un ulus*).[292] The *qa'an*s could also establish garrison troops (*tamma*) which operated within or on the fringes of the princely *ulus*es.[293] They also had some degree of control even over the troops which had been given to the princes/khatuns. During campaigns for example, the *qa'an*s took a ratio of each family member's troops to bring with them, though representatives of that family member were sent as these troops' leaders. Reassigning troops which had already been handed out was possible also, though it seemingly caused an uproar. Ögödei famously moved 1,000 Sonit and 2,000 Suldus troops from

[288] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 279-281.
[289] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 32; BH/Budge, p. 355.
[290] Khazanov, *Nomads and Outside World*, p. 218 states 'The dual loyalty of nomadic leaders, to their unit and to the state, if the appropriate conditions arose, could easily turn into disloyalty to the state'.
[291] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, pp. 278- 282.
[292] H. Kim, 'A Re-examination of the 'Register of Thousands (*hazāra*)' in the *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*', in (eds.) A. Akasoy, C. Burnett and R. Yoeli-Tlalim, *Rashīd al-Dīn. Agent and Mediator of Cultural Exchanges in Ilkhanid Iran*, (London: The Warburg Institute, 2013) p. 108 has shown the potential power of Tolui as regent if he did indeed have control of the troops of the centre as the regent until 1229. Ögödei as ruler could not have accepted Tolui controlling some 100,000 troops.
[293] Jackson, 'Dissolution', p. 318.

under the control of Tolui's sons to his own son Köten, which had many great commanders protesting to Sorqoqtani Beki of Ögödei's actions. Interestingly, Rashīd al-Dīn states that the problem with this (beyond violating Chinggis' will) was that Ögödei had not consulted the princes and commanders.[294] Apparently, if he had got this action approved by a *quriltai*, it may have been more acceptable.

This final example brings us closer to the ultimate question, did the *qa'an*s have the power of appointment/removal with regards to the regional *uluses*? As they were by and large created by Chinggis, he certainly had some say in the appointment of their rulers. At least in the instance of the Jochid *ulus*, it was supposedly he who decided on Batu as Jochi's successor.[295] Given that he appointed his sons as head of *ulus*es, this arguably set a precedent for the khan/*qa'an* to decide who should rule the *ulus*. However, we cannot forget that in this instance, this was a father apportioning his patrimony to his sons, and thus part of the social structure of the Mongol world. It is not clear if this should hold for successive *qa'an*s who did not hold this patriarchal position. With regards to the *uluses* held by those other than Chinggis' sons, according to the *SHM*, when appointing *ulus*es to his brothers and nephews, Chinggis told them and their descendants to choose their own rulers from within those lines.[296] This seems to set a precedent for the Chinggisids of that particular *ulus* to decide upon their own rulers. However, again we are confronted with the vagaries of Chinggisid succession practice. Were these rulers to be chosen by a sort of localised *quriltai*, or by the previous ruler, or based on principles such as primogeniture or seniority? As far as we know, the empire-wide *quriltai*s do not seem to have been involved in succession issues in the *ulus*es, though regional *quriltai*s continued to do so.[297] While Tolui died during Ögödei's reign, it is unclear how or even who succeeded to control of the *ulus*. From Rashīd al-Dīn's account, it would appear that it was Sorqoqtani Beki who took control on behalf of Möngke, but there is no solid confirmation of this.[298]

---

[294] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 282; Jones, 'The Objects of Loyalty', p. 7.

[295] As mentioned above however, this information is largely indebted to the much later account of Ötemish Ḥājjī. Favereau, *The Horde,* pp. 95-6, states that a new ruler of the *ulus* in fact *had* to be confirmed by both the *qa'an* and a *quriltai*. But it is unclear to me if she means a regional *quriltai*, or one involving the entire empire. Jochi himself apparently either accepted his father's decision on succession, or simply never decided on a successor.

[296] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §255, p. 188.

[297] Allsen, *Policies of Möngke*, p. 105 claims that major appointments were supposed to be collegial, but I have found no evidence of a *quriltai* deciding on leadership of an *ulus*. Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, p. 65 also states that there was a dichotomy among the wishes of the *ulus* heads, who wanted to bequeath what they chose to their favoured successor, and the empire-wide *quriltai*s, however, Chinggis' statement to his relatives to decide their own leaders seems to contradict this.

[298] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 386-7. Atwood notes that Möngke was not raised by Sorqoqtani, but in fact grew up in the *ordu* of Ögödei, Atwood, 'Ghazanid Chronicle', p. 79.

The next clear succession to one of the princely *ulus*es was that of Chaghadai. During the interregnum, he was succeeded by his grandson Qara Hülegü, apparently according to the wishes of Chinggis, Ögödei, and Chaghadai himself.[299] Thus with no sitting *qa'an* at the time, the choice of the previous ruler of that *ulus* (backed up by the support of the dynastic founder and the previous *qa'an*) determined succession. However, as I have discussed elsewhere, the next *qa'an*, Güyük, was unhappy with this choice and appointed his own ruler of the *ulus*, Chaghadai's 5th son, Yesü Möngke, who Güyük said was senior to Qara Hülegü.[300] So here the *qa'an* not only asserts his right to make decisions about succession after the previous *ulus* ruler has died, but even deposes a sitting ruler. This policy was reversed by Möngke, who also appointed successors to the Jochid *ulus*, who may even have had to travel to Mongolia to receive their appointment from him, as Batu's son Sartaq did.[301]

This treatment of appointment to regional *ulus*es came to a head during the Toluid civil war of the 1260s, when both Qubilai and Ariq Böke appointed their own heads of the Chaghadaid *ulus*, desperately seeking to control the key area. This was possible when a ruler was young, a woman, or had only tenuous control of the area. It seems highly unlikely that Ögödei could have deposed Chaghadai, even if he had wanted to, nor Möngke Batu. Rashīd al-Dīn certainly believed that it was Qubilai's right to appoint regional rulers, but also asserts that some consultation was expected. The Chaghadaid ruler Alghu says 'I sat in Chaghatai's place without consulting the qa'an or Hülägü Aqa', before requesting that the *aqa-ini* assemble and decide whether this move was right or wrong.[302] Rashīd al-Dīn goes on to say that Qubilai appointed Abaqa to Hülegü's *ulus* and Möngke Temür to Jochi's after their predecessors died.[303] However, neither of these successions were in fact organised by Qubilai, though he did confirm them. In the Chaghadaid *ulus*, the regent Orghina Khatun had supported Alghu's claim by marrying him, but when Alghu died, Orghina consulted with the amirs of the Chaghadaid *ulus* to establish her own son Mubārakshāh as the ruler, thought Qubilai established his own candidate, Baraq, who eventually overthrew Mubārakshāh.[304] As Lane has noted, Qubilai

[299] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 255.

[300] Jones, 'The Objects of Loyalty', p. 8.

[301] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 361. Though Sartaq was apparently chosen by Batu also. Kirakos, *History of the Armenians*, p. 309 says that Sartaq was already on his way to Möngke when he heard of Batu's death, so travelling to Qara Qorum may not have been the norm. There is disagreement among scholarship as to the prerogatives of the *qa'an* in deciding Jochid succession. Favereau, *The Horde*, p. 140 states that it was a statement of independence that Berke was not confirmed by the great khan, while Kamola, 'The making of history', p. 58, describes Möngke's decisions on Sartaq and Ulaghchi's successions as 'intervening in Jochid dynastic politics'.

[302] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 435.

[303] Ibid.

[304] Ibid. and p. 371.

would have been well aware of Orghina and Mubārakshāh's support for his rival Ariq Böke, so it was imperative for him to install someone more amenable.[305] However, it is unclear whose rights were being trampled: the *qa'an*'s right to appoint *ulus* heads by Orghina and her amirs, or the regional *quriltai*'s right to decide their own succession by the overbearing and unrecognised Qubilai.[306]

3.7.2 Communal and Ideal Loyalties to the Regional Ruler

Naturally, communal loyalty to a more local ruler was quite strong in the Mongol Empire. Groups of people given in perpetuity as property of that ruler were often of one people/nation/unit, such as a thousand of the Suldus. This kept them as cohesive entities under their regional lord/khatun. Jackson notes that Rashīd al-Dīn mentions Kölgen, a son of Chinggis by another wife, Qulan Khatun, receiving a *kārkhāna* (group of artisans) in Tabriz, held by Kölgen's descendants even in Rashīd al-Dīn's own day.[307] Such groups of people were regularly given to Chinggisid princes and khatuns as rewards, as well as fiefs and revenue streams from certain areas far from their own centre of power. Even the Ögödeid, Qaidu, received revenues from within Qubilai's territory during their rivalry, though these were cut off by Qubilai in the 1280s.[308] Given that these lands and the people in them were within another sovereign prince's realm, it is unlikely that when pushed they would still side with their nominal overlord, though there were instances of this too. Upon Hülegü's assassination of the three Jochid princes who had accompanied him on his western campaign, groups of the Jochids' forces chose different loyalty paths. Some accepted Hülegü's overlordship under duress, while others fought or fled either back to the Jochid *ulus* itself, or to their allies, the Mamluks.[309] One group, under the Jochid commander Negüder, moved to the area around Ghazni and formed a force called the Negüderis or Qara'unas, who would constantly be a thorn in the side of the Ilkhans, with their regular raiding of Khurasan.[310] Whether this was out of any loyalty to the

[305] Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, p. 79.
[306] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 369 states that the eldest son of Büri, Abishgha, was a supporter of Qubilai, and was sent to rule Ulus Chaghatai and arrest Orghina Khatun.
[307] Jackson, 'Dissolution', p. 317; RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 280-1.
[308] Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 22, 43.
[309] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 367, 513-4; Grigor of Akanc', *Nation of Archers*, p. 341; K. Golev, 'Intra-Mongol Diplomacy', p. 354, note 85 states that various Mamluk authors claimed that Berke ordered his troops with Hülegü to flee to the Mamluks if they could.
[310] For more on the Negüderis/Qara'unas, see P. Jackson, 'The Mongols of Central Asia and the Qara'unas', *Iran*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (2018), pp. 91-103; M. Bernardini, 'The Mongol puppet lords and the Qarawnas', in (eds) R.

Jochids, or that Negüder simply saw an opportunity to carve out his own personal fiefdom is not exactly clear.

If we consider a family or lineage a community, there were many instances of loyalty and disloyalty during the Mongol period. The Ögödeid princes flocking to Qaidu from Qubilai's realm indicate that this draw could be quite powerful. In another instance, Tegüder, a grandson of Chaghadai who accompanied Hülegü's campaign to the west and settled in the Ilkhanate, received a letter asking for support from Baraq, the Chaghadaid khan in 1267. Tegüder 'rebelled' against Abaqa, the Ilkhan, and waged a guerrilla war in the mountains of Georgia for some three years, until he was captured in 1270 and his amirs executed by Abaqa.[311] Of course, as the numbers of descendants of the original *ulus* rulers grew, family ties to distant cousins were weakened, and these loyalties became more strained. Notwithstanding, as Mongol history has repeatedly proven, even full blood brotherhood was no impediment to rivalry for power or a guarantee of loyalty. Jochi and Chaghadai could not be trusted to support each other, while Güyük's sons Khoja and Naqu also were unable to come to any agreement as to who should succeed their father.[312]

In the realm of ideal loyalties, we are in somewhat of a quandary as to who a subject of a regional lord should be loyal to. Naturally, both the regional lord and the *qa'an*, but in practice it was regularly difficult to maintain one's obligations to these two loci of allegiance. Juvainī tells the story of Edigü-Temür, an official appointed to the region of Khurasan by Batu, who was in conflict with Korguz, the governor of the region, who had been confirmed by both Batu and Ögödei. Edigü-Temür brought charges of mismanagement against Korguz, and physically attacked him and his servants. The separate cases were brought to the *jarghu*, where Ögödei had both men and their supporters investigated, and attempted to reconcile the two men by forcing them to sleep in the same tent. After many months, the *jarghu* finally found in favour of Korguz and found Edigü-Temür guilty of being an *ayqaq* (lying informant). Ögödei himself passed judgement, and ordered that Edigü-Temür be sent to his lord, Batu, for punishment. However, Edigü-Temür appealed this verdict, arguing that Ögödei was Batu's superior, and thus he should be sentenced by Ögödei. Ögödei then spared Edigü-

---

Hillenbrand, A.C.S. Peacock and F. Abdullaeva, *Ferdowsi, the Mongols and the History of Iran: Art, Literature and Culture from Early Islam to Qajar Persia*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), pp. 169-176. Peter Golden also highlights that it was from the Mongol period that many groups came to be named after military commanders, showing the personal loyalty of military units, which then intermingled with local people to form new ethnic groupings (the Uzbeks, the Noghai etc.), P.B. Golden, '"I will give the people unto thee": The Činggisid Conquests and Their Aftermath in the Turkic World', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 10, No. 1, (2000), pp. 38-9.

[311] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 367, Vol. III, pp. 522-3. For more on this incident, see Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, pp. 87-8.

[312] See above p. 104, note 153.

Temür's life, assuring him that Batu would not have done so.[313] This incident is instructive in many ways, not least showing that Batu had a great deal of control of appointments in the region of Khurasan, which were on the whole approved by the *qa'an* Ögödei.[314] According to Sayfī's *Tārīkhnāma-yi Herāt*, Majd al-Dīn, the *malik* of Kalyun, was in no doubt as to where his loyalties should lie. Majd al-Dīn applied directly to Batu for permission to rebuild his city's fortifications, and honoured Batu's envoys more than Ögödei's, giving superior gifts to the regional lord.[315]

Ögödei looks to have struggled to impose himself on these regional lords. The above incident with Edigü-Temür looks to have been an attempt to make Korguz 'Ögödei's man', but even if this was successful, Batu's tax official in the region, Sharaf al-Dīn, continued to further his own lord's interests. This struggle would outlast Ögödei's own life, with Sharaf al-Dīn causing problems for Töregene's appointee for the region, Arghun Aqa. Even Arghun Aqa, one of the most powerful imperial officials in Mongol history who served Töregene, Güyük and Möngke, had obligations to the Jochids, and regularly reported to Batu.[316] Even when the official was clearly the *qa'an*'s man, like Maḥmūd Yalāvach, he trod on dangerous ground when challenging a regional ruler's authority. As I have shown elsewhere, when there was a clash between Ögödei and Chaghadai over misappropriated lands in the Chaghadaid *ulus*, the regional ruler nominally backed down, but in fact kept the lands, and the imperial official who reported it, Yalāvach, was hastily appointed to a position far away.[317] The regional ruler's rights were regularly asserted against those of the centre. The division of appointments was one way in which the power balance was decided. According to Christopher Atwood, the *qa'an* would appoint tax officials, while the *jarghuchi*s and *darughachi*s were chosen by the appanage holder, though this is contested by Iver Neumann and Qiu Yihao.[318]

The personal nature of service in the Mongol world contributed significantly to a moral obligation to one's lord. Thus, oaths of fealty (*üge baraldu*) were given to specific lords, and heavy moral obligations attended these oaths. Punishments sworn to upon violation of these oaths were

[313] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, pp. 493-9.
[314] Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, p. 64 shows that these rivalries were kept on simmer, with disputes only coming to the boil with Güyük's appointment of Eljigidei to govern Anatolia.
[315] Jackson, *Mongols and the Islamic World*, pp. 120-1.
[316] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 413; Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, pp. 514, 521; Kirakos, *History of the Armenians*, p. 298; Jackson, 'Dissolution', p. 327.
[317] Jones, 'The Objects of Loyalty', pp. 16-17.
[318] Atwood, *Encyclopedia of Mongolia*, p. 18. Neumann states that the appointment of *darughachi*s was in fact one of the key powers of the *qa'an*, and that Möngke appointed a *darughachi* called Kitai to the Jochid *ulus* in 1257, perhaps seeking to show the new ruler of that *ulus*, Berke, that Möngke was still in charge, I.B. Neumann, 'Europeans and the steppe: Russian lands under the Mongol rule', in (eds.) S. Suzuki, Y. Zhang, J. Quirk, *International Orders in the Early Modern World: Before the Rise of the West* (New York and London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 16, 19. Qiu Yihao also shows that Ögödei appointed Sayyid Ajall as *darughachi* to Jochid and Chaghadaid lands in Taiyuan and Pingyang, Yihao, 'Independent Ruler, Indefinable Role', 20.

regularly the acceptance of death, but also the ending of one's line and destruction of family and property.[319] Thus, for those political actors below the regional lord, their service was owed to that particular lord, rather than to the *qa'an* or to the state more generally. As Naomi Standen has shown, this was prevalent in Chinese society also, meaning that retainers regularly stood by their ministers even when the minister was in rebellion against the state.[320] One such incident in the later Ilkhanate is of interest. The amir Chupan revolted against the Ilkhan Abū Saʿīd in 1325 after Abū Saʿīd executed Chupan's son, Dimashq Khvāja. However, in this revolt he twice had his own amirs swear personal oaths of loyalty to him before facing Abū Saʿīd. Eventually, Chupan seemingly struggled with his own oaths, realising that he could not draw a sword against the house of Hülegü. Subsequently, his amirs deserted him to Abū Saʿīd.[321] Chupan's nervousness about his own amirs' loyalty may have been due to these amirs' obligations to the Ilkhan, as they may have been included in those who also had to swear loyalty to the Ilkhan on his accession. These double obligations seem to have given actors some latitude in their decision-making; they could sense which loyalty oath was more likely to cause them problems and adhere to the other.

3.8 Conclusion

In this chapter we have elucidated the key objects of loyalty in the Mongol Empire as it developed over the 13th century. As the empire grew, new intermediaries were created between actors and objects of loyalty. Therefore, a local *malik* would usually have to signify his submission in person to the qa'an himself, but subsequently, the *malik* would now have to report first to the Mongols' regional official, perhaps a *darughachi* or a governor. Another layer could also be the regional ruler, if the area was in one of the *ulus*es of a prince or khatun. It was these rulers who were expected to deal with the large majority of issues in their own realms, as indicated by John of Plano Carpini, who states 'everything is settled according to the decision of the Emperor without the

[319] Hope, '*El* and *bulqa*', pp. 15-18.

[320] Standen, *Unbounded Loyalty*, p. 45.

[321] *Ta'rikh-i Shaikh Uwais*, pp. 55-6, Persian text, p. 154; C. Melville, 'Wolf or Shepherd? Amir Chupan's Attitude to Government', in (eds) J. Raby and T. Fitzherbert, *The Court of the Il-khans, 1290-1340*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 87-9; C. Melville, *The Fall of Amir Chupan and the Decline of the Ilkhanate, 1327-37: A decade of discord in Mongol Iran*, Papers on Inner Asia, No. 30, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1999), p. 20.

turmoil of legal trials' and that 'the other princes of the Tartars do the same in those matters concerning them'.[322] Thus with administrative complexity came stratification of loyalties, though all subjects of the Mongol Empire were theoretically loyal to the qa'an. These new positions were added to the more compact system of political loyalties in the 12th century Mongol world: khan, *quriltai* and rightful lord. The major change was to introduce the Chinggisid family structure as a ruling stratum between the qa'an and the steppe aristocracy. Their influence was felt in the *quriltai* as well as in their own realms, where imperial control was not always so evident, and the princes and khatuns often had great license to govern as they saw fit.

This situation created powerful communal loyalties, where the inhabitants of an *ulus* were more likely to follow their regional lord in a pressure situation, particularly if he was a powerful Chinggisid prince himself. The division of forces and the great distances involved in the Mongol Empire meant that these regional actors had a great deal more to fear from the Mongol representative close by than from the qa'an himself. This is, in effect, what occurred in the 1260s, as Ariq Böke in Mongolia and Qubilai in China were supported by the princes, amirs and khatuns in their regional orbit, while for the most part those further afield remained neutral or noncommittal in their support of their chosen candidate. This division also presented an opportunity for the Chinggisids out of the reach of the potential successors to Möngke to assert their own independence, and reformulate Mongol loyalties. Those such as Berke of the Jochid *ulus* and Hülegü of the newly-created Ilkhanate were responsible for redefining how their subjects would express their loyalties, with only members of the specific branch of Chinggisids now eligible for rulership, and those who served the wrong type of Chinggisid seen as fair game in their conflict.[323] It is to Hülegü and his successors that we now turn.

[322] Dawson, *Mongol Mission*, pp. 67-8.
[323] Favereau, *The Horde*, pp. 140-9.

4. Loyalty in Ilkhanid Iran

4.1 Introduction

We now turn our attention to loyalty in Ilkhanid Iran. While there were multiple *ulus*es and khanates which survived the breakdown of the united Mongol Empire in 1259, the Ilkhanate is one of the most well-documented of these successor states. It also provides a fascinating case study in how loyalty decisions changed with the more regional focus of these new realms. We also get from our Ilkhanid sources a picture of loyalty issues in other regions, particularly the Jochid *ulus* and the Chaghadaid *ulus*, which provide a somewhat negative reflection on how these sources view loyalty obligations. In looking at Ilkhanid Iran, we also get a glimpse of how the Persian-speaking elites interacted with Mongol loyalty networks to create a new synthesis of these ideas.

The concept of loyalty in Ilkhanid Iran is a tricky one due to the murky circumstances in which the realm was established as a political entity ruled by Hülegü and his successors, but by its very nature, gives us particular insight into loyalty decisions. The predominance of Toluid-leaning sources for the Mongols not only explains Hülegü's rule in Iran as entirely valid, but also reinforces Möngke's own legitimacy, which was questioned by many who believed that the khanship should have remained in the house of Ögödei. Möngke's ruthless dealings with those who challenged his right to rule have been addressed, but it should be mentioned that this had a knock-on effect for the Ilkhanate, as Ilkhanid history writers had to explain both events in such a way that showed both Möngke's rightful accession and Hülegü's correct actions in following the commands of his brother and khan. This situation has been discussed at length by many scholars, and while this study will not cover these analyses in their entirety, a look at the primary source material on Hülegü's formation of a new state is imperative if we are to understand the concept of loyalty with regard to the Ilkhanate. Many of the issues addressed in this chapter relate to succession in the Ilkhanate, as this is where loyalty choices are most obvious. It will also be shown that it was through the successions of Aḥmad and Arghun in particular, that loyalties to the house of Hülegü were damaged, leading to the assertion of non-Chinggisid power against the ruling house, providing alternative nodes of

leadership. These non-Chinggisids seem to have largely been able to subjugate Chinggisid princes in practice, if not in name.

This chapter will also address the recent trend in Mongol scholarship where Rashīd al-Dīn is seen as the creator of legitimacy for Hülegü's son, Abaqa, and his linear successors (Figure 8). This narrative has become quite prevalent, and thus many loyalty decisions which are relayed by Rashīd al-Dīn are thus put down to his bias towards Abaqa and his line. I believe however, that in consultation with other sources, it is possible to examine these loyalty decisions using the categories we have already established to understand the multiple possible reasons that actors made their choices. Thus, it is essential to understand this debate in order to come to grips with how loyalty is framed in both the contemporary sources and in modern works, and how we can move beyond somewhat simplistic accusations of bias on behalf of Rashīd al-Dīn's employers.

4.2 The Founding of the Ilkhanate and Loyalty Developments across the Mongol World

If we consider our major sources for the founding of the Ilkhanate, we must first begin with Juvainī, one of the earliest Ilkhanid histories. Juvainī's account does not cover the founding of the state, though it does address Möngke's original mission for Hülegü in the west. Juvainī simply states that Möngke 'appointed him (Hülegü) to capture the western regions' (و او را بضبط جانب غربی نامزد فرمود, *va ū rā bi-żabṭ-i jānib-i gharbī nāmzad farmūd*).[1] Rashīd al-Dīn, who largely followed Juvainī's narrative until 1256, has to go a bit further. As a servitor of the Hülegüid dynasty, it was necessary for him to justify Hülegü's establishment of the Ilkhanate as fully sanctioned by Möngke. Peter Jackson notes that the Ilkhanid historian explains the status quo by stating that Möngke sent Hülegü on a temporary mission to Iran, but that later he secretly indicated to Hülegü that he and his successors should rule over Persia.[2] Indeed, one of the more 'independent' sources we have for the period, the Syriac historian Gregory Bar Hebraeus, seems to indicate that there was some confusion in the Mongol leadership as to possession and control of pasture lands in the wild west of the Mongol world. He says that Hülegü was coming 'to the western countries […] in the territory of Eljigidei, who Güyüg Khan sent.'[3] He later implies that Hülegü drove Baiju Noyan (the replacement for Eljigidei,

[1] Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. III, p. 90.
[2] P. Jackson, 'From *Ulus* to Khanate: The Making of the Mongol States c. 1220-c.1290', in (eds.) R. Amitai-Preiss and D. Morgan, *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), p. 29; RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 283, Vol. II, p. 479.
[3] BH/Budge, p. 419. Bar Hebraeus did base much of his work on the early Mongols on Juvainī's account.

who had been killed in the purges of Möngke in the early 1250s) out of the territories of Iran, though this general would serve Hülegü ably in later campaigns, before his eventual execution.[4]

Juvainī confirms that previous commanders in the west had largely had independent power, and that Möngke had tried to curb this. Speaking of Möngke's administrator *extraordinaire* Arghun Aqa, he states, 'He restored to order the affairs of that region which had been disturbed by the proximity of the great emirs such as Chormaghun, Baiju and others who regarded that territory as their own property.'[5] It seems that Hülegü was sent to take overall leadership of western campaigning, suborning the previous general Baiju and only later did he claim rulership.[6] According to Krawulsky, this did not take place until 1264, after his investiture by the recently victorious Qubilai, when Hülegü began minting coins with the title Ilkhan.[7] Judith Kolbas has shown however, that local rulers in Mardin and Baghdad were minting coins in Hülegü's name, with the title khan, by 657 AH (1258-9), though it was not until 1264 that the 'ilkhan' title was included.[8] The fact that the Jochids in the Qipchaq Khanate and the Ögödeids and Chaghadaids in Central Asia did not recognise either Qubilai's supremacy or Hülegü's right to rule in Iran, as confirmed by Qubilai, changed the dynamic of loyalty in the Mongol world. Descent from Chinggis alone was not sufficient for rulership in the different khanates. One also had to be the right type of Chinggisid.

The long-running debate in modern scholarship as to the will of Chinggis Khan illustrates that this problem may have reared its head earlier than we have previously considered. According to the translator of the *SHM*, Igor de Rachewiltz, the *SHM*'s claim that Chinggis decided upon Ögödei as his successor was in fact a later Toluid amendment to the text in order to justify the Toluid takeover.[9] Certainly there were attempts by the Ögödeids in the mid-13th century to guarantee that succession remained in their line, though the princes themselves were not in agreement as to which Ögödeid was the most suitable.[10] For Möngke and his brothers Qubilai and Hülegü, it was imperative that they

[4] Idem, p. 424.

[5] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 507.

[6] This caused problems with the Jochids, as Baiju had been Batu's representative in Iran, see Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, p. 62.

[7] Krawulsky, *Mongol Ilkhans*, p. 56. Hülegü's official reign then only lasted for about a year before his death in 1265.

[8] Kolbas, *The Mongols in Iran*, pp. 157, 161, 173.

[9] SHM/de Rachewiltz, 'Philological Commentary', Vol. II, p. 923. The key to this argument is §255, where both Ögödei and Chinggis speak poetically of the potential that Ögödei's descendants may be unfit rulers, leading Chinggis to say 'is it possible that among my descendants not even a single one will be born who is good?'. This then foreshadows Möngke's takeover.

[10] See above p. 101. It was apparently not outside of the realm of possibility that someone other than a son of Chinggis Khan could take over. Jackson has pointed out how greatly Temüge, Chinggis' younger brother, was favoured in Chinggis' allotment of troops, and his attempt to take the throne during the reign of Töregene Khatun; Jackson, 'From *Ulus* to Khanate', p. 33

both legitimise their own rule through calling into question the necessity of Ögödeid succession while also supporting their brothers' various claims to authority to ensure Toluid power in the Mongol world. Therefore Qubilai's ritual crowning of the Ilkhanid rulers, despite their *de facto* independence, and various Ilkhanid successors' desire for the Qa'an's blessing and approval of their rule were ways of bolstering each other's authority and legitimacy, under threat from the other powers in the Mongol world. While the narrowing of acceptable dynastic lines is common practice in attempting to limit the competitors for power, this tension in the Ilkhanate was not fully resolved. Bruno de Nicola argues that descendants of Abaqa, Hülegü's successor, such as Arghun, Ghazan and Öljeitü, as well as their supporters, sought to firmly establish Ilkhanid rule in the Abaqaid line, though Aḥmad Tegüder and Baidu's reigns indicate that this effort was not entirely successful.[11] Indeed, after the death of Abū Saʿīd in 1335 and the lack of an appropriate successor, at least one non-Abaqaid, and even a non-Hülegüid, Arpa Ke'ün, a descendant of Hülegü's younger brother Ariq Böke, sought to succeed as Ilkhan, though authority was largely held by powerful amirs or *noyan*s by this stage.[12]

These developments affected not only loyalty within the Chinggisid house, but also those not lucky enough to have been born of the great conqueror. Michael Hope argues that both the tighter criteria for those able to hold power and the relative paucity of Chinggisid princes in Ilkhanid Iran contributed to the greater power of the non-Chinggisid Mongol elite, such as the *noyan*s and the *inaq*s (personal advisors).[13] It was these men who profited from the loss of the joint aspect of rulership within the larger Chinggisid house, filling many of the command positions previously occupied by Chinggisid princes. Whereas previously members of princely houses, agents of khatuns and others had all partaken in campaigns, interlineal rivalries now mostly prevented this. For example, the Jochid princes who had been sent with Hülegü in his campaign against the Ismāʿīlīs and the Caliphate were put to death while those who had served them fled, many of them to the Mamluk state in Egypt.[14] This action by Hülegü was tantamount to a declaration of war. Both Berke and Hülegü had each other's merchant representatives slaughtered upon the outbreak of this war.[15] The

[11] De Nicola, *Women in Mongol Iran*, p. 108.
[12] Melville, *Fall of Amir Chupan*, p. 44.
[13] Hope, *Power, Politics and Tradition*, p. 5.
[14] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 367, 513-14; Grigor of Akanc', p. 341; Gulev, 'Intra-Mongol Diplomacy', p. 354, note 85 states that various Mamluk authors claimed that Berke ordered his troops with Hülegü to flee to the Mamluks if they could. Several groups of them reached the Mamluk sultanate in 1262 and 1263, where they were welcomed by the sultan Baybars, becoming the first of the so-called *wāfidiyya*, groups of Mongol refugees who defected to the Mamluks and were incorporated into their army, but at a lower level than the Mamluks themselves. The Mamluk sultans did however marry into the families of these Mongol refugees, Van den Bent, 'Mongols in Mamluk Eyes', pp. 214-19.
[15] Jackson, *Mongols and the Islamic World*, p. 142.

message was clear therefore. The Ilkhanate would now be exclusively ruled by Hülegü's house, and Jochid and Ilkhanid loyalties were drawn in the sand.

These changes were mirrored by those in the Chaghadaid *ulus*, where Alghu, the ruler appointed by Ariq Böke, not only cast off his allegiance to Ariq Böke but actively fought him. Alghu also sought to stamp Chaghadaid control onto his *ulus*, putting to death some 5,000 families of craftsmen in Bukhara who apparently belonged to Berke.[16] We can go too far with this sort of statement of course. It was only a few years later at the Talas *quriltai* of 1269 that Jochid, Ögödeid and Chaghadaid princes agreed on a division of the Chaghadaid *ulus* and matters related to the administration of cities in Central Asia.[17] This unity did not last, but there were instances of princes continuing to receive incomes from lands held by enemies, such as Qaidu's lands in China as well as the Mamluk historian al-ʿUmarī's claim that Jochid revenues from Tabriz were being withheld by the Ilkhans.[18] Both instances however are used as a *casus belli*, indicating that perhaps practically these incomes would be forfeited in times of conflict. As Hodong Kim has pointed out on the other hand, conflict did not necessarily mean that exchanges and contacts across the khanates did not occur, especially when it came to those less directly associated with politics, such as religious men and merchants.[19]

More specifically for the Ilkhanate, a troublesome situation developed from their treatment of the Jochids and Chaghadaids in their lands. One of the Jochid representatives in Hülegü's army was Negüder, who according to Rashīd al-Dīn, had been a commander under the Jochid princes Quli and Tutar. When Hülegü killed these princes, Negüder fled with a large part of their army to the borders of India, in modern day Afghanistan.[20] This Negüder, due perhaps to a scribal error and/or the likeness of the ت and ن letters in Arabic script in the manuscripts, has been often conflated with the Chaghadaid prince Tegüder, also in Ilkhanid lands, who rebelled under encouragement from the Chaghadaid ruler Baraq, in the area of Georgia during Abaqa's reign and was defeated.[21] The Jochid Negüder gave his name to the group of Mongol warriors active in the late 13th and early 14th centuries, the Negüderis. In the regions of Ghaznin and Ghor, they were joined by another group of Mongol soldiers operating largely outside the classical 'four khanates' picture, the Qara'unas. The Qara'unas were garrison troops, called *tammachi*s, who had been based in Afghanistan since

[16] Idem, p. 149.
[17] Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 26.
[18] Jackson, 'From *Ulus* to Khanate', p. 31, note 87.
[19] H. Kim, 'The Unity of the Mongol Empire and Continental Exchanges over Eurasia', *Journal of Central Eurasian Studies,* Vol. 1, (2009), pp. 15-42.
[20] RAD/Thackson, Vol. II, p. 362.
[21] Jackson, 'The Mongols of Central Asia', p. 93, note 18; Jones, 'The Objects of Loyalty', pp. 20-1.

Möngke had sent them there under the command of one Sali Noyan. Command of the garrison was apparently hereditary, as first Sali's son Oldu succeeded him, then Oldu's son Begtüt.[22] According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Sali was subordinate to Hülegü and sent him slaves from campaigns in India, but over time, the loyalty to the Ilkhanid khan weakened, and perhaps encouraged by the Negüderis, groups of Qara'unas became quite independent, raiding into Khurasan as well as into the Chaghadaid *ulus*. However, Qāshānī lists one 'Bīkūt' son of Alādū son of Sātī Noyan of the Tatar people as one of the key amirs under Öljeitü stationed near the Amu Darya.[23] This seems to be referring to the same Begtüt, so clearly there continued to be Qara'unas support for the Ilkhans in the early 14th century.

It is a little misleading to think of the Negüderis and Qara'unas as distinct groups that acted as specific entities. Our source material indicates that groups of these two 'quasi-tribes', to use Jackson's expression, pursued their own goals, at times joining together with their colleagues for greater reward, but often turning against the commanders who led them and conducting small-scale pillaging.[24] Groups of Qara'unas served the Ilkhans, while others served the Chaghadaids, with some fighting on behalf of regional lords such as Nawrūz in Khurasan. By the 14th century however, many of the Qara'unas largely were brought under the Chaghadaid aegis, and became extremely influential in the *ulus* and under Temür and his successors as well.[25] Clearly, loyalties became more fractured in the Ilkhanate, especially in these border areas where there were ready backers and troops for princes or amirs who acted against the Ilkhan.

If we add this information to what we know about the situation in other khanates, we develop a slightly different picture of loyalties in the post-imperial world than perhaps our sources would have us believe. The presence within the greater Jochid *ulus* of the *ulus* of Orda (later known as the Blue Horde), the elder brother of Batu who was passed over for succession to the khanate, would in the course of the late 13th and early 14th centuries render the 'Golden Horde' as a cohesive entity a political misconception, though the two *ulus*es did act in concert at times. Even in the 1250s, Orda's *ulus* had a great degree of independence from Batu's, and according to Rashīd al-Dīn, Orda was mentioned first in Möngke's *jarligh*s.[26] Thomas Allsen has shown that by the 1280s and 1290s, the *ulus* of Orda was in fact allying with the Toluid powers in China and Iran while their western

[22] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 49; T. May, 'The Ilkhanate and Afghanistan', in (eds.) T. May, D. Bayarsaikhan and C.P. Atwood, *New Approaches to Ilkhanid History*, (Leiden: Brill, 2021), pp. 282-5.
[23] Qāshānī/Hambali, p. 9 پانزدهم بیکوت پسر الادو بن ساتی نویان از قوم تاتار حامی کنار امویه, *pānzdahum bīkūt pisar-i alādū bin sātī nūyān az qawm-i tātār ḥāmī-yi kinār-i amūya*. Elsewhere, Qāshānī calls him بکتوت پسر الدو نویان, Qāshānī/Hambali, p. 22.
[24] Jackson, 'The Mongols of Central Asia', p. 99.
[25] See Bernardini, 'The Mongol puppet lords', *passim*.
[26] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 348.

cousins were in conflict with the Ilkhanate.[27] In the Chaghadaid *ulus*, not only were there the Qara'unas and Negüderis, whose loyalties at the best of times were questionable, but also the state created within the *ulus* by Qaidu, grandson of Ögödei. Qaidu's influence with, and often power over, Chaghadaid khans again should make us question whether the Chaghadaid Khanate at different periods in the 13th century was a stable political 'state'.

Despite the clear information we have about the existence of these 'sub-khanates', they are almost never included in maps of the post-imperial Mongol world and rarely discussed. It is perhaps more accurate to talk about six main Chinggisid-ruled *ulus*es, with several important regional players operating on the fringes of these domains, see Map 4. Indeed, as Kim has shown, Chinggis' brothers, nephews and daughters controlled much land as *emchü* (private land) throughout the empire, and while they were largely submissive to their Chinggisid rulers, they still held some degree of power and influence which allowed them to 'rebel' at times.[28] We have already seen how Chinggis' younger brother Temüge Otchigin tried to seize power after Ögödei's death. His appanage was not removed from his descendants however, and one of these, Nayan, rebelled against Qubilai's rule in the 1280s. Even so, descendants of Temüge continued to hold land in the Yuán Empire until the Míng took power.[29] What we must be aware of are our sources' biases towards a more centralised view of rule, especially Rashīd al-Dīn, who was intimately involved in Ghazan's centralising reforms. It is largely his narrative which frames the discussion of loyalty in the Ilkhanate, though of course we do have competing voices which change the picture somewhat. Again, it may help us understand Ilkhanid history and the way it is portrayed by Rashīd al-Dīn if we think about the categories of loyalty which seek to explain *why* someone did something or acted in a certain way.

