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‘Walking the extra mile’: how governance networks attract international organizations to Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen (1995-2015)

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RESEARCH DESIGN AND OPERATIONALIZATION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

As I want to explain the success and failure variables of governance networks attracting IOs to small to medium-sized cities, I use a comparative case study design.³ Comparative case studies usually employ both qualitative and quantitative methods and are particularly useful for understanding how the context influences the successes of program or policy initiatives. A case study is an intensive study of a single case or a small number of cases for the purpose of understanding a larger set of similar cases (Gerring, 2009; Yin, 2014). The use of case study methods has some consequences, one being that more intensive research is possible than with a cross-case study, which is often a large-N study comparing many cases. Other consequences are that it allows the possibility of focusing more on causal mechanisms and that the data availability is concentrated. The trade-off of doing case studies is that it is not possible to test hypotheses, as case study methods have more of a hypothesis-generating goal, and a somewhat smaller degree of confidence. The internal validity of case study methods is high, as they are better at establishing the accuracy of a causal relationship between independent and dependent variables, and better at explaining causal mechanisms.

In case study research, a question often asked is: “Of what is the case a case of?” (Dellepiane, 2015, p. 14). As Gerring argues, “A study of the French Revolution may be conceptualized as a study of revolution, of social revolution, of revolt, of political violence, and so forth. Each of these topics entails a different population and a different set of causal factors” (2007, p. 41). In this study, I selected cases from four cities with a comparable background. These cases are different; these cities are as much similar as possible given the instances in which a discussion on IOs has taken place. Afterward, I select the IOs in those four cities. The IOs are selected from the types that I touched upon in the introduction: UN and IO headquarters and departments, and Quasi-IOs. By selecting different cities (and not multiple cases in one city) I can compare both successes and failures, and compare the cities, as some of the cities competed against each other to attract the same IO.

3 Looking at small to medium-sized cities makes sense because these have an increasing number of competitors when looking at the attraction of IOs. Not only are they competing with so-called global cities, such as New York, Seoul, Nairobi, and Paris, but also more and more with non-Western cities in the Middle East (Qatar) and Asia (Singapore, Shanghai), especially when looking at becoming hubs for IOs.

In the following sections, I explain how the city and IO cases are selected, how I carried out the data collection and analysis, and how the three perspectives are operationalized. The chapter concludes with a summary of the research strategy.

3.2 SELECTION OF CASES

As explained my research design is based on cases of attracting IOs in cities that are, as much as possible, comparable. The reason behind this choice is to focus on characteristics of the network supporting the attraction of an IO while keeping other factors, that is, those related to the immediate context in which this process takes place, as much as possible constant. I will start by focusing on this context before moving to the selection of my cases.

To properly compare several attraction processes for IOs, the cities had to have some common characteristics. The first criterion was geographic location. As the research question is on governance networks in small to medium-sized Western European host cities, I first looked at several definitions of ‘Western European’ and then opted for a broad scope. I selected the cities in the unofficial Regional Group in the UN ‘Western European and Others Group’. Table A1 in the Appendices shows 23 countries that fall under this category. Choosing from this group led to a better and more balanced decision than choosing a narrower definition of Western European such as the UN geoscheme classification, consisting of nine countries. The Model European Parliament classifies only seven countries as ‘Western Europe’, while the EuroVoc classification includes twelve. In the broader definition, the countries in the Western European and Others Group act as voting blocs and negotiation forums (UNAIDS, 2010). This means the cities are in the same boat when it comes to voting on important global decisions, such as the location of an IO. Within this broad definition, I reason that cities should be centrally located for reasons of comparability. Some of the cities were less suitable for comparison as these are in the periphery of the European and Others Group, such as Ankara, Lisbon, Dublin, and Helsinki.

