‘Walking the extra mile’: how governance networks attract international organizations to Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen (1995-2015)

Groen, R.S.

‘Walking the extra mile’

Rosa Groen

How governance networks attract International Organizations to Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen (1995-2015)

eleven

It is August 26, 2015. A crucial day during the Conference of State Parties in Cancún, Mexico. 67 of the 69 member states of the Arms Trade Treaty vote for a location of the new Secretariat. Three candidate host states and their cities are bidding: Austria (Vienna), Switzerland (Geneva), and Trinidad and Tobago (Port of Spain). In the first round, Port of Spain wins with 32 votes, Geneva gets 21, and Vienna drops out with 14 votes. The second round, Geneva gets 35, scooping up all of Vienna's votes, and wins. What did Switzerland and Geneva do right? What did the others do wrong – if anything?

This book is about how governance networks in host cities attract International Organizations (IOs), and about how and why they fail or succeed. Scholars in the field of governance and public policy often agree that better policy alignment and cooperation in networks increase the chances of success. Yet, the findings of this study contradict this. Considering the interests of IOs proves to be more important than having matters 'in order' internally.



‘Walking the extra mile’

The commercial edition of this book is published by Eleven.

ISBN 978-94-6236-283-3
ISBN 978-90-5189-681-7 (E-book)

This study was supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (grant number 023.005.004) and The Hague University of Applied Sciences: Faculty Management & Organisation (Bedrijfskunde Program), the Centre of Expertise Governance of Urban Transitions (Lectorate Public Governance), the former Lectorate International Peace, Justice & Security, and the Centre of Expertise Global Governance (Lectorate Changing Role of Europe).

Published, sold and distributed by Eleven
P.O. Box 85576
2508 CG The Hague
The Netherlands
Tel.: +31 70 33 070 33
Fax: +31 70 33 070 30
e-mail: sales@elevenpub.nl
www.elevenpub.com

Sold and distributed in USA and Canada
Independent Publishers Group
814 N. Franklin Street
Chicago, IL 60610, USA
Order Placement: +1 800 888 4741
Fax: +1 312 337 5985
orders@ipgbook.com
www.ipgbook.com

Eleven is an imprint of Boom uitgevers Den Haag.

'Walking the extra mile'

How governance networks attract International Organizations to Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen (1995-2015)

PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van
de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof.dr.ir. H. Bijl,
volgens besluit van het college voor promoties
te verdedigen op 24 november 2022
klokke 16.15 uur
door
Rosa Sara Groen
geboren te Amsterdam
in 1979

Promotores:
Prof.dr. B. Steunenberg (Leiden University)
Prof.dr.ir. J.J.C. Voorhoeve (Leiden University)

Co-promotor:
Dr. H.C. Theisens (The Hague University of Applied Sciences)

Leescommissie:
Prof.mr.dr. E.R. Muller (Leiden University)
Prof.dr. S.M. Groeneveld (Leiden University)
Prof.dr. C.H.J.M. Braun (Leiden University)
Dr. P.W. Meerts (Clingendael Institute)
Prof.dr. E. Versluis (Maastricht University)
Dr. D.B.D. Bannink (VU Amsterdam)

For Ruben,
Japi and Pom

Acknowledgements

Here I am, on the train in Spain, writing the acknowledgements. I pinch myself. Is this really happening? While working on this book I went through many stages, of which I learned so much. I owe many people my thanks for this. The 150 respondents have been generous with their time, I want to thank every single one of them. I am grateful to the municipalities of The Hague and Vienna, as well as the Canton of Geneva and the Greater Copenhagen. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, The Netherlands, Austria, and Denmark have been helpful, as well as the many International Organizations, experts, and NGOs I bothered with my curiosity and questions. I am grateful to my supervisors, Bernard, Joris, and Henno. Without your steering efforts and constructive feedback, the manuscript would not have become a success. Our pleasant meetings started with compliments, and the rest of the hour was full of scientific objections. It was tough at times, but it made me stronger. Thanks to the three of you for keeping faith in me. I am grateful to the advisors in academia as well, such as the Pyjama Elf team on lobbying and interest groups: Ellis, Adriá, Moritz, Erin, Rik, and Linda, Patrick and Jeroen. I would like to thank the Dual-PhD center of Leiden University, especially Yvonne, Johannes, and Petra, and in the final years the Kopgroep. We shared frustrations and successes, which made the whole experience more relatable. I want to thank Mark Dechesne, Geertje and Titus for their help on the SPSS part of the book. I want to thank my academic Twitter community, and the inspiring colleagues I met at conferences of the Netherlands Institute of Governance (NIG) and the European Group of Public Administration (EGPA). The feedback of Yvonne Kleistra, Gerard Wuisman, Lisa Roodenburg, Patrick Kenis, Jörg Raab, Allan McConnell, Paul Kuijpers, Ruben Stern, Roos van Os, and Flip Schrameijer on earlier versions improved the manuscript. I am thankful to all of you. Christopher Chambers and John Hayes, natives who revised my English: I owe you. I would also like to thank my fellow lecturers from The Hague University of Applied Sciences, especially Carolien, Wil, Thessa, Frank, Maarten, Henk, Loes, Esther, as well as my (former) managers Willem, Marjolein, Dolf, Phine, Ronald, Florien, and Michiel. Colleagues at the lectorate Changing Role of Europe have been very supportive and fun to work with. Thanks to Mendeltje, Tibor, Remmelt, Vasilis, Chris, Rieneke, Emma, and the new researchers, I feel like having a research family. I am especially thankful to my boss Mendeltje van Keulen for supporting me during the last phase of the PhD. I want to thank Geert Mak, Herman Tjeenk Willink, and René van Stipriaan for being my inspiration. I am indebted to the Japi-and-Pom-caretaker-team: Sas, Jacqueline, Jan, Flip, Martien, and Gelske – also for our runs where we process every past week: thank you! Your love and support have been insanely helpful. I am grateful to the existence and care of the team of Castle Slangenburg. I would like to say a few words of thanks for keeping me physically sane to the acupuncture, beauty therapist, yoga, and massages of Marijke, Linda, Anja, Annelies, and Marlien, and to the Walrusclub for our cold swims in the Markermeer. Merel and Annemarie, thanks for our cozy sauna visits. Without the *Feestclub* in Amsterdam, I would never have finished the book: Merel K., Merel L., Laura, Fenneke, Leonard, and Eleá, I hope to ‘party’ many more years in libraries, Coffee Companies and houses of friends and family who are on vacation. I want to thank my friends Roos, Rutger, Maya, Sarah, Lone, Tjarda, Marloes, Janne, and Anne for being there for me with a coffee, drink, lunch, or dinner, or just a call when I needed you. For keeping me mentally sane, I want to thank our English Book Club: Emily, Ruben, Tineke, Albert, Eric, Jane, Giles, Linda, Alex, Chris, Mas, and all the others. We have read 52 novels during this PhD-work which has been wonderful. Fellow *Warderberen*, thank you for listening and taking care of the kids in rush hours. I would also like to thank my paranymphs Marloes and Maya for the effort you put in supporting me, and in the festivities. And of course, my family for being there for me, and especially Floor for the magnificent book cover. Mom and dad, I am incredibly grateful for your love, listening ear, and presence. My dear brother Ruub, I thank you for our annual dinners, let’s keep them going. Finally, I am limitlessly indebted to my daily companions. Ruben, Japi, and Pom: thank you for your love, laughs, music, play, patience, and time. Without you, I would not have managed to finish anything. Therefore, I dedicate this work to you.

Table of Contents

Prologue

It is the summer of 2019. The outcome of the Brexit negotiations is unpredictable, and most EU-funded European agencies are preparing to leave the United Kingdom to survive. One of them is the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF), an independent Intergovernmental Organization based in Reading. In September 2019, the ECMWF sends a letter to all the 23 member states of the organization informing them of the necessity to establish a new ECMWF facility to host the Copernicus program, the IGO branch dependent on European Union funding. They issue a Call for Proposals and request all member states to consider hosting the program, good for 250 workstations and, more importantly, a creation of synergies on scientific weather and climate excellence and thereby an increased reputation in the field.

On 15 April 2020, one month into the COVID pandemic, 9 of the 23 member states hand in a *letter of intent*, stating they want to host the facility. Originally, the deadline for the *proposals* and *bid books* is 10 September; due to the pandemic, it is postponed to October. This allows time to select a city to host this program, set up an organizational network, and lobby internally to get sufficient government support for an attractive proposal.

In May, Bologna, already hosting an ECMWF facility, is the first to publish its candidacy, followed by Toulouse. The other cities are Utrecht, Bonn/Helsinki, Barcelona, Tallinn, Lisbon, and Dublin. Bonn and Helsinki hand in a proposal together, indicating that they support each other. Reading also applies just in case the Brexit deal allows for EU-funded institutions to stay in the UK. Nearing the deadline, the host city of Utrecht backs out. The remaining countries and cities compete fiercely to get the necessary support from the member states, especially once the deadline for proposal is past and it is clear who the competitors are.

On 9 December 2020, a panel of non-bidding member states of the ECMWF decide in favor of Bonn. The proposal, supported by Helsinki from the start, consists of a 16-story glass tower with all the requested facilities to be built between 2021 and 2023, and a temporary facility in the city center. The panel notes that Bonn is home to 'numerous UN agencies' and has 'a clear strategic advantage' in being 'within a radius of only a few hundred kilometers' of several other EU countries. The ECMWF Council will be further investigating the setting-up of an 'EANode' (scientific hub) in Helsinki, Finland.

Now the questions arise: what were the conditions under which Bonn and Helsinki successfully attracted the organization? What did the organizational network do right? What did the others do wrong – if anything? Was it the promised new building? Was it the collaboration with Helsinki, giving the proposal a more international profile? Was it

Chancellor Angela Merkel's strong position across the EU? Or was it sheer luck? Why did the other seven proposals, despite having 'blown away' the committee, fail? In short, what determined the success of Bonn and Helsinki and the failure of the others?

1 Introduction

1.1 Setting the Stage: Attracting International Organizations

At the end of the 19th century, the Russian Tsar, Nicholas II, and his ministers were looking for a location for a Peace Conference. They decided early on that St. Petersburg was less than suitable. Preference would be given to a small, neutral country. The cities of Copenhagen, Brussels, and Bern were considered but later rejected. Denmark announced that it was not interested and in Belgium, disagreement between King Leopold II and the parliament on whether to host the conference faltered. Switzerland was considered too dangerous, due to the fatal assault on Austrian Empress 'Sisi' near Lake Geneva. After lengthy discussion, the choice eventually fell on The Hague.

The Hague was considered a favorable neutral location, with its stable parliamentary tradition as well as the legacy closely associated with Hugo Grotius in the field of international law. Another asset was the family connection between Queen Wilhelmina and Nicholas II, as Wilhelmina's grandmother, Anna Paulowna, was the daughter of Tsar Paul I. The fact that The Hague had already been the center of international meetings on transnational legal questions had surely weighed heavily in its favor. From the First Hague Peace Conference in May-June 1899, the city of The Hague became increasingly *the* international city of Peace and Justice. The Hague Peace Conference became the continuity of this international path of Western, if not global, recognition (Joor, 2013). Today, over 22 Intergovernmental Organizations are based in The Hague (Decisio, 2020).

This is just one of many examples of how decision-making processes concerning a choice of location for the establishment of an International Organization took place in the past. In the recent example given in the prologue, one can read that the competition between host cities increasingly intensified and that an array of distinctive aspects was considered. And yet, all these processes are quite distinct from each other. How cities such as The Hague, supported by their host state, attract the establishment of International Organizations (hereafter IOs), is therefore a topic worthy of further study.

Host states compete to attract IOs, and throughout the relatively short history of such competition, the contest has grown stronger. Quite clearly, states and cities do not attract IOs independently but incorporate other actors in the process. Since the number of IOs has been growing and the distribution of IOs has widened to include many more countries scattered around the world, the competition has become fiercer. Therefore, the need to understand the intrinsic processes at work in attracting IOs has gained considerable ground in recent years.

This thesis attempts to illustrate how such processes are enacted to attract IOs from the perspective of governance networks. A premise of this thesis is that host states and cities attracting IOs work in a collaborative manner, and how they do this affects the outcome of such a process. Diplomatic relations are key in these types of processes, as the member states of an IO are usually the ones voting for a suitable location. As the number and variety of IOs have increased, the processes to attract them have also become more and more complex along the way.

Since the arrival of the very first IOs, the Red Cross in 1863 and the Universal Postal Union in 1874, there has been steady growth. In 1950, there were only 123 IOs; in the 1980s, this number had increased to 3,546. That, in turn, grew to almost 8,000 in 2019 (Union of International Associations, 2020). International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) became even more ubiquitous: from 832 in 1950 to more than 40,000 in 2017 (Turner, 2010; Appel, 2018). As IOs of different types are seen by many cities as important for their status and economy, competition between cities to host them has also increased substantially.

Small to medium-sized Western European cities are increasingly interested in attracting IOs. They face competition from non-Western cities in emerging countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and African and South American countries. As IOs operate in the vicinity of other IOs, INGOs, and Public Private Partnerships good infrastructure in the host city is crucial to their success. IOs need specialists, both highly skilled and medium-skilled staff, and several cooperative partners. In addition, a variety of local knowledge-based institutions, as well as suitable facilities and infrastructure will be required. To address the necessity for international schooling, as well as opportunities available for others closely associated with the core staff, these secondary facilities must be conveniently located, as well.

