'Walking the extra mile': how governance networks attract international organizations to Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen (1995-2015)

Groen, R.S.

"With the Green Climate Fund, there were three cities from Europe.
And that of course weakened Europe because the European votes got divided.
If you had a unified Europe, that would have been different"
(Quote from an employee at United Nations Office at Geneva,
2018, Interview A27.30)

4 GENEVA

4.1 SWITZERLAND AND GENEVA

The second half of the nineteenth century the city of Geneva was growing, as did its role on the international stage. Geneva was home to the founding congress of the Red Cross in 1863. Finally, in 1872, a landmark arbitration award, signed at City Hall, ordered Great Britain to pay substantial restitution to the United States for its role in the Civil War. The settlement of this conflict was "largely credited to Geneva and Swiss neutrality" and contributed to the construction of a solid reputation (Huber, 2007, p. 15). At the same time, the first IOs were established in Switzerland, Bern, such as the International Telegraph Union in 1868 and the Universal Postal Union in 1874. Decisive for the global fate of Geneva was the location of the headquarters of the League of Nations in 1919. Among others, Brussels and The Hague were nominated, but the neutrality of Switzerland and the fact that Geneva was not a capital (thus reducing the risk of the host state interference) were advantages (Picot, 1965). In addition, the personal determination of US president Woodrow Wilson in favor of a non-monarchical regime and a city that was originally Calvinist played a role. The number of international staff was about 200 at that time, but the League of Nations developed during the interwar period and was joined by the International Labor Office (ILO).

The Second World War, however, sounded the death knell of the League of Nations, which resided in the *Palais des Nations* that was erected between 1929 and 1938. This was a determining factor for the establishment of its European branch in Geneva (rather than in London). Thus, the immediate postwar period led to the development of Geneva's international sector, with the establishment of the World Health Organization in 1948, the World Meteorological Organization, and the World Organization for Migration in 1951. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees followed, and the European Organization for Nuclear Research (Republic and State of Geneva, 2013). In 1965, Geneva counted 8,210 international functionaries, of which 80% lived in the Canton of Geneva, and the rest almost exclusively in France. The same year, however, the city lost OPEC to Vienna, which granted the employees complete diplomatic and fiscal privileges (Huber, 2007).

Position of Geneva on the international stage
The position of Geneva radically changed with the disappearance of the bipolar world in the 1990s. All at once, the Swiss haven was no longer of sufficient attractiveness, and at the same time the consolidation of an expanding European Union diplomatically isolated the Swiss confederation. Competition resulted in some notable failures in the 1990s, beginning with the inability to secure the secretariats resulting from the 1992 Rio Environment Summit (linked to the Conventions on Desertification and Climate Change in Bonn and the Biodiversity Convention opting for Montreal). Many UN Volunteers moved to Bonn in 1996 and departments of the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to Copenhagen in December 2006.

The competition between host states of IOs and conferences had increased. States hosting IOs undertook new forms of partnerships between public and private sector in the framework of multilateral cooperation when formulating their policies of action (Swiss Federal Council, 2006). Besides, NGOs were more regularly consulted and even allowed to participate in international conferences. Finally, funding modalities for international bodies were undergoing profound changes from state funding to burden sharing for program funding and implementation. Nevertheless, Geneva kept a predominant position in the realm of IOs. This is evidenced by the major Secretariats of the Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions, the UN Economic Commission for Europe, among others, and the retention of the Human Rights Council at Palais Wilson. It can also count on the highest density of IOs (4 in 2022, in the Lake of Geneva Region), quasi-governmental organizations (ICRC, IUCN) and NGOs (over 450) that have a consultative status to the UN (Republic and State of Geneva, 2020). In Geneva 178 states are represented, which makes it undemanding for the UN framework to operate.[11] In 2020, the Republic and Canton of Geneva counted 40,000 international staff, of which around 30,000 resided in the city of Geneva (Swiss Federal Chancellery, 2019).

In the years 2008-2013 about 21 relocations of departments took place. Humanitarian, human rights and migration IOs moved their IT, logistics and finance departments to Brussels, Budapest, Copenhagen, Istanbul, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Nairobi, Paris, and Turin. The central reason for moving from Geneva was reduction of costs, but also being closer to the field (Bradley, 2013). After some of these relocations, Switzerland and Geneva changed their strategy. In 2013, a report was published by the *Groupe Permanent Conjoint* about the strengthening of International Geneva. The confederation lobbied successfully for a total sum of 117,2 million Swiss Francs (112,6 euros in 2022), allocated for the period of 2016-2019. In 2012 and 2013-15, Geneva and Switzerland set up two large campaigns

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11   Apart from the headquarters in New York, the UN has three additional regional headquarters, or headquarters districts. These were opened in Geneva in 1946, in Vienna in 1980, and Nairobi in 1996.

to attract an IO and an International Secretariat. The Green Climate Fund[12] is a member of the UN family and the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat was set up outside the UN.[13]

4.1.1   Case 1: The Green Climate Fund

In 2009, the first talks about the establishment of the Green Climate Fund took place. In 2010, during the UN Climate Change Conference in Cancún, Mexico, at the Conference of the Parties (COP 16) the UN member states decided to establish the Green Climate Fund. The governing instrument was adopted the next year at COP 17. The Climate Fund is an operating body of the UNFCCC's financial mechanism. Apart from the Swiss, five other countries submitted their candidacy to host the Green Fund in April 2012: Germany, Mexico, Namibia, Poland, and the Republic of Korea. There were various stages of the location decision-making process. In the six months between April and October 2012, the six candidate countries set up a campaign. The possible host cities were Geneva (Switzerland), Warsaw (Poland), Bonn (Germany), Windhoek (Namibia), Mexico City (Mexico) and Songdo (Republic of Korea). 24 Board Members voted for the location; every member had an alternate member. During the months between April and October 2012, active contact took place between the governance networks in Switzerland and representatives of these regions. Before the voting, the Host Country Evaluation Committee explored the reports of the six candidates. This Committee consisted of six members with equal representation between developed and developing countries: Indonesia, Egypt, Spain, Belize, The USA, and the Czech Republic. The Interim Secretariat, in Bonn, played an administrative, logistical, and technical role until the independent Secretariat was established (Board of the Evaluation Committee, 2012). After several rounds of voting where Switzerland was out in the first round, the decision fell on Songdo, Republic of Korea.

Table 4.1   Course of events: Establishment of the Green Climate Fund

2009	First mention of the need to set up the Green Climate Fund (GCF)
2010	Conference of States Parties (COP 16) in Cancún, Mexico, decides to establish the Green Climate Fund, December
2011	Governing Instrument was adopted at the 17th UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP 17) in Durban, April Third meeting of the United Framework Convention on Climate Change's Transitional Committee of the GCF in Geneva, September

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12 This study will refer to the Green Fund, Climate Fund, or Green Climate Fund.
13 For the Canton of Geneva, the number was 86, as they included all organizations with a seat agreement, fiscal arrangement and arrangements on privileges and immunities, including funds, programs, institutes, regional committees and subsidiaries organs (Foraus, 2013).

2012	Submission of candidacies, April
	First Board meeting in Geneva, August
	Meeting with applicant countries in Washington, Mid-September
	Second Board meeting in Songdo, voting by Board members on host country, October
2013	Third Board meeting in Berlin, March
	Final Board meeting in Songdo
	Permanent headquarters established in Songdo, Republic of Korea
2014	Green Climate Fund opens office in Songdo, Republic of Korea

Course of events

From the start, the Swiss Confederation had intensive contacts with the City and Canton of Geneva. Both local entities engaged themselves in this project of making an offer and a bid for the Climate Fund and finding ways to house the UN entity. For example, the Canton offered CHF 810,000 (841,300 EUR in 2022) for the first operating years of the Fund; there was cooperation for the edition of the bid and for the organization of the Board Meeting in August 2012 in Geneva. The Swiss, regional and local actors formed an organizational network to prepare the offer for the Green Fund. After the decision was taken to present an offer, this information was sent to a broader policy network. It included a strong presence of NGOs: environmental NGOs were lobbying for Geneva as the new location for the Fund. The Foreign Ministry orchestrated the campaign, both from Bern and Geneva. It handed in a bid and an offer, the two requested documents. The decision of the member states to establish the Green Climate Fund in the Republic of Korea, came – for most Swiss actors involved – as an unpleasant surprise.

