‘Walking the extra mile’: how governance networks attract international organizations to Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen (1995-2015)

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2 Theoretical background

2.1 Introduction

The attraction of an IO is a dynamic and strategic process that involves many actors. It is common for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take the lead while other ministries are involved in making the attraction process a success. Specialists, advisors, businesses, and city, region, and state-level actors are involved in this governance network. The first step of such a network is to express its interest. The second step is the initiation of a process in which a bid book – a glossy brochure including answers to the IO's questionnaire – is prepared. Partners are sought to contribute financially, and a specific location is selected in the candidate city. These preparations need to be realized under time pressure as there are set deadlines, and there is fierce competition with other candidates. The third step is the lobbying stage, first within the applicant country, involving other departments at the national but also the local level. Then the applicant country needs to lobby externally for votes from the member states of the IO. Consequently, ambassadors and IO employees are involved in the governance network. When the vote finally takes place, or some form of decision is close to being taken, the candidate is well prepared and can make a last-ditch effort to lobby for its cause. Since attracting IOs requires making and shaping a group of closely involved actors from different organizations into a network supporting this cause, in this chapter I will further develop a network approach to understand these processes.

In the following sections, I discuss how the literature on governance networks can be helpful and I advance the three perspectives touched upon in the introduction. As a next step, I develop different ways of determining network success. The chapter concludes with a summary of the perspectives, concepts, and variables operationalized in the methodological chapter.

2.2 Governance networks

As mentioned, I follow Sørensen and Torfing (2007) in defining governance networks as "a relatively stable horizontal articulation of independent actors which interact by the means of negotiation that take place in a self-regulating framework" (p. 15). This definition highlights the interdependency of public and private actors, which is also important to understand the performance of a task as complex as attracting an IO. Furthermore, it emphasizes the operational autonomy of these network actors to interact through negotiations that combine "hard-nosed bargaining with consensus-seeking

deliberation" (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009, p. 236) typical for the kind of interactions involved in attracting IOs.

Public administrative researchers who have addressed the effectiveness of such governance networks have attempted to explain the differences in success across networks. There is, however, no systematic framework for assessing this (Provan & Milward, 1995; Provan & Sebastian, 1998; Provan & Kenis, 2008). An exception is the work of Provan and Milward (2001). Although they focus on specific community-based networks in terms of their costs and benefits for the community, the network, and participating organizations, they provide an important source of inspiration. Nevertheless, I do not find the standard notions of network success appropriate for evaluating the performance of governance networks. As Cristofoli et al. put it: "questions of how to successfully manage public networks remain without a clear answer" (2017, p. 275). Thus far, network effectiveness researchers have not examined how governance networks interact with actors such as IO employees and permanent representatives abroad, let alone how and when they are successful in attracting IOs.

Research on governance network effectiveness has, however, expanded and is therefore quite broad. In this literature, three fields can be distinguished. The first is the aforementioned work of Sørensen and Torfing (2007; 2009) and colleagues (Torfing & Triantafillou, 2017; Torfing, Peters, Pierre, & Sørensen, 2013). They study interactive governance with the main focus on democratic effectiveness and metagovernance. They look at the theory and dimensions of governance, particularly at how political and administrative institutions interact. This is interesting to consider in my study since IOs are the embodiment of 'global governance' but they are attracted by a local network.

The second field is that of Provan and Milward (1995; 2001; 2002) who have developed a model for how to assess network effectiveness. The key consideration is that a network should be checked on distinctive network levels (client/community, network, and agencies/public–private partners), using different indicators to establish success. An important consequence is that effectiveness for one network level does not mean the same to another network level, so the researcher must choose which network level prevails. This idea has been developed by Provan and Kenis (2008; 2009) and others (Isett, LeRoux, Mischen, & Rethemeyer, 2011; Raab, Mannak & Cambré, 2015; Kenis & Raab, 2020) who worked on specific organizational networks and their effectiveness. In these studies, the structure of the network is crucial, along with the different contextual elements. Following Provan and Milward (2001), I distinguish three groups that are involved in the attraction of IOs: the organizational network attracting an IO (network level); the policy network retaining IOs (agency level); and the IO representatives (community level).