Attracting an IO is a complicated process that involves many actors. Success or failure depends on numerous circumstances. Candidate cities try to influence the process by offering attractive conditions and premises. Especially small to medium-sized cities are involved in the process of attracting IOs by interacting closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, because smaller cities do not necessarily have as many international contacts as so-called *global cities*. In addition, improving their international presence can be beneficial, as they are often at a disadvantage as the second or third city in their country. Part of the complexity stems from the involvement of different layers of government: ministries, provincial and local authorities, housing agencies, marketing departments, and divisions dealing with protocol and host state issues will all be called upon for their input. These actors form networks of largely unknown effectiveness. An IO attraction process is made even more complex as there is a lot of political maneuvering.

International diplomatic relations undoubtedly play a role; however, locally formed networks need to pay due regard to these relationships, too.

1.2 Governance Network Approach

The fact that IOs are attracted by various departments and stakeholders indicates that a network approach is worth considering when seeking to understand these processes. Collaborative governance is a field that underlies a governance network perspective. The concept of collaborative governance can be linked to the study of intergovernmental cooperation in the 1960s, while others trace its roots back to the birth of American federalism – "the most enduring model of collaborative problem resolution" (McGuire, 2006, p. 34). Others explain it as group theory and the theoretical response and evolution of Olsen's (1965) *Logic of collective action* or refer to the prisoner's dilemma and game theory (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2011). In collaborative governance, a focus on governance networks is often a sound point of departure. Since attracting IOs occurs in a network constellation, exploring this topic through a governance network approach seems most appropriate. Governance networks can be defined broadly enough to include actors from different levels. These different levels are municipal, provincial/cantonal, federal, and national, as well as IOs, NGOs, specialists, and knowledge centers. These governance networks are by their nature dynamic and differ in each case.

Since a clear set of conditions evident during the attraction of an IO and the reasons why these processes succeed or fail are not readily available, I have adopted an exploratory research approach. This means that this research does not have a theory testing or theory building purpose. While exploring the topic of governance networks attracting IOs, it can be useful to examine the actions of networks from different angles. Starting from the empirical complexity sketched above and the literature on governance networks, it seems useful to first focus on host policies and the experiences of those affected by such policies. This is called the *instrumental perspective*. Next, it is important to find out what narratives the involved network actors have on attracting IOs. What do *they* think is important during the process of attracting or retaining IOs? Consequently, do the IO representatives themselves have different ideas than the network attracting IOs? This is coined the *discursive perspective*. Thirdly, it is important to examine network characteristics and the positions of actors in the networks. Who are the key actors involved in the processes of attracting IOs? What is the frequency of their meetings and how does the size and structure of this network affect the outcome? This is to be understood as the *relational perspective*. These three perspectives form the basis of my exploratory approach.

There are two main advantages in using three independent perspectives. First, by looking at this topic with different theoretical perspectives, I expect to highlight contrasting accounts which, together, better explain how governance networks succeed or fail. In the work of Allison and Zelikow, who inspired me to select three perspectives, they argue that "while in the process of explaining and predicting the actions of governments, where one group of simplifications becomes convenient and compelling, it is paramount to have one or more conceptual frames at hand – a reminder of what is likely being omitted" (1999, p. 8). As Allison and Zelikow state further on: "Alternative frameworks are essential as a reminder of the limitations of whatever framework one employs" (p. 15). When independent perspectives are specified into concrete questions, these can offer the researcher a grip on the subject during an exploratory investigation.

Secondly, different criteria are often used in the field of network effectiveness studies. In the debate on how to assess network effectiveness, scholars have agreed that collaboration *alone* is not enough (Klaster, Wilderom, & Muntslag, 2017). When looking at influential studies in this field, for example those of Provan and Milward (1995), Sørensen and Torfing (2007), Isett et al. (2011), and Kenis and Raab (2020), what they have in common is that they use differing effectiveness criteria, where soft indicators such as network trust are combined with hard criteria such as goal attainment. Furthermore, in network effectiveness studies there is often a focus on collaborative policy design (Howlett, 2018), contextual factors such as 'system stability' (Provan & Milward, 1995; Provan & Kenis, 2008), and network structures and relationships (Provan & Sebastian, 1998; Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015). These three frames form the basis of my exploratory approach: collaborative policy design, contextual narratives, and relational characteristics.

In short, the three perspectives are concentrated on the following. The first considers the *policy* of attracting and hosting IOs. In every host state, increasing attention is being paid to the climate for these IOs – and businesses, as well. Host policies are designed at different levels, firstly at a national level: national governments consider the themes they want to invest in, and often consider whether bringing in a new IO would contribute to the profile and image of the country. Secondly, they are designed on a municipal level: authorities work on their marketing – such as 'The Hague, *the* International City of Peace and Justice'. Policymakers try to align this profile with both regional and national ambitions. Thirdly, to attract an IO, a local network often creates a *bid book* (a brochure including answers to the IO's questionnaire) that is in line with the national *brand*. They do this with the above-mentioned policies in mind. In policy design studies, the coherence and congruence of policy goals are often presupposed (Hood & Margretts, 2007; Howlett & Mukherjee, 2018) but the question is whether this approach is sufficiently attuned to the IOs in question. A second question is whether the implementation of these policies is successful, and how the perception of IO employees already in the city affects the outcome of the attraction of a new IO.

The second perspective has more to do with the *discursive* background of the networks that attract IOs, therefore focusing more on the context of the topic. Governance networks are working on preparing bids and retaining IOs in the city, but the actions they take are based on their shared perceptual frames. What policymakers prioritize and what they think IOs consider important sometimes differs from what the IOs and their employees themselves consider to be central. This discursive scope is interesting because actions and decisions are often taken based on perceived *discourses*. Particularly in a world that changes rapidly, the assumptions made by policymakers based on perceptual frames may be incorrect (Peters, 2012; Boräng & Naurin, 2015). Through taking a discursive view, looking at the differences and similarities in discourses of the networks involved, the query becomes apparent as to whether the overlap of different groups' narratives may lead to success in attracting IOs.

The third perspective concerns the relational sphere in which the networks operate. The structure of those types of networks has been studied, especially the conditions for effectiveness of goal-oriented organizational networks (Kenis & Provan, 2009; Kenis & Raab, 2020). What has not been investigated is whether these conditions are also applicable to the networks attracting IOs. Actors in those networks lobby voting member states, collaborating with specialists and permanent representatives. The question here is how do network characteristics, such as network cooperation, centrality, and network size and diversity affect network failure or success?

In my approach it is my choice to focus on governance networks. When it comes to networks, I pay attention to different aspects, for instance policy, but also actors and their discourses. While doing this, I can also discuss politics in a way that is important to me, posing the questions: who are the participants, what is their connection with others, and what are their views, what shapes the discourse? Furthermore, all kinds of contextual factors can play a role, but I try to keep these factors as 'constant' as possible by choosing comparable cases and by looking at successfully and unsuccessfully attracted cases within the same circumstances (e.g., municipality and country).

1.3 Research problem and questions

These perspectives are derived from the governance network literature and from the empirical puzzle: how governance networks attract IOs. The mechanisms that lead to success or failure when attracting IOs seem hidden in a black box. Following the independent perspectives, I arrive at my research question and sub-questions:

> *What contributes to the successes and failures of governance networks in small to medium-sized Western European host cities in attracting International Organizations?*

Due to the broad scope of the research question, I divided this into several sub-questions:

- Sub-question 1: *How do host policy design and its implementation contribute to success?*
- Sub-question 2: *How do overlaps of perceptual frames of the networks involved contribute to success?*
- Sub-question 3: *How do network characteristics – such as level of cooperation, centrality, diversity, and size – contribute to success?*

In answering the questions, I have limited myself to small to medium-sized host cities in Western Europe, as these cities find themselves in a particularly challenging position. Firstly, large global cities are perceived as more attractive than small to medium-sized cities. Secondly, the distribution of IOs is shifting toward Eastern Europe and other parts of the world and is therefore subject to more and more competition.

1.4 International Organizations

Since my interest in attracting IOs started in 2013 when studying the peace and justice sector in The Hague, the focus is mainly on IOs with universal membership. At the time, 18 of these organizations were housed in The Hague, whereas now – in 2022 – there are 22. Many universal IOs are involved in peace, justice, and security in The Hague and the city's ambitions to participate in this field are far-reaching globally. This city has been called 'Geneva at the North Sea', which is an interesting fact, as the UN cluster in Geneva is much larger than in The Hague. Based on this interest, a comparison between medium-sized cities with the same ambition, such as Geneva, was obvious. Using this comparison as a base, it was thereby established in an early stage that regional organizations such as EU agencies would be excluded from this study.[1]

IOs are defined as "intergovernmental entities based on a multilateral treaty possessing a permanent secretariat" (Ege & Bauer, 2013, p. 135). IOs differ from INGOs in that their memberships predominantly consist of states. They have plenary meetings at

1 The relevance of the example in the Prologue to this study is still evident, as the ECMWF is an Intergovernmental Organization with EU funded branches, that needed to move due to the outcome of the Brexit negotiations. The headquarters of the climate-related IO remained seated in Reading in the UK. Although the competition between candidate cities to host EU agencies has similar mechanisms as features, there are also substantial differences. This is the main reason why these are excluded from this study.

least every ten years, as opposed to ad hoc international conferences, and they have a permanent secretariat and correspondence address, which differentiates them from regular international conferences or regimes (Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck, & Dijkstra, 2019). Traditionally, scholars distinguish four different types:

1) Universal IOs (e.g., the UN, which strives for universal membership) that aim to make global rules and try to expand their membership as widely as possible.

2) Intergovernmental IOs or IGOs that are organized as a cooperation between states. These can decide to create organizations for handling specific subjects at a governmental level, but the governments of the member states remain responsible for decision-making. Intergovernmental organizations can be subdivided into general ones, discussing general issues, and functional ones operating in narrowly defined fields. Examples of functional IGOs include the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat in Geneva and the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

3) Closed IOs, which are intended to cover only a limited group of states. Many of these IOs address themselves to a particular region, such as the African Union, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Schermers, 1991; Fischer, 2012).

4) The Supranational Organizations with powers above the level of the state. These are, for example, the EU and some technical organizations that are legally not supranational but have such powers in their field of operation that their decisions have an almost supranational force, such as the World Meteorological Organization or the International Civil Aviation Organization (Schermers, 1991).

In my study, I focus on type 1 and 2: the universal and the intergovernmental organizations. Both types can be divided into headquarters and departments that leave or aim to leave. There is also a newer type in category 1: the Quasi-IO. This is a hybrid between an INGO and an IO. It has a non-profit character and should have permanent staff, and its work must be related to an established IO. The legal status of a Quasi-IO entails certain tax exemptions. As noted, in these considerations I steer clear of the EU, since the cities I started investigating are focused on UN organizations, IOs and Quasi IOs, and because Geneva is not part of the EU.

In the UN literature, scholars also make a distinction between the 'First UN', the arena for state decision-making, and the 'Second UN' consisting of heads of secretariats and staff members who are paid from voluntary budgets. The 'Third UN' comprises NGOs, experts, commissions, businesses, and academics (Weiss, 2013). All these international actors influence how a location is decided upon, for headquarters or other divisions. The First UN, however, is the most important in this process. These actors are permanent representatives of their host state and the ones voting on a decision about the creation or relocation of an IO. Nevertheless, regional actors as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAG), and the EU also play a role in influencing these voting procedures (Panke, Lang, & Wiedemann, 2018). When a state is part of a regional group, it is often lobbied to take a position in a voting procedure. How this process evolves depends on the type and specialization of the IO and how the IO is planning to relocate or set up an office.

Several IOs started looking for new premises in the mid-1990s, when the economic crisis of the 1980s seeped through into the IOs’ world, and again in 2008 due to the financial crisis. An unstable UN system causes more unrest, as UN departments consider moving to cheaper locations. In the years between 2008 and 2013, for instance, 21 UN and other departments relocated from Geneva alone. They moved IT, logistics, and finance branches to Turin, Budapest, Istanbul, Manila, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, and Nairobi, but also to New York, Copenhagen, Brussels, and Paris (Bradley, 2013). To understand why IOs settle in certain cities it is necessary to understand what their ‘survival mechanisms’ are during financial hardships.

When an IO (partly) relocates, the organization’s bureaucracy changes. Its optimal functioning is key to an IO and in fact the whole UN system, and when an IO operates well, it also enjoys more legitimacy. This legitimacy is crucial for the relevance of an IO (Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). The choice of location helps with its optimal functioning and legitimacy. When focusing on the vitality of IOs, studies point to the physical relocation of bureaucracies as a way of improving their performance (Gray, 2018; Ireland, 2006). The vitality of IOs is linked to where they are located because autonomous bureaucracies “cannot work well without competent staff” (Gray, 2018, p. 4). A report commissioned by CARICOM, a regional organization among Caribbean countries, also argues that the convenience surrounding the location of their operation can play a prominent role in IO functioning (Bishop, et al., 2011). The location of an IO is crucial considering the requirements for qualified staff, good working conditions, and international schools for the staff’s children.