The selection of the future host country for the Climate Fund was one of the main decisions of the second Board meeting in Songdo, 18-20 October 2012, and dealing with this agenda item took significant Board time for two days (Schalatek, 2012). It was also a key deliverable of the Green Climate Fund Board to the Conference of Parties (COP 18) as mandated by the Durban decision in 2011. South Korea was the winner after 2,5 hours of confidential balloting among the 24 Board members behind closed doors under exclusion of alternate Board members, advisors, and registered observers on the third day of the Board meeting. No other results were announced, although eliminated countries were given in writing the number of votes they had received and the round in which they were eliminated. This was a compromise reached at the urging from Namibia. The confidential ballots were sealed and retained by the Interim Secretariat. Five rounds of voting took place. After Switzerland, Mexico was eliminated, then Poland, Namibia, and finally Germany. What had happened beforehand?

As soon as the different candidates handed in the bids in April 2013, the candidates started planning their lobbying strategy as well as their hosting event of the Board of the Green Climate Fund (Green Climate Fund, 2012). All the bids provided information on

the following criteria: financial arrangements, legal status, administrative and logistical support, privileges and immunities, and local facilities and conditions (Schalatek, 2012; Green Climate Fund, 2014). The evaluation team of six Board members had been set up. Since late August, the team of six (from Indonesia, Egypt, Spain, USA, Czech Republic and chaired by the Board member from Belize) had reviewed the host country proposals. The evaluation committee qualified three of the bids with only 'green lights' on the five criteria (Switzerland, South Korea, and Germany). The other three had one yellow 'light' (Mexico for local facilities and conditions), a 'red' light (Poland for privileges and immunities), and two yellow lights (Namibia for legal status and local facilities and conditions).

Furthermore, the evaluation committee met with applicant countries in mid-September 2012 in Washington, conducted site visits accompanied by the Interim Secretariat and wrote an evaluation report shared for comments with the host country bidders (Schalatek, 2012). The bidding countries had one last opportunity to present their proposal to the Board, where every country highlighted their own strength. Switzerland touted its international credentials with hosting more than 32 IOs and more than 250 NGOs as well as foreign nationals from 184 countries in Geneva, whereas other bidding countries promised high contributions (South Korea) or highlighted its dedication to the subject of climate change (Germany and Poland). On the voting day, the 20th of October of 2012, President Lee Mying Bak arrived within one hour after the decision to move the Interim Secretariat of the Green Climate Fund to Songdo, to thank Board members to assure them of Korea's commitment (Schalatek, 2012). The Headquarters agreement of the Green Climate Fund with the Republic of Korea was signed on June 10th in 2013.

*The Green Climate Fund Success Measures (Geneva)*
To define the first type of success, the stages of attracting this case to Geneva is visualized in the following figure. The Green Climate Fund case made it to the first stage: 'factual failure'. Below the figure, these stages are explained (see Table 4.1). The pre-stage is when an IO decides to (re)locate somewhere. This pre-stage started officially in 2010, with the decision to establish the Green Fund at the COP 16 Conference in Cancún. The pre-stage consisted of the announcement that the organization needed a place to settle. The first stage is the Request for Proposals RfP) and the submission of candidates (Stage 1). The next stage was with the first round of voting. Switzerland was out (Stage 2). The second round of voting was the same day, when Mexico was eliminated, followed by the third and fourth round, when Poland and Namibia were out (Stage 3). The final stage was the fifth round, when Germany was out of the bidding game and thereby the Green Climate Fund was placed in Songdo (Stage 4). Geneva and Switzerland made it to the first round, they were eliminated afterwards.

Figure 4.1   First success type for Geneva's failed case: Green Climate Fund

| Factual Failure | Moderate FF | Moderate FS | Factual Success |

Stage 1: Submission of candidates > Stage 2: 1st voting round > Stage 2: 2nd & 3rd voting round > Stage 4: Songdo wins

For the second measure of 'perceived success', the interpretation of the organizational network prevailed. When they perceived it as a failure, the measure would be perceived a failure, when they saw it as a success, a moderate perceived failure. The involved policymakers perceived the attraction process of the Green Climate Fund as an 'electroshock' in the positive sense. They took steps in the direction of a better host policy for IOs. The collaboration between the Canton, Confederation and the City of Geneva immediately changed because of losing so early in the bidding game. They improved the financing policy, as well as the distribution of security costs. An action plan was drawn up in June 2013 with proposals to strengthen Geneva as a hub for IOs. The second type of success is therefore coined a moderate perceived failure.

Figure 4.2   Second success type for Geneva's failed case: Green Climate Fund

| Perceived Failure | Moderate PF | Moderate PS | Perceived Success |

Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Success > Perceived Success

4.1.2   Case 2: The Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat

The road towards the adaptation of the Arms Trade Treaty by the UN General Assembly on April 2nd, 2013, was a nearly bi-decade struggle of intense advocacy and diplomacy. In 2006, the UN General Assembly admitted that the "absence of common international standards on the import, export and transfer of conventional arms"[14] contributed to conflict, crime, terrorism, and the displacement of people. Furthermore, it would undermine peace, security, safety, stability, reconciliation, and sustainable development.

The Treaty is legally binding and obliges states that plan to authorize a transfer of conventional arms to another state first to undertake a risk exploration. This should be based on whether there is a substantial risk that those arms will be used to facilitate violations of humanitarian law or human rights (Callixtus, 2013; Panke, Lang, & Wiedemann, 2018).

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14   Under conventional arms fall small arms and light weapons. These are weapons whose ability to damage comes from kinetic or incendiary, or explosive energy and exclude weapons of mass destruction (such as nuclear, biological, radiological and chemical weapons).

In 2008, the initiators asked the UN Secretary-General to establish a group of experts to examine "the feasibility, scope and draft parameters for a comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms" (Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 2013, p. 5).

The UN General Assembly adopted the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat in December 2009, through Resolution 64/48. The Treaty was open to signature in June 2013. With its entry into force on December 24th, 2014, the Arms Trade Treaty aimed to contribute to international and regional peace, security, stability, and promoting cooperation, transparency, and responsible action among the international community, reducing human suffering (Whall & Pytlak, 2014). However, the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat was set up outside the UN Framework, to avoid bureaucracy that could slow down the implementation of the Treaty.

The candidates and decision procedure
The three candidates for hosting the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat were Switzerland (Geneva), Austria (Vienna) and Trinidad and Tobago (Port of Spain). At the time of the vote for the location, there were 69 states entitled to vote, of which 67 were present at the Conference of State Parties in August 2015.[15] The type of co-decision was however not clear from the beginning; it took a while before the State Parties decided that the vote would be secret. The country with the least votes was out first, then there would be a second and final round. In the first round, 14 voted for Austria, 21 for Switzerland and 32 for Trinidad and Tobago. In the second round (probably the same) 32 voted for Trinidad and Tobago, the other 35 for Switzerland.

Table 4.2   Course of events: Establishment of the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat

2006	Identified lack of common international standards in arms trade regulation
2008	Standardization within the EU
2009	UN General Assembly adopts resolution 64/84 for the set up of the Arms Trade Treaty
2011	Four informal meetings of the Preparatory Committee
2013	Host countries formally announce their candidacy, April-September
2013	Verbal notes sent by the host countries

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15 At this stage, in 2022, the Treaty has a total of 111 States Parties and 30 States have signed but not yet ratified the Treaty.

2014	Introduction of the offers in all the capitals, May
	First informal consultation in Mexico City, September
	Second informal consultation in Berlin, November
	ATT enters into force, December
2015	1st Preparatory Meeting in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, February
	Third informal Preparatory Meeting in Vienna, April
	Final Preparatory Meeting in Geneva, July
	1st Conference of States Parties (CSP1) in Cancún: location is decided on, August
2016	2nd Conference of States Parties (CSP2) in Geneva, August

Course of events

When the organizational network started to attract the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat to Geneva in 2013, a reinforcement of collaboration between the confederation and the Canton took place. The strategy described in the report *La Genève Internationale* was put into practice. The Secretariat would be small: only three (as a start) to – eventually – six employees; the attraction of the Secretariat was more a matter of prestige. Also, the process of attracting the Secretariat was not very transparent. According to an employee of the Foreign Ministry, this was difficult: "There was no clear procedure. There was also no clear leadership, nor a centralized process. I remember (…) we didn't even know to whom to send the candidacy to. For the Green Fund there was an evaluation committee, whereas here (…) the process was chaotic" (Interview A12.14). A widespread sentiment among Swiss governmental actors during the attraction of the Secretariat was that there should be learnt lessons after not obtaining the Green Climate Fund.