The third field is that of network management, represented by McGuire and Agranoff (2011) and Meier and O'Toole (2001), who developed the O'Toole–Meier model and tested the effects of several variables, including management quality, managerial networking, management stability, and personnel stability, management tenure, and the time that managers spend in networks (Juenke, 2005; Wang, 2016). Scholars in this field have studied network management variables such as the identification of a connection to crucial actors and leadership (Klijn, Edelenbos, & Steijn, 2010; Van der Voet, Kuipers, & Groeneveld, 2016). How network management can influence network success is important to my study, as the networks attracting IOs are managed in a certain way, which may affect their success.

As explained in the introduction, I make use of three perspectives in my exploratory approach. It is an exploratory study, for which I use several perspectives that are independent of each other and of which one or two may not be relevant. I use these perspectives to get a better view on the processes of attracting IOs. And, because they are different angles, they probably yield a more complete image and therefore a better understanding. The following sections further explain my theoretical expectations based on these three different perspectives.

2.3 The instrumental perspective

First, when wanting to know when and why governance networks fail or succeed in attracting an IO, I need to focus on the instruments the network uses. The governance networks build on their host and branding policies when creating the bid book to attract the IO. As the processes of attracting IOs are often ad hoc, those policy documents are the main tools that the governance network can build on, besides the specific information of specialists. Those types of policies are paramount, as IO employees are directly affected. If they have complaints about the host country and share them with others, it can lead to reputational damage to the country or city where they live, and the next IO will not be attracted as easily. The policy and its implementation are important for current and future IO employees on a local level (Badache, 2020). This can determine the success or failure of a network in attracting an IO. How the tools are formulated, implemented, and perceived by the parties involved is one way of looking at the effectiveness of these networks. This 'instrumental' perspective is a useful approach to start with when considering network success in this context.

From this instrumental perspective, the idea is twofold. On the one hand, I focus on the idea that the creation of a policy design involves multiple stakeholders. On the other hand, I argue that a positive policy perception of the 'target group' leads to a higher likelihood of success. The instrumental perspective is therefore based on two concepts:

policy design, stemming from collaborative design studies (Howlett & Rayner, 2018), and *benefit for the target group*, derived from the policy success (McConnell, 2010) and implementation literature (Pülzl & Treib, 2007).

The first concept of policy design is seen as a collaborative effort of different layers of government. A good policy design is "coherent, congruent and consistent", argue Howlett and Rayner (2018, p. 389). Additionally, a shared understanding among network members about how strategies are being followed is seen as crucial (Andrews, Boyne, Meier, O'Toole Jr., & Walker, 2012, p. 78). To succeed, governmental organizations need to be clear on their strategies, tasks, and efforts and in formulating and aligning their policies. As the alignment of goals leads to better performance, this is something governance networks strive for (Ayers, 2015; Rogge, 2018).

According to Rogge (2018), there are three levels of consistency important for achieving policy objectives. These are the alignment of policy objectives, a consistent policy mix in which the instruments "reinforce each other in the pursuit of policy objectives, and the interplay of the instrument mix and the policy strategy" (2018, p. 44). Applying this to the collaborative governance context means that network actors' roles are judged in terms of their contributions to the common goals.

Common goals need to be separated from means or tools as components of how policy is brought into effect. The danger of isolating formulated goals is that they are taken out of context, but the advantage is that they can be compared on a higher level of abstraction. The first step then asks: "What general types of ideas govern policy development?" (Howlett & Rayner, 2018, p. 393). The concept of policy design is in line with that first step, which I explore by focusing on the alignment of the policy goals. This is important because the national, regional, and local governmental organizations are considered to have similar goals to be successful.

