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‘Walking the extra mile’: how governance networks attract international organizations to Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen (1995-2015)

Groen, R.S.

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*“(…) What we encounter is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
is not sufficiently equipped to attract an IO”*
(Quote from an employee of the Central Government Real Estate Agency
December 16, 2016, Interview B22.36)

5 THE HAGUE

5.1 THE NETHERLANDS AND THE HAGUE

Since the Dutch legal scholar Tobias Asser founded The Hague Conference on Private International Law in 1893, The Hague has been a global player in the legal field. Today, this remains the oldest IO in The Hague. Six years later, the young Dutch queen Wilhelmina offered hospitality to the first Peace Conference. This conference of 1899 initiated by the Russian Czar Nicholas II made The Hague a reference point for international law (Eyffinger, 2005). The event founded the establishment of the world's first organization for the settlement of international disputes: The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). Shortly afterwards, the Scottish American billionaire Andrew Carnegie made the necessary funds available to build the Peace Palace to house the PCA. This Palace was built during the Second Peace Conference in 1907 and it was completed, ironically, one year before the outbreak of the First World War. The third Peace Conference, planned shortly afterwards, never took place.²¹

Position of The Hague on the international stage

In 1920, the first Assembly of the League of Nations adopted the Statute of a Permanent Court of Justice. Big leaps were taken all at once: not only the Permanent Court of International Justice made its entrance in the Peace Palace, “Asser’s Hague Academy also opened on the same premises” (Eyffinger, 2005, p. 39). After the Second World War, the Permanent Court of International Justice was reorganized under the International Court of Justice. As this is the highest legal authority within the United Nations, The Hague is legally second in the hierarchy of UN cities after New York.

In this era, the Dutch government was willing but not very active in acquiring such organizations. The Cold War was freezing multilateral cooperation, which stopped the creation of IOs (Kaufmann, 2018). Nevertheless, within the Western block major legal institutions emerged in other locations, such as the Court of Justice in Luxembourg and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The end of the Cold War triggered a

21 The alternative Third Peace Conference however took place in June 2015 at the Peace Palace.

resurge of multilateral organizations and in that wave The Hague managed to enlarge and diversify its international hub by acquiring organizations such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the High Commissioner of National Minorities, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Court, Eurojust, and Europol. This era is often called the “renaissance of The Hague” (Lagerwaard, 2005, p. 51). In 2015, The Hague was home to 131 international institutes and agencies, employing 14,000 personnel (The Hague Municipality, 2015). The number of IOs increased from 10 in 2004 to 15 in 2010, and from 20 in 2016 to 22 in 2019 (Decisio, 2011; Decisio, 2020). Apart from many IOs, international corporations are also based in The Hague: Shell, Siemens, and T-Mobile are some examples. Another success for The Hague was the establishment of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers & Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, which started in 2015 with its first trials in 2020.

5.1.1 Case 1: The International Criminal Court

The adoption of the Rome Statute of the Court marked the successful conclusion of a fifty-year struggle to establish a permanent body capable of prosecuting international crimes (Combs, 2005). The achievement was an unlikely one. When the Rome Conference opened, no important issues had been agreed upon. The Conference began with a Draft Statute that contained over 1700 sets of brackets with each bracket representing an alternative provision (Combs, 2005). In the end, compromises were reached on all those issues, and the Rome Statute was adopted in an emotional vote of 120 to 7, while 21 countries abstained from voting. Four years later the required sixty States had ratified the treaty.

The countries that showed interest to host the Court were Germany (Nuremberg), France (Lyon) and the Netherlands (The Hague). However, these countries were not actively campaigning for the seat of the International Criminal Court, as the first two countries were quite soon eliminated from the bidding process. A problem was that neither Nuremberg nor Lyon were a seat of government.

The International Criminal Court interrogates and, where justified, tries persons charged with crimes of concern to the international community: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression (CPI/ICC, 2018). Only when national courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute criminals, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction. Another option is when individual states or the UN Security Council refer cases to the court. Up until 2022, the Court indicted 45 individuals, including the Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, the Ugandan leader Joseph Kony, and the Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta. The Criminal Court’s governing and foundational document is the Rome Statute. When states ratify the Rome Statute they become Member State of

the Criminal Court. Thus far, there are 123 International Criminal Court member states. The following table shows the course of events for the establishment of the Criminal Court:

Table 5.1 Course of events: Establishment of the International Criminal Court

1994	The International Law Commission (ILC) completes its draft statute for a permanent International Criminal Court
1996	ILC completes its draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind. Germany (Nuremberg), France (Lyon) and the Netherlands (The Hague) show their interest in hosting the Court
1998	Statute of the International Criminal Court is adopted in Rome on July 17 Rome Statute is created and signed, the decision of The Hague as its location is taken
2002	Rome Statute is ratified and enters into force, the ICC settles into former PTT Telecom building in The Hague
2003	Eighteen judges and first prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo take oath in March
2004	The Trust Fund for Victims Inaugurated. Second prosecutor takes oath
2006	Seat agreement with the Netherlands is signed

The period between the official opening of the International Criminal Court in 2002 and the signing of the seat agreement in 2006 is important to this study. In this time span, the organizational network was active in negotiations with the Court and policy network to establish the Court. This gives insights in the levels of cooperation, communication, and lobbying within the governmental networks and between them and the IO community – the first International Criminal Court-employees and the IO representatives already present in The Hague.

In 2011, just before the end of the ten years rent-free housing in 2012 a renegotiation took place between the International Criminal Court and the host government about the relocation to the permanent premises, which were not yet finished. With political help and a lobby played out in the media, the Court got funding to stay rent-free for another period of 10 years. The International Criminal Court relocated in 2015 to the *Alexanderkazerne*. These events will not be considered as I focus on the attraction, and not the retention of the IO. This study focuses on the years of the attraction and establishment of the International Criminal Court (1998-2006).

Course of events

On 1 April 1998, at the 57th meeting of the Preparatory Committee, a representative of the Netherlands declared the candidacy of The Hague for the sea of “an international criminal court” (Preparatory Committee ICC, 1998, p. 20). The UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court adopted the

Statute on 17 July 1998 (United Nations, 1998). In accordance with its article 125, the Statute was opened for signature by all States in Rome. Thereafter, it moved to Rome at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy. After that, in New York at the UN Headquarters until 31 December 2000 (Preparatory Committee ICC, 1998).

Mayor of The Hague Deetman was present at the adoption of the Treaty in Rome 15 June - July 17 in 1998. Apart from the Mayor, a limited number of actors from the municipality was invited. The other representatives were ambassadors, advisors and actors of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defense, and Justice. A few days before the decision was taken who would host the Court, Foreign Minister Hans an Mierlo hosted a reception on behalf of the Netherlands. At this reception for 120 people, mayor Deetman and Vice-Mayor Verkerk shook many hands.

The European Economic Community (EEC) had backed The Hague as host city already in a European Community meeting. In this case no voting took place as in most other location decision-making processes of IOs. It was, indeed, agreed within the European Economic Community that The Hague would be the sea of the Court as it was envisaged that the Court would take the building of the International Court of Former Yugoslavia, already running in The Hague since 1994.

