‘Walking the extra mile’: how governance networks attract international organizations to Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen (1995-2015)

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8 Comparative analysis

8.1 Introduction

This chapter compares the results from my previous case studies based on an instrumental, discursive, and relational perspective. I will start by explaining the different outcomes of the two success measures for all the cases. To what extent were the cases a success when using the two success yardsticks developed in this study? This is briefly explained for each case. Then, I will focus on my expectations and analyze for each expectation whether the independent variables may have affected the outcome. Each expectation will be discussed by moving from the least successful case to the most successful. Finally, I conclude with a summary of my findings.

8.2 Measures of Success

The first type of 'success as fact' was explored by defining up to when the host city was still in the 'bidding contest' for the IO. In each case, I established four stages, starting with the Request for Proposals or RfP, and each city's letter of intent (Stage 1), followed by either a voting procedure (Stages 2–4) or a procedure without voting. When a city withdrew or was rejected before the voting procedure started, the case was considered a factual failure. When it was eliminated after the first round of voting it was considered a moderate factual failure. When it made it to the last round, or it won but not overwhelmingly, it was considered a moderate factual success, and when it won overwhelmingly it was considered a factual success. The four stages were marked as degrees of success, and details are given in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1 Eight cases and the degrees of factual success

Degrees of success	**Case, place (voting / no voting)**		
Factual failure	Green Climate Fund, Geneva (voting)	Arms Trade Treaty, Vienna (voting)	
Moderate factual failure	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships, The Hague (no voting)	Sustainable Energy for All, Copenhagen (no voting)	
Moderate factual success	Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat, Geneva (voting)		
Factual success	International Criminal Court, The Hague (no voting)	UNOPS, Copenhagen (no voting)	Sustainable Energy for All, Vienna (no voting)

The remarkable cases from Table 8.1 are the UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships case in The Hague and the Arms Trade Treaty case in Geneva. The first is distinctive because it failed but, looking at the phase in which the Netherlands dropped out, it was not at the very beginning. Therefore, this is coined a moderate factual failure instead of a factual failure. The second is noteworthy because the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat case is labeled as a moderate factual success even though it was won by Geneva. This is because it was not an overwhelming success. Geneva lost in the first round of voting, and in the second, it won against Trinidad and Tobago by only three votes (out of 67).

The second type is 'success as interpretation'. A case was considered a perceived failure when it did not attract successfully and was not *perceived* as a success by the organizational networks. A case was viewed as a moderate perceived failure when the organizational network perceived the case as a success, although it did not successfully attract the IO. This could be due to a shift in the agenda-setting of attracting IOs, or an increase of collaboration or resources for the endeavor. A case was a moderate perceived success when it successfully attracted the IO, but the organizational network perceived the case as a failure. A case was a *perceived success* when the successfully attracted case was perceived as such. Table 8.2 shows the outcomes of the cases by type of success as interpretation.

Table 8.2 Eight cases and the degrees of perceived success

Degrees of success	**Case, place (voting / no voting)**		
Perceived failure	Arms Trade Treaty, Vienna (voting)	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships, The Hague (no voting)	
Moderate perceived failure	Green Climate Fund, Geneva (voting)	Sustainable Energy for All, Copenhagen (no voting)	
Moderate perceived success	Sustainable Energy for All, Vienna (no voting)		
Perceived success	International Criminal Court, The Hague (no voting)	Arms Trade Treaty, Geneva (voting)	UNOPS, Copenhagen (no voting)

In contrast with the first type of success, the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat case is now among the successful cases, as the policymakers involved perceived it to have been an outright success for Geneva. On the other hand, the UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships case, a moderate failure according to the previous success yardstick, is now a perceived failure, as it was commented on negatively by those involved. The Green Climate Fund case, which was a failure according to the previous success type, is now

labeled a moderate perceived failure, as it was perceived to be a success – due especially to the profits that Geneva experienced following their failure to attract the IO. Also notable is the change in relative position in the table of Sustainable Energy for All case in Vienna. Whereas in the last measure the case was considered a factual success, it is now downgraded to a moderate perceived success, as the organizational network was less than satisfied with the effort and expenses involved in achieving the outcome.

8.3 Policy design and perception

The instrumental perspective focuses on policy alignment and perception. The following sections compare the eight cases discussing the two expectations.
The first expectation is:

> E1: *The more the bid books are aligned with the attraction policies, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

In Table 8.3, the light grey boxes show a high policy alignment, the dark grey boxes an average alignment, and the black boxes a low policy alignment. One would expect to see black boxes in the top left corner (the failed cases) and light grey boxes in the bottom right corner (the successful cases). Surprisingly, this is not the case: the most successfully attracted IOs show a low and average alignment between the policies and the bids, whereas the failed cases reveal a higher alignment.