Remarkably, social sciences literature has paid little attention to the geographic location element inherent in the decision-making process of IOs. Some anthropological studies deal with the relationship between an IO and its host city (Abélès, 2011; Müller, 2013; Niezen & Sapignoli, 2017; Dairon & Badache, 2021). Historical studies considered reasons for IOs being headquartered in a city (Mires, 2013; Meyer, 2013). Furthermore, there are several impact studies on UN presence in cities as New York and Geneva (Fondation Pour Genève, 2013; Fondation pour Genève, 2015; City of New York, 2016). Recent studies by Badache (2020) and her colleagues conceptualize locations of IO headquarters as ‘ecosystems’ (Dairon & Badache, 2021). This concept aims to capture the complexity of what the location means for the performance of IOs. The impact of a location on an IO has been studied by these scholars, albeit to a limited extent, but not from the perspective of the cities: How do networks in cities attract IOs, and what are the mechanisms of attracting IOs from a local perspective?

1.5 Interurban competition to host IOs

One of the relevant areas of literature that deals with this topic addresses the location of corporate headquarters and economic geography, as this aims to explain why headquarters are situated where they are. Adler and Florida (2020) argue that the locations where corporate headquarters settle have changed in tandem with the rise of post-industrialism. They find that a key factor of post-industrialist geography is the clustering of human talent and economic activity. According to Porter (2000), competitive advantage is grounded in the capacity of its cluster, being the nearby firms with which it shares institutional support, suppliers, and workers. Others showed that head offices are more likely to cluster near each other (Mariotti, Piscitello, & Elia, 2010). Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2009) also identify airports as a decisive factor, beside relevant services, same-industry specialization, and taxes. Although cluster theory is one way of looking at the importance of a location, Adler and Florida (2020) argue that, nowadays, the main means firms seek are human capital or talent. They imply there is a necessity of a new paradigm for the (re)location of corporate headquarters, which is based more on talent or human capital and on the locations where these are concentrated. It is an intriguing question whether the need for a new paradigm also applies to IOs moving their headquarters and departments, or whether this is only the case for big firms.

When focusing on the (re)location of IOs from the cities' perspectives, the literature on attracting events and international conferences is relevant, in the absence of literature on cities attracting IOs. These include global summits (Death, 2011; Falk & Hagsten, 2018), or sports competitions (Salisbury, 2016). *Why* cities want to attract these events is evident: it enhances the reputation of the host city and brings economic advantages. Global summits, for instance, are often perceived as 'moments of political theatre' and are established as landmark moments of different types of global governance (Death, 2011). Why *small to medium-sized Western European cities* attract conferences and sports events is also evident. As 'hosting' is perceived to achieve a higher position in the global hierarchy, bidding for events has become increasingly attractive for cities around the globe (Nauright, 2004). Bidding has become an 'industry' for cities and is linked to city marketing. Promoting a city globally has the advantage that a certain strategic location can increase its competitiveness and position itself as an attractive center for interurban competition.

To reach a high position in the rankings to attract IOs, the following locational factors are considered crucial for the international profile of cities: performing arts, hospitality, real estate and architecture, academia, corporate services, museums, media, (other) IOs and multinationals, and finance (Grosveld, 2002). Rankings, such as Mercer's Quality of Living Index or the Global Urban Competitiveness Report, are essential to policymakers when they are working on regional innovation. Most of these benchmarks are based on locational factors. Recently, the so-called 'soft factors' (for instance, livability, social cohesion, and urban amenities) have become increasingly important (Hu, Blakely, & Zhou, 2013; Csoti & Van Haelst, 2016).

Rankings also started to measure which cities are popular loci of sustainable, peaceful, and legal global governance. Since 2010, the Global City Index, which ranks 65 cities with 25 measures on five globalization dimensions, added the dimension 'political engagement' (Kearney, 2015). This dimension measures the degree to which a city influences policymaking and dialogue by examining the number of embassies and consulates, major think tanks, IOs, INGOs, and the number of political conferences hosted by that city (Groen, 2016).

Larger cities on these benchmarks have more political weight, whereas small and medium-sized cities are perceived as objects within the changing dynamic of globalization, and they are often seen as the victims of interurban competition. Although local studies and reports consider the role of IOs in these cities, an exploration of how cities are involved in the attraction of IOs is currently lacking in this body of literature.

While studying this topic, it has become clear that attracting IOs takes place by an assembly of very different actors, working on winning such a bid. Candidate cities, in tandem with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and collaborating with other relevant actors, organize the process of attracting an IO together. In short, attracting (and retaining) an IO is the result of a multitude of actors and not of just one or a few. This makes using a network approach to this topic so interesting.

1.6 Research approach

In this thesis I will use three perspectives, as explained, to investigate the successes and failures of governance networks in attracting IOs. The reason why using three perspectives is helpful is twofold. On the one hand, other network effectiveness scholars have agreed that collaboration alone is not enough and that soft factors should be combined with hard factors in analyzing network effectiveness. Also, they consider collaborative policy design, contextual indicators, and relational aspects as essential. This has, however, not been used to analyze governance networks attracting IOs. On the other hand, inspired by the work of Allison and Zelikow (1999), the use of three theoretical frameworks can be useful to see what aspects are being omitted in each of the three perspectives. As the literature in this field indicates, collaborative policy design, contextual narratives, and network characteristics appear to be important factors in the functioning of networks. This may also be the case for attracting IOs.

While conducting this exploratory research, I seek to find out how the perspectives may explain network success or failure. Within qualitative research, process tracing is often used for investigating causal relationships, with the aim of establishing a better link between possible causes and outcomes. Whereas the goal of process tracing is to find as many steps as possible in the causal mechanism, I try to investigate whether the theoretical expectations match the outcomes found in the case studies I analyze.

Policy success is a much-debated topic, which is why I have differentiated between two success types. The two ways I look at success, considering the literature, are factual and perceived success. This will be explained in more detail in Chapter 2. My exploratory approach can be summarized as follows:

Figure 1.1 Research problem, perspectives, and outcomes



This study follows a comparative case study design throughout. When comparing cases, a researcher can decide on a large set of cases with hypothesis-testing possibilities, or a small set of cases, with less confidence but higher internal validity. In this study, I decided to use a small set of cases, to be able to explore the cases in depth and compare them properly. For the sake of comparability, I decided to select four cities with similar characteristics. Considering several objectifiable criteria, I selected Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen. For each of these cities, I then selected a successfully attracted IO and a failed attempt to attract or retain an IO.[2]

Governance networks responsible for attracting and retaining IOs are defined as "a relatively stable horizontal articulation of independent actors which interact by the means of negotiations that take place in a self-regulating framework" (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007, p. 15). Governance networks are divided into three groups: a (usually small) organizational network attracting IOs; a policy network retaining IOs; and IO representatives already established in the city. These are the three network levels I used as units of analysis.

In my work, I conducted interviews and document analysis of policy documents, IO websites, government reports, and requested insights into previous communications between the host country and IOs. The interviews (N=175) were conducted in several rounds with a total of 150 employees from IOs, municipalities, ministries, and businesses, specialists, and policy advisors. I decided to hold interviews rather than conduct a survey as it was not clear in advance which elements would be important for IOs when deciding where to settle, and because the perceptions and narratives of the people involved were to be central. These issues would have been impossible to determine with a survey.

1.7 The contribution of this work

The contribution of this work is threefold. First, it seeks to contribute to the discussion on governance network and network performance studies. While network governance literature discusses the internal composition of networks and the positive effects of good network collaboration (Isett, LeRoux, Mischen, & Rethemeyer, 2011; Raab, Mannak & Cambré, 2015; Kenis & Raab, 2020), in this work I address that a less internal orientation of networks can potentially lead to better results. This work contributes to network governance and collaborative governance theory, in that it provides a step towards a more externally oriented scope when studying networks. In doing so, it advocates a more actor-oriented approach when looking at governance networks. On a more practical note, with this book it can become more tangible as to what local governments can do to improve how they welcome and host IOs.

Secondly, this book contributes to the literature on moving IOs and what the host city signifies to IOs. While relying on many interviews in combination with other empirical

2 This study speaks of 'attracting IOs', when referring to 'attracting and retaining IOs'. These two processes are similar in that some cases were attracted to one city while other cities attempted to retain the IOs.

sources, it provides an overview of what the IO representatives consider to be important locational elements. This has been less researched in the public administrative literature and provides new information to policymakers. It also helps to further develop theorizing about the (proper) functioning of IOs. When looking at the recent work of Badache (2020), theory development on how IOs interact with their physical surroundings is quite new. Time and space have been new elements considered in the study of IOs, and this book contributes to that notion by including the appreciation of the space where IOs are located (Maertens, Kimber, Badache, & Dairon, 2021), and by proposing that the timing of attracting IOs is crucial, too.

The third contribution is on the role of medium-sized cities in the international arena. This study shows that a city's role in a lobby towards member states to attract an IO is limited. Nevertheless, it also shows that the contribution of city actors in governance networks attracting IOs can be quite significant. This has not been studied in-depth before and furthers the discussion on *city diplomacy*, an upcoming literature on local influence on a larger scale. Global problems are increasingly solved at a local level. This study adds to this discussion, by taking cities as examples of actors that affect crucial decisions, such as the (re)locations of IOs. This is a valuable contribution to the city diplomacy literature, as it focuses on cities' actions in the international arena and it lifts a tip of the veil of how city actors can be strategically involved in processes of attracting IOs (Amiri & Sevin, 2020).

In terms of relevance, this study is quite topical. While the United Nations is in an era of transformation, attracting IOs is now very important. UN departments and other IOs are relocating more frequently and therefore cities and states need to re-examine their host policies. Due to increased global competition, the topic is even more urgent for cities. Practitioners are often puzzled when an opportunity to attract an IO comes along. They need better strategies, not only for attracting IOs but also for retaining them. This study may help by providing further insight into questions related to the success or failure of these attraction or retention policies.

1.8 The outline of this thesis

Successes and failures of governance networks in the host cities are explored in this study by examining eight attracted IOs. Chapter 2 offers the theoretical background, the definitions and context of governance networks, the three perspectives, and policy success. Chapter 3 sheds light on the case selection, data collection, and operationalization of the three perspectives. Chapters 4–7 discuss the four cities and the eight selected cases from these three different perspectives. After describing the history of the city as a host to IOs, the cases and their success measures are described. Then, each perspective sheds light on the two cases, concluding with a summary of the findings per perspective. Each city chapter concludes with a summary of the results. Chapter 8 offers a comparison between the eight cases, discussing the outcomes of the expectations and making sense of the relations between the explored cases and the possible causes of success or failure. Chapter 9 synthesizes the findings and implications for theory and practice and highlights the opportunities for further research. In the Epilogue, I discuss the outcomes of the case presented in the Prologue.

2 Theoretical background

2.1 Introduction

The attraction of an IO is a dynamic and strategic process that involves many actors. It is common for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take the lead while other ministries are involved in making the attraction process a success. Specialists, advisors, businesses, and city, region, and state-level actors are involved in this governance network. The first step of such a network is to express its interest. The second step is the initiation of a process in which a bid book – a glossy brochure including answers to the IO's questionnaire – is prepared. Partners are sought to contribute financially, and a specific location is selected in the candidate city. These preparations need to be realized under time pressure as there are set deadlines, and there is fierce competition with other candidates. The third step is the lobbying stage, first within the applicant country, involving other departments at the national but also the local level. Then the applicant country needs to lobby externally for votes from the member states of the IO. Consequently, ambassadors and IO employees are involved in the governance network. When the vote finally takes place, or some form of decision is close to being taken, the candidate is well prepared and can make a last-ditch effort to lobby for its cause. Since attracting IOs requires making and shaping a group of closely involved actors from different organizations into a network supporting this cause, in this chapter I will further develop a network approach to understand these processes.

In the following sections, I discuss how the literature on governance networks can be helpful and I advance the three perspectives touched upon in the introduction. As a next step, I develop different ways of determining network success. The chapter concludes with a summary of the perspectives, concepts, and variables operationalized in the methodological chapter.

2.2 Governance networks

As mentioned, I follow Sørensen and Torfing (2007) in defining governance networks as "a relatively stable horizontal articulation of independent actors which interact by the means of negotiation that take place in a self-regulating framework" (p. 15). This definition highlights the interdependency of public and private actors, which is also important to understand the performance of a task as complex as attracting an IO. Furthermore, it emphasizes the operational autonomy of these network actors to interact through negotiations that combine "hard-nosed bargaining with consensus-seeking deliberation" (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009, p. 236) typical for the kind of interactions involved in attracting IOs.

Public administrative researchers who have addressed the effectiveness of such governance networks have attempted to explain the differences in success across networks. There is, however, no systematic framework for assessing this (Provan & Milward, 1995; Provan & Sebastian, 1998; Provan & Kenis, 2008). An exception is the work of Provan and Milward (2001). Although they focus on specific community-based networks in terms of their costs and benefits for the community, the network, and participating organizations, they provide an important source of inspiration. Nevertheless, I do not find the standard notions of network success appropriate for evaluating the performance of governance networks. As Cristofoli et al. put it: "questions of how to successfully manage public networks remain without a clear answer" (2017, p. 275). Thus far, network effectiveness researchers have not examined how governance networks interact with actors such as IO employees and permanent representatives abroad, let alone how and when they are successful in attracting IOs.