The negotiations started and ended in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), but the better part took place in the Conference of the Parties (CoP) under the auspices of the UN. Between July 2012 and March 2013, the Arms Trade Treaty was negotiated in two CoPs. It was not possible to reach consensus at these meetings, which was required for the Treaty to be adopted. Consequently, Arms Trade Treaty supporters moved the Treaty to the UN General Assembly where the Arms Trade Treaty was adopted on 2 April 2013 via majority voting. On 12 August 2015, the facilitator of the Secretariat, France, submitted the answers to an extended questionnaire of the three candidates: Trinidad and Tobago, Switzerland, and Austria. These answered questions on logistical aspects, outsourcing options, conference centers and human resources. Also, they added a chapter on 'other remarks': aspects the candidates wanted to highlight to the facilitator.

The voting for the location of the headquarters took place on the penultimate day of the First Conference of States Parties (CSP1) in Cancun, Mexico, 24-27 August 2015. The represented 67 States Parties would vote for Geneva, Port of Spain, or Vienna (First Conference of States Parties, 2015). The non-recorded ballot was conducted as follows: a ballot containing more than one registered preference would be an invalid ballot, the secret ballots would be collected one by one in alphabetical order, the ballot collection

and count would be conducted by 1 teller accompanied by 4 verification officers that performed these tasks on a voluntary basis and were drawn from a geographically representative pool and came from States that were Party to the Arms Trade Treaty. A 2/3 majority of votes obtained by one of the three locations in the first round would provide the candidate for consideration by States Parties; if none of the tree locations obtained this majority, a second secret ballot would be conducted. The location that in a second round obtained a simple majority of votes would be the only remaining candidate for consideration by States Parties as the permanent seat of the Secretariat. The first ballot would be conducted Wednesday morning local time, 26 August 2015. The second ballot was conducted no earlier than Wednesday afternoon local time, the same day (First Conference of States Parties, 2015).

The Arms Trade Treaty Success Measures (Geneva)
The winning of the Arms Trade Treaty by Switzerland and Geneva was a moderate factual success: they only just made it to the end. The pre-stage consisted of the adoption of resolution 64/84 by the UN General Assembly in 2009, and the Prep Com meetings in 2011. Two years later, a *Request for Proposals* was sent out. The first stage started when three candidates reacted with verbal notes: Port of Spain (Trinidad and Tobago); Geneva (Switzerland); and later Vienna (Austria) (Stage 1). They introduced the offers until May 2014. During the rounds of voting, in August 2015 in Cancún, Port of Spain was the first winner with 32 votes (versus 14 for Vienna and 21 for Geneva) (Stage 2). Vienna was eliminated with the least votes. The second round of voting resulted in Geneva as the winner with 35 votes versus the same 32 for Port of Spain (Stage 3). In the last stage, Geneva was announced as the winner (Stage 4). The victory was not overwhelming. There was a difference of only three votes between the winner (Geneva) and the second candidate (Port of Spain) that won overwhelmingly in the first round.

Figure 4.3   First success type for Geneva's successful case: Arms Trade Treaty

Stage 1: Letters of intent and offers > Stage 2: 1st voting round > Stage 3: 2nd voting round > Stage 4: Geneva wins

As for the second type of success, the Arms Trade Treaty was a perceived success. Switzerland and Geneva lobbied successfully in the hours between the first and second round of voting. In the year beforehand, from the announcement of candidacy in April 2013 and the introduction of the offers in May 2014, the involved were imposed to lobby. About the attraction process, one of the Parliamentarians stated: "The success is that we elaborated on a strategy (…) In the new strategy the city was completely involved, we had the strategy to guarantee to anticipate on the needs of the IOs" (Interview A13.15). Switzerland and Geneva had put an effort in highlighting the high level of diplomatic representation in Geneva, especially from African countries: "Many Western countries

find it important that non-Western countries participate. Trinidad is very favorable from the Global South. A country like Trinidad feels like a winner. Representatives from African countries wondered: how do we get there? There is no hub. A fuzz for diplomats" (Interview A28.31). A Swiss ambassador commented on the success as a victory: "We put our community of disarmament ambassadors in Geneva in the forefront. We have the Conference of Disarmament, which means that there are 55 ambassadors that are accredited as disarmament ambassadors, they meet regularly" (Interview A20.22). The success was therefore also perceived as a success.

Figure 4.4   Second success type for Geneva's successful case: Arms Trade Treaty

Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Success > Perceived Success

Now that I have described both cases and their success measures, I turn to the three perspectives. In each perspective, I first discuss the Green Climate Fund and then the Arms Trade Secretariat. The chapter concludes with a summary of the results.

4.2   INSTRUMENTAL PERSPECTIVE

Instrumental explanation Geneva's failed case
The Swiss host state policy was shaken up during the crisis in the mid-90s when the WTO almost left, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was successfully attracted to Bonn instead of Geneva. In the renegotiation with the WTO (then GATT) the labor market was opened for spouses of international civil servants, and for missions. A working permit was created for spouses if their partner remained his or her diplomatic status. Later, new changes were made in host state policies. In 2006, a memorandum was published to establish a new host State law. The purpose of the bill was "to consolidate the existing legal bases in the field of host state policy and to establish it based on the constitutional powers of the Federal Council" (Swiss Federal Council, 2006). The memorandum concluded that the adoption of the Federal Law of 2000 on financial aid to the Foundation for Buildings for IOs (FIPOI) only partially filled the gaps. That was one of the reasons the Federal Council proposed the adoption of a new federal law covering the privileges, immunities, and facilities and the financial assistance aspects in the context of the Host State Policy of the Federal Council (Swiss Federal Council, 2006). The law was implemented in 2008. One fundamental difference with the former law was the inclusion of intergovernmental organizations in the provision of immunities and privileges. These quasi-organizations are different from International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) in their structure of their members and their funding, as well as in

the tasks entrusted to them. In fact, most of the members of the quasi-intergovernmental organization are states or public-law entities, and most of the financing of the organization is of public origin. These organizations deserved special status, according to the new Act, because "the predominant inter-state nature of this type of organization justifies the granting of a special status in Switzerland, in order to enable it, as well as the intergovernmental organization to accomplish its tasks independently and without Switzerland as a host State deriving financial benefits from its presence on its territory" (Swiss Federal Council, 2006, pp. 16-17).

Host policy goals 2012
A new host state law, referred to as 'Loi Etat Hôte 2007' or 'LEH 2007' had another impact on international Geneva: it constituted the legal basis for acquisitions of buildings for official purposes both for IOs and for the States through their permanent mission. Since 2012, the Confederation could also contribute, on a case-by-case basis, to the rental burden of the IOs located in Switzerland. The goal of the new law was, in short: "not to attract new entities at any cost or to oppose any relocation, but to reinforce the key competences of Switzerland's host state policy and to ensure qualitative development on the territory" (Swiss Federal Council, 2014, p. 29).

Nation branding goals 2012
Nation branding of Switzerland developed since 2002 into a focused promotion of its science and technology, higher education, and innovation environment (Fetscherin & Marmier, 2010). The five branding pillars that Switzerland focused on were (and still are): Peace, security, disarmament; Humanitarian action and law, human rights, migration; Work, economy, commerce, science, telecommunications; Health; and Environment, sustainable development (Group Permanent Conjoint, 2013). Policymakers were, however, ambivalent about these pillars. The areas were broad, and therefore not attracting a niche. Nevertheless, many others did mention the urge to be selective. As one of the respondents said: "Both the Swiss Mission (Foreign Ministry) and us (the Canton) want the same: we don't want to specialize, we want to be generalists. (Interview A4.4)."