This policy 'funnel', from the national to provincial/cantonal and local levels, is often followed purely out of habit. The themes the national government focuses on in terms of content targeting, for instance, the Dutch 'top sector' policy, are meant to trickle down to the provincial and municipal levels. This also applies to attracting IOs. Policies from the different layers of government represent the actors or networks working there. This means there is vertical coordination, an alignment between the different governmental bodies. The alignment can be explored by comparing the policy goals of different policy documents. A successful bid book then ought to stem from these policies. I expect that the more the bid book is embedded in and aligned with the policy goals of the government layers involved, the more successful the attraction process will be. This results in the following expectation:

> Expectation 1. *The more the bid books are aligned with the attraction policies, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

The degree of alignment between the host state policy, the nation branding, city marketing policies, and the bid book for the specific IO is the main variable in this expectation. It can be qualitatively explored by comparing the goals of the host and branding policies with the bid book, both in co-occurrence and content.

Where the first expectation contemplates the alignment of policy goals, the second addresses the operational settings: What are the specific on-the-ground requirements of policy? (Mukherjee & Howlett, 2018, p. 379). These requirements can best be examined with a bottom-up approach while addressing the recipients' perceptions of the policy implementation. Studies have shown that the resilience and involvement of the policy 'users' have a positive effect on policy outcomes (Marshall, 2007). In this study, the bottom-up approach is used to explore whether a negative or positive perception of the implemented policies influences governance network success.

While doing this, I use the concept of *creating benefit for the target group*. This concept stems from the policy success literature. McConnell argues that the more the intended target group benefits, the higher would be the likelihood of policy program success (2010, p. 67). The idea is based on the existence of a causal relation between policy perception and the governance network's performance (Hill & Hupe, 2002; Pülzl & Treib, 2007). This idea also appears in policy design studies, where it is assumed that a policy design is a response to how a policy is received. A successful policy design is therefore an interaction between the policymakers and the target group.

In the course of attracting IOs, the creation of host state policies is often formed as a response to the complaints of the international community in the host city, or to changing conditions. The reactions of the target group are therefore important for the proper execution of the policy. Considering these elements, I expect that the IO employees' perceptions of the attraction (host and branding) policies and government support play a role in successfully attracting new IOs.

> E2: *The more positively the respondents in the city perceive the host policies and support, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

This expectation is explored with regard to the perception of the attraction policies (the visibility and effectiveness of nation branding and city marketing, the elements in the bid and governance support). The respondents' responses should then shed light on how the IO employees perceive the host and branding policies and the support they receive. These should also clarify the effect these perceptions have on governance network success.

2.4 The discursive perspective

Whenever a governance network is formed, the actors establish behaviors, priorities, and narratives which are often a mix of conscious and unconscious efforts. In other words, the network actors have a discursive context, a shared discourse, and this comes to the fore in their narratives. Furthermore, in the international environment in which lobbying takes place, the informal circuit is important. Conferences are held where IO employees meet and talk to ambassadors, governors, private stakeholders, and NGO workers. The discursive context also plays an important role at those times. When the different groups' narratives or 'perceptual frames' are similar, I expect that the attraction processes will be more successful. This 'discursive' perspective is a second way to explore the successes and failures of governance networks.

This perspective focuses on the discourses of those involved. Discursive institutionalism is one of the 'new institutionalisms' that differs from the other three in that it is based on ideas. It is distinct from rational choice institutionalism in that it is less fixed on rational preferences, and from sociological institutionalism in that it is not underlining all-defining cultural norms (Schmidt, 2008, p. 305). It is, finally, distinct from historical institutionalism in that it is less concerned with the equilibrium conditions that may result from a selection of ideas to guide policies. With that, it is less focused on historical paths. Discursive institutionalism is led by the discourses that are shared by political or policy actors. By focusing on discourses or narratives, the representation of ideas is expressed. These ideas are linked to the institutional contexts of policy and political actors (Schmidt, 2008; Peters, 2012). As such, this approach contributes to the understanding of political or policy actions in a way that the other institutionalisms do not. The argument is that to understand the role ideas play in shaping policy, one must understand the entire discourse within which it is embedded.