The second criterion was size: a small to medium-sized city is a city with between 70,000 and 2 million inhabitants (Campbell, 2000). This criterion is important since I want to know how processes of attracting IOs in *small to medium-sized* West European host cities take place. IOs tend to cluster in places with a *hub* for IOs which is often available in medium-sized cities – think of Geneva, Strasbourg, The Hague, Stockholm, Bonn, and Barcelona. When the cities are small to medium-sized, they also share similar difficulties (lack of affordable housing) and benefits (easy to get around, an international community one can oversee). Many cities in Europe fall outside this scope. If I look at the 28 cities included in Table A1 in the Appendices, I can see that some of the remaining

cities located in the center of the area are too big (London, Paris, Rome) and others too small (Monaco, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg City).

Narrowing down the number of cities even further, the third criterion was the content of the topics the cities compete on. As depicted in Table A1 in the Appendices, each city has its own favored topic to attract IOs. The reason this is a relevant criterion is that I wanted cities with a similar focal area while attracting IOs. Several cities are excluded because they have a different focus when it comes to attracting IOs. Examples include Bonn, a city committed to climate and sustainability, and Strasbourg and Brussels, two cities focused on European institutions rather than international ones.

The four cities that remained were Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen. They are small to medium-sized: Geneva being the smallest (202,000 in 2021), and Vienna the largest (1.9 million in 2021). They are in a similar geographic location, Copenhagen being slightly further north but not located in the periphery, and the cities host many IOs focused on similar topics, such as peace, security, justice, humanitarian aid, environment, and life sciences.

The first city, Geneva, is the most well-known hub for UN organizations, with the highest density of international employees living in the city compared to others. It also has the longest history of attracting IOs and is seen as the Second UN City, with the most headquarters after New York. The Hague is one of the smaller cities, having been neutral in World War I, just like Geneva, which played a role in the attraction of some of the first IOs. With the International Court of Justice, The Hague also has the name of Second UN City – this is a much-debated title both cities claim. Vienna is also known as a UN City and hosts many headquarters in the field of security and non-proliferation. It is seen as a diverse city that bridges cultures between Eastern and Western Europe. With an eventful past, Vienna has grown into one of the safest cities worldwide with the highest scores on livability, thus increasing its attractiveness to IOs. Lastly, Copenhagen competes with Vienna on the highest livability benchmarks, being the city with the ‘happiest people’ in the world and marketed as ‘the world’s best city for families.’ Copenhagen has been competing fiercely to attract IOs since 2013 when its ‘UN City’ building was finished and needed to be filled with – preferably UN – organizations.

The way to proceed and choose cases of attracted IOs in the cities is to make a careful selection while noting that the characteristics of the governance networks are different, while the background factors are comparable. For instance, when comparing how the act of attracting IOs is related to success, the differences among these cities are less important than the causal relationship suggested by the mechanisms I would like to research as part of my network perspective (Anckar, 2008). The way governance networks in the host city apply, lobby, and bid for IOs prevails. In other words, the object under study is not

the cities themselves or how the cities handle the attraction process, but the processes of attraction set up by governance networks. These networks consist of a mix of municipal, ministerial, academic, IO, and NGO actors.

Through a selection of similar types of cities, the differences between the governance networks can be studied in a clear-cut manner. The cities and their similar background factors form the contexts in which the governance networks operate.

IO case selection

Having established that the cities show some important similarities but are far from equal, I selected the IOs on the dimension of their diversity. As the research question focuses on what contributes to the successes and failures of governance networks in these cities, I selected a failed and a successfully attracted IO in each city. One of the criteria of this selection was, obviously, that at least one of the cities was in global competition to attract the IO. Secondly, the time span when the attraction processes took place was in the 20 years before I started this project (1995–2015). A period of 20 years was relevant because of the data collection: older cases are harder to study when conducting in-depth interviews. Thirdly, I looked for variation and a diverse set of organizations, selecting from UN headquarters and departments (the universal type), IO headquarters and departments (the intergovernmental type), and Quasi-IOs. Table A2 in the Appendices depicts the IOs that were newly created or moved to the four cities between 1995 and 2015. I selected one from the category of UN headquarters (UNOPS in Copenhagen), three of the IO headquarters (Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat, Green Climate Fund, and International Criminal Court), one UN department (UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships), and one Quasi-IO (Sustainable Energy for All). By having a broad group of cases, the study seeks to be as representative as possible to explore the phenomenon of attracting IOs. However, as I chose the small and medium-sized cities first, the selection of IOs is not entirely representative of the total population of IOs. Nevertheless, this selection provides a good representation of the processes of attracting and retaining IOs, as the IO cases differ in size, type, process duration, and the number of competing host states and cities. Two IOs were attracted simultaneously by two of the cities: the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat by Geneva and Vienna, and the Sustainable Energy for All by Vienna and Copenhagen. Table 3.1 depicts the selected cases, whether they were failed to be or successfully attracted, and their characteristics, such as type, size, timespan and number of competing candidate cities.