Geneva's city marketing goals 2012
Geneva's brand has been under conscious development since 2005. Two surveys were carried out to clarify Geneva's brand image. The questionnaires were given to visitors. The city used the slogan '*Geneva – A world of its own*' (Hyytiäinen, Renko, Gauli, Järvisalo, & Nadan, 2014). On the English website of the city of Geneva in January 2013, the following text was illustrative for the city brand regarding the presence of IOs and international reputation:

> *"Known both as the «smallest of big cities», or the «city of peace», Geneva, among other things, is home to the European headquarters of the UN. Geneva*

> *is linked to Europe's capital cities by its international airport, motorways, and railway network. It is the seat of several major multinationals, as well as the International Red Cross Committee. What is so special about Geneva for the Swiss and the rest of the world? The answer is that it has far greater international influence than any other city of 200'000 inhabitants." (Ville de Genève, 2013)*

Apart from the International character of the City of Geneva and the influence the city aspired to have, Geneva's goals were to be the 'City of Culture' and 'City of Parks', and with the IOs, the international slogan 'City of Peace' was mentioned on the website as well.

Bid for the Green Climate Fund (2012)

The Swiss offer for the Green Climate Fund consisted of three parts: financial, facilities, and legal framework. The first, Switzerland's offer of financial, administrative, and technical support for the Secretariat of the Green Climate Fund, handled the start-up funding, which was 300.000 Swiss Francs for office equipment and 10,000 Francs per workspace. Besides, it offered rent-free offices in a flagship building (of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in Geneva), financial support for the operation,[16] contribution of funding for capacity development,[17] and other support for the Secretariat (administrative and technical issues). The second part, local facilities, was subdivided in four chapters on access to top-quality infrastructure and services; excellent transport connections; access to a dense network of global players, and advantages of a cosmopolitan city. These chapters highlighted all Geneva had to offer with two or more colorful pictures and maps per page. The last part, legal framework, handled the privileges and immunities for the Secretariat and its staff. It offered immunities and privileges to staff, delegates attending conferences, experts on mission for the Secretariat, and family members. Spouses and official partners would enjoy access to the Swiss labor market under the same conditions as spouses of IOs staff in Switzerland, if they resided in Switzerland and lived in the same household. In the bid, the scientific experiences of Switzerland's universities were mentioned, the UNFCCC was highlighted as a resolute advocate of an internationally negotiated solution to the global problem of climate change. Switzerland is portrayed as a determined player in the fight against climate change.

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16 3 million Swiss Francs annually from the Swiss government between 2014-2016, and 120,000 Francs from the Canton.

17 One million Swiss Francs annually between 2014-2016 from the Swiss government to support the activities of developing countries relation to the Green Climate Fund's work.

Table 4.3 Alignment between policies and bid for the Green Climate Fund

GCF bid	Host policy	Nation branding	City Marketing	Policy alignment
Goals in keywords: / Elements in the GCF bid:	'financial assistance, the conditions of reception, work, integration and security in Switzerland of the beneficiaries, a good integration of the so-called 'internationals''	'promotion science and technology, higher education and innovation. Pillars: 1. Peace, security, disarmament; 2. Humanitarian action and law, human rights, migration; 3. Work, economy, commerce, science, telecommunications; 4. Health; 5. The environment, sustainable development.'	'international airport, motorways and railway network. It is the seat of a number of major multinationals, it has international influence more than any other city of 200.000 inhabitants.'	The following elements from the GCF bid showed alignment on the *depth of information* dimension:
Switzerland's offer of financial, administrative, and technical support for the Secretariat of the Green Climate Fund	'Targeted financial assistance' / 'contributes to the good functioning of the organizations established in our country'	'One of the five pillars: The environment, sustainable development'	-	financial support for the operation, contribution of funding for capacity development, and other support for the Secretariat (administrative and technical issues). **Alignment with two policies**
Local facilities and conditions	'The conditions of reception, work, integration and security in Switzerland'	'Focus on science and technology, higher education and innovation environment'	'Geneva is linked to Europe's capital cities by its international airport, motorways and railway network'	A. Access to top-quality infrastructure and services, B. Excellent transport connections, C. Access to a dense network of global players, and D. Advantages of a cosmopolitan city. **Full alignment**
Legal framework	'The good functioning of the organizations established in our country'	-	'	**Alignment with one policy**

Categorical concurrence
When exploring how elements of the bid were mentioned in the policy goals, I found most categorical concurrence with the second element of the bid: Local facilities and conditions. The conditions were mentioned in the host policy goals, in the nation branding goals, and the physical infrastructure and other facilities were mentioned in the city marketing goals. The third element of the bid – legal framework – co-occurred least: only with the host policy goals, where the "good functioning of the organizations established in our country" was one of the main goals. The categorical concurrence was 67 percent, as six of the nine boxes were filled.

Depth of information
The first element in the bid – Switzerland's offer – was mentioned in the host policy and nation branding goals, but not in the city marketing goals. The second element in the bid – local facilities – was mentioned in all the policy goals. The third element of legal framework was only mentioned in the host policy goals. All the elements mentioned above that showed *categorical concurrence* also showed *depth of information*, meaning that all the elements in the bid that co-occurred with the policy goals were elaborated upon, which makes the *depth of information* element also 67 percent.

Perception of host policy and support Geneva's failed case
In the second part of the instrumental perspective, I focus on *perception of policy and support*. I explore the perception of branding policies, the effectiveness of the branding policies to attract them, the elements in the bid, rules and regulations and government support.

The following figure depicts how the policies and conditions were rated by the respondents among the international representatives in Geneva (N=13): the branding polices (visibility and effectiveness), (some) elements in the bids (level of education and expertise labor force, level of English, competitiveness) and the rules and regulations for IOs. Further on, I discuss the background of these ratings.

Perception of branding policies
The way respondents ranked the visibility of the Swiss nation branding was considerably lower than the city marketing of International Geneva. For the effectiveness of the branding activities to attract IOs, the respondents were moderately positive. The pillars to attract IOs were perceived as insignificant: five pillars were set up to focus on in attracting organizations and spent resources. But, as a government official stated: "these pillars are vague, we used to say City of Peace, but we can say City of Humanitarian Affairs, Trade, anything (…) Nonetheless, despite the current situation [budget crisis, 2013] and Geneva being one of the most expensive cities in the world, the working

climate is attractive" (Interview A4.4). This element was coined one plus, because the respondents were positive about branding but negative about the effectiveness of it.

Figure 4.5   Perception of host policy and support Geneva (N=13)

Perception of elements in the bid

The elements in the bid were 'financial and technical support', 'local facilities and conditions' and 'legal framework'. Most respondents were positive about the financial and technical support, but negative about the cost of living in Geneva. One of the respondents of the Red Cross (ICRC) found the "cost of living high; people from embassies have their own currency, the exchange rate is too high" (Interview A24.27). The Green Fund was attracted during a financial crisis, as many mentioned. Related to local facilities and conditions, many were positive, although excellence of the facilities underwhelmed them. Also, the negative attitude towards foreigners in Geneva was in contrast with the 'Cosmopolitan city', as was proposed in the bid. One respondent knew several people who left because of hostility towards them. About the third aspect, the legal framework, respondents were moderately positive. Some agreed that the bureaucracy of obtaining permits for family members is tiring. This element was coined a plus/minus as the attitude was predominantly negative or moderately positive.

Perception of rules and regulations

The rules and regulations for IOs consist of acquiring working permits, legitimation cards, and the implications of the seat agreement, for instance, until what age the children of international staff get immunities and privileges. The different groups rated the clarity of the rules and regulations rather high. Nonetheless, they complained about – the lack and affordability of – housing and the cost of living. Childcare was a problem to them as well because there was often a one- or two-year-waiting list, which was difficult for IO employees who just arrived. Others complained about the boring nightlife, and the watershed in the population of Geneva: locals versus internationals. There was hostility against diplomatic number plates in traffic. One of the municipal employees remarked: "There are a lot of false ideas about us, for instance, that they are taking away our houses, they have the profits, we have the problems". There are some initiatives to try to bring the two worlds together, there are a lot of attempts" (Interview A8.11). A study of the Foundation for Geneva confirms this phenomenon (L'Observatoire de la Fondation Pour Genève, 2013). This element was coined a plus/minus because the rating was high, but complaints were articulated as well.