Table 8.3 Instrumental perspective: policy alignment

	Factual failure	**Factual measured failure**	**Factual measured success**	**Factual success**
Perceived failure	Arms Trade Treaty Vienna (0.67) *	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships The Hague (0.53)		
Perceived Relative failure		Sustainable Energy for All Copenhagen (0.5)		
Perceived Relative success	Green Climate Fund Geneva (0.67)**			Sustainable Energy for All Vienna (0.39)

	Factual failure	Factual measured failure	Factual measured success	Factual success
Perceived success			Arms Trade Treaty Geneva (0.58) *	UNOPS HQ Copenhagen (0.42) **
				International Criminal Court (0.53)

* The figures are the generated measures of alignment between bids and policy goals on the dimension of depth of information.

** Light grey for low policy alignment (up to 50%), dark grey for average policy alignment (50–60%) black for high policy alignment (higher than 60% overlap).

Failed cases in the top left corner show a high and average policy alignment, the opposite of what I expected. The bid book for the Arms Trade Treaty in Vienna overlaps most with the host policy of being a hub for peace, security, and international dialogue, business, finance, and quality of life. The bid for the UNICEF Division in The Hague aligns most with host policy goals, too. This is also true for Sustainable Energy for All in Copenhagen, whose bid shows average overlap with the host policy goals, but also with the city marketing. The bid for the other failed case, the Green Climate Fund in Geneva, also shows most overlaps with the host policy goals of financial assistance, welcoming attitude, work, and security in Switzerland, as well integration of the internationals. What these failed cases have in common is that their bids are averagely or highly aligned with the host policy goals. Furthermore, two of the cases were in the favorable position of being already seated elsewhere and did not necessarily have to relocate. Maintaining the status quo is easier than moving the IO or department; therefore, these processes involve an additional difficulty for the potential host city.

Of the successful cases in the bottom right corner, the Sustainable Energy for All in Vienna shows the lowest alignment (in black). The bid for this case was most aligned with the host policy goals, such as 'attract new international entities'. Notably, the UNOPS case – a success in both fact and interpretation – reveals a low level of policy alignment. The bids for the Arms Trade Treaty in Geneva and the International Criminal Court in The Hague reveal an average alignment with the host state, nation branding, and city marketing policy goals. Contrary to what was expected, these four cases show that the lower the alignment was, the higher the likelihood of success.

The second expectation is about the perception of host policies:

> E2: *The more positively the respondents in the city perceive the host policies and support, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

In Table 8.4, the failed cases in the top left corner are expected to show dark colors – a more negative policy perception. In the successful cases in the bottom right corner of the table, one would expect light grey boxes: a more positive policy perception of the IO representatives. Policy perception is explored with four different questions regarding what the people involved thought of the branding policies, the elements in the bid, the rules and regulations for IOs, and government support. A positive policy perception appears to be related to the likelihood of success. Indeed, in Table 8.4, the top left corner is filled with darker colors than the bottom right corner of the table. The only exception is the International Criminal Court.

Table 8.4 Instrumental perspective: Policy perception and support

	Factual failure	**Factual measured failure**	**Factual measured success**	**Factual success**
Perceived failure *Branding policies* *Elements in the bid* *Rules and regulations* *Government support*	Arms Trade Treaty Vienna * +/- +/- +/- +/-	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships The Hague +/- + +/- -		
Perceived Relative failure *Branding policies* *Elements in the bid* *Rules and regulations* *Government support*		Sustainable Energy for All Copenhagen ** +/- - - +/-		
Perceived Relative success *Branding policies* *Elements in the bid* *Rules and regulations* *Government support*	Green Climate Fund Geneva + +/- +/- ++			Sustainable Energy for All Vienna +/- + + +

	Factual failure	Factual measured failure	Factual measured success	Factual success
Perceived success			Arms Trade Treaty Geneva	UNOPS HQ Copenhagen
Branding policies			++	+/-
Elements in the bid			+	+
Rules and regulations			+	+
Government support			+	+
				International Criminal Court The Hague
Branding policies				+/-
Elements in the bid				+/-
Rules and regulations				+/-
Government support				-

* The first plus or minus is for Branding policies, the second is for Elements in the bid, the third is for Rules and regulations, and the fourth is for Government support.