Table 3.1 Selected cities, IO-cases, and characteristics (type of IO, size, time span, no. of competitors)

Cities	IO-cases (Failure/Success)	IO characteristics
A. Geneva	1. Green Climate Fund (F)	– Type: IO Headquarter – Size: 750 working stations – Time span: 2012–2014 – No. of competitors: six
	2. Arms Trade Treaty (S)	– Type: IO Headquarter – Size: 6 working stations – Time span: 2013–2016 – No. of competitors: three
B. The Hague	3. International Criminal Court (S)	– Type: IO Headquarter – Size: 900 working stations – Time span: 1996–2002 – No. of competitors: three
	4. UNICEF Private Fundraising Partnerships (F)	– Type: UN Department – Size: 450 working stations – Time span: 2013–2014 – No. of competitors: four
C. Vienna	5. Arms Trade Treaty (F)	– Type: IO Headquarter – Size: 6 working stations – Time span: 2015–2016 – No. of competitors: three
	6. Sustainable Energy for All (S)	– Type: Quasi-IO – Size: 30 working stations – Time span: 2015–2016 – No. of competitors: five
D. Copenhagen	7. UNOPS Headquarters (S)	– Type: UN Headquarter – Size: 120 working stations – Time span: 2005–2006 – No. of competitors: five
	8. Sustainable Energy for All (F)	– Type: Quasi-IO – Size: 30 working stations – Time span: 2015–2016 – No. of competitors: five

3.3 DATA COLLECTION

For the qualitative research, I used different sources: I conducted in-depth interviews to gather information about the cases and attraction processes, and I studied over 200 policy documents containing bid books, policy strategies, correspondence of governments with

IOs, records of city council meetings, websites, and studies about local host policies.⁴ The information gathered from the interviews was combined with the other sources. When writing the city chapters and case descriptions, I based the information mostly on primary sources from the IOs, ministries, city councils, and regional institutes. For the timeline of the cases, I used information from the interviews combined with evaluation studies. At times when information was not available or could not be gained from the interviews, I used Freedom of Information Requests to gather governmental information (in The Hague and Copenhagen).

In 2012 and 2013, I first conducted a pilot study in two cities – The Hague and Geneva – to check and improve my questionnaire (see Table A3 in the Appendices). The pilot study consisted of two rounds of semi-structural interviews in The Hague (2012–2013) and Geneva (April 2013). The data were analyzed with a coding scheme (Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendices) and the questionnaire was subsequently improved based on these codes. After the pilot study, I undertook three trips to Geneva⁵ and Vienna⁶ and two to Copenhagen⁷ and conducted four rounds of interviews in The Hague.⁸ For the selection of the respondents, I used the snowball method. Each time I finished up an interview, I asked the respondents who else I needed to approach for more information.

My goal was to speak to all the organizational network members and a selection of the policy network members. In the final phase, I sent the list of organizational network members of each case to the network administrative organizations. When the list of organizational network members was incomplete, I supplemented it and contacted other members.

For the IOs, my goal was to have a mixed group of respondents, whom I gathered using the same snowball method. The type of IO employee was not important to this study, I wanted to approach a mixed group of international employees. For this group, in-depth interviews with a group of 12 to 18 representatives per city was considered sufficient. I interviewed employees from IOs, INGOs, think tanks, specialists, and Quasi-IOs.