Perception of government support

About the way possible complaints were handled, most respondents were extremely positive. One Swiss respondent said, about the responsiveness of the government: "When someone has a problem: they take it seriously" (Interview A21.23). An employee at the World Trade Organization found that the handling of complaints had been improved: "Housing for staff has been improved, and there is more of a client-oriented setup. However, the "client is the king" is not the natural attitude here. A lot of the expats find it very hard to adapt. The Japanese and Chinese even have more of a problem here because they are used to be well treated" (Interview A23.25). This element was coined a double plus because of the extreme optimism about how the support had been improved.

Instrumental explanation Geneva's successful case

In April 2013, the Swiss government formally announced its candidacy for the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat. During that time, changes in the host state policy were already on their way. From May 2014 onwards, when the offers were introduced, the Federal Council introduced a host state law in a new 'Message'. Simultaneously, the foreign policy strategy (2012-2015) had stressed the importance of a clear host state policy, by providing for the sustainable promotion of international Geneva in its priority axes (Swiss Federal Council, 2014). "En effet", stated the memorandum enacting the new law: "le rôle d'Etat hôte confère à notre pays un poids politique nettement supérieur à sa taille" or "the role of host state gives our country a political weight far greater than its size" (Swiss Federal Council, 2014, pp. 8).

Host policy goals 2015
The starting point of the new law was a motion tabled in 2012 by Federal Councilor Carlo Sommaruga: "Strengthening International Geneva and Switzerland as places of reception for multilateral international diplomacy" (Swiss Federal Council, 2014). No less than 120 parliamentarians representing political trends and regions of Switzerland signed this. The aim was to lay down the political and strategic framework for International Geneva, namely the strategy pursued by the Federal Council, as well as the necessary financial framework, over several years, to achieve this objective. The financial means to carry out the host state policy of Switzerland were based on two pillars. The first included the funding of IOs, permanent missions, NGOs and other institutions that fell under the host state policy, as well as the promotion of Swiss candidacies for seats of IOs. Secondly, it concerned the financing of infrastructures and their functioning, as well as the construction of the external security measures of IOs.[18]

Nation branding goals 2015
During the attraction of the Secretariat, Switzerland was ranked second in the overall ranking in the Nation branding index of FutureBrand, just after Japan. The second ranking was one place down from 2013, when it was ranked first. Other rankings, such as the Anholt 'Good Country Index', ranked Switzerland 3rd in 2014, based on seven indicators (Anholt Good Country Index, 2014). Furthermore, whereas the Swiss foreign policy of 2012-2015 explained the four main strategic axes as being 'Neighboring countries', 'EU and its member states', 'Stability in Europe and beyond', and 'Strategic partners and global issues', the follow up in 2015, the strategy of 2016-2019 was different.[19] It added peace and security as well as sustainable development to new foreign policy target areas. This change in areas (what Switzerland wanted as an external image) is interesting as there was more overlap with other hubs in the ecology and security field, such as Bonn, Nairobi, and The Hague.

City marketing goals 2015
The slogan 'Geneva, A world of its own' remained unchanged. Surprisingly, on the website of the City of Geneva the only change since 2013 was the paragraph on 'Culture'.

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18   The increase in budget was huge: instead of the normal CHF 72.4 million (64,3 million euros) there was an increase of CHF 44.8 to 117.2 million francs (104,1 million euros) for the period of 2016-2019 (Swiss Federal Council, 2014). This amount consisted of the host state policy (72.4 million francs) and additional resources for the implementation of the strategy (30 million francs). In addition, the Federal Council was asking for two commitment appropriations, one for the renovation of the International Conference Center (4 million francs), and a second for buildings to strengthen the external protections of the sites of IOs (11.1 million francs).

19   The 2016-19 strategy focused on "Relations with European Union and EU and EFTA member states", "Relations with global partners", "Peace and Security", and "Sustainable development and prosperity" (Federal Council, 2012; Federal Council, 2016).

Instead of the following sentences: "Geneva is a city of arts and culture. The City was financially responsible for around thirty venues and performance centers, eleven museums, the Municipal library network and Geneva Library (Ville de Genève, 2013)", the website of 2015 phrased it differently: "A dynamic, international city like Geneva devotes a large part of its budget to cultural affairs. Supporting creativity in the arts and facilitating public access to culture in all its forms are the principal policy objectives of the Department of Culture and Sport (Ville de Genève, 2015)". The goals were thus to make Geneva a dynamic, international city, and to facilitate public access to culture.

Bid for the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat (2015)
The fact that the 'gentlemen's agreement' was not written in stone was evidenced by the Swiss participation in the bidding process for the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat: the Swiss did not leave disarmament organizations for Vienna. The bid for the Arms Trade Treaty consisted of two pages: a front cover and a page with four main categories that represent the attractive facts of Geneva and Switzerland. These categories were 'Inclusiveness', 'Expertise', 'Continuity', and 'Switzerland offers'. In a colon alongside the categories the bid explained the omnipresent representatives of more than 170 member states, the expertise in Arms Trade Treaty-related matters, the presence of relevant partners and the four conditions Switzerland offers the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat (Swiss Confederation, 2015). These conditions were office space free of charge for four years, a financial contribution for the first couple of years, privileges and immunities for the staff, and support by the Welcome Center to assist staff and their families in settling in Geneva. Compared to the other offers, this was a limited offer, except for the logistical aspects and facilities: 173 Permanent missions, 68 of the 72 States Parties of the Arms Trade Treaty at the time were permanently represented in Geneva.

Categorical concurrence
The first dimension of alignment was high: 83 percent or ten of the twelve boxes were filled (Table 5.4). The element 'Inclusiveness' in the bid was mentioned in all other policies. The second element 'Expertise' was aligned with two other policies; City marketing goals did not mention expertise. The third element 'Continuity' co-occurred with all the other policy goals. Finally, the bid mentioned 'Switzerland offers' This element co-occurred with two other policy goals, but not with nation branding.

Depth of information
The alignment of the second dimension was lower – 58 percent or seven of the twelve boxes showed depth of information. Especially the 'expertise' goal of the bid, presenting Geneva as a place with a range of stakeholders with broad expertise in Arms Trade Treaty-related matters', highly aligned with the host policy and nation branding goals. The 'peace and security' pillar of the host policy was elaborated on and a nation branding

objective was 'to make Switzerland a key player in solving global problems'. Another example of high depth of information was the 'inclusiveness' goal of the bid – more than 170 UN member states, among them most of the Arms Trade Treaty States Parties represented in Geneva.

Perception of host policy and support Geneva's successful case

Perception of branding policies

The branding policies and their effectiveness to attract IOs was considered good. One of the respondents said about the effectiveness of branding policies: "If you think of Geneva, you think of IOs, I don't think many people know it as the city of Peace. Switzerland's branding is more one of neutrality. I would say the city marketing is more effective" (Interview A32.35). Others were quite as positive about the branding strategies, especially when they elaborated on all the cooperation possibilities in Geneva because of the presence of other organizations specialized in disarmament. This element was marked with two pluses, as most respondents considered this as positive.

Perception of elements in the bid

The four elements in the Arms Trade Treaty-bid were 'inclusiveness', 'expertise', 'continuity', and 'Switzerland offers'. About the inclusiveness, most international employees were negative. Hostility towards foreigners was every day's business. As a disarmament ambassador said: "We had a Moroccan maid at the time, and she was often examined on the streets and questioned what she was doing in Switzerland. Also, we knew an Indonesian couple that left because of hostility" (Interview A18.20). The second element in the bid, expertise, was rated high, explained a Red Cross employee: "…because Geneva offers many higher education opportunities, also for IO staff that is already working in the field. Professionally they recruit internationally, they do not need a lot of local staffers, only for administrative services" (Interview A33.36). The element Continuity, a bit inappropriate as the Secretariat would be new, was not reflected upon. On the last element, Switzerland offers, many commented positive. The offer for the Arms Trade Treaty was ample, said an Arms Trade Treaty-respondent: "The Swiss have given us rent for four years, we deal with the City and the Police department of Foreign affairs with security needs. It works well. Health care is over-medicated in Switzerland: 40 percent of the women have caesarians instead of the normal 15 percent. And we are obliged to have private insurance. Childcare is a mess" (Interview A31.34). Apart from the last comment on childcare – which has its difficulties for foreigners because of capacity problems – the respondents were positive about the elements in the bid, which results in a plus.