Research on governance network effectiveness has, however, expanded and is therefore quite broad. In this literature, three fields can be distinguished. The first is the aforementioned work of Sørensen and Torfing (2007; 2009) and colleagues (Torfing & Triantafillou, 2017; Torfing, Peters, Pierre, & Sørensen, 2013). They study interactive governance with the main focus on democratic effectiveness and metagovernance. They look at the theory and dimensions of governance, particularly at how political and administrative institutions interact. This is interesting to consider in my study since IOs are the embodiment of 'global governance' but they are attracted by a local network.

The second field is that of Provan and Milward (1995; 2001; 2002) who have developed a model for how to assess network effectiveness. The key consideration is that a network should be checked on distinctive network levels (client/community, network, and agencies/public–private partners), using different indicators to establish success. An important consequence is that effectiveness for one network level does not mean the same to another network level, so the researcher must choose which network level prevails. This idea has been developed by Provan and Kenis (2008; 2009) and others (Isett, LeRoux, Mischen, & Rethemeyer, 2011; Raab, Mannak & Cambré, 2015; Kenis & Raab, 2020) who worked on specific organizational networks and their effectiveness. In these studies, the structure of the network is crucial, along with the different contextual elements. Following Provan and Milward (2001), I distinguish three groups that are involved in the attraction of IOs: the organizational network attracting an IO (network level); the policy network retaining IOs (agency level); and the IO representatives (community level).

The third field is that of network management, represented by McGuire and Agranoff (2011) and Meier and O'Toole (2001), who developed the O'Toole–Meier model and tested the effects of several variables, including management quality, managerial networking, management stability, and personnel stability, management tenure, and the time that managers spend in networks (Juenke, 2005; Wang, 2016). Scholars in this field have studied network management variables such as the identification of a connection to crucial actors and leadership (Klijn, Edelenbos, & Steijn, 2010; Van der Voet, Kuipers, & Groeneveld, 2016). How network management can influence network success is important to my study, as the networks attracting IOs are managed in a certain way, which may affect their success.

As explained in the introduction, I make use of three perspectives in my exploratory approach. It is an exploratory study, for which I use several perspectives that are independent of each other and of which one or two may not be relevant. I use these perspectives to get a better view on the processes of attracting IOs. And, because they are different angles, they probably yield a more complete image and therefore a better understanding. The following sections further explain my theoretical expectations based on these three different perspectives.

2.3 The instrumental perspective

First, when wanting to know when and why governance networks fail or succeed in attracting an IO, I need to focus on the instruments the network uses. The governance networks build on their host and branding policies when creating the bid book to attract the IO. As the processes of attracting IOs are often ad hoc, those policy documents are the main tools that the governance network can build on, besides the specific information of specialists. Those types of policies are paramount, as IO employees are directly affected. If they have complaints about the host country and share them with others, it can lead to reputational damage to the country or city where they live, and the next IO will not be attracted as easily. The policy and its implementation are important for current and future IO employees on a local level (Badache, 2020). This can determine the success or failure of a network in attracting an IO. How the tools are formulated, implemented, and perceived by the parties involved is one way of looking at the effectiveness of these networks. This 'instrumental' perspective is a useful approach to start with when considering network success in this context.

From this instrumental perspective, the idea is twofold. On the one hand, I focus on the idea that the creation of a policy design involves multiple stakeholders. On the other hand, I argue that a positive policy perception of the 'target group' leads to a higher likelihood of success. The instrumental perspective is therefore based on two concepts:

policy design, stemming from collaborative design studies (Howlett & Rayner, 2018), and *benefit for the target group*, derived from the policy success (McConnell, 2010) and implementation literature (Pülzl & Treib, 2007).

The first concept of policy design is seen as a collaborative effort of different layers of government. A good policy design is "coherent, congruent and consistent", argue Howlett and Rayner (2018, p. 389). Additionally, a shared understanding among network members about how strategies are being followed is seen as crucial (Andrews, Boyne, Meier, O'Toole Jr., & Walker, 2012, p. 78). To succeed, governmental organizations need to be clear on their strategies, tasks, and efforts and in formulating and aligning their policies. As the alignment of goals leads to better performance, this is something governance networks strive for (Ayers, 2015; Rogge, 2018).

According to Rogge (2018), there are three levels of consistency important for achieving policy objectives. These are the alignment of policy objectives, a consistent policy mix in which the instruments "reinforce each other in the pursuit of policy objectives, and the interplay of the instrument mix and the policy strategy" (2018, p. 44). Applying this to the collaborative governance context means that network actors' roles are judged in terms of their contributions to the common goals.

Common goals need to be separated from means or tools as components of how policy is brought into effect. The danger of isolating formulated goals is that they are taken out of context, but the advantage is that they can be compared on a higher level of abstraction. The first step then asks: "What general types of ideas govern policy development?" (Howlett & Rayner, 2018, p. 393). The concept of policy design is in line with that first step, which I explore by focusing on the alignment of the policy goals. This is important because the national, regional, and local governmental organizations are considered to have similar goals to be successful.

This policy 'funnel', from the national to provincial/cantonal and local levels, is often followed purely out of habit. The themes the national government focuses on in terms of content targeting, for instance, the Dutch 'top sector' policy, are meant to trickle down to the provincial and municipal levels. This also applies to attracting IOs. Policies from the different layers of government represent the actors or networks working there. This means there is vertical coordination, an alignment between the different governmental bodies. The alignment can be explored by comparing the policy goals of different policy documents. A successful bid book then ought to stem from these policies. I expect that the more the bid book is embedded in and aligned with the policy goals of the government layers involved, the more successful the attraction process will be. This results in the following expectation:

Expectation 1. *The more the bid books are aligned with the attraction policies, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

The degree of alignment between the host state policy, the nation branding, city marketing policies, and the bid book for the specific IO is the main variable in this expectation. It can be qualitatively explored by comparing the goals of the host and branding policies with the bid book, both in co-occurrence and content.

Where the first expectation contemplates the alignment of policy goals, the second addresses the operational settings: What are the specific on-the-ground requirements of policy? (Mukherjee & Howlett, 2018, p. 379). These requirements can best be examined with a bottom-up approach while addressing the recipients' perceptions of the policy implementation. Studies have shown that the resilience and involvement of the policy 'users' have a positive effect on policy outcomes (Marshall, 2007). In this study, the bottom-up approach is used to explore whether a negative or positive perception of the implemented policies influences governance network success.

While doing this, I use the concept of *creating benefit for the target group*. This concept stems from the policy success literature. McConnell argues that the more the intended target group benefits, the higher would be the likelihood of policy program success (2010, p. 67). The idea is based on the existence of a causal relation between policy perception and the governance network's performance (Hill & Hupe, 2002; Pülzl & Treib, 2007). This idea also appears in policy design studies, where it is assumed that a policy design is a response to how a policy is received. A successful policy design is therefore an interaction between the policymakers and the target group.

In the course of attracting IOs, the creation of host state policies is often formed as a response to the complaints of the international community in the host city, or to changing conditions. The reactions of the target group are therefore important for the proper execution of the policy. Considering these elements, I expect that the IO employees' perceptions of the attraction (host and branding) policies and government support play a role in successfully attracting new IOs.

E2: *The more positively the respondents in the city perceive the host policies and support, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

This expectation is explored with regard to the perception of the attraction policies (the visibility and effectiveness of nation branding and city marketing, the elements in the bid and governance support). The respondents' responses should then shed light on how the IO employees perceive the host and branding policies and the support they receive. These should also clarify the effect these perceptions have on governance network success.

2.4 The discursive perspective

Whenever a governance network is formed, the actors establish behaviors, priorities, and narratives which are often a mix of conscious and unconscious efforts. In other words, the network actors have a discursive context, a shared discourse, and this comes to the fore in their narratives. Furthermore, in the international environment in which lobbying takes place, the informal circuit is important. Conferences are held where IO employees meet and talk to ambassadors, governors, private stakeholders, and NGO workers. The discursive context also plays an important role at those times. When the different groups' narratives or 'perceptual frames' are similar, I expect that the attraction processes will be more successful. This 'discursive' perspective is a second way to explore the successes and failures of governance networks.

This perspective focuses on the discourses of those involved. Discursive institutionalism is one of the 'new institutionalisms' that differs from the other three in that it is based on ideas. It is distinct from rational choice institutionalism in that it is less fixed on rational preferences, and from sociological institutionalism in that it is not underlining all-defining cultural norms (Schmidt, 2008, p. 305). It is, finally, distinct from historical institutionalism in that it is less concerned with the equilibrium conditions that may result from a selection of ideas to guide policies. With that, it is less focused on historical paths. Discursive institutionalism is led by the discourses that are shared by political or policy actors. By focusing on discourses or narratives, the representation of ideas is expressed. These ideas are linked to the institutional contexts of policy and political actors (Schmidt, 2008; Peters, 2012). As such, this approach contributes to the understanding of political or policy actions in a way that the other institutionalisms do not. The argument is that to understand the role ideas play in shaping policy, one must understand the entire discourse within which it is embedded.

As indicated, the focus of this study is on governance networks attracting IOs to cities. For this purpose, when focusing on narratives, the discursive approach seems appropriate. Network activity is based on the behavior of its members, which is, following a discursive approach, embedded in a common 'narrative' or a shared understanding of people (Steunenberg, 2001). Especially since these networks develop in an ad hoc manner (to maintain the presence of an IO in a city or attract a new IO based on a bid), the development of common views, judgments, and ideas among the participants are important. This may result in any further institutionalization that may shape the rules or routines that can be found in more established organizations. Using discursive institutionalism to study governance networks and their effectiveness, the following questions come to mind: What are the shared perceptual frames? To what extent are these frames shared by those involved in the attracting process, and how does this affect network success?

Following these questions, I can further explore whether overlapping perceptual frames between networks point in the direction of higher network success. The concept I focus on in this perspective is *similar frames*. I will first explain why I argue that similar frames between the organizational and policy networks would lead to a higher likelihood of success. Consequently, I will argue that similar frames between the organizational network and IO representatives would lead to a higher likelihood of success.

Starting with the concept of similar frames, I expect that groups will make better collaborative policy decisions when they share a similar discourse. I first need to understand that in networks, individuals treat information that is congruent with their beliefs and knowledge as stronger than incongruent information (McBeth, Jones, & Shanahan, 2014). Network actors select sources and information that concur with what they already believe. Sharing a similar discourse, the network actors then have corresponding ideas about what is important. They have a so-called commonality in vision and perceptual framework, which can be thought of as 'schemata of interpretation' (Boräng & Naurin, 2015).

Within the governmental groups – the organizational and policy networks – I argue that having a common set of beliefs is important. When an organizational network interacts with a policy network on the topic of their mission – for example, to attract an IO – they need to be on the same page. Whenever they have a different discourse, a multitude of ideas can slow down the process of attracting an IO. Based on these aspects, I expect that by having a similar discourse and thereby similar priorities and narratives about what is important to IOs, the process is also more likely to be successful. This allows me to expect the following:

> E3: *The more the priorities and narratives overlap between the organizational network and the policy network in the host city, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

To be successful, the governance networks need to consider the wishes and needs of the IO representatives in the host cities. Two governmental networks with similar priorities and narratives are one thing but having a similar frame with a different group is yet another. I expect that, especially when groups come from different institutional settings, it will be crucial that they share the same narratives about what their priorities are. In this sense, the fourth expectation is an alternative to the third:

> E4: *The more the priorities and narratives overlap between the organizational network and the IO representatives in the host city, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

In these two expectations, the priorities and narratives are strongly related. By mentioning the same locational elements as priorities and sharing similar *stories*, the networks show their *similar frames.*

2.5 The relational perspective

Finally, the dynamics of the governance network actors' interactions need attention. Especially in the international context, formal and informal connections are crucial. Many scholars have focused on the effectiveness of governance networks, with determinants such as management, goal attainment, productivity, stability, conflict resolution, and learning capacity (Kenis & Provan, 2009). When I look at the relational aspects in this context, a lobby dimension prevails. The networks attracting IOs consist partly of international actors that need to be lobbied for votes. The political tendency to distribute IOs equally across the globe plays a role in this respect. Consequently, when analyzing the network characteristics in a relational way, the political context, in which networks collaborate and compete, must also be considered. Therefore, this 'relational' perspective will be the third way to explore the effectiveness of the governance networks that attract IOs.

Where the instrumental and discursive perspectives deal with the network level, this perspective explains decisions at a more individual level: it focuses on how actors 'play the policy game' and how they are positioned in the network. The premise for this perspective is that "as a consequence of interdependence, no single actor can dominate the interaction completely" (Godfroij, 1995, p. 185). This partially explains why networks often do not function as smoothly as might be expected from their official *raison d'être* and can produce results that none of the participants had wished for. Nevertheless, as many scholars have shown, the way in which a network is organized can influence its results. When focusing on strengthening internal stability, there is a need for a climate where productive interactions take place. Participation, information exchange, and harmony are important elements to explore. The concept I use in this perspective is *network characteristics*. This is a broad concept, as I want to explore the interactions of the network actors, as well as how the attraction process developed politically and whether the diversity and size of the network played a role.

The relational perspective refers to the theoretical notion that the structure of the networks matters when examining network success. Provan and Milward (2001) developed this perspective and suggested that distinguishing different levels in the analysis is appropriate. These are the network, agency, and community levels. Since these levels appeal to my empirical reality of attracting IOs, I will apply them in the following way.