In Table 3.2 I present an overview of respondents. Some were interviewed twice or even three times (see Table A6 in the Appendices). The broader policy network was involved

4 The sources are made available via the DANS archive: <https://easy.dans.knaw.nl/ui/datasets/id/easy-dataset:213881/tab/1>

5 April 2013 as a pilot, April 2014, December 2015, and August 2018.

6 November 2014, February 2015, and March 2017.

7 April 2017 and April 2018.

8 March 2012–March 2013 as a pilot, one round in March–April 2014, in March 2015, in December 2016–March 2017, and in November 2018.

in all campaigns and consisted of more actors. Table 3.2 depicts the respondents of the four groups per city. The study consisted of 175 interviews with 150 interviewees, which led to 198 different observations. As a number of these respondents had different roles, they were counted twice or even three times. The figure of 198 is therefore the number of observations and not the number of people. They were, for instance, in both the organizational network for the failed case and the successful case in their city. In that situation, I either held two interviews or separated the cases within the interview and counted them twice, as a member of both groups.

Table 3.2 Types of respondents in Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen

Host city \ Type of group	Organizational network that attracted the successful case	Organizational network that attracted the failed case	Policy network for retaining IOs	IO representatives	Total per city
Geneva	7*	7	14	13	41
The Hague	12	6	38	18	74
Vienna	8	5	17	16	46
Copenhagen	5	5	15	12	37
Total per group	32	23	84	59	198**

* These numbers are the total number of key persons in the organizational networks.

** The number of 198 is higher than the factual number of respondents: I conducted 175 interviews with 150 interviewees, sometimes meeting people twice or three times over the period of 2012–2018.

The questionnaire consisted of four parts: 1) a card game where respondents were asked to organize locational elements for the discursive perspective; 2) competitiveness; 3) branding; and 4) policy and political process. To collect more details, I asked the respondents to grade some of the questions from 1 to 10, such as the clarity of rules and regulations, the visibility and effectiveness of branding policies, and what they thought of the cooperation in their networks. After grading, I asked them to elaborate. I analyzed these elaborations in the ways described in the following sections.

3.4 OPERATIONALIZATION

First, the dependent variable is operationalized in two ways: as factual success, and perceived success. Second, the independent variables are operationalized in the following sections.

3.4.1 Operationalizing the success variable

For the ‘success as fact’ type, I explore success by examining the attraction process. The spectrum from failure to success consists of four stages. The first is a factual failure: this is when the host city is out of the race because it loses in the first round of voting. When no voting takes place, this is the stage when a host city has submitted a bid and is initially considered, but then does not meet the criteria and is rejected after the submission.

The second is a moderate factual failure, when the host city is out of the race after the first stage of the process, for instance in the second round of voting. Without a voting procedure, a potential host city makes it halfway through the decision-making process.

The third stage is a moderate factual success. This degree applies when the host city either only just loses or only just wins the IO. For example, when a host city wins a voting procedure by only the slightest of margins over the runner-up, or when the city only just loses in the last round after, for example, a heads or tails situation occurs. Without a voting procedure, this means that the host city and country are considered until the final two options.

The last stage, a factual success, means that the host city is overwhelmingly successful in attracting the IO. It wins the vote with a large majority. When there is no voting, this means the host city is seen to be the right place from the beginning and no competitors offered a viable alternative.

The way I explore ‘perceived success’ is by gathering information of the organizational network members about how they assess the attraction process. As the size of such an organizational network is rather small (6-12 people) and as I interviewed almost all of these actors, the overall perception could be assessed. When the overall assessment was negative and the process failed, it was a ‘perceived failure’, whereas when the overall perception was positive, while the process in fact failed, it was considered a ‘moderate perceived failure’. Continuing, when the case was successfully attracted but the overall assessment was negative, the process was considered a ‘moderate perceived success’, whereas when it was successfully attracted and the perception was also positive, it was coined a ‘perceived success’.