** Black for low perception of host policy and support (only +/- or minuses), dark grey for average perception of host policy and support (at least one plus), light grey for high perception of host policy and support (at least three pluses).

As expected, the failed cases in the top left corner show a more negative perception of policy and support on the part of the people involved. The rules and regulations for IOs are especially negatively rated by the IO representatives. The perception of the host policy and support is lowest in the Sustainable Energy for All case in Copenhagen. The representatives of IOs perceived the elements in the bid particularly negatively. The fact that Denmark could not offer the organization tax-free status caused some irritation. On top of that came the problems with the identity numbers that were not workable for the IO employees from non-EU countries. What these failed cases have in common is that many elements are considered a plus/minus, that is, a mix of positive and negative perceptions and support ratings.

Of the successful cases in the bottom right corner, the Arms Trade Treaty in Geneva shows the most positive perception of policy and support measures. The elements in the bid were perceived positively, with some disadvantages, for example, the differences between host agreements of IOs were seen as hierarchical. The IO respondents rated the support positively, although they considered the Swiss to be strongly regulated in the area of rental accommodation.

The exception is the International Criminal Court in The Hague, a case which shows unexpected results. During the attraction of this IO, a problem arose around the hospitality of the Dutch government, which, according to many, was considered insufficient. In addition, there was an impression that the protection of human rights defenders could be improved. The IO representatives were critical toward host policies and negative about policy support, whereas, in the later UNICEF case, these elements were considered more positively. Apart from the International Criminal Court case, the results in the table show that the expectation emerges as true. Clearly, when host policies and support are *positively perceived*, almost all IO cases are successfully attracted.

8.4 Similar perceptual frames

The discursive perspective concentrates on the similarity of perceptual frames of different groups while discussing their priorities and narratives.

The third expectation is:

> E3: *The more the priorities and narratives overlap between the organizational network and the policy network in the host city, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

Table 8.5 shows the cases with high degrees of overlap of priorities in light grey, average overlaps in dark grey, and low overlaps in black boxes.[43] One would expect that for the failed cases in the top left corner of the table the degrees of overlap would be *low* (black) and that for the successful cases in the bottom right corner the degrees of overlap would be *high* (light grey). However, the table shows mixed results. In the failed cases, the degrees are *average* and *high*, whereas in the successful cases, all shades of grey and black appear. The results reveal that the degree of overlap of priorities and narratives between the governmental groups has no relationship with success.

43 In fact, the measures are continuous, but for the sake of presentation, I used intervals.

Table 8.5 Discursive perspective: Overlap of priorities and narratives of organizational and policy networks

	Factual failure	**Factual measured failure**	**Factual measured success**	**Factual success**
Perceived failure	Arms Trade Treaty Vienna 0.70	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships The Hague ** 0.55		
Perceived Measured failure		Sustainable Energy for All Copenhagen 0.55		
Perceived Measured success	Green Climate Fund Geneva 0.59			Sustainable Energy for All Vienna 0.59
Perceived success			Arms Trade Treaty Geneva 0.61	UNOPS HQ Copenhagen 0.38 International Criminal Court The Hague 0.76

* The figures between 0 and 1 are in Kendall's tau-b, the overlap between the groups (with an N of 17 to 20 locational elements).

** Black for low overlap of priorities and narratives (below 0.5 Kendall's tau-b), dark grey for average overlap of priorities and narratives (0.5 to 0.6 Kendall's tau-b), light grey for high overlap of priorities and narratives (higher than 0.6 Kendall's tau-b).

Starting with the top left corner where the failed cases are positioned, the results show that in three of the four cases the overlaps were average. This was not foreseen, as I expected that these measures would be low. One of these failed cases even shows an opposite result: in the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat case in Vienna, the overlaps between the government groups are high. This is noteworthy, as this is the 'most failed' case in the graph where many aspects of the process went wrong, except being 'on the same page' between the government groups. It is also possible that the organizational and policy networks paid too much attention to aligning their perceptual frames, and too little to the external stakeholders and their perceptual frames.

In the successful cases in the bottom right corner, I expected the measures of overlap to be high, but this corner shows mixed results, as well. Two cases that do show expected

results are the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat case in Geneva and the International Criminal Court case in The Hague. These show high overlaps of priorities and narratives between the government groups, but the other two show average and low degrees of overlap. This means that the similarities of the perceptual frames do not necessarily need to be high to succeed. The case of the UNOPS Headquarters in Copenhagen is the exception here, as it shows the lowest degree of overlap while being one of the most successful cases. This case shows that achieving success is within reach, even with a limited similarity in frames between the government groups.