The organizational network that attracted the Court was set up during the next phase of the establishment, from scratch. There was no building, no Court, there were no judges, and the host state agreement was still to be created. The Court was attracted, but much needed to be done before it could start its work. As William Pace, godfather of the Criminal Court and chairman of the coalition of non-governmental organizations described in 2001: “According to some, ratification by the required sixty countries would take ten to fifteen years, but the ratifications are coming in. Already 139 countries have signed the statute, of which 32 have now also ratified.” (Vreeken, 2001). Pace was right; the number of the required sixty ratifications was reached within nine months. Nevertheless, the implementation was slow. As Pace went on: “We don’t understand why the Netherlands’ efforts are so minimal. There is still no definitive decision about where the court should be built. There is no beginning of decision-making about a temporary facility – which, incidentally, must be a fully-fledged building, where the court will be housed for five to eight years. We have no proof whatsoever that the Netherlands can do that with the current planning. (Vreeken, 2001)“ As a result of “various publications in the media on the preparation of the accommodation of the International Criminal Court”, a counselor raised questions in writing. The Mayor and his secretariat answered. Most questions were about the accommodation of the Court. One of the councilor’s questions important to this study was: “How is the municipality of The Hague involved in the preparation of the accommodation of the International Criminal Court in The Hague?” (City Council of The Hague, 2001). The answer was as follows:

“In the same way that the municipality of The Hague was involved in the acquisition activities that preceded the allocation of the International Criminal Court to The Hague in the Statute in 1998, the municipality of The Hague is involved in the realization of the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Naturally, the center of gravity of the activities lies with the [national] government, which in appropriate forums consults with the parties involved in the establishment of the International Criminal Court. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice have used the period since the signing of the treaty to organize two things:

- Determining the location where the International Criminal Court will be definitively established.*
- Taking care of the interim housing for the starting International Criminal Court organization, which will eventually transfer to the final housing” (City Council of The Hague, 2001).*

This answer is interesting because it shows several things: the municipality worked closely together with the Foreign and Justice Ministries in the acquisition of the International Criminal Court as well as in its establishment – and the center of gravity laid with the national government.

Attracting the International Criminal Court: the playing field and its players

The European Community played a role in the development of the International Criminal Court through the support and funding of Non-Governmental Organizations. More importantly, within the European Community discussions arose about the location of the Court and many member states expressed their preference for The Hague. It might have been of importance that the Dutch just ended their Presidency of the Council of the EU (Van Keulen & Rood, 2003). At the plenary meetings in Rome, when the Statute was being discussed, for example Ms. Johnson, representative of Norway, said “the seat should be in The Hague” (United Nations, 1998, p. 65). The United Kingdom’s representative, Mr. Lloyd, said: “The Conference should consider favorably the offer of the Government of the Netherlands to host the Court in The Hague” (United Nations, 1998, pp. 66-67). Other states outside the European Community addressed the issue as well at the Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of ‘an International Criminal Court’ such as the observer of the delegate of Ukraine, Mr. Tatsiy, who agreed that the “Court should be located in The Hague” (United Nations, 1998, p. 85).

Foreign Minister Van Mierlo endorsed – on behalf of the Government of the Netherlands – the statement of the UK and said that his country was in favor of the establishment of ‘an’ international criminal court with strong institutional and organizational links with the United Nations. The Netherlands supported the system for the exercise of jurisdiction

by the court and did not want the court to rely on the ad hoc consent from states.²² The Foreign Minister assured the Conference that the Netherlands would do everything to be a worthy host to the court.

The International Criminal Court Success Measures (The Hague)

The first type success as fact can be coined a factual success: The host city of The Hague was decided upon as location and this happened overwhelmingly. The pre-stage of attracting the International Criminal Court started in 1994 with the draft statute for a permanent international court. The International Law Commission sent out a *Request for Proposals* (Stage 1); Nuremberg, Lyon and The Hague reacted with a letter of intent (Stage 2). The process of signing the Statute took place in 1997 (Stage 3), the preparations for the campaigns were already well under way. The Statute was adopted in 1998, and with that adoption, the location was decided upon (Stage 4).


Figure 5.1 First success type for The Hague’s successful case: Criminal Court



Stage 1: Letters of intent 1996 > Stage 2: three candidates > Stage 3: signing phase > Stage 4: Adoption Rome Statute 1998

The second type of success was a ‘perceived success’. The Court was easily attracted but difficult to establish. The organizational network establishing the Court was in great difficulties to get hold of resources, a building and support. “The Foreign Ministry had no money”, said the former Mayor of The Hague. He discussed the requirements for the Court building with the municipality of The Hague, but there was a problem with resources when the building would be at the *Alexander Kazerne* in Scheveningen. “I called the Prime Minister, Jan Peter Balkenende”, the former Mayor said, “and addressed him as a Christian Democratic Party member, I said we couldn’t moan about a piece of land while building an institution bringing peace worldwide. The next Council of Ministers sealed the deal. Defense received its money, [the Ministry of] Finance paid for it. There was a rental structure for ten years” (Interview B41.56). The ambassador to the UN in New York also considered the campaign a success: “It was in article 3 of the Rome Statute; the seat of the Court. (...) We spoke about why The Hague was the best place – and did not know exactly which other countries and cities were interested. (...) A kind of package emerged; a task force was intensely involved in the negotiations between diplomatic departments in The Hague. A bid-book was made” (Interview B42.57). This quote shows that most respondents of the organizational network attracting and establishing the Criminal Court referred to the process as a success.

22 In the end, states can make their own decision to recognize the International Criminal Court. As is well known, the United States, among others, do not recognize the ICC.

Figure 5.2 Second success type for The Hague's successful case: Criminal Court

5.1.2 Case 2: UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships

The UN General Assembly created the International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) on 11 December 1946 to provide healthcare and emergency food to children in countries destroyed by World War II. Seven years later, the UN System adopted UNICEF as a permanent UN arm. UNICEF is headquartered in New York and has several divisions, of which seven are Headquarters Offices. These include the Regional Office for Europe in Geneva, the Supply Division in Copenhagen, the Global Shared Service Center in Budapest, and the Innocenti Research Centre in Florence. The others are the Office for Japan in Tokyo, the Brussels, and Seoul Office in the Republic of Korea. UNICEF reports to its Executive Board to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) which reports to the UN General Assembly (UNICEF, 2017; UN System, 2020).

The Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division is part of the Regional Office for Europe in Geneva. It focuses on UNICEF's work with the private sector. The main tasks of the division are fundraising, engagement and advocacy for children by coordinating fundraising activities and private sector partnerships and engagement for the organization. UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships provided support to 34 National Committees and 21 country offices with structured private sector fundraising activities, as well as many other country offices engaging with the private sector to deliver on the child rights agenda (United Nations Children's Fund, 2016). In the years 2012-2014, the Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division was troubled with negative figures. It was offered a beneficial seat agreement (and a building) by Denmark. The prices in Geneva had gone up, the number of flights decreased, and many employees lived in France (Interview B18.29).

After Denmark made a pitch in 2010 when a new building for UN departments (the UN CITY in Copenhagen) was nearly finished, the Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division started to work on a feasibility study comparing European cities. As part of this process the advantages and disadvantages of the locations of UNICEF operations were being considered. The aim for UNICEF was to explore several options, which would offer efficiency gains and cost savings for the organization. They listed cities and compared their travel hubs, train links and other logistical considerations. The long list changed in a short list and several countries started to make offers; Hungary and the Netherlands followed Denmark. The cities of Copenhagen and The Hague became serious options

for UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships. After informal discussions with Denmark and the Netherlands, a UNICEF Division delegation visited Copenhagen and The Hague, and several formal letters went back and forth. The move of the Division would include 170 staff and 40 locally recruited staff members.

An element that might have influenced the serious consideration of UNICEF, was the move of the UNHCR Division of Private Fundraising and Engagement from London to Copenhagen in 2014.²³ The process of this move was already in motion. The UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division was asked by its surroundings: “if they could do it, why couldn’t you?” The Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division received the Dutch offer by e-mail in January 2014 and provisional requests were done. The Private Fundraising and Partnerships requested upfront payments for moving staff and their families, and when the Netherlands could not offer these, two bidders remained: Switzerland and Denmark. In November 2014, the Swiss won the bid, and the Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division stayed in Geneva.