3.4.2 Operationalizing the instrumental perspective

The governance network is expected to have a higher likelihood of success when the attraction policies show a higher alignment with the bid book for the case. The concept was policy design. One way to explore this is by looking at ‘goal alignment’. This term

has been borrowed from strategic management and goal setting theories but has also been tested empirically in public organizations (Andrews, Boyne, Meier, O'Toole Jr., & Walker, 2012) using Vertical Strategic Alignment. The method, however, focused on testing the employees' alignment with strategic goals, which makes it less applicable to this study. Another way to explore goal alignment, defined as "linking individual goal outcomes with organizational goal alignment" (Ayers, 2015, p. 171), is to focus on the actual *embedding* of organizational goals in performance plans (plan alignment). As Ayers (2015) put it, goal alignment can be operationalized in various ways, the key being to link individuals' activities, or departments' goals, to organizational goals. This means that the different departments' goals can be compared.

To do this, I used an analytical alignment approach (DeLuca & Bellara, 2013), stemming from (educational) curriculum alignment methodology. The analytical alignment approach qualitatively focuses on documents, following alignment dimensions. In this study, these dimensions were (a) categorical concurrence and (b) depth of information. Four data sources were used: host policy, nation branding, city marketing documents, and the bid for the specific organization.

To determine categorical concurrence, all policy documents were placed side by side. The first step was to define the policy goals of each policy document: host policy, nation branding, and city marketing. The aspects in the bid for the specific case were then compared with the policy goals of the three documents. When the elements in the bid showed concurrence with the policy goals, this was the first step to achieving alignment. For instance, the elements in the bid book could concur with one policy goal, with two, or all three.

Depth of information was operationalized by classifying data by their level of complexity, meaning by looking at how the element in the bid concurred with the policy goals (DeLuca & Bellara, 2013). With a simple mention of the policy goal in the bid – such as international climate – the depth of information was absent; with an elaboration on the subject, it was present. It was important that elements in the bid were derived from the policy goals, that they, as it were, formed the basis of the bid for the IO. When categorical concurrence was present in tandem with depth of information, the element in the bid was considered aligned with the policy goal. Frequencies of alignment were generated for the two dimensions. For instance, in one case, the categorical concurrence could be 83 percent, meaning that 10 of the 12 boxes of the frequency table were filled, whereas the depth of information was 58 percent, as 7 of the 12 boxes showed depth of information. This last measure of alignment was used to compare the cases, as they both needed to be present to be considered aligned.

In the second part of this perspective, I expected that the more positively the respondents in the city perceived host policies and support, the higher was the likelihood of success. The concept I used was benefit for the target group, which I broke down into the perception of host policy and support. To explore this, I asked the respondents to rate host policy elements, such as rules and regulations for IOs (acquiring legitimization cards or privileges and immunities) and the mentioned conditions in the bid book. Respondents were asked to tell stories about struggles they had experienced in relation to the case and give examples of how they coped with these struggles (Nederhand, Van der Steen, & Van Twist, 2019). Afterward, I analyzed the transcribed interviews by coding them on the following elements: branding policies and their effectiveness to attract IOs; the main elements in the bid; rules and regulations for IOs; and how they perceived the support of the government.

The last two codes were considered particularly important for examining the policy perception. The comparative method was used, a method that is grounded in fieldwork and focuses on the beliefs and opinions of policymakers. The codes were created before doing the interviews to improve the structure and methods to compare the groups and cases. Not only were interviews conducted, but also documents such as evaluations with international employees were consulted. The aim was to have a complete picture of how the representatives of IOs perceived host policies. Based on the multiple sources, I assigned pluses and minuses (minus, plus/minus, plus, or double plus) to the four codes (branding policies, elements in the bid, rules and regulations, government support). Table 3.3 shows the operationalization of this perspective.