The fourth expectation is:

> E4: *The more the priorities and narratives overlap between the organizational network and the IO representatives in the host city, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

Table 8.6 shows the degrees of overlap of priorities and narratives between the organizational networks and the IO representatives in the eight cases. Again, I expected that in the failed cases (top left corner) overlaps would be low (black boxes) and that the successful cases in the bottom right corner would be high (light grey boxes). Most cases show the anticipated results. This table illustrates that a higher overlap of priorities and narratives between the organizational network and the IO representatives will indeed lead to a higher likelihood of success. Nevertheless, there are some nuances.

Table 8.6 Discursive perspective: Overlap of priorities organizational network and internationals

	Factual failure	**Factual measured failure**	**Factual measured success**	**Factual success**
Perceived failure	Arms Trade Treaty Vienna 0.59	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships The Hague** 0.55		
Perceived Measured failure		Sustainable Energy for All Copenhagen 0.30		
Perceived Measured success	Green Climate Fund Geneva 0.59			Sustainable Energy for All Vienna 0.73

	Factual failure	Factual measured failure	Factual measured success	Factual success
Perceived success			Arms Trade Treaty Geneva 0.65	UNOPS HQ Copenhagen 0.54
				International Criminal Court The Hague 0.73

* The figures between 0 and 1 are in Kendall's tau-b, the overlap between the groups (with an N of 17 to 20 locational elements).

** Black for low overlap of priorities and narratives (below .5 Kendall's tau-b), dark grey for average overlap of priorities and narratives (.5 to .6 Kendall's tau-b), light grey for high overlap of priorities and narratives (higher than .6 Kendall's tau-b).

Top left of Table 8.6, the lowest overlaps between the organizational network and IO representatives are in the Copenhagen Sustainable Energy case. Of the failed cases, it is striking that the 'moderate factual failed' cases show lower overlaps of priorities and narratives between the different groups than the 'most failed' examples. Nevertheless, the table shows that the overlap of perceptual frames is moderate or low in these failed cases.

In the bottom right corner of Table 8.6, the highest measures of overlap are in the International Criminal Court case in the Hague and the Sustainable Energy for All case in Vienna. Another high overlap of priorities and narratives is found in the Arms Trade Treaty case in Geneva. One notable exception in this table is the UNOPS case, where I found an average degree of overlap between the two groups. One explanation for this might be that Copenhagen, and Denmark, did not have much experience as a host candidate during the attraction of UNOPS in 2007. Furthermore, the attraction process took place at a high level, and mostly in New York, so it might have been hard to develop a similar perceptual frame with the IO representatives already in the city.

Remarkably, the overlap between different groups (governmental and employees of IOs) shows a greater relation to network success than the overlap between similar government groups. These results are in line with the results of the first perspective, where a higher positive perception of host policy and support on the part of IO representatives appears to be partially related to success.

8.5 Network characteristics

The relational perspective explores the contribution of internal legitimacy (perceived good cooperation), actor centrality, and network diversity and size.

The fifth expectation is:

> E5: *The higher the perception of good cooperation between the main players, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

This expectation would translate to a table where the failed cases in the top left corner would show low levels of internal legitimacy, assessed through perceived good cooperation (black boxes), whereas the successful cases (bottom right) would indicate high levels (light grey). However, Table 8.7 reveals mixed results. In the failed cases (top left), most levels of cooperation are high – there is one exception – whereas in the successful cases, some show *high* or *average* results. These results show that perceived *good cooperation* possibly does not contribute to real success. The table not only indicates that more high levels of good cooperation are among the failed cases, but also that the most successful cases show only an *average perception* of good cooperation by those involved.

Table 8.7 Relational perspective: perceived network cooperation

	Factual failure	**Factual measured failure**	**Factual measured success**	**Factual success**
Perceived failure	Arms Trade Treaty Vienna 7.3*	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships The Hague ** 4.8		
Perceived Relative failure		Sustainable Energy for All Copenhagen 7.0		
Perceived Relative success	Green Climate Fund Geneva 8.7			Sustainable Energy for All Vienna 7.0

	Factual failure	Factual measured failure	Factual measured success	Factual success
Perceived success			Arms Trade Treaty Geneva 9.0	UNOPS HQ Copenhagen 6.6
				International Criminal Court The Hague 6.3

* The figures from 1 to 10 are grades the respondents gave for cooperation within the organizational network attracting the IO (N=10–15).