Table 5.2 Course of events: The possible relocation of the UNICEF Private Fundraising

2010	Pitch of Denmark to host the UNICEF PFP – before the opening of the UN CITY building
2011	Feasibility long study of UNICEF PFP with European cities and their travel hubs, train links, logistical considerations
2012	Creation of a short list of cities
2013	Letter from UNICEF to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August
2014	Hungarian offer to host UNICEF PFP in Budapest
2014	Visit of UNICEF PFP delegation to Copenhagen, January
2014	Visit of UNICEF PFP delegation to The Hague, January
2014	extra requests from UNICEF PFP declined, September
2014	decision between Swiss and Danish offer, October
2014	Final decision of UNICEF to stay in Geneva, November

Course of events

It was August 23 in 2013 when the initial letter of the Executive Director of UNICEF Martin Mogwanja arrived at the desk of the Ambassador IOs at the Foreign Ministry. The initial letter issued the possible relocation of a part of UNICEF headquarters operations based in Geneva and identified the Netherlands as a focal point (UNICEF, Deputy Executive Director, 2013). The positive response of the Netherlands came four days later. In December, Mogwanja’s letter arrived from New York. He wrote to “continue

23 In January 2016 this UNHCR Division moved back to London.

the collaboration and exploratory process UNICEF was undertaking” (UNICEF, Deputy Executive Director, 2013). “UNICEF is undertaking, like many UN agencies,” he stated, “a comprehensive review of the efficiency and effectiveness of operations at the global level, to ensure that resources are used as efficiently as possible, and that the organization is best structured to deliver programs to advance the rights of children around the world” (UNICEF, Deputy Executive Director, 2013). Attached to the letter was an indicative list of information of their interest, including UN immunities and privileges, Security, Facilities, Financial, and Local diversity, and services. After the visit of the delegation to The Hague, the Dutch government underlined that the Netherlands was eager to ensure that the process was transparent, and they wished to maintain its good relations with the Swiss government. A second request of UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships arrived by telephone to cover upfront costs ‘in cash’ (€10 million). Despite the increased budget in the bid (the rent contribution could be converted to a fixed amount in advance) this recruitment was unsuccessful (IOB, 2018).


Attracting Private Fundraising and Partnerships to The Hague: the playing field and its players

In the Netherlands, the Ambassador of IOs was the main actor involved in the attraction process of UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships. Besides, the Foreign Ministry Directorate, the Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN in New York was involved. Another important actor was the Multilateral Institutions and Human Rights Directorate (DMM) of the Foreign Ministry. Competitors actively attracting the Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division were the Foreign Ministry of Denmark and the Swiss Federal Department.

The UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships Success Measures (The Hague)

The first type of success as fact was a moderate factual failure. The process started with the pre-stage: a Danish pitch for the Fund in 2010. Consequently, the Private Fundraising and Partnerships conducted a study on new possible host states and shortlisted The Netherlands, Hungary, Denmark, and their host state Switzerland in 2012 (Stage 1). A year later, the Division sent a letter to the Dutch Foreign Ministry. In 2014, Hungary showed interest as well in hosting the Division. Hungary did however not meet the criteria and dropped out (Stage 2). Later that year, the Private Fundraising and Partnerships delegation visited Copenhagen, The Hague and requested extra information. The extra resources ‘in cash’ for making the move was, however, declined by the Dutch government (Stage 3). In the fourth stage, only the Swiss and Danish governments were in the bidding game. The UNICEF Division, after several reviews under the own work force, decided to stay in Geneva in October 2014 (Stage 4). The following Figure depicts the stage where The Netherlands was rejected as a host after Stage 2.

Figure 5.3 First success type for The Hague’s failed case: UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships



For the second type of perceived success this case was a ‘perceived failure’. Most respondents were negative about the process. The organizational network was under time pressure and the Directorate Multilateral Relations was executing the bid, instead of the department of the Ambassador of IOs, which some considered a failure. Another problem was the lack of conviction: “The question was: to what extent was this serious, and to what extent did they want to be better positioned in Geneva?” (Interview B15.25). The Netherlands could offer 10 years of rent. The former Mayor of The Hague thought the Dutch offer was good and well arranged, but that the management of the Partnership “Did not break through. A short-sighted decision, in my opinion” (Van Aartsen, 2019). An organizational network member thought the offer was insufficient: “We did not have buildings on offer as a municipality, but the national building agency did. (...) Either you keep them empty, and you lose, or you house a UN institution, and you break even. Somehow it doesn’t work that way in the Netherlands” (Interview B25.40). A combination of negligence and insolubility on the government side and short-sightedness on the side of the Private Fundraising and Partnerships predominated according to those involved.

Figure 5.4 Second success type for The Hague’s failed case: UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships



5.2 INSTRUMENTAL PERSPECTIVE

Instrumental explanation The Hague’s successful case

Where in 1985 a policy evaluation document questioned whether the contribution to the United Nations could be stopped²⁴, such an attitude was unimaginable a few years later. In 1988 a first host state policy was formulated, underlining the importance of the acquisition, and welcoming of IOs. This was the Fourth Spatial Planning Memorandum

24 The IOB evaluation report stated: “The Netherlands would ridicule itself completely in the international community by withdrawing or terminating a contribution (which, incidentally, is compulsory). The employment of a number of international civil servants of Dutch nationality working at UN level (around 700) would be threatened.” (IOB, 1985, p. 91).

of 1988, that had a paragraph on the “increasing competition on a European and global scale” (Tweede Kamer, 1988, p. 112). It claimed about the government city that “The Hague has good opportunities to attract more IOs and companies and has a residential environment and facilities that meet international standards” (Tweede Kamer, 1988, p. 114).

Host policy goals 2000

The first host policy document highlighted three important location factors: international schools, accessibility and a metropolitan environment combined with recreational areas. After the establishment of the Yugoslavia Tribunal (1993) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague (1998), internationals criticized the way the Netherlands hosted them. Bottlenecks were the incompleteness and timeliness of information about policy developments that had an impact (IOB, 2002). Besides, a dissatisfaction grew about the differences in tax privileges and issues such as infrastructure facilities (hotel and conference capacity, international schools, medical facilities), visa issuance and residence rights. The goals in keywords consisted of ‘International urban business environment, accessibility and diversity’.

Nation branding goals 2000

Since 1988, the promotion of respect for human rights was called a cornerstone or the ‘main pillar’ of Dutch foreign policy, based on the document *Human Rights and Foreign Policy* (1979). Until 2000, spatial economic policy in the Netherlands consisted mainly of equity or equalization to reduce the differences in prosperity between regions. Nation branding of the Netherlands developed more since the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs founded the Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency (NFIA), an operational unit to assist foreign companies to establish their business in the Netherlands and to take advantage of the Dutch business environment. It was, at the time, positioned as a job machine. The idea that foreign companies are good for the economic dynamics and competitiveness of the Netherlands was a guiding principle. The NFIA worked most intensively on branding the Netherlands for foreign investments. The goals were to focus on a “business climate, innovation knowledge industry and technology” (House of Representatives, 1988).

City marketing goals 2000

Project ‘The Hague 2025’ was a foundation for the policy program of 1998-2000 which was linked to the brand of The Hague (The Hague Municipality, 1997). This vision of the future for the city was focused on ‘City of residence by the sea’ and ‘International city of law and administration’. Two conditions were clean and safe, accessible, and economy. One of the five areas of the city were highlighted to improve was ‘The Hague, globally and locally’. This theme was about the diversity (more than 60 nationalities) and it stressed the importance of the EU for the City: “It is important for The Hague

that the European Union will develop further and that the city and region The Hague/ Haaglanden will become an important identification point” (The Hague Municipality, 1997, p. 6). In the policy program of 1998-2000 the policy goals were to “tackle the city’s recovery, both financially, socially and economically” (The Hague Municipality, 1998, p. 5). Furthermore, to “invest in society, livability, social security, youth, the relationship with the city (relational governance), in the cultural climate, and the municipal organization. Strengthening the economy in The Hague and combating unemployment were “spearheads of municipal policy for the coming period” (The Hague Municipality, 1998, p. 8). No further mention was made of IOs.

Bid for the International Criminal Court (1998)

The bid for the International Criminal Court, ‘A Bid for Justice’, was finished in the spring of 1998. The Foreign Ministry and the municipality of The Hague worked closely together on the formulation of the bid. It was beautifully designed and edited in English and French. Behind the azure cover with a Lady Justice in a green tile, it showed two introductions of Foreign Minister Van Mierlo and Mayor Deetman. The bid consisted of five chapters. In the first, The Netherlands was mentioned as “home-from-home for diplomats”; the legacy of Hugo Grotius’ *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* is mentioned as “the first modern treatise on the waging of war and the laws and regulations governing warfare” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Municipality of The Hague, 1998, p. 4). It mentioned the Dutch efforts in the field of development aid, “the Netherlands being one of the few countries exceeding the UN target for official development aid of 0.7% of GNP” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Municipality of The Hague, 1998, p. 6). Finally, the first chapter mentioned The Hague as a center for international law studies and the experience of the city as host to international courts and tribunals, which makes the Hague “the prime candidate for the seat of the International Criminal Court” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Municipality of The Hague, 1998, p. 6).