Table 4.4   Alignment between policies bid for the Arms Trade Treaty (Geneva)

ATT bid	Host policy	Nation branding	
Goals in keywords / Elements in the ATT bid:	reinforce the key competences of Switzerland's host state policy and to ensure qualitative development on the territory	The five branding pillars and the aim to make Switzerland a key player in solving global problems; on the scientific side, to make Switzerland a key location for scientific research on global governance	
1. Inclusiveness	'To reinforce the key competences of Switzerland's host state policy and to ensure qualitative development on the territory' / 'Relations with global partners',	'1. Peace, security, disarmament'	
2. Expertise	'Peace and Security' as pillar of the Foreign policy 2016-2019.	'To make Switzerland a key player in solving global problems'	
3. Continuity	'The aim is not to attract new entities at any cost or to oppose any relocation, but to reinforce the key competences of Switzerland's host state policy and to ensure qualitative development on the territory'	'To make Switzerland a key location for scientific research on global governance'	
4. Switzerland offers	'By means of targeted financial assistance, the conditions of reception, work, integration and security in Switzerland of the beneficiaries, a good integration of the so-called 'internationals' is one of the keys to the success of Switzerland's host state policy and contributes to the good functioning of the organizations established in our country'	-	

	City Marketing	Policy alignment
	'Geneva: A world of its own'. The objective: to develop international communication from Geneva, in order to make the assets of Switzerland and International Geneva visible to the international community	The following elements from the ATT bid showed alignment on the *depth of information* dimension:
	The brand was 'Geneva: A world of its own'; including all IOs and the international character of Geneva	'More than 170 UN Member States, among them the large majority of ATT States Parties and Signatory States, are represented in Geneva on a permanent basis. **Full alignment**
	-	The presence of a range of stakeholders with broad expertise in ATT-related matters will contribute to the Treaty's implementation. **Alignment with two policies**
	'Geneva is the seat of a number of major multinationals, as well as the International Red Cross Committee'	By enabling regular exchanges among relevant partners throughout the year, a Geneva-based Secretariat ensures that attention is paid to the Treaty's implementation. **Full alignement**
	'[The GCF led to a] modification of the financing policy for building renovations of international organizations or a new distribution of security costs' / 'Geneva is linked to Europe's capital cities by its international airport, motorways and railway network.	office space free of charge for four years, a financial contribution for the first couple of years, privileges and immunities for the staff, and support by the Welcome Center to assist staff and their families in settling in Geneva. **Alignment with two policies**

Perception of rules and regulations
One respondent of the successful case of the Arms Trade Treaty who ranked the rules and regulations quite high, interpreted them as "rather clear": "I haven't heard about discussions on the host state agreement. Our discussion is more about the mandate of our organization. About what our organization could be doing versus what it strategically would be doing" (Interview 23.35). The rules and regulations are quite strict, according to a second respondent: "You need to pay three salaries in advance if you want to get an apartment. When you sublet, insurance is required, and you need a liability contract. The cost of living is so high that both parents have to work to exist" (Interview A24.27). Others were more positive about Switzerland as a host state, and especially the host agreements. "There is a hierarchy, some are better than others. (…) There are some things that could be improved, but it is a generous package. It's efficient and there's a pleasant working atmosphere" (Interview A30.33). The aspect is coined a double plus, as most found the rules and regulations strict, but very well organized (it scored a 8,76, N=10).

Perception of government support
Most problems IO representatives reported about covered housing, high cost of living, childcare, and bureaucracy. In a longitudinal study of the *Fondation* the housing problems had been addressed, "ringing the alarm bells", because the "fate of "International Geneva" faces painful issues regarding housing, mobility and security. The climate has become strained. This was all it took for some of the population and political classes to point a finger at Geneva's international residents. How integrated do they feel in Geneva?" (Fondation Pour Genève, 2013, p. 4). One of the conclusions of the first study was that the "housing problem must be addressed in more detail (…). The same applies to healthcare, education, etc. One important subject is integration" (Fondation Pour Genève, 2013, p. 55). Two years later the question arose: "Must we see an erosion of the attractiveness of Geneva?". The conclusions were mild: the Geneva-based economy suffered from a shortage of qualified staff, which forces companies to recruit their staff from abroad, but policy responses to the vulnerabilities [shortage of housing, inadequate public transport and the quality of the Geneva educational systems] will allow to strengthen the position and improve the wellbeing of the entire population too (Fondation pour Genève, 2015, p. 62). From the interviews, a similar mildness came to the fore: respondents found the conditions beneficial, the cost of living and bureaucracy levels high, while the availability of housing remained problematic. This element was coined a plus, as the respondents did not think the disadvantages outweighed the advantages of living and working in Geneva.

Conclusion
Although the expectation was that the alignment of policies increased the likelihood of success, the results showed the opposite; the failed Green Climate Fund case showed a higher alignment between the attraction policies and the bid. Perception of host policy

and support were however higher in the successful case of the Arms Trade Treaty. Although problems as outlined above persisted, government support had been improved.

4.3   Discursive perspective

Discursive explanation Geneva's failed case
The discursive perspective is based on the concept of *similar frames* and derived from questions about normative behavior. By looking at these frames, this approach seeks to explore whether overlapping *priorities and narratives* between groups have a relation with successfully attracting IOs.

Organizational network's priorities and narratives failed case
For the organizational network (N=9), the element of *Relevant centers* can be seen as a leading narrative, especially their absence in the case of the Green Climate Fund. As one of the group members said: "Geneva is not a climate and ecological hot spot. We have health, intellectual property, trade, and humanitarian areas" (Interview A13.15). The other most important elements were settling in and taxes, of which the first was more present in the narratives. One Municipal respondent said: "It is about understanding their needs" (Interview A8.10). Regarding settling in of foreigners, the organizational network showed a positive narrative: contacts between IOs and the Head of Protocol (Foreign Ministry) were excellent and visa arrangements well organized. About the host state agreement, the umbrella for taxes, the respondents agreed it to be one of the crucial ones: "Today it is mostly played on the offer, and if there is a competition between the different centers it is about how much he is going to pay", said a Foreign Affairs employee (Interview A22.24). Livability had been considered to have worsened: "living space, housing for staff, a certain client-oriented attitude is lacking, client is not the king" said one respondent (Interview A29.32). Although one would expect that in the experienced city of Geneva the livability would be great, this appeared to be not the case.

Policy network's priorities and narratives failed case
Within the policy network (N=12), relevant centers, political stability and physical infrastructure were key. Political stability in Switzerland, the highest ranked with relevant centers, was accompanied with a strong narrative. The stability is called an important asset of Switzerland: "the fact that you know that authorities do what they say" mentioned one respondent (Interview A17.19). The policy network, being focused on the retention of IOs, considered retaining as a way of attracting new ones. The following, however, captures a contrasting narrative: "We cannot retain all the administration of the UN bodies (…) It is important that the Headquarters stay, to have all the countries represented here" (Interview A13.15). Related to the retention role, one narrative was about the hospitality policies, starting just after Geneva lost the International Labor

Organization to Canada in 1945. When one of the architects of the Swiss host country policy started his work at the Foreign Ministry the Head of mission told him: "Never forget, if you hear something, a criticism, when someone has a problem: take it seriously. Feel wherever you are as a host country ambassador" (Interview A21.23).

Comparison organizational and policy network failed case
Figure 4.6 visualizes the priorities of the organizational network and the policy network. The numbers on the y-axis represent the mean of the group's prioritization: 5 is highest, 1 is the lowest score of the top-5 priorities. The names of the thirteen most often prioritized elements on the x-axis are shortened. The two groups overlap in their narratives about the increased competition with other host cities and the increased pressure this had put on the host policy. In the priorities, both groups scored relevant centers are nearby and cooperative highest.

Figure 4.6   Green Climate Fund: priorities governmental groups

*IO representatives' priorities and narratives failed case*
For the international representatives (N=13) the following elements were key: relevant centers, political stability, physical infrastructure, and taxes are beneficial. As the taxes fell under the host state agreement, this appeared to be crucial. Regarding the physical infrastructure, the cooperation with Swiss Air was described as a priority. Related to an earlier case, when the airline decided to skip flights to and from Geneva, a group member said: "Swiss Air forgot the IO dimension. (…) Within 48 hours, the UN Climate Change Secretariat decided that Bonn would be the new location for the Headquarters.