As indicated, the focus of this study is on governance networks attracting IOs to cities. For this purpose, when focusing on narratives, the discursive approach seems appropriate. Network activity is based on the behavior of its members, which is, following a discursive approach, embedded in a common 'narrative' or a shared understanding of people (Steunenberg, 2001). Especially since these networks develop in an ad hoc manner (to maintain the presence of an IO in a city or attract a new IO based on a bid), the development of common views, judgments, and ideas among the participants are important. This may result in any further institutionalization that may shape the rules or routines that can be found in more established organizations. Using discursive institutionalism to study governance networks and their effectiveness, the following questions come to mind: What are the shared perceptual frames? To what extent are these frames shared by those involved in the attracting process, and how does this affect network success?

Following these questions, I can further explore whether overlapping perceptual frames between networks point in the direction of higher network success. The concept I focus on in this perspective is *similar frames*. I will first explain why I argue that similar frames between the organizational and policy networks would lead to a higher likelihood of success. Consequently, I will argue that similar frames between the organizational network and IO representatives would lead to a higher likelihood of success.

Starting with the concept of similar frames, I expect that groups will make better collaborative policy decisions when they share a similar discourse. I first need to understand that in networks, individuals treat information that is congruent with their beliefs and knowledge as stronger than incongruent information (McBeth, Jones, & Shanahan, 2014). Network actors select sources and information that concur with what they already believe. Sharing a similar discourse, the network actors then have corresponding ideas about what is important. They have a so-called commonality in vision and perceptual framework, which can be thought of as 'schemata of interpretation' (Boräng & Naurin, 2015).

Within the governmental groups – the organizational and policy networks – I argue that having a common set of beliefs is important. When an organizational network interacts with a policy network on the topic of their mission – for example, to attract an IO – they need to be on the same page. Whenever they have a different discourse, a multitude of ideas can slow down the process of attracting an IO. Based on these aspects, I expect that by having a similar discourse and thereby similar priorities and narratives about what is important to IOs, the process is also more likely to be successful. This allows me to expect the following:

> E3: *The more the priorities and narratives overlap between the organizational network and the policy network in the host city, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

To be successful, the governance networks need to consider the wishes and needs of the IO representatives in the host cities. Two governmental networks with similar priorities and narratives are one thing but having a similar frame with a different group is yet another. I expect that, especially when groups come from different institutional settings, it will be crucial that they share the same narratives about what their priorities are. In this sense, the fourth expectation is an alternative to the third:

> E4: *The more the priorities and narratives overlap between the organizational network and the IO representatives in the host city, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

In these two expectations, the priorities and narratives are strongly related. By mentioning the same locational elements as priorities and sharing similar *stories*, the networks show their *similar frames.*

2.5 The relational perspective

Finally, the dynamics of the governance network actors' interactions need attention. Especially in the international context, formal and informal connections are crucial. Many scholars have focused on the effectiveness of governance networks, with determinants such as management, goal attainment, productivity, stability, conflict resolution, and learning capacity (Kenis & Provan, 2009). When I look at the relational aspects in this context, a lobby dimension prevails. The networks attracting IOs consist partly of international actors that need to be lobbied for votes. The political tendency to distribute IOs equally across the globe plays a role in this respect. Consequently, when analyzing the network characteristics in a relational way, the political context, in which networks collaborate and compete, must also be considered. Therefore, this 'relational' perspective will be the third way to explore the effectiveness of the governance networks that attract IOs.

Where the instrumental and discursive perspectives deal with the network level, this perspective explains decisions at a more individual level: it focuses on how actors 'play the policy game' and how they are positioned in the network. The premise for this perspective is that "as a consequence of interdependence, no single actor can dominate the interaction completely" (Godfroij, 1995, p. 185). This partially explains why networks often do not function as smoothly as might be expected from their official *raison d'être* and can produce results that none of the participants had wished for. Nevertheless, as many scholars have shown, the way in which a network is organized can influence its results. When focusing on strengthening internal stability, there is a need for a climate where productive interactions take place. Participation, information exchange, and harmony are important elements to explore. The concept I use in this perspective is *network characteristics*. This is a broad concept, as I want to explore the interactions of the network actors, as well as how the attraction process developed politically and whether the diversity and size of the network played a role.