The second chapter promised suitable premises conforming to the standards of the Dutch building code: 10 years rent-free from the date on which the Statute enters into force. At the end of the period the Court “may rent its premises, tax-free, at the prevailing market rates”, it said (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Municipality of The Hague, 1998, p. 14). The bid offered detention facilities “in the vicinity of the Court’s main building” and guaranteed the protection of employees, persons held by order of the Court, and victims and witnesses called to testify before the Court.

In the third to fifth chapters presented The Hague as a city to work and live in and to enjoy. The city as seat of the government, the Queen’s residence, parliament buildings and the multilingual staff passed in review. A table showed the Netherlands as the most multilingual country (79 % English, 23 % French, and 66 % German), compared to Germany, Austria, and France. The accessibility and the number of hotels and rooms

were mentioned. The coastal dunes, tree-lined avenues, peaceful suburbs and stretches of open countryside were promoted, The Hague was portrayed as one of the most scenic cities in Europe. Housing prices in The Hague and Amsterdam were compared in a table with those in Rome, Milan, Bonn, Frankfurt, Geneva, Vienna, and New York (The Hague's prices were lowest). Cable television was mentioned, as well as the excellent medical care in The Hague: "Ten hospitals in the city and its environs provide medical service of the highest standard. Everyone is entitled to hospital treatment" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Municipality of The Hague, 1998, p. 24). The last part described leisure activities in The Hague, Rotterdam, Utrecht, and Amsterdam, especially museums, orchestras, and The Hague's annual North Sea Jazz festival (which later moved to Rotterdam).

Table 5.3 Alignment between policies and bid for the International Criminal Court

ICC bid	Host policy	Nation branding – spatial economic policy	City Marketing – local economic policy	Policy alignment
Goals in keywords Elements in the ICC bid	International urban business environment, accessibility and diversity	focusing on a business climate, innovation knowledge industry, technology	Invest in society, livability, social security, youth, the relationship with the city	The following elements from the ICC bid showed alignment on the <i>depth of information</i> dimension:
1. Democracy, diplomacy and rule of law	government promotes development of inter-national legal order	-	'International city of law and administration'	'The Netherlands: Democracy, the Rule of Law', Aligned with one policy
2. International climate	International urban business environment	Innovation and competitiveness in regional clusters	International city of law and administration	'The Hague as a center for international law studies Aligned with two policies
3. Cultural diversity	Presence of many and diverse IOs	-	'The Hague, globally and locally	'Most multilingual country' No alignment
4. Judicial capital	-	-	International city of law and administration	'The Hague: Judicial Capital' No alignment
5. City of Justice	-	-	International city of law and administration	'The Hague: a Bid for Justice' No alignment

ICC bid	Host policy	Nation branding – spatial economic policy	City Marketing – local economic policy	Policy alignment
6. City to work in	International urban business environment	Focus on business climate, innovation knowledge industry, technology	Invest in society, livability, social security	‘multilingual staff easily recruited in and around The Hague’ Fully aligned
7. City to live in	Maintaining and strengthening the spatial diversity	Improve the attractiveness of the Netherlands	Invest in society, livability, social security	‘The Hague: A city to live in’ Fully aligned
8. City to enjoy	-	-	participation of residents, companies and organizations	‘leisure activities in The Hague’ Aligned with one policy
9. Accessibility	Improving accessibility	achieve an excellent business climate and accessibility	The Hague: clean and safe, accessible and better economy	‘Accessibility and the number of hotels and hotel rooms’ Fully aligned
10. Economy	International urban business environment	Improve attractiveness of the Netherlands by focusing on a business climate, innovation knowledge industry, technology	Invest in society, livability, social security, youth, the relationship with the city	‘Facts and figures’, the Netherlands and The Hague are laid out in two tables, covering geography, demography and economy’ Fully aligned

Categorical concurrence

Five fields were highlighted in the bid and visible in all the other policies: the international climate, city to work in, livability, accessibility, and a focus on the economy in a broader sense. Two elements, ‘democracy and rule of law’ and ‘cultural diversity’, were reflected in two other policies, and the other three were only aligned with one other policy. City marketing goals showed the highest overlap with the bid, although the term ‘city marketing’ is overrated. It took until 2004 to promote The Hague as the ‘City of Justice and Peace’ (The Hague Municipality, 2004). During the campaign for the International Criminal Court, none of the policies focusing on the ‘City of Justice’ as proposed in the bid. The project ‘The Hague 2025’ the municipality proposed in 1997 did mention the “International city of law and administration”, but The Hague as “Legal capital of the world” had not yet penetrated in the municipal policy, which was more directed at a “relationship of trust between city and administration”. The international climate of the city only came off the ground after the turn of the next millennium. The categorical concurrence was high, 73 percent or 22 of the 30 boxes were filled (See Table 5.3).

Depth of information

When looking at how the policy goals elaborated on the elements in the bid, the alignment was coined 'average'. Although the city marketing goals showed alignment with the bid, the solidness was thin: 'International city of law and administration' was not a goal elaborated upon. The same applies to the goal of 'cultural diversity' in the bid: It was aligned with the host policy (Presence of many and diverse IOs) and city marketing (The Hague, globally and locally) but very limited. The following goals did align with the other policies: 'city to work in', 'city to live in', 'economy' and 'accessibility', as well in number as substance. The second step of alignment was only 53 percent or 16 of the 30 boxes.

Surprisingly, although this case showed the highest possible success measures, the alignment between the host and branding policies and the bid for the Court were only average. This result does not support the alignment expectation.


Perception of host policy and support The Hague's successful case

The second half of the perspective discusses perception of host policy and support of the IO representatives in the city (N=13). While discussing the perception of the branding policies (visibility and effectiveness), the rules and regulations and the conditions for international employees (level education and expertise labor force, level of English and French, competitiveness), I make a distinction between the cases in the host city.

Perception of branding policies

The Hague being the 'Capital of Peace and Justice' was evident to most internationals. One OPCW employee stated: "The Hague has a very specific particular brand. (...) What the city does well: it is really geared for IOs, the city has an international feel" (Interview B44.59). About the visibility of the nation branding IO representatives were less positive. The effectiveness of branding policies was perceived higher, especially city marketing. An employee of the NGO Center of International Legal Cooperation (CILC) found that "if you want to bring an IO to a city, marketing strategies are part of it. (...) The Institute for Global Justice is a clear sign of city marketing, a brand of UN, Peace, Justice and Security. However, when ask the baker or the butcher "what The Hague stands for" that is the local football club." (Interview B49.66). The perception was coined a plus/minus because the visibility of both branding policies was rated low. The following figure depicts how the policies and conditions were rated by all IO representatives (N=13 in total).

Figure 5.5 Perception of host policy and support The Hague (N=13)



Perception of elements in the bid

One of the important elements in the bid was ‘City to work in’, which was commented on by the employees by rating the level of education and expertise of the local labor force. This came across as high, although some disadvantages also came to the fore. An NGO-employee found it: “always disappointing, compared to Eastern Europe, what the attitude of young people is. There is more a nine-to-five culture here, less passion of students. I found the level deceiving as well, in terms of languages” (Interview B49.66). When talking about the quality of universities the explanation about the rating was a bit more differentiated. One IO representative in The Hague during the International Criminal Court attraction found that there was “not a university atmosphere, as in Geneva and Vienna” (Interview B55.72). According to this actor, there was also a lack of documents in different languages. The ICP report confirms these observations (Csoti & Van Haelst, 2016, p. 16). This aspect was coined a plus/minus because these elements in the bid were perceived as average.