The first level is the organizational network attracting the IO. This is a goal-directed network, meaning that the "network consists of three or more organizations that consciously agree to coordinate and collaborate, are used to deliver services, address problems and opportunities, transmit information, innovate, and acquire needed resources" (Kenis & Provan, 2009, p. 440). This network generally consists of only six to twelve individuals, depending on the type and size, importance, and complexity of the IO. There are often only one or two representatives per department involved in the organizational network.

The second level is the broader policy network that deals with the retention of IOs in the host city. The policy network consists of many more individuals as it represents housing agencies, policing, security officials, and communication departments at different government levels. This network generally maintains contact with the IOs, tackles problems they experience, helps the organizational network find a suitable location, and helps with the necessary papers for new employees, such as work and residence permits. The cooperation between the specific goal-oriented organizational network and the broader policy network is often close and well-coordinated.

The third level consists of the IO employees themselves. This is a broad group, as in the studied host cities the communities consist of 30,000 to 50,000 individuals, including their families. They play a role in policymaking around the attraction of IOs, as they serve as ambassadors and are exemplary for potential new international employees. In addition, they often provide feedback on host state policies, and local policy is also tailored to them. It is important to distinguish these three network levels when dealing with the interacting networks, because they have different roles and are, simultaneously, interdependent.

In the relational perspective, I look at the way these different levels interact and argue that they affect the outcome of the IO attraction process. As indicated, my main unit of analysis is network success or performance. Kenis and Provan (2009) propose three ways to develop indicators when evaluating network performance. The way to evaluate this, they argue, depends on the type of inception (voluntary/mandated), the governance form (shared governance/lead organization/network administrative organization), and the developmental stage. In this study, I use these three ways to develop criteria and variables with which I can explore the network characteristics. Table 2.1 depicts the three propositions of Kenis and Provan (2009), followed by the criteria and variables.

Table 2.1 Developing variables by applying the propositions of Kenis and Provan (2009)

Network performance indicators depend on (Kenis & Provan, 2009):	**Concepts:**	**Independent variables:**
1. Mandated/voluntary inception of the network	Internal legitimacy	Network cooperation
2. Form of governance: Network administrative organization (NAO)	Actor-level properties	a. Betweenness centrality b. Degree centrality
3. Developmental stage of the network	Network-level properties	a. Network diversity b. Network size

When looking at the first proposition, the type of inception, I am dealing with mandated organizational networks, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decides, by mandate from the Head of Government, to attempt to attract an IO. The Head of Government is authorized to make the final decision, besides which, the department coordinating the network approaches the other actors to cooperate. These actors can be other ministries, universities, or other knowledge institutes, depending on the type of IO. The coordinating department continues to take the lead here. This way, the network is not formed voluntarily but rather by mandate.

When developing criteria to explore the network's performance, it is relevant to look at the internal legitimacy of the network. Although Kenis and Provan (2009) argue that the internal legitimacy is only appropriate when dealing with voluntary networks, I reason that it also matters for mandated networks. Internal legitimacy refers to a positive assessment by the network participants (Human & Provan, 2000). Success elements such as reciprocity, trust, and cooperation are considered crucial for increasing internal legitimacy (Turrini, Cristofoli, Frosini, & Nasi, 2010). I expect that in a voluntary network the internal legitimacy is already high since the members have a common sense of purpose. A mandated network, on the other hand, still needs to create internal legitimacy. Internal legitimacy is, however, crucial in mandated networks. In the short time the organizational network has to attract the IO, I argue that it is important for its participants to value their cooperation positively. The members may not yet know each other well, so if there is a feeling of good cooperation, there is a greater chance of successful outcomes. This can also have a so-called flywheel effect: when people are satisfied with the cooperation, the cooperation improves, and the internal legitimacy increases. Hence, I arrive at the variable of 'perception of good network cooperation' for network success from a relational perspective. I expect the following:

E5: *The higher the perception of good network cooperation between the main players, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

The main players in this expectation are the actors within the organizational network. They are the ones attracting the IO, and they must experience their cooperation as positive.

For their second proposition, Kenis and Provan (2009) argue that the network performance criteria depend on the governance form. They distinguish three forms: shared governance, lead organization, and network administrative organization. In shared governance, a multitude of organizations work collectively as a network but with no distinct governance entity. In a lead organization, the network also consists of horizontally multilateral partners, but one plays the lead role. The third form is where one of the network entities is established with the sole purpose of network governance. This form is applicable to this study because a department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly takes a coordinating role. This department, usually protocol or host country affairs, has the most experience with bringing in IOs. It coordinates the process and looks for the relevant partners, both internally as well as externally. This host department is not an entity within the network as in a lead organization, and it is not a multitude of organizations working together as in shared governance. This Foreign Ministry department is coordinating the network, the degree of hierarchy depending on the case.

Within this form, one of the criteria I can look at is the centrality of the actors involved. In theory, the network administrative organization is the most centrally positioned actor, but how does this play out in practice? How often do people see or communicate with each other, and does this affect the likelihood of success? Based on these questions, I argue that when the network administrative organization leads the network, I need to evaluate the network on *actor-level properties*. These questions lead to the two variables of betweenness centrality (centrally positioned in the network) and degree centrality (level of activity in the network). A second reason that it is worthwhile to examine the network on centrality measures is that the governance network exists of several layers. The network administrative organization leads the organizational network, but others are involved as well: the broader policy network and the IO representatives. The way they are involved in the network is important when assessing network success, as they can form important sub-networks. Provan and Sebastian (1998) and Turrini et al. (2010) show that elements that support network performance are "defined by the presence of one coordinated agency and different subsets that are highly cohesive and strongly linked to each other" (p. 541). The data allows me to qualitatively explore whether this is, indeed, the case in these processes. I expect that in those networks, actor centrality affects success:

> E6: *The higher the actor centrality of the involved, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

The concept of actor-level properties is explored in two ways: betweenness centrality and degree centrality. The first considers the degree to which a node is located on the shortest path between any two other nodes in the network. The second is the simplest definition of actor centrality: a central actor must be the most active in the sense that it has the most ties to others. This is relevant because the network administrative organization leads the organizational network, but also connects the broader policy network and IO representatives.

The third proposition of Kenis and Provan (2009) is that the developmental stage is important for developing criteria to evaluate network performance. This 'life cycle characteristic' of the network allows me to take a closer look at the network-level properties. When zooming out to the bigger picture, several questions can be asked: Is the network more diverse and larger the longer it exists and the longer it has experience with attracting IOs? Is it also the case that networks with more experience and a longer existence show more success? In other words, are networks in host countries with more experience also more diverse, larger, and therefore more successful? From these questions arise the variables *network diversity* and *network size*.

When first looking at network diversity, this has proven to be an important element of coalition-building in network effectiveness studies (Zakocs & Edwards, 2006) as well as in the literature on lobbying success (Phinney, 2017). The latter's *theory of diverse coalitions* is in essence the idea that the diversity of coalition partners leads to legislative influence. Coalitions that unite diverse actors "expand informational lobbying capabilities, while providing credible information to legislators about the consequences of their policy choices" (Phinney, 2017, p. 18). This means that with a diverse network, the chances are higher that a lobby succeeds, for instance, to attract an IO. I argue that network diversity is especially important in my cases, as in the international context, actors with different backgrounds could diversify and empower a governance network.

The second variable is network size. Although some argue that network performance decreases with larger networks (Hasnain-Wynia, Sofaer, & Bazzoli, 2003), others show that a moderately high number of network members lead to better performance (Kenis & Provan, 2008). What works best depends on the network context. I expect that the higher the number of actors there are, the higher is the likelihood of the network's success, as it evidences that a network is further developed and therefore more mature and stable. This leads to the last expectation:

> E7: *The higher the network diversity and number of the actors involved, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

The types of actors in the governance network can be distinguished by their characteristics: are they a knowledge institution, a single specialist, minister, mayor, embassy, or head of a secretariat or embassy? Then, the number of involved actors is considered. The types and number of actors during an attraction process of an IO are explored and then compared between the cases.

2.6 Network success or failure?

After explaining each perspective, it is important to define network failure and success. The nature of policy success has been among the topics under discussion. In my study, one of the simplest explanations of success is that the IO is successfully attracted by the host city. When the policy goal is to attract an IO, then the appropriate measure of success is a 'factual success' in attracting the IO. There are, however, different degrees of factual success. A host city can be eliminated before the bidding even starts or can only just make it to the end. Furthermore, network success can also be defined as 'success as interpretation' and measured gradually as well. For the definition of success, I use the work of McConnell (2010), who distinguishes three perspectives on the nature of policy success: foundationalist, anti-foundationalist, and realist. The foundationalist perspective sees success as a fact that can be explored against identifiable standards; anti-foundationalists assume success is purely a matter of interpretation; the realists' assumption is that 'success is both fact and interpretation'. In the realist approach, "A policy can be successful in some senses, for example, as a benefit for the target group, but not everyone will perceive it to be a success" (McConnell, 2010, p. 31).

In terms of success definitions, McConnell uses three types of success: programmatic, process, and political success (2010). Compton and 't Hart (2019), on the other hand, check cases against four criteria: programmatic, process, political, and endurance success (Compton & 't Hart, 2019, p. 5). Bovens and 't Hart argue for mid-range theories of failure and success, meaning that one could use mid-range approaches to success, instead of a one-size-fits-all approach (2016, p. 661). In using a mid-range approach, I can adapt my approach to success to the empirical reality. Bovens and 't Hart (2016) argue that this could be done by "explaining specific instances" of policy success or failure, or by "develop[ing] theories explaining a range of policy successes or failures of a certain type" (2016, p. 14). This way, it might be possible to better explain what success is in this empirical reality.

The suggestion of Bovens and 't Hart (2016) to adapt success measures to the empirical world gives space to establish different degrees of success. Furthermore, McConnell's (2010) realistic approach allows to look at success as fact, as well as success as interpretation by key stakeholders. I interpret the key stakeholders as the organizational networks. These are the ones that need to perceive the attraction as a success.

The first type of success, ‘success as fact,’ ties in with the achievement of policy’s intended outcomes: attracting the IO successfully, and therein recognizing different stages of success. This type of success is observable, as it is an ‘objective’ measure of how far a city progressed in the bidding game. The operationalization of this type of success is explained in the next chapter on methodology. Table 2.2 depicts the degrees of ‘success as fact’.

Table 2.2 Degrees of ‘success as fact’

Degrees of success / **Type of procedure**	*Prelude*	First stage **Factual failure**	Second stage **Moderate factual failure**	Third stage **Moderate factual success**	Fourth stage **Factual success**
Voting	Announce-ment of (re)location, *Request for Proposals*	Submission of candidates; host city is out in first voting round	Second round of voting	When host city only just wins, without a large majority	Host city wins the last round of voting with a large majority
No voting	Informal an-nouncement of the search for a (re)loca-tion	Host city is not taken into consideration after submission	Host city no longer in consideration halfway through	Only two host cities are left in the process	Being considered as the only successful candidate from the beginning

Next, I focus on ‘perceived success’ which is defined in degrees of how the organizational network actors, based on their opinions, assess the result of the attraction process. This type also gradually moves from failure to moderate failure, moderate success, and success. In the literature, a ‘policy fiasco’ is “[a] negative event that is perceived by a socially and politically significant group of people in the community to be at least partially caused by avoidable and blameworthy failures of public policymakers” (McConnell & Tormey, 2020, p. 687). Applying this definition, the failure must at least be partially caused by the organizational network attracting or retaining the IO. The range from failure to success is described using the following logic. The first degree is a perceived failure, for example, when the IO has not been successfully attracted, and the organizational and policy networks do not perceive the case as a success.

The second degree, a moderate perceived failure, occurs when the IO has not been successfully attracted but the governmental networks perceive the case as a success. For instance, an attraction can be a failed process, but the resources have been increased due to the failure, or host policy has been turned into a top priority.

The third degree, a moderate perceived success, is when the IO has been successfully attracted, but the organizational network perceives the process as a failure to some extent. This can be a typical case of 'too much invested to quit' with all the problematic cognitive dissonance it entails (Bovens & 't Hart, 2016).

The fourth degree, a perceived success, is when the IO has been successfully attracted and the case is perceived as an outright success. Table 2.3 depicts these degrees of 'perceived success'.

Table 2.3 Degrees of 'perceived success'

Degrees of success / **Type of procedure**	Perception of success **Perceived failure**	Perception of success **Moderate perceived failure**	Perception of success **Moderate perceived success**	Perception of success **Perceived success**
Voting / No voting	The organizational network perceives the process as a failure	The organizational network perceives the process as a success, although the IO was not successfully attracted	The IO was successfully attracted, but the organizational network perceives the process as a failure to some extent	The organizational network perceives the process as an outright success

2.7 Conclusion

How governance networks attract IOs is still an unexplored area of research. In this chapter, I develop my network approach to explore the success of applicant cities in attracting IOs. As indicated, this work requires input from many parties, as different actors at different levels of government, as well as from the private sector, need to work together to successfully compete on a bid.

For the instrumental perspective, I use the concepts of policy design and benefit for the target group by introducing policy alignment and perception of host policy and support variables. For the discursive perspective, I develop the similar perceptual frames concept by explaining ways to examine the governance network in overlapping priorities and narratives. For the relational perspective, I use Kenis and Provan's (2009) three ways to develop variables to assess network success. By focusing on the network characteristics, I arrive at internal legitimacy, and variables of actor- and network-level properties to examine the structure of the networks and their effect on success. When I define what network success means, I use the realist approach wherein policy success is both an objectively determined success as well as a perceived success. First, I focus on the stages of the process of attracting IOs (objectively determined) and then on the degree to which the involved network members perceive the process as a success. In this way, success could be determined more precisely. Table 2.4 summarizes the perspectives, concepts, and variables.