[27] Allsen, 'Princes of the Left', pp. 21-3.
[28] H. Kim, 'Formation and Changes of *Ulus*es', pp. 269-317.
[29] Idem, p. 311.



Map 4: The major Chinggisid *ulus*es in the late 13th century. This map is found in *The Horde: How the Mongols Changed the World* (2021), reproduced here with the kind permission of its author Marie Favereau.

4.3 The Abaqaid Succession

One of the key issues in recent scholarship which surrounds loyalty choices in the Ilkhanate is the establishment of Abaqa and his descendants as rulers of the Ilkhanate. As we have seen, succession was something that often troubled the Mongols, and the Ilkhans were no different. Three of the Mongol Ilkhans, Aḥmad Tegüder (r. 1282-1284), Gaykhatu (r. 1291-1295), and Baidu (r. 1295), were put to death after rebellions against their rule, and there was some suspicion that Arghun may have been poisoned as well. If we add to this the many princes who were put to death by incoming Ilkhans seeking to solidify their rule, we can see that the question of loyalty was often a fatal one in Ilkhanid Persia. According to our sources, Abaqa succeeded his father in 1266 in what appears to be one of the more straightforward transfers of power in the Mongol world. Of the following seven Ilkhans, five of them were descendants of Abaqa, so his legacy is firmly stamped on the history of the

Ilkhanate. Here we analyse how and why this took place by looking at our loyalty categories, by which we seek to address some of the recently raised problems around this succession.

Firstly, let us summarise these issues. The main hypothesis put forward primarily by Jonathan Brack, and followed by Broadbridge and to a lesser extent de Nicola, is that one of the key aims of Rashīd al-Dīn's history is a legitimation of the Abaqaid line, and that in this light, he frames succession disputes as a competition between the legitimate successor and the challenger who rebels against his rightful khan.[30] Brack argues that Rashīd al-Dīn is following a fundamentally Perso-Islamic view of succession, whereby the son succeeds the father; a view perhaps held by the historian, but not one held by all Mongols.[31] Indeed, as we have seen, Mongol successors were often brothers, cousins and nephews. However, it is questionable what is meant by 'Perso-Islamic succession', as this does not seem to be an easily defined or limited concept. It is neither Qur'anic, nor was filial succession the case among the Rashidun (Rightly-Guided) Caliphs. Admittedly among the 'Abbasids this became the norm, but Turkic modes of succession had been influential in preceding dynasties in Iran such as the Seljuqs and the Khwarazmshāhs, where filial succession occurred but was not regular. It does not seem immediately apparent why Rashīd al-Dīn should plump for 'Abbasid caliphal succession over others.

It was rather the possession of divine fortune, *farrah-i īzadī*, which qualified one for rule, and this was only apparent after successfully winning the throne. As Sara Mirahmadi has shown, this concept was present in Sasanian times, and developed heavily in Firdawsī's *Shāhnāma*, before being incorporated into the poetic usages of Firdawsī by both Juvainī and Rashīd al-Dīn, as well as other Ilkhanid scholars.[32] That Rashīd al-Dīn co-opted Firdawsī to legitimise his patrons is in no doubt, but the prevalence of this idea in Persian historiography and thought before the coming of the Mongols, in conjunction with Turco-Mongolic ideas of divine favour in the form of *qut/suu*, means that there does not seem to be such a wide gap between the imposing culture and the receiving culture with regards to succession traditions. Rashīd al-Dīn then, is not going back and presenting a clean image of the past, but rather he is trying to show how certain rulers came to be in possession of divine favour, even when they were unfancied or had relatively little support.

[30] J. Brack, 'Mediating Sacred Kingship: Conversion and Sovereignty in Mongol Iran', PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2016, p. 41; Broadbridge, *Women*, p. 264; De Nicola follows the line of reasoning that the Abaqaids were trying to establish themselves as the only legitimate rulers of the Ilkhanate, but he does not attribute this to Rashīd al-Dīn's work as such, de Nicola, *Women in Mongol Iran*, pp. 99, 108.
[31] Brack, 'Mediating Sacred Kingship', p. 52.
[32] S. Mirahmadi, 'Legitimising the Khan: Rashid al-Din's Ideological Project from a Literary Aspect', *Iran*, (2021), DOI: 10.1080/05786967.2021.1889929, pp. 1-14.

Perhaps rather we should consider previous Mongol succession precedents to understand Ilkhanid succession. The decisions made by Chinggis and his descendants would have a powerful influence on the later khanates, where loyalty decisions were regularly justified based on these precedents. While before Chinggis it seems that filial succession was not at all common, Chinggis himself clearly sought to change this, indicating to his brothers and nephews that succession would belong to his sons.[33] Chinggis himself, as well as his successor Ögödei, were keen on their sons to succeed them as *qa'an*, while Jochi, Chaghadai and Tolui all sought to pass their *uluses* on to their sons (or grandsons).[34] The regular occurrence of this trend should make us doubt whether this was a retrojection of 'Perso-Islamic ideals'. This is not to say that the principle of seniority disappeared however, as is made clear in the succession of Qubilai, where competition to succeed Möngke was between Qubilai and Ariq Böke, Möngke's brothers, not with any of Möngke's sons.[35] While two of the most influential of these, Asutai and Shiragi, were born of concubines, perhaps limiting their chances of succession, one of his sons, Ürüngtash, was born of Qutuqtai Khatun of the Ikires, who Rashīd al-Dīn says was Möngke's chief wife (Figure 7).[36] Interestingly however, Ürüngtash seems to have been a willing supporter of Ariq Böke at first, and did not assert his own potential claim to the throne before the *quriltai* which elected Ariq Böke.[37] We have no information about Möngke's desired successor, and even the Toluid propagandists do not claim this for Qubilai.[38] We are unaware of Ürüngtash's age on Möngke's death, consequently, we cannot be sure if he was simply too young to gain support. What we do know is that Möngke left Ariq Böke in control of the *ordu*s and soldiers in Mongolia when Möngke departed on the campaign against the Sòng on which he died, and that Ürüngtash was left with Ariq Böke.[39] Ürüngtash likely had no choice but to go along with his powerful

[33] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §255, p. 188.
[34] Güyük also may have appointed his son Naqu as his successor, see above p. 104, note 153.
[35] Qubilai began to follow Chinese practice by issuing an edict in 1276 naming his heir and empress, H. Franke, 'From tribal chieftain to universal emperor and god: The legitimation of the Yuan Dynasty', in *Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte 2, Munich, 1978,* reproduced in H. Franke, *China under Mongol Rule*, (Aldershot: Variorum, 1994), Number IV, p. 25.
[36] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 399. Qutuqtai had an elder son, Baltu, but he must have died at a young age as he is not mentioned elsewhere. Atwood, *Encyclopedia of Mongolia*, p. 364 hypothesises that perhaps the civil war took place because Möngke was not survived by any of his chief wives who could have served as regents and perhaps even secured the succession of one of their sons.
[37] Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, p. 73 states that as the youngest son of the chief wife and *otchigin*, Ürüngtash could have been a regent like Tolui.
[38] Neither Chinese nor Persian advocates of 'filial succession' question why Ürüngtash was not chosen. Indeed, the *YS* states that Qubilai was the proper successor because of capability and seniority, *'Yuanshi* Annals (benji 本紀) for Shizu 世祖 (Qubilai Qa'an) Part Two (1260)', (trans.) G. Humble, Unpublished, p. 2. Bar Hebraeus heard that Ariq Böke claimed that Möngke had given the kingdom over to him when he went on campaign to China, BH/Budge, p. 439. This again presents a challenge to the classical dichotomy of Ariq Böke representing the conservative Mongol element and Qubilai representing the Sinified 'new wave'. If this was the case, we should expect the *YS* to claim Qubilai's right based on Möngke's will, which would fit Chinese succession practices, rather than to focus on seniority, a much more common determinant of succession on the steppe.
[39] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 414.

uncle. However, we are given a fascinating titbit of information by Rashīd al-Dīn, that Ürüngtash in 1264, perhaps sensing the change in the wind, demanded Möngke's great jade seal from Ariq Böke, and upon receiving it, went over to Qubilai.[40]



Figure 7: The Toluids, Möngke's Family © Tobias Jones

In the Jochid *ulus* also, seniority came to the fore after a period of filial succession. Batu hand-picked his successor, his son, Sartaq, whose death shortly after his father in 1256 led to Möngke installing Sartaq's young son (or brother) Ulaghchi as ruler of the Jochid *ulus*, with Batu's wife Boraqchin Khatun serving as regent until Ulaghchi's majority (Figure 6).[41] After Ulaghchi's death that same year, Berke assumed control of the *ulus*.[42] According to Peter Jackson, there was a similar

[40] Idem, p. 432. However, Ürüngtash does not seek independence. It is interesting that Ürüngtash requests Möngke's jade seal. Famously, the royal seal, *al tamgha*, was red. Perhaps this jade seal represents Möngke's personal authority? Qubilai did give a jade seal to the Tibetan monk Phagpa as part of his role as leader of Buddhists in Yuán China, '*Yuanshi* Annals for Shizu, Part Two', p. 8. Clearly the jade seal represents something less than imperial authority.

[41] Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 268.

[42] Some scholars have questioned Berke's accession, either arguing that it was a usurpation, Broadbridge, *Women*, p. 231, or that Möngke was not keen on it given his involvement in the successions of both Sartaq and Ulaghchi, Kamola, 'The making of history', p. 52; Lane, *Early Mongol Empire*, p. 69. There were certainly rumours about Berke's involvement in the death of Sartaq at least. Kirakos claims that the Muslim Jochids, Berke and Berkechay (Berkecher) poisoned the Christian Sartaq after Möngke appointed him ruler, Kirakos,

struggle in the *ulus* of Orda in the late 13th century, whereby more senior princes vied for power with those of the khan's direct descendants.[43] In the Chaghadaid *ulus* also, we have shown in the previous chapter that Chaghadai's designated successor Yesü Möngke originally succeeded him even though there were Chaghadaid princes who were more senior, before Yesü Möngke was replaced by Güyük with Qara Hülegü, arguing seniority. In the Qaidu's reinstated Ögödeid *ulus*, Qaidu, regularly seen as the bastion of Mongol tradition and conservatism, attempted to hand-pick his own successor, Orus, his third son, born of his chief wife Dörbejin. However, the Chaghadaid ruler Du'a, previously Qaidu's greatest ally, preferred Qaidu's eldest son Chapar, son of Kukui Khatun, to succeed him and had Chapar enthroned instead of Orus.[44]

History of the Armenians, p. 310; Vardan, *Compilation of History*, p. 90. Jūzjānī also mentions a religious conflict, saying that Sartaq refused to visit Berke on his return journey due to Berke's religious beliefs and delivered him a personal insult, and that Berke had prayed for Sartaq's death. Interestingly however, Jūzjānī quotes a rumour that Sartaq's death was down to Möngke's belief that Sartaq had rebelled against him, Jūzjānī/Raverty, pp. 1291-2. Both Kirakos and Jūzjānī seem to play up the religious conflict, as Rashīd al-Dīn does not mention anything in this regard, despite his patrons' animosity towards Berke and the Jochids, though Rashīd al-Dīn acknowledged Berke's status as *aqa*, see p. 114 and he may have been unwilling to criticise a Muslim for killing a Christian. He does state that Möngke and Berke had a close working relationship, RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 511, and 'there was unanimity and friendship between Tolui Khan's and Batu's progeny' through most of Berke's reign, Vol. III, p. 361. Lane and others rely heavily on Jūzjānī's narrative, however Jūzjānī does not seem the best-placed to know the workings of Mongol government, and his story is highly coloured by his approval of Berke's faith. Favereau, *The Horde*, p. 102 states that Berke 'would have to fight harder than his brothers for a place on the Jochid throne, owing to his mother's lower rank', accepting that Berke's mother was the daughter of the Khwarazmshāh Sultan Muḥammad, Sultan Khatun. However, Berke's mother's identity has never been solidly confirmed, Broadbridge, *Women*, p. 231. Vaṣṣāf regularly calls Berke 'Berke Oghul', and Ilkhanid historians seem to have often used this appellation to refer to Chinggisid princes born of concubines, or descending from those born of concubines: Baidu Oghul, Tübshin Oghul, Qada'an Oghul to name a few. Qiu Yihao questions Rashīd al-Dīn's narrative of good relations between Möngke and Berke however, highlighting that Mamluk sources like Baybars al-Manṣūrī claimed that Möngke backed Boraqchin Khatun's regency on behalf of Batu's grandson Töde Möngke. This led to Berke's supporters executing Boraqchin, and Möngke giving Jochid appanages in China, Yihao, 'Independent Ruler, Indefinable Role', pp. 29-31. Istvan Vasary questions this narrative, given the many different sources which provide conflicting information, regarding it as mostly legendary, I. Vasary, 'History and Legend in Berke Khan's Conversion to Islam', in (ed.) D. Sinor, *Aspects of Altaic Civilization III, Proceedings of the Thirtieth Meeting of the Permanent International Altaistic Conference, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, June 19-25, 1987*, (Bloomington, IN: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 242-6. Returning to our Toluid sources, Juvainī, writing in the 1260s, when his ruler was involved in a war against Berke, is either neutral about Berke, or positive. He notes Berke's name first in the list of princes that enthroned Möngke, and that at the celebration of Möngke's enthronement, all animals were slaughtered in the halal fashion because of Berke's religion, while Möngke gave him great gifts and favours on his departure, Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, pp. 568, 573, 594. Neither is Rashīd al-Dīn, who usually has Toluid propaganda more fully developed than Juvainī, particularly negative about Berke beyond his description of Berke's 'overbearing' nature and 'nastiness' (even here, this is due to his close relationship with Möngke), RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 511. He still calls Berke the *aqa*, attributes the original estrangement to the poisoning of Berke's relatives in Hülegü's camp, and spells out Berke's own issues with Hülegü, Vol. II, pp. 362, 511. Perhaps neither Juvainī nor Rashīd al-Dīn could afford to be overly critical of a man who was both considered highly-ranked in Mongol hierarchy and one of the first Chinggisid princes to convert to Islam.

[43] Jackson, *Mongols and the Islamic World*, p. 190.

[44] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 307-310; Qāshānī/Hambali, pp. 32-3, p. 41 (son of Kukui كوكوى); M. Biran, 'The Mongols in Central Asia from Chinggis Khan's Invasion to the rise of Temür: the Ögödeid and Chaghadaid

Thus, we can see that many of the previous Mongol rulers across the empire and its successor khanates had *wished* to be succeeded by their sons, though the principle of collective sovereignty still did intervene in cases such as those of Güyük and Möngke, where seniority could not be discounted.[45] Surprisingly then, it seems more a trend of Mongol rulers to try and push filial succession on their recalcitrant family members and subjects, rather than later historiographical editing based on their own preferences. The precedent of Chinggis' own choice to make his son succeed was likely a very influential factor amongst his descendants. That Rashīd al-Dīn should echo the wishes of the khans themselves is hardly surprising given his role, and we can decide not to suspect the historian of some grand plot here. It seems as if he was seeking to explain what occurred in Ilkhanid history and the wishes of the Mongol rulers. That this slanted his history in an Abaqaid direction thus makes complete sense, as it was indeed the Abaqaid line that was largely successful in establishing itself in Ilkhanid Iran and quashing those who they saw as representing a threat to their own control. If we look at Rashīd al-Dīn's history through this light, we can better understand how loyalty to the Chinggisid house in the Ilkhanate was expressed.

If we look at the case of Abaqa's succession, we can see its effects on the Ilkhanid vision of Chinggisid power in the khanate. Both Broadbridge and Brack have shown that Abaqa's position amongst Hülegü's sons was not necessarily the strongest. His mother, Yesünjin Khatun, seems to have been relatively unknown and is mentioned only briefly by Rashīd al-Dīn. Abaqa had a brother, Jumghur, who is mentioned by both Rashīd al-Dīn and Juvainī. He is twice mentioned by Rashīd al-Dīn as older than Abaqa, but elsewhere said to be younger by both Rashīd al-Dīn and Juvainī (Figure 8).[46] As Broadbridge points out, Jumghur's mother Güyük Khatun had been Hülegü's senior wife before her early death, and thus, in her view, whatever the question of who was older between Abaqa and

realms', in (eds.) N. Di Cosmo, A.J. Frank and P.B. Golden, *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 54.

[45] That Mongol *quriltai*s often selected rulers not chosen by their predecessors indicates the strength of the 'collegialist' notion in the Mongol world as put forward by Michael Hope, *Power, Politics and Tradition*, pp. 1-4. Interestingly, the anonymous *Akhbār-i Mughulān* (compiled however by the scholar Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī, a protege of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and envoy of the Ilkhans) states that 'there is no clear ruling on imperial bequests' in the *yasa*, *The Mongols in Iran: Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī's Akhbār-i Moghūlān* (trans.) G. Lane, (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), p. 75, Persian text, p. 65. The term here translated by Lane as 'imperial bequest', *vaṣiyyat*, is more specifically a will. For more on this work, see G. Lane, 'Mongol News: The Akhbār-i Moghulān dar Anbāneh Qutb by *Quṭb al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Masʿūd Shīrāzī*', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 22, Nos. 3-4 (2012), pp. 541-559.

[46] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 57, Vol. II, p. 428 where Jumghur is older, Vol. II, pp. 472, 480, 513 say that Abaqa is the elder, while Juvainī says that Abaqa was older, Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 611; *Akhbār-i Mughulān*, p. 61, Persian text, p. 44, also mentions Abaqa as the oldest son (though certainly true by Hülegü's death). Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 31; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 52 has 12 sons of Hülegü, listed in almost completely different order to Rashīd al-Dīn (though Vaṣṣāf does not explicitly state age order). Abaqa is listed first, Möngke Temür, said by Rashīd al-Dīn to be the eleventh son, is listed fourth, and before Aḥmad Tegüder. Jumghur is in fact listed last, which would suggest he would fill the role of *otchigin*, staying in Mongolia to look after his father's camps. Vaṣṣāf also lists Jüshkeb as a son of Hülegü, rather than a son of Jumghur, according to Rashīd al-Dīn.

Jumghur, Jumghur was senior based on his mother's status.[47] The question of age was not necessarily a determinant for the ruler's choice of successor, as we have seen with Chinggis' choice of his third son Ögödei, Ögödei's choice of his second or third son Köchü (father of Shiremün), even when all the sons were of the same mother. Hülegü did summon Jumghur from Mongolia to join him in Iran, so it may have been that he was indeed planning to have Jumghur succeed him, though we cannot be sure. Rashīd al-Dīn's phrasing seems to indicate that Jumghur was being summoned to account for his actions in supporting Ariq Böke however.[48] Whatever the case may be, Jumghur died en route and Abaqa was made to succeed. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, the reasons for his succession are thus: 'You are here, you are the eldest of all the sons, you know well the customs and ancient *yosun* and *yasa*, and Hülägü Khan made you the heir designate during his lifetime. How can anyone else accede to the throne?'[49]

[47] Broadbridge, *Women*, p. 264; Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. 3, pp. 96-7; Juvainī/Boyle, Vol. II, p. 611; RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 57; Vol. II, p. 472. A closer look at Juvainī's Persian text reveals more questions than it does answers. و جومغار اغول را که از راه منصب سبب مادر که از خاتونان دیگر بزرگتر بود (رتبهٔ تقدم داشت) قایم مقام خویش بر سر اردو و لشکر نصب فرمود. This all seems quite straightforward, but as the editor Qazvini notes, the phrase in brackets, *rutba-yi taqaddum dāsht*, meaning 'had the preceding/higher position', is not present in any of the manuscripts. The sentence would certainly seem to imply that Jumghur was the most senior, but we cannot be certain. Grigor of Akanc' claimed that Abaqa was in fact the senior son, Grigor Aknerts'i', *History of the Nation of Archers*, Chap. 14, pg. 16. Returning to Juvainī, we also have the problematic phrase, *mādar az khātūnān-i dīgar buzurgtar būd*, saying Jumghur's mother Güyük was the greatest of the *other* women. Does this mean apart from Doquz Khatun, who was childless? No other woman is mentioned here. The final question is what is meant by *qāyim maqām*. This could mean deputy or, less often, successor, but being put in charge of the *ordu* and army in Mongolia was regularly the preserve of the *otchigin*, or hearth-keeper, who was supposed to be the youngest son or brother. Considering that Juvainī famously misunderstood the difference between succession and inheritance for the Mongols, it is not impossible that Jumghur fulfilled the *otchigin* role. If however, *qāyim maqām* means successor in this case, it would indicate that Hülegü presumably had no plans to stay in Iran and was not in fact given it as his to rule, and brought his elder sons, of lower rank, on a dangerous assignment, while leaving his preferred successor in charge of the original *ulus*. The lack of clarity on this issue does not allow for any firm statements.

[48] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 519; RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, p. 941. به وقت بلغاق اریغ بوکا جومقور مصاحب او بود...چون خبر به هولاگو خان رسید...اباتای نویان را به طلب جومقور و اغروق فرستاد, *bi-vaqt-i bulghāq-i arīgh būkā jūmqūr maṣāḥib-i ū būd… chun khabar bi hūlāgū khān rasīd…ibātāI nūyān rā bi ṭalab-i jūmqūr va aghrūq firistād*. Brack, 'Mediating Sacred Kingship', p. 42, note 104 questions Rashīd al-Dīn's portrayal of Jumghur supporting Ariq Böke, saying it was an attempt to show Jumghur in a negative light. However, this type of Rashīd al-Dīn revisionism can go too far. Jumghur was in Mongolia, with Hülegü's *aghruq*, which had been left in Möngke's care, and thus passed to Ariq Böke when Möngke died. Ariq Böke was elected *qa'an* by a significant portion of the Mongol elite, and it is unlikely that Jumghur had any choice in supporting Ariq Böke. That this would have caused Hülegü some problems given his support for Qubilai is undoubtable, and Hülegü likely had to show at least some outward disapproval of Jumghur's actions. Both Jumghur's coercion into supporting Ariq Böke and Hülegü's displeasure are explicitly stated by Rashīd al-Dīn, RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 473.

[49] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 517.



Figure 8: The Ilkhanid Line, Key Descendants and Mothers © Tobias Jones

Let us look now at our categories of loyalty to understand why this happened. The most obvious is the very practical statement made by Rashīd al-Dīn saying 'You are here'. Abaqa's presence nearby when his father died was key. His other brothers, Aḥmad Tegüder and Möngke Temür, may have been born of mothers whose lineage was far more prestigious than Yesünjin Khatun, but these brothers were still in Mongolia. The Ilkhanid state was a fledgling one, whose legitimacy was highly questionable. For the amirs who had accompanied Hülegü and helped him win his state, from the perspective of both their inertial and clientelist loyalties, Abaqa was an easy choice. A speedy succession protected their gains and their support for Abaqa would have rendered

them rewards in the future. These amirs presumably knew Abaqa personally, and had fought alongside him during Hülegü's campaigns, while Abaqa also had the support of Hülegü's vizier, Arghun Aqa, who was in attendance on Abaqa when he received news of his father's death.[50] Waiting for the princes still in Mongolia would have been risky given the shaky foundations the state was based on, the nascent war with the Jochids and the lack of personal connections between these princes and the amirs. Abaqa also would have had plenty of time to establish loyalty networks among those he campaigned with, while his brothers in Mongolia were at a disadvantage in this regard.

From a charismatic loyalty point of view, Abaqa had already proven himself an able military commander and administrator of the province of Khurasan; a worthy successor to his father. Indeed, as we shall see, this province was repeatedly given by Ilkhans to their sons or brothers who eventually succeeded them. This looks to have been a ploy to boost their chances of succession, as Khurasan was a wealthy and powerful province (Map 4) and the heir's establishment of loyalty bonds in the region during their father or brother's rule seems to have stood them in good stead when they sought the khanate.[51] The communal loyalty of this key province played a large part in the success of the Abaqaids.[52] Finally, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, Abaqa also appealed to his supporters' ideal loyalty by his knowledge of and respect for Chinggisid *jasaq* and Mongol custom. We have no way of knowing whether this was the case, but Rashīd al-Dīn is ticking a box here for a suitable successor. The confirmation of Abaqa as fitting the bill from an ideal loyalty perspective was his official enthronement by Qubilai in 1270.[53] The rubber stamping of Abaqa's rule by Qubilai could only have elevated Abaqa's prestige among his subjects.

[50] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 517; Hope, *Power, Politics and Tradition*, p. 114.

[51] This situation in Khurasan has led to Timothy May stating that 'the prince stationed there became, in effect, the Prince of Wales', May, *The Mongol Empire*, p. 82.

[52] Michael Hope has shown how Nawrūz was able to create communal loyalty networks in Khurasan and establish himself as a major regional player who challenged Ilkhanid authority, see Hope, 'The "Nawrūz King": the rebellion of Amir Nawrūz in Khurasan (688-694/1289-94) and its implications for the Ilkhan polity at the end of the thirteenth century', *Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies,* Vol. 78, (2015), pp. 451-473.

[53] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 535.

4.4 Aḥmad's Rise and Fall

Although Abaqa's brother Yoshmut, born of a concubine, apparently tested the waters to see if his succession was possible, it was made clear to him by the amirs that his claim would not be supported, and thus Abaqa did not truly have a challenger for the throne.[54] We see quite a different situation with the succession of first Aḥmad Tegüder, and subsequently, Arghun. Aḥmad has not received particularly stellar reviews in the histories of the Ilkhanate, and his succession was not quite as clear cut as Abaqa's had been, at least according to Rashīd al-Dīn. Aḥmad's lineage was said to be key to his succeeding Abaqa. In Rashīd al-Dīn's account, Abaqa, unlike Hülegü, had not clearly indicated who his successor was to be, which caused some consternation among the amirs and princes.[55] However, the *quriltai* which decided upon Aḥmad as Abaqa's successor, despite weighing up the claims of Arghun, Abaqa's son by a concubine named Qaitmish Egechi, and Möngke Temür, Hülegü's son by another of his chief wives, Öljei Khatun, Aḥmad's greater age and the superior status of his mother, Güyük Khatun, saw him chosen as Ilkhan.[56] Möngke Temür's suspiciously timed death during the course of the *quriltai,* which Bar Hebraeus and Het'um the Historian put down to poison, seems to have been a significant filip to Aḥmad's party as well.[57] Vaṣṣāf, Bar Hebraeus and the *Akhbār-i Mughulān* state that not only was Aḥmad's election unanimous, but that Arghun supported Aḥmad at the outset.[58]

Arghun, at least according to Rashīd al-Dīn, after an initial play for the throne by seizing his father's treasury, accepted Aḥmad as ruler due to the greater support Aḥmad had in the *quriltai*. Arghun certainly seems to have been damaged in his play for the throne by several key factors. His status was lesser to Aḥmad's due to Aḥmad's mother's rank and Aḥmad's seniority by a generation, as well as the fact that Arghun was born of a concubine. Abaqa's failure to make his desired

---

[54] Idem, p. 517. Jūzjānī states that Yoshmut was not a successful general, saying that Hülegü insulted him for his inability to take Mayyafaraqin, and promising that he could take it in three days, Jūzjānī/Raverty, pp. 1270-3. This may have accounted for a lack of charismatic loyalty to Yoshmut among Hülegü's amirs. Yoshmut is portrayed as quite hapless, with Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī saying that he accidentally hit his brother Abaqa in the neck with an arrow, Hope, *Power, Politics and Tradition*, p. 114.

[55] Idem, p. 558.

[56] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 548; Āqsarā'ī (ed. Turan, p. 136) and Shabānkārā'ī, *Majmaʿ al-ansāb fī l- tawārīkh*, p. 294, as referenced in J. Pfeiffer, 'Conversion to Islam', p. 172; BH/Budge, p. 467.

[57] BH/Budge, p. 466, says Möngke Temür died some 25 days after Abaqa, though he does not attribute the poisoning to any of the claimants to the throne; Het'um the Historian, *Flower of Histories*, p. 59 states that a Muslim poisoned both Abaqa and Möngke Temür. However, Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 55; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 89 claims that Möngke Temür died on his campaign against the Mamluks in 1280/1281.

[58] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, pp. 66, 71; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, pp. 106, 118; BH/Budge, pp. 467, 470; *Akhbār-i Mughulān*, p. 66, Persian text, p. 53. Qāżī Bayżāvī in his *Niẓām al-tavārīkh* also claimed that Aḥmad's election was supported by most amirs and princes, see C. Melville, 'From Adam to Abaqa: Qādī Baidāwī's Rearrangement of History (Part II)', *Studia Iranica*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2007), p. 60.

successor clear is apparent enough as even Rashīd al-Dīn does not claim this definitively. Rather, he writes of a council of amirs and princes meeting in 1284 where the matter was discussed. One of the key amirs, Buqa Jalayir, instead says that based on precedent, i.e. Hülegü's succession by Abaqa, the rule should pass to Arghun. Buqa argues that this had been Abaqa's plan but he had died before being able to do so. Given that Abaqa reigned for some 17 years, he certainly had plenty of time to indicate his preferred successor, though of course Arghun had been entrusted with the governorship of Khurasan. Several of the other amirs present claimed that they had heard Abaqa say that the original heir would be Möngke Temür, and after him Arghun, but other amirs present did not accept this as more than hearsay. Buqa saw that there was no agreement and delayed, saying that the counsel of the khatuns would help them decide as to who should be Ilkhan.[59]

Rashīd al-Dīn's explanations of Arghun's position may be somewhat suspect, but as we can see he shows us that support was not overwhelming for Arghun even in 1284, shortly before he in fact became Ilkhan. The important questions to figure out are how did people's loyalty sway *away* from Aḥmad and then *towards* Arghun. As we have seen, Arghun himself originally supported Aḥmad, so perhaps we can analyse why our sources say he changed his tune. Rashīd al-Dīn, given his position in the court of Ghazan (the son of Arghun), could hardly afford to accuse Arghun of treachery, but rather positions the argument in such a way that although Arghun had a claim to the throne, it was not until Aḥmad sent one of his *noyan*s, Alinaq, to attack Arghun that Arghun felt forced into rebelling.[60] Thus the aggression is all on Aḥmad's part, and Arghun is simply reactive, and even apologetic for taking up arms against his *aqa*.[61] Vaṣṣāf, further away from the incidents temporally and geographically, states that Arghun, under the influence of a group of amirs, became desirous of the kingship.[62] This situation occurred because of Aḥmad's actions regarding the Mamluks. Vaṣṣāf claims that a *quriltai* was held in which all of the Mongol princes and amirs present agreed to attack the Mamluks, but Aḥmad instead offered Sultan Qalāwūn peace, which angered and upset the Mongols.[63] For Bar Hebraeus, it was one specific action of Aḥmad's that turned Arghun

[59] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 558. According to the *Akhbār-i Mughulān*, Buqa said Abaqa gave the throne to Arghun, confirmed by Dankiz (Tanggiz in Rashīd al-Dīn) Güregen, with Möngke Temür not mentioned, possibly because of Abaqa's extreme disappointment in his brother after his defeat at the hands of the Mamluks at Homs, *Akhbār-i Mughulān*, pp. 64, 74-5 Persian text, pp. 49, 65.

[60] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 556.

[61] This is echoed in Khwāndamīr/Thackston p. 81, where Ghazan is apologetic to Baidu for turning against his *aqa*, but felt forced due to Baidu's plot to kill him.

[62] Vaṣṣāf was far more negative about Arghun than Rashīd al-Dīn could ever afford to be. He called Arghun 'the sworn enemy of Muslims', *dushman-i jān-i musalmānān*, and said that Arghun and his Jewish *ṣāḥib-dīvān* Saʿd al-Dawla tried to force Muslim spiritual leaders to preach Arghun's prophethood. He even went so far as to say that Arghun plotted to turn the Kaʿba into a Buddhist site, Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 145; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, pp. 241-2; Hope, *Power, Politics and Tradition*, p. 145.

[63] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, pp. 70-1; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, pp. 113, 118.

against him, and this was Aḥmad's execution of Qongqortai, one of Hülegü's sons by a concubine, Ajuja Egechi, who Aḥmad had appointed governor of Rum. Apparently he and Arghun had been firm friends and Aḥmad suspected them of plotting against him.[64]

If we combine our information on Aḥmad's reign, it is perhaps not too hard to see from a loyalty perspective why his supporters turned against him. The killing of Qongqortai seems to have been a major gripe for the Chinggisid princes themselves. It is unsure exactly why this took place, as we have several possible reasons given in our sources. Both Rashīd al-Dīn and Bar Hebraeus claim that it was Qongqortai's support for, or perceived support for, Arghun that led to Aḥmad having him killed.[65] For Vaṣṣāf, Qongqortai himself had rebelled and sought to overthrow Aḥmad.[66] In a letter from the Mamluk Sultan Qalāwūn, Aḥmad is criticised for allowing Qongqortai to kill Muslims in Anatolia, and it was soon after this that Aḥmad had him killed, leading Judith Pfeiffer to hypothesise that this was a possible reason for his execution.[67] The *Akhbār-i Mughulān* tells a similar story, saying that Qongqortai massacred people in Rum who were 'very *īl*', and that this, along with Qongqortai's plotting with Arghun, was why Aḥmad had him killed. It adds that gossipers told Aḥmad that Qongqortai had shared Aḥmad's women.[68]

Whatever the case may have been, Aḥmad's execution of his brother negatively affected loyalty towards Aḥmad on several different levels. At the most basic, as mentioned in Chapter 2, this could be seen as breaking the contract between a lord and his subject, in this case compounded by the blood relationship between the two. Of course, if Qongqortai's actions did amount to rebellion, Aḥmad was presumably well within his rights to punish his subject, however, this had to be done in the correct way. For both the princes and the amirs, this may also have been a blow to their ideal loyalty towards the Ilkhan, with Aḥmad ignoring Mongol custom and Chinggisid *jasaq* by foregoing a trial for Qongqortai. Again, the *Akhbār-i Mughulān* provides an interesting analysis of this moment. Here, Aḥmad is portrayed as following the *jasaq* by executing Qongqortai, 'in accordance with the precepts of Chinggis Khan, who had said that the back of whosoever plots against the kingdom should be broken', but also mentions that Aḥmad acted pre-emptively in executing his brother.[69] The

[64] BH/Budge, p. 470.
[65] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 549; BH/Budge, p. 470.
[66] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 74; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 125.
[67] J. Pfeiffer, 'Aḥmad Tegüder's Second Letter to Qala'un (682/1283)' in (eds.) J. Pfeiffer, S.A. Quinn, E. Tucker, and J.E. Woods, *History and historiography of post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East: studies in honor of John E. Woods*, (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006), pp. 178-182.
[68] *Akhbār-i Mughulān*, pp. 66-7, Persian text, p. 54. *Īl*, as shown in Chapter Two, was submissive and obedient to Mongol rule.
[69] Idem, pp. 66-7, Persian text, pp. 54-5.

language here is noteworthy also, as Aḥmad's own execution would be a breaking of the back performed by Qonqortai's sons.[70]

For the Chinggisid princes themselves, their clientelist and inertial loyalties would be weakened at seeing a son of Hülegü executed without a trial in which they participated. If this could be done to Qongqortai what was to prevent it happening to them? Rashīd al-Dīn also states that after Qongqortai's execution, Aḥmad ordered the arrest of Prince Jüshkeb as well as several powerful amirs such as Taghachar (whose career will be discussed later in this chapter).[71] Many may have feared a more widespread purge. Pivotally, Vaṣṣāf states that Buqa and the other amirs sought to overthrow Aḥmad because he had brought the house of Chinggis into disrepute.[72] Executing a Chinggisid prince at the behest of a Muslim slave ruler would certainly fall into such a category. This action signalled a weakening in charismatic loyalty, whereby the charisma of the house of Chinggis was being damaged by the actions of Aḥmad.

The other major incident which seems to have irrevocably damaged Aḥmad's loyalty ties to his family and amirs was his establishment of peace with the Mamluks. Interestingly this is not mentioned by Rashīd al-Dīn, though he does note that there were envoys exchanged.[73] Bar Hebraeus discusses the peace but does not attribute it as a cause of Aḥmad's overthrow.[74] It is Vaṣṣāf who explicitly states that it was Aḥmad's actions in this regard which saw many of his amirs turn against him. Vaṣṣāf claims that after his coronation, Aḥmad held a *quriltai* in which there was an agreement between the princes and amirs to attack Mamluk lands.[75] However, according to Vaṣṣāf and Bar Hebraeus, Aḥmad, in seeking to promote Islam, instead sought peace with Qalāwūn, looking to re-establish trade between the two realms. It is due to this peace that many of the amirs apparently deserted Aḥmad and began to encourage Arghun to take power.[76] Adel Allouche and Judith Pfeiffer have shown however that Aḥmad's original embassy to Qalāwūn in August 1282 was far more aggressive than once believed, requiring Qalāwūn's obedience (طاعت, *ṭāʿat*), and his belligerent

[70] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 80; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 134. According to Vaṣṣāf, this was done according to *qiṣāṣ*, the retaliatory punishment by a victim or victim's family member discussed in the Qur'an, and still practised in Iran's legal code today. However, this seems unlikely, as neither Qongqortai nor his sons were Muslims as far as we know, and the Mongols had their own system of retributive justice, which nonetheless matched this idea quite well. J. Schacht, 'Ḳiṣāṣ', *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, Online, http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_4400, Accessed 25th February 2022.

[71] RAD/Thackston Vol. III, p. 552.

[72] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 78; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 132.

[73] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 551.

[74] BH/Budge, p. 467.

[75] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 70; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 113.