Perception of rules and regulations

About the rules and regulations for IOs, which could differ from tax-free cars to the ease of getting working permits or the covering of costs for education of family members, the rating was quite high (with a mean of 7,35, N=6). One member of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons found the fact that each IO had its own host

agreement was sometimes confusing. Another employee found the Netherlands “not a bad host state. They help out, but that goes with a cost, which is usually quite huge” (Interview B53.70). A representative of the International Court of Justice found that the Dutch host state did not cope well with the sensibility of the people of IOs: “When you try to attract, be flexible. The Dutch are tremendously afraid to improvise. They are very strict and not able to do something not organized. That is a problem” (Interview B55.72). This aspect was coined a plus/minus as well, as the respondents reacted mixed about it.

Perception of government support

About how the complaints of the international employees were handled, I found the following. The respondents criticized the fragmented organization of the institutions working on similar themes. During the establishment of the Court, the Welcome Center in The Hague was still ‘under construction’, in the Municipal note of 2004, one of the goals was ‘Examine the feasibility of setting up a visitor center’ (The Hague Municipality, 2004). This was indeed one of the criticisms, as one of the internationals stated: “There is the X-pat desk, but it is not promoted enough. It would be useful to keep several agencies together” (Interview B53.70). About the Court more specifically, policymakers were advised to improve the protection of human rights defenders: “The Hague should organize training sessions for lawyers about international justice, for example” (B45.61). This last element was a minus, as so many aspects were commented on negatively. The expectations of this perspective did not materialize for the first case. Now let’s look at the second.

Instrumental explanation The Hague’s failed case

In 2001, a policy evaluation group created a framework that could streamline the decision-making procedure as well as improve hospitality, through standardization of the seat agreements (IOB, 2002, p. 14). The main bottlenecks for acquiring new IOs were housing and financing for IOs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013, p. 6). In 2005, the Dutch government advocated a hospitable and generous business climate in which departments operated efficiently and decisively. This Cabinet position marked a turning point in the host policy. More attention was paid to actively hosting and acquiring IOs. In 2008, the Dutch constitution had even been changed: Article 90; The Government shall promote the development of the international legal order” (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2008, p. 22). Most of the measures were adopted in 2007.²⁵ In the Netherlands, 26 of the 32 IOs accepted the equalization package, which aligned staff members with diplomats regarding tax privileges.

25 A uniform tax agreement was reached with almost all IOs, except for the Taalunie, which did not want to make a distinction between Dutch and non-Dutch employees. (Steering Group Netherlands Host Country, 2007).

Host policy goals 2013

In 2013, the host policy was renewed again. At that time the number of IOs had increased to 34 in the Netherlands. The host policy needed an update because of “increased competition from cities such as Bonn, Geneva, and Vienna and new players on the world stage, such as Qatar” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013, p. 1). The new policy goals formed ‘priority and focus’ on organizations in the field of peace and justice, organizations linked to established IOs, and organizations in the field of the following top sectors: water, agri & food, horticulture, high-tech systems and innovation, and logistics and energy, referring to the Top Sector Policy. The instruments described in this new policy were focused on buildings, occasional allowances, borrowing facility and a model host agreement (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013).

Nation branding goals 2013

A serious Dutch branding approach started in 2005. The Netherlands Tourism and Congress Bureau would work more intensively with the other parties such as the Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency to send one identity into the world. The policy goals key to nation branding and spatial economic policies were to improve the attractiveness of the Netherlands by focusing on a business climate, innovation knowledge industry, technology – since 1999 especially in IT (Tweede Kamer, 1999) – and accessibility and transport. In 2013, this changed, into policy goals formulated by Netherlands Tourist Bureau attracting tourists and conferences. The four brand values were: Welcoming, Holland as an easy going and hospitable country where anyone can feel at home; Colorful, Holland as an environment with a lot of diversity between landscapes and people; Inventive, Holland as a nation where necessity has led to innovation (such as water management); and Enterprising, Holland as an economic pioneer, not only in the 17th century but also at present” (NBTC, 2013). These four brand values can be seen as nation branding policy goals.

The Hague city marketing goals 2013

The Hague evolutionized into a City of Peace and Justice in the years between 2005 and 2012. Four important changes in policy mark this 'revolution'. Firstly, in 2012, the words 'Peace and Justice' were added to the city coat of arms. Secondly, the new Mayor of The Hague Jozias van Aartsen changed the focus of the city to outward looking, international city of Peace and Justice by strengthening the International Issues department (BIZ, *Bureau Internationale Zaken*). Instead of one contact person, 14 people worked at BIZ. Thirdly, The Hague Institute for Global Justice was established in 2011 as a sign of dedication of the municipality, through investing 17 million euros to make this a recognized international think tank on conflict prevention, rule of law and global governance (Municipality of The Hague, 2011).²⁶ Finally, The Hague International Center (THIC) was expanded and improved. Starting with two awarded National City Marketing Trophies in both 2010 and 2011, the *City Marketing Vision 2011-2015* described the brand of The Hague. First, the percentage of Dutch people thinking that The Hague was realizing its position as International City of Peace and Justice would have to rise from 21% in 2009 to 30% in 2015. Second, the percentage of residents of The Hague thinking similarly would need to rise from 33% in 2009 to 40% in 2015. Thirdly, 50% of the schools in The Hague would have to include a visit to the Peace Palace in its program (Municipality of The Hague, 2011).²⁷ These three can be seen as city marketing goals during the attraction of the UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division.

Bid for UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships (2013)

The offer was not a polished bid-book but consisted of three annexes to a letter through e-mail. The first was on information about the possibility of the Netherlands' hosting UNICEF, UN immunities and privileges, Security and staff wellbeing, Facilities and other related services, financial support, local diversity of population and services to UNICEF staff, medical care, and language facilities. The second was about The Hague – Some facts and figures. The third was on Cost saving potential of Private Fundraising and Partnerships offices in The Hague, as well as cost projections, financial issues, office accommodation in The Hague, international and highly qualified workforce, privileges and immunities, and a conclusion. These elements in the offer were provided on three separate moments. The first was when the organizational network had prepared the bid after the first request in December 2013. In this communication, The Hague was

26 This institute was dismantled in 2018 and failed at being an important meeting place and legal think tank internationally, but at the time it was a significant ambition of the local government to set it up.

27 For the vision of 2011-2015 the municipality made use of the Decisio studies that reported the economic benefits of the presence of IOs and NGOs in The Hague. According to the 2013 Decisio report, the economic spin-off of international institutions in The Hague would bring the local economy direct and indirect benefits of 2,7 billion euros. These effects involved 35,500 jobs (Decisio, 2011). The 2011 marketing vision used these numbers and the economic spin-off for The Hague as starting point (Municipality of The Hague, 2011).

positioned as City of Peace and Justice. The long history of The Hague in the field of peace and justice was highlighted, from 1899 when the First Peace Conference was held. The Peace Palace and the International Court of Justice – “the only UN organ not headquartered in New York” – were mentioned as well. It said that the Dutch government was eager to maintain and develop its country’s status. It mentioned The Hague International Zone, and article 90 of the Dutch constitution, which gave the government the task of promoting the development of the international legal order. In the part on ‘UNICEF and The Hague’ the bid explained that in The Hague many organizations help building a world of justice for all. The accessibility, education and childcare in The Hague highlighted the short distance to the international airport, the distances in time of important hubs in Europe by train, the (highest) concentration of international schools in the Netherlands, the University college of Leiden University and the nearness of Technical University of Delft and the Erasmus University Rotterdam.