Table 2.4 Three perspectives, concepts, and variables

<table>
<tr><th>Perspectives</th><th>Concepts</th><th>Independent variables</th><th>Dependent variables</th></tr>
<tr><td>Instrumental perspective</td><td>Policy design (Mukherjee & Howlett, 2018)
Benefit for the target group (McConnell, Grealy, & Lea, 2020)</td><td>1. Policy alignment
2. Policy perception and support</td><td rowspan="3">Success as fact: how far a host city made it in the bidding process
(McConnell, 2010)

AND

Success as interpretation to what extent the organizational network perceives the case as a success.
(McConnell & Tormey, 2020)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Discursive perspective</td><td>Similar frames (Peters, 2012; Boräng & Naurin, 2015)</td><td>3. Similar frames between organizational and policy network
4. Similar frames between organizational network and IO representatives</td></tr>
<tr><td>Relational perspective</td><td>Network characteristics (Kenis & Provan, 2009; Phinney, 2017)</td><td>Internal legitimacy:
5. Network cooperation

Actor-level properties:
6a. Betweenness centrality
6b. Degree centrality

Network-level properties:
7a. Network diversity
7b. Network size</td></tr>
</table>

The table represents three ways to explore the processes of attracting IOs. All the expectations mention the assumption that these will indicate a higher likelihood of success in attracting IOs. The reason this is phrased this way is that many components can influence such a process, and I look at how governance networks' actions might have an effect. By using three perspectives, I expect that some of these will be able to better explain how networks are more successful. In the following chapter, I will further operationalize these expectations.

3 Research design and operationalization

3.1 Introduction

As I want to explain the success and failure variables of governance networks attracting IOs to small to medium-sized cities, I use a comparative case study design.[3] Comparative case studies usually employ both qualitative and quantitative methods and are particularly useful for understanding how the context influences the successes of program or policy initiatives. A case study is an intensive study of a single case or a small number of cases for the purpose of understanding a larger set of similar cases (Gerring, 2009; Yin, 2014). The use of case study methods has some consequences, one being that more intensive research is possible than with a cross-case study, which is often a large-N study comparing many cases. Other consequences are that it allows the possibility of focusing more on causal mechanisms and that the data availability is concentrated. The trade-off of doing case studies is that it is not possible to test hypotheses, as case study methods have more of a hypothesis-generating goal, and a somewhat smaller degree of confidence. The internal validity of case study methods is high, as they are better at establishing the accuracy of a causal relationship between independent and dependent variables, and better at explaining causal mechanisms.

In case study research, a question often asked is: "Of what is the case a case of?" (Dellepiane, 2015, p. 14). As Gerring argues, "A study of the French Revolution may be conceptualized as a study of revolution, of social revolution, of revolt, of political violence, and so forth. Each of these topics entails a different population and a different set of causal factors" (2007, p. 41). In this study, I selected cases from four cities with a comparable background. These cases are different; these cities are as much similar as possible given the instances in which a discussion on IOs has taken place. Afterward, I select the IOs in those four cities. The IOs are selected from the types that I touched upon in the introduction: UN and IO headquarters and departments, and Quasi-IOs. By selecting different cities (and not multiple cases in one city) I can compare both successes and failures, and compare the cities, as some of the cities competed against each other to attract the same IO.

3 Looking at small to medium-sized cities makes sense because these have an increasing number of competitors when looking at the attraction of IOs. Not only are they competing with so-called global cities, such as New York, Seoul, Nairobi, and Paris, but also more and more with non-Western cities in the Middle East (Qatar) and Asia (Singapore, Shanghai), especially when looking at becoming hubs for IOs.

In the following sections, I explain how the city and IO cases are selected, how I carried out the data collection and analysis, and how the three perspectives are operationalized. The chapter concludes with a summary of the research strategy.

3.2 Selection of cases

As explained my research design is based on cases of attracting IOs in cities that are, as much as possible, comparable. The reason behind this choice is to focus on characteristics of the network supporting the attraction of an IO while keeping other factors, that is, those related to the immediate context in which this process takes place, as much as possible constant. I will start by focusing on this context before moving to the selection of my cases.

To properly compare several attraction processes for IOs, the cities had to have some common characteristics. The first criterion was geographic location. As the research question is on governance networks in small to medium-sized Western European host cities, I first looked at several definitions of 'Western European' and then opted for a broad scope. I selected the cities in the unofficial Regional Group in the UN 'Western European and Others Group'. Table A1 in the Appendices shows 23 countries that fall under this category. Choosing from this group led to a better and more balanced decision than choosing a narrower definition of Western European such as the UN geoscheme classification, consisting of nine countries. The Model European Parliament classifies only seven countries as 'Western Europe', while the EuroVoc classification includes twelve. In the broader definition, the countries in the Western European and Others Group act as voting blocs and negotiation forums (UNAIDS, 2010). This means the cities are in the same boat when it comes to voting on important global decisions, such as the location of an IO. Within this broad definition, I reason that cities should be centrally located for reasons of comparability. Some of the cities were less suitable for comparison as these are in the periphery of the European and Others Group, such as Ankara, Lisbon, Dublin, and Helsinki.

The second criterion was size: a small to medium-sized city is a city with between 70,000 and 2 million inhabitants (Campbell, 2000). This criterion is important since I want to know how processes of attracting IOs in *small to medium-sized* West European host cities take place. IOs tend to cluster in places with a *hub* for IOs which is often available in medium-sized cities – think of Geneva, Strasbourg, The Hague, Stockholm, Bonn, and Barcelona. When the cities are small to medium-sized, they also share similar difficulties (lack of affordable housing) and benefits (easy to get around, an international community one can oversee). Many cities in Europe fall outside this scope. If I look at the 28 cities included in Table A1 in the Appendices, I can see that some of the remaining cities located in the center of the area are too big (London, Paris, Rome) and others too small (Monaco, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg City).

Narrowing down the number of cities even further, the third criterion was the content of the topics the cities compete on. As depicted in Table A1 in the Appendices, each city has its own favored topic to attract IOs. The reason this is a relevant criterion is that I wanted cities with a similar focal area while attracting IOs. Several cities are excluded because they have a different focus when it comes to attracting IOs. Examples include Bonn, a city committed to climate and sustainability, and Strasbourg and Brussels, two cities focused on European institutions rather than international ones.

The four cities that remained were Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen. They are small to medium-sized: Geneva being the smallest (202,000 in 2021), and Vienna the largest (1.9 million in 2021). They are in a similar geographic location, Copenhagen being slightly further north but not located in the periphery, and the cities host many IOs focused on similar topics, such as peace, security, justice, humanitarian aid, environment, and life sciences.

The first city, Geneva, is the most well-known hub for UN organizations, with the highest density of international employees living in the city compared to others. It also has the longest history of attracting IOs and is seen as the Second UN City, with the most headquarters after New York. The Hague is one of the smaller cities, having been neutral in World War I, just like Geneva, which played a role in the attraction of some of the first IOs. With the International Court of Justice, The Hague also has the name of Second UN City – this is a much-debated title both cities claim. Vienna is also known as a UN City and hosts many headquarters in the field of security and non-proliferation. It is seen as a diverse city that bridges cultures between Eastern and Western Europe. With an eventful past, Vienna has grown into one of the safest cities worldwide with the highest scores on livability, thus increasing its attractiveness to IOs. Lastly, Copenhagen competes with Vienna on the highest livability benchmarks, being the city with the 'happiest people' in the world and marketed as 'the world's best city for families.' Copenhagen has been competing fiercely to attract IOs since 2013 when its 'UN City' building was finished and needed to be filled with – preferably UN – organizations.

The way to proceed and choose cases of attracted IOs in the cities is to make a careful selection while noting that the characteristics of the governance networks are different, while the background factors are comparable. For instance, when comparing how the act of attracting IOs is related to success, the differences among these cities are less important than the causal relationship suggested by the mechanisms I would like to research as part of my network perspective (Anckar, 2008). The way governance networks in the host city apply, lobby, and bid for IOs prevails. In other words, the object under study is not the cities themselves or how the cities handle the attraction process, but the processes of attraction set up by governance networks. These networks consist of a mix of municipal, ministerial, academic, IO, and NGO actors.

Through a selection of similar types of cities, the differences between the governance networks can be studied in a clear-cut manner. The cities and their similar background factors form the contexts in which the governance networks operate.

IO case selection

Having established that the cities show some important similarities but are far from equal, I selected the IOs on the dimension of their diversity. As the research question focuses on what contributes to the successes and failures of governance networks in these cities, I selected a failed and a successfully attracted IO in each city. One of the criteria of this selection was, obviously, that at least one of the cities was in global competition to attract the IO. Secondly, the time span when the attraction processes took place was in the 20 years before I started this project (1995–2015). A period of 20 years was relevant because of the data collection: older cases are harder to study when conducting in-depth interviews. Thirdly, I looked for variation and a diverse set of organizations, selecting from UN headquarters and departments (the universal type), IO headquarters and departments (the intergovernmental type), and Quasi-IOs. Table A2 in the Appendices depicts the IOs that were newly created or moved to the four cities between 1995 and 2015. I selected one from the category of UN headquarters (UNOPS in Copenhagen), three of the IO headquarters (Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat, Green Climate Fund, and International Criminal Court), one UN department (UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships), and one Quasi-IO (Sustainable Energy for All). By having a broad group of cases, the study seeks to be as representative as possible to explore the phenomenon of attracting IOs. However, as I chose the small and medium-sized cities first, the selection of IOs is not entirely representative of the total population of IOs. Nevertheless, this selection provides a good representation of the processes of attracting and retaining IOs, as the IO cases differ in size, type, process duration, and the number of competing host states and cities. Two IOs were attracted simultaneously by two of the cities: the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat by Geneva and Vienna, and the Sustainable Energy for All by Vienna and Copenhagen. Table 3.1 depicts the selected cases, whether they were failed to be or successfully attracted, and their characteristics, such as type, size, timespan and number of competing candidate cities.

Table 3.1 Selected cities, IO-cases, and characteristics (type of IO, size, time span, no. of competitors)

Cities	IO-cases (Failure/Success)	IO characteristics
A. Geneva	1. Green Climate Fund (F)	– Type: IO Headquarter – Size: 750 working stations – Time span: 2012–2014 – No. of competitors: six
	2. Arms Trade Treaty (S)	– Type: IO Headquarter – Size: 6 working stations – Time span: 2013–2016 – No. of competitors: three
B. The Hague	3. International Criminal Court (S)	– Type: IO Headquarter – Size: 900 working stations – Time span: 1996–2002 – No. of competitors: three
	4. UNICEF Private Fundraising Partnerships (F)	– Type: UN Department – Size: 450 working stations – Time span: 2013–2014 – No. of competitors: four
C. Vienna	5. Arms Trade Treaty (F)	– Type: IO Headquarter – Size: 6 working stations – Time span: 2015–2016 – No. of competitors: three
	6. Sustainable Energy for All (S)	– Type: Quasi-IO – Size: 30 working stations – Time span: 2015–2016 – No. of competitors: five
D. Copenhagen	7. UNOPS Headquarters (S)	– Type: UN Headquarter – Size: 120 working stations – Time span: 2005–2006 – No. of competitors: five
	8. Sustainable Energy for All (F)	– Type: Quasi-IO – Size: 30 working stations – Time span: 2015–2016 – No. of competitors: five

3.3 Data collection

For the qualitative research, I used different sources: I conducted in-depth interviews to gather information about the cases and attraction processes, and I studied over 200 policy documents containing bid books, policy strategies, correspondence of governments with

IOs, records of city council meetings, websites, and studies about local host policies.[4] The information gathered from the interviews was combined with the other sources. When writing the city chapters and case descriptions, I based the information mostly on primary sources from the IOs, ministries, city councils, and regional institutes. For the timeline of the cases, I used information from the interviews combined with evaluation studies. At times when information was not available or could not be gained from the interviews, I used Freedom of Information Requests to gather governmental information (in The Hague and Copenhagen).

In 2012 and 2013, I first conducted a pilot study in two cities – The Hague and Geneva – to check and improve my questionnaire (see Table A3 in the Appendices). The pilot study consisted of two rounds of semi-structural interviews in The Hague (2012–2013) and Geneva (April 2013). The data were analyzed with a coding scheme (Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendices) and the questionnaire was subsequently improved based on these codes. After the pilot study, I undertook three trips to Geneva[5] and Vienna[6] and two to Copenhagen[7] and conducted four rounds of interviews in The Hague.[8] For the selection of the respondents, I used the snowball method. Each time I finished up an interview, I asked the respondents who else I needed to approach for more information.

My goal was to speak to all the organizational network members and a selection of the policy network members. In the final phase, I sent the list of organizational network members of each case to the network administrative organizations. When the list of organizational network members was incomplete, I supplemented it and contacted other members.

For the IOs, my goal was to have a mixed group of respondents, whom I gathered using the same snowball method. The type of IO employee was not important to this study, I wanted to approach a mixed group of international employees. For this group, in-depth interviews with a group of 12 to 18 representatives per city was considered sufficient. I interviewed employees from IOs, INGOs, think tanks, specialists, and Quasi-IOs.