[76] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 71; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 118; BH/Budge, p. 467.

wording was rebuked by Qalāwūn in his response. It was only in Aḥmad's second embassy, in June 1283 that he dropped this word and instead used the words peace (صلح, *ṣulḥ*) and harmony (اتفاق, *ittifāq*).[77] This letter was sent after the execution of Qongqortai and it may be that Aḥmad was thus seeking to placate the Mamluks while dealing with problems at home. Perhaps Vaṣṣāf is conflating the two missions, but Bar Hebraeus also notes the submissive element required of Qalāwūn in Aḥmad's initial letter, threatening the Mamluks should they continue in their state of rebellion.[78]

Maybe then this motive is overplayed by Vaṣṣāf, but it is worth considering why such an action would have given rise to dissension among the Mongols. Firstly, if Aḥmad did not pursue war with the Mamluks with sufficient gusto, this would have been damaging to the amirs' self interest. The successful pursuit of war brought with it the chance for positions, wealth, and the opportunity for booty for a leader's restless soldiers. The expectation of military success and reward were a key part of the Mongol system. One should note that Aḥmad also attempted to organise a peace with the Jochids as well, and it may be that many amirs were frustrated by the lack of outward campaigns.[79] If Vaṣṣāf is correct in stating that the *quriltai* decided on war and Aḥmad did not pursue it successfully, again the theme of ideal loyalty is relevant. The *quriltai*'s decisions were meant to be binding, even on the khan, and if Aḥmad went against this decision, it was a betrayal of Mongol and Chinggisid custom.[80] The assertion of the Ilkhan's power vis-à-vis the princes and amirs could be an attempt at centralisation, recalling Michael Hope's analysis of the tug-of-war between the patrimonialist and collegialist tendencies, though if so this attempt backfired dramatically.[81]

We must consider other reasons for Aḥmad's overthrow if we are to complete our analysis of loyalty decisions made by key figures at this juncture. Rashīd al-Dīn sums up Aḥmad's failures as a leader by claiming that he was uninterested in financial affairs, leaving such up to his mother Qutui and the *noyan* Asiq, while he himself spent his time in the company of Sufi shaykhs. The historian also notes that Aḥmad did not properly appreciate two highly influential figures in the Ilkhanate, Shiktur Noyan and Suqunchaq Aqa, whose support had been vital in his ascension.[82] Suqunchaq Aqa was the son of Sodon Noyan, a commander under Chinggis, Ögödei and the Toluids, and the

[77] A. Allouche, 'Tegüder's Ultimatum to Qalawun', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 22, (1990), pp. 437-446; Pfeiffer, 'Second Letter', pp. 177-9.
[78] BH/Budge, p. 467.
[79] Pfeiffer, 'Second Letter', p. 189.
[80] See Chapter 3, p. 127.
[81] Hope, *Power, Politics and Tradition*, *passim*.
[82] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 551. Qāżī Bayżāvī mentions the importance of Suqunchaq Aqa for the reign of Abaqa, saying he was the pivot of rule, Abaqa's vice-regent and governor, 'From Adam to Abaqa', p. 59. Khwāndamīr/Thackston, p. 70 claims that Shiktur Noyan was present with Aḥmad upon his capture by the Qara'unas, and arrested his sovereign.

grandson of Chila'uqan Bahadur, one of Chinggis' 'four steeds', his most loyal and effective soldiers. Chila'uqan Bahadur himself was a son of Sorghan Shira of the Suldus, whose assistance in hiding and freeing the young Temüjin from the Tayichi'ut was later rewarded with *darqan* status.[83] This status was also hereditary, and thus Suqunchaq would have held it also.[84] Disrespecting such an influential amir, with highly symbolic status as a *darqan* and a descendant of some of Chinggis' most loyal *nökör*s, could easily have been seen as disloyalty to the legacy of Aḥmad Tegüder's illustrious ancestor. However, this statement by Rashīd al-Dīn is somewhat lessened by the fact that Aḥmad made Suqunchaq his *nāyib* (vice-regent) after his accession.[85] It is unclear when exactly the slight on Suqunchaq occurred.[86] If Aḥmad did do something to damage the relationship with Suqunchaq, we may see the practical implications of side-lining an extremely powerful figure who had his own charismatic pull.

On top of this, Rashīd al-Dīn emphasises Aḥmad's inability to win over Buqa Jalayir as the issue most directly linked to his overthrow. Buqa had been an *inaq* (personal advisor) of Abaqa and kept the royal seal, a position of great honour. Aḥmad tried to gain Buqa's support, but forced him to leave Arghun and threatened and mocked him, raising up others in his place.[87] In the *Akhbār-i Mughulān*, Buqa expressed his fears to his brother Aruq that Aḥmad planned to kill them for being overly friendly with Arghun, and thus convinced Aruq to get Prince Jüshkeb onside, and telling the

[83] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, pp. 94-5; SHM/de Rachewiltz, §84-85 and §219, pp. 27-8, 149. All of the four steeds may have been *darqan*s, as Muqali and Bo'orchu also were given this status by Chinggis, I. de Rachewiltz, 'Muqali, Bōl, Tas, An-t'ung', in (eds.) I. de Rachewiltz, H. Chan, H. Ch'i-ch'ing and P.W. Geier, *In the Service of the Khan: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period (1200-1300),* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993) pp. 3-4.

[84] His grandson Chupan was the extremely powerful amir of Öljeitü and Abū Saʿīd, whose descendants founded the Chupanid dynasty in Iran.

[85] Pfeiffer, 'Conversion to Islam', pp. 200-1.

[86] Idem, pp. 279, 306, Pfeiffer notes that in Rashīd al-Dīn's *Shuʿab-i Panjgāna*, Rashīd al-Dīn states that after Aḥmad's accession, he no longer listened to Suqunchaq, and that he gave the position of *inaq* to the Sufi shaykh ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, which Suqunchaq had previously held under Abaqa. However, Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, pp. 140-1 suggests that already during Abaqa's reign, Suqunchaq experienced a loss in prestige after Abaqa appointed Taqajar Noyan to collect the taxes of Shiraz after Suqunchaq was accused of corruption and embezzlement.

[87] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, pp. 541, 555. Judith Pfeiffer references Henry Howorth's *History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th century,* 1888. Part III. p. 296, who used Vaṣṣāf, saying that Aḥmad married Qutui Khatun to Buqa, however I cannot find this information in Vaṣṣāf nor do other scholars who make use of Vaṣṣāf mention this, J. Pfeiffer, 'Conversion to Islam among the Ilkhans in Muslim Narrative Traditions: The Case of Aḥmad Tegüder', PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2003, p. 280. Rashīd al-Dīn says that Qutui honoured Buqa with a robe of Hülegü's, but mentions no marriage, RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 550.

amir Tagana that they would be willing to give the throne to his lord, Prince Hülechü.[88] Aḥmad also imprisoned Arghun after he rebelled, possibly planning to kill him.[89]

From Rashīd al-Dīn's assessment at least, one can see the manner in which Aḥmad undermined the loyalty both of his relatives and his great amirs. The princes rose up, not originally on behalf of Arghun's desire for the throne, but seemingly from a sense of communal loyalty, where they perceived themselves as a group under threat, Qongqortai having been executed by Aḥmad and now possibly Arghun. The great amirs who had been in high position under Abaqa were clearly unhappy with their treatment by Aḥmad, who limited their opportunities and handed their positions to Sufi shaykhs. Aḥmad also ground down people's charismatic loyalty to him by taking a less than active role in government, allowing his mother Qutui and her *amir-i ordu* (camp manager) Asiq to run things.

If we consider the other sources for Aḥmad's reign, we get a very different picture of the reasons for his overthrow. Apparently even before the execution of Qongqortai, one Ilkhanid official seems to have questioned Aḥmad's right to rule. This was Tash Möngke who as governor of Shiraz on behalf of Aḥmad, in 1283 refused to use the title 'khan' for Aḥmad in his letters, preferring the term *aqa*.[90] It is unclear why Tash Möngke did not recognise his patron's status as khan, or if he received any sanction for this potentially treasonous action but such open dissension cannot have helped Aḥmad's cause. It is notable that in 1284 Tash Möngke headed back for court, while the Salghurid Abish Khatun was sent as governor of Shiraz in his stead.[91] Presumably Aḥmad was calling his recalcitrant official to task, while replacing him with a client who had long lived in the Ilkhanid *ordu* having been married to Möngke Temür, while also appearing more acceptable to the people of Shiraz, who welcomed her with celebration and joy after the mismanagement of several Mongol officials.[92]

---

[88] *Akhbār-i Mughulān*, pp. 72-3, Persian text, p. 63.

[89] Rashīd al-Dīn states that it was Aḥmad's general and son-in-law Alinaq who wanted to kill Arghun, but Vaṣṣāf states that Aḥmad ordered Alinaq to do so. RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 556; Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 78; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 131.

[90] See Chapter 2.

[91] Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, pp. 143-4. Both Lane and Ann Lambton have identified, based on Vaṣṣāf, this Tash Möngke as Möngke Temür, the husband of Abish Khatun and son of Hülegü, see A.K.S. Lambton, *Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia: Aspects of Administrative, Economic and Social History, 11th-14th Century*, (London: Tauris, 1988), pp. 272-3. However, I believe this to be a misidentification. All the other sources of this period say Möngke Temür died before Aḥmad's accession (see page 156). Not only this, but Vaṣṣāf himself regularly uses the name Möngke Temür, as well as saying that he died from an arrow wound during the battle against the Mamluks in 679 AH (1280/1281), Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 55; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 89. This would explain Lane's confusion as to Vaṣṣāf openly calling Tash Möngke stupid and prideful, something he was not likely to have done about a Chinggisid prince, as well as the strange actions of the 'husband' of Abish Khatun not greeting his wife on the border of the province of Fars.

[92] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, pp. 123-4; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 211.

Vaṣṣāf also mentions Aḥmad's appointment of corrupt officials who embezzled funds from the camps of princes and khatuns, but for him, Aḥmad's major conflicts as a ruler stemmed from his religious choices.[93] Aḥmad's active support for Islam and raising of Muslims to positions of power apparently caused fear and anger among the amirs and princes, which was compounded by his reaching out to the Mamluk sultan Qalāwūn.[94] Neither Rashīd al-Dīn nor Bar Hebraeus mention Aḥmad's Islamising policies whatsoever, nor do they credit his religion as an issue with the Mongols. In this sense Vaṣṣāf, though generally not particularly approving of Aḥmad's reign, sympathises with Aḥmad's situation. Thus, despite further critical accounts of Aḥmad by Ilkhanid historians such as Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī, Pfeiffer notes that by the Timurid period, Aḥmad was portrayed as a martyr for Islam in Timurid historiography.[95]

Several Christian sources also emphasise religious issues, unsurprisingly. Marco Polo claims that Arghun used Aḥmad's Islam as a stick to beat him with during their conflict, and also that Aḥmad had seized the throne and not shared out Abaqa's wives.[96] Mar Yahbh Allaha, the Catholicus of the Syriac Church in Maragha, states that Aḥmad persecuted Christians and took away the *paiza* which had been given to him by Abaqa. He also writes that Aḥmad's vizier, Shams al-Dīn Juvainī, accused the Catholicus and Rabban Sawma of sending treasonous letters to Qubilai, though these charges were eventually dropped and his *paiza* was returned to him by Aḥmad. Mar Yahbh Allaha does not link Aḥmad's Islam to his overthrow, only saying that Arghun loved Christians and that a greater number of the soldiers supported him.[97] The other source who discusses Aḥmad's reign in this manner is Het'um the Historian, who likewise highlights Aḥmad's persecution of Christians. Interestingly, Het'um also speaks of an informal alliance between Arghun and a brother of Aḥmad to overthrow Aḥmad. Apparently they informed Qubilai of Aḥmad's forsaking of the ways of their forefathers, which saw Qubilai order Aḥmad to cease and desist his proselytising efforts. Aḥmad ignored this and instead had this unnamed brother executed (clearly Qongqortai) and attacked Arghun. He was only prevented from doing so by Buqa, whose love for Abaqa would not let him see Abaqa's son executed.[98]

---

[93] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 68; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 110, dealing with Khvāja Fakhr al-Dīn Idachi.

[94] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, pp. 70, 74; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, pp. 113, 125. Mamluk sources such as al-Yūnīnī and al-Nuwayrī also emphasise Aḥmad's attempts to convert the Mongol elite as a reason for his downfall, Van den Bent, 'Mongols in Mamluk Eyes', p. 185.

[95] Pfeiffer, 'Conversion to Islam', pp. 333, 345.

[96] *The Travels of Marco Polo*, (trans.) L.F. Benedetto, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), First Published 1931, pp. 320, 322.

[97] *The Monks of Kublai Khan*, pp. 158-162, 165.

[98] Het'um the Historian, *History of the Tartars*, pp. 60-1.

Undoubtedly, there were some Mongols and Ilkhanid subjects who were unhappy with Aḥmad's religious policies, however this seems somewhat overblown. The historian Khwāndamīr believed that the brothers Buqa and Aruq wanted to do away with Aḥmad because he promoted Muslims above others.[99] Bar Hebraeus does state that Arghun announced that Aḥmad had turned away from the laws of our fathers and trod the path of Islam, which may indeed have been Arghun's belief.[100] However, as a Christian cleric and one who would have suffered greatly at Aḥmad's hands if Aḥmad did indeed persecute non-Muslims, Bar Hebraeus surprisingly announces that Aḥmad looked kindly on Christians and gave them patents.[101] Rashīd al-Dīn, who seems to have been slightly embarrassed by Aḥmad's conversion, coming as it did before his patron Ghazan's, only makes a small comment as an aside that one of Rashīd al-Dīn's slaves was taken from him by one of Aḥmad's amirs. Rashīd al-Dīn asked for restitution, but was ignored, which a just Muslim ruler would not have done.[102] There may indeed have been those who complained to Qubilai that Aḥmad was not following tradition, but it is unlikely that his religion was the main problem. As Judith Pfeiffer has pointed out, princes and amirs were taking on Muslim names before Aḥmad's conversion, indicating that there was already a significant degree of Islamisation by Aḥmad's reign.[103] Indeed this is explicitly stated by the continuator of Bar Hebraeus, who says that a large number of the Mongols had converted in his day, echoed by Het'um, who believed that by Baidu's brief reign (1295) many Mongols had already converted.[104] Given that neither Arghun nor Gaykhatu were Muslims, there was no particular event which saw this change occur, but rather it seems that this situation developed over time. The continuator of Bar Hebraeus added that at this same time (mid-1290s), both the nobles and lesser folk of the Mongols had mostly converted.[105]

In this case, we should perhaps think about what ideal loyalty meant in this case. As many of our sources claim, it was Aḥmad's Islam that led to his overthrow. But these same sources also believed that conversion was already quite widespread. We know from previous Mongol history that conversions to different religions had not been a problem for Chinggisid rulers. Ghazan himself of course would prove the point that one could be a Muslim and a successful Chinggisid ruler, though there were some who questioned the need to convert to Islam. The issue was perhaps how Aḥmad

[99] Khwāndamīr/Thackston, p. 69.
[100] BH/Budge, p. 474.
[101] Idem, p. 467.
[102] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 560. Kamola, *Making Mongol History*, pp. 144-5 indicates that this in fact was likely Rashīd Khvāfī, a scribe who added some amendments to the TMG text, as well as to Juvainī's *Tārīkh-i Jahāngushā*.
[103] Pfeiffer, 'Conversion to Islam', pp. 121-5.
[104] BH/Budge, p. 486; Het'um the Historian, p. 62.
[105] BH/Budge, p. 505.

went about enacting his beliefs. His actions contrary to the *quriltai* regarding the Mamluks and his replacement of key Mongol *noyan*s with Sufi shaykhs may have been more damaging expressions of his faith. The execution of Qongqortai, little to do with Aḥmad's faith, also was seen as a betrayal of Mongol custom. These policies certainly weakened the Mongols' ideal loyalty to Aḥmad, which when married to his failure to appeal to his key subjects' self-interest and his perceived lack of charisma, saw Aḥmad's reign end quickly with the rise of his nephew Arghun.

4.5 Arghun's Succession

Now that we have answered the question 'why not Aḥmad?', we must therefore deal with the 'why Arghun?' question, by looking at the loyalty models that we have established. We would perhaps expect the great apologist of the Abaqaid line, Rashīd al-Dīn, to portray Arghun's succession as natural and inevitable.[106] However, Rashīd al-Dīn clearly shows us that while some key figures supported Arghun and believed him to be the rightful successor based on the precedent of Abaqa's succession to Hülegü as eldest son, there were equally many powerful amirs, princes and khatuns who held to different views. In the *quriltai* which elected Aḥmad, Rashīd al-Dīn lists Hülegü's sons, Qongqortai and Hülechü; Jumghur's sons, Jüshkeb and Kingshü; and the key amirs Shiktur Noyan and Suqunchaq Aqa as supporters of Aḥmad, and presumably Aḥmad's mother Qutui as well.[107] Möngke Temür also had supporters, notably his mother, the influential khatun Öljei.[108] Even Aq Buqa, one of Arghun's supporters at the 1282 *quriltai*, was decisively won over to Aḥmad during his short reign. Another of Arghun's *amir*s, Hindu Noyan, refused to support Arghun's claim for the throne, stating that Aḥmad was the *aqa* and that Arghun should be happy with Khurasan. Hindu Noyan did promise to fight for Arghun if Aḥmad attacked him and apparently followed up on this promise when Aḥmad advanced on Arghun in April 1284.[109]

---

[106] Brack, 'Mediating Kingship', p. 41 explicitly states 'Rashīd al-Dīn also strives to show that the Abaqaid (Arghun, Gaykhatu, Ghazan) succession to the throne was undisputed, and enjoyed consensus among the princes to the house of Hülegü'.

[107] Though Rashīd al-Dīn states that Qutui supported Arghun, he later shows that she strove on behalf of her son Aḥmad till the end, Vol. III, p. 559. According to the *Akhbār-i Mughulān*, Qutui was unhappy with Abaqa's rulership, as he had given her incomes to his concubine, Arqan, while Qutui was not yet in Iran, *Akhbār-i Mughulān*, p. 62, Persian text, p. 46. It seems highly unlikely then that she would support Abaqa's son Arghun over her own son Aḥmad.

[108] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 548.

[109] Idem, p. 552-3.

Clearly most of the key figures in the Ilkhanate did not support Arghun's candidacy in 1282. However, even after Rashīd al-Dīn delineates how Aḥmad lost many of these supporters over the next two years, he still stages a set-piece in 1284 where the princes and amirs gathered to discuss who should become the ruler. Again, despite Aḥmad not being considered and Arghun's uncles Möngke Temür and Qongqortai dead, support for Arghun was not particularly strong. Some were keen on Hülechü, saying that a son of Hülegü was alive, and thus power should not go to a grandson.[110] Others supported Jüshkeb based on his greater age and control of the great *yurt*.[111] Rashīd al-Dīn states that Tanggiz Güregen claimed that he and Shiktur Aqa had heard Abaqa say that he would be succeeded first by Möngke Temür, then by Arghun.[112] The *Akhbār-i Mughulān,* an anonymous source from the 1280s, says that Buqa claimed that Abaqa had named Arghun his successor, confirmed by Dankiz (Tanggiz) Küregen. However, the source also specifies that the legitimacy of the ruler's will was not clearly delineated in the Chinggisid *jasaq*.[113] In this case, maternal lineage was not a factor as Arghun, Hülechü and Jüshkeb were all born of concubines.[114] No

[110] This echoes the successions of Güyük and Yesü Möngke.

[111] Idem, p. 558. Even if we were to base our entire view of this period on Rashīd al-Dīn, the supposed white washer of Abaqaid pretensions, these statements show beyond doubt that Rashīd al-Dīn does not cover up that Arghun was not well-supported. He in fact repeatedly shows this.

[112] Ibid.

[113] See *Akhbār-i Mughulān*, p. 75, note 33, Persian text, p. 65. '*hīch beh jāī vasiyyat nīstand*'. The Armenian chronicler Vardan tells a different story, saying that he was consulted by Doquz Khatun after Hülegü's death as to who should be raised in his place. Vardan responded that it was according to Scripture that the senior son should be appointed, and that the will was legally binding, thus Abaqa should be the ruler, Vardan Arewelts'i's *Compilation of History,* (trans.) R. Bedrosian, http://www.attalus.org/armenian/vaint.htm, Accessed March 30th 2020, p. 97. It seems highly unlikely that the Mongols cared for Vardan's opinion on the matter, or that they would be swayed by Christian scripture.

[114] Broadbridge, *Women*, pp. 283-4 calls Ghazan 'anomalous' because he was born of a concubine, but Arghun and Ghazan were both born of concubines, while Baidu's father, Taraghai, was a son of Hülegü by a concubine also. Baidu's mother is called by Rashīd al-Dīn Qaraqchin, but he does not use the title Khatun, nor is she mentioned again, which seems to indicate she was a concubine as well, RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 474. Three out of nine Ilkhans then were descended from concubines, thus we cannot really call this an anomaly. The consideration for rule of Hülechü, Jüshkeb, and Kingshü (all born of concubines), and the willingness of amirs to support them for the throne should make us question whether the mother's status was as decisive as Broadbridge and others claim, at least in the Ilkhanate. There is good reason to make this claim based on Juvainī's description of Mongol seniority, Juvainī/Qazvini, Vol. I, p. 29, در رسم مغول اعتبار فرزندان یک پدری بنسبت آن فرزند را مزیت و رجحان باشد مادران باشد مادر هرکدام بزرگتر بنسبت. *dar rasm-i mughul iʿtibār-i farzandān-i yik pidarī bi-nisbat-i madārān bāshad, mādar-i har-kudām buzurgtar bi-nisbat ān farzand rā mazīyyat va rujḥān bāshad*. 'According to the custom of the Mongols, the importance of the sons of one father is in relation to mothers, whichever mother is eldest, that son has superiority'. However, Juvainī seems to be describing an ideal scenario here, and indeed, this quote emerges from his description of Chinggis' four sons by Börte, the classical case. If we consider what we know of Ilkhanid history, this simplistic rule is rarely followed. After Abaqa's death, why was it Arghun (Abaqa's son of a concubine, Qaitmish Egechi) who challenged for the throne and not Gaykhatu (the son of Nuqdan Khatun, Abaqa's second wife)? And why did Ghazan (Arghun's son by a concubine, Qultaq Egechi) and not Öljeitü (Arghun's son by his third wife Örüg Khatun) challenge Baidu for the throne in 1295? The answer is that there were many contributing factors as to why one prince was chosen for the throne, with the status of the mother only one of these, and clearly rarely the most decisive, at least by this period in the Ilkhanate. The use of concubines as royal consorts became the norm in the Ottoman Empire, see L.P. Pierce,

agreement was reached, and Buqa tried to defer the issue until Öljei Khatun and the royal women could be consulted, perhaps hoping to win them to Arghun's side. Vaṣṣāf goes a step further, saying that the princes and amirs successfully chose a candidate, and that candidate was Hülechü, with even Buqa saying he had traded Aḥmad's *yasa* for Hülechü's.[115]

We are somewhat in the dark about how Arghun exactly managed to gain power, but it was clearly without the support of his rivals Jüshkeb and Hülechü. Both Vaṣṣāf and Rashīd al-Dīn confirm that Arghun had himself crowned without the support of any Chinggisid princes, but rather only certain amirs and khatuns.[116] Vaṣṣāf states that Öljei Khatun, Buqa and Shiktur Noyan, three powerful Ilkhanid figures, confirmed Arghun's succession, but even Arghun's confirmation *quriltai* was not attended by the Chinggisid princes and there was still support for Hülechü at this assembly as well.[117] Incredibly, Arghun apparently apologised profusely to Hülechü for seizing the throne, even sending him an umbrella (*chatr*), a symbol of royal authority across Asia from the Achaemenids in Persia to the Zhōu Dynasty in China.[118] Rashīd al-Dīn says that the possible conflict with the forces of Hülechü and Jüshkeb contributed to Aḥmad's execution, Arghun needing to show strength and not mercy on this occasion.[119] Indeed, though these princes did give *möchelge*s after the *quriltai*, Hülechü and Jüshkeb were executed a few years later by Arghun for rebelling.[120] Arghun's execution of many Chinggisid princes indicates how insecure he felt about his rule.

The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 30-41.

[115] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 78; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, pp. 132-3.

[116] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 559; Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 81; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 137.

[117] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 81; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, pp. 137, 139.

[118] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, pp. 81-2; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 139; E. Sims, 'Chatr', *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, Vol. V, Fasc. 1, (Dec. 1990), pp. 77-9, https://iranicaonline.org/articles/catr-parasol-or-umbrella-an-attribute-of-royalty-in-iran, Accessed 9th February, 2022; C.E. Bosworth, P.M.Holt, P. Chalmeta, P.A. Andrews, and J. Burton-Page, 'Miẓalla', in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, Online Edition (2012), http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0757, Accessed 11th February 2022; S. Gordon, 'In the Aura of the King: Trans-Asian, Trans-Regional, and Deccani Royal Symbolism', *South Asian Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1, (2016), pp. 45, 50. According to Abu'l Fazl, the vizier of the Mughal ruler, Akbar, in his *A'īn-i Akbārī*, the *chatr* was one of the four royal symbols that should never be bestowed on anyone else. Eleanor Sims however, has shown that in the Timurid period, the umbrella was also permissible for princes of the blood, as shown in depictions of Shah Rukh and Baysunghur. The Mongols may not have been so picky however, as the Syriac Catholicus Mar Yahbh-Allaha apparently received a parasol, a golden *paiza* and a seal from Abaqa, *Monks of Kublai Khan*, p. 155, while the Mongol *noyan* Shiktur also was given one by Aḥmad Tegüder, Pfeiffer, 'Conversion to Islam', p. 278.

[119] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 559.

[120] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, pp. 563, 571. Brack, 'Mediating Sacred Kingship', pp. 41, 46 states that Kingshü also was executed, though Rashīd al-Dīn says he fled to Ghor, p. 598, and Brack later admits that we in fact have no evidence of his execution, merely that we no longer hear of him after Nawrūz's revolt, 'Mediating Sacred Kingship', p. 57, note 138; a Kingshü does appear in Vaṣṣāf, where he is one of the leaders of Ghazan's Syrian campaign of 1303, where he is captured in a confrontation with the Mamluks at Marj al-Suffar. Vaṣṣāf lists him after other notable amirs like Taitaq and Irinjin, and says that he was captured with 'other amirs', (*va chand amīr-i dīgar*), which may indicate he was merely an amir of the same name. Vaṣṣāf also mentions that it was

Buqa's support was key in Arghun gaining power. Pfeiffer states that Buqa's loyalty to Arghun was personal, as he had been in Arghun's service.[121] However, this service cannot have been for very long, as Rashīd al-Dīn states that Buqa only entered Arghun's service after Abaqa's death in April 1282, and he had been Abaqa's *inaq*, while Arghun was based in Khurasan.[122] Given that Buqa was called to serve Aḥmad only a month after Aḥmad's enthronement in July 1282, Arghun did not have a great deal of time to make this personal connection. Instead we must turn to our loyalty categories to analyse Buqa's actions. As an *inaq* to Abaqa, Buqa's ideal loyalty presumably would have seen him honour Abaqa's children, and he may have seen it as his duty to support his lord Arghun. However, if we consider Vaṣṣāf's version of events, Arghun was not considered for rule at Aḥmad's *quriltai*, and Buqa only actively intervened on Arghun's behalf when Aḥmad sought to execute him. This can be seen as residual loyalty to Abaqa, but as we can see, Buqa had no problem announcing that he was in service to Hülechü when killing Aḥmad's general Alinaq.[123] If we turn to Arghun's reign itself, it may become clear what Arghun offered Buqa to get him onside. Buqa was given the vizierate and apparently literally showered in gold.[124] His powers under Arghun were manifold, and it was only after some five years or so that Arghun reacted against Buqa's perceived *lèse-majesté* and eventually had him executed.[125]

The other factor that we must consider when thinking why the princes and amirs would accept Arghun as Ilkhan is his military might. This stemmed from two sources. The first source was what he received from his father as *emchü* (Persianised form, *īnjū*), personal property. Crucially, this included a number of Qara'unas troops handed down from Abaqa. This seems to have been no small amount, as Rashīd al-Dīn lists among their leaders two Chinggisid princes, Gaykhatu and Baidu, and no less than seven amirs. He calls these *gäzigtän*, who made up the personal bodyguard, or *keshig*, of Abaqa which passed down to Arghun.[126] Elsewhere Rashīd al-Dīn states that during Abaqa's reign he provided a personal *keshig* for Arghun, having his amirs give their sons and brothers and liegemen as *emchü* for Arghun.[127] It is not clear how large this force was, but it seems only to have been provided

---

the Amir Qutlughshah who carried Ghazan's *tugh* (banner) into battle, which would indicate that a Chinggisid prince was not present, Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, pp. 246-7; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, pp. 410-13. RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 657 mentions this engagement, and the defeat of the Mongols which sparked a trial of the commanders responsible, but does not mention Kingshü or Irinjin, though he does state that Taitaq and another amir, Tarsa, disappeared.

[121] Pfeiffer, 'Conversion to Islam', p. 280.

[122] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 548.

[123] See note 93.

[124] Idem, p. 563.

[125] Idem, pp. 568-570. BH/Budge, pp. 477-480.

[126] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 551.

[127] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 283.

to Arghun. While the Qara'unas could be of doubtful loyalty, deserting Arghun before the conflict which saw him imprisoned by Aḥmad, they eventually were vital in securing Arghun the throne by capturing Aḥmad and the khatuns.[128] The *Akhbār-i Mughulān* also mentions that the support of the Qara'unas was pivotal in ensuring Arghun was made Ilkhan.[129] While Arghun's forces were not comparable in size to those at Aḥmad's disposal, none of the other Chinggisids, such as Hülechü, had a personal bodyguard of such size with which they could contend for power.

The second source which provided the backing for Arghun's power play were the forces he could lead based as governor of Khurasan. As the largest and wealthiest of the provinces of the Ilkhanate, it seems no coincidence that the princes given this province were consistently successful in becoming Ilkhans.[130] As a frontier province, it was also threatened by both the Chaghadaids and Qara'unas/Negüderi groups to the east and its governor was given significant forces to combat this threat.[131] Arghun was able to call on workshops at Nishapur, Tus, and Isfarayin, as well as his treasury at Garrakan (?) in order to provide gold, jewels and textiles to his amirs and soldiers, crucial in winning over loyalties of self-interest.[132] If the Ilkhans did not want their eldest sons to succeed, they certainly seem to have made it more difficult for anyone else to do so by entrusting these sons with Khurasan.

This military superiority over the other princes and the decisive capture of Aḥmad and the royal *ordu*s by the Qara'unas seems to have enabled Arghun to take swift advantage. Having himself chosen as khan by key figures such as Buqa, Shiktur Noyan and Öljei Khatun forced a decision by the other princes: to continue to resist against Arghun's superior forces or to accept Arghun as Ilkhan, at least temporarily. Het'um the Historian claims that many accepted Arghun out of fear.[133] Both Vaṣṣāf and Rashīd al-Dīn agree that when the princes arrived after Arghun had already been chosen, they accepted the status quo and confirmed Arghun as Ilkhan.[134] However, Rashīd al-Dīn believed that Kingshü and Jüshkeb were only waiting to rebel at a later date, while Vaṣṣāf says that Hülechü still had a good deal of support as well.[135] Arghun clearly tried to appease these princes. We have already seen how he sought to mollify Hülechü, and he doled out governorships to all the key Chinggisid princes. Jüshkeb and Baidu were assigned to Baghdad, Hülechü and Gaykhatu to Anatolia, and

[128] Idem, pp. 554, 559.
[129] *Akhbār-i Mughulān*, p. 75, Persian text, p. 65.
[130] Jackson, *Mongols and the Islamic World*, p. 189.
[131] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, pp. 517-8, where Abaqa gives his brother Tübshin a large army to control Khurasan and Mazanderan.
[132] Idem, p. 553.
[133] Het'um the Historian, p. 61.
[134] Khwāndamīr/Thackston, p. 70 states 'other princes were brought, willingly or otherwise, into obedience'.
[135] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 563; Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, pp. 81-2; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 139.

Khurasan and Mazandaran to Kingshü and Arghun's own son Ghazan.[136] This seems to have been a prudent move, placating the princes with lucrative positions, but also separating them, having the brothers Jüshkeb and Kingshü at different extremes of the realm. Notably, he also installed counterpart princes and amirs to attempt to ensure the others' loyalty. Thus Khurasan was ruled not just by Kingshü, but also Ghazan, and Nawrūz, until this point one of Arghun's firm supporters, while Aruq, the brother of Buqa, was installed in Baghdad alongside Jüshkeb.[137]

4.6 Arghun's Tenuous Rule

This appeasement seems to have worked out for the next five years, but when the great amir Buqa baulked at Arghun's attempts to limit his power, there were no shortage of Chinggisid princes to whom Buqa could turn to as alternatives to his previous protégé. Eventually, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, it was Jüshkeb that Buqa sought to supplant Arghun. After flattering him and apparently submitting *möchelge*s to Jüshkeb alongside some other amirs who supported Buqa, Jüshkeb reported this to Arghun. Jüshkeb was so keen to prove his loyalty, he asked to be allowed to kill Buqa himself, which Arghun accepted and rewarded Jüshkeb. Despite this elaborate show, Arghun clearly did not believe Jüshkeb's innocence in all this, executing him a few months after Buqa's death.[138] This situation is portrayed in even more stark terms by Vaṣṣāf. In his account, Buqa's revolt is no less than a full-fledged princely uprising against Arghun. Vaṣṣāf lists some seven princes involved, including all of those who had been considered as possible replacements for Aḥmad previously. Both Hülechü and Jüshkeb partook, though Vaṣṣāf confirms that it was Jüshkeb who spilled the beans on the plot to Arghun.[139] If Hülechü had already been chosen once as Ilkhan, perhaps Jüshkeb feared the same result and instead sought to gain by tardily showing his loyalty to Arghun. Vaṣṣāf also mentions that

[136] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 563.

[137] This was common practice in the Mongol Empire, see M. Hope, 'The *Atābaks* in the Mongol Empire and the Ilkhanate of Iran (602–736/1206–1335)' in (eds.) T. May, D. Bayarsaikhan and C.P. Atwood, *New Approaches to Ilkhanid History*, (Leiden, Brill, 2021), pp. 321-345.

[138] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, pp. 569-571.

[139] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 140; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 232. Brack, 'Mediating Sacred Kingship', pp. 55-60, shows how Rashīd al-Dīn portrays this rebellion, and several others by Chinggisid princes against the Abaqaid line as driven by ambitious amirs, and not the princes themselves, who are shown as pawns. This tropic narrative of Rashīd al-Dīn is not to be found in Vaṣṣāf, but we should remember that this has been a regular ploy of dissenters in many regimes across the world. It is safer to question influential advisers or pernicious women than to blame the rulers directly.

Jüshkeb took Buqa's life with his own hands, though he seems to indicate that Jüshkeb's own death did not take place until late 1290 once Arghun was already ill.[140]

It seems that while through clever manipulation of the situation surrounding Aḥmad's fall, Arghun was able to capitalise and take control, he had to walk a fine line between various groups whose loyalty to him only extended as far as they were benefiting from his rule, and many of them only under threat. It is made clear by Rashīd al-Dīn, Bar Hebraeus and Vaṣṣāf that for most of Arghun's reign, Buqa and his brother Aruq controlled many of the offices of the Ilkhanate, handing them out to their supporters. Key amirs such as Nawrūz in Khurasan bolstered Buqa's support. As we have seen, it looks as if Arghun was forced to accept Buqa's extensive power in order to get his support to take the Ilkhanate. However, this situation clearly disadvantaged other notable figures in the Ilkhanate, such as Taghachar Noyan, Ordu Qaya, Qunchuqbal, and Toghan. These amirs directly benefited from Arghun's assertion of independence from Buqa.[141] Taghachar was put in charge of all the *emchü* lands in the Ilkhanate, previously in Buqa's control, while Ordu Qaya was given the governance of Baghdad, removing Aruq from his position. Toghan, who had been beaten at Buqa's order for infringements of the *jasaq*, was particularly keen to encourage Arghun's actions against Buqa.[142] However, Arghun's actions were to have severe repercussions which lasted until the end of his reign. The revolt of the princes and Buqa was fiercely put down, but according to Vaṣṣāf, this very ruthlessness saw Nawrūz revolt in Khurasan when he became aware of it.[143] Nawrūz's rebellion was declared in the name of Hülechü and Kingshü according to Rashīd al-Dīn, and while Ghazan was able to capture Hülechü and send him back to Arghun, Nawrūz's revolt was still underway when Arghun died in 1291.[144]

The tenuous nature of Arghun's reign is indicated by his increasing brutality throughout. Buqa's rebellion was met with his execution as well as that of his brother Aruq, all of their sons, dependents, amirs and anyone who had any association with them that Arghun could get his hands on. The ignominy with which the bodies of Buqa and Aruq and their associates were treated is vividly portrayed in Vaṣṣāf. Aruq and his son's heads were displayed over the Chaghan Bridge in Tabriz, but Arghun 'ordered that the dead (Buqa and all his kith and kin) were left in the wilderness to be devoured by dogs, wolves and vultures' (فرمود تا کشتگان را در صحرا گذارند تا سگان و گرگان و لاشخوران گوشت آنها را بخورند, '*(Arghun) farmūd tā kushtigān rā dar ṣaḥrā guẕārand tā sagān va gurgān va lāshkhūrān*

[140] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, pp. 140, 146; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, pp. 233, 244.
[141] Khwāndamīr/Thackston, p. 73.
[142] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, pp. 568-570; Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, pp. 138-9; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, pp. 230-1. Rashīd al-Dīn highlights the personal animosity of Toghan, saying that he kicked Buqa in the chest before Jüshkeb killed him.
[143] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 141; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 235.
[144] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, pp. 596-602.

gūsht-i ānhā rā bikhurand').[145] By the end of his reign, Arghun was extremely ill and seemingly paranoid due to the repeated rebellions of his relatives, either in support of Buqa or Nawrūz. He decided to simply do away with any who were remotely troublesome. If we include Aḥmad himself, Arghun was responsible for the deaths of 17 Chinggisid princes. Even the infant sons of Hülechü and Qara Noqai (a son of Yoshmut) were not spared, diverging from Mongol norms whereby the sons of defeated or executed rivals were reintegrated into the appanage system, though usually at a lower level.[146] Sultan Idachi, Arghun's tool for this gruesome task, was tried and executed by Taghachar Noyan and Qunchuqbal, apparently while Arghun was still alive.[147] Vaṣṣāf even states that Arghun disavowed any knowledge of Sultan Idachi's actions, though it is extremely difficult to believe that an amir would execute 16 Chinggisid princes of his own whim.[148]

Loyalties at this moment seem to have been increasingly malleable and temporary, and Arghun's paranoia is perhaps understandable. However, Vaṣṣāf mentioned that according to 'Mongol holy men' (*rūḥānīyān*) the unjust murder of Chinggisid princes and infants was a cause of Arghun's illness.[149] Rashīd al-Dīn makes the scapegoat for this Sultan Idachi, but still saying that the amirs believed this action caused Arghun's illness.[150] If important Mongol amirs and religious figures believed that Arghun's actions were so damaging, indubitably this would have undermined

---

[145] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati pp. 140-1; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, pp. 233-4.