** Black for low network cooperation (rated below 5 on a 1–10 scale), dark grey for average network cooperation (5 to 7 on a 1–10 scale), light grey for high network cooperation (higher than 7 on a 1–10 scale).

Focusing on the top left corner of Table 8.7, the highest grades for network cooperation are found in the Geneva Climate Fund case. In the 'most failed' Vienna Arms Trade Treaty example, the cooperation was good but started late. Similarly, in the case of the Copenhagen Sustainable Energy example, the cooperation level was also high. The exception in this corner of the table is the UNICEF case in The Hague showing *low perceived* cooperation. What has proved disappointing to the organizational network is the network's misjudgment of how serious the IO was in its intention to leave Geneva. Also of note, with a summer recess combined with a freshly elected government installed in The Hague during the process, it would prove difficult to provide timely information when required.

In the bottom right corner, the highest level of network cooperation is in the Geneva Arms Trade Treaty case. In the Vienna Sustainable Energy for All case, the participants were positive about the energy hub that had influenced the process. In both cases, a previous failure would play a role in the extra boost the collaboration then received. The third case in the bottom right corner is the International Criminal Court case, where the cooperation levels were rated as average. In the other *average measure* of cooperation – the UNOPS Headquarters case – the participants wanted to offer more value to IOs through better regional urban cooperation.

In all these cases, the political developments in the background played a role during the attraction processes. Most difficulties occurred when the government suddenly changed or when departments did not take responsibility for attracting the IO. How the involved perceived their cooperation did not play a serious role in their success in these cases. The sixth expectation is:

E6: *The higher the actor centrality of the involved, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

As I explore actor level properties by looking at *betweenness* and *degree centrality*, while not ignoring the structure of the network itself, I will first discuss the two centrality measures and then the network graphs.

Betweenness centrality marks the probability of any node being the shortest path between any pair of actors. In other words, the node with the highest betweenness centrality has the shortest paths between other actors and consequently acts more independently in the network. The measure is expressed in percentages and can therefore be better assessed within a network than across networks. Nevertheless, comparing the most independent nodes across networks does indicate how big or autonomous the main node was within that network.

In Table 8.8, one would expect low levels of betweenness centrality in the top left corner where the failed cases are positioned (black boxes) and high levels in the bottom right corner (light grey). However, the table shows mixed results. Low and high levels appear in both corners, as well as average levels of betweenness centrality, meaning that the betweenness centrality on the actor level contributes only partially to success.

Table 8.8 Relational perspective: betweenness centrality

	Factual failure	**Moderate factual failure**	**Moderate factual success**	**Factual success**
Perceived failure	Arms Trade Treaty Vienna 14*	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships 27**		
Moderate perceived failure		Sustainable Energy for All Copenhagen 20		
Moderate perceived success	Green Climate Fund Geneva 20			Sustainable Energy for All Vienna 11

	Factual failure	Moderate factual failure	Moderate factual success	Factual success
Perceived success			Arms Trade Treaty Geneva 12	UNOPS Copenhagen 24
				International Criminal Court 21

* The measure is expressed as the percentage of the maximum possible betweenness that an actor could have had. In this table, the percentage shown is that of the actor with the highest betweenness centrality in the network.

** Black for low betweenness centrality of the most independent actor in the network (below 15%), dark grey for average betweenness centrality of the most independent actor (16–20%), light grey for high betweenness centrality (more than 20%).

In the top left corner of Table 8.8, the betweenness centrality measure of the 'most failed case' is low. This can be explained by the distribution of power in the network: more than one actor had the highest level of independence. That the betweenness centrality of the UNICEF case is highest of all can be explained by the power of only one actor in the middle, the Ambassador of IOs in the Foreign Ministry, who was most independently involved. The other two cases in the top left corner show average results.

In the bottom right corner, the results show that the most successful UNOPS case shows a high betweenness centrality. This means that there were only a few actors indicating high independence and that the network was sparse. Although most cases show that a dense network with many involved (and quite active) actors contributes to success, this case is an exception. In the International Criminal Court case even more is revealed. The betweenness centrality is similarly high, but the network contains many sub-networks where the distribution of power still lies with a few sizeable nodes in the middle. This would explain the high centrality measure. The other two cases show low betweenness centrality characteristics. In both cases, this could be explained: more of the involved actors took responsibility in the process and acted quite independently. These findings show that the independence of a few actors 'in the middle' of the network was crucial.