The second moment was when the additional information was provided on 2 July 2014. Referring to the visit on 11 June 2014 and the additional questions on the potential cost savings from establishing the offices in The Hague, the letter provided information on Cost saving potential, Cost projections (with information on payroll costs), Financial issues – with one-time costs and set-up costs, recurrent costs, and indemnity costs. About the indemnity costs, the Ambassador of IOs could note that the Ministry was not in the position to fund these costs separately, as “the Netherlands already made a considerable contribution to the separation and termination liabilities fund indirectly” (Ambassador IOs, 2014, Letter 2 July). The third moment was after the Division requested to receive up-front costs for the moving of its offices. In the final offer of 24 July, the Ambassador for IOs answered that the upfront costs ‘in cash’ were difficult to provide, but that there was a possibility of a rent-free period of 10 years, and that other resources were made available in 2015. For more financial options, approval “was needed of both the Municipal Executive and the Municipal Council” (Ambassador International Organizations, 2014, p. Letter 24 July). Annex 3 consisted of pictures of the future office building for UNICEF in The Hague, a map of the International District, and some facts and figures about the Cost of Living in The Hague. With these facts and figures, some mention was made of the competitive edge of The Hague. It quoted two representatives of organizations that changed their location from Copenhagen to The Hague.

Categorical concurrence

The categorical concurrence between the elements in the bid and the policy goals was 55 percent or 20 of the 36 boxes. Of the twelve elements in the bid for the Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division three elements were fully aligned with the other policies: 'Security and staff wellbeing', 'Facilities and other related services', and 'Internationally high qualified workforce'. Five of the elements were aligned with two other policies, three with only one policy and two others with none of the policies (Language facilities and Accessibility). The alignment between the host state policy and the bid was greater than the overlap with the city marketing and nation branding. Noteworthy, the host policy and city marketing goals were most aligned with the bid. For instance, the host policy focused on the acquisition of organizations in the field of peace and justice and some of the top sectors, as did the nation branding. The host policy mentioned hospitality; nation-branding policy did as well. City marketing goals were focused on a better participation with its citizens in radiating the same international and peace and justice vibe. The categorical concurrence between the elements in the bid and the policy goals was 55 percent or 20 of the 36 boxes (Table 5.4).

Depth of information

The policy elements elaborated upon was a little lower than the simple 'mentions': 53 percent or 19 of the 36 boxes, which was coined an 'average alignment'. The alignment was visible between the bid and the host state policy, on the immunities and privileges, security and staff wellbeing, facilities, financial support, and four others. Of the twelve goals in the bids, three overlapped with all the other policy goals. The goals in the bid that aligned with the other policies were firmly rooted in the host policies, in the city marketing (facilities, participation of locals, quality experience and international city of peace and justice) and less in the nation branding (hospitality, financial injections and a highly qualified international work force). The elements with no elaboration in the policy goals were 'medical care', 'language facilities and 'accessibility'. The element with only one elaboration in the host policy goals was 'financial support'.

The alignment was not differing significantly from the last case, although this IO was attracted 15 years later. This is striking because one would expect different outcomes with the rapid policy changes.

Table 5.4 Alignment between policies and bid for the UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships

UNICEF PFP bid	Host policy	Nation branding	City Marketing	Policy alignment
Goals in keywords Elements in the bid for the UNICEF PFP:	recruitment of a new IOs based on thorough preparation in an interdepartmental context, good hospitality, uniform and equal treatment of IO employees	Welcoming, Holland as an easy going and hospitable country where anyone can feel at home; Colorful, Holland as an environment with a lot of diversity.	International City of Peace and Justice, Quality experience, <i>Hagenaars</i> participate, Together with the city and Communication.	The following elements from the UNICEF PFP bid showed alignment on the <i>depth of information</i> dimension:
1. UN immunities and privileges	Good hospitality, uniform treatment of IOs	-	-	‘UN immunities and privileges’ Aligned with one policy
2. Security and staff wellbeing	field of peace and justice, orgs linked to already established IOs	Holland as an easy going and hospitable country	The Hague International Center (THIC)	‘Good living environment for their staff’ Fully aligned
3. Facilities and other related services	Good hospitality, uniform treatment of IOs	Welcoming, hospitable country	The Hague International Center (THIC)	‘Services offered to these orgs and staffs’ Fully aligned
4. Financial support	A uniform tax agreement	-	-	‘financial support’ Aligned with one policy
5. Local diversity of population and services	-	Hospitable country, diversity	<i>Hagenaars</i> participate	‘Local diversity’ Aligned with two policies
6. Medical care	-	‘Life Sciences & Health’	-	‘A good living for their staff’ No alignment
7. Language facilities	-	-	-	‘A good living for staff’ No alignment
8. City of Peace and Justice	Priority and focus on peace and justice	-	‘International City of Peace and Justice’	‘Peace and Justice’ Alignment with two policies
9. Accessibility	-	-	-	‘The accessibility, in Europe by train’ No alignment
10. Office accommodation	good hospitality	-	Quality experience	‘A possibility of a rent-free period’ Alignment with two policies

UNICEF PFP bid	Host policy	Nation branding	City Marketing	Policy alignment
11. Cost saving potential	Cost saving	A financial injection	-	'resources available in 2015' Alignment with two policies
12. Internationally high qualified workforce	Top sectors	Cabinet of Rutte I reserved 7 billion	'Quality experience'	'Promoting the development of the legal order' Fully aligned

Perception of host policy and support The Hague's failed case

Perception of branding policies

When looking at the policy perception and support, one sees an ambivalent image in 2014 The Hague. One international said: "The Dutch are leaders in technology, they could be bolder in promoting that". This representative found it strange that the Netherlands was not more focused on the UN Environment Program: "because arguably the Dutch are dealing with a lot of climate-related issues. Master's degrees are devoted to water management. This is not present here. In terms of knowledge sharing, it would make sense" (Interview B57.74). About the city marketing the representatives were a bit more positive: "I see a growth in the security topic, the security summit helped," said the same respondent, referring to the Nuclear Security Summit in March 2014, when 84 world leaders came to visit The Hague.

The effectiveness of both branding policies was rated higher than their visibility. A member of the International Community Platform was critical about the city marketing: "The target group should be reached more effectively. The encouraging thing is, we actually have it all here" (Interview B44.60). These issues are also among the conclusions of their annual research, where they suggested that "the existing brands in the region [should be] profiled in a coherent manner" (Csoti & Van Haelst, 2016, p. 32). When talking about the nation branding effectiveness the image was that the Netherlands could put more effort in the endeavor. This ambivalence in responses led to a plus/minus for the perception of the branding policies.

Perception of elements in the bid

When talking about the quality of universities and the level of education and expertise of the labor force, the internationals were quite positive. They found that the labor force in The Hague was "highly educated but shortened on a number of aspects: on technology, but also in other areas" (Interview B44.60). What another IO employee found was that "when it comes to attracting talents, the families of the talents are important (...) The soft aspects are being looked at more: partner schools, healthcare, culture, housing, as it turns out" (Interview B44.60). This was the experience for more employees in the period

when the Division was attracted. The perception of the level of English in The Hague was mixed. Although most representatives were generally positive about it, two of the representatives found these qualities “heavily overrated: the Dutch always show a lack of languages” (Interview B50.67). The perception of elements in the bid was predominantly positive and was therefore coined a plus.

Perception of rules and regulations

Concerning the rules and regulations, one NGO employee thought the governmental bodies ‘responding quickly’. The rules and regulations for IOs were seen as well-organized since there were more social events for the international community. Since 2009, The Hague International Spirit started, a mission to intensify the interaction between local, political, business, and educational institutions and the international community. They tried to meet the needs of the diplomatic corps in The Hague (The Hague International Spirit, 2009). One of the IO representatives said about this mission that the Dutch: “...do not know the international segment very well; it is due to hesitation, but also to envy. The expats are not viewed entirely positively, it is seen as an elitist thing. It clashes culturally with the egalitarian system. (...) Internationals have different [higher] expectations of services than the Dutch (Interview B44.60). Because of the hesitation and mixed answers, this element was considered a plus/minus.