[146] See p. 124.

[147] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 575.

[148] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 146; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 244. Rashīd al-Dīn also is keen not to explicitly blame Arghun, saying that he had not been able to speak for some time, so there was no way he could have ordered the deaths of the young children, RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 575.

[149] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 146; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 246.

[150] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 575. This tale also reached the Florentine Dominican traveller Riccoldo da Montecroce, who was in the region of Baghdad in the early 1290s and later in Tabriz. Riccoldo reports that Arghun became gravely ill due to killing so many innocent women and children, and that an apparition came to him in a dream to hold him to account for his crimes. Arghun sought the advice of the *bakhshi*s (Buddhist monks), who told him that only through alms could he save himself from death. Arghun freed captives and gave out great treasures and alms, but still died soon after, R. George-Tvrtkovic, *A Christian Pilgrim in Medeival Iraq: Riccoldo Da Montecroce's Encounter with Islam*, (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012), p. 198. This was not the first time an Ilkhanid ruler was admonished by his Buddhist advisors for violence either. The abbot of Drigung Monastery, Togdugpa, wrote to Hülegü warning him of the King Ajatasatru, who had committed five inexpiable sins and became ill, but repented and became a Bodhisattva. Hülegü apparently followed Ajatasatru's example, J. Samten and D. Martin, 'Letters to the Khans: Six Tibetan Epistles of Togdugpa to the Mongol Rulers Hülegü and Khubilai, as well as to the Tibetan Lama Pagpa', in (ed.) R. Vitali, *Trails of the Tibetan Tradition: Papers for Elliot Sperling,* (Dharamsala: Amnye Machen Institute, 2015). Republished in *Revue d'Études Tibétaines*, Vol. 31, (2015), p. 311. Amnesties were seen to have positive effects in the natural world in both Buddhist and Confucian traditions, thus Ögödei was convinced by Ila Chucai to forgive offences after his accession in 1229 also, F. Hodous, 'Faith and the Law: Religious Beliefs and the Death Penalty in the Ilkhanate', in (eds.) C. Melville and B. de Nicola, *The Mongols' Middle East: continuity and transformation in Ilkhanid Iran,* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 120-2. Qubilai repeatedly issued such amnesties, P. H. Ch'en, *Chinese Legal Tradition under the Mongols*: *The Code of 1291 as Reconstructed*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 46. Khwāndamīr/Thackston, p. 75 says that Arghun's officials tried to implement these tactics also, giving alms, releasing prisoners and sending out *al tamgha*s to show justice to the people.

charismatic and ideal loyalty to him. Interestingly there is also some notion that Arghun was poisoned or subject to witchcraft. The main suspect in this action was one of his wives Toghachaq Khatun, who was drowned after an interrogation found her guilty alongside several other wives. Vaṣṣāf tantalises us by mentioning that Toghachaq was the niece of Jüshkeb, only a few lines after notifying us that Jüshkeb had been executed.[151] We also find out from Rashīd al-Dīn that Toghachaq had in fact been married to Aḥmad before, so Arghun was therefore responsible for the deaths of her husband and uncle.[152] It is perhaps too poetic to read into this a story of long-awaited revenge, given that we have seen that accusing women of witchcraft and poisoning their khan had already occurred in the Mongol world.[153] Clearly, however, Arghun had not done much to inspire loyalty in either princes, khatuns or amirs and perhaps only inertial loyalty and fear kept them somewhat under control until his illness.

4.7 Late 13th century developments: Taghachar and Nawrūz

This situation would deteriorate during the succession struggles of the 1290s and Arghun's son Ghazan's reign. The whittling down of the Chinggisid family in Arghun's reign seems to have allowed a great deal more freedom for the *amir*s of the Ilkhanate. The actions of two in particular perhaps highlight a lessening of ideal and charismatic loyalties to the house of Chinggis and Hülegü, with clientelist loyalties, what we might term simply 'opportunism', coming to the fore. These two *amir*s were Taghachar Aqa and Nawrūz, whose actions largely decided succession issues in the Ilkhanate in the three changes of power between 1291 and 1295.[154] A casual glance at the sources would certainly suggest both acted for their own aggrandisement, but there is another strand of thought that can be pursued. Both Rashīd al-Dīn and Vaṣṣāf are quite critical of two Ilkhans in particular, Aḥmad Tegüder and Gaykhatu. Recent scholarship has labelled this as Abaqaid bias (though Gaykhatu was Abaqa's son), but one must also look at the commonalities in these criticisms. Both Ilkhans are primarily accused of two things: misgovernment and diminishing the legacy of Chinggisid rule, with the first causing the second. We must certainly not ignore the biases of our Persian administrators, who valued justice in their rulers to a great degree. However, the importance of the second criticism for the Chinggisids and their subjects cannot be underestimated. As Welsford

[151] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 575; Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 146; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 244.
[152] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 473.
[153] See p. 38.
[154] Taghachar is at times called Taghachar Noyan by Vaṣṣāf, but as this refers also to a descendant of Temüge Otchigin who served Qubilai, I have used Rashīd al-Dīn's label of Taghachar Aqa.

has shown, living up to Chinggisid charismatic standards continued to be important among dynasties of the 16th and 17th centuries.[155]

Both Aḥmad and Gaykhatu were abandoned by the majority of their amirs. For Aḥmad, an assembly of amirs and princes apparently claimed that 'Sultan Aḥmad despised the house of Chinggis Khan and held it worthless' (سلطان احمد خاندان چنگیز را خوار و بی قدر ساخته, *sulṭān aḥmad khāndān-i chīngīz rā khuvār va bī-qadr sākhta*).[156] For Gaykhatu 'all of the amirs, because of his attack on their honour and for the reason that their reputation was being tarnished, hated him' (چون همهٔ امرا به علت تعرض کیخاتو خان به عرض و ناموس آنان و اینکه موجب بدنامی و ریختن آبرویشان شده بود از او متنفر بودند, *chun hama-yi umarā bi-illat-i taʿarruż-I kaykhātū khān bi ʿarż va nāmūs-i ānān va īnki mawjib badnāmī va rīkhtan-i ābrūyishān shuda būd az ū mutinaffir būdand*.) [157] Vaṣṣāf notes that Gaykhatu's opponents criticised him for leaving for Anatolia soon after his enthronement, when the young ruler should be establishing his power at the heart of the realm.[158] These expressions of discontent with the debasing of Chinggisid charisma and the effects this had on the amirs themselves may have us rethink the amirs' actions. Michael Hope has shown how there were actors who saw the Chinggisid state as more collegialist, but the actions of the amirs should not only be seen as that which increased their power.[159] It seems that they also demanded from their leaders a strong hand (though not tyrannical) in government and in warfare. Neither Aḥmad nor Gaykhatu had good records on either front, and it may be that the amirs acted out against this in order to preserve the legacy of the Chinggisid house. If certain amirs also could increase their own power and wealth along the way, there was ample opportunity to do so. As such, the amirs were not always demanding more freedom of action and

[155] See p. 12-3 of this thesis.

[156] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 78; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 132.

[157] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 168; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 276.

[158] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 159; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 261. Gaykhatu's age is very difficult to figure out based on our sources. The manuscripts of Rashīd al-Dīn do not give easy answers, saying he was born in 64_ Hijri, or 638 of the Yazdgird era, RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 579. Karl Jahn, on the advice of J.A. Boyle, plumps for 1259 though it is not clear where this information comes from; perhaps it is simply the last possible year of the 640s, K. Jahn, 'Paper Currency in Iran: A contribution to the cultural and economic history of Iran in the Mongol Period', *Journal of Asian History*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1970), p. 105, note 14. However, Rashīd al-Dīn is clear that Arghun is older than Gaykhatu, and Arghun was apparently born in 1261. When exactly Gaykhatu was born is not clear, but it is possible he was born some years later given the fact that Vaṣṣāf calls him young on his accession and that he was not given a position in the Ilkhanate until Arghun's reign, and that he was not considered for rulership in 1284. This last point would be particularly surprising if he was 25 (according to Jahn and Boyle) and of better birth than Arghun, his mother being Nuqdan Khatun of the Tatar while Arghun's mother was a concubine. The issue of dating in Rashīd al-Dīn is extremely thorny in general of course, and specifically in Arghun's case. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Ghazan was born in November 1271 (*Rabīʿ al-'awwal* 670), (Vol. III, p. 589), which according to the above date for Arghun's birth would have made him one of the youngest fathers in history at the age of 9/10. However, he also states that Arghun was 33 when he died in March 1291, (Vol. III, p. 561), giving us a date of 1258, rendering him 13 when Ghazan was born, a more probable age for fathering a child.

[159] Hope, *Power, Politics and Tradition*, *passim*.

regional control, but in fact sought a strong ruler such as Abaqa had been to strengthen the state, and thereby their own prestige and charisma. Of course when rulers such as Arghun pushed their amirs too hard, it could cause rupture as well, as we will see with both of our amirs. Clearly, a balance had to be struck.

4.7.1 The Case of Taghachar

The first of our amir case studies is Taghachar Aqa. Taghachar Aqa's father, Qutu Buqa, had been a great commander under Abaqa and had fought and died in service against the Jochids.[160] Taghachar himself also served Abaqa, and was involved in the punishment of the Juvainī brothers, having 'Aṭā-Malik tortured on Abaqa's orders.[161] As we have seen, Taghachar rose to greater prominence through his support of Arghun, with Vaṣṣāf claiming that he was one of the few present at Arghun's election.[162] Taghachar seems to have been a firm supporter of Arghun and was relied on by Arghun as a buffer against Buqa and later took an active role in Buqa's deposition and execution. However, once Arghun became fatally ill, Taghachar began to act quite independently of the Ilkhans. Taghachar, along with other amirs such as Qunchuqbal and Toghan, quickly sought to eliminate Arghun's inner circle, his *inaq*s Joshi, Ordu Qaya and Quchan, as well as the extremely powerful vizier Saʿd al-Dawla and Arghun's executioner Sultan Idachi in show trials.[163] Hope holds that this retaliation was due to the resentment many amirs felt towards the limiting of their power through the actions of Saʿd al-Dawla and Arghun.[164] Dispensing with important rivals, given the death of Suqunchaq Aqa and the old age of Shiktur Noyan, also would have made Taghachar one of the most important amirs in the Ilkhanate.

In the aftermath of the death of Arghun and during the establishment of Gaykhatu as his successor, Taghachar was an active player. While Taghachar was not able to install his own desired candidate, Baidu, as Ilkhan due to the canny politics of Örüg Khatun, an influential widow of Arghun and mother of the later Ilkhan Öljeitü, he was able to act with relative impunity during the reign of Gaykhatu. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, the Ilkhanate's amirs unanimously calumniated Taghachar to Gaykhatu for instigating the rebellion during Arghun's illness, including Shiktur Noyan, who had been involved in the plot but blamed his old age and lack of alternatives for going along with Taghachar

[160] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 106; Vol. III, p. 518. He was of the Suqai'ut, a subdivision of the Ba'arin Mongols.
[161] Idem, pp. 543, 545.
[162] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 81; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 137.
[163] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 575.
[164] Hope, *Power, Politics and Tradition*, pp. 143, 147.

and his cronies Qunchuqbal and Toghan. Gaykhatu may or may not have ordered Toghan's execution, but Taghachar and Qunchuqbal were either absolved of their crimes (according to Rashīd al-Dīn) or summarily punished with three strokes of a wooden rod (according to Vaṣṣāf) after submitting to Gaykhatu, though they were demoted and their positions given to other amirs.[165] For those amirs who had reported Taghachar's actions, they must have been angered by Gaykhatu's failure to punish him. Vaṣṣāf states that Gaykhatu was so worried by the warning issued by Mongol holy men regarding Arghun's ruthlessness as the cause of his illness that he refused to have anyone executed during his reign.[166] In loyalty terms, inertial loyalties to the state would have weakened at its failure to keep Taghachar in line, while a Chinggisid kowtowing to an amir cannot have but damaged their view of his charisma.

Gaykhatu's inability to act against Taghachar and other powerful amirs was indicated by the fact that Taghachar seems to have supported another Chinggisid pretender, Anbarchi, the son of Möngke Temür, and falsely announced Gaykhatu's death fighting in Anatolia. This rebellion was soon dealt with by Shiktur Noyan, who attacked and captured Taghachar, somewhat belying his previous claim of old age. Even this did not see Taghachar (or Anbarchi) punished, or even removed from military command.[167] Vaṣṣāf does at least credit Gaykhatu with attempts to limit Taghachar's power. In the incident where Taghachar was beaten for his actions during Arghun's illness, Gaykhatu also transferred 10 *hazāra*s (thousands) from Taghachar and Qunchuqbal to other amirs.[168] After Taghachar's second rebellion, Gaykhatu put his chief amir (*amīr-i amīrān*) Aq Buqa in command of Taghachar.[169] These half-measures seem to only have encouraged Taghachar, who realised he could largely do as he wished, especially given that Gaykhatu was by and large not particularly interested in rulership according to both Vaṣṣāf and Bar Hebraeus.[170]

Taghachar unsurprisingly saw no impediment to turning his cloak once again and backing Baidu's play for the throne in 1295, as Baidu was Taghachar's original choice for rule. We have another account of this incident in the chronicle *Tārīkh-i Shaykh Uvays* of around 1360, written by the historian al-Ahrī on behalf of the Jalayirid dynasty (1335-1432 CE) which ruled over part of the

[165] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 581. In a sort of 'Who will rid me of this troublesome priest?' situation, Rashīd al-Dīn has Gaykhatu speaking out loud that Toghan deserves execution after encouragement from Örüg Khatun, and Aq Buqa taking it upon himself to act on these words; Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p.158; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 260; Khwāndamīr/Thackston, p. 76 says that Taghachar's *tümen* was given to another amir, while Qunchuqbal's was given to Shiktur Noyan.

[166] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 161; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 267, see p. 166 of this thesis.

[167] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, pp. 581-2, 586; Hope, *Power, Politics and Tradition*, p. 150.

[168] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 159; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 260.

[169] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 160; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 265.

[170] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 161; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 268; BH/Budge, p. 492.

former Ilkhanid realm. In this account a personal confrontation emerged between Taghachar and Gaykhatu's Jalayirid *amīr-i amīrān*, Aq Buqa. Gaykhatu sent Taghachar to fight Baidu, but Taghachar wanted to go over to Baidu instead. Aq Buqa refused out of loyalty to Gaykhatu, and accused Taghachar of acting against the *jasaq* (خلاف یاسا, *khilāf-i yāsā*). Baidu then put Aq Buqa to death when he came into power.[171] Some months later however, Taghachar subsequently abandoned Baidu for Ghazan on the eve of battle.[172] Ghazan finally put an end to Taghachar's manoeuvring, despite acknowledging his key role in his own accession.[173] Gaykhatu's weakness in the face of Taghachar can only have encouraged other amirs to see that inertial loyalty to the state was at this point riskier than transferring their allegiance to another Chinggisid, as Aq Buqa's case proves. In fact, amirs such as Qunchuqbal and Tolodai were confident enough in their choice of loyalties to execute Gaykhatu of their own volition, without the consultation of the Chinggisid family.[174] This confidence was misguided, and Gaykhatu's nephew Ghazan would kill them for daring to lay hands on a Chinggisid prince. Betraying Gaykhatu was less of a problem than the infringement of Mongol ideals in killing a Chinggisid as a group of non-Chinggisids (*qarachu*).

It is perhaps worthwhile to quote Rashīd al-Dīn's account of Ghazan's justification of his execution of Taghachar in full:

> و هرچند پادشاه اسلام را دلخواه نبود که او را هلاک گرداند لیکن مصلحت کار ملک را آن حکم فرمود, و در آن قضیه با مقربان خود گفت که, در قدیم الایام به ولایت ختای دو پادشاه با یکدیگر جنگ کردند یکی منهزم شد و لشکر او متفرق گشتند و لشکر منصور بر پی مقهور چند روزی می رفتند, امیری آن پادشاه را منهزم یافت, و چون بغایت عاجز و مضطر بود بر وی رحم آورد و خواست که او را خلاص دهد. در آن حدود به چاهی رسید, او را گفت در بن چاه رو تا لشکریان ما ترا نبینند. چون جماعت دررسیدند سبب آنکه ریگستان بود و بادآمده و پیها را ناپدید کرده راه نمی یافتند. آن امیر گفت راه پیدا نیست و معلوم نه که به کدام جانب بیرون رفته, و او به راهی رود و ما به صد راه چگونه او را توانیم یافت؟ اولی آنکه بازگردیم. باتفاق مراجعت نمودند و آن پادشاه از چاه بیرون آمد و با ملک رفت و بتدریج و تأنی لشکر جمع کرد و باز به جنگ آمد و آن پادشاه را که آن نوبت غالب آمده بود بشکست و بر ملک او مستولی شد, و آن امیر را که حق جانی بر وی ثابت داشت به انواع نوازش مخصوص فرمود و بغایت مقرب گشت و راه امارت بزرگ و نیابت مطلق به وی مفوض شد. روزی یکی از امرا با پادشاه گفت که این شخص حقوق پادشاه خود را نشناخت و با وی وفا نکرد و سبب هلاکی او و پادشاهی تو او بود, چگونه او را زنده توان گذاشت, چه عن قریب با تو همان غدر اندیشد. پادشاه بغایت زیرک بود, آن شخص مسموع داشت و به قتل او اشارت راند. آن امیر فریاد برآورد که بر تو حقوق جانی دارم. پادشاه بگریست و گفت : حق به جانب تست و من به قتل تو قطعا رضا ندارم, لیکن رعایت مصلحت ملک و پادشاهی را چاره

[171] *Ta'rikh-i Shaikh Uwais*, Text Summary, pp. 44, 48, Translation, pp. 142, 146; P. Wing, *The Jalayirids: Dynastic State Formation in the Mongol Middle East*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), p. 56.
[172] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, pp. 617, 621, 625.
[173] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, pp. 632-3.
[174] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 170; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 279.

نیست, و لازم است که ترا بکشند؛ و او را بکشت و می گریست. حال ضبط امور پادشاهی بر این نمط است و هرچند بر من عظیم دشوار است کسی را کشتن, اما محافظت قضایای کلی و جزوی را اگر سیاست نکنند پادشاهی نتوان کرد [175]

Although the Padishah of Islam was loathe to have him killed, he issued the order in the best interests of the state. In this regard he said to his close associates, ''In olden times there were two kings at war with each other in Cathay. One of them was beaten and his army was scattered. The victorious army went out in pursuit of the defeated for several days. An officer who discovered the defeated king had compassion on him and wanted to save him because he was so helpless and miserable. He came across a well in that region and said, "Get into this well so that our soldiers won't see you." When the troop arrived, because it was a sandy desert and the wind was blowing and effacing all tracks, they couldn't find their way. 'His tracks are gone,' the amir said, 'and there is no telling which way he has gone. No matter how hard we search, we won't be able to find him. It would be better for us to turn back.' When they had gone, the king came out of the well and went to his own land, where little by little he gathered an army and then came out again to fight. This time, he defeated and killed the king who had been victorious the time before and took over his kingdom. He covered the officer to whom he owed his life with special favors and took him into his closest confidence, assigning him to the highest office and making him his absolute deputy.

One day, one of the officers said to the king, 'This person did not recognize his obligations to his king. Not only was he unfaithful to him but he also caused his death and brought about your rule. How can he be left alive? It will not be long before he contemplates the same treachery with you.' The king, being extremely clever, listened to this person's words and motioned for the officer's execution. The officer cried out, 'You owe me your life!' The king wept and said, 'You are right, and I am in no way pleased to put you to death. However, in the best interests of the state and throne there is no alternative: it is imperative that you be killed.' The king did have him killed, but he wept.

"Such things are necessary for keeping regal affairs under control, and no matter how difficult it is for me to have someone killed, in the interests of maintaining affairs both great and small, if executions are not carried out it is impossible to rule."[176]

There are many interesting facets of this text that could be brought out, but for the purposes of our argument, the loyalty aspects of this tale are telling. Here Rashīd al-Dīn puts into the mouth of his patron an anecdote that echoes Chinggis Khan's own words and actions when he confronted the liegemen of his enemies who went over to him. Consider the *SHM*'s account of the equerry of

[175] RAD/Raushan, Vol. II, pp. 1117-18.
[176] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, pp. 632-3, Thackston's translation.

Senggüm (a rival of Chinggis), Kököchü, who abandoned his lord to go over to Chinggis: 'As for the equerry Kököchü himself, who comes here having in this manner abandoned his rightful lord, who would now trust such a man, and take him for a companion?" He cut him down and cast away his body.'[177] Rashīd al-Dīn also reports Chinggis' response to a betrayal of loyalty of his former *anda* Jamuqa by his own men, saying that Jamuqa's words upon his capture were reported to Chinggis, '"If my own liege men, whose lord I was, took me captive and proved faithless, to whom will they be faithful?" Genghis Khan ordered that group [...] who had taken him captive be separated and executed'.[178] This sort of story may be a trope of ideal loyalty, but it was one that held strong, and that Rashīd al-Dīn believed applied as much in China as in the Ilkhanate.[179] Thus his patron Ghazan is portrayed as continuing the Chinggisid beliefs as to the obligations of loyalty, like his illustrious forefather Chinggis, even when the betrayal would benefit him. Naturally of course, Ghazan accepted Taghachar's help at the time he betrayed Baidu to support Ghazan, to ensure the 'best interests of the state and throne' no doubt.

This story is of course also a warning. Rashīd al-Dīn was seeking to restore the power of inertial loyalty in the Ilkhanate, which seems to have waned significantly in the 1290s. The message is clear, order had now been established, and Ghazan would do anything to ensure that it was preserved, even execute those to whom he owed his life and loved. Indeed, he apparently put to death five princes and 38 amirs in just one month.[180] Rashīd al-Dīn was not the only source who noted Ghazan's emphasis on inertial loyalty. The scholar Ibn Bazzāz Ardabīlī claimed that in a meeting between Ghazan and Shaykh Zāhid Gīlānī, there were five unpardonable sins: 1) A subject rebelling against the king, 2) A *qāżī* misinterpreting the sharia, 3) counterfeiting coins, 4) a child disrespecting his parents, 5) and a slave rising against his master.[181] The fact that three of these unpardonable sins deal with 'natural' loyalties to authority figures shows that Ghazan was particularly worried about

[177] SHM/de Rachewiltz, §188, p. 110.
[178] RAD/Thackston, Vol. I, p. 108.
[179] Indeed, if Chinggis' extreme position on loyalty was a trope, it certainly passed into several different historical traditions. Both the *YS* and Ila Chucai's spirit-path stele tell the story of Chinggis summoning the descendants of the Liáo dynasty present in Jīn lands after he had conquered them, telling them that he had avenged their ancestors by destroying the Jīn. Chucai, whose father and grandfather had served the Jīn loyally, responded 'As the son of a Jīn vassal, how could I dare repay him by harbouring divided loyalties and regard his ruler-father as my enemy?' It was these words of loyalty that apparently caused Chinggis to trust Ila Chucai, Humble, 'The Biography of Yelu Chucai, p. 1; Song Zizhen, 'Spirit-Path Stele for his Honor Yelu, Director of the Secretariat', in (ed. and trans.) C.P. Atwood, *The Rise of the Mongols: Five Chinese Sources*, (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2021), p. 137.
[180] Brack, 'Mediating Sacred Kingship', p. 59.
[181] Hope, *Power, Politics and Tradition*, p. 162.

this.[182] Brack has shown that this was not without good reason, as Ghazan faced a rebellion from Söge, the son of Yoshmut, and later that of Ala Fireng, a son of Gaykhatu.[183]

If we compare the cases of Aq Buqa and Taghachar, we can see the predicament that the amirs were in. One could pick a hill to die on, as Aq Buqa did with his apparently unwavering support for Gaykhatu, or one could try to stay ahead by switching sides whenever it became apparent that a candidate had lost his edge, as Taghachar did. When Taghachar was questioned by Aq Buqa as to his refusal to accept Aq Buqa's precedence as chief amir and violation of the *jasaq*, Taghachar simply responded that Baidu had given that position to him now.[184] The fact that so many amirs were executed in this period may have swayed many to take a short-termist approach to their loyalties, and try to reap what reward they could and hope they were seen as too indispensable to do away with easily. Taghachar was only the most notable of these, and his interventions were both timely and regularly disastrous for the ruler he left.

4.7.2 The Case of Nawrūz

Nawrūz's situation, contemporaneous with Taghachar's movements, highlights the failures of several of the Chinggisid Ilkhans to encourage loyalty in their subjects. His long rebellion in Khurasan (1290-1295) has been comprehensively dealt with by Michael Hope and Michal Biran, giving us a clear insight into how loyalty functioned at a regional and state level.[185] Nawrūz was the son of the great statesman of the Mongol Empire and later the Ilkhanate, Arghun Aqa. Arghun Aqa's prestige was transferred to his son, who like him was made governor of Khurasan in 1284, alongside the young Ghazan by the Ilkhan Arghun.[186] Both Nawrūz and his father had been close with Buqa. It was this intimacy, along with the fear of punishment which Arghun wrought on anyone even remotely connected with his former vizier, which Vaṣṣāf states caused Nawrūz to rebel in Khurasan.[187] Arghun

[182] Naturally, counterfeiting coins was also a form of lese-majeste.
[183] Brack, 'Mediating Sacred Kingship', pp. 59-61.
[184] Khwāndamīr/Thackston, p. 78.
[185] M. Hope, 'The "Nawrūz King"', pp. 451-473; Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 57-9.
[186] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 563; Hope, 'The "Nawrūz King"', p. 453. Regarding Arghun Aqa's own prestige, Stefan Kamola points out there was a significant difference as to his lineage according to Juvainī, where he is the son of a prominent Oirat commander, Taichu, while Rashīd al-Dīn says he was traded to a Jalayir commander for a leg of beef by his father. This divergence may have had to do with Nawrūz's disgrace not long before Rashīd al-Dīn's history was written. Kamola, 'The making of history', p. 160. However, as I have indicated in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the use of the term *soyurghamīshī* for Arghun Aqa by Rashīd al-Dīn, only otherwise used for divinities and Chinggisid rulers themselves, seems to show that great respect was still maintained for Nawrūz's father.
[187] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 141; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, pp. 233-5.

set his son Ghazan to deal with Nawrūz's rebellion. However, this proved too daunting a task for Ghazan, for a variety of factors. Nawrūz was well-connected locally given his father's long career in the area. He also was a Muslim, and had the support of local *qadi*s against Ghazan, who at this point had not converted. He was supported and given refuge by the Chaghadaids and Qaidu to the east, who were always keen to destabilise the Ilkhanate. On top of this, after Arghun's death, Ghazan seemingly did not get adequate assistance from the new Ilkhan Gaykhatu, who refused to send money or troops to his nephew, perhaps due to his own struggles with rebellious amirs and princes.[188] In the end, an opportunity for both Ghazan and Nawrūz saw reconciliation occur. Gaykhatu and Baidu's inability to unite the realm meant that the khanate was attainable. Ghazan needed a backer, a Buqa who could make the difference in his claim for the throne, while Nawrūz saw the chance to be virtual ruler of the whole Ilkhanate.

Nawrūz may have been acting as an independent ruler, but his rebellion did not cleave away from the Chinggisid house. His family had been heavily involved in the Chinggisid venture up to this point, and Nawrūz sought allies from princes who had been maltreated by Arghun or the Ögödeid and Chaghadaid rulers to the east. His first foray was to support two princes who had been contenders for the Ilkhanate and been outmanoeuvred by Arghun's seizing of the throne without a *quriltai*: Hülechü and Kingshü. According to Khwāndamīr, Nawrūz was Kingshü's brother-in-law, and it seems that Nawrūz sought to establish kinship relations with Chinggisid princes to solidify his power, much as Temür would do in his own career.[189] Hülechü, as we have seen, looks to have been the originally chosen successor of Aḥmad, while there had been some support for Kingshü as well. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Nawrūz issued decrees in the name of both princes.[190] Ghazan was able to capture Hülechü in 1289 and send him to Arghun, who had him executed, while Kingshü was forced to flee to the frontiers and take refuge with the Qara'unas in the region of Ghor.[191]

Arghun's purge of Ilkhanid princes limited Nawrūz's options, and he turned in a different direction, issuing *farmān*s in the name of one Örüg/Ürüng Temür, an Ögödeid prince descended from Ögödei's sixth son Qada'an.[192] It is difficult to exactly interpret this move. While it may seem that Nawrūz was simply casting around for a Chinggisid prince to give legitimacy to his actions, he also

[188] Hope, 'The "Nawrūz King"', pp. 453-463.
[189] Khwāndamīr/Thackston, p. 79.
[190] Given that Hülechü gives a *jarligh*, the province of Mongol rulers, and Kingshü follows this by giving a *buyruq*, or command, it looks as if Hülechü was the superior and Kingshü the subordinate. This tallies with Hülechü's direct descent from Hülegü, see RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 596.
[191] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, pp. 596, 598.
[192] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 192; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 315. Vaṣṣāf calls him Ürüng Temür, while Rashīd al-Dīn uses Örüg Temür.

took a further step in marrying his daughter to Örüg Temür.[193] Perhaps, given Nawrūz's previous associations with Qaidu, Nawrūz may have been looking to act more independently, though this seemingly backfired. According to Khwāndamīr, when Nawrūz and Örüg Temür's joint invasion of Khurasan went wrong, Örüg Temür had Nawrūz punished.[194] Eventually, when Örüg Temür was accused of supporting Ghazan, it was his father-in-law Qaidu who had him executed.[195] It may also have been that Nawrūz was expressing explicit independence from the Ilkhanid house by turning to a non-Toluid. It is likely a combination of these factors that led to this somewhat strange situation, but it did not last long, as Örüg Temür abandoned Nawrūz in fear for his life.[196]

Nawrūz and Ghazan, so long rivals regionally, joined forces in order to supplant Baidu as Ilkhan. Predictably, Rashīd al-Dīn, Ghazan's vizier, shows this as on Ghazan's terms. Nawrūz is pardoned of his offences, and Ghazan converts to Islam at Nawrūz's suggestion but of his own free will.[197] Vaṣṣāf's account however, shows Nawrūz as clearly in the driving seat and Vaṣṣāf is far more positive about Nawrūz generally.[198] He mentions nothing of Nawrūz being pardoned, while Nawrūz states that he will serve Ghazan 'on the condition that Prince Ghazan accepts Islam' (به شرط آنکه شاهزاده غازان اسلام بیاورد, *bi-sharṭ-i ānki shāhzāda ghāzān islām bī-āvard*).[199] Perhaps this is the greatest difference between Nawrūz and other amirs who had sought to maintain their independence vis-a-vis their Ilkhans. Nawrūz's loyalty would only come at a price, and that was a commitment to Islam. It is possible that his previous Chinggisid lord, Örüg Temür, was also made to convert by Nawrūz.[200] As both Christian and Mamluk sources confirm, it was Nawrūz who was the most vehement in pursuing Islamising policies.[201] However, this Islamising trend has been somewhat overplayed. Hope states,

---

[193] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 310.

[194] Khwāndamīr/Thackston, p. 80.

[195] Ibid. Interestingly, not for having supported Nawrūz, which he did, but for having supported Ghazan, which he did not.

[196] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 192; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 315. Khwāndamīr/Thackston, p. 80 suggests it was Nawrūz who broke off the alliance.

[197] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, pp. 608, 620.

[198] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 191; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 314. شجاعت و پردلی و صیت اسلام پروری او همه جا را بگرفت. برای تقویت اسلام رنج فراوان کشید, *shujāʿat va purdilī va ṣīt-i islām-parvarī-yi ū hama jā rā bigirift. Barāyi taqvīyat-i islām ranj-i farāvān kishīd.* 'Word of his courage, bravery and his promotion of Islam was spread everywhere. He suffered greatly to strengthen Islam.'

[199] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, pp. 192-3; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 316. See Hope, 'Nawrūz King', pp. 464-7.

[200] Hope, *Power, Politics and Tradition*, p. 154. As Michal Biran points out, Rashīd al-Dīn lists two of his sons as having Islamic names, Muḥammad and ʿAlī, at a time that very few Ögödeids were identifiably Muslim, Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 93. The fact that Rashīd al-Dīn lists nine other sons with much more Mongol names (eg. Tuqluq Buqa, Chin Temür) and only the last two are given Islamic names suggests a late conversion, perhaps when he married Nawrūz's daughter, RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 310. As to the willingness of Örüg Temür to convert, we can only speculate.

[201] *The Monks of Kublai Khan,* pp. 210, 216; BH/Budge, p. 507; R. Amitai, 'Ghazan, Islam and Mongol Tradition: A View from the Mamluk Sultanate', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,* 59 (1996), pp. 1-10 shows how the Mamluk historian al-Ṣafadī portrayed Nawrūz's conversion of Ghazan.

based on Vaṣṣāf, that Nawrūz 'announced his intention to launch a holy war against the heathen armies of Qaidu and the Ilkhanate, promising to expel them from the region.'[202] However, Vaṣṣāf in actual fact only claimed that Nawrūz made an agreement with Örüg Temür to cleanse the area of Qaidu's armies and to spread Islam. Vaṣṣāf goes on to describe this as a secret whose revelation broke down communication between the two allies.[203] The fact that only a few lines later Vaṣṣāf describes an embassy from Nawrūz to Ghazan suggesting an alliance hardly suggests that such a strong claim was ever made by Nawrūz.

Whatever the case may be, it seems that Nawrūz was the senior partner in this marriage of convenience, and he asserted himself as such early in Ghazan's reign. Vaṣṣāf states that Nawrūz was made Ghazan's *nāyib* (vice-regent), and that through this position he appointed his own *nāyib*s for every district.[204] Rashīd al-Dīn reports that Nawrūz was granted the emirate and vizierate, and requested that the *al tamgha* seals, used by the Mongols for decades as a sign of their authority, be changed to include Islamic elements, and be changed from the square shape to a circle.[205] Mar Yahbh-Allaha confirms that Nawrūz was in fact in possession of the *al tamgha*.[206] What we see here is a repeat of the situation with Buqa and Arghun. The princely pretender, dealing with his relative weakness vis-a-vis the centre, is forced into an alliance with a powerful amir, who is promised almost unassailable position and influence. Both Buqa and Nawrūz had also shown their willingness to switch to a different horse if their power was threatened. It may be for this reason that both Arghun and Nawrūz put so many of the Ilkhanid princes to death.[207]

Where the stories differ however, is the reason for these amirs' downfall. While Buqa was accused of supporting another Chinggisid prince, Nawrūz was brought down due to perceived support for the Mamluks. Rashīd al-Dīn comes up with quite a twisted tale to explain Nawrūz's rebellion, where both Nawrūz and Ghazan are absolved from serious blame. Nawrūz apparently sent an envoy, one ʿAlam al-Dīn Qayṣar, to the Mamluk Sultan Kitbugha during the reign of Baidu (1295),

---

[202] Hope, "Nawrūz King", p. 461.

[203] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, pp. 191-2; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 315, با اورنگتمور که میانشان خویشاوندی بود هم پیمان شد که به مدد یکدیگر حوالی آب آمویه را از لشکر قیدو پاک گردانند و اسلام را شایع سازند. این راز فاش شد و سلسلهٔ مراوده میان آنان بکلی بگسست, *bā ūrungtimūr ki miyānishān khvīshāvandī būd ham paymān shud ki bi madad-i yikdīgar ḥavālī-yi āb āmūya rā az lashkar-i qaydū pāk gardānand va islām rā shāyiʿ sāzand. Īn rāz fāsh shud va silsila-yi murāvida miyān-i ānān bi-kullī bi-gusast*.

[204] Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, pp. 198-9; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, pp. 325-7. The term can be written *nāʿīb* or *nāyīb*. As Vaṣṣāf uses the latter form here, I follow him.

[205] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, pp. 629-630.

[206] *Monks of Kublai Khan*, p. 216.

[207] 'Rebellions' of Anbarji s. Gaykhatu, Söge s. Yoshmut, Ildar s. Ajai s. Hülegü, Ildar and Esen Temür s. of Qongqortai, and Taichu s. Möngke Temür were all met with executions by Ghazan, RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, pp. 474-5. These revolts and their implications have been extensively dealt with in Brack, 'Mediating Sacred Kingship', Chapter 1, particularly pp. 50-64.

asserting that both Nawrūz and Kitbugha were Muslims, and Baidu was not, and should therefore be overthrown.[208] However, Qayṣar returned only in 1297, well after Baidu had already been killed. Subsequently, the vizier Sadr al-Dīn Zanjānī, who had a personal animosity towards Nawrūz, planted letters on Qayṣar and then had him investigated. These letters were purportedly sent to the amirs of Egypt and Syria (not to the newly installed Mamluk Sultan Lāchīn), complaining of Ghazan's amirs' attempts to block Islamisation. Nawrūz then offered to occupy Iran and turn it over to them. These letters were naturally discovered, and their existence was reported to Ghazan, who ordered the execution of Nawrūz's sons and followers. Nawrūz himself fled to Herat, where he was at first given shelter by the Kurtid *malik* of the city, Fakhr al-Dīn. Once Ghazan's amir Qutlughshāh arrived, however, Fakhr al-Dīn handed Nawrūz over, and Qutlughshāh executed him, sending his head to be hung at the city gates of Baghdad.[209]

This fanciful tale is a perplexing one. It allows Rashīd al-Dīn to put most of the blame on Sadr al-Dīn Zanjānī, who Rashīd al-Dīn had a personal falling-out with before Zanjānī's execution for embezzlement in 1298.[210] However, it seems quite unclear if Nawrūz had any actual contact with the Mamluks, or if this was simply a ploy by Ghazan and/or his officials to get rid of Nawrūz's overweening power.[211] It certainly seems confusing why Nawrūz should wish to overthrow the Ilkhanid regime when he was such a major figure within it. Perhaps he believed that if he turned the province over to the Mamluk Sultan, he would be left in charge without any Chinggisid supervision. We can only speculate as to Nawrūz's motives, if this envoy was ever sent. The Mamluk historian Al-Ṣafadī claimed that Nawrūz believed that the time of the Mahdi had come, and that it was his role to pave the way for his arrival.[212] What is interesting, is that whether Rashīd al-Dīn's tale is contrived or not, the story is that Nawrūz sought help *outside* the Chinggisid house for the first time, and was seemingly willing to overthrow the Hülegüids on behalf of the Mamluks. Ghazan's harsh reaction also may have been linked to the 1296 defection of the amir Turaghai to Sultan Kitbugha (r. 1294-1296)

---

[208] There was some disagreement among our sources as to Baidu's religion. Het'um the Historian called him a Christian and a just man, Het'um the Historian, *Flower of Histories*, p. 62, while Bar Hebraeus states that he had been a Christian at some point but converted to Islam because most of the realm had also done so, BH/Budge, p. 505. He certainly contributed to the upkeep of the Iraqi Syriac monastery, Mār Behnam, where there was an Uighur script dedication to him, A. Harrak and N. Ruji, 'The Uighur Inscription at the Mausoleum of Mār Behnam, Iraq', *Journal of the Canadian Society for Syriac Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2004), pp. 66-72. The monastery has since been destroyed by ISIS and subsequently restored.