Although it seems that betweenness centrality has little effect on achieving success, the above results can be explained. First, the measures indicate that when there are several actors who are jointly centrally positioned, the betweenness centrality of the 'most central actor' is lower. Second, the centrality measures show that a sparse network has higher measures than a dense network, but that this is not necessarily a better situation.

Table 8.9 shows the levels of degree centrality of the most active actor in the network. Again, this could be a person or an organization, and this measure is in percentages. The reason why these percentages are lower is that with *betweenness centrality* the measure shows the position of someone in the network (how centrally one is positioned) whereas *degree centrality* shows how active the actors were (how often they met with others). With degree centrality, the activity is spread over a larger network of actors, which results in a lower percentage and degree centrality for each actor. Table 8.9 shows mixed results, implying that a high degree centrality (or activity) for the most active actor contributes only partially to success.

Table 8.9 Relational perspective: degree centrality

	Factual failure	**Moderate factual failure**	**Moderate factual success**	**Factual success**
Perceived failure	Arms Trade Treaty Vienna 5*	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships 13**		
Moderate perceived failure		Sustainable Energy for All Copenhagen 10		
Moderate perceived success	Green Climate Fund Geneva 10			Sustainable Energy for All Vienna 5
Perceived success			Arms Trade Treaty Geneva 5	UNOPS Copenhagen 10
				International Criminal Court 8

* Degree centrality refers to the number of ties or connections a node (network participant) has to other nodes. The measure is expressed in a percentage as well, of the most active actor compared to the other actors in the network.

** Black for low degree centrality of the most active actor in the network (below 10%), dark grey for average degree centrality of the most active actor (10–13%), light grey for high degree centrality (more than 13%).

The failed cases are positioned in the top left corner. The most failed case, that of the Vienna Arms Trade Treaty, shows the lowest degree centrality. This indicates that the most active actor in the network shared its activity with many others; it was not convincingly more active. The highest degree centrality is in the other failed case of the UNICEF Division attracted to The Hague. The most active actor in that case was the Ambassador of IOs at the Foreign Ministry. The other two failed cases show average degree centrality measures.

In the bottom right corner, the measures are average and low, meaning that a high level of activity did not seem to contribute. This can be explained by the types of actors involved. In the networks of those successful cases, the most active nodes were operating at a higher political level. For example, in the Arms Trade Treaty in Geneva, the Foreign Minister was actively involved, and in the Sustainable Energy for All case in Vienna, the level of the actor was higher as well. The stakes were high in both cases, as the cities had each just lost an IO (Geneva lost the Green Climate Fund, Vienna the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat). In the two most successful cases, the measures of degree centrality were average. These cases also indicate that a high level of activity is not necessary when the actors involved are acting on a high political level and share the responsibility with others.

What applies to betweenness centrality applies also to degree centrality. The results can be explained by the types of actors involved. If these were actors at high political levels, then a higher activity of actors was often not necessary. One can imagine that in the case of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, the Prime Minister had only to intervene once or twice to exert influence. The same would have been true for the Geneva Arms Trade Treaty case, where the Secretary of State gave an influential speech. When looking at activity by actors, it makes a considerable difference what type of actors they were. Therefore, it is not the case that network activity did not have an effect, but rather that it depended on who or what department showed high network activity. It is helpful to present network structures for this understanding.

The following graphs in Figure 8.1 - Figure 8.8 show the network structures. These offer another useful representation of betweenness and degree centrality, while also visualizing how the most important actors are positioned in the middle or on the periphery of a network.

Figure 8.1 Network graph Green Climate Fund (failed, Geneva)



Figure 8.2 Network graph Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat (success, Geneva)



Figure 8.3 Network graph International Criminal Court (success, The Hague)



Figure 8.4 Network graph UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships (failed, The Hague)



Figure 8.5 Network graph Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat (failed, Vienna)



Figure 8.6 Network graph Sustainable Energy for All (success, Vienna)



Figure 8.7 Network graph UNOPS Headquarters (success, Copenhagen)



Figure 8.8 Network graph Sustainable Energy for All (failed, Copenhagen)



Key:
Size of the nodes: bigger nodes have higher degree centrality (activity)
Node centrality: the higher the betweenness centrality (independency)
Links between the nodes: frequency of meetings (connected to node activity)
Colors: each color is a different type of node (network diversity)

Among the failed cases in the graphs above, it is noticeable that the network structures were often sparse. For instance, for Geneva, the density was lower in the failed case (Fig. 8.1) than in the successful one (Fig. 8.2). The second and third failed cases show similar images. The failed Sustainable Energy for All case in Copenhagen (Fig. 8.8) shows a sparse network with only one highly centralized node, the Ministry of Climate and Energy. These cases have in common that the number of centrally placed actors with *high independence* is low and that the level of information exchange is similarly low.