In Table 3.2 I present an overview of respondents. Some were interviewed twice or even three times (see Table A6 in the Appendices). The broader policy network was involved

4 The sources are made available via the DANS archive: https://easy.dans.knaw.nl/ui/datasets/id/easy-dataset:213881/tab/1
5 April 2013 as a pilot, April 2014, December 2015, and August 2018.
6 November 2014, February 2015, and March 2017.
7 April 2017 and April 2018.
8 March 2012–March 2013 as a pilot, one round in March–April 2014, in March 2015, in December 2016–March 2017, and in November 2018.

in all campaigns and consisted of more actors. Table 3.2 depicts the respondents of the four groups per city. The study consisted of 175 interviews with 150 interviewees, which led to 198 different observations. As a number of these respondents had different roles, they were counted twice or even three times. The figure of 198 is therefore the number of observations and not the number of people. They were, for instance, in both the organizational network for the failed case and the successful case in their city. In that situation, I either held two interviews or separated the cases within the interview and counted them twice, as a member of both groups.

Table 3.2 Types of respondents in Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen

Type of group / Host city	Organizational network that attracted the successful case	Organizational network that attracted the failed case	Policy network for retaining IOs	IO representatives	Total per city
Geneva	7*	7	14	13	41
The Hague	12	6	38	18	74
Vienna	8	5	17	16	46
Copenhagen	5	5	15	12	37
Total per group	32	23	84	59	198**

* These numbers are the total number of key persons in the organizational networks.

** The number of 198 is higher than the factual number of respondents: I conducted 175 interviews with 150 interviewees, sometimes meeting people twice or three times over the period of 2012–2018.

The questionnaire consisted of four parts: 1) a card game where respondents were asked to organize locational elements for the discursive perspective; 2) competitiveness; 3) branding; and 4) policy and political process. To collect more details, I asked the respondents to grade some of the questions from 1 to 10, such as the clarity of rules and regulations, the visibility and effectiveness of branding policies, and what they thought of the cooperation in their networks. After grading, I asked them to elaborate. I analyzed these elaborations in the ways described in the following sections.

3.4 Operationalization

First, the dependent variable is operationalized in two ways: as factual success, and perceived success. Second, the independent variables are operationalized in the following sections.

3.4.1 Operationalizing the success variable

For the 'success as fact' type, I explore success by examining the attraction process. The spectrum from failure to success consists of four stages. The first is a factual failure: this is when the host city is out of the race because it loses in the first round of voting. When no voting takes place, this is the stage when a host city has submitted a bid and is initially considered, but then does not meet the criteria and is rejected after the submission.

The second is a moderate factual failure, when the host city is out of the race after the first stage of the process, for instance in the second round of voting. Without a voting procedure, a potential host city makes it halfway through the decision-making process.

The third stage is a moderate factual success. This degree applies when the host city either only just loses or only just wins the IO. For example, when a host city wins a voting procedure by only the slightest of margins over the runner-up, or when the city only just loses in the last round after, for example, a heads or tails situation occurs. Without a voting procedure, this means that the host city and country are considered until the final two options.

The last stage, a factual success, means that the host city is overwhelmingly successful in attracting the IO. It wins the vote with a large majority. When there is no voting, this means the host city is seen to be the right place from the beginning and no competitors offered a viable alternative.

The way I explore 'perceived success' is by gathering information of the organizational network members about how they assess the attraction process. As the size of such an organizational network is rather small (6-12 people) and as I interviewed almost all of these actors, the overall perception could be assessed. When the overall assessment was negative and the process failed, it was a 'perceived failure', whereas when the overall perception was positive, while the process in fact failed, it was considered a 'moderate perceived failure'. Continuing, when the case was successfully attracted but the overall assessment was negative, the process was considered a 'moderate perceived success', whereas when it was successfully attracted and the perception was also positive, it was coined a 'perceived success'.

3.4.2 Operationalizing the instrumental perspective

The governance network is expected to have a higher likelihood of success when the attraction policies show a higher alignment with the bid book for the case. The concept was policy design. One way to explore this is by looking at 'goal alignment.' This term has been borrowed from strategic management and goal setting theories but has also been tested empirically in public organizations (Andrews, Boyne, Meier, O'Toole Jr., & Walker, 2012) using Vertical Strategic Alignment. The method, however, focused on testing the employees' alignment with strategic goals, which makes it less applicable to this study. Another way to explore goal alignment, defined as "linking individual goal outcomes with organizational goal alignment" (Ayers, 2015, p. 171), is to focus on the actual *embedding* of organizational goals in performance plans (plan alignment). As Ayers (2015) put it, goal alignment can be operationalized in various ways, the key being to link individuals' activities, or departments' goals, to organizational goals. This means that the different departments' goals can be compared.

To do this, I used an analytical alignment approach (DeLuca & Bellara, 2013), stemming from (educational) curriculum alignment methodology. The analytical alignment approach qualitatively focuses on documents, following alignment dimensions. In this study, these dimensions were (a) categorical concurrence and (b) depth of information. Four data sources were used: host policy, nation branding, city marketing documents, and the bid for the specific organization.

To determine categorical concurrence, all policy documents were placed side by side. The first step was to define the policy goals of each policy document: host policy, nation branding, and city marketing. The aspects in the bid for the specific case were then compared with the policy goals of the three documents. When the elements in the bid showed concurrence with the policy goals, this was the first step to achieving alignment. For instance, the elements in the bid book could concur with one policy goal, with two, or all three.

Depth of information was operationalized by classifying data by their level of complexity, meaning by looking at how the element in the bid concurred with the policy goals (DeLuca & Bellara, 2013). With a simple mention of the policy goal in the bid – such as international climate – the depth of information was absent; with an elaboration on the subject, it was present. It was important that elements in the bid were derived from the policy goals, that they, as it were, formed the basis of the bid for the IO. When categorical concurrence was present in tandem with depth of information, the element in the bid was considered aligned with the policy goal. Frequencies of alignment were generated for the two dimensions. For instance, in one case, the categorical concurrence could be 83 percent, meaning that 10 of the 12 boxes of the frequency table were filled, whereas the depth of information was 58 percent, as 7 of the 12 boxes showed depth of information. This last measure of alignment was used to compare the cases, as they both needed to be present to be considered aligned.

In the second part of this perspective, I expectd that the more positively the respondents in the city perceived host policies and support, the higher was the likelihood of success. The concept I used was benefit for the target group, which I broke down into the perception of host policy and support. To explore this, I asked the respondents to rate host policy elements, such as rules and regulations for IOs (acquiring legitimation cards or privileges and immunities) and the mentioned conditions in the bid book. Respondents were asked to tell stories about struggles they had experienced in relation to the case and give examples of how they coped with these struggles (Nederhand, Van der Steen, & Van Twist, 2019). Afterward, I analyzed the transcribed interviews by coding them on the following elements: branding policies and their effectiveness to attract IOs; the main elements in the bid; rules and regulations for IOs; and how they perceived the support of the government.

The last two codes were considered particularly important for examining the policy perception. The comparative method was used, a method that is grounded in fieldwork and focuses on the beliefs and opinions of policymakers. The codes were created before doing the interviews to improve the structure and methods to compare the groups and cases. Not only were interviews conducted, but also documents such as evaluations with international employees were consulted. The aim was to have a complete picture of how the representatives of IOs perceived host policies. Based on the multiple sources, I assigned pluses and minuses (minus, plus/minus, plus, or double plus) to the four codes (branding policies, elements in the bid, rules and regulations, government support). Table 3.3 shows the operationalization of this perspective.

Table 3.3 Operationalization of the instrumental perspective

Perspective	Concept	Variables	Sub-variables	Qualitative exploration
Instrumental	Policy design	X1 Policy alignment	Alignment of attraction policy goals and the bid	The elements in the bid are aligned with the host policy, nation branding, and city marketing goals. These are explored on two dimensions: *categorical concurrence* and *depth of information*, of which the latter plays the leading role
	Benefit for the target group	X2 Perception of host policy and support	Perception of host policy (elements in the bid) and government support	The IO representatives' perceptions about: 1. Branding policies and their effectiveness 2. Main elements in the bid 3. Rules and regulations 4. Support of the government

3.4.3 Operationalizing the discursive perspective

In this perspective, I first expected that the more the priorities and narratives overlapped between the organizational network and the policy network, the higher was the likelihood of success. Afterward, I expected the same with the organizational network and the IO representatives. The concept of *similar frames* is operationalized by discussing two variables: overlapping priorities and narratives between policy groups and overlapping priorities and narratives between a policy group and the target group – the IO employees.

With the pilot questionnaire and a list of locational elements for the card game, I gathered scores on possible variables that were considered important to IOs. Initially, I collected 25 locational factors to discuss with the respondents. Following meetings with specialists and a review of the literature (e.g., Meijers, Spaans, Louw, Hoogerbrugge, & Priemus, 2013; Mercer, 2012; Ni & Kresl, 2010), the list changed. Two criteria guided the construction of the list: the nature of the circumstances being exclusively important to IOs, such as *relevant centers are nearby and cooperative*; and the degree of integration – the list should combine hard elements, such as *cost of hiring labor force* and soft elements, such as *livability*. I finalized the list based on interviews with practitioners from different governmental layers. It contained six themes: reputation of city and country, physical connectivity and amenities, livability, enterprise hub, workforce, and virtual connectivity. Each theme consisted of three to five elements, resulting in 22 in total. Respondents were asked to rank the locational elements depicted on cards in order of importance to them. The 22 cards with statements such as 'physical infrastructure is working well' were divided into the five most and five least important (see Table A7 in the Appendices for all locational elements).

To study how views on the important locational elements for IOs were different across groups, it was key to explore how these frames were formed. To do this, I asked the respondents to prioritize the cards and then explain their reasons for ordering them as they did. I then analyzed the ordered data in four steps:

1. I looked at the priorities of the organizational network that attracted the IO in the host city. I looked at how this group ranked the top five priorities of the 22 locational elements. In this step, I also used the narratives to explain why the group prioritized in that way. The priorities were contextualized and explained with quotations. This helped identify whether the narratives were in line with the prioritization of the respondents. Then, I discussed the priorities and narratives of the policy network.

2. I compared the organizational network with the policy network. I looked first at whether the elements in the top five of one group were significantly higher than those in the top five of the other group, by conducting a Kruskal–Wallis H test with a Bonferroni correction. A Kruskal–Wallis H test is based on ranked data and enables a comparison of how the groups scored specific aspects (Field, 2009). As the numbers of participants in the organizational networks were small, this led to problems of confidence. I was aware of these problems and did not rely excessively on these results. They were more illustrative of the qualitative data than the other way around.
3. I made a description of the priorities and narratives of the international representatives. Then I compared the priorities and narratives of the organizational network with those of the international representatives.
4. I explored the overlap between all the groups' ratings, which I did with a Kendall's tau-b test. This measure resulted in non-parametric correlation coefficients and helped me to find the strength of association between the groups and the directions of the relationships.[9] The information from all four groups of both cases in the host city was entered into a table in the empirical chapter[10], the measures from which were used in Chapter 8.

Discussing the priorities and narratives of these groups not only provided an overview of what was considered important in the specific cases but also explored how the perceptual frames differed or were comparable, while thereby exploring the expectations that overlapping frames affected the likelihood of success in attracting IOs, first between governmental groups, then between the organizational network and international representatives. Table 3.4 depicts the operationalization of the discursive perspective.

9 The value of a correlation coefficient varies between -1 and +1. A value of 1 would be an excellent degree of association (overlap) between two variables. When the value goes toward 0, the relationship between the two variables will be weaker (Field, 2009; Howell, 2013).

10 In the empirical chapters these are Tables 4.5, 5.5, 6.4 and 7.4.

Table 3.4 Operationalization of the discursive perspective

Perspective	Concept	Variables X1–X7	Sub-variables	Qualitative exploration
Discursive	Similar frames	X3 Similar frames between organizational and policy network	Overlap of priorities and narratives of organizational and policy networks	Top five priorities of the 22 locational elements overlap between organizational network attracting IO and policy network. Narratives overlap as well
		X4 Similar frames between organizational network and IO representatives	Overlap of priorities and narratives of organizational network and IO representatives	Top five priorities of the 22 locational elements overlap between organizational network attracting IO and IO representatives. Narratives overlap as well

3.4.4 Operationalizing the relational perspective

I first expected that the higher the level of network cooperation there was, the higher was the likelihood of success. The concept of this perspective was network characteristics, which I explored with the variable network cooperation. This was operationalized the same way as the narratives in the previous variables and combined analysis of the interviews with analysis of the documents. The cooperation between actors in this analysis was the perceived level of cooperation by network actors themselves and others. The following questions were key: What is the cooperation like between these institutions (i.e., local versus national government)? Can you give me an answer on a scale of 1 (very poor) to 10 (excellent)? Can you elaborate? This part also sought to discuss the political process by exploring the answers to the following questions: How do you see the rules of the 'policy game' to attract IOs? Can you elaborate? The answers to these questions explained the way the negotiations worked, both internally between departments and externally. The policy game was described in interviews as negotiations within and between departments, as well as with international actors. This wide approach gave me the opportunity to collect data about the respondents' roles and a description of the political process of attracting the cases. The rating of the cooperation between the different layers of government and the description of the political process were key for the analysis. To do this qualitatively with the constant comparative method adds to the validity, as the perceived strength of the network is what defines network cooperation in this perspective.