The relational perspective refers to the theoretical notion that the structure of the networks matters when examining network success. Provan and Milward (2001) developed this perspective and suggested that distinguishing different levels in the analysis is appropriate. These are the network, agency, and community levels. Since these levels appeal to my empirical reality of attracting IOs, I will apply them in the following way.

The first level is the organizational network attracting the IO. This is a goal-directed network, meaning that the "network consists of three or more organizations that consciously agree to coordinate and collaborate, are used to deliver services, address problems and opportunities, transmit information, innovate, and acquire needed resources" (Kenis & Provan, 2009, p. 440). This network generally consists of only six to twelve individuals, depending on the type and size, importance, and complexity of the IO. There are often only one or two representatives per department involved in the organizational network.

The second level is the broader policy network that deals with the retention of IOs in the host city. The policy network consists of many more individuals as it represents housing agencies, policing, security officials, and communication departments at different government levels. This network generally maintains contact with the IOs, tackles problems they experience, helps the organizational network find a suitable location, and helps with the necessary papers for new employees, such as work and residence permits. The cooperation between the specific goal-oriented organizational network and the broader policy network is often close and well-coordinated.

The third level consists of the IO employees themselves. This is a broad group, as in the studied host cities the communities consist of 30,000 to 50,000 individuals, including their families. They play a role in policymaking around the attraction of IOs, as they serve as ambassadors and are exemplary for potential new international employees. In addition, they often provide feedback on host state policies, and local policy is also tailored to them. It is important to distinguish these three network levels when dealing with the interacting networks, because they have different roles and are, simultaneously, interdependent.

In the relational perspective, I look at the way these different levels interact and argue that they affect the outcome of the IO attraction process. As indicated, my main unit of analysis is network success or performance. Kenis and Provan (2009) propose three ways to develop indicators when evaluating network performance. The way to evaluate this, they argue, depends on the type of inception (voluntary/mandated), the governance form (shared governance/lead organization/network administrative organization), and the developmental stage. In this study, I use these three ways to develop criteria and variables with which I can explore the network characteristics. Table 2.1 depicts the three propositions of Kenis and Provan (2009), followed by the criteria and variables.

Table 2.1 Developing variables by applying the propositions of Kenis and Provan (2009)

Network performance indicators depend on (Kenis & Provan, 2009):	**Concepts:**	**Independent variables:**
1. Mandated/voluntary inception of the network	Internal legitimacy	Network cooperation
2. Form of governance: Network administrative organization (NAO)	Actor-level properties	a. Betweenness centrality b. Degree centrality
3. Developmental stage of the network	Network-level properties	a. Network diversity b. Network size

When looking at the first proposition, the type of inception, I am dealing with mandated organizational networks, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decides, by mandate from the Head of Government, to attempt to attract an IO. The Head of Government is authorized to make the final decision, besides which, the department coordinating the network approaches the other actors to cooperate. These actors can be other ministries, universities, or other knowledge institutes, depending on the type of IO. The coordinating department continues to take the lead here. This way, the network is not formed voluntarily but rather by mandate.

When developing criteria to explore the network's performance, it is relevant to look at the internal legitimacy of the network. Although Kenis and Provan (2009) argue that the internal legitimacy is only appropriate when dealing with voluntary networks, I reason that it also matters for mandated networks. Internal legitimacy refers to a positive assessment by the network participants (Human & Provan, 2000). Success elements such as reciprocity, trust, and cooperation are considered crucial for increasing internal legitimacy (Turrini, Cristofoli, Frosini, & Nasi, 2010). I expect that in a voluntary network the internal legitimacy is already high since the members have a common sense of purpose. A mandated network, on the other hand, still needs to create internal legitimacy. Internal legitimacy is, however, crucial in mandated networks. In the short time the organizational network has to attract the IO, I argue that it is important for its participants to value their cooperation positively. The members may not yet know each other well, so if there is a feeling of good cooperation, there is a greater chance of successful outcomes. This can also have a so-called flywheel effect: when people are satisfied with the cooperation, the cooperation improves, and the internal legitimacy increases. Hence, I arrive at the variable of 'perception of good network cooperation' for network success from a relational perspective. I expect the following:

> E5: *The higher the perception of good network cooperation between the main players, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

The main players in this expectation are the actors within the organizational network. They are the ones attracting the IO, and they must experience their cooperation as positive.