The successful cases show that a denser network with formed sub-networks on the periphery can be of more value. In the Geneva Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat case (Fig. 8.2), for example, the Foreign Ministry was the most centrally located along with the Presidential Department of the Canton, which contained the highest measure of degree centrality. The International Criminal Court case network shows two nodes in the middle, linked to the Ministry of Social Affairs and forming a sub-network with other ministries and even the Prime Minister and the Brussels Legal Committee. The same applies to the third successful network, that of the Sustainable Energy for All case in Vienna, where the IO itself was in the center. These cases reveal that a dense network with sub-networks formed on the periphery invariably contributes to success.

The exception of the graphs above is Copenhagen's successful UNOPS case (Fig. 8.7). Although a sub-network can be detected on the periphery, the network is sparse and the activity of the actors low. The sub-network in the periphery may have played an important role, as well as the political weight brought to bear from the actors involved. Examples of highly placed actors in this case would be the State Secretary for Development Policy, the acting head of UNOPS, and the Minister for Development Cooperation.

Finally, the seventh expectation based on network-level properties is:

> E7: *The higher the network diversity and number of the actors involved, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

In Table 8.10, the expectation is that the top left corner with the failed cases shows low degrees of network diversity (black boxes), whereas, in the bottom right corner with the successful cases, the network diversity would be high (light grey). The results are consistent with this expectation, with only one exception. The findings show that a high level of network diversity contributes to successfully attracting IOs.

Table 8.10 Relational perspective: network diversity

	Factual failure	**Factual measured failure**	**Factual measured success**	**Factual success**
Perceived failure	Arms Trade Treaty Vienna 5*	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships The Hague ** 6		
Perceived Relative failure		Sustainable Energy for All Copenhagen 4		
Perceived Relative success	Green Climate Fund Geneva 6			Sustainable Energy for All Vienna 7
Perceived success			Arms Trade Treaty Geneva 8	UNOPS HQ Copenhagen 2 International Criminal Court The Hague 8

* The range in the empirical data is between 3 and 8 actor types.

** Black for low network diversity (less than 4 types), dark grey for average network diversity (4 to 6 types), light grey for high network diversity (more than 6 types).

In the top left corner, the cases show an average network diversity. These failed cases have four to six types of network actors of the total of 11 actor types (See Table A8 in the Appendices). The lowest number of actor types in the top left corner is four – in the Copenhagen Sustainable Energy for All case. Noticeably, in this case, hardly any NGOs participated. The second-lowest number of types of actors is in the Vienna Arms Trade Treaty case (five types). In the third and fourth failed cases, the Geneva Green Fund and UNICEF in The Hague, six types of actors were involved. In both cases, the government types were well represented, but NGOs and businesses were not involved.

In the bottom right corner, the number of types of actors was higher in three cases. In the Vienna Sustainable Energy case, the number was seven. Here, the variety of actors was broad, companies were involved, and different types of advisors were present: a legal advisor of the ministry, specialists, and an energy think tank. In the second and third successful cases, the Geneva Arms Trade Treaty and the International Criminal Court in The Hague, the number of types totaled eight. Here, the variety of actors was extended with the involvement of the Swiss Parliament (Geneva) and EU actors (The Hague). The Hague also included the Prime Minister and Parliament during the process.

The exception in this table is UNOPS, a successful case involving only two types of actors. They were the IOs (UNOPS Headquarters and UN Development Programme) and the national government (different ministries, ambassadors, ministers, and protocol departments). Notably, although the government was inexperienced, it succeeded despite using only two types of actors. NGOs and other IOs were not involved, nor were specialists, advisors, or the city of Copenhagen.

The second part of the actor-level properties expectation is about the number of actors involved. In Table 8.11, one would expect to see low numbers of actors in the top left corner and high numbers in the bottom right. However, the table shows a mixed pattern. The result of this part of the expectation is that the number of network actors contributes only partially to success.

The numbers in the top left corner are generally lower than those in the bottom right. The lowest number of actors was found in the UNICEF case in The Hague (16 actors). In the Vienna Arms Trade Treaty case, the number was 22; the main nodes in the middle were involved with 19 other nodes, mainly on the periphery. In the Geneva Green Climate Fund case, the number of nodes was 23; many of these were also to be found on the periphery.