[209] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, pp. 636-640.

[210] Idem, pp. 641-2.

[211] Vaṣṣāf makes no mention of faked letters, only that a spy (*jāsūsī*) from Nawrūz to Egypt was captured with a letter urging the Sultan, his amirs and his army to actively support the spread of Islam, Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 206; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 341.

[212] J. Brack, 'A Mongol Mahdi in Medieval Anatolia: Rebellion, Reform, and Divine Right in the Post-Mongol Islamic World', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 139, No. 3, (2019), p. 619.

with some 10-18,000 Oirat households.[213] Ghazan could ill afford any further major defections of this kind.

4.8 Conclusion

The cases of Taghachar and Nawrūz suggest that there was a significant weakening of inertial loyalty to the Ilkhanid house among the great amirs. This eventually led to the emergence of dynasties led by these amirs, and not by Chinggisids. While it may be said that the Ilkhanid realm was significantly more stable in the later reign of Ghazan and the reigns of his successors Öljeitü and Abū Saʿīd after the chaos of the 1290s, a closer look shows that the balance of power between the amirs and rulers had been tipped in the favour of the amirs. Charles Melville has shown that the great amirs Chupan and the *atābeg* Sevinch, who controlled many of the affairs of the Ilkhanate, took six months to put the 11 year-old Abū Saʿīd on the throne after the death of Öljeitü.[214] Abū Saʿīd, unlike many of his Chinggisid ancestors, was not led to the throne by his high-ranking Chinggisid relatives, but by Sevinch and Chupan.[215] Christopher Atwood has also shown that in the early Ilkhanate, the ruler's affixed their seals on documents solely on their own authority, but that from the reign of Gaykhatu, these documents were countersigned by the four principal *keshig* amirs.[216] Perhaps the most telling indication of the amirs' greater self-confidence was that Abū Saʿīd faced three major revolts (Irinjin of the Kerait, Chupan of the Suldus and Temürtash s. Chupan) during his reign, none of which chose to use a Chinggisid as its figurehead.[217]

All of this goes to show only what other scholars have pointed out already, that the amirs' power was greater than ever before in the Ilkhanate at the turn of the 13th century.[218] The death of Abū Saʿīd and the emergence of statelets such as the Jalayirids and Chupanids (1338-1357), who briefly made use of Chinggisid puppets, but soon dispensed with this formality, drives this point

[213] Van den Bent, 'Mongols in Mamluk Eyes', pp. 220-1.
[214] Melville, 'End of the Ilkhanate', pp. 310-11.
[215] Khwāndamīr/Thackston, p. 113; R. Sela, *Ritual and Authority in Central Asia: The Khan's Inauguration Ceremony, Papers on Inner Asia*, No. 37 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 2003), p. 31.
[216] Atwood, '*Ulus* Emirs, *Keshig* Elders', p. 146.
[217] For Irinjin's rebellion, see C. Melville, 'Abū Saʿīd and the Revolt of the Amirs in 1319', in (ed.) D. Aigle, *L'Iran face à la domination mongole*, (Tehran: Institut Français de Recherche en Iran, 1997), pp. 89-120. For Chupan's rebellion, see Melville, *Fall of Amir Chupan*, *passim* and 'Wolf or Shepherd?', *passim*. For the revolt of Temürtash, see Brack, 'Mongol Mahdi in Anatolia', *passim*.
[218] Melville, *Fall of Amir Chupan*, pp. 40. 42; Hope, *Power, Politics and Tradition*, p. 190.

home yet further.[219] However, the descriptions of decline are usually reserved for the reigns of Abū Saʿīd, and to a lesser extent, Öljeitü.[220] But it is perhaps worth returning to the reign of Ghazan and our loyalty categories to challenge this view. Both Arghun and Ghazan were particularly bloodthirsty, executing large numbers of Chinggisids and key amirs.[221] While this was perhaps a necessary measure in the short term, it seems to have caused their successors great difficulties.[222] Both rulers were desperately seeking to encourage inertial loyalty to the state, preemptively showing their subjects what could be expected at the least sign of rebellion. However, these actions damaged both the charismatic loyalty of the amirs to the Chinggisid house, and also the ideal loyalty towards the blood of the *altan urugh*, which Arghun and Ghazan freely spilled without recourse to consultation.[223] Unlike previous punishments of the rebellious in the Mongol world, where their descendants were regularly excluded from execution and rehabilitated into the state, Arghun and Ghazan's reactions also often included the family and followers of rebellious princes and amirs. This seems to have both weakened the Ilkhanid state, and led to a more backs-to-the-wall reaction from the amirs when issues arose with their families.[224]

[219] For the Jalayirids, see Wing, *Jalayirids*; for the Chupanids, see M. Hope, 'The Political Configuration of Late Ilkhanid Iran: A Case Study of the Chubanid Amirate (738–758/1337–1357)', Iran, (2021) DOI: 10.1080/05786967.2021.1889930, pp. 1-18.

[220] Interestingly, the period of decline in the Ilkhanate seems to have been attended with the greatest florescence of cultural production, such as the illumination of *Shāhnāma* manuscripts. This curious paradox would also be apparent at the court of Sultan Husayn Bāyqarā, the last Timurid ruler of Herat.

[221] Even Öljeitü, Ghazan's successor, despite apparently being Ghazan's declared heir for three or four years on Ghazan's death, felt the need to execute the prince Ala Fireng, son of Gaykhatu, before his own accession, Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 270; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, p. 457; Brack, 'Mediating Sacred Kingship, pp. 76-80. The amir tied to Ala Fireng's rebellion, Horqudaq, was killed along with his brothers and sons, though his wife Shāh ʿAlām and her young son Jahāngīr were spared by Öljeitü, Vaṣṣāf/Ayati, p. 273; Vaṣṣāf/Iqbal, pp. 464-466. Thus, as Brack shows, despite Rashīd al-Dīn's emphasis on Öljeitü gaining the throne without spilling blood and ending the period of *fitna*, his reign in fact began with a bloody purge on a smaller scale than his brother's, 'Mediating Sacred Kingship', p. 77.

[222] Favereau, *The Horde*, p. 21 has shown that a similar situation emerged in the Jochid *ulus*, whereby rulers of the lineage of Batu, such as Özbek, purged Chinggisid lines which had opposed them, which solidified their own rule, but strengthened the hand of the *beglerbeg*s, such as the late 14th century Mamai, who made use of puppet khans in his two-decade career. It also led to a changing of hands among Jochid lineages, whereby the descendants of Batu and Orda were marginalised, and the line of Toqa Temür (whose descendants would later rule the Uzbek khanate) came to the fore under the khan Toqtamish.

[223] The damage to the Ilkhanid regime in the long-term and the charisma of the Abaqaid line is highlighted by the Mamluk scholar al-ʿUmarī, who states in the 1340s that no descendants of Hülegü could be found, and even those that did exist had belittled themselves to avoid executions, becoming tanners and sellers of barley, see Brack, 'Mediating Sacred Kingship', p. 81, note 202.

[224] See Melville, *Fall of Amir Chupan*, pp. 87-9. This should not be overplayed of course, Ishayahu Landa has shown that the family of Arghun Aqa, though descended not through Nawrūz, but another of his sons, Oyiratai, continued to hold power under Ghazan, and two of his female descendants, Bujughan and Bulughan Khatun married Öljeitü, I. Landa, 'New Light on Early Mongol Islamisation: The Case of Arghun Aqa's Family', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* Vol. 28, No. 1, (2018), pp. 77-100.

These vindictive attacks on the families of rebels culminated in the young Abū Saʿīd's vicious response to the revolt of his amirs Irinjin, Toqmaq and Qurumshi in 1319.[225] Before the final battle between the two sides, Abū Saʿīd had Irinjin's son Shaykh ʿAlī decapitated and his head paraded on a spear. His other son Vafādār (ironically meaning 'loyal') was killed and his head thrown before his mother Könchek, who had taken part in the battle, before she herself was trampled by horses. Both Irinjin and Toqmaq were hung up on butcher's hooks, as well as Toqmaq's brother Orus and his two seven year-old sons.[226] A similar fate befell the historian and vizier Rashīd al-Dīn also, whose son Khwaja Ibrahim was cut in two in front of him before his own execution.[227] These extremely personal reactions may be put down to Abū Saʿīd's youth and his domination by Irinjin's rival Chupan and Rashīd al-Dīn's conflict with the vizier Tāj al-Dīn ʿAlīshāh, but we should not forget that Ghazan's reign also began with a brutal spate of executions.[228] These shows of strength in fact had the opposite effect longer term, damaging the credibility of the Ilkhanid state and the Chinggisid lineage. As noted by Jonathan Brack, this led to the Chupanid ruler Malik Ashraf being told that 'no charisma (Turkic *ughūr*) remains in the house of Chinggis Khan', according to the 15th century Timurid historian Muʿīn al-Dīn Naṭanzī.[229]

In this regard, it is perhaps interesting to reconsider Rashīd al-Dīn's account of Ghazan's reign. While Rashīd al-Dīn does not ignore Ghazan's executions of his kinsmen and *noyan*s, he is at great pains to play up Ghazan's justice and Islamic kingship.[230] As Devin DeWeese put it, Mongol khans often adopted their subjects' religious beliefs, 'in periods when the khans were politically weak and needed some other (i.e. non-Chinggisid) source of legitimacy.'[231] Thus, Rashīd al-Dīn takes a different angle, looking at Ghazan's treatment of the peasantry. He first shows how under previous Ilkhanid rule (though he does not specify which rule), 'because of such mismanagement and waste, most of the peasants in the provinces abandoned their homes and settled in foreign parts', for 'they

[225] Perhaps he sought to emulate his predecessors Ghazan and Öljeitü, who had both begun their reigns in like manner. According to the *Tārīkh-i Shaykh Uvays*, Irinjin and Qurumshi were foster brothers of Ghazan, so there is little about family loyalty here, *Ta'rikh-i Shaikh Uwais*, p. 53, Persian text, p. 151.
[226] Melville, 'Revolt of the Amirs', pp. 104-110.
[227] Khwāndamīr/Thackston, p. 114.
[228] ʿAbū Saʿīd could be more forgiving as well. Stefan Kamola shows that while his uncle Ghazan's great statesman Rashīd al-Dīn and one of his sons were executed for the alleged poisoning of Öljeitü, another of his sons, Ghīyāṣ al-Dīn, was appointed as vizier in 1327, Kamola, *Making Mongol History*, p. 162.
[229] Naṭanzī, *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh-i Muʿīnī* (ed.) J. Aubin, (Tehran: Kitābfurūshī-i Khayyām, 1336 [1957]), p. 158, quoted in Brack, 'Mongol Mahdi in Anatolia', p. 625, note 73.
[230] This has been well-studied in J. Brack, 'Theologies of Auspicious Kingship: The Islamization of Chinggisid Sacral Kingship in the Islamic World', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 60, No.4, (2018), pp. 1143-1171; C. Melville, '*Pādshāh-i Islām*: The Conversion of Sultan Maḥmūd Ghāzān Khān', *Pembroke Papers*, Vol. I, (1990), pp. 159-177; Jackson, *Mongols and the Islamic World*, Chapters 12 and 13 and Jackson, 'Mongol Khans and Religious Allegiance', *passim*.
[231] DeWeese, 'Islamization in the Mongol Empire', p. 121.

had developed an antipathy to that great realm'.[232] This was arguably the only way, apart from non-payment of taxes (though this was a natural by-product of departure), for the lowest echelons of society to show disloyalty. Therefore, Rashīd al-Dīn creates a scenario in which inertial loyalty among the general population was so weak towards the Ilkhanids that many of them preferred to depart the realm rather than deal with Ilkhanid exactions. Naturally then, after Ghazan punishes the voracious governors and tax collectors, and sets tax standards, these runaways return to their homelands, which begin to flourish once again.[233]

This narrative is one that has been regularly questioned, given Rashīd al-Dīn's own involvement in these reforms, and the fact that Ghazan was only alive for another year after he implemented them, giving them very little time to take effect. We also have local histories which put an element of doubt in the idea of the dire situation under Ghazan's predecessors. Charles Melville has shown that in Anatolia, there were several chronicles which highlighted the justice of various Ilkhanid governors and rulers. The Seljuq Anonymous Chronicle was in high praise of Gaykhatu as a just governor of Rum, though it is less complimentary about his time as Ilkhan.[234] The historian Āqsarā'ī also described Hülegü, Abaqa and Arghun as just rulers who punished corruption and protected local traditions of law.[235] The efforts of Rashīd al-Dīn to pillory previous Mongol rule and play up the common people's love of Ghazan look to be attempts to distract attention away from his sovereign's paranoid murders of anyone who had the potential to weaken his own power.[236]

One of the earlier Ilkhans who presumably was being anonymously criticised in Rashīd al-Dīn's account of the pillaging of Iran was Abaqa. However, Rashīd al-Dīn's own account of Abaqa's reign shows him as rarely troubled by internal uprisings and rebellions.[237] The one major 'internal' revolt by the Chaghadaid prince Tegüder, which lasted from 1267-1270, was finally put down by Abaqa, who did not execute Tegüder, but merely kept him under guard until his patron, Baraq, was dead, then let him free.[238] Abaqa put to death Tegüder's amirs, but he protected the Chinggisid

[232] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, p. 703.
[233] Idem, p. 707.
[234] C. Melville, 'The Early Persian Historiography of Anatolia', in (eds.) J. Pfeiffer, S.A. Quinn, E. Tucker, and J.E. Woods, *History and historiography of post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East: studies in honor of John E. Woods,* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006), pp. 153-4.
[235] Idem, pp. 156-8.
[236] Favereau, *The Horde*, p. 250 reaches the same conclusion, that authoritarianism and centralisation developed in the Jochid *ulus* under the rulership of Toqto'a and Özbeg, and consensus and sharing of power disappeared. This is echoed in Hope's analysis of Ghazan's rule and the weakening of collegialist ideas of government, Hope*, Power, Politics and Tradition*, p. 169. In both *ulus*es, the amirs reacted against such changes and seized back control.
[237] According to Qāshānī also, Abaqa's main attribute was justice, and he was associated with the promotion of agriculture and building works, Qāshānī/Hambali, p. 106, see Kamola, *Making Mongol History*, p. 169.
[238] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, pp. 522-3.

bloodline, and merely divided up his soldiers amongst other units.[239] He similarly merely exiled his brother Yoshmut after Yoshmut hit him in the neck with an arrow.[240] The Juvainī brothers, accused of embezzlement, were tortured and threatened on Abaqa's orders. However, both were released from prison, and Shams al-Dīn was restored to favour, though ʿAṭā-Malik was beaten through the streets of Baghdad.[241] Abaqa could be brutal, as he showed in his treatment of Chaghadaid soldiers after the Battle of Herat in 1273, his sack of the city of Bukhara in the same year, and his execution of the Anatolian official Muʿīn al-Dīn Parvāna on suspicion of collaboration with the Mamluks.[242] However, none of these actions seem out of keeping with mediaeval rulership.

Peter Jackson has emphasised that Abaqa's smooth succession to Hülegü allowed him to keep continuity with his father's reign, maintaining many of the same people in their roles, while Ghazan, who came to power violently, was forced to begin his regime with a purge.[243] Nonetheless, as we have seen with Arghun, the Mongols and their respected religious advisors genuinely believed that such bloodthirstiness towards one's own family had physical effects on the guilty party. The fact that Ghazan died of an illness at 33 may have caused similar feelings among the Turco-Mongol elite. While they had all supposedly converted to Islam, and Buddhist/shamanic influence had apparently been removed, this change was too fresh for such powerful cultural beliefs to have disappeared.[244] The damage to Ghazan's charisma is certainly not shown in our Persian Muslim sources, who highlight his Islamic good works. These may have impressed the administrative and scholarly classes, but undoubtedly the ruling elites would have been worried about his paranoia and ruthlessness, much as had occurred with his father. This trend of signs of a weakening of charismatic loyalty to the dynasty continued under Öljeitü, when during his campaign in Gilan in 1307, several members of the royal household were struck by lightning, an indication in the Mongol world of divine displeasure, which the Mongol *bakhshi*s apparently put down to the realm's conversion to Islam.[245] Abū Saʿīd's

[239] Biran, 'The Battle of Herat', p. 188; Lane, *Early Mongol Rule,* p. 88.
[240] Hope, *Power, Politics and Tradition*, p. 116.
[241] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, pp. 543-5.
[242] RAD/Thackston, Vol. III, pp. 536-8. Biran, 'Battle of Herat', pp. 198, 201. Het'um the Historian tells a fanciful tale that Abaqa ordered that the Parvāna be cut into pieces and divided up for he and his nobles to eat, Het'um the Historian, *Flower of Histories*, p. 56. Interestingly however, this story also reached Riccoldo da Montecroce, *A Christian Pilgrim*, p. 191.
[243] Jackson, *Mongols and the Islamic World*, pp. 270-1. After Möngke's coup, there were also executions, but many of the Chinggisid princes were spared. In the Chaghadaid realm, where there were regular changes of power, officials like Mahmud Yalāvach and Mas'ud Beg were still kept on, while Chinggisids like Mubārakshāh, son of Orghina Khatun, were stripped of power, but kept alive.
[244] In the Jochid *ulus*, also a Muslim polity at this point, the khan Birdibek in 1358 executed 12 brothers and his own son, leading to the ruling elites abandoning him, Favereau, *The Horde*, p. 262.
[245] Qāshānī/Hambali, p. 89; Kamola, *Making Mongol History*, p. 105. Brack, 'Mediating Sacred Kingship', p. 60 shows that the line of Baidu (the Ilkhan who preceded Ghazan) was shown to be illegitimate in Rashīd al-Dīn's work by indicated that Baidu's father Taraghai was killed by a lightning strike. DeWeese, *Islamization and*

vindictive streak formed a part of this pattern which looks to have fatally damaged charismatic loyalty to the Hülegüid line.[246]

By looking at these categories of loyalty, we can better understand why the political credit of the Chinggisids had disappeared in the Ilkhanate. There were certainly issues with fertility in the later Ilkhanid period, but as observed by Charles Melville, the absence of direct heirs, as occurred after Abū Saʿīd's death in 1335, did not cause the other khanates to collapse.[247] The Ilkhans' weeding out of their rivals did lead to a lack of great choices to succeed Abū Saʿīd. The actions of those Ilkhans also had a great effect on their own commanders, who saw that their livelihoods were under severe threat by greater centralising methods of those such as Ghazan. The factional rivalries between different commanders with no strong hand to guide them led to a pulling apart of the realm. Inertial loyalty to the state was at an all-time low, which caused many of these commanders to decide to strike out on their own, creating smaller versions of the Ilkhanid state in their own statelets.

Native Religion, p. 260, based on Qāshānī, claims that it was a specific *jasaq* of Chinggis that everyone nearby a lightning strike had to be purified by passing through two fires.

[246] Favereau, *The Horde*, pp. 204-5 has shown that similar treatment of Chinggisids by Toqto'a in the early 14th century led to greater power in the hands of the *beg*s, though Chinggisid lineage continued to be respected.

[247] Broadbridge, *Women*, p. 274; Melville, 'End of the Ilkhanate', p. 313; Lane, *Daily Life*, p. 163 attributes the lessened fertility of the Ilkhanid rulers to genetic issues stemming from heavy alcohol consumption.

5. Conclusion

Every society, culture and state has its own set of norms, unspoken rules and laws which govern loyalty obligations. Some of these may be to people, others may be to ideas or the supernatural, while others may be to institutions or government bodies. This work set out to establish some of the loyalty networks which existed across the Mongol Empire and its successor states, with a specific focus on the Ilkhanate. Those the Mongols ruled over and who were a key part of maintaining loyalty networks at a regional level, such as the Persian administrators Juvainī and Rashīd al-Dīn, were involved in the project of both explaining Mongol custom to a Persian-speaking audience, as well as legitimating the rule of their employers. In this manner, they made use of Turco-Mongol terminology which described how the ruling classes understood, expected and performed loyalty obligations. The performative aspects of these rituals hammered home the political and societal cost of defiance, both for members of the Turco-Mongol elite and those they ruled over. The complexities of these cultural events show that Mongol loyalty networks were based in a highly ritualised society, where rank and precedence were strictly observed. Even when the Mongols adopted a new religion, such as Islam in the lands of the Ilkhanate, these rituals remained of vital importance in the display of power, submission and obedience.

These loyalty networks centred on nodes, or objects of loyalty, in the various roles and institutions which already existed on the Mongol steppes in the 12th century and which were agglomerated into the administration as the Mongol Empire grew over the course of the 13th century. The language of the customary law, or *törü*, was adopted and adapted by Chinggis and his successors to show his own right to obedience, long before he had in fact established himself as a khan on the steppe. Chinggis' legacy and his decisions during his lifetime had a powerful resonance through Mongol society, and they continued to affect how his descendants were viewed. This legacy became a sort of unwritten constitution to which Mongol political actors turned when they sought to explain their own loyalty decisions. The presence of long-standing societal roles which emphasised seniority, such as the *aqa*, clashed with newly established Chinggisid precedents, such as lineal succession. However, these disputes were almost always framed in terms of appeals to the Chinggisid *jasaq*, or Chinggis' personnel decisions. The existence of a consultative body, the *quriltai*, was supposed to preserve these records and ensure compliance, but powerful figures could always

forge their own path, and the *quriltai*'s weightiness was lessened by non-attendance and geographical moves away from Mongolia, though localised versions continued to take place throughout the Mongol world. The regionalisation of power forced local actors to make loyalty decisions with far more basis in self-preservation than in any ideal factors.

As this regionalisation grew, qa'ans made power grabs within their own spheres of influence, causing a breakdown in the unity of the empire in the early 1260s. The emergence of *ulus*es or khanates which no longer cooperated with each other and periodically sent strong messages of independence and separation occurred over the latter half of the 13th century. In one of these successor states, the Ilkhanate, a new concept of loyalty emerged. The rulers would no longer recognise the influence of the elder brothers of the Jochid line to the north, who were enemies who had allied with a non-Mongol state, the Mamluks. Their official loyalty as ilkhans, or submissive khans, was given to the great qa'an in Daidu. However, within the state, there were painful adjustments as once again the actors were regularly forced to choose between the ideas of seniority and the will of the previous ruler, and these loyalty decisions often were based on self-interest. The idealistic and charismatic loyalties of political decision-makers to the house of Hülegü were whittled away, as its scions brutally executed their own kin, as well as those who served them, at the slightest hint of sedition. This extreme violence transgressed Mongol custom, and put the amirs who served them in an unenviable position of choosing to follow out of fear. Eventually, these amirs had enough, and decided to risk exerting their own power without the support of the Chinggisid name.

In looking at Mongol loyalties, we have seen that, just as elsewhere in the world, there were push and pull factors which contributed to each individual loyalty decision. However, inertial loyalties in particular seem to have been less powerful in a society that had a great respect for strength and individual charisma. This explains to some extent why the united Mongol Empire disintegrated only a few decades after the death of its founder. The many claimants on loyalty also created tension for Mongol subjects, particularly high-level political actors, who would be judged on their choices. Those actors who were not Chinggisids often felt the brunt of their decisions in a way that members of the *altan urugh* did not, as they were usually protected by the sanctity of their blood. This began to change however, as the number of Chinggisid descendants grew, and their ability to destabilise the state became worrisome to rulers who needed to solidify their power. There were revivals in Chinggisid fortunes after the collapse of successor states like the Ilkhanate and Chaghadaid *ulus*, where the concept of loyalty to Chinggisid ideals restarted. The most notable of these was the rule of Temür, whose Turco-Mongol background gave him a familiarity with Chinggisid ideas of rulership,

which he used to show himself as a guardian of the legacy of Chinggis Khan.[1] This did not prevent him from killing the puppet khans he had no more use for however, and loyalty to the ideal of Chinggisid charisma was no longer the same force in the 14th and 15th centuries.

The speedy rise of the Mongol Empire and the necessary creation of administrative positions to govern it led to problems of jurisdiction and control. Many of these problems were famously actively sponsored by the Mongols, who worried about officials and commanders in far-flung regions becoming too powerful, and thus doubled roles in many areas.[2] This forced Mongol servitors to keep each other accountable, and ensured that their loyalty remained with the centre. While the situation in the provinces is well-known, it is questionable to what extent the Mongols created a similar system at the very heart of their empire. The clashes in authority between the regent, the *aqa*, and the heir presumptive may cause us to wonder if the lack of planning for the ruler's death was an oversight or not. Almost all of the actions by the early regents and Batu as *aqa* seem very ad hoc, based on a nebulous idea of custom. The role of the regent in particular seems a response to a potentially dangerous situation, which the previous rulers were unwilling or unable to prepare for. Rashīd al-Dīn and the Chinese sources are adamant about the presence and priority of wills of Chinggis and Ögödei at least, but as we have seen in Chapter 4, the *Akhbār-i Mughulān*, a source for Rashīd al-Dīn's work, claimed that the will as a concept had no basis in Mongol law.[3] The Mongols' great respect for strength and the proof of divine favour certainly applied to pretenders to the throne, but it also may have applied to these 'temporary' positions as well. They were what the holders of the title could make of them. Naturally however, the existence of these roles simultaneously, and a whole set of customs which could be employed to lend them weight, led to difficult choices for Mongol political actors.

---

[1] B.F. Manz, 'Temür and the problem of a conqueror's legacy', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 8, (1998), pp. 21-41. All across the former Mongol world, dynasties emerged which paid lip-service to Chinggisid heritage, or were ruled by Chinggisids, but where the real power was in the hands of powerful non-Chinggisid amirs. In Mongolia, the Northern Yuán dynasty struggled with the Oirats for control during the 15th century, with the Oirat ruler Esen Taishi using Chinggisid puppets, P. Golden, *Central Asia in World History*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 102; I. Togan, *Flexibility and Limitations in Steppe Formations: The Kerait Khanate and Chinggis Khan*, (Leiden: Brill, 1998), p. 8; May, *Mongol Empire*, pp. 26-8. Edigü did something similar in the Jochid *ulus*, DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion*, pp. 340-1. In Moghulistan, the eastern half of the former Chaghadaid *ulus*, Chaghadaid khans still ruled in the 16th century, but they were in regular conflict with the powerful Dūghlāt family, whose amirs were at times independent, or decided Chaghadaid succession, see *A History of the Moghuls of Central Asia, being the Tarikh-i Rashidi of Mirza Muhammad Haidar, Dughla*t (ed.) N. Elias, (trans.) E. Denison Ross, (London, 1972).

[2] Ostrowski, 'The *tamma*', p. 277; Ravalde, 'Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī', p. 58; Birge, *Marriage and the Law*, p. 42.

[3] See p. 151. The question of the will has been put forward in Krawulsky, *Mongol Ilkhans*, pp. 23-7; Favereau, *The Horde*, pp. 61-2 goes even further, stating that after Jochi, Chinggis' original heir, had fallen out of favour, 'Chinggis appointed no heir; the question of his succession was to remain open'.

Perhaps it is justifiable to state that some of these loyalty conflicts were by design then. If the whole Mongol political system rested on who had the favour of Tengri, other customary positions could be subsumed by this. Chinggis himself broke down many systems, reordered hierarchies, and established new precedents, but he seemingly had no desire to create a fully centralised state, as we might expect a founding ruler to do. He permitted his lateral relatives to choose their own leaders, he gave legal standing to the *quriltai*, and created the *güregen* class, which maintained standing and power in the hands of groups like the Oirat and Qonggirat. His successors were obliged not only to respect Chinggis' legacy, but also had to work within the same systems that he had. Though small scale changes could be enacted, as we have seen with the transfer of the Suldus troops, both Chinggisids and their amirs reacted strongly against amendments of the status quo. The creation of several nodes of loyalty obligations may have strengthened the Chinggisid family as a whole vis-à-vis the substrata of the ruling classes: officials, amirs etc. but it also allowed Chinggisid actors to make their own luck, showing their possession of *qut*. Innovators like Batu and Töregene played on existing customs and enlarged the scope of their own roles, which by and large impressed the Mongol ruling classes and external observers.

The appreciation of power did not eliminate a deep respect for custom and tradition. In the pre-imperial Mongol steppe, people were largely illiterate, and thus, society was governed by these very norms and unwritten rules, the *törü* being the highest of these. As Chapter Two has shown, hierarchies in ritual and performance were of the utmost importance in Mongol culture.[4] Thus, even those such as Batu and Töregene, who reshaped how the Mongols considered their positions, did not emphasise the new aspects of their actions, but rather how they were simply reconnecting to ideals of the past.[5] Batu played up his loyalty to the *jasaq*, to the process of the *quriltai*, and thereby to the Chinggisid legacy. For the Mongols, whose religious rituals involved the representation of their ancestors in images made of felt, Batu shows himself as merely honouring the wishes of his illustrious ancestor.[6] Töregene also connected herself to the tradition of both consultation and the figure of the *aqa* in reaching out to Chaghadai and the other Chinggisid princes to approve of her regency. However, when these figures showed a lack of respect for tradition, they were told as much. When Batu requested in 1248 to hold the *quriltai* closer to him due to his gout, he was told by the

[4] In this aspect I disagree with Lane, *Daily Life*, p. 22 who states 'Steppe leaders had no need for pomp and ceremony.'

[5] Favereau, *The Horde*, pp. 25, 96-7, states that this respect for tradition while innovating is in fact central to nomadic culture, and what provides its dynamism.

[6] These felt images (called *ongghot*) were noticed by European travellers such as John of Plano Carpini, *Mongol Mission*, p. 9; Marco Polo, *Travels*, p. 98, and Armenian chroniclers such as Grigor of Akanc', *Nation of Archers*/Bedrosian, p. 2; Vardan, *Compilation of History*, p. 97. See DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion*, pp. 37-41 and Lane, *Daily Life*, p. 184.

Ögödeids that his request was absurd, as Chinggis' capital was where such things took place.[7] Töregene likewise was informed by her son Köten that she could not do as she wished with the officials Chinqai and Maḥmūd Yalavach, as they must be tried for the crimes she suspected of them at the *quriltai*.[8]

Loyalty decisions, particularly for non-Chinggisids, could be life or death affairs, and thus they could rarely afford to be so idealistic. Aq Buqa's die-hard commitment to the Ilkhan Gaykhatu may have been commended by later commentators, but it cost him his life while amirs around him capitalised on the wind blowing a different way. However, even joining a successful leader could be perilous, if it was done in the wrong way. The examples of Jamuqa's followers' execution at the hands of Chinggis, or Taghachar's by Ghazan, show that ideal loyalties were not taken lightly and that the pure opportunists rarely had long term success either. This culture of uncertainty seems to have been deliberate, and it affected the way later rulers treated the Chinggisids. They often sought power not in their own name, but in the name of a Chinggisid puppet, as a fall back should their khan grow too powerful. Only once was their power assured did they dispense with formalities.[9]

Many of the loyalty categories the Mongols adhered to were taken on by other dynasties also. Adherence to the *jasaq/törü* continued in some form or another under the Timurids, and its influence was such that even the Mamluks, great enemies of the Mongols, were believed by their own historians to have taken on its concepts.[10] The respect for Mongol regents and women more generally as arbiters of power also permeated the Middle East, where women such as Shāhrukh's wife Gawharshād for the Timurids and the Safavid ruler Shah Tahmāsp's daughter Parī Khān Khānum played major political roles, either as regents or as sponsors of pretenders.[11] In Míng China there was

[7] RAD/Thackston, Vol. II, p. 387. Rashīd al-Dīn specifically mentions Töregene Khatun as complaining about this breach in protocol, though this seems impossible as the historian himself states that Töregene was dead by this point.

[8] Juvaini/Boyle, Vol. I, p. 242.

[9] One can think of the Chupanids, Jalayirids, Timurids, Oirats etc.

[10] Subtelny, *Timurids in Transition*, pp. 16-18; D. Ayalon, 'The Great *Yāsa* of Chingiz Khān: A Reexamination (Part C2). Al-Maqrīzī's Passage on the *Yāsa* under the Mamluks', *Studia Islamica*, Vol. 38, (1973), pp. 107-156 has shown that the actual evidence for any use of the *jasaq* in the Mamluk Sultanate is negligible, but that Mamluk historians such as Al-Maqrīzī and Ibn Taghrībirdī attributed its influence to the moral decay of the realm in the 14th century. See also Van den Bent, 'Mongols in Mamluk Eyes', pp. 123-151. However, this reaction may have been due to the influence of groups of *wāfidiyya* Mongols, such as the Oirats, who for a long time did not convert to Islam, and were heavily involved in succession issues in the late 13th and early 14th century. For more on this see Van den Bent, 'Mongols in Mamluk Eyes', pp. 220-6.

[11] B. de Nicola, 'Pādshāh Khatun: An Example of Architectural, Religious, and Literary Patronage in Ilkhanid Iran', in (eds.) M. Biran, J. Brack and F. Fiaschetti, *Along the Silk Roads in Mongol Eurasia: Generals, Merchants and Intellectuals*, (Oakland, CA, University of California Press, 2020), pp. 270-289, de Nicola, *Women in Mongol Iran*, Chapter 3 and Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, Chapter 5 have shown how women's political roles in vassal states of the Ilkhanate were increased at this time. B.F. Manz, 'Gowhar-šād Āḡā', *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, Online, https://iranicaonline.org/articles/gowhar-sad-aga, Accessed 31st March 2022; R. Savory, *Iran Under the*

a complex response to Mongol rule, whereby there was great condemnation of Mongol government and culture in official histories, particularly with regards to the influence of women, but in practice, Yuán influence was great in the Míng period.[12] Take the much-emphasised neo-Confucian approach to women in power, as expressed in an edict by the Hóngwǔ Emperor, Zhū Yuánzhāng (r. 1368-98), the founder of the Míng dynasty: 'Although the empress and consorts are exemplars of motherhood to the empire, they must not be allowed to participate in the affairs of government'.[13] However, the Dowager Empress Zhāng was a decisive figure in the reign of her son Xuāndé (r. 1425-35), then becoming unofficial regent for her grandson Yīngzōng (r. 1435-1449). She was apparently involved in all major councils on military and state affairs. However, she refused the Míng officials' request that she establish a regency on the basis that this violated ancestral laws, setting a precedent in the Míng period that women did not take the official title of regent.[14] This paradoxical approach to women's role in the government looks to be a reaction to the brazen expressions of female power in the Mongol period, where in name these women subscribed to neo-Confucian ideals about their roles in society, but in essence they continued to wield a great deal of power at the heart of Míng politics.

The importance of the figure of the *aqa* was such that the term came to be used as a respectful title by many later states, as well as in modern Persian and Tajik. Mongol loyalty networks and their processes were often adopted and adapted by later dynasties; the important institution of the *keshig* (imperial bodyguard) and the Mongol written oath, the *möchelge*, are only two of the most notable.[15] It was not just in the Middle East and Central Asia where these ideas were influential of course, as Donald Ostrowski and Charles Halperin have been keen to elucidate the impact of the Mongols on the political structure of the principality of Muscovy in the 14th and 15th centuries.[16] There are certainly further examples of the Mongol legacy in political systems, but it is key to understand that for all the misunderstandings of the exact functioning of Mongol power dynamics,

---

Safavids (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 70-74. Parī Khān Khānum was in conflict with the wife of the Shah Muḥammad Khudābanda, usually titled Mahd-i ʿUlyā, who took over as essential regent from Parī Khān, who was assassinated, until she herself was strangled.

[12] Robinson, 'The Ming Court', *passim*.

[13] E. Soulliere, 'The Writing and Rewriting of History: Imperial Women and the Succession in Ming China, 1368-1457', *Ming Studies*, Vol. 73, (2016), p. 14, from the *Míng Shǐ*, Vol. 12, Chapter 113.

[14] Idem, pp. 16-19.

[15] Melville, 'The *Keshig* in Iran', *passim*; Subtelny, 'Binding pledge', *passim*. A.K.S. Lambton, "Dārūgha", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, Online, http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_1728, Accessed 22nd March 2021, has shown that this position, in different forms, lasted up to the Constitutional Period in Iran. C.P. Mitchell, *The Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran: Power, Religion and Rhetoric*, (London: Tauris, 2009), p. 50, shows that many Turco-Mongol official posts like *qurchi*, *yasavul* and *yurtchi*, were present in the Safavid realm.

[16] Halperin, 'Muscovite Political Institutions' *passim*; D.G. Ostrowski, 'Muscovite Adaptation of Steppe Political Institutions: A Reply to Halperin's Objections', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (2000), pp. 267-304. The two authors disagree as to the degree of Mongol influence.

states across Eurasia, both during the Mongols' own period and beyond, regularly tapped into Mongol ideas to try and enhance their own prestige and bolster their subjects' loyalties. Despite the united Mongol Empire's relatively brief time span, the ideas which were at the heart of the impressive early Mongol enterprise and the long reign of many of their successors continued to have a powerful influence over various regions of Eurasia.