For their second proposition, Kenis and Provan (2009) argue that the network performance criteria depend on the governance form. They distinguish three forms: shared governance, lead organization, and network administrative organization. In shared governance, a multitude of organizations work collectively as a network but with no distinct governance entity. In a lead organization, the network also consists of horizontally multilateral partners, but one plays the lead role. The third form is where one of the network entities is established with the sole purpose of network governance. This form is applicable to this study because a department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly takes a coordinating role. This department, usually protocol or host country affairs, has the most experience with bringing in IOs. It coordinates the process and looks for the relevant partners, both internally as well as externally. This host department is not an entity within the network as in a lead organization, and it is not a multitude of organizations working together as in shared governance. This Foreign Ministry department is coordinating the network, the degree of hierarchy depending on the case.

Within this form, one of the criteria I can look at is the centrality of the actors involved. In theory, the network administrative organization is the most centrally positioned actor, but how does this play out in practice? How often do people see or communicate with each other, and does this affect the likelihood of success? Based on these questions, I argue that when the network administrative organization leads the network, I need to evaluate the network on *actor-level properties*. These questions lead to the two variables of betweenness centrality (centrally positioned in the network) and degree centrality (level of activity in the network). A second reason that it is worthwhile to examine the network on centrality measures is that the governance network exists of several layers. The network administrative organization leads the organizational network, but others are involved as well: the broader policy network and the IO representatives. The way they are involved in the network is important when assessing network success, as they can form important sub-networks. Provan and Sebastian (1998) and Turrini et al. (2010) show that elements that support network performance are "defined by the presence of one coordinated agency and different subsets that are highly cohesive and strongly linked to each other" (p. 541). The data allows me to qualitatively explore whether this is, indeed, the case in these processes. I expect that in those networks, actor centrality affects success:

> E6: *The higher the actor centrality of the involved, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

The concept of actor-level properties is explored in two ways: betweenness centrality and degree centrality. The first considers the degree to which a node is located on the shortest path between any two other nodes in the network. The second is the simplest definition of actor centrality: a central actor must be the most active in the sense that it has the most ties to others. This is relevant because the network administrative organization leads the organizational network, but also connects the broader policy network and IO representatives.

The third proposition of Kenis and Provan (2009) is that the developmental stage is important for developing criteria to evaluate network performance. This 'life cycle characteristic' of the network allows me to take a closer look at the network-level properties. When zooming out to the bigger picture, several questions can be asked: Is the network more diverse and larger the longer it exists and the longer it has experience with attracting IOs? Is it also the case that networks with more experience and a longer existence show more success? In other words, are networks in host countries with more experience also more diverse, larger, and therefore more successful? From these questions arise the variables *network diversity* and *network size*.

When first looking at network diversity, this has proven to be an important element of coalition-building in network effectiveness studies (Zakocs & Edwards, 2006) as well as in the literature on lobbying success (Phinney, 2017). The latter's *theory of diverse coalitions* is in essence the idea that the diversity of coalition partners leads to legislative influence. Coalitions that unite diverse actors "expand informational lobbying capabilities, while providing credible information to legislators about the consequences of their policy choices" (Phinney, 2017, p. 18). This means that with a diverse network, the chances are higher that a lobby succeeds, for instance, to attract an IO. I argue that network diversity is especially important in my cases, as in the international context, actors with different backgrounds could diversify and empower a governance network.