In the top left corner, the numbers were low to average, whereas in the bottom right corner they were all high. The highest number of actors was the Arms Trade Treaty case in Geneva (39 actors). UNOPS in Copenhagen was an exception. In this successful case, the network consisted of 17 actors, which were also mostly positioned on the periphery. The results show that, although the UNOPS case is an exception, a higher number of actors seems partially related to the likelihood of success in attracting an IO.

Table 8.11 Relational perspective: network size

	Factual failure	**Factual measured failure**	**Factual measured success**	**Factual success**
Perceived failure	Arms Trade Treaty Vienna 22*	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships The Hague** 16		
Perceived Relative failure		Sustainable Energy for All Copenhagen 25		
Perceived Relative success	Green Climate Fund Geneva 23			Sustainable Energy for All Vienna 26
Perceived success			Arms Trade Treaty Geneva 39	UNOPS HQ Copenhagen 17 International Criminal Court The Hague 31

* The figure is between 14 and 25 main nodes.

** Black for low number of nodes (lower than 20 nodes), dark grey for average number of nodes (20 to 25 nodes), light grey for high number of nodes (higher than 25 nodes).

8.6 Conclusion

As discussed, some of the findings were as expected, while others were contrary to my expectations. My main points are briefly summarized below.

In the instrumental perspective, I initially explored the alignment of the attraction policies with the bid books to attract the IOs. This resulted in an almost opposite outcome: the failed cases showed a high and average alignment, whereas the successful cases showed a low alignment – except for the International Criminal Court case. The more the content of the branding and host policies corresponded with the bid book for the IO, the less likely it seems that the IO was successfully attracted. This was the most surprising result. In the second part of the instrumental perspective, I looked at policy perception and support. A positive perception of host policies and government support did bear a relation to success, albeit not convincingly. When the group of IO

representatives referred positively to the branding policies, elements in the bid, rules and regulations for IOs, and government support, the processes were usually more successful. Understandably, the order in which organizations were brought in played a role. In all cities except for Copenhagen, the timelines showed that the IO representatives were less satisfied in the first case than in the second. The cases in Copenhagen are probably an exception because the Danish rules and regulations for IOs changed in 2016. Since then, employees from non-EU states have had to obtain an administrative identity card, with all the difficulties that that entails.

The discursive perspective showed that the similar frames – consisting of prioritizing locational elements and narratives closely connected between these governmental groups – showed only a partial relationship with success. These results showed that the considerable overlap in priorities and narratives between the organizational and the policy networks did not automatically lead to network success. For instance, when the organizational network was composed in an extremely ad hoc fashion, as in the UNOPS case, the levels of overlap of priorities and narratives were low but the network was still quite effective. When the organizational network showed high overlaps with the policy network, the endeavor could still fail, such as in the Vienna Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat case. The alternative expectation worked well: the overlaps of priorities and narratives between the organizational network and the IO representatives showed a strong correlation with the likelihood of success. When the perceptual frames of the IO representatives overlapped with the views of the organizational network, the likelihood of success was higher.

With the relational perspective, I focused on network cooperation and structure, looking at actor centrality and network diversity and size. The results of this perspective were mixed. The level of cooperation among the organizational network members did not show a relationship with network success. High levels of actor centrality indicated a correlation with success, albeit partial. The findings were especially noticeable in the network structure. Where there were a couple of strong nodes in the middle connected to smaller sub-networks, I found a higher likelihood of success. Network diversity showed a strong relationship with a successful outcome. The more diverse the core networks – the organizational networks and surrounding actors – preferably with specialists, businesses, IOs, and NGOs, the higher the network success. Involving senior, highly placed political actors in the process also contributed to network success. A higher number of main nodes in these core networks also showed a relationship to fortunate outcomes, except in the successful UNOPS case in Copenhagen, where the number of actors was low.

At the end of the described results, I can identify two variables that have appeared to contribute highly to success in the eight cases: overlap of priorities and narratives between the organizational network and the IO representatives (Expectation 4), and

network diversity and size (E7). Unexpectedly, perception of the host policy and support (E2) and degree and betweenness centrality (E6) contributed only partially to success. The determinant with an almost opposite result to what was expected was the alignment of attraction (host and branding) policies with the bid books (E1). Two variables did not contribute to success: the overlap of priorities and narratives between the organizational and policy networks (E3), and network cooperation (E5).