Perception of government support

Some persistent policy issues played a role as obstacles to the work of international staff: healthcare, housing, and public transport. Respondents experienced problems in the support to their work. One international employee thought the “hospitals and healthcare should be changed, but the one-stop-shop is well-organized, especially digitally” (Interview B51.68). The International Community Platform concluded that, with a score of 6,8 on the perceived quality of life-career ratings, international talent “might consider opportunities elsewhere or not even opt for The Netherlands at all” (Csoti & Van Haelst, 2016, pp. 13-14). Another employee found that the focus should be more on international staff: “The encouraging thing is that it is all present, but in terms of marketing they are not focused on this target group. Much can be achieved with little pragmatic steps (...) such as connecting students with IOs” (Interview B44.59). One of the respondents found the support in finding a house badly organized: “I lost a lot of money in finding our house, it’s much better to have a Dutch broker. I wish someone had told me that before [moving to the Netherlands]” (Interview B53.70). This element was considered a minus, because the recognition of the Dutch support systems was predominantly negative.

Conclusion

The findings of policy alignment show, again, that the alignment between the goals and the bid was lower in the successful case than in the failed case, which was not as expected. Surprisingly, the findings do not support the policy perception expectation either. In

the time frame the Criminal Court was attracted, the international employees were less enthusiastic about their host country and host city than in the second UNICEF case.

5.3 DISCURSIVE PERSPECTIVE

Discursive explanation The Hague's successful case

Organizational network's priorities and narratives successful case

Of the list the respondents could pick, the highest priorities of the organizational network attracting the Court (N=12) were relevant centers, security, physical infrastructure, and taxes. The Mayor of The Hague, Wim Deetman, detected three reasons why The Hague was the most logical location to establish the International Criminal Court. The first was because Secretary General of the UN Boutros-Ghali had called The Hague 'the legal center of the UN' – with The Hague bluff we transformed what he said into, 'legal capital of the world' (Voorhoeve, 2011). The second was that the developing countries were in favor of The Hague as the location of the International Criminal Court, because many had their education at The Institute of Social Studies in The Hague. The third reason was that former communist countries backed The Hague. The Permanent Representative for the Netherlands to the UN in New York said, referring to relevant centers: "The Hague was the legal capital of the world with the International Court of Justice, and the international law tradition played a major role in the negotiations" (Interview B42.57). Another narrative consisted of good infrastructure: respondents often mentioned Schiphol and Rotterdam – The Hague Airport.

Policy network's priorities and narratives both cases


For the policy network (n=38, both cases) the narratives were concentrated on relevant centers and physical infrastructure. Most of the respondents referred to The Hague as legal capital and strengthening the *brand* of the city. About the physical infrastructure an element significantly higher than others,²⁸ a network member explained: "IOs also look at good housing, financial arrangements, and the package of tax privileges and immunities" (Interview B10.16). Finally, the focus on international schools is noteworthy. There was quite some mention on the importance of schools and educational facilities.

28 Within the policy network (N=38) there was a significant difference in ranking of the elements, as found with the Friedman test, $X^2(38) = 125.9$, $p < .01$. Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was conducted with a Bonferroni correction, resulting in a significance level set at $p < 0.003$.

Comparison between organizational and policy network successful case

The following figure shows the overlap of the means of the top five priorities between the organizational network and the policy network (5 was highest, 1 lowest of the top 5). The only element differing in the top priorities was physical infrastructure for the organizational network and the higher prioritized international schools for the policy network. In the narratives, the differences were in the physical infrastructure.

Figure 5.6 International Criminal Court: priorities governmental groups



Priorities and narratives IO representatives

For the IO representatives (N=13, both cases) the highest priorities were security, settling in and taxes. The group rated security significantly higher than the other groups in The Hague.²⁹ It was often mentioned in relation to the establishment of the International Criminal Court, of which an employee said, “The Court is threatened; we need better protection of human rights defenders” (Interview B45.62). Yet another respondent explained: “Security is important. To attract good foreign talent, even if you don’t offer reasonable salaries, a crime density is a much bigger turnoff. Hospitals and healthcare are also crucial as this is not something that an IO can correct; we are dependent” (Interview


²⁹ This was found with a Kruskal-Wallis H test: $H(3) = 8.89, p < .05$.

B56.73). This was also an element present in the literature about the attractiveness of The Hague. The medical facilities are often mentioned as many complaints were issued about this (Csoti & Van Haelst, 2016).

Comparison organizational network and IOs successful case

The following figure shows the overlaps between the organizational network and the IO representatives. It shows that the security element was prioritized higher by the IOs. The overlaps were mainly found in the settling in and relevant centers.

Figure 5.7 International Criminal Court: organizational network and internationals



Discursive explanation The Hague's failed case

Priorities and narratives organizational network


The organizational network attracting the UNICEF-Division (N=5) highlighted taxes in priorities and narratives, as they were negotiating about the financial requirements. One of the leaders of the group explained that the important elements were premises, conference facilities, privileges and immunities, and budget and organization. The narrative around tax issues was also about the harsh negotiation method of the UNICEF

Division. Many believed that the Division was trying to put pressure on its own government with this attempted move. Another strong narrative I found in settling in which was mentioned in combination with living is easy. Linked to the case some found that the living conditions were great but that the negotiations were foremost about the rent-free building.

Comparison organizational and policy network

Figure 5.8 shows the priorities of the organizational and policy network. The overlap was quite low, and taxes was significantly higher for the organizational network.³⁰ A difference between the organizational network and the policy network was the importance of relevant centers to the policy network, and the lack of importance to the organizational network. An overlap between the organizational network attracting UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships and the policy network was a focus on physical infrastructure and international schools of both groups.

Figure 5.8 UNICEF Private Fundraising: priorities governmental groups




30 A Kruskal Wallis H Test showed this: $H(3) = 8,89, p = 0,031$.

Comparison organizational network and international representatives

Whereas the organizational network prioritized taxes highest, the international representatives prioritized security as most important element. This was also the main difference between the two groups, in priorities and narratives. Another difference I found in the importance of digital infrastructure to the international representatives, as opposed to the organizational network who gave less priority to this. In the following figure, the differences are more visible than the overlaps.

Figure 5.9 UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships: priorities organizational network and internationals



Comparing the priorities of all groups with correlation coefficients

The following table shows that the overlap in priorities in Kendall's tau-b between the successful International Criminal Court organizational network was higher with the policy network and the IO representatives than the failed UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships organizational network. The N is the number of locational elements with which the groups were overlapping with their rating (of the 22 locational elements, four were never mentioned in the top 5). The overlap between the groups was high.

Table 5.5 Correlations failed and successful groups on prioritizing locational elements The Hague

	Policy network	International Organizations
International Criminal Court Organizational network (success)	0.76**	0.73*
UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships organizational network (fail)	0.55**	0.55**

N=18. * p <.05, ** p <.01. Based on 2-tailed Kendall's tau-b.

Conclusion

The table shows that the correlations between rankings of the International Criminal Court-organizational network and the policy network and the internationals are higher than those between the failed UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division organizational network and the other two groups. The narratives have shown that the overlaps were higher in the successful case as well.

5.4 RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Relational explanation The Hague's successful case

Level of network cooperation successful case The Hague

The organizational network was led by a Network Administrative Organization, in this case the ‘Steering Committee’, a collaboration between the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry with representatives from Finance, Justice, the Government Building Agency and the Mayor. The cooperation was rated a 6.3 in the case of the International Criminal Court in The Hague (N=10). The head of the Task Force to set up the International Criminal Court rated it an 8 and observed that the collaboration went well “despite the obstacles and problems that we had to solve; people were active in the areas where they had to make a contribution” (Interview B40.55). The meetings to discuss host state issues and the establishment of the Court were not only held in The Hague but also in Brussels at the *Committee juridique*, the legal committee. The position as a host country was “often one in defense” said one respondent who rated the cooperation low. “There was not enough interdepartmental organization”, he continued: “in the absence of central direction different voices were heard” (Interview B40.55). This makes clear that there was not one central *story* about the attraction and establishment of the Court.


Political process successful case: International Criminal Court

About the ‘rules of the policy game’ the members of the organizational network were only moderately positive. A Real Estate Agency respondent meant that it was not clear who was paying for what and he criticized the Foreign Ministry: “The pressure on the host country greatly increased to get money on the table. The Foreign Ministry has shown anything but leadership here. As a Real Estate Agency, we act in an ad hoc-like setting and we want to get that out” (Interview B18.29). This quote shows that the internal policy game showed some hiccups and that the subject of attracting IOs was not high on the standard agendas. The ‘policy game’ in the Court case respondents found clear. These elements show is that the cooperation levels were average and considered irresolute.