The second variable is network size. Although some argue that network performance decreases with larger networks (Hasnain-Wynia, Sofaer, & Bazzoli, 2003), others show that a moderately high number of network members lead to better performance (Kenis & Provan, 2008). What works best depends on the network context. I expect that the higher the number of actors there are, the higher is the likelihood of the network's success, as it evidences that a network is further developed and therefore more mature and stable. This leads to the last expectation:

> E7: *The higher the network diversity and number of the actors involved, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

The types of actors in the governance network can be distinguished by their characteristics: are they a knowledge institution, a single specialist, minister, mayor, embassy, or head of a secretariat or embassy? Then, the number of involved actors is considered. The types and number of actors during an attraction process of an IO are explored and then compared between the cases.

2.6 Network success or failure?

After explaining each perspective, it is important to define network failure and success. The nature of policy success has been among the topics under discussion. In my study, one of the simplest explanations of success is that the IO is successfully attracted by the host city. When the policy goal is to attract an IO, then the appropriate measure of success is a 'factual success' in attracting the IO. There are, however, different degrees of factual success. A host city can be eliminated before the bidding even starts or can only just make it to the end. Furthermore, network success can also be defined as 'success as interpretation' and measured gradually as well. For the definition of success, I use the work of McConnell (2010), who distinguishes three perspectives on the nature of policy success: foundationalist, anti-foundationalist, and realist. The foundationalist perspective sees success as a fact that can be explored against identifiable standards; anti-foundationalists assume success is purely a matter of interpretation; the realists' assumption is that 'success is both fact and interpretation'. In the realist approach, "A policy can be successful in some senses, for example, as a benefit for the target group, but not everyone will perceive it to be a success" (McConnell, 2010, p. 31).

In terms of success definitions, McConnell uses three types of success: programmatic, process, and political success (2010). Compton and 't Hart (2019), on the other hand, check cases against four criteria: programmatic, process, political, and endurance success (Compton & 't Hart, 2019, p. 5). Bovens and 't Hart argue for mid-range theories of failure and success, meaning that one could use mid-range approaches to success, instead of a one-size-fits-all approach (2016, p. 661). In using a mid-range approach, I can adapt my approach to success to the empirical reality. Bovens and 't Hart (2016) argue that this could be done by "explaining specific instances" of policy success or failure, or by "develop[ing] theories explaining a range of policy successes or failures of a certain type" (2016, p. 14). This way, it might be possible to better explain what success is in this empirical reality.

The suggestion of Bovens and 't Hart (2016) to adapt success measures to the empirical world gives space to establish different degrees of success. Furthermore, McConnell's (2010) realistic approach allows to look at success as fact, as well as success as

interpretation by key stakeholders. I interpret the key stakeholders as the organizational networks. These are the ones that need to perceive the attraction as a success.

The first type of success, 'success as fact,' ties in with the achievement of policy's intended outcomes: attracting the IO successfully, and therein recognizing different stages of success. This type of success is observable, as it is an 'objective' measure of how far a city progressed in the bidding game. The operationalization of this type of success is explained in the next chapter on methodology. Table 2.2 depicts the degrees of 'success as fact'.

Table 2.2 Degrees of 'success as fact'

Degrees of success / **Type of procedure**	*Prelude*	First stage **Factual failure**	Second stage **Moderate factual failure**	Third stage **Moderate factual success**	Fourth stage **Factual success**
Voting	Announcement of (re)location, *Request for Proposals*	Submission of candidates; host city is out in first voting round	Second round of voting	When host city only just wins, without a large majority	Host city wins the last round of voting with a large majority
No voting	Informal announcement of the search for a (re)location	Host city is not taken into consideration after submission	Host city no longer in consideration halfway through	Only two host cities are left in the process	Being considered as the only successful candidate from the beginning

Next, I focus on 'perceived success' which is defined in degrees of how the organizational network actors, based on their opinions, assess the result of the attraction process. This type also gradually moves from failure to moderate failure, moderate success, and success. In the literature, a 'policy fiasco' is "[a] negative event that is perceived by a socially and politically significant group of people in the community to be at least partially caused by avoidable and blameworthy failures of public policymakers" (McConnell & Tormey, 2020, p. 687). Applying this definition, the failure must at least be partially caused by the organizational network attracting or retaining the IO. The range from failure to success is described using the following logic. The first degree is a perceived failure, for example, when the IO has not been successfully attracted, and the organizational and policy networks do not perceive the case as a success.