Even this relatively short study highlights the complexities of Mongol society, cultural norms and political administration. There are a great many geographical areas, ideas and loyalties which have been passed over for the sake of coherence, but further investigation of such issues would deepen our understanding of these networks. A study on the interaction of Mongol officials and their loyalties or specific analyses of regions like Yuán China or the Caucasus are *desiderata* in the broader field of Mongol studies. It would also be of great interest to see the relationship between loyalty to the Mongols and religious ideals, as these regularly ran afoul of each other.[17]

This dissertation has shown that by applying the framework of loyalty provided to us by authors such as Thomas Welsford and Naomi Standen, we can see how political actors in the Mongol world understood their decisions. Analysing these categories of loyalty: charismatic, clientelist, inertial, communal and idealistic loyalties, we see how the dynamics of these decisions played out at key moments. The Chinggisid enterprise created a network of loyalty objects, which was extremely powerful when there was a balance struck between loyalties of self-interest and those which prioritised the Chinggisid legacy. The venue for the performance of these loyalties, the *quriltai*, was arguably the key cog in this wheel. When political actors were forced to confront each other, the social aspect of this gathering saw to it that consensus was required. Even a qa'an could not go against the public assertion of this grand assembly if he wanted to remain in power.[18] As these empire-wide *quriltai*s were marginalised through regionalisation, their localised iterations continued to occur and maintain relevance at times, but they were no longer able to heal the bonds which had been severed in the 1250s and 1260s.

The power of the Chinggisid legacy was such that dynasties from Russia to China played with Mongol political concepts, adapting or rejecting those they thought could strengthen them or those which held too much memory of a barbarian oppressor. It is only through returning to the Mongol

[17] One can consider perhaps the incident when Ghazan, despite his conversion to Islam, wanted a formal marriage to his father's wife Bulughan Khatun, illegal under Islamic law. A *fatwa* was issued by an unnamed *ulema* saying that because Bulughan had been married to a non-Muslim, Arghun, this marriage was not valid, and thus Ghazan had every right to marry her, see Amitai, 'Ghazan, Islam and Mongol Tradition', p. 3; Melville, '*Pādshāh-i Islām*, p. 77.
[18] Favereau, *The Horde*, p. 99.

rise to power that we can understand the dynamism which was so attractive to these later societies. This dynamism married respect for tradition with a great respect for charismatic displays of power.[19] It was in this tension that both the Mongol Empire thrived and eventually fell apart, though its successor states sought to recapture and reframe this loyalty network, to varying degrees of success. Interestingly, it was in states where the Mongols sought to incorporate more local ideas of rule that power slipped away quicker. In Iran and China, Chinggisid Mongol rule had disappeared by the 1370s. However, in the realms where the Mongols were able to maintain the more classic Mongol system, such as the Jochid *ulus* and Moghulistan, their rule lasted for at least another two hundred years.

[19] Idem, p. 25. This was also noticed by Marie Favereau, whose work echoed my own thoughts on the matter.

Appendices

I. Appendix 1: *Soyurghamīshī* Instances in Rashīd al-Dīn's *Tārīkh-i Mubārak-i Ghāzānī*

RaD/R= Location in Rashid al-Din, ed. Raushan and Mousavi

RaD/Th= Location in Thackston's English translation

CQ= Chinggisid Qa'an (as titled by Rashid al-Din)

NCQ= Non-Chinggisid Qa'an/Qan

CRR= Chinggisid Regional Ruler

NC= Non-Chinggisid

(Note: For the purposes of this table, transliteration has been simplified)

Number	Location	Receiver	Action	Gift/Favour	Giver	Giver's Status
1	RaD/R: Vol. I 81. RaD/Th: Vol. I 48	Sali	Bravery in battle	Made commander and *inaq*	Mongke	CQ
2	RaD/R: Vol. I 113. RaD/Th: Vol. I 66	Ugu Temur Noyan	Long service, left Chinggis' service	Offense forgiven. Favourite wife returned to him	Chinggis	CQ
3	RaD/R: Vol. I 122. RaD/Th: Vol. I 71	Ala Qush of Ongut	Support against Naiman. Handed over wall in Jin Empire	Chinggis' daughter Alaqai Beki promised to him	Chinggis	CQ
4	RaD/R: Vol. I 130. RaD/Th: Vol. I 76	Barchuq (*idiqut*)	Submission	Unspecified	Chinggis	CQ

5	RaD/R: Vol. I 131. RaD/Th: Vol. I 76	Barchuq (*idiqut*)	Military support	Chinggis' daughter Altun Beki	Chinggis/Ogodei	CQ
6	RaD/R: Vol. I 189. RaD/Th: Vol. I 108	Jochi Qasar	Surrender to Ong Qan (Feigned)	Given back his household	Ong Qan	NCQ
7	RaD/R: Vol. I 192. RaD/Th: Vol. I 110	Jebe	Promised loyalty to Chinggis	Made commander of 10	Chingis	CQ
8	RaD/R: Vol. I 193. RaD/Th: Vol. I 111	Sulaimish (descendant of Jebe)	Unspecified	Given 5000 horsemen, made amir of *tumen*	Ghazan	CRR
9	RaD/R: Vol. I 194. RaD/Th: Vol. I 111	Daga, Guchugur, and their mother Baidu Khatun	Left Tayichi'ut for Chinggis, orphaned	Daga given *aktachi* position. Guchugur given hazara/tumen, mares. Baidu Khatun made darqan and *kumiss* server	Chinggis	CQ
10	RaD/R: Vol. I 254. RaD/Th: Vol. I 135	Jochi Qasar	Service in battle	Rank and title, he and his descendants sit among princes	Chinggis	CQ
11	RaD/R: Vol. I 257. RaD/Th: Vol. I 136	Chaghadai	Sought *soyurghamīshī*	Given descendants of Jochi Qasar	Ögödei	CQ
12	RaD/R: Vol. I 333. RaD/Th: Vol. I 179	Bo'orchi Noyan	Admitting leaving guard duty, gives Chinggis 10 gold goblets from Ong Qan	10 gold goblets	Chinggis	CQ
13	RaD/R: Vol. I 379. RaD/Th: Vol. I 205	Barchuq (*idiqut*)	Submission, turning over treasury	Unspecified	Chinggis	CQ
14	RaD/R: Vol. I 381. RaD/Th: Vol. I 205	2 envoys of *idiqut*	Brought letter announcing submission	Unspecified	Chinggis	CQ
15	RaD/R: Vol. I 393. RaD/Th: Vol. I 213	Barchuq (*idiqut*)	Came to Chinggis to submit	Red robe, gold belt, becoming a fifth son	Chinggis	CQ

16	RaD/R: Vol. I 403. RaD/Th: Vol. I 222	Liuga' Yeh-Lu Liu Ko	Submission, performs *uljamishi*	Made commander of *tumen*, given two cities and province of Guangning	Chinggis	CQ
17	RaD/R: Vol. I 405. RaD/Th: Vol. I 224	Shigi Qutuqu	Refused bribe, recognising 'great principle'	Receives double the bribe	Chinggis	CQ
18	RaD/R: Vol. I 409. RaD/Th: Vol. I 227	Boroghul Noyan	Conquered Tumat, died on campaign	Sons taken care of	Chinggis	CQ
19	RaD/R: Vol. I 410. RaD/Th: Vol. I 227	Muqali	Conquered Jurchen	Given title *kuo wang* (ruler of region), given *tumen* of Ongut	Chinggis	CQ
20	RaD/R: Vol. I 435. RaD/Th: Vol. II 241	Arslan Khan	Submission	Unspecified	Chinggis	CQ
21	RaD/R: Vol. I 442. RaD/Th: Vol. II 245	Son of Temur Malik, amir of Khwarazm Shah	Unspecified	Regained father's lands and possessions	Batu	CRR
22	RaD/R: Vol. I 444. RaD/Th: Vol. II 246	Leaders of Zarnuq	Presented *nozul*, turned over city	Lives spared	Chinggis	CQ
23	RaD/R: Vol. I 480. RaD/Th: Vol. II 261	Guyuk, Koten (Kolgan in Thackston)	Unspecified	Robes of honour from Tolui, *shihna* from Chinggis	Chinggis/Tolui	CQ/CRR (?)
24	RaD/R: Vol. I 522. RaD/Th: Vol. II 294	Chinggis' descendants	Conditional: Following the *yasaq* and *yosun* of Chinggis	The whole world	God	Deity
25	RaD/R: Vol. I 527. RaD/Th: Vol. II 298.	Chinggis' servants, female relatives	Unspecified	Golden garments, horses, pastures	Chinggis	CQ

26	RaD/R: Vol. I 593. RaD/Th: Vol. II 323	Chin Temur, Kul Bolad	Brought Malik Baha' al-Din to submit at court	Chin Temur given governorship of Khurasan and Mazanderan, Kul Bolad made his partner	Ogodei	CQ
27	RaD/R: Vol. I 594. RaD/Th: Vol. II 324	Chinggisid family, amirs	Presence at *quriltai*	Unspecified	Ogodei	CQ
28	RaD/R: Vol. I 597. RaD/Th: Vol. II 326	Bayan and Chiqu, amirs of Alans/Bulghars	*Uljamishi* to princes	Unspecified	Chinggisid princes	CRR
29	RaD/R: Vol. I 606. RaD/Th: Vol. II 331	Rukn al-Din Qutlugh, Sultan of Kirman	Submission	Given title Qulugh Khan, *jarligh* for rule over Kirman	Ogodei	CQ
30	RaD/R: Vol. I 616. RaD/Th: Vol. II 336	A poor man	Brought awls to Ogodei	One bar of silver per awl	Ogodei	CQ
31	RaD/R: Vol. I 618. RaD/Th: Vol. II 337	An admirer	Brought pearls to Ogodei	Unspecified	Ogodei	CQ
32	RaD/R: Vol. I 642. RaD/Th: Vol. II 351	Ayachi, grandson of Orda	Service to Arghun	Unspecified	Arghun	CRR
33	RaD/R: Vol. I 658. RaD/Th: Vol. II 361	People of Jochid *ulus*	Unspecified (on enthronement of Ulagchi, Batu's grandson)	Unspecified	Mongke	CQ
34	RaD/R: Vol. II 745. RaD/Th: Vol. II 410	Princes and commanders	Unspecified	Unspecified	Mongke	CQ
35	RaD/R: Vol. II 745. RaD/Th: Vol. II 410	Sons of Koten, Qadaqan Oghul and Malik Oghul(sons of Ogodei)	Supported Mongke in succession struggle	Given *ordu*s and wives from among Ogodei's.	Mongke	CQ

36	RaD/R: Vol. II 746. RaD/Th: Vol. II 410	Retainers of Maḥmūd Yalavach and Mas'ud Beg	Came to the *ordu*	Unspecified	Mongke	CQ
37	RaD/R: Vol. II 747. RaD/Th: Vol. II 410	Maliks, amirs and retainers of Arghun Aqa	Service	Unspecified	Arghun Aqa/Mongke	NC/CQ
38	RaD/R: Vol. II 758. RaD/Th: Vol. II 417	Arghun Aqa	Performed *tikishmishi*, reported state of affairs in Iran	*Jarligh* and confirmed in position	Mongke	CQ
39	RaD/R: Vol. II 791. RaD/Th: Vol. II 435	Qaidu and descendants of Chaghadai	Proposed: Submission to Qubilai	Proposed: Unspecified	Qubilai	CQ
40	RaD/R: Vol. II 795. RaD/Th: Vol. II 438	Sarban (grandson of Mongke)	Defeated Toluid rebels	Lands and troops	Qubilai	CQ
41 **(2x)**	RaD/R: Vol. II 811. RaD/Th: Vol. II 448	Sayyid Ajall Bukhari	Service in Qarajang, provisioned Qubilai's army, represented Qubilai in Mongke's court	From Mongke: Unspecified From Qubilai: Made vizier, son made governor of Qarajang	Mongke/Qubilai	CQ
42	RaD/R: Vol. II 814. RaD/Th: Vol. II 450	Gau 'Finjan' *ping chang* (deputy/vizier)	Surrendered city of Hsiang Yang Fu	Life spared, safe conduct, sword	Qubilai	CQ
43	RaD/R: Vol. II 814. RaD/Th: Vol. II 450	Gau 'Finjan' *ping chang* (deputy/vizier)	Surrendered city of Hsiang Yang Fu	Given post of '*finjan*'	Qubilai	CQ
44	RaD/R: Vol. II 817. RaD/Th: Vol. II 451	A group of Muslim merchants	*Tikishmīshī*: White legged falcon and white eagle	Food from Qubilai's own table	Qubilai	CQ

45	RaD/R: Vol. II 819. RaD/Th: Vol. II 453	Malik Nasir al-Din Kashghari	Being a generous man, accused of embezzlement	Life spared, property returned	Qubilai	CQ
46	RaD/R: Vol. II 823. RaD/Th: Vol. II 455	Abubakr Bayan 'Finjan'	Honesty, protected subjects	Jewel studded robe with belt, control of administrative affairs	Qubilai	CQ
47	RaD/R: Vol. II 824. RaD/Th: Vol. II 456	Abubakr Bayan 'Finjan'	Told Qubilai to establish his successor, prevented dispute between princes	Given his grandfather's title, he and his brothers given *jarligh*s and *paiza*s	Qubilai	CQ
48	RaD/R: Vol. II 847. RaD/Th: Vol. II 468	Amir Dordaqa	Returned from serving Qaidu/Du'a, promised to attack them.	Pardoned, troop to attack Qaidu/Dua	Temur	CQ
49	RaD/R: Vol. II 848. RaD/Th: Vol. II 468	Amir Dordaqa and Chinggisid princes	Attacked Dua, killed many men, captured his son-in-law	Unspecified	Temur	CQ
50	RaD/R: Vol. II 866. RaD/Th: Vol. II 479	Those who submit	Submission (theoretical)	Treated kindly, rewarded properly	Hülegü	CRR
51	RaD/R: Vol. II 868. RaD/Th: Vol. II 480	Malik Shams al-Din Kurt	First of maliks of Iran who came to greet Hülegü	Unspecified	Hülegü	CRR
52	RaD/R: Vol. II 869. RaD/Th: Vol. II 480	Boatmen	Gave up boats for Hülegü to cross Jayhun	Tax on them abolished	Hülegü	CRR
53	RaD/R: Vol. II 872. RaD/Th: Vol. II 482	Nasir al-Din, *muhtasham* of Quhistan	Brought gifts, submission	Family spared, given *jarligh* and *paiza* for governorship of Tun	Hülegü	CRR
54	RaD/R: Vol. II 879. RaD/Th: Vol. II 485-6	Nasir al-Din Tusi, sons of Ra'is al-Dawla and Movaffaq al-Dawla	Loyalty	Horses, families spared, they and their descendants provisioned at court	Hülegü	CRR

55	RaD/R: Vol. II 890. RaD/Th: Vol. II 491	Husam al-Din, governor of Dartang	Submission	Several fortresses	Hülegü	CRR
56	RaD/R: Vol. II 906. RaD/Th: Vol. II 501	Atabeg Sa'd of Fars	Came to court, congratulated Hülegü on conquest of Baghdad	Unspecified	Hülegü	CRR
57	RaD/R: Vol. II 909. RaD/Th: Vol. II 503	Amir Qorchan, Achu Sukurchi, Sadun Gurji	Took facial wounds in siege of Aleppo	Unspecified	Hülegü	CRR
58	RaD/R: Vol. II 916. RaD/Th: Vol. II 506	Malik Nasir, Ayyubid prince of Aleppo	Submission?	Governorship of Damascus, 300 cavalry	Hülegü	CRR
59	RaD/R: Vol. II 916. RaD/Th: Vol. II 506	Malik Nasir, Ayyubid prince of Aleppo	None (ploy by Hülegü to trap him)	Banquet and reward (in fact killed)	Hülegü	CRR
60	RaD/ R: Vol. II 920. RaD/Th: Vol. II 508	Malik Kamil, Ayyubid prince of Mayyafariqin	Submission	*Jarligh, paiza*, family treated well	Mongke	CQ
61	RaD/R: Vol. II 922. RaD/Th: Vol. II 509	Malik Salih of Mosul	Unspecified	Rule of Mosul	Hülegü	CRR
62	RaD/R: Vol. II 941. RaD/Th: Vol. III 519	Ma'sud Beg	Envoy to Abaqa from Qaidu/Baraq	Unspecified	Abaqa	CRR
63	RaD/R: Vol. II 954. RaD/Th: Vol. III 526	Shams al-Din Kurt	Submission, brought *tuzghu* and tribute	Realm of Khurasan, group of *noker*s, made tax farmer of Herat	Baraq	CRR
64	RaD/R: Vol. II 955. RaD/Th: Vol. III 527	Prince Tubshin, Arghun Aqa, Sultan Hajjaj	Attended Abaqa in Khurasan	Unspecified	Abaqa	CRR

65	RaD/R: Vol. II 972. RaD/Th: Vol. III 535	Takachak, *elchi* of Abaqa	Carried Abaqa's arms while Abaqa was injured, good service	Became grand and influential, made *keshigten* for Arghun?	Abaqa	CRR
66	RaD/R: Vol. II 978. RaD/Th: Vol. III 538	Izz al-Din Aybak Shami	Submission	Made governor of Malatya, given annual stipend of 5000 dinars to support him and his men	Abaqa	CRR
67	RaD/R: Vol. II 979. RaD/Th: Vol. III 539	Shams al-Din Kurt	Submission	Made malik of Herat, Sabzavar, Ghor and Gharcha	Hülegü	CRR
68	RaD/R: Vol. II 979. RaD/Th: Vol. III 540	Shams al-Din Kurt	Joined Baraq, refused summons to go to Abaqa	None (no *soyurghamīshī* remains)	Abaqa	CRR
69	RaD/R: Vol. II 985. RaD/Th: Vol. III 543	Ayachi, servant of Majd al-Mulk	Hypothetical: Proving embezzlement claim against Shams al-Din Juvaini	Unspecified	Abaqa	CRR
70 **(2x)**	RaD/R: Vol. II 986. RaD/Th: Vol. III 543	Shams al-Din Juvaini	Wrote document claiming his innocence, backed by Oljei Khatun	Not punished, kept position	Abaqa	CRR
71	RaD/R: Vol. II 997. RaD/Th: Vol. III 549	Ala' al-Din Ata Malik Juvaini	Was 'falsely accused' by Abaqa	Regained possessions, given textiles and commercial goods	Ahmad Teguder	CRR
72	RaD/R: Vol. II 998. RaD/Th: Vol. III 550	Ala' al-Din Ata Malik Juvaini	Unspecified	Control of Baghdad	Ahmad Teguder	CRR
73	RaD/R: Vol. II 999. RaD/Th: Vol. III 551	Malik Fakhr al-Din	Unspecified	Made governor of Rayy, as previously	Arghun	CRR
74	RaD/R: Vol. II 1002. RaD/Th: Vol. III 552	Cherig, retainer of Qongqortai	Brought *tangsuq*s from Rum on behalf of Qongqortai as apology	Unspecified (2 leopards sent to Qongqortai)	Arghun	CRR

75	RaD/R: Vol. II 1021. RaD/Th: Vol. III 563	Shams al-Din Juvaini	Went to Arghun's court	Unspecified	Arghun	CRR
76	RaD/R: Vol. II 1022. RaD/Th: Vol. III 564	Arghun Khan	Unspecified	Father's crown and throne	God	Deity
77	RaD/R: Vol. II 1030. RaD/Th: Vol. III 566	Sa'd al-Dawla	Reported back taxes of Baghdad	*Jarligh* and *paiza* to collect taxes in Baghdad	Arghun	CRR
78	RaD/R: Vol. II 1036. RaD/Th: Vol. III 571	Prince Jushkeb	Reported conspiracy of Buqa	Unspecified	Arghun	CRR
79	RaD/R: Vol. II 1051. RaD/Th: Vol. III 581	All of Gaykhatu's amirs	Unspecified	Unspecified	Gaykhatu	CRR
80	RaD/R: Vol. II 1065. RaD/Th: Vol. III 591	Everyone	Abaqa celebrates safe delivery of Ghazan	Unspecified	Abaqa	CRR
81	RaD/R: Vol. II 1076. RaD/Th: Vol. III 596-7	Mihtar Najib al-Din Farrash	Only person of Juvayn to submit to Ghazan, presented horses as *tikishmīshī*, good service	Made intimate at court, given village of Zirabad, *jarligh* making him *darqan*, made a treasurer, he and his offspring given control of *khanaqah* and *vaqf* properties in Buzinjird	Ghazan	CRR
82	RaD/R: Vol. II 1077. RaD/Th: Vol. III 597	Amir Aladu of Qara'unas	Left Nawruz and Qara'unas and submitted to Ghazan	Unspecified	Ghazan	CRR
83	RaD/R: Vol. II 1090. RaD/Th: Vol. III 605	Amir Muhammad Idachi	Gave *tangsuq*s as *tikishmīshī*	Made *mulazim* (court intimate)	Ghazan	CRR
84	RaD/R: Vol. II 1091. RaD/Th: Vol. III 606	Amir Qutlughshah and other amirs	Presented booty taken from Nawruz as *tikishmīshī*	Unspecified	Ghazan	CRR

85	RaD/R: Vol. II 1094. RaD/Th: Vol. III 611	Satilmish, *noker* of Nawruz	Brought peace offer from Nawruz	Unspecified	Ghazan	CRR
86	RaD/R: Vol. II 1095. RaD/Th: Vol. III 612	Prince Toghan and Amir Nawruz	Performed *tikishmīshī*	Pardon, other unspecified	Ghazan	CRR
87	RaD/R: Vol. II 1098. RaD/Th: Vol. III 614	Na'uldar, herald of Baidu	Performed *tikishmīshī*	Unspecified	Ghazan	CRR
88	RaD/R: Vol. II 1104. RaD/Th: Vol. III 617	Nawruz	Gave oath to Baidu, united with him (a ruse)	His son Sultanshah given governorship of Yazd and *barat* of 10,000 dinars	Baidu	CRR
89	RaD/R: Vol. II 1109. RaD/Th: Vol. III 621	Sadr al-Din Zanjani	Unspecified (Baidu is afraid of his possible disloyalty)	Given *jarligh* and *paiza*, governorship of Rum	Baidu	CRR
90	RaD/R: Vol. II 1110. RaD/Th: Vol. III 621	Amir Chupan and Qurumshi Kurgan	Left Baidu, submission	Given robes, hats, jewel studded belts	Ghazan	CRR
91	RaD/R: Vol. II 1110. RaD/Th: Vol. III 621	Amir Chupan and Qurumshi Kurgan	Promised to join forces with Manqalai, Nawruz and Qutlughshah against Baidu	Requested unspecified *soyurghamīshī*	Ghazan	CRR
92	RaD/R: Vol. II 1121. RaD/Th: Vol. III 634	Nurin Aqa	Came to Ghazan in Baghdad	Unspecified	Ghazan	CRR
93	RaD/R: Vol. II 1122. RaD/Th: Vol. III 635	Atabek Afrasiyab Lur	Came to court	Unspecified	Ghazan	CRR
94	RaD/R: Vol. II 1132. RaD/Th: Vol. III 640.	Sadr al-Din Zanjani	Involved in executing Nawruz	*Al tamgha* (red royal seal) given to him	Ghazan	CRR
95	RaD/R: Vol. II 1133. RaD/Th: Vol. III 641	Amir Qutlughshah	Brought Malik Da'ud and Khatanak to Ghazan	Unspecified	Ghazan	CRR
96	RaD/R: Vol. II 1149. RaD/Th: Vol. III 650	Sa'd al-Din Sahib Divan	Unspecified	*Al tamgha* given to him, affairs of divan	Ghazan	CRR

97	RaD/R: Vol. II 1155. RaD/Th: Vol. III 653	Ali Sher and two other Syrian amirs	Submission	Unspecified	Ghazan	CRR
98	RaD/R: Vol. II 1157. RaD/Th: Vol. III 654	Toqta's envoys	Performed *tikishmīshī*	Unspecified	Ghazan	CRR
99	RaD/R: Vol. II 1162. RaD/Th: Vol. III 657	Amir Chupan	Looked after soldiers during campaign	Unspecified	Ghazan	CRR
100	RaD/R: Vol. II 1166. RaD/Th: Vol. III 659	Prince Ala Fireng	Told Ghazan the truth of his rebellion	Crime forgiven	Ghazan	CRR
101	RaD/R: Vol. II 1168. RaD/Th: Vol. III 660	Khwaja Sa'd al-Din	Honesty, righteousness	Unspecified	Ghazan	CRR
102	RaD/R: Vol. II 1168. RaD/Th: Vol. III 661	Khwaja Sa'd al-Din	Taking care of the country	Given *hazara* of Mongol troops, *tugh* and *kahvarga*	Ghazan	CRR
103	RaD/R: Vol. II 1170. RaD/Th: Vol. III 661	Khwaja Sa'd al-Din	Performed *tikishmīshī*	Unspecified	Ghazan	CRR
104	RaD/R: Vol. II 1317. RaD/Th: Vol. III 729	Ghazan	Unspecified	His forefathers' *ulus* and kingdom	God	Deity
105	RaD/R: Vol. II 1320. RaD/Th: Vol. III 733.	Mongol soldiers	Being just, maintaining *yasa*	Given *'iqta*	Ghazan	CRR
106	RaD/R: Vol. II 1321. RaD/Th: Vol. III 734	Mongol soldiers	Being industrious	Unspecified	Ghazan	CRR
107	RaD/R: Vol. II 1322. RaD/Th: Vol. III 734	Mongol soldiers	Service	Given *'iqta*	Ghazan	CRR

II. Appendix 2: *Tikishmīshī* Instances in Rashīd al-Dīn's TMG

RaD/R= Location in Rashid al-Din, ed. Raushan and Mousavi

RaD/Th= Location in Thackston's English translation

CQ= Chinggisid Qa'an (as titled by Rashid al-Din)

NCQ= Non-Chinggisid Qa'an/Qan

CRR= Chinggisid Regional Ruler

CP= Chinggisid Prince

(Note: For the purposes of this table, transliteration has been simplified)

No.	Location	Performer	Gift	Receiver	Response	Status of Performer	Status of Receiver
1	RaD/R: Vol. I 4. RaD/Th: Vol. I 4	Everyone	Unspecified	Ghazan	Unspecified	Subject	CRR
2	RaD/R: Vol. I 115. RaD/Th: Vol. I 67	Anyat Qa'an	Unspecified (9x9)	Narqish Tayang, elder brother and ruler of Naiman	An embrace	Non-Subject	NCQ
3	RaD/R: Vol. I 192. RaD/Th: Vol. I 110	Jebe	1000 white mouthed horses	Chinggis	*Soyurghamīshī*	Subject	CQ
4	RaD/R: Vol. I 257. RaD/Th: Vol. I 136	Descendants of Jochi Qasar	Unspecified	Abaqa	*Soyurghamīshī*	Non-Subject	CRR
5	RaD/R: Vol. I 602. RaD/Th: Vol. II 329	Princes, amirs and army	Unspecified	Ogodei	Share of prey after hunt	Subject	CQ

6	RaD/R: Vol. I 680. RaD/Th: Vol. II 375	Chaghadai, Tolui and their relatives	Unspecified (9 times)	Ogodei	Unspecified	Subject	CQ
7	RaD/R: Vol. I 681. RaD/Th: Vol. II 375	Chaghadai	9 horses	Ogodei	Life spared, offence forgiven	Subject	CQ
8	RaD/R: Vol. I 682. RaD/Th: Vol. II 376	Chaghadai	Unspecified	Ogodei	Allowed into inner apartments	Subject	CQ
9	RaD/R: Vol. I 686. RaD/Th: Vol. II 377-8	Sechektu, amir of *hazara*	Beautiful horses	Qipchaq	Unspecified	Non-Subject	CP
10 **(2x)**	RaD/R: Vol. I 686. RaD/Th: Vol. II 377-8	Sechektu, amir of *hazara*	Beautiful horses	Baraq	Unspecified	Non-Subject	CRR
11	RaD/R: Vol. II 738. RaD/Th: Vol. II 406	Rebellious princes	Unspecified (9x9)	Mongke	Allowed into inner *ordu*	Non-Subject	CQ
12	RaD/R: Vol. II 758. RaD/Th: Vol. II 417	Arghun Aqa	Unspecified	Mongke	Confirmed in position, *soyurghamīshī*	Subject	CQ
13	RaD/R: Vol. II 785. RaD/Th: Vol. II 432	Armies of Arigh Boke	Unspecified	Qubilai	Unspecified	Non-Subject	CQ
14	RaD/R: Vol. II 785. RaD/Th: Vol. II 432	Arigh Boke	Unspecified	Qubilai	Entry into Qubilai's presence	Non-Subject	CQ
15	RaD/R: Vol. II 786. RaD/Th: Vol. II 433	Hülegü's *urugh* (referring to Arigh Boke)	Unspecified	Qubilai	(Complaint of Hülegü about manner of Arigh Boke's *tikishmīshī)*	Non-Subject	CQ
16	RaD/R: Vol. II 793. RaD/Th: Vol. II 437	Prince Yobuqur	Planned Submission	Qubilai	Unspecified	Non-Subject	CQ
17	RaD/R: Vol. II 811. RaD/Th: Vol. II 448	Nasir al-Din, grandson of Sayyid Ajall Bokhari	None (did not perform *tikishmīshī*)	Qubilai	None (however father had received *soyurghamīshī* from Mongke and Qubilai)	Subject	CQ

18	RaD/R: Vol. II 817. RaD/Th: Vol. II 451	A group of Muslim merchants	A white legged falcon with a red beak and a white eagle	Qubilai	Food from Qa'an's own table, *soyurghamīshī*	Non-Subject	CQ
19	RaD/R: Vol. II 906. RaD/Th: Vol. II 501	Seljuk Sultain Izz al-Din	A pair of magnificent boots with his own face painted on them	Hülegü	Mercy	Non-Subject	CRR
20	RaD/R: Vol. II 949. RaD/Th: Vol. III 523	Sechektu, amir of *hazara*	Beautiful horses	Qipchaq	Unspecified	Non-Subject	CP
21 **(2x)**	RaD/R: Vol. II 949. RaD/Th: Vol. III 523	Sechektu, amir of *hazara*	Beautiful horses	Baraq	Unspecified	Non-Subject	CRR
22	RaD/R: Vol. II 970. RaD/Th: Vol. III 534	Mubarakshah, Chubay and Qaban	News of Baraq's death	Qaidu	Unspecified	Non-Subject	CRR
23 **(2x)**	RaD/R: Vol. II 980. RaD/Th: Vol. III 539	Malik Shams al-Din Kurt	Livestock and robes	Abaqa	Unspecified	Unclear	CRR
24	RaD/R: Vol. II 1052. RaD/Th: Vol. III 581	Amirs Taghachar, Qunchuqbal and others	Unspecified	Gaykhatu	Crimes forgiven	Subject	CRR
25	RaD/R: Vol. II 1076. RaD/Th: Vol. III 596-7	Mihtar Najib al-Din Farrash of Juvayn	Fine horses	Ghazan	*Soyurghamīshī*, villages, *darqan* status, made treasurer, control of *khanaqah* and *vaqf*	Non-Subject	CRR
26	RaD/R: Vol. II 1086. RaD/Th: Vol. III 603	Anbarchi (son of Gaykhatu), amirs Doladai, Qunchuqbal and Il Temur	Unspecified	Ghazan	Unspecified	Non-Subject	Later CRR

27	RaD/R: Vol. II 1091. RaD/Th: Vol. III 606	Qutlughshah and his amirs	Booty taken from Nawruz	Ghazan	*Soyurghamīshī*	Subject	Later CRR
28	RaD/R: Vol. II 1095. RaD/Th: Vol. III 612	Nawruz and Prince Toghan	Unspecified	Ghazan	*Soyurghamīshī*, crimes forgiven	Non-Subject	Later CRR
29	RaD/R: Vol. II 1098. RaD/Th: Vol. III 614	Na'uldar, herald of Baidu	Unspecified	Ghazan	*Soyurghamīshī*	Non-Subject	Later CRR
30	RaD/R: Vol. II 1102. RaD/Th: Vol. III 616	Amir Doladai (sent by Baidu)	Food and wine	Ghazan	Unspecified	Non-Subject	Later CRR
31	RaD/R: Vol. II 1102. RaD/Th: Vol. III 616	Qipchaq, son of Baidu	Unspecified	Ghazan	Robe of honour, horse.	Non-Subject	Later CRR
32	RaD/R: Vol. II 1157. RaD/Th: Vol. III 654	Toqta's messengers and Mamluk envoys	Unspecified	Ghazan	*Soyurghamīshī* (for Toqta's envoys)	Non-Subject	CRR
33	RaD/R: Vol. II 1163. RaD/Th: Vol. III 658	Amirs from Syrian campaign	Unspecified	Ghazan	Unspecified	Subject	CRR
34	RaD/R: Vol. II 1170. RaD/Th: Vol. III 661	Sa'd al-Din Sahib Divan	Unspecified	Ghazan (and other members of Chinggisid house: princes and *khatuns*)	*Soyurghamīshī*	Subject	CRR

III. Appendix 3: *Uljamīshī* Instances in Rashīd al-Dīn's TMG

RaD/R= Location in Rashid al-Din, ed. Raushan and Mousavi

RaD/Th= Location in Thackston's English translation

CQ= Chinggisid Qa'an (as titled by Rashid al-Din)

CRR= Chinggisid Regional Ruler

(Note: For the purposes of this table, transliteration has been simplified)

No.	Location	Performer	Gift	Receiver	Response	Status of Performer	Status of Receiver
1	RaD/R: Vol. I 68. RaD/Th: Vol. I 41	Chormaghun	Unspecified	Ogodei	4 *tumen* of *tamma* troops	Subject	CQ
2	RaD/R: Vol. I 133. RaD/Th: Vol. I 77	Urut Utuju, Elig Temur, Ayqaraq; 3 amirs of Kirghiz sent by Altan and Buqra, kings of Kirghiz	White hawks	Chinggis	Unspecified	Non-Subject	CQ
3	RaD/R: Vol. I 375. RaD/Th: Vol. I 203	Dayir Usun and the Uhaz Merkit	Dayir Usun's daughter Qulan Khatun	Chinggis	Split into hundreds, *shihna*s put over them	Non-Subject	CQ
4	RaD/R: Vol. I 393. RaD/Th: Vol. I 213	Arslan Khan of Qarluq	Unspecified	Chinggis	*Soyurghamīshī*	Non-Subject	CQ

5	RaD/R: Vol. I 393. RaD/Th: Vol. I 213	Barchuq, Uighur *idiqut*	Unspecified	Chinggis	*Soyurghamīshī*, red cloak, golden belt ring, Chinggis' daughter	Non-Subject	CQ
6	RaD/R: Vol. I 403. RaD/Th: Vol. I 222	Yeh-Lu Liu Ko of Khitai (Li Wang)	Unspecified	Chinggis	*Soyurghamīshī*, made amir of *tumen*, 2 cities	Non-Subject	CQ
7	RaD/R: Vol. I 405. RaD/Th: Vol. I 224	Qailiq and Qadai, deputies of Altan Khan (Jin Emperor)	Gold robes and *tangsuq*s	Onggur Ba'urchi, Harqai Qasar, (Shigi Qutuqu refused)	Unspecified	Non-Subject	Representatives of CQ
8	RaD/R: Vol. I 406. RaD/Th: Vol. I 224	Treasury chief of Jungdu	His grandson Ch'ungshan	Chinggis	Unspecified	Non-Subject	CQ
9	RaD/R: Vol. I 464	Tolui	Unspecified	Chinggis	Unspecified	Subject	CQ
10	RaD/R: Vol. I 464	Chaghadai and Ogodei	Unspecified	Chinggis	Unspecified	Subject	CQ
11	RaD/R: Vol. I 483. RaD/Th: Vol. II 263	Shidurqu, king of Tangut	Unspecified	Chinggis	Refused as Chinggis was ill	Subject (in rebellion)	CQ
12	RaD/R: Vol. I 513. RaD/Th: Vol. II 290	Arslan Khan of Qarluq, Barchuq of Uighur	Unspecified	Chinggis	Unspecified	Non-Subject	CQ
13	RaD/R: Vol. I 597. RaD/Th: Vol. II 326	Bayan and Chiqu of Bolghar and Alans	Unspecified	Chinggisid Princes	*Soyurghamīshī*	Non-Subject	CRR, later CQs
14	RaD/R: Vol. I 680. RaD/Th: Vol. II 374	Chaghadai, Ogodei, Tolui (?)	Unspecified	Chinggis	Unspecified	Subject	CQ
15	RaD/R: Vol. II 790. RaD/Th: Vol. II 435	Arigh Boke and Asutai	Unspecified	Qubilai	Lives spared, allowed to enter *ordu*	Non-Subject	CQ
16	RaD/R: Vol. II 868. RaD/Th: Vol. II 480	Arghun Aqa and nobles of Khurasan	Unspecified	Hülegü	Unspecified	Subject	CRR

17	RaD/R: Vol. II 983. RaD/Th: Vol. III 541	Qara'unas amirs in Herat	Unspecified	Abaqa	Unspecified	Non-Subject	CRR
18	RaD/R: Vol. II 1022. RaD/Th: Vol. III 564	Shams al-Din Juvaini	Unspecified	Arghun	No favour, no anger	Subject	CRR
19	RaD/R: Vol. II 1036. RaD/Th: Vol. III 571	Ayachi, son of Buqa	Unspecified	Arghun	Request to perform *uljamishi* rejected, he and his brothers executed	Subject	CRR

Dramatis Personae

The Chinggisids

Abaqa- Eldest son of Hülegü and Yesünjin Khatun and 2nd ruler of the Ilkhanate.

Abū Saʿīd- Last widely recognised Ilkhan, eldest son of Öljeitü.

Al Altan- Chinggis' daughter (Order unknown). Killed after Güyük's accession for suspected poisoning of Ögödei.

Aḥmad Tegüder- Son of Hülegü and Qutui Khatun, 3rd Ilkhan and half-brother of Abaqa, overthrown by his nephew Arghun.

Alaqa (Alahai, Alaqa) - Chinggis' 3rd daughter and regent of the Öng'üt.