Actor centrality The Hague's successful case

In the Criminal Court case, two of the actors showed the highest betweenness centrality and were the most independent: The Deputy Director of the Task Force and the Task Force. Other highly centralized nodes were the Foreign Ministry and the International Department of the municipality (the forerunner of BIZ). The Mayor of The Hague and the International Criminal Court Registrar showed a lower independence. Four to twelve actors are linked to the central organizations. Many network ties (edges or links between the nodes) were of the same thickness, meaning that the meetings were as frequent. The four actors in the middle can be seen as the ones with a brokerage role in information exchange.

Figure 5.10 Actor centrality during the Rome Conference and establishment of the Internaional Criminal Court



Key:

Size of the nodes: bigger nodes have higher degree centrality (activity)

Node centrality: the higher the betweenness centrality (independency)

Links between the nodes: frequency of meetings (connected to node activity)

Colors: each color is a different type of node (network diversity)

Degree centrality is visualized in the size of the nodes in the graph. The graph shows many middle-sized nodes, such as the involved ministries, the Coalition for the Court and the Support Services of the Court. Strikingly, when looking at the network structure, several sub-networks or cliques are visible in the many departments at the periphery. The table below shows the centrality measures of the five most centralized nodes, based on the betweenness centrality percentage, or the proportion of the whole network. This shows that the Court’s Task Force was the most centralized actor, followed by its Deputy Director.

Table 5.6 Top five actors: Betweenness measures and node type Criminal Court

Node	Betweenness centrality %	Degree centrality %	Node type (diversity)
1. Task Force ICC	21	8	1. National level
2. Deputy Director Task Force ICC	19	8	National level
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs	12	5.6	National level
4. Municipality - BIZ	11	4.8	2. City
5. ICC: Registrar	8	2.6	3. UN/IO

Network diversity and number of nodes successful case The Hague

The number of types of actors during the Criminal Court attraction was eight which was high. The national level contained sixteen actors (including three ambassadors, blue), three of the City of The Hague (yellow) four of the International Criminal Court and UN (purple), two of Parliament (red), three NGOs (pink), one advisor (light blue), two EU actors (orange), and the Prime Minister (dark blue). The only actor type that was not represented in the network was the regional level. The ministries were all involved for a variety of reasons. One important group was the municipal network including the Mayor of The Hague who was a driving force behind the establishment of the Court. The Head of the Task Force of the International Criminal Court was part of this group, as it had strong links with the municipal actors. The number of actors was high: 31 nodes are depicted, and those were actively working together with the organizational network consisting of 12 actors.

Relational explanation The Hague’s failed case

Level of network cooperation failed case

The level of cooperation was low in the case of the UNICEF Division, the rating for cooperation was a 4,8 out of 10 (N=5). The members of the organizational and policy network marked their own cooperation as insufficient. The organizational network first put together a team, and in this case the Government Building Agency was involved, especially with the government. One of the involved exclaimed about their lack of

influence on the process: “What we encounter is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not sufficiently equipped to take on an IO” (Interview B22.36). Another organizational network member described the network efforts as a ‘fantastic collaboration’ between the municipality and Foreign Ministry: “What we always do of course is explain why The Hague is a great city. But UNICEF started negotiating hard”. Another problem was the lack of time. The Dutch delegation asked for a deadline postponement twice, and one of the organizational network members was self-critical when it came to the attraction process, and considered the department was “not running fast enough” (Interview B24.38).

Political process failed case: UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships

One of the Network Administrative Network leading the organizational network explained that the delegation of UNICEF “consisted of an executive director and a deputy, Mrs. Kahn, with maybe 1 or 2 people. She was the negotiator, and it was a bit tricky for the Netherlands: on the one hand we wanted to make a good offer and on the other we knew that Copenhagen has such a beautiful building that they could enter right away” (Interview B15.25). The political backlash of this process was twofold. First, the municipality was in recess during the process which put reservations on the proposed bid. Second, the international game was inscrutable to the involved. As they did not know exactly what to expect, this had an influence on the cooperation and proactive attitude of the network. Both elements of this variable point in the direction of a low level of network cooperation, which was expected in this failed case.

Actor centrality The Hague’s failed case

The nodes in the middle, the most independent nodes with the highest betweenness centrality consisted of three nodes: The IO Ambassador of the Foreign Ministry, an advisor of the municipality and the Deputy Executive of the UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships. Four to seven actors were linked to the organizations in the center. Other nodes were less centrally positioned and showed less independence. Following the three mentioned actors, the head of the international department of the municipality was the most centralized. What is striking, is that the Mayor of The Hague did play a role, but at the periphery, with only one tie to a centralized node.

Table 5.7 Top five actors: Betweenness measures and node type UNICEF Private Fundraising

Node	Betweenness centrality %	Degree centrality %	Node type (diversity)
1. Advisor Municipality BIZ	27	12	1. City
2. Foreign Ministry: Ambassador IOs	22	13	2. National level
3. Deputy Executive Director Management UNICEF PFP	20	8	3. UN/IO
4. Government Building Agency	16	3.6	National level
5. Municipality: Head of BIZ	8	9.5	City

Network diversity and number of nodes failed case The Hague

The number of actor types was six. These consisted of the national level (seven actors, blue), city level (two, yellow), three UN actors (purple), two advisors (light blue), Parliament (one, red) and a Public Private Partnerships (one, dark blue). These 16 actors were collaborating with the organizational network. The only ‘other’ type of actor was the International Community Platform, a network of internationals in The Hague advocating for a better host policy and better conditions for expats in general. The network size was 16, which was considered ‘low’ (less than 20 actors).

Conclusion

The level of cooperation was average in the case of the International Criminal Court, it was low in the UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships case, which was as expected. The actor centrality measures showed four big, centralized nodes in the International Criminal Court-case, with high degree centrality measures, with many links to other actors. In the case of the UNICEF Division, the actor centrality showed three nodes in the middle, with not so many ties to others. Interestingly, the first network is denser than the second, and shows several sub-networks within the network. The network diversity showed a high number of actor types in the Criminal Court case a high number of actors involved. In the UNICEF case, I found an average number of actor types and a low number of actors.

5.5 CONCLUSIONS THE NETHERLANDS AND THE HAGUE

The successful attraction process of the Criminal Court showed an average policy alignment between the policies and the bid. In the case of UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships the alignment was also average. Looking at perception of policy and support, I found that the visibility and effectiveness of city marketing and nation branding was rated low by both groups. Rules and regulations were experienced as bureaucratic,

and although the clearness was rated high, there was also quite some criticism, especially when it came to negotiations and financial issues, for instance, the fact that the host state agreements were not synchronized across The Hague. In the failed UNICEF case, I found that branding policies were considered inconsistent but also that these had improved since the city was steering (again) towards security themes. Handling complaints had been improved and was more appreciated in the second case.

Discursively, I found high overlaps of priorities and narratives between the International Criminal Court organizational network and the policy network. In the failed case of the UNICEF Division, the overlap was lower between these groups. Compared with the international representatives, the organizational network of the International Criminal Court showed a strong overlap in the security element. Another overlap was in the focus on settling in of foreigners. In the failed case, the organizational network and the internationals overlapped in their focus on Taxes. The overlaps between these groups were higher in the successful case of the International Criminal Court in priorities as well as in narratives.

From a relational perspective in the case of the Criminal Court I found that the network cooperation was average but more positively rated and contextualized than in the failed case of the UNICEF Fundraising Partnership, where cooperation was low. In the failed case, the organizational network had difficulties with persuading the other ministries. Besides, a strong competition of Copenhagen and a hard negotiation style of the Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division from Geneva played a role. The actor centrality measures in the successful case showed some strong actors in the middle with many ties to others, whereas in the failed case there were three highly centralized actors with less ties to others. The diversity and number of actors were high in the successful case and average in the failed case of the UNICEF Division, which was an expected result.