Even WTO considered moving to Bonn". He continued, still agitated: "not only did the Swiss ignore the significant business they were getting from UN travel, but they also assumed that people traveling from the UN would accept to spend three hours more on the flight and go to Zurich instead" (Interview A29.32). The conditions for international employees formed another strong narrative. International representatives found the international schools, universities, and research centers extremely important. An IO employee said: "The Geneva Academy act as a pipeline for many IOs. There is a direct path from these institutions to the UN" (Interview A32.35). These narratives show that the IO representatives considered connectivity paramount, physically as well as virtually.

Comparison between organizational network and IO representatives failed case
Figure 4.7 shows the overlap between the organizational network and the internationals in Geneva. The priorities and narratives overlap most in the relevant centers and taxes. Where they differ is in the international representatives being more concerned with security, the infrastructure for professional networks and the international schools, of which they were more critical (especially the capacity).

Figure 4.7   Green Climate Fund: organizational network and internationals

Discursive explanation Geneva's successful case

Organizational network's priorities and narratives successful case
The organizational network attracting the Arms Trade Treaty (N=5) prioritized relevant centers, available labor force and political stability. The group promoted Geneva as a hub for arms control, non-proliferation, and humanitarian issues (Swiss Confederation, 2014). A dominant narrative was that many countries are represented in Geneva: the presence of more than 178 permanent missions was often mentioned. A recurring concept was 'synergies', deriving from this presence. One of the parliamentarians combined some of the priorities in his narrative: "the proximity of all the organizations, conferences (…). It is true that we have difficulties, life is costly, but we have an advantage with the location, office space and we have a lot of skilled labor" (Interview A13.15). A former disarmament ambassador answered accordingly: "Geneva is expensive, but the Swiss are always willing to reach deep into the pockets to see if they can offer something acceptable". Following skilled labor, many mentioned the disarmament community in Geneva as an advantage.

Comparison organizational and policy network successful case
Figure 4.8 shows the priorities of the organizational network attracting the Secretariat and the policy network.

**Figure 4.8**   Arms Trade Treaty: priorities governmental groups

The overlaps in priorities and narratives between the organizational and policy network I found in the relevant centers and political stability. Differences were that the policy network was more focused on physical infrastructure and livability. About livability one of the policy network actors said: "Nobody wants to leave Geneva. It's expensive, but they never say it is a reason to leave" (Interview A5.A6.7). Whereas the policy network was prioritizing welcome services and retention, the organizational network was targeting the attraction relevant elements more: relevant centers, physical infrastructure, and taxes.

Comparison organizational network and IO representatives successful case
The following figure shows the overlap between the organizational network and the international representatives. Whereas the organizational network prioritized and told stories about the relevant centers and taxes, many of the international representatives prioritized relevant centers and physical infrastructure. They thought the synergies on disarmament were crucial and were less concerned with taxes.

Figure 4.9   Arms Trade Treaty: organizational network and internationals

Comparing the priorities of all groups with correlation coefficients
Looking at the overlaps between the groups with Kendall's tau-b, the following comes to the fore. The table below shows the overlap between the groups rating the 17 locational elements (N=17, the other five of the 22 were never mentioned in the top 5). The organizational network attracting the Arms Trade Treaty showed a higher overlap with the policy network and with the IO representatives than the organizational

network attracting the failed case of the Green Climate Fund. However, the number of observations is limited, which I consider in my interpretation, where the overlap in narratives is predominant while the overlap in priorities is more illustrative.

Table 4.5 Correlations failed and successful groups on prioritizing locational elements Geneva

	Policy network	International Organizations
Green Climate Fund organizational network (fail)	0.59**	0.47*
Arms Trade Treaty organizational network (success)	0.61**	0.65**

N=17. * p <.05, ** p <.01. Based on 2-tailed Kendall's tau-b.

This table shows that the ranked ordering of elements is strongly correlated across the groups. First, the correlations between rankings of the organizational network that attracted the Green Fund, and the policy network are lower than those between the successful organizational network attracting the Arms Trade Secretariat and the policy network. Correlations between the organizational networks and the international representatives are also lower in the failed than in the successful case. Although these patterns match the expectation that a stronger correlation in rankings of elements is related to the likelihood of success, the substantive differences are small.

Conclusion
The results were as expected: the higher overlap of priorities and narratives between the organizational and policy network the higher the likelihood of success. Strikingly, the overlap between the ranked ordering of the groups shows a stronger correlation for the fourth expectation (organizational network and IOs) than the third (organizational and policy network).

4.4   Relational perspective

Relational explanation Geneva's failed case

Level of network cooperation failed case Geneva
The ratings of network cooperation were high in Geneva, where I found some differences between the failed and the successful case. For the Green Climate Fund, the cooperation was rated an 8,7 out of 10 (N=10). There was monthly communication on a technical level, and twice a year on a political level. When attracting Green Climate Fund, the

meetings were more often. From the moment the brochure and the offer had to be handed in (April 2012) the intensity of the communication between organizational network members and the policy network peaked. The organizational network was unanimously positive: the cooperation was "very good between the City, Canton, and Federal level, regarding strategy, financial support and communication" (Interview A12.14). An actor of the supporting team helping with the campaign stated that the tasks were well distributed: "We were dealing with the campaign, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Environment, Finance. Other government members went to conferences and visits. The host country section played a role, the Canton and the City, and the interim secretariat." (Interview A9.12). Strikingly, although the level of network coordination was high, the attraction of the Green Fund failed.

*Political process failed case: Green Climate Fund*
Between the Board meeting in Geneva (August) and the decisive Board meeting in Songdo (October) the lobby took place. An organizational network member from the municipal level was negative about the policy game: "It's always talks, it's not really clear who pays for what. It's in the end a diplomatic game. They try to let the member states of the UN pay; blackmailing is part of the game. The strategy should be more integrated; now it's everyone on its own level" (Interview A8.10). The policy game was politicized, also argued another respondent: "Politics clearly plays a role, you can offer excellent conditions and support and fail to attract an IO, simply for political reasons" (Interview A12.14). How the game is played also depends on the view others have of the host country, many agreed. "Regional alliances play a role, but these are often unpredictable" (Interview A3.3) argued another respondent. Despite regular meetings, the strategy remained inadequate. The respondents were too confident in their chances of success, which can be illustrated by the following quote of a respondent who warned his boss before the voting took place and said: "Geneva might not take it to the second round, because you will have these geographic constellations independently". He responded – "Are you crazy?" Look at the evaluation, we are doing better than three or four of them". In retrospect, he stated: "My believe is that when Geneva would have survived the first round, Geneva would have good chances to win." (Interview A27.29). From these quotes the image of a highly politicized process comes to the fore, where global constellations were overruling internal tactics.

Actor centrality Geneva's failed case
To explore *actor centrality,* I zoomed in on betweenness and degree centrality. I presumed that higher those measures, the higher the likelihood of success. As is visualized in graph 4.10, several members played central role in the network of information exchange. Four to eight persons were linked to the organizations in the center. Some of these ties or edges (lines between the dots or nodes) are thick, meaning that they had more contact than the thinner ties.

When starting with betweenness centrality, the actors with a high betweenness centrality, the 'brokers' with a capacity to facilitate or limit interaction between the nodes it links, were the 24 Green Fund Board Members who were lobbied during the final part of the attraction, the others were the UN Office of Geneva, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Those were the most independent actors.

Figure 4.10   Actor centrality during the attraction process of the Green Climate Fund

Key:
Size of the nodes: bigger nodes have higher degree centrality (activity)
Node centrality: the higher the betweenness centrality (independency)
Links between the nodes: frequency of meetings (connected to node activity)
Colors: each color is a different type of node (network diversity)[20]

The degree centrality is visible in the size of the nodes in the graph. This measure defines the degree of participation of each actor in relation to the total number of ties between the actors of the network. The thickness of the ties, edges, or lines between them shows the frequency of interactions, showing how active the nodes were during the process. The member of the Support team, working at the IOs and host policy section of the Foreign Ministry, was the most active and central actor. Other ministries, the FIPOI the building agency, the Mayor and the United Nations Office of Geneva played active roles as well. The following table shows the centrality measures for the five most central nodes, based on the betweenness centrality percentage. These measures show the proportion

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20   See for an overview of the colors Table A8 in the Appendices.

of centrality each actor had. Interestingly, the 24 Board members show the highest percentage, meaning that they were actively targeted in the lobby. It also means they were the most independent actors. The second and third were the UN office of Geneva and the Foreign Ministry, the latter showing the highest degree centrality. This actor was, however, active, not the most centrally placed and did not have the broker position as was expected.