Alghu- Ariq Böke's choice for Chaghadaid khan and 4th Chaghadaid ruler, married Orghina Khatun and made her son Mubārakshāh his heir.

Anbarchi- Son of Möngke Temür who rebelled against Gaykhatu's reign.

Arghun- Son of Abaqa and a concubine, Qaitmish Egachi, 4th Ilkhan, overthrew his uncle Aḥmad Tegüder.

Ariq Böke- 4th son of Tolui and Sorqoqtani. Proclaimed himself *qa'an* after Möngke's death but was defeated by Qubilai.

Arpa Ke'ün- One of the last rulers of the Ilkhans, descended from Ariq Böke.

Baidu- Grandson of Hülegü and 6th Ilkhan, killed and succeeded by Ghazan.

Baraq- Qubilai's choice for Chaghadaid khan and 6th Chaghadaid ruler. Deposed Mubārakshāh.

Batu- 2nd son of Jochi and 2nd khan of the Jochid *ulus*. Organised with Sorqoqtani Beki the transfer of power to the Toluids.

Berke- Half-brother of Batu, and 5th khan of the Jochid *ulus*. Converted to Islam, at war with Ilkhanate.

Boraqchin Khatun- Chief wife of Batu, regent on behalf of her grandson Ulaghchi for a short time until Berke came to power.

Börte- Chief wife of Chinggis, and mother of Jochi, Chaghadai, Ögödei, and Tolui. Qonggirat daughter of leader Dei Sečen.

Büri- Either a son, but more likely a grandson of Chaghadai. According to the *SHM*, he was Chaghadai's eldest son, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, he was the second son of Chaghadai's second son Mö'etüken by a woman of the camp.

Chaghadai- 2nd son of Chinggis and ruler of Chaghadaid *ulus*.

Doquz/Toquz Khatun- A chief wife of Tolui who married Hülegü after Tolui's death. Accompanied Hülegü west and was a patron of Christians there.

Du'a- Son of Baraq and 9th khan of the Chaghadaid *ulus*, allied with Qaidu in opposition to Qubilai.

Hülechü- 12th son of Hülegü by a concubine, a candidate for succession before Arghun's khanate. Killed by Arghun for rebelling.

Hülegü- 3rd son of Tolui and Sorqoqtani. Leader of western campaign under Möngke and founder of the Ilkhanate.

Gaykhatu- Son of Abaqa and Nuqdan Khatun, 5th Ilkhan. Overthrown by Baidu.

Güyük Khatun- First wife of Hülegü, of the Oirat. Mother of Jumghur and Aḥmad Tegüder. Died in Mongolia before Hülegü went west.

Güyük Qa'an- Eldest son of Ögödei and Töregene Khatun. 3rd ruler of the Mongol Empire.

Jochi- Eldest son of Chinggis, may have been illegitimate, ruler of the Jochid *ulus*.

Jumghur- 2nd son of Hülegü, mother was Güyük Khatun, left in Mongolia by his father when he went west, sided with Ariq Böke for a time, and died on his way to join his father in Iran.

Jüshkeb- Eldest son of Jumghur by a concubine, a candidate for the throne before Arghun's rule, killed by Arghun for rebelling.

Khoja- Eldest son of Güyük, and potential successor to his father.

Kingshü- 2nd son of Jumghur, by a concubine, a candidate for the throne before Arghun's rule.

Köchü- Ögödei's 2nd or 3rd son, chosen as successor, but died young. His son Shiremün contended for the throne.

Köten- Ögödei's 2nd or 3rd son, a potential successor to Ögödei.

Möge Khatun- Former wife of Chinggis, taken by Ögödei after his father's death. May have been regent after Ögödei died.

Möngke- Eldest son of Tolui and Sorqoqtani, and 4th ruler of the Mongol Empire. First Toluid ruler of the empire.

Möngke Temür (s. Hülegü)- 11th son of Hülegü by his wife Öljei Khatun, potential successor to Abaqa, but died before Aḥmad came to power.

Möngke Temür (s. Toqoqan)- 6th ruler of the Jochid *ulus* from 1266-1280, succeeded by his brother Töde Möngke. Father of Toqto'a.

Mubārakshāh- Young son of Qara Hülegü and Orghina Khatun and 5th Chaghadaid ruler. Deposed by Baraq.

Naqu- Younger son of Güyük, and potential successor to his father.

Noghai- Great-grandson of Jochi through his 7th son Bo'al. General under Batu and Berke, became khanmaker in the Jochid *ulus* in the later 13th century.

Ögödei Qa'an- 3rd son of Chinggis and 2nd ruler of the Mongol Empire. Husband of Töregene Khatun and father of Güyük, the 3rd ruler of the Mongol Empire.

Oghul Gaimish- Chief wife of Güyük and regent of the Mongol Empire after his death.

Öljei Khatun- Wife of Hülegü and sister of Güyük Khatun. Mother of Möngke Temür. Married Abaqa through the levirate. Very influential in Ilkhanid politics.

Öljeitü- Son of Arghun and Örüq Khatun, half-brother of Ghazan, and 8th Ilkhan. Converted to Shi'ism.

Orda- Eldest son of Jochi and first ruler of the *ulus* of Orda, the left wing of the Jochid *ulus*.

Orghina Khatun- Wife of Qara Hülegü, regent of the Chaghadaid *Ulus*, mother of Chaghadaid khan Mubārakshāh. Later married Alghu.

Örüq Khatun- Wife of Arghun, mother of Öljeitü.

Örüg (Ürüng) Temür- Great-grandson of Ögödei through his sixth son Qada'an, joined Nawrūz's rebellion in Khurasan, executed by Qaidu.

Özbek- Ruler of the Jochid *ulus* in the early 14th century, generally credited with definitively turning the realm into a Muslim state. It is from him that the Shaybanid Uzbeks of the 15th and 16th centuries derived their name.

Qaidu- Grandson of Ögödei through his fifth son Qashi, and creator of a new Ögödeid *ulus* within the Chaghadaid *ulus*. Rival of Qubilai and in alliance with Du'a.

Qara Hülegü- Grandson of Chaghadai, son of Chaghadai's eldest legitimate son Mö'etüken. Chaghadai's chosen successor to the Chaghadaid *ulus*, 2nd Chaghadaid khan, removed by Güyük, but reinstated by Möngke.

Qongqortai- Hülegü's 9th son, born of a concubine, half-brother of Aḥmad Tegüder. Governor of Anatolia, killed by Aḥmad.

Qubilai Qa'an- 2nd son of Tolui and Sorqoqtani. Proclaimed himself *qa'an* after Möngke's death, but not recognised except by Ilkhans. Founder of the Yüan Dynasty.

Qutui Khatun- According to some sources, the chief wife of Hülegü after death of his wife Güyük. Mother of Jumghur and Aḥmad Tegüder, influential in Ilkhanid succession struggles.

Sartaq- Eldest son of Batu and Boraqchin Khatun, and 3rd khan of the Jochid *ulus* but died after receiving his patent from Möngke.

Shiremün- Grandson of Ögödei, may have been chosen by Ögödei as his successor.

Sorqoqtani Beki- Chief wife of Tolui, and mother to Möngke, Qubilai, Hülegü and Ariq Böke. Organised with Batu the transfer of power to the Toluids.

Tegüder- Chaghadaid prince who accompanied Hülegü in western campaign, rebelled against Abaqa under encouragement from relative Baraq.

Temür Qa'an- Successor to Qubilai as Yuan Emperor, briefly recognised in 1304 as qa'an of the united Mongol Empire.

Tolui- Youngest son of Chinggis and Börte. Regent after Chinggis' death. Husband of Sorqoqtani Beki. Father of Möngke, Qubilai, Hülegü and Ariq Böke.

Toqta (Toqta'i/Toqto'a)- 8th khan of the Jochid *ulus*, patronised by Nogay for the throne, executed his senior rivals, then defeated Nogay.

Töregene Khatun- Chief wife, or one of Ögödei's chief wives. Mother of Güyük and regent after Ögödei's death.

Ulaghchi- Infant son of Sartaq, and briefly 4th khan of the Jochid *ulus*, his grandmother Boraqchin Khatun was regent on his behalf.

Ürüngtash- Son of Möngke who originally supported Ariq Böke, then went over to Qubilai.

Yesü Möngke- Chaghadai's 5th son and Güyük's choice for khan of the Chaghadaid *ulus*, 3rd Chaghadaid khan. Replaced by Möngke with his nephew Qara Hülegü.

Yesünjin Khatun- Junior wife of Hülegü and mother of Abaqa.

Yoshmut- Hülegü's 3rd son, born of a concubine, came with Hülegü and Abaqa on the campaign to the west.

Early Steppe Elites

Altan Otchigin- Youngest son of Qutula Khan, at times in opposition to Chinggis.

Ambaqai (Hambaqai) Qa'an/Khan- Khan of the Mongols and Tayiči'ut, succeeded Qabul Qa'an/Khan, a cousin. Succeeded by Qutula Qa'an/Khan. Killed by Jīn.

Bekter- Half-brother of Chinggis, may have been elder. Killed by Chinggis. Only attested in SHM.

Belgütei- Half-brother of Chinggis, younger brother of Bekter.

Daritai Otchigin- Younger brother of Yisügei, at times in opposition to Chinggis.

Hö'elün- Mother of four sons: Chinggis, Jochi Qasar, Qači'un, Temüge Otčigin and one daughter, Temülün, and one of Yisügei's two wives.

Güchülüg (Küchlüg) - Ruler of the Naiman, fled to Qara Khitai and took over their state.

Gürbesü Khatun- Step-mother and wife of Tayang Khan of the Naiman, married Chinggis after Naiman defeat.

Jamuqa- *Anda* of Chinggis, set up as rival khan, often supporter of To'oril.

Jochi Qasar- Younger brother of Chinggis.

Kököchü Teb Tengri- Son of Temüjin's guardian Mönglik, he predicted Temüjin's empire and became a powerful shaman. He was later killed by Jochi Qasar on Temüjin's orders.

Mönglik- Ally of Yisügei who supported Hö'elün and Temüjin after Yisügei's death, and may have been married to Hö'elün. One of his sons, Kököchü, called Teb Tengri, was a religious figure killed by Temüjin.

Qabul Qa'an/Khan- Ancestor of Chinggis and khan of the Mongols.

Quchar- Son of Nekün Taiši, elder brother of Yisügei, at times in opposition to Chinggis.

Qutula Qa'an/Khan- Son of Qabul Khan, but did not succeed him immediately, but after Ambaqai. Father of Bartan Ba'atur, grandfather of Chinggis.

Sacha Beki- Elder relative of Chinggis, either an uncle or a cousin (son of Bartan Ba'atur, or grandson of Ökin Barqaq, elder brother of Bartan). Led the Yürkin sub-division and at times in opposition to Chinggis.

Taichu- Elder relative of Chinggis, usually paired with Sača Beki as making up the Yürkin branch, they may have been brothers or cousins.

Tarqutai Qiriltuq- Leader of the Tayiči'ut, in opposition to Chinggis, son of Adal Khan, a descendant of Ambaqai.

Tayang Khan- Ruler of the Naiman, defeated by Chinggis.

Temüge Otchigin- Youngest brother of Chinggis, tried to seize throne before Güyük's accession. Executed after.

Tödö'en Girte (Töda'a Qahurchi/Qorčin)- Son or brother of Qada'an Taishi, son of Ambaqai Khan. Leader of Tayiči'ut and supporter of Tarqutai Qiriltuq.

To'oril (Toghril/Ong Qan) - Khan of the Kerait, *anda* to Yisügei, supporter of Chinggis, father of Senggüm.

Tumbinai Sechen (Tumina) - Ancestor of Chinggis, father of Qabul Qa'an.

Yisügei Ba'atur- Father of Chinggis, a leader of some of the Mongols. Poisoned by Tatars in Chinggis' youth.

Administrators, Officials and Commanders

Abū al-Qāsim Qāshānī- Historian patronised by Rashīd al-Dīn and Tāj al-Dīn 'Alīshāh, the viziers of Öljeitü. Wrote the *Tārīkh-i Öljeitü*, and claimed authorship of *Jāmi' al-Tavārīkh* as well.

Aq Buqa- Amir who served Aḥmad, Arghun and made chief commander under Gaykhatu.

Arghun Aqa- Administrator and tax official under the Mongol qa'ans and Ilkhans. Son Nawrūz was influential in converting Ghazan to Islam.

Aruq- Brother of Buqa, together made up a powerful Jalayir faction at court of Arghun.

'Aṭā Malik Jūvainī- Governor of Baghdad under the Ilkhans, wrote *Tārīkh-i Jahāngushā* (History of the World Conqueror) about the Mongol conquests and empire.

Baiju- Succeeded Chormaqan and Eljgidei as commander of the *tamma* troops in Azerbaijan, close ties with Jochids, defeated Rum Seljuqs at Köse Dagh, executed by Hülegü.

Buqa- Influential Jalayir commander under Ilkhans Abaqa and Aḥmad Tegüder, pivotal in Arghun coming to power, ruled almost independently until Arghun had him executed.

Chinqai- Nestorian Turk (Onggud or Kerait) official under Chinggis, Ögödei, and Güyük.

Chormaqan (Chormaghun) - Leader of the Mongols' *tamma* forces in north-western Iran and the Caucasus during the 1230s and 1240s.

Eljigidei- Appointed by Güyük to command *tamma* troops in Azerbaijan, executed by Batu during Möngke's purges of early 1250s. Replaced again with Baiju.

Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī Qazvīnī- Financial administrator in late Ilkhanid period. Wrote geography of the Ilkhanid realm, *Nuzhat al-Qulūb*, and a history, *Tārīkh-i Guzīda*.

Ila Chucai (Yehlü Chucai) - Khitan adviser to Chinggis, served as a tax official for northern China under Ögödei.

Jebe- One of Chinggis' most successful generals, led pursuit of Sultan Muḥammad Khwarazmshāh across Iran and Caucasus, before defeating Rus' and allies at the Kalka River.

Kit Buqa- Nestorian Christian Naiman general of Hülegü, defeated by Mamluks at 'Ayn Jalūt.

Korguz- Uighur governor of Khurasan under Ögödei.

Maḥmūd Yalāvach- Central Asian administrator, first of Khurasan under Chinggis, later of northern China under Ögödei and Möngke.

Mengeser Noyan- Chief *jarghuchi* under Möngke.

Muqali- Jalayir *nöker* of Chinggis, *guówáng* (国王） in northern China.

Naṣīr al-Din Ṭūsī- Polymath in service to Ismāʿīlīs, captured by Hülegü and made one of his chief advisers. Built observatory at Maragha, most famous for his authorship of *Akhlāq-i Naṣīrī*, a book on ethics that had great readership in the Muslim world.

Nawrūz- Son of Arghun Aqa, governor of Khurasan under Arghun before rebelling. Supported Ghazan's play for the throne and influential in converting him to Islam, later executed.

Negüder- Commander of Jochid troops who fled to Ghaznin after Hülegü's execution of Jochid princes. His followers, the Negüderis, were raiders who often troubled the Ilkhanate.

Rashīd al-Dīn Fażlullāh- Vizier to Ilkhans Ghazan and Öljeitü. Supervised creation of the *Jāmi' al-Tavārīkh* (Compendium of Chronicles), a history of the Mongols and the world.

Saʿd al-Dawla- Powerful Jewish vizier under Arghun, killed during Arghun's illness.

Shams al-Dīn Jūvainī- *Ṣāḥib-dīvān* under early Ilkhans, amassed huge wealth alongside his brother, the historian 'Aṭā Malik. Executed by Arghun.

Shigi Qutuqu- Orphan adopted by Hö'elün, became *jarghuchi* under Chinggis and kept book of Chinggis' *bilig*s.

Shiktur Noyan- Powerful commander under several different Ilkhans, involved in several transfers of power.

Sübüdei- Mongol general, involved in first attacks on China, before accompanying Jebe in pursuit of Sultan Muḥammad Khwarazmshāh. Was the military leader of the western campaign in the 1230s and 40s under Ögödei.

Su'unchaq (Suqunjaq) Aqa- Influential noyan under Abaqa, Aḥmad and Arghun.

Taghachar Aqa- Influential *noyan* in the late 13th c. Ilkhanate, changed sides many times, finally executed by Ghazan.

Vaṣṣāf- Tax administrator for the province of Fars under the Ilkhans. Wrote *Tajziyat al-amṣār va tazjiyat al-a'ṣār*, a continuation of Juvaini's history.

Enemies, Rebels, Victims and Vassals

Al-Malik al-Kāmil- Ayyubid ruler of Mayyafariqin, and vassal of the Mongols. Rebelled and was killed by Hülegü.

Al-Malik al-Nāṣir Yūsuf- Ayyubid ruler of Aleppo and vassal of the Mongols. Killed by Hülegü.

Al-Musta'ṣim- Last 'Abbāsid caliph, resisted Hülegü's attack on Baghdad, killed along with his family after Baghdad was sacked.

Barchuq- Uighur *idiqut* who cast off allegiance to the Qara Khitai and supported Chinggis.

Baybars al-Bunduqdārī- 4th Mamluk sultan, fought at 'Ayn Jalūt, entered into alliance with Berke of Jochid *ulus*.

Ibn al-Āthīr- Arab scholar from the Jazira, served in Mosul, wrote *al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh*, a general history which includes an account on the Mongol invasions of the Islamic world.

Jalāl al-Dīn Khwarazmshāh- Last Khwarazmshāh, continued resistance to the Mongols after his father Sultan Muḥammad's death. Fled to Afghanistan, then northern India, before campaigning across Iran, the Caucasus and Anatolia. Defeated by Chormaqan.

Maḥmūd Tārābī- Sufi sieve-maker who led a populist revolt against the Mongols in 1238-9 near Bukhara.

Minhāj-i Sirāj Jūzjānī- Persian historian from Jūzjān who fled the Mongol invasions to Delhi, serving the Delhi sultans, wrote the *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī*, which includes an account of the Mongol conquests.

Qalāwūn, al-Malik al-Manṣūr- 7th ruler of Mamluk Sultanate, exchanged embassies with Aḥmad Tegüder.

Rukn al-Dīn Khūrshāh- Last ruler of the Ismā'īlīs who submitted to Hülegü and was killed by Möngke.

Sayf al-Dīn Quṭuz- Ruler of the Mamluk Sultanate, defeated the Mongols at 'Ayn Jalūt.

Sultan Muḥammad Khwarazmshāh- Last ruler of the Khwarazmshāhid Empire proper, defeated by the Mongols, and whose son Jalāl al-Dīn, continued resistance to them into the 1230s.

Christian Sources on the Mongols

Gregory Abū'l Farāj Bar Hebraeus- Syriac polymath, of Jewish descent, served as Maphrian of the East for Syriac Church in Aleppo, worked in Baghdad under Hülegü, then in Maragha under Abaqa and Aḥmad. His *Chronography* focuses on the Syriac Church and the Ilkhanate.

Grigor Aknerts'i (Grigor of Akner/Akanc) - Abbot of Cilician monastery who wrote *History of the Nation of Archers*, a book about the Mongols and their interactions with the Armenians.

Het'um II- King of Cilicia in the late 13th century, and possible author of a *Chronicle* which contains significant information on the Ilkhanid state.

Het'um the Historian- Nephew of King Het'um I, monk, later general who fought alongside the Mongols against the Mamluks. Dictated his history, *The Flower of Histories of the East* in French.

John of Plano Carpini- Italian Franciscan friar, sent in 1240s by Pope Innocent IV to find out more about the Mongols. Present at Güyük's *ordu* during his enthronement.

Kirakos Ganjakets'i- Armenian monk who was captured by the Mongols and served as a scribe, later writing a *History of the Armenians*, which documented the Mongol invasion and the history of the Armenian Church in this period. A colleague of Vardan Arewelts'i.

Marco Polo- Venetian merchant who travelled to Qubilai's court, wrote a *Description of the World*.

Mar Yahbh Allaha- Companion of Rabban Sauma to the west. Made Catholicus of Syriac Church in Maragha. An anonymous history of his life was written shortly after his death.

Rabban Sauma- Öng'üt Nestorian monk from near Daidu, travelled west with his friend Rabban Mark. Given position in Syriac Church, and made envoy to the west by Arghun.

Riccoldo da Montecroce- Italian Dominican prior who travelled the Middle East at the turn of the 14th c. Wrote *Contra legem Sarracenorum*, a polemic against Islam, but with much information about the Mongols.

Simon of St. Quentin-French Dominican friar sent by Pope Innocent IV to the Mongols. Met general Baiju in Anatolia, wrote *Historia Tartarorum*.

Smbat Sparapet- Brother of King Het'um I of Cilicia (Lesser Armenia) and commander. Travelled to Qara Qorum in 1248, and wrote a *Chronicle* about Cilicia, and a letter to his brother-in-law Henry I of Cyprus about his journey.

Vardan Arewelts'i- Armenian monk who was well-traveled in the Near East, and trained alongside Kirakos Ganjakets'i. Met Hülegü, and wrote a *Compilation of History*, that includes information on the Mongols and other Turkish rulers, like the Seljuqs.

William of Rubruck- Flemish Franciscan friar, sent by Louis IX of France in 1250s to convert Mongols. Travelled to Qara Qorum.

Glossary

M- Mongolian
T- Turkish
A- Arabic
P- Persian
C- Chinese
G- Greek

***Aghruq/a'uruq* (M.)**- The camp for followers, elderly, children, wives etc.

***Airag* (M.)**- The Mongol term for *kumiss*, fermented mare's milk.

***Aktachi* (M.)**- Keeper of horses.

***Al tamgha* (T/M.)**- Red royal seal of Mongol rulers.

***Altan Khan* (M.)**- The golden khan, a common appellation for the ruler of the Jīn dynasty.

***Altan urugh* (M.)**- 'Golden lineage', referring to the Chinggisid family.

***Amir* (A/P.)**- Commander, ruler, governor, equivalent to the Mongolian *noyan* or the Turkic *beg*.

***Anda* (M.)**- Blood brother. A pact sworn between non-relatives by putting their blood into *qumis* and sharing it.

***Aqa* (M.)**- Elder brother, elder relative, term of respect. Also used as part of titles, e.g. Arghun Aqa, Bolad Aqa. Combined with *ini*, meaning elder and younger brothers, thus all participants in Mongol ruling class.

***Ba'atur* (Persianised form: *bahādur*) (M.)**- Hero, term of respect often given as a title.

***Bakhshi* (T.)**- Buddhist lama, holy man, or scribe. There is some debate about the origin of this term, Sanskrit or Chinese, but in the Mongol period it was regularly used to describe Buddhists in Iran.

***Barāt* (A/P.)**- Draft, patent.

***Basqaq* (T.)**- Turkish equivalent of the Mongol *darughachi*, an official in charge of conquered cities or regions, sometimes with a military presence.

***Ba'urchi* (M.)**- Steward, cook.

***Bayʿa* (A/P.)**- Oath of allegiance commonly given to ʿAbbasid Caliph and other rulers.

***Beg/bey* (T.)**- Commander, governor, equivalent to Arabo-Persian *amir* or Mongolian *noyan*.

***Beki* (M.)**- A title of respect given most commonly to women, but also to senior male figures in the Mongol world.

***Bilig* (M.)**- Wise saying, wise words, especially of Chinggis.

***Boqtaq* (M.)**- Mongolian royal women's hat.

***Bulqa* (M.)**- Rebellious, used by the Mongols for areas not yet conquered also. Can be a noun, *bulqaq*, meaning unrest or rebellion.

***Catholicos* (G.)**- Title for patriarch of Church of the East (Nestorians), also a position similar to an archbishop in the Syriac Church.

***Dào* 道 (C.)**- The right way or path, the natural order of the universe.

***Darughachi* (M.)**- Mongol official in charge of conquered cities or provinces. This term more regularly used in China.

***Egachi* (M.)**- Concubine.

***Ejen* (M.)**- Lord.

***Eke* (M.)**- Mother.

***El* (Persianised form: *īl*) (T/M.)**- Submissive, peaceful, on good terms. Used for regions and people that had submitted to the Mongols.

***Elchi* (Persianised form: *īlchī*) (T/M.)**- Envoy.

***Emchü* (Persianised form: *īnjū*) (M.)**- Private lands and possessions of the Chinggisid house.

***Farmān* (P.)**- Royal order or decree.

***Farr* (P.)**- Divine favour, particularly for kings, though there are different types of *farr*.

***'Fīnjān', píng zhāng* 平章 (C.)**- Deputy, privy councillor.

***Fitna* (A/P.)**- Disturbance of the peace, unrest, rebellion.

***Ghulām* (A/P.)**- Slave soldier.

***Güregen* (M.)**- Son-in-law. Used for those who married daughters of Chinggisids, became a social class. Adopted by Temür and his successors.

***Gür-khan* (T.)**- Universal khan, used as a title by the Qara Khitai khans.

***Guówáng* 国王 (C.)-** Ruler of a region.

***Ḥasab* (A/P.)**- Actions, often used in stock phrase, *ḥasab u nasab*, to mean a person's pedigree.

***Hazāra* (P.)**- Referring to a unit of 1,000 troops, called in Mongolian a *mingghan*.

***Idiqut* (T.)**- Uighur term for their ruler, lord of divine fortune.

***Inaq* (M.)**- Personal advisor and confidant of the ruler.

***Ini* (M.)**- Younger brother, younger relative.

***Iqṭāʿ* (A/P.)**- Land grant used by Seljuqs and Ilkhanids, later came to be known as *soyurġal*.

***Jam* (Persianised form: *yām*) (M.)**- Postal station with fresh horses for travelers.

***Jarghu* (Persianised form: *yārghū*) (M.)**- Mongol court.

***Jarghuchi* (Persianised form: *yārghūchī*) (M.)**- Official responsible for recording khan's laws and conducting interrogations.

***Jarligh* (Persianised form: *yārlīgh*) (M.)**- Imperial decree.

***Jasaq* (Persianised form: *yāsā*) (M.)**- Mongol law.

***Jins* (A/P.)**- Kind, class, type, gender, race.

***Jirga* (M.)**- Hunting circle.

***Kahvarga* (M.)**- Drum.

***Kāsa-gīrī* (P.)**- Ritual offering of a bowl of wine.

***Keshig* (M.)**- Personal guard corps and employment pool of Chinggis, extended later and adopted by successor khanates, as well as later dynasties.

***Keshigten* (M.)**- Member of elite household guard, the *keshig*.

***Khan/qan* (T/M.)**- A ruler chosen by steppe elites to rule over several groups of people.

***Khānaqāh* (P.)**- Sufi lodge.

***Khaṭ* (A/P.)**- Writing, but in the Mongol period often referred to a written pledge, equivalent to the *möchelge*.

***Khatun* (T/M.)**- Royal woman.

***Khil'a* (A/P.)**- Robe of honour, often given by a ruler to a subordinate.

***Khuṭba* (A/P.)**- Friday sermon in which the ruler's name is mentioned.

***Khvarna/khwarrah* (P.)**- Avestan term for divine favour, its New Persian synonym is *farr*.

***Kö'ün* (M.)**- Son, regularly used to refer to Chinggisid princes.

***Kumiss* (T.)**- The commonly used term for fermented mare's milk, the favoured alcoholic beverage of the Mongols.

***Malik* (A/P.)**- King, though often not the highest ruler.

***Mamlūk* (A/P.)**- Slave soldier, also the name of the dynasty which ruled over Egypt and Syria from the mid-13th century to early 16th.

***Mingghan* (M.)**- Unit of 1,000 troops, regularly referred to in Persian sources as a *hazāra*.

***Möchelge* (M.)**- Written pledge.

***Muḥtasham* (A/P.)**- A noble.

***Mulāzim* (A/P.)**- Courtier, servant of the ruler.

***Nasab* (A/P.)**- Lineage.

***Nisba* (A/P.)**- A name related to the geographical background of a person or their family, thus someone from the city of Samarqand would have the *nisba* Samarqandī.

***Nökör/nöker* (M.)**- Faithful companion, especially to Chinggis.

***Noyan* (pl. *noyat*) (M.)**- Commander, equivalent to Arabo-Persian amir.

***Nuzūl* (A/P.)**- A type of tax/gift to a guest or traveller.

***Oghul* (T.)**- Turkic equivalent of *kö'ün*, used for royal princes.

***Ordu* (T/M.)**- Turco-Mongol term for a tent camp. Origin of the word 'horde' in English.

***Otchigin* (M.)**- Keeper of the hearth. The youngest son of the chief wife, who received his father's lands and often wives.

***Ötök* (T/M.)**- Ritual offering of wine, request made to a superior.

***Pādshāh/pādishāh* (P.)**- Emperor, supreme *shah*.

***Paiza* (M/C.)**- From the Chinese 牌子 *páizi*. Passport/badge of office used in the Mongol world to convey authority. Made of gold, silver, or wood.

***Qa'an/qaghan* (T/M.)**- Imperial version of the term khan/qan, going back to the Türk Empire who used *qaghan* for their rulers.

***Qarachu/qarachi* (M.)**- Commoner, to distinguish from the Chinggisid family. In the later Jochid *ulus*, there were four *qarachi beg*s, non-Chinggisid amirs who formed a ruling council.

***Qāżī* (A/P.)**- Religious judge, often also a political leader.

***Quriltai* (T/M.)**- The seasonal gathering of Mongol notables, part feast, part parliament, and part coronation ceremony. All key Mongol stakeholders took part.

***Qut* (T.)**- Divine favour. This term was used by the early Türk dynasty, and later by others.

***Shaykh* (A/P.)**- Sufi leader, holy man.

***Shiḥna* (A/P.)**- Governor/mayor/sheriff for a conquering dynasty, used by the Qara Khitai, adopted by the Mongols. Largely equivalent to Turkic *basqaq* and Mongol *darughachi*.

***Sikka* (A/P.)**- Coinage, along with *khuṭba* used to legitimize a ruler in the Muslim world.

***Sinf* (A/P.)**- Professional class.

***Soyurghal* (T/M.)**- Royal favour, later came to mean a tax-free land grant among the post-Ilkhanid dynasties.

***Soyurghamīshī* (T/M.)**- The act of a ruler's bestowal of favour, in the form of gifts, lands, titles etc. on a loyal follower.

***Suu* (M.)**- The Mongolian form of *qut*, divine favour, though the Mongols also made use of the word *qut*.

***Tamgha* (T/M.)**- A seal or stamp, often in the form of a symbol or animal, which could represent a Mongol ruler. The imperial seal was red (*al tamgha*). It also came to mean the tax on commerce in the Mongol and Timurid empires.

***Tamma* (M.)**- Garrison troops in frontier areas, which often became independent entities.

***Tangsuq* (M.)**- Precious/rare things, tribute.

***Darqan* (Persianised form: *tarkhan*) (M.)**- Hereditary position given by the ruler, allowing the receiver to be pardoned for up to nine crimes, and tax exempt status. Also a title attached to that person and their family.

***Tikishmīshī* (T/M.)**- The act of giving gifts to a ruler and performing obeisance.

***Törü/töre* (T/M.)**- Turco-Mongol term for customary law or principles.

***Toy* (M.)**- Banquet, feast, celebration.

***Tugh* (T/M.)**- Standard, usually made from yak or horse tails.

***Tümen* (M.)**- Unit of 10,000 men.

***Tuzghu* (M.)**- Food provisions.

***Üge baraldu* (M.)**- To give one's word in an oath.

***Uljāmīshī/huljāmīshī* (M.)**- Going out to meet a ruler, usually to submit or to ask forgiveness.

***Ulus* (M.)**- The appanage, grazing grounds and people allotted to a Chinggisid family member.

***Ulus ejen* (M.)**- Lord of the *ulus*.

***Urugh* (M.)**- Family, lineage. *Altan urugh* refers to the 'Golden Lineage' of Chinggis Khan.

***Vaqf/waqf* (A/P.)**- Land set aside for pious purposes, a religious endowment.

***Wāfidiyya* (A.)**- Literally 'those coming, arriving in a group'. Used to refer to the bands of Mongol refugees from the Jochid *ulus* or the Ilkhanate who defected to the Mamluk Sultanate in the 13th century.

***Yeke Mongghol Ulus* (M.)**- The united Mongol Empire.

***Yeke törü/yosun*-** 'The Great Principle', governing loyalty obligations between a lord and his servants.

***Yosun* (M.)**- Custom.

***Yurt* (T/M.)**- A tent, but also more generally an appanage and grazing territory.

***Zhōng* 忠 (C.)**- Confucian idea of undying loyalty to a dynasty.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Al-Ahrī, Abū Bakr al-Quṭbī, *Ta'rikh-i Shaikh Uwais (History of Shaikh Uwais): An Important Source for the History of Adharbaijan in the Fourteenth Century* (trans.) , J.B. van Loon ('s-Gravenhage: Excelsior, 1954).

Bar Hebraeus, Gregory Abū'l Farāj, *The Chronography of Gregory Abû'l Faraj, the Son of Aaron, The Hebrew Physician Commonly Known as Bar Hebraeus, Being The First Part of His Political History of the World*, (trans.) E.A. Wallis Budge, Vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 1932).

Dūghlāt, Mīrzā Muḥammad Ḥaidar, *A History of the Moghuls of Central Asia, being the Tarikh-i Rashidi of Mirza Muhammad Haidar, Dughlat* (ed.) N. Elias, (trans.) E. Denison Ross, (London, 1972).

Grigor of Akanc', *History of the Nation of the Archers by Grigor of Akanc' Hitherto Ascribed to Matak'ia the Monk* (trans. and ed. R.P. Blake and R.N. Frye) *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 12, Nos. 3 and 4, (Dec., 1949) pp. 269-399.

- *History of the Nation of Archers,* (trans.) R. Bedrosian, http://www.attalus.org/armenian/ga1.htm#8. Accessed 25th May 2021.

Het'um the Historian, *History of the Tartars, [The Flower of Histories of the East]*, (trans.) R. Bedrosian, http://www.attalus.org/armenian/hetumtoc.html, Accessed 20th December 2020.

Ibn al-Āthīr, *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athīr for the Crusading Period from* al-Kāmil fi'l-ta'rīkh: *Part 3, The Years 589-629/1193-1231: The Ayyubids after Saladin and the Mongol Menace* (trans.) D.S. Richards, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *The Travels of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, A.D. 1325-1354* (trans.) H.A.R. Gibb, Vols. 1-4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958).

Ibn Fadlān, Ahmad, *Mission to the Volga* (trans.) J.E. Montgomery, (New York: New York University Press, 2017).

John of Plano Carpini, 'The long and wonderfull voyage of Frier John de Plano Carpini, Anno 1246', (ed.) R. Hakluyt, in *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation In Twelve Volumes, Volume I*, (London: MacMillan and Co., 1903), Online Edition, (Cambridge University Press, 2014).

Juvainī, 'Aṭā Malik, *Tārīkh-i Jahāngushā*, (ed.) Mohammad Qazvini, (Tehran: Dunya-yi Ketab, 2011).

Juvaini, 'Ala-ad-Din 'Ata Malik, *The History of the World-Conqueror*, (trans.) J.A. Boyle, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958).

Jūzjānī, Maulana Minhaj-ud-Din Abu-Umar-i-Usman, *Tabakat-i Nasiri: A General History of the Muhammadan Dynasties of Asia, Including Hindustan; from A.H. 194 (810 A.D.) to A.H. 658 (1260 A.D.) and the Irruption of the Infidel Mughals into Islam* (ed. and trans.) H.G. Raverty Vol. II (New Delhi, 1970).

Kirakos Ganjakets'i, *Kirakos Ganjakets'i's History of the Armenians,* (trans.) R. Bedrosian, http://www.attalus.org/armenian/kgtoc.html, Accessed 25th May 2021.

'Le Chapitre CVII du Yuan Che', (trans.) L. Hambis, *T'oung Pao*, Vol. 38-Supplement, (1945), pp. 1-181.

'Letters to the Khans: Six Tibetan Epistles of Togdugpa to the Mongol Rulers Hulegu and Khubilai, as well as to the Tibetan Lama Pagpa', (trans.) J. Samten and D. Martin, in (ed.) R. Vitali, *Trails of the Tibetan Tradition: Papers for Elliot Sperling,* (Dharamsala: Amnye Machen Institute, 2015). Republished in *Revue d'Études Tibétaines*, Vol. 31, (2015), pp. 298-323.

Marco Polo, *The Travels of Marco Polo*, (trans.) L.F. Benedetto, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), First Published 1931.

Qāżī Bayżāvī, (trans.) C. Melville, 'From Adam to Abaqa: Qādī Baidāwī's Rearrangement of History (Part II)', *Studia Iranica*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2007) pp. 7-64.

Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-tavārīkh*, (*Tārīkh-i Mubārak-i Ghāzānī)* (ed.) Mohammad Raushan and Mostafa Mousavi (Tehran: Mīrāṣ-i Maktūb*,* 1395/2016).

Rashiduddin Fazlullah, *Jamiʿu't-Tawarikh, Compendium of Chronicles: A History of the Mongols,* (trans.) W.M. Thackston (Harvard, MA: The Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, 1999).

Riccoldo da Montecroce, *A Christian Pilgrim in Medieval Iraq: Riccoldo Da Montecroce's Encounter with Islam*, (ed. and trans.) R. George-Tvrtkovic, (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012).

Shīrāzī, Quṭb al-Dīn, *The Mongols in Iran: Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī's Akhbār-i Moghūlān* (trans.) G. Lane, (London and New York: Routledge, 2018).

Simon of Saint-Quentin, *Simon of Saint-Quentin: History of the Tartars*, (ed. and trans.) S. Pow, T. Kiss, A. Romsics, and F. Ghazaryan, www.simonofstquentin.org, Accessed 25th November 2020.

'The Biography of Ruizong, 睿宗, *Yuanshi* 115.2885-87', (trans.) G. Humble, Unpublished, pp. 1-4.

'The Biography of Yelu Chucai, *Yuanshi*, 146.3455-65', (trans.) G. Humble, Unpublished, pp. 1-14.

The History of the Yuan, Chapter 1, (ed. and trans.) C.P. Atwood, *Mongolian Studies,* Vol. 39, (2017/18) pp. 2-80.

The History of Yuan Dynasty, Vols. 1-4, (eds.) Q. Zhang and C. Yao, (Taipei: The National War College, 1966-7).