Furthermore, I expected that the higher the level of actor centrality of those involved was, the higher was the likelihood of success. I explored actor centrality in two ways: betweenness centrality and degree centrality. Betweenness centrality is a measure that characterizes the importance of a given node for establishing short pathways between another node (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). It marks the probability of any node being on the shortest path (geodesic) between any pair of actors in the network. If two geodesics exist, each receives .5 probability (Raab, 2011). I can norm this measure by expressing it as a percentage of the maximum possible betweenness that an actor could have had. This percentage is aimed at measuring the intermediate position and can be used in coordination explorations or even to control relationships (Borgatti & Everett, 1997; Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). Betweenness centrality shows, in this context, how independent a node or actor is in its network.

Whereas betweenness centrality shows the independence of the actors in the network, degree centrality shows the local centrality measure or the activity of the actors. Degree centrality refers to the number of ties or connections a node (network participant) has to other nodes. Ties can be weighted; the weight is a number that indicates information about a relationship (Golbeck, 2013). In this study, degree centrality was based on how often network participants met. If the actors in the network were in monthly contact about the matter, this number of meetings was 12. If the contact was weekly, I included 50 in the Excel sheet as a measure to calculate degree centrality. In this study, the ties between two nodes, also known as edges, were undirected, meaning that they indicated a mutual relationship. The percentages of degree centrality showed the activity of each actor regarding the whole network.

The betweenness and degree centrality percentages cannot be compared easily across networks, but they do clarify the role of the most independent and most active actors in each network. They also provide information about each network and its structure. Therefore, for each network, the five actors with the highest betweenness centrality percentages were discussed and their position analyzed based on the visualized networks. Betweenness centrality measures say more about the power or independence of actors; therefore, I underscored this measure more in the analysis than the degree centrality, which demonstrates actor activity.

These centrality measures helped to explore the structure of the networks and the actors in the middle who potentially exerted more control in the network, and more interpersonal influence on the attraction process. To explore the two different measures, I analyzed the answers to the following questions: How often did you meet as an organizational network? How often did you meet others outside the organizational network? With which institution did you have most contact: the city, region, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? These questions provided input for the network analysis and enabled inferences about the structure of the networks and how this could have affected the likelihood of success. The eight networks were compared to explore the expectation that a higher actor centrality would lead to more success.

I expected that the higher the diversity and size of the network were, the higher was the likelihood of success. I explored the network diversity and number of nodes (or actors) by looking at the types of actors involved in attracting IOs and at the network size. To operationalize this, I used eleven labels to divide actor types: municipality, provincial government, federal government, parliament, Public Private Partnership, IO/UN, NGO, policy advisor, European Union, business, and prime minister (Table A8 in the Appendix depicts the full list). I explored these types of actors per organizational network that attracted an IO, including the actors that had close collaborations outside the network. I started with the organizational network members – a list that I had cross-checked with those involved. By making use of the graphs, I could see the organizational network and its links with coalition partners. This led to an analysis of a wider network and the diversity of its actors. I used the answers to the questions: Which institution is the most important for attracting and retaining IOs in this city? Are there other institutions that deal with attracting and retaining IOs? and What other actors were involved in the attraction process for this IO? The stories were used to contextualize, making the analysis more specific per case, which allowed me to make more grounded inferences.

The second element was the number of most active nodes or actors in the network. For this variable, all the involved network members were included. For visualization, I used Visone (visual social networks) software, which is a tool from Tilburg University and partners. Visone aims to communicate ideas "with clarity, precision and efficiency, conveying the most knowledge in the shortest time (…), telling the truth about the data and to show more than one variable at the same time" (Raab, 2011, p. 5). Table 3.5 depicts the operationalization of the relational perspective.

Table 3.5 Operationalization of the relational perspective

Perspective	Concept	Variables	Sub-variables	Qualitative exploration
Relational	Network characteristics	X5 Internal legitimacy	Network cooperation	Perceived level of cooperation by network actors themselves and others
		X6 Actor-level properties	a. Betweenness centrality b. Degree centrality	The centrality of network actors is explored with betweenness centrality and degree centrality
		X7 Network-level properties	a. Network diversity b. Network size	The diversity of the network actors is explored by labeling the types of actors in the network. The size of the network is explored by their narratives about how many actors were involved, around the organizational network

3.5 Conclusion

In this study, I use a comparative case study design with the goal of exploring the processes of governance networks attracting IOs. By comparing different cases, it is possible to determine what the failure and success determinants were. I first select four small to medium-sized host cities satisfying the following criteria: geographic location, size, experience with attracting IOs, and topics as being important in the attraction of IOs to these cities. In the cities – Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen – I then select diverse cases – one failed and one successfully attracted IO in each city. These cases are chosen in such a way to enable better comparison between the failed and successful processes. This study is grounded in fieldwork: I conducted 175 interviews with 150 interviewees. The respondents are divided into four groups in each city: the organizational network attracting the successful case; the organizational network attracting the failed case; the policy network; and the IO representatives.

I operationalize the independent conceptual perspectives with three different methods. The instrumental perspective is first investigated using the analytical alignment approach to find the alignment between policy goals and the bid book for the IO. The perception of the IO representatives is subsequently analyzed using the qualitative comparative method – a way to compare differences of subjective information between groups. The interviews are coded, and the groups (IO representatives on eight different cases) compared.

The discursive perspective is explored by using the data of a card game played during the conducted interviews. The narratives are analyzed with the qualitative comparative method: first, the respondents are asked to prioritize the five most important locational elements and then to talk freely about their choices. These narratives are compared between different groups. For illustrative reasons, I conduct a statistical test, which cannot be seen as representative because of the small numbers. They do, nevertheless, show whether the locational elements are rated significantly higher by one group or another. A Kendall's tau-b test is conducted to measure the overlap between all the groups per city.

The relational perspective is explored by establishing the internal legitimacy with qualitative data and ratings of cooperation by the involved. For the actor-level characteristics, I use the Visone visualization tool to depict betweenness and degree centrality measures. For the network-level characteristics (diversity and size of the networks), I use the information I gathered during the interviews.

In the following chapters, I will focus on the individual cities, cases, and the analysis from three perspectives, followed by a conclusion.

"With the Green Climate Fund, there were three cities from Europe.
And that of course weakened Europe because the European votes got divided.
If you had a unified Europe, that would have been different"
(Quote from an employee at United Nations Office at Geneva,
2018, Interview A27.30)

4 Geneva

4.1 Switzerland and Geneva

The second half of the nineteenth century the city of Geneva was growing, as did its role on the international stage. Geneva was home to the founding congress of the Red Cross in 1863. Finally, in 1872, a landmark arbitration award, signed at City Hall, ordered Great Britain to pay substantial restitution to the United States for its role in the Civil War. The settlement of this conflict was "largely credited to Geneva and Swiss neutrality" and contributed to the construction of a solid reputation (Huber, 2007, p. 15). At the same time, the first IOs were established in Switzerland, Bern, such as the International Telegraph Union in 1868 and the Universal Postal Union in 1874. Decisive for the global fate of Geneva was the location of the headquarters of the League of Nations in 1919. Among others, Brussels and The Hague were nominated, but the neutrality of Switzerland and the fact that Geneva was not a capital (thus reducing the risk of the host state interference) were advantages (Picot, 1965). In addition, the personal determination of US president Woodrow Wilson in favor of a non-monarchical regime and a city that was originally Calvinist played a role. The number of international staff was about 200 at that time, but the League of Nations developed during the interwar period and was joined by the International Labor Office (ILO).

The Second World War, however, sounded the death knell of the League of Nations, which resided in the *Palais des Nations* that was erected between 1929 and 1938. This was a determining factor for the establishment of its European branch in Geneva (rather than in London). Thus, the immediate postwar period led to the development of Geneva's international sector, with the establishment of the World Health Organization in 1948, the World Meteorological Organization, and the World Organization for Migration in 1951. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees followed, and the European Organization for Nuclear Research (Republic and State of Geneva, 2013). In 1965, Geneva counted 8,210 international functionaries, of which 80% lived in the Canton of Geneva, and the rest almost exclusively in France. The same year, however, the city lost OPEC to Vienna, which granted the employees complete diplomatic and fiscal privileges (Huber, 2007).

Position of Geneva on the international stage
The position of Geneva radically changed with the disappearance of the bipolar world in the 1990s. All at once, the Swiss haven was no longer of sufficient attractiveness, and at the same time the consolidation of an expanding European Union diplomatically isolated the Swiss confederation. Competition resulted in some notable failures in the 1990s, beginning with the inability to secure the secretariats resulting from the 1992 Rio Environment Summit (linked to the Conventions on Desertification and Climate Change in Bonn and the Biodiversity Convention opting for Montreal). Many UN Volunteers moved to Bonn in 1996 and departments of the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to Copenhagen in December 2006.

The competition between host states of IOs and conferences had increased. States hosting IOs undertook new forms of partnerships between public and private sector in the framework of multilateral cooperation when formulating their policies of action (Swiss Federal Council, 2006). Besides, NGOs were more regularly consulted and even allowed to participate in international conferences. Finally, funding modalities for international bodies were undergoing profound changes from state funding to burden sharing for program funding and implementation. Nevertheless, Geneva kept a predominant position in the realm of IOs. This is evidenced by the major Secretariats of the Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions, the UN Economic Commission for Europe, among others, and the retention of the Human Rights Council at Palais Wilson. It can also count on the highest density of IOs (4 in 2022, in the Lake of Geneva Region), quasi-governmental organizations (ICRC, IUCN) and NGOs (over 450) that have a consultative status to the UN (Republic and State of Geneva, 2020). In Geneva 178 states are represented, which makes it undemanding for the UN framework to operate.[11] In 2020, the Republic and Canton of Geneva counted 40,000 international staff, of which around 30,000 resided in the city of Geneva (Swiss Federal Chancellery, 2019).

In the years 2008-2013 about 21 relocations of departments took place. Humanitarian, human rights and migration IOs moved their IT, logistics and finance departments to Brussels, Budapest, Copenhagen, Istanbul, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Nairobi, Paris, and Turin. The central reason for moving from Geneva was reduction of costs, but also being closer to the field (Bradley, 2013). After some of these relocations, Switzerland and Geneva changed their strategy. In 2013, a report was published by the *Groupe Permanent Conjoint* about the strengthening of International Geneva. The confederation lobbied successfully for a total sum of 117,2 million Swiss Francs (112,6 euros in 2022), allocated for the period of 2016-2019. In 2012 and 2013-15, Geneva and Switzerland set up two large campaigns

11 Apart from the headquarters in New York, the UN has three additional regional headquarters, or headquarters districts. These were opened in Geneva in 1946, in Vienna in 1980, and Nairobi in 1996.

to attract an IO and an International Secretariat. The Green Climate Fund[12] is a member of the UN family and the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat was set up outside the UN.[13]

4.1.1 Case 1: The Green Climate Fund

In 2009, the first talks about the establishment of the Green Climate Fund took place. In 2010, during the UN Climate Change Conference in Cancún, Mexico, at the Conference of the Parties (COP 16) the UN member states decided to establish the Green Climate Fund. The governing instrument was adopted the next year at COP 17. The Climate Fund is an operating body of the UNFCCC's financial mechanism. Apart from the Swiss, five other countries submitted their candidacy to host the Green Fund in April 2012: Germany, Mexico, Namibia, Poland, and the Republic of Korea. There were various stages of the location decision-making process. In the six months between April and October 2012, the six candidate countries set up a campaign. The possible host cities were Geneva (Switzerland), Warsaw (Poland), Bonn (Germany), Windhoek (Namibia), Mexico City (Mexico) and Songdo (Republic of Korea). 24 Board Members voted for the location; every member had an alternate member. During the months between April and October 2012, active contact took place between the governance networks in Switzerland and representatives of these regions. Before the voting, the Host Country Evaluation Committee explored the reports of the six candidates. This Committee consisted of six members with equal representation between developed and developing countries: Indonesia, Egypt, Spain, Belize, The USA, and the Czech Republic. The Interim Secretariat, in Bonn, played an administrative, logistical, and technical role until the independent Secretariat was established (Board of the Evaluation Committee, 2012). After several rounds of voting where Switzerland was out in the first round, the decision fell on Songdo, Republic of Korea.

Table 4.1 Course of events: Establishment of the Green Climate Fund

2009	First mention of the need to set up the Green Climate Fund (GCF)
2010	Conference of States Parties (COP 16) in Cancún, Mexico, decides to establish the Green Climate Fund, December
2011	Governing Instrument was adopted at the 17th UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP 17) in Durban, April Third meeting of the United Framework Convention on Climate Change's Transitional Committee of the GCF in Geneva, September

12 This study will refer to the Green Fund, Climate Fund, or Green Climate Fund.
13 For the Canton of Geneva, the number was 86, as they included all organizations with a seat agreement, fiscal arrangement and arrangements on privileges and immunities, including funds, programs, institutes, regional committees and subsidiaries organs (Foraus, 2013).

2012	Submission of candidacies, April First Board meeting in Geneva, August Meeting with applicant countries in Washington, Mid-September Second Board meeting in Songdo, voting by Board members on host country, October
2013	Third Board meeting in Berlin, March Final Board meeting in Songdo Permanent headquarters established in Songdo, Republic of