Table 4.6 Top five actors: Betweenness measures and node type Green Climate Fund

Node	Betweenness centrality %	Degree centrality %	Node type (diversity)
1. 24 GCF Board members	20	6	1. Federal level
2. UN Office of Geneva	20	4	2. UN/IO
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs	17	10	UN/IO
4. City: External relations	12	9	3. City
5. Swiss Parliament	10	7	4. Parliament

Network diversity and number of nodes failed case Geneva: Green Climate Fund
When exploring network diversity, the findings show six different types of actors. These were from the Federal department (twelve actors, light blue in the graph), the Fondation of Geneva (three, dark blue), the City of Geneva (two, yellow), the Canton of Geneva (three, green), the United Nations (two, purple), and Parliament (one active member, red). This number of six types is coined an 'average network diversity' (between 4 and 6 types).

When zooming in on the network size and the number of 23 actors depicted above, of those 15 were actively involved at the Geneva side. Of the 15 actors four were interacting with the 24 Board members of the Green Climate Fund: The Canton, the City, Swiss Parliament, and the IO Division of the Foreign Ministry. The lack of NGOs is remarkable in this graph, showing no activity. This is even more striking as one of the UN Office of Geneva employees said to have included that in the strategy and one of the reasons why the Green Fund should be in Geneva. The total number of 23 actors is considered an average network size (between 20 and 25 actors).

Relational explanation Geneva's successful case

Level of network cooperation successful case Geneva
The organizational network that attracted the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat to Geneva rated their cooperation quite positively, which is not surprising. The intensity of communication had changed since the last case. The respondents (N=12) rated the

cooperation a 9, which was high. According to an expert, this was all due to an evolution in the host policy. One of the organizational network members found that "It worked very well. We usually have meetings 3 times a year with the *Group permanent conjoint*. It is a place where people can talk freely" (Interview A5.7). There was also a member of the policy network who considered the quality of the communication as improved in two years' time: "It was a 5 or 6 and now it's 9 (…). We have noticed since 3 or 4 years since Didier Burkhalter [the Foreign minister] that it has been improved" (Interview A10.13). Strong personalities played a role in this, he said: "The maintenance of the quality of International Geneva. Sommaruga [the Parliamentarian] is a convincing person, who fights for support for international Geneva" (Interview A10.13). Another type of cooperation took place between some associations for international employees, which was part of one of the key policy goals: to integrate the international staff more into the local community. An organizational network member found, however, that cooperation was especially needed on a Presidential level, as the Swiss President changes every year. The importance of 'strong personalities' is interesting in this regard, as it was not mentioned in the Green Fund case.

Political process successful case: Arms Trade Treaty
Many interviewees felt that the negotiations were taking place outside their sphere of influence. As soon as the embassies got involved, they were offered a note for visits abroad. More than one respondent had mentioned the advantage of hosting a delegation in their own host city. The sense of direction was however felt as relatively absent. With no idea of a clear procedure, the process felt a bit 'out of hand'. One of the network members even called the political process "chaotic" (Interview A12.14). These findings show mixed results about the level of *network cooperation*, although the ratings were high.

Actor centrality Geneva's successful case
When first reviewing betweenness centrality, the actors 'in the middle' with most independence and a broker position were the Foreign Ministry and the Presidential Department of the Canton. Two other central nodes were the Cantonal Welcome center and the building agency (FIPOI) which was involved for the location of the Secretariat. The ties between the Foreign Ministry and the Canton Presidential Department were the thickest, plus the ties between the Foreign Ministry and the Protocol Service of the Canton. What this graph shows is that one actor was the most central in the network, but that the less centralized President Department of the Canton had the most ties with actors in the periphery in the network. The ties with this department were thick, meaning that they often met and had large flow of information. The Foreign Ministry in the middle, shows more than ten individual ties with other actors. Besides, two persons of the Foreign Ministry were centrally positioned in the network, having a high degree of independence.

Figure 4.11 Actor centrality during the attraction process of the Arms Trade Treaty

Key:
Size of the nodes: bigger nodes have higher degree centrality (activity)
Node centrality: the higher the betweenness centrality (independency)
Links between the nodes: frequency of meetings (connected to node activity)
Colors: each color is a different type of node (network diversity)

In the following table, the nodes with the highest percentages of betweenness centrality are depicted. The links or ties between the President Department of the Canton were the most apparent.

Table 4.7 Top five actors: Betweenness measures and node type Arms Trade Treaty Geneva

Node	Betweenness centrality %	Degree centrality %	Node type (diversity)
1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs	12	4.6	1. Federal level
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs	9	3.7	Federal level
3. Canton: Welcome center	8	4	2. Canton
4. Canton: Department President	8	5	Canton
5. Foundations for Buildings for IOs (FIPOI)	7	3	3. Public Private Partnership

Looking at the second measure, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat and President department of the Canton showed the highest degree centrality. Those were the most active actors. NGOs and Public Private Partnerships such as the building agency were also quite active. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDR) was an important collaborator, as well as the Democratic Control

of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva Disarmament Platform, and Geneva Center for Security Policy. The 69 Signatories of the Arms Trade Treaty were lobbied actively. Not only members of the organizational and policy network, but also players such as the UN Office of Geneva and the Foreign Minister himself aimed to win votes from the 67 represented Signatories.

Network diversity and number of nodes successful case Geneva
In the case of the Arms Trade Treaty, there were eight different types of actors. These were from the Federal department (thirteen actors, blue), Public Private Partnerships (four, dark blue), the City of Geneva (three, yellow), the Canton of Geneva (five, green), the United Nations and other IOs (eight, purple), Parliament (one active member, red), NGOs (four, pink) and a business (one, light blue). This number of eight is marked a 'high network diversity', as more than seven types were involved. In total, the number of network actors, as visualized in the graph above, was 39 which was high.

Conclusion
The intensity of cooperation was high in both cases. The betweenness and degree centrality measures of the Green Climate Fund showed that the position of three main actors was right at the center of the network but that these did not have as many ties with others as in the second Arms Trade Treaty case. The number of node types was average, while the number of actors was low. The case of the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat showed only one central actor but many other less central but very connected other actors. This case showed a high network diversity and a high number of network actors.

4.5   Conclusions Switzerland and Geneva

The alignment between the bid and the attraction policies appeared to be less in the successful case of the Arms Trade Treaty than in the failed case of the Green Climate Fund. This is telling, as it seemed less relevant to have the policy goals aligned than to attend to the needs of the international representatives as a governance network. When zooming in on policy perception and support, international representatives commented more negatively during the attraction of the Green Climate Fund than in the Arms Trade Treaty case. They were complaining during the first attraction process (2011-12) about affordable housing, space in the city and security issues. Another worry was the capacity of childcare. During the attraction of the second case, representatives were slightly more positive; the feeling of security and safety in Geneva was higher. The support had been improved, especially when it came to issues such as allowance of children at international schools.

From a discursive perspective, the overlap of priorities between the organizational network attracting the Green Climate Fund and the other two groups was slightly lower than in the successful case. The overlap between the narratives of the organizational network attracting the Arms Trade Treaty and the other two groups was also higher, especially in their view of the disarmament hub in Geneva. Many of the narratives described the presence of professional network opportunities quite positively.

From the relational perspective, I found that in the successful case of the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat, the respondents rated the cooperation slightly higher. An example is the successful lobby in Parliament to get more funding for the Canton of Geneva to make International Geneva more attractive. Although the differences between these rankings were small, the involved had a more intense cooperation in the second case. What was striking in the network structure, was the different shapes of the graphs. The first diagram showed a relatively sparse information network in which the responsible ministry played a central role, supported by the UN Office of Geneva and the Board Members of the Green Fund. In the second diagram, the network looked denser and even showed networks within networks, or different *cliques*. The most active members were not the most independent ones but were even located in the periphery of the network, meaning that they were highly interdependent with others. The diversity of actor types was high in the successful case and average in the failed case of the Climate Fund. The high level of interaction with NGOs, the United Nations Office of Geneva and the intensity of lobbying persuaded all the countries that voted for Vienna in the first round to vote for Geneva in the second.