The second degree, a moderate perceived failure, occurs when the IO has not been successfully attracted but the governmental networks perceive the case as a success. For instance, an attraction can be a failed process, but the resources have been increased due to the failure, or host policy has been turned into a top priority.

The third degree, a moderate perceived success, is when the IO has been successfully attracted, but the organizational network perceives the process as a failure to some extent. This can be a typical case of 'too much invested to quit' with all the problematic cognitive dissonance it entails (Bovens & 't Hart, 2016).

The fourth degree, a perceived success, is when the IO has been successfully attracted and the case is perceived as an outright success. Table 2.3 depicts these degrees of 'perceived success'.

Table 2.3 Degrees of 'perceived success'

Degrees of success / **Type of procedure**	Perception of success **Perceived failure**	Perception of success **Moderate perceived failure**	Perception of success **Moderate perceived success**	Perception of success **Perceived success**
Voting / No voting	The organizational network perceives the process as a failure	The organizational network perceives the process as a success, although the IO was not successfully attracted	The IO was successfully attracted, but the organizational network perceives the process as a failure to some extent	The organizational network perceives the process as an outright success

2.7 Conclusion

How governance networks attract IOs is still an unexplored area of research. In this chapter, I develop my network approach to explore the success of applicant cities in attracting IOs. As indicated, this work requires input from many parties, as different actors at different levels of government, as well as from the private sector, need to work together to successfully compete on a bid.

For the instrumental perspective, I use the concepts of policy design and benefit for the target group by introducing policy alignment and perception of host policy and support variables. For the discursive perspective, I develop the similar perceptual frames concept

by explaining ways to examine the governance network in overlapping priorities and narratives. For the relational perspective, I use Kenis and Provan's (2009) three ways to develop variables to assess network success. By focusing on the network characteristics, I arrive at internal legitimacy, and variables of actor- and network-level properties to examine the structure of the networks and their effect on success. When I define what network success means, I use the realist approach wherein policy success is both an objectively determined success as well as a perceived success. First, I focus on the stages of the process of attracting IOs (objectively determined) and then on the degree to which the involved network members perceive the process as a success. In this way, success could be determined more precisely. Table 2.4 summarizes the perspectives, concepts, and variables.

Table 2.4 Three perspectives, concepts, and variables

Perspectives	Concepts	Independent variables	Dependent variables
Instrumental perspective	**Policy design** (Mukherjee & Howlett, 2018) **Benefit for the target group** (McConnell, Grealy, & Lea, 2020)	1. Policy alignment 2. Policy perception and support	*Success as fact: how far a host city made it in the bidding process* (McConnell, 2010) *AND* *Success as interpretation to what extent the organizational network perceives the case as a success.* (McConnell & Tormey, 2020)
Discursive perspective	**Similar frames** (Peters, 2012; Boräng & Naurin, 2015)	3. Similar frames between organizational and policy network 4. Similar frames between organizational network and IO representatives	
Relational perspective	**Network characteristics** (Kenis & Provan, 2009; Phinney, 2017)	*Internal legitimacy:* 5. Network cooperation *Actor-level properties:* 6a. Betweenness centrality 6b. Degree centrality *Network-level properties:* 7a. Network diversity 7b. Network size	

The table represents three ways to explore the processes of attracting IOs. All the expectations mention the assumption that these will indicate a higher likelihood of success in attracting IOs. The reason this is phrased this way is that many components can influence such a process, and I look at how governance networks' actions might have an effect. By using three perspectives, I expect that some of these will be able to better explain how networks are more successful. In the following chapter, I will further operationalize these expectations.