Table 3.3 Operationalization of the instrumental perspective

Perspective	Concept	Variables	Sub-variables	Qualitative exploration
Instrumental	Policy design	X1 Policy alignment	Alignment of attraction policy goals and the bid	The elements in the bid are aligned with the host policy, nation branding, and city marketing goals. These are explored on two dimensions: <i>categorical concurrence</i> and <i>depth of information</i> , of which the latter plays the leading role
	Benefit for the target group	X2 Perception of host policy and support	Perception of host policy (elements in the bid) and government support	The IO representatives' perceptions about: 1. Branding policies and their effectiveness 2. Main elements in the bid 3. Rules and regulations 4. Support of the government

3.4.3 Operationalizing the discursive perspective

In this perspective, I first expected that the more the priorities and narratives overlapped between the organizational network and the policy network, the higher was the likelihood of success. Afterward, I expected the same with the organizational network and the IO representatives. The concept of *similar frames* is operationalized by discussing two variables: overlapping priorities and narratives between policy groups and overlapping priorities and narratives between a policy group and the target group – the IO employees.

With the pilot questionnaire and a list of locational elements for the card game, I gathered scores on possible variables that were considered important to IOs. Initially, I collected 25 locational factors to discuss with the respondents. Following meetings with specialists and a review of the literature (e.g., Meijers, Spaans, Louw, Hoogerbrugge, & Priemus, 2013; Mercer, 2012; Ni & Kresl, 2010), the list changed. Two criteria guided the construction of the list: the nature of the circumstances being exclusively important to IOs, such as *relevant centers are nearby and cooperative*; and the degree of integration – the list should combine hard elements, such as *cost of hiring labor force* and soft elements, such as *livability*. I finalized the list based on interviews with practitioners from different governmental layers. It contained six themes: reputation of city and country, physical connectivity and amenities, livability, enterprise hub, workforce, and virtual connectivity. Each theme consisted of three to five elements, resulting in 22 in total. Respondents were asked to rank the locational elements depicted on cards in order of importance to them. The 22 cards with statements such as ‘physical infrastructure is working well’ were divided into the five most and five least important (see Table A7 in the Appendices for all locational elements).

To study how views on the important locational elements for IOs were different across groups, it was key to explore how these frames were formed. To do this, I asked the respondents to prioritize the cards and then explain their reasons for ordering them as they did. I then analyzed the ordered data in four steps:

1. I looked at the priorities of the organizational network that attracted the IO in the host city. I looked at how this group ranked the top five priorities of the 22 locational elements. In this step, I also used the narratives to explain why the group prioritized in that way. The priorities were contextualized and explained with quotations. This helped identify whether the narratives were in line with the prioritization of the respondents. Then, I discussed the priorities and narratives of the policy network.

2. I compared the organizational network with the policy network. I looked first at whether the elements in the top five of one group were significantly higher than those in the top five of the other group, by conducting a Kruskal–Wallis H test with a Bonferroni correction. A Kruskal–Wallis H test is based on ranked data and enables a comparison of how the groups scored specific aspects (Field, 2009). As the numbers of participants in the organizational networks were small, this led to problems of confidence. I was aware of these problems and did not rely excessively on these results. They were more illustrative of the qualitative data than the other way around.
3. I made a description of the priorities and narratives of the international representatives. Then I compared the priorities and narratives of the organizational network with those of the international representatives.
4. I explored the overlap between all the groups’ ratings, which I did with a Kendall’s tau-b test. This measure resulted in non-parametric correlation coefficients and helped me to find the strength of association between the groups and the directions of the relationships.⁹ The information from all four groups of both cases in the host city was entered into a table in the empirical chapter¹⁰, the measures from which were used in Chapter 8.

Discussing the priorities and narratives of these groups not only provided an overview of what was considered important in the specific cases but also explored how the perceptual frames differed or were comparable, while thereby exploring the expectations that overlapping frames affected the likelihood of success in attracting IOs, first between governmental groups, then between the organizational network and international representatives. Table 3.4 depicts the operationalization of the discursive perspective.

9 The value of a correlation coefficient varies between -1 and +1. A value of 1 would be an excellent degree of association (overlap) between two variables. When the value goes toward 0, the relationship between the two variables will be weaker (Field, 2009; Howell, 2013).

10 In the empirical chapters these are Tables 4.5, 5.5, 6.4 and 7.4.

Table 3.4 Operationalization of the discursive perspective

Perspective	Concept	Variables X1–X7	Sub-variables	Qualitative exploration
Discursive	Similar frames	X3 Similar frames between organizational and policy network	Overlap of priorities and narratives of organizational and policy networks	Top five priorities of the 22 locational elements overlap between organizational network attracting IO and policy network. Narratives overlap as well
		X4 Similar frames between organizational network and IO representatives	Overlap of priorities and narratives of organizational network and IO representatives	Top five priorities of the 22 locational elements overlap between organizational network attracting IO and IO representatives. Narratives overlap as well

3.4.4 Operationalizing the relational perspective

I first expected that the higher the level of network cooperation there was, the higher was the likelihood of success. The concept of this perspective was network characteristics, which I explored with the variable network cooperation. This was operationalized the same way as the narratives in the previous variables and combined analysis of the interviews with analysis of the documents. The cooperation between actors in this analysis was the perceived level of cooperation by network actors themselves and others. The following questions were key: What is the cooperation like between these institutions (i.e., local versus national government)? Can you give me an answer on a scale of 1 (very poor) to 10 (excellent)? Can you elaborate? This part also sought to discuss the political process by exploring the answers to the following questions: How do you see the rules of the ‘policy game’ to attract IOs? Can you elaborate? The answers to these questions explained the way the negotiations worked, both internally between departments and externally. The policy game was described in interviews as negotiations within and between departments, as well as with international actors. This wide approach gave me the opportunity to collect data about the respondents’ roles and a description of the political process of attracting the cases. The rating of the cooperation between the different layers of government and the description of the political process were key for the analysis. To do this qualitatively with the constant comparative method adds to the validity, as the perceived strength of the network is what defines network cooperation in this perspective.

Furthermore, I expected that the higher the level of actor centrality of those involved was, the higher was the likelihood of success. I explored actor centrality in two ways: betweenness centrality and degree centrality. Betweenness centrality is a measure that characterizes the importance of a given node for establishing short pathways between another node (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). It marks the probability of any node being on the shortest path (geodesic) between any pair of actors in the network. If two geodesics exist, each receives .5 probability (Raab, 2011). I can norm this measure by expressing it as a percentage of the maximum possible betweenness that an actor could have had. This percentage is aimed at measuring the intermediate position and can be used in coordination explorations or even to control relationships (Borgatti & Everett, 1997; Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). Betweenness centrality shows, in this context, how independent a node or actor is in its network.

Whereas betweenness centrality shows the independence of the actors in the network, degree centrality shows the local centrality measure or the activity of the actors. Degree centrality refers to the number of ties or connections a node (network participant) has to other nodes. Ties can be weighted; the weight is a number that indicates information about a relationship (Golbeck, 2013). In this study, degree centrality was based on how often network participants met. If the actors in the network were in monthly contact about the matter, this number of meetings was 12. If the contact was weekly, I included 50 in the Excel sheet as a measure to calculate degree centrality. In this study, the ties between two nodes, also known as edges, were undirected, meaning that they indicated a mutual relationship. The percentages of degree centrality showed the activity of each actor regarding the whole network.

The betweenness and degree centrality percentages cannot be compared easily across networks, but they do clarify the role of the most independent and most active actors in each network. They also provide information about each network and its structure. Therefore, for each network, the five actors with the highest betweenness centrality percentages were discussed and their position analyzed based on the visualized networks. Betweenness centrality measures say more about the power or independence of actors; therefore, I underscored this measure more in the analysis than the degree centrality, which demonstrates actor activity.

These centrality measures helped to explore the structure of the networks and the actors in the middle who potentially exerted more control in the network, and more interpersonal influence on the attraction process. To explore the two different measures, I analyzed the answers to the following questions: How often did you meet as an organizational network? How often did you meet others outside the organizational network? With which institution did you have most contact: the city, region, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? These questions provided input for the network analysis and enabled inferences

about the structure of the networks and how this could have affected the likelihood of success. The eight networks were compared to explore the expectation that a higher actor centrality would lead to more success.

I expected that the higher the diversity and size of the network were, the higher was the likelihood of success. I explored the network diversity and number of nodes (or actors) by looking at the types of actors involved in attracting IOs and at the network size. To operationalize this, I used eleven labels to divide actor types: municipality, provincial government, federal government, parliament, Public Private Partnership, IO/UN, NGO, policy advisor, European Union, business, and prime minister (Table A8 in the Appendix depicts the full list). I explored these types of actors per organizational network that attracted an IO, including the actors that had close collaborations outside the network. I started with the organizational network members – a list that I had cross-checked with those involved. By making use of the graphs, I could see the organizational network and its links with coalition partners. This led to an analysis of a wider network and the diversity of its actors. I used the answers to the questions: Which institution is the most important for attracting and retaining IOs in this city? Are there other institutions that deal with attracting and retaining IOs? and What other actors were involved in the attraction process for this IO? The stories were used to contextualize, making the analysis more specific per case, which allowed me to make more grounded inferences.

The second element was the number of most active nodes or actors in the network. For this variable, all the involved network members were included. For visualization, I used Visone (visual social networks) software, which is a tool from Tilburg University and partners. Visone aims to communicate ideas “with clarity, precision and efficiency, conveying the most knowledge in the shortest time (...), telling the truth about the data and to show more than one variable at the same time” (Raab, 2011, p. 5). Table 3.5 depicts the operationalization of the relational perspective.

Table 3.5 Operationalization of the relational perspective

Perspective	Concept	Variables	Sub-variables	Qualitative exploration
Relational	Network characteristics	X5 Internal legitimacy	Network cooperation	Perceived level of cooperation by network actors themselves and others
		X6 Actor-level properties	a. Betweenness centrality b. Degree centrality	The centrality of network actors is explored with betweenness centrality and degree centrality
		X7 Network-level properties	a. Network diversity b. Network size	The diversity of the network actors is explored by labeling the types of actors in the network. The size of the network is explored by their narratives about how many actors were involved, around the organizational network

3.5 CONCLUSION

In this study, I use a comparative case study design with the goal of exploring the processes of governance networks attracting IOs. By comparing different cases, it is possible to determine what the failure and success determinants were. I first select four small to medium-sized host cities satisfying the following criteria: geographic location, size, experience with attracting IOs, and topics as being important in the attraction of IOs to these cities. In the cities – Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen – I then select diverse cases – one failed and one successfully attracted IO in each city. These cases are chosen in such a way to enable better comparison between the failed and successful processes. This study is grounded in fieldwork: I conducted 175 interviews with 150 interviewees. The respondents are divided into four groups in each city: the organizational network attracting the successful case; the organizational network attracting the failed case; the policy network; and the IO representatives.

I operationalize the independent conceptual perspectives with three different methods. The instrumental perspective is first investigated using the analytical alignment approach to find the alignment between policy goals and the bid book for the IO. The perception of the IO representatives is subsequently analyzed using the qualitative comparative method – a way to compare differences of subjective information between groups. The interviews are coded, and the groups (IO representatives on eight different cases) compared.

The discursive perspective is explored by using the data of a card game played during the conducted interviews. The narratives are analyzed with the qualitative comparative method: first, the respondents are asked to prioritize the five most important locational elements and then to talk freely about their choices. These narratives are compared between different groups. For illustrative reasons, I conduct a statistical test, which cannot be seen as representative because of the small numbers. They do, nevertheless, show whether the locational elements are rated significantly higher by one group or another. A Kendall's tau-b test is conducted to measure the overlap between all the groups per city.

The relational perspective is explored by establishing the internal legitimacy with qualitative data and ratings of cooperation by the involved. For the actor-level characteristics, I use the Visone visualization tool to depict betweenness and degree centrality measures. For the network-level characteristics (diversity and size of the networks), I use the information I gathered during the interviews.

In the following chapters, I will focus on the individual cities, cases, and the analysis from three perspectives, followed by a conclusion.