The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries (ed.) C. Dawson, (London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955).

The Monks of Kublai Khan, Emperor of China: Medieval Travels from China through Central Asia to Persia and Beyond, (trans.) Sir E. A. Wallis Budge, New Introduction by D. Morgan, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014).

The Rise of the Mongols: Five Chinese Sources (ed. and trans.) C.P. Atwood, (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2021).

The Secret History of the Mongols: A Mongolian Epic Chronicle of the Thirteenth Century, (trans.) I. de Rachewiltz, (Leiden: Brill, 2004).

The Vinland Map and the Tartar Relation, (ed.) R.A. Skelton, T. E. Marston and G. D. Painter, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965).

Ṭūsī, Naṣīr al-Dīn, 'Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī on Finance', (ed. and trans.) M. Minovi and V. Minorsky, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, Vol 10, Issue 3, (Oct. 1940), pp. 755-789.

Vardan Arewelts'i, *Vardan Arewelts'i's Compilation of History,* (trans.) R. Bedrosian, http://www.attalus.org/armenian/vaint.htm, Accessed 30th March 2020.

Vaṣṣāf-i Hażrat, ‘Abd Allāh b. Fażl Allāh, *Taḥrīr-i Tārīkh-i Vaṣṣāf*, (ed.) Abd al-Muhammad Ayati (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Bunyād-i Farhang-i Iran, 1346/1967-68).

Vaṣṣāf Shīrāzī, Shihāb al-Dīn ‘Abd-Allāh, *Tārīkh-i Vaṣṣāf*, (ed.) Muḥammad Iqbal, (Lahore: Karīmī Press, 1929).

‘Yuanshi Annals (benji 本紀) for Shizu 世祖 (Qubilai Qa’an) Part Two (1260)’, (trans.) G. Humble, Unpublished, pp. 1-9.

Secondary Sources

Abedi, Mahmoud, '*Kāsa giriftan'*, in *Nashriyya-yi Zabān va Adabīyāt-i Fārsī* (Journal of Persian Language and Literature), Nos. 9, 10, and 11, (Summer, Autumn and Winter 1374/1995), pp. 89-104.

Abou El Fadl, Khaled, *Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Aigle, Denise, 'The Letters of Eljigidei, Hülegü and Abaqa: Mongol overtures or Christian Ventriloquism?', *Inner Asia*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (2005), pp. 143-162.

Algazi, Gadi, Valentin Groebner, and Bernhard Jussen, *Negotiating the Gift: Pre-Modern Figurations of Exchange* (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003).

Allouche, Adel, 'Tegüder's Ultimatum to Qalawun', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 22, (1990), pp. 437-446.

Allsen, Thomas T., 'A Note on Mongol Imperial Ideology', in (eds.) V. Rybatzki, A. Pozzi, P.W. Geier and J.R. Krueger, *The Early Mongols: Language, Culture and History, Studies in Honor of Igor de Rachewiltz*, (Bloomington, IN: Denis Sinor Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 1-8.

-*Commodity and Exchange in the Mongol Empire: A Cultural History of Islamic Textiles*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

-*Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

- *Mongol Imperialism: The Policies of the Grand Qan Möngke in China, Russia, and The Islamic Lands, 1251-1259* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987).

-'Robing in the Mongolian Empire', in (ed.) S. Gordon, *Robes and Honor: The Medieval World of Investiture*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 305-313.

- 'The Princes of the Left Hand: An Introduction to the History of the *Ulus* of Orda in the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries', *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, Vol. 5, (1987), pp. 5-40.

- 'The Rise of the Mongolian Empire and Mongolian Rule in North China', in (eds.) H. Franke and D. Twitchett, *The Cambridge History of China,* Vol. 6, *Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 321-413.

- *The Royal Hunt in Eurasian History,* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).

- *The Steppe and the Sea: Pearls in the Mongol Empire*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019).

Amitai-Preiss, Reuven, 'Ghazan, Islam and Mongol Tradition: A View from the Mamlūk Sultanate', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,* Vol. 59, (1996), pp. 1-10.

-'Mongol Imperial Ideology and the Ilkhanid War against the Mamluks', in (eds.) R. Amitai-Preiss and D. Morgan, *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 57-72.

-'The Mongol Occupation of Damascus in 1300: A Study of Mamluk Loyalties', in (eds.) A Levanoni and M. Winter, *The Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society*, (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 21-41.

Arom, Na'ama O., 'Arrowheads of Hülegü Khan: Envoys and Diplomacy in His Invasion of the Middle East, 1255–1262', in (eds.) T. May, D. Bayarsaikhan, and C.P. Atwood, *New Approaches to Ilkhanid History*, (Leiden: Brill, 2021), pp. 249-271.

Atwood, Christopher P., *Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire*, (New York: Facts on File, 2004).

-'Historiography and transformation of ethnic identity in the Mongol Empire: the Öng'üt case', *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol. 15, No. 4, (2014), pp. 514-534.

-'Jochi and the Early Western Campaigns', in (ed.) M. Rossabi, *How Mongolia Matters: War, Law, and Society*, (Leiden: Brill, 2017), pp. 35-56.

-'Mongols, Arabs, Kurds and Franks: Rashīd al-Dīn's Comparative Ethnography of Tribal Society', in (eds.) A. Akasoy, C. Burnett and R. Yoeli-Tlalim, *Rashīd al-Dīn. Agent and Mediator of Cultural Exchanges in Ilkhanid Iran*, (London: The Warburg Institute, 2013), pp. 223-250.

-'Pu'a's Boast and Doqolqu's Death: Historiography of a Hidden Scandal in the Mongol Conquest of the Jin', *Journal of Song-Yuan Studies*, Vol. 45, (2015), pp. 239-278.

-'Rashīd al-Dīn's Ghazanid Chronicle and Its Mongolian Sources', in (eds.) T. May, D. Bayarsaikhan, C.P. Atwood, *New Approaches to Ilkhanid History*, (Leiden: Brill, 2021), pp. 53-121.

- 'Six Pre-Chinggisid Genealogies in the Mongol Empire', *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, Vol. 19, (2012), pp. 5-58.

- 'The Date of the 'Secret History of the Mongols' Reconsidered', *Journal of Song-Yuan Studies,* No. 37 (2007), pp. 1-48.

-'*Ulus* Emirs, *Keshig* Elders, Signatures, and Marriage Partners: The Evolution of a Classic Mongol Institution', in (ed.) D. Sneath, *Imperial Statecraft: Political Forms and Techniques of Governance in Inner Asia, Sixth-Twentieth Centuries*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 141-174.

Ayalon, David, 'The Great Yāsa of Chingiz Khān: A Reexamination (Part C2). Al-Maqrīzī's Passage on the Yāsa under the Mamluks', *Studia Islamica*, Vol. 38, (1973), pp. 107-156.

Baumann, Brian, 'Whither the Ocean? The *Talu Dalai* in Sultan Öljeitü's 1305 Letter to Philip the Fair of France', *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, Vol. 19, (2012), pp. 59-80.

Bastug, Sharon, 'Tribe, Confederation and State among Altaic Nomads of the Asian Steppes', in (ed.) K. Erturk, *Rethinking Central Asia: Non-Eurocentric Studies in History, Social Structure and Identity*, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1999), pp. 77-110.

Bernardini, Michele, 'The Mongol puppet lords and the Qarawnas', in (eds) R. Hillenbrand, A.C.S. Peacock and F. Abdullaeva, *Ferdowsi, the Mongols and the History of Iran: Art, Literature and Culture from Early Islam to Qajar Persia*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), pp. 169-176.

Biran, Michal, 'Baghdād under Mongol Rule, in (eds.) J. Scheiner and I. Toral-Niehoff, *Baghdad: From Its Beginnings to the 14th Century*, (Leiden: Brill, 2022), pp. 285-315.

-*Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia*, (Richmond: Curzon, 1997).

-'The Battle of Herat (1270): A Case of Inter-Mongol Warfare', in (ed.) N. Di Cosmo, *Warfare in Inner Asian History*, (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 175-219.

- 'The Chaghadaids and Islam: The Conversion of Tarmashirin Khan', *Journal of the American Oriental Society,* Vol. 122, No. 4 (2002), pp. 742-752.

- 'The Mongols in Central Asia from Chinggis Khan's Invasion to the rise of Temür: the Ögödeid and Chaghadaid realms', in (eds.) N. Di Cosmo, A.J. Frank and P.B. Golden, *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 46-66.

-'The Qara Khitai', *Oxford Research Encyclopedia for Asian History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 1-21.

- 'True to their Ways: Why the Qara Khitai Did Not Convert to Islam', in (eds.) R. Amitai and M. Biran, *Mongols, Turks and Others: Nomads and the Sedentary World*, (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 175-200.

Birge, Bettine, *Marriage and the Law in the Age of Khubilai Khan*: *Cases from the* Yuan dianzhang, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017).

Birtalan, Agnes, 'Rituals of Sworn Brotherhood (Mong. anda bol-, Oir. and, ax düü bol-) in Mongol Historic and Epic Tradition', *Chronica: Annual of the Institute of History, University Szeged*, Vols.7-8 (2007-2008), pp. 44-56.

Blair, Sheila S., 'The Mongol Capital of Sulṭāniyya, "The Imperial"', *Iran*, Vol. 24, (1986), pp. 139-152.

Bolhasani, Seyed S.D. and Jalil Tajlil, 'A Brief Introduction to the Book of Tarikh-i Vassaf and Its Author', *Journal of Basic and Applied Scientific Research*, Vol. 3, No. 4, (2013), pp. 963-967.

Bosworth, Clifford E., 'Ṭabaqāt-e Nāṣeri', *Encyclopædia Iranica*, Online, https://iranicaonline.org/articles/tabaqat-naseri%20, Accessed 10th March 2022.

Bosworth, Clifford E., Peter M. Holt, Pedro Chalmeta, Peter A. Andrews, and John Burton-Page, 'Miẓalla', in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, Online Edition (2012), http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0757, Accessed 11th February 2022.

Bosworth, Clifford E., Robert E. Darley-Doran, and G.S.P. Freeman-Greenville, 'Sikka', in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_1076, Accessed 9th April 2021.

Boyle, John A., 'On the Titles Given in J̌uvainī to Certain Mongolian Princes', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2, (1956), pp. 146-154.

Brack, Jonathan, 'A Mongol Mahdi in Medieval Anatolia: Rebellion, Reform, and Divine Right in the Post-Mongol Islamic World', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 139, No. 3, (2019), pp. 611-629.

-'Mediating Sacred Kingship: Conversion and Sovereignty in Mongol Iran', PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2016.

- 'Theologies of Auspicious Kingship: The Islamization of Chinggisid Sacral Kingship in the Islamic World', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 60, No.4, (2018), pp. 1143-1171.

Broadbridge, Anne, *Kingship and Ideology in the Islamic and Mongol Worlds*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

-*Women and the Making of the Mongol Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

Buell, Paul D., 'Činqai', in (eds.) I. de Rachewiltz, H. Chan, H. Ch'i-ch'ing and P.W. Geier, *In the Service of the Khan: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period (1200-1300),* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993), pp. 95-111.

-'Sino-Khitan Administration in Mongol Bukhara', *Journal of Asian History*, Vol. 24, No. 2, (1979), pp. 121-151.

-*The A to Z of the Mongol World Empire*, (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2003).

- 'Yeh-lü A-hai, Yeh-lü T'u-hua', in (eds.) I. de Rachewiltz, H. Chan, H. Ch'i-ch'ing and P.W. Geier, *In the Service of the Khan: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period (1200-1300),* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993), pp. 112-121.

Buell, Paul D. and Judith Kolbas, 'The Ethos of State and Society in the Early Mongol Empire: Chinggis Khan to Güyük', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 26, Nos. 1-2, (2016), pp. 43-64.

Ch'en, Paul H., *Chinese Legal Tradition under the Mongols*: *The Code of 1291 as Reconstructed*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).

Clauson, Gerard, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth Century Turkish*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).

Cleaves, Francis W., '*Aqa Minu*', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 24, (1962-1963), pp. 64-81.

De Bruijn, Johannes T.P., 'Rind', *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, Online, http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_6300, Accessed 20th May 2022.

Dencher, Alexander, 'Comemmorating Conquest: The triumphal entry of William III of Orange, King of England, into The Hague in 1691', PhD Thesis, Leiden University, 2020.

De Nicola, Bruno, 'Pādshāh Khatun: An Example of Architectural, Religious, and Literary Patronage in Ilkhanid Iran', in (eds.) M. Biran, J. Brack and F. Fiaschetti, Along *the Silk Roads in Mongol Eurasia:*

Generals, Merchants and Intellectuals, (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2020), pp. 270-289.

-'The Queen of the Chaghatayids: Orghīna Khātūn and the rule of Central Asia', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* Vol. 26, Nos. 1-2, (2016), pp. 107-120.

-*Women in Mongol Iran: The Khatuns, 1206-1335* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017).

De Rachewiltz, Igor, 'Qan, Qa'an and the Seal of Güyüg', *East Asian History*, Vol. 43, (2019), pp. 95-100.

-'The Dating of the *Secret History of the Mongols*- A Re-interpretation', *Ural-altaische Jahrbücher / Zeitschriftenband* (2008), pp. 150-184.

-'Muqali, Bōl, Tas, An-t'ung', in (eds.) I. de Rachewiltz, H. Chan, H. Ch'i-ch'ing and P.W. Geier, *In the Service of the Khan: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period (1200-1300),* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993), pp. 3-12.

-'Was Töregene Qatun Ögödei's "Sixth Empress"?', *East Asian History*, Nos. 17-18, (1999), pp. 71-76.

-'Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, Yeh-lü Chu, Yeh-lü Hsi-liang', in (eds.) I. de Rachewiltz, H. Chan, H. Ch'i-ch'ing and P.W. Geier, *In the Service of the Khan: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period (1200-1300),* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993), pp. 136-175.

- 'Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (1189-1243): Buddhist Idealist and Confucian Statesman', in (eds.) A. Wright and D. Twitchett, *Confucian Personalities*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 189-216.

De Rachewiltz, Igor, Hok-Lam Chan, Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing and Peter W. Geier (eds.), *In the Service of the Khan: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period (1200-1300),* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993).

DeWeese, Devin, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tükles and Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition*. (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994).

-'Islamization in the Mongol Empire', in (eds.) N. Di Cosmo, A.J. Frank and P.B. Golden, *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 120-134.

-''Stuck in the Throat of Chingiz Khan:' Envisioning the Mongol Conquests in Some Sufi Accounts from the 14th to 17th Centuries', in (eds.) J. Pfeiffer, S.A. Quinn, E. Tucker, and J.E. Woods, *History and historiography of post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East: studies in honor of John E. Woods*, (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006), pp. 23-61.

Doerfer, Gerhard, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen,* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1963).

Duara, Prasenjit, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

Endicott-West, Elizabeth, 'Imperial Governance in Yüan Times', First Published, *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 46, No, 2, (1986), pp. 523-549, in (eds.) D. Sneath and C. Kaplonski, *The History of Mongolia*, *Vol I: The Pre-Chinggisid Era, Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Empire* (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2010), pp. 478-496.

Favereau, Marie, *The Horde: How the Mongols Changed the World*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2021).

Flaig, Egon, 'Is Loyalty a Favor? or: Why Gifts cannot oblige an Emperor', in (eds.) G. Algazi, V. Groebner, and B. Jussen, *Negotiating the Gift: Pre-Modern Figurations of Exchange* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), pp. 29-62.

Franke, Herbert, 'From tribal chieftain to universal emperor and god: The legitimation of the Yüan Dynasty', in *Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte 2, Munich, 1978,* reproduced in H. Franke, *China under Mongol Rule*, (Aldershot: Variorum, 1994) Number IV, pp. 3-85.

Frankel, Yehoshua, 'The Turks of the Eurasian Steppes in Medieval Arabic Writing', in (eds.) R. Amitai and M. Biran, *Mongols, Turks and Others: Nomads and the Sedentary World*, (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 201-241.

Golden, Peter B., *Central Asia in World History*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

-'"I will give the people unto thee": The Činggisid Conquests and Their Aftermath in the Turkic World', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 10, Issue 1, (2000), pp. 21-41.

-'Imperial Ideology and the Sources of Political Unity amongst the Pre-Chinggisid Nomads of Western Eurasia', *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, Vol. 2, (1982), pp. 37-76.

Golev, Konstantin, 'Intra-Mongol Diplomacy and Witch-Hunt during the Dissolution of the Empire: the Witchcraft Trial at the Court of Hülegü', *Eurasian Studies*, Vol. 17, (2019), pp. 327-368.

Gommans, Jos and Said Reza Huseini, 'Neoplatonism and the Pax Mongolica in the making of ṣulḥ-i kull. A view from Akbar's millennial history', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 56, No. 3, (2022), pp. 870-901.

Gordon, Stewart, 'In the Aura of the King: Trans-Asian, Trans-Regional, and Deccani Royal Symbolism', *South Asian Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1, (2016), pp. 42-53.

Grodzins, Morton, *The Loyal and the Disloyal*: *Social Boundaries of Patriotism and Treason*, (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing Company, 1956).

Gronbech, Kaare, 'The Turkish System of Kingship' *Studia Orientalia Ionna Pedersen dicata*, (Copenhagen: Eingar Munksgaard, 1953), pp. 124-129.

Haider, Mansura, 'The Revolt of Mahmud Tarabi and the Sarbadar Movement', *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, Vol. 52, (1991), pp. 939-949.

Haider, Najam, *Shīʿī Islam, An Introduction*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

Halperin, Charles J., 'Muscovite Political Institutions in the 14th Century', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History,* Vol. 1, No. 2, (2000), pp. 237-257.

Hambly, Gavin R. G., 'From Baghdad to Bukhara, from Ghazna to Delhi: The *khil'a* Ceremony in the Transmission of Kingly Pomp and Circumstance', in (ed.) S. Gordon, *Robes and Honor: The Medieval World of Investiture*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 193-223.

Harrak, Amir and Niu Ruji, 'The Uighur Inscription at the Mausoleum of Mār Behnam, Iraq', *Journal of the Canadian Society for Syriac Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (2004), pp. 66-72.

Hodous, Florence, 'Faith and the Law: Religious Beliefs and the Death Penalty in the Ilkhanate', in (eds.) C. Melville and B. de Nicola, *The Mongols' Middle East : continuity and transformation in Ilkhanid Iran,* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 106-129.

-'The *Quriltai* as a Legal Institution in the Mongol Empire', *Central Asiatic Journal*, Vol. 56 (2012/2013), pp. 87-102.

Holmgren, Jennifer, 'Observations on Marriage and Inheritances Practices in Early Mongol and Yüan Society, with Particular Reference to the Levirate', *Journal of Asian History*, Vol. 20, (1986), pp. 127-192.

Hope, Michael, '*El* and *Bulqa*: Between order and chaos in the formative years of the Mongol Empire (1206-1259)', Forthcoming.

- *Power, Politics and Tradition in the Mongol Empire and the Īlkhānate of Iran* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

- 'The *Atābaks* in the Mongol Empire and the Ilkhanate of Iran (602–736/1206–1335)' in (eds.) T. May, D. Bayarsaikhan and C.P. Atwood, *New Approaches to Ilkhanid History*, (Leiden: Brill, 2021), pp. 321-345.

-'The "Nawrūz King": the rebellion of Amir Nawrūz in Khurasan (688-694/1289-94) and its implications for the Ilkhan polity at the end of the thirteenth century', *Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies,* Vol. 78, (2015), pp. 451-473.

-'The Political Configuration of Late Ilkhanid Iran: A Case Study of the Chubanid Amirate (738–758/1337–1357)', *Iran*, (2021) DOI: 10.1080/05786967.2021.1889930, pp. 1-18.

- 'The Transmission of Authority through the *Quriltai*s of the Early Mongol Empire and the Īlkhānate of Iran (1227-1335)', *Mongolian Studies*, Vol. 34, (2012), pp. 87-115.

Hsiao, Ch'i-Ch'ing, 'Yen Shih', in (eds.) I. de Rachewiltz, H. Chan, H. Ch'i-ch'ing and P.W. Geier, *In the Service of the Khan: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period (1200-1300),* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993), pp. 60-74.

Humble, Geoffrey, 'Narrating Female Rule at the Mongol Court: Juwaynī and Rashīd al-Dīn on Töregene Qatun', Unpublished.

Humphrey, Caroline and Altanhuu Hurelbaatar, 'The term *törü* in Mongolian History', in (ed.) D. Sneath, *Imperial Statecraft: Political Forms and Techniques of Governance in Inner Asia, Sixth-Twentieth Centuries*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 265-293.

-'Regret as a Political Intervention: An Essay in the Historical Anthropology of the Early Mongols', *Past & Present*, Vol. 186, (2005), pp. 3-46.

Jackson, Peter, 'From *Ulus* to Khanate: The Making of the Mongol States c. 1220-c.1290', in (eds.) R. Amitai-Preiss and D. Morgan, *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 12-38.

-'Mongol Khans and Religious Allegiance: The Problems Confronting a Minister-Historian in Ilkhanid Iran', *Iran*, Vol. 47, No. 1, (2009), pp. 109-122.

-'Reflections on the Islamization of Mongol Khans in Comparative Perspective', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient,* Vol. 62, (2019), pp. 356-387.

-'The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire', First published in *Central Asiatic Journal*, Vol. 22, (1978), pp. 186-244., Reprinted in (eds.) D. Sneath and C. Kaplonski, *The History of Mongolia,* Vol. 1, (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2010), pp. 315-357.

-*The Mongols and the Islamic World: From Conquest to Conversion*, (Cumberland: Yale University Press, 2017).

-The Mongols of Central Asia and the Qara'unas', *Iran*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (2018), pp. 91-103.

Jahn, Karl, 'Paper Currency in Iran: A contribution to the cultural and economic history of Iran in the Mongol Period', *Journal of Asian History*, Vol. 4, No. 2, (1970), pp. 101-135.

James, Boris, 'Mamluk and Mongol Peripheral Politics: Asserting Sovereignty in the Middle East's 'Kurdish Zone' (1260–1330)' in (eds.) C. Melville and B. de Nicola, *The Mongols' Middle East : continuity and transformation in Ilkhanid Iran,* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 277-305.

Jones, Linda G., *The Power of Oratory in the Medieval Muslim World*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012).

Jones, Tobias, 'The Objects of Loyalty in the Early Mongol Empire (Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries)', *Iran*, (2021), DOI: 10.1080/05786967.2021.1915701, pp. 1-25.

Kamola, Stefan, *Making Mongol History: Rashid al-Din and the* Jamiʿ al-Tawarikh, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019).

-'Rashīd al-Dīn and the making of history in Mongol Iran', PhD Thesis, University of Washington, 2013.

Khazanov, Anatoly M., *Nomads and the Outside World* (trans.) J. Crookenden, 2nd Edition (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994).

Kim, Hodong, 'A Reappraisal of Güyüg Khan', in (eds.) R. Amitai and M. Biran, *Mongols, Turks, and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World*, (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 309-338.

- 'A Re-examination of the 'Register of Thousands (*hazāra*)' in the *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*', in (eds.) A. Akasoy, C. Burnett and R. Yoeli-Tlalim, *Rashīd al-Dīn. Agent and Mediator of Cultural Exchanges in Ilkhanid Iran*, (London: The Warburg Institute, 2013), pp. 89-114.

- Formation and Changes of *Ulus*es in the Mongol Empire', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, Vol. 62, (2019), pp. 269-317.

-'The Unity of the Mongol Empire and Continental Exchanges over Eurasia', *Journal of Central Eurasian Studies,* Vol. 1, (2009), pp. 15-42.

-'울루스인가 칸국인가 — 몽골제국의 카안과 칸 칭호의 분석을 중심으로 —' ('*Ulus* or *Khanate*?: An Analysis of the Titles of *qa'an* and *khan* in the Mongol Empire'), in 중앙아시아연구 21권2호 (*Central Asian Studies,* Vol. 21, No. 2,) (December 2016), pp. 1-29.

Kolbas, Judith, 'A Dirham for Your Drinking Cup: Calculating Monetary Value', in (eds.) T. May, D. Bayarsaikhan, C.P. Atwood, *New Approaches to Ilkhanid History*, (Leiden: Brill, 2021), pp. 198-207.

-*The Mongols in Iran: Chingiz Khan to Uljaytu, 1220-1309*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).

Komaroff, Linda, *Gifts of the Sultan: The Arts of Giving at the Islamic Courts*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011).

Krader, Benjamin, *Social Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Pastoral Nomads*, (The Hague: Mouton & Co, 1963).

Krawulsky, Dorothea, *The Mongol Īlkhāns and their Vizier Rashīd al-Dīn* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang AG, 2011).

Lambton, Anne, *Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia: Aspects of Administrative, Economic and Social History, 11th-14th Century*, (London: Tauris, 1988).

-"Dārūg̲ha", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, Online, <http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_1728>, Accessed 22nd March 2021.

-'"*Pīshkash*": Present or Tribute?', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, Vol. 57, No. I, (1994), pp. 145-158.

Landa, Ishayahu, 'New Light on Early Mongol Islamisation: The Case of Arghun Aqa's Family', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* Vol. 28, No. 1, (2018), pp. 77-100.

Lane, George, *Daily Life in the Mongol Empire*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006).

-*Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran: A Persian Renaissance*, (London: Routledge, 2003).

-'Intellectual jousting and the Chinggisid Wisdom Bazaars', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 26, Nos. 1-2, (2016), pp. 235-247.

-'Jovayni, 'Alā' al-Din', *Encyclopædia Iranica*, Online, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/jovayni-ala-al-din , Accessed 19th January 2022.

-'Mongol News: The Akhbār-i Moghulān dar Anbāneh Quṭb by *Quṭb al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Mas'ūd Shīrāzī*', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 22, Nos. 3-4, (2012), pp. 541-559.

Levi Della Vida, Giorgio, 'Kh̲āri.d̲jites', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition,* Online Edition, (2012) http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0497, Accessed 7th March 2022.

Manz, Beatrice F., 'Gowhar-šād Āg̲ā', *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, Online, https://iranicaonline.org/articles/gowhar-sad-aga, Accessed 31st March 2022.

-'Temür and the problem of a conqueror's legacy', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 8, (1998), pp. 21-41.

May, Timothy, 'Commercial Queens: Mongolian Khatuns and the Silk Road', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* Vol. 26, (2016), pp. 89-106.

-*The Mongol Empire: A Historical Encyclopedia*, Vol. I, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2017).

-'The Ilkhanate and Afghanistan', in (eds.) T. May, D. Bayarsaikhan, and C.P. Atwood, *New Approaches to Ilkhanid History*, (Leiden: Brill, 2021), pp. 272-320.

Mazor, Amir, 'Sayf al-Dīn Qipchaq al-Manṣūrī: Defection and Ethnicity between Mongols and Mamluks', in (eds.) M. Biran, J. Brack and F. Fiaschetti, *Along the Silk Roads in Mongol Eurasia:*

Generals, Merchants and Intellectuals, (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2020), pp. 102-119.

Melville, Charles, 'Abū Saʿīd and the Revolt of the Amirs in 1319', in (ed.) D. Aigle, *L'Iran face à la domination mongole*, (Tehran: Institut Français de Recherche en Iran, 1997), pp. 89-120.

-'From Adam to Abaqa: Qādī Baidāwī's Rearrangement of History', *Studia Iranica*, Vol. 30, No. 1, (2001), pp. 67-86.

- '*Pādshāh-i Islām*: The Conversion of Sultan Maḥmūd Ghāzān Khān', *Pembroke Papers*, Vol. I, (1990), pp. 159-177.

-'The Early Persian Historiography of Anatolia', in (eds.) J. Pfeiffer, S.A. Quinn, E. Tucker, and J.E. Woods, *History and historiography of post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East: studies in honor of John E. Woods,* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006), pp. 135-166.

-*The Fall of Amir Chupan and the Decline of the Ilkhanate, 1327-37: A decade of discord in Mongol Iran*, Papers on Inner Asia, No. 30, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1999).

-'The *Keshig* in Iran: The Survival of the Royal Mongol Household', in (ed.) L. Komaroff, *Beyond the Legacy of Genghis Khan* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 135-166.

-'Wolf or Shepherd? Amir Chupan's Attitude to Government', in (eds) J. Raby and T. Fitzherbert, *The Court of the Il-khans, 1290-1340*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 79-94.

Mirahmadi, Sara, 'Legitimising the Khan: Rashid al-Din's Ideological Project from a Literary Aspect', *Iran*, (2021), DOI: 10.1080/05786967.2021.1889929, pp. 1-14.

Mitchell, Colin P., *The Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran: Power, Religion and Rhetoric*, (London: Tauris, 2009).

Morgan, David O., 'Āqā', *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, Online, https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/aqa-or-aca, Accessed 12th November 2021.

-*The Mongols*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

-'Who Ran the Mongol Empire?', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 2, (Jan, 1982), pp. 124-136.

Moses, Larry, 'Triplicated Triplets: The Number Nine in the "Secret History" of the Mongols', *Asian Folklore Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 2, (1986), pp. 287-294.

Mottahedeh, Roy, *Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).

Munkh-Erdene, Lhamsuren, 'The Rise of the Chinggisid Dynasty: Pre-Modern Eurasian Political Order and Culture at a Glance', *International Journal of Asian Studies*, Vo. 15, No. 1, (2018), pp. 39-84.

- 'Where Did the Mongol Empire Come From? Medieval Mongol Ideas of People, State and Empire', *Inner Asia*, Vol. 13, No. 2, (2011), pp. 211-237.

Neumann, Iver B., 'Europeans and the steppe: Russian lands under the Mongol rule', in (eds.) S. Suzuki, Y. Zhang, J. Quirk, *International Orders in the Early Modern World: Before the Rise of the West* (New York and London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 12-34.

Ostrowski, Donald, 'Muscovite Adaptation of Steppe Political Institutions: A Reply to Halperin's Objections', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (2000), pp. 267-304.

-'The *tamma* and the Dual-Administrative Structure of the Mongol Empire', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and Asian Studies*, Vol. 61, No. 2, (1998), pp. 262-277.

Pfeiffer, Judith, 'Aḥmad Tegüder's Second Letter to Qalā'ūn (682/1283)' in (eds.) J. Pfeiffer, S.A. Quinn, E. Tucker, and J.E. Woods, *History and historiography of post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East: studies in honor of John E. Woods*, (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006), pp. 167-204.

- 'Conversion to Islam among the Ilkhans in Muslim Narrative Traditions: The Case of Aḥmad Tegüder', PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2003.

Pierce, Leslie P., *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

Pochekaev, Roman Y., 'The Evolution of Soyurghal in Chinggisid and Non-Chinggisid States during the Post-Imperial Period', *Golden Horde Review*, Vol. 6, (2018), pp. 729-740.

- '*Törü*: Ancient Turkic Law 'Privatised' by Chinggis Khan and His Descendants', *Inner Asia,* Vol. 18, (2016), pp. 182-195.

Ratchnevsky, Paul, *Genghis Khan: His Life and Legacy*, (trans. and ed.) T.N. Haining (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1991), First Edition 1983.

Ravalde, Esther, 'Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, Vizier and Patron: Mediation between Ruler and Ruled in the Ilkhanate', in (eds.) C. Melville and B. de Nicola, *The Mongols' Middle East: Continuity and Transformation in Ilkhanid Iran,* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 55-78.

Robinson, David M., 'The Ming Court and the Legacy of the Yuan Mongols', in (ed.) D.M. Robinson, *Culture, Courtiers, and Competition: The Ming Court (1368-1644),* (Boston, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008), pp. 365-421.

Rossabi, Morris, *Khubilai Khan,* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988).

- 'The Legacy of the Mongols', in (ed.) B. Manz, *Central Asia in Historical Perspective*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 27-45.

- *Voyager from Xanadu: Rabban Sauma and the First Journey from China to the West*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010).

Schacht, Joseph, 'Ḳiṣāṣ', *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, Online, http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_4400, Accessed 25th February 2022.

Sela, Ron, *Ritual and Authority in Central Asia: The Khan's Inauguration Ceremony,* Papers on Inner Asia, No. 37, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 2003).

Shea, Eiren L., *Mongol Court Dress, Identity Formation, and Global Exchange*, (Routledge: New York and London, 2020).

Shiraiwa, Kazuhiko, 'On the *Ötegü Bogol* in the *Jāmiʿ al-Tavārīkh* of Rashid al-Din', *Acta Orientalia, Societas Orientales Danica, Fennica, Norvegica, Svecica*, Vol. 47, (1986), pp. 27-31.

-'Rashīd al-Dīn's Primary Sources in Compiling the *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*: A Tentative Survey', in (eds.) A. Akasoy, C. Burnett and R. Yoeli-Tlalim, *Rashīd al-Dīn. Agent and Mediator of Cultural Exchanges in Ilkhanid Iran*, (London: The Warburg Institute, 2013), pp. 39-56.

Shurany, Vered, 'Prince Manggala- The Forgotten Prince of Anxi', *Asia*, Vol. 71, No. 4, (2017), pp. 1169-1188.

Sims, Eleanor, 'Chatr', *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, Online, https://iranicaonline.org/articles/catr-parasol-or-umbrella-an-attribute-of-royalty-in-iran, Accessed 9th February 2022.

Skrynnikova, Tatiana D., '*Boghol,* A Category of Submission at the Mongols', *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, Vol. 58, No. 3, (2005), pp. 313-319.

-'Relations of Domination and Submission: Political Practice in the Mongol Empire of Chinggis Khan', in (ed.) D. Sneath, *Imperial Statecraft: Political Forms and Techniques of Governance in Inner Asia, Sixth-Twentieth Centuries*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 85-115.

Smith, Jr., John M., 'Mongol Manpower and Persian Population', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Oct. 1975), pp. 271-299.

Sneath, David, *The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society and Misrepresentations of Nomadic Inner Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

Soucek, Svat, *A History of Inner Asia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

Soudavar, Abolala, *The Aura of Kings: Legitimacy and Divine Sanction in Iranian Kingship* (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2003).

-'The Saga of Abu-Saʿid Bahādor Khān. The *Abu-Saʿidnāmé*', in (eds.) J. Raby and T. Fitzherbert, *The Court of the Il-khans, 1290-1340*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 95-218.

Soulliere, Ellen, 'The Writing and Rewriting of History: Imperial Women and the Succession in Ming China, 1368-1457', *Ming Studies*, Vol. 73, (2016), pp. 2-29.

Standen, Naomi, *Unbounded Loyalty: Frontier Crossing in Liáo China*, (Honolulu, HA: University of Hawaii Press, 2007).

Subtelny, Maria, *Timurids in Transition: Turko-Persian Politics and Acculturation in Medieval Iran* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

- 'The binding pledge (*möchälgä),* A Chinggisid practice and its survival in Safavid Iran', in (ed.) C. Mitchell, *New Perspectives on Safavid Iran: Empire and Society*, (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 9-29.

'Tanistry', *Britannica Academic, Encyclopædia Britannica, 8 Feb.2019.* academic-eb-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2443/levels/collegiate/article/tanistry/71183, Accessed 13th June 2019.

Togan, İsenbike, *Flexibility and Limitations in Steppe Formations: The Kerait Khanate and Chinggis Khan*, (Leiden: Brill, 1998).

-'In Search of an Approach to the History of Women in Central Asia', in (ed.) K. Erturk, *Rethinking Central Asia: Non-Eurocentric Studies in History, Social Structure and Identity*, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1999), pp. 163-196.

Van Den Bent, Josephine, 'Mongols in Mamluk Eyes: Representing Ethnic Others in the Medieval Middle East', PhD Dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 2020.

-'"None of the Kings on Earth is Their Equal in *ʿaṣabiyya*": The Mongols in Ibn Khaldūn's Works', *Al-Masāq, Journal of the Medieval Mediterranean*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2016), pp. 171-186.

Vásáry, István, 'History and Legend in Berke Khan's Conversion to Islam', in (ed.) D. Sinor, *Aspects of Altaic Civilization III, Proceedings of the Thirtieth Meeting of the Permanent International Altaistic Conference, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, June 19-25, 1987*, (Bloomington, IN: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 230-252.

-'The Preconditions to Becoming a Judge (*Yarġuči*) in Mongol Iran', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 26, (2016), pp. 157-169.

-'*Yasa* and *Sharīʿa.* Islamic Attitudes towards the Mongol Law in the Turco-Mongolian World (From the Golden Horde to Timur's Time)', in (eds.) R. Gleave and I.T. Kristo-Nagy, *Violence in Islamic Thought from the Mongols to European Imperialism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018), pp. 58-78.

Von Bruck, Michael, 'Political Authority: A Christian Perspective', *Buddhist-Christian Studies*, Vol. 30, (2010), pp. 159-170.

Watson, Angus J., 'Mongol inhospitality, or how to do more with less? Gift giving in William of Rubruck's *Itinerarium'*, *Journal of Medieval History*, Vol. 37, (2011), pp. 90-101.

Welsford, Thomas, *Four Types of Loyalty in Early Modern Central Asia: The Tūqāy-Tīmūrid Takeover of Greater Mā Warā al-Nahr, 1598-1605*, (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

Wensinck, Arent J., 'Khuṭba', in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_4352, Accessed 9th April 2021.

Wing, Patrick, *The Jalayirids: Dynastic State Formation in the Mongol Middle East*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016).

Woods, John E., 'A Note on the Mongol Capture of Iṣfahān', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Jan., 1977), pp. 49-51.

Yihao, Qiu, 'Gift-Exchange in Diplomatic Practices during the Early Mongol Period', *Eurasian Studies*, Vol. 17 (2019), pp. 202-227.

-'Independent Ruler, Indefinable Role: Understanding the History of the Golden Horde from the Perspectives of the Yuan Dynasty', *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée*, Online, Vol. 143, (2018), DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/remmm.10237, Accessed 4th April 2022.

Yıldız, Sara N., 'Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Seljuk Anatolia: The Politics of Conquest and History Writing, 1243-1282', PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2006.

Zhao, George Q., *Marriage as Political Strategy and Cultural Expression: Mongolian Royal Marriages from World Empire to Yuan Dynasty*, (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2008).

Zimonyi, Istvan, ''The Feast After the Siege of the Alan Capital in the Western Campaign of the Mongols', *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, Vol. 22 (2016), pp. 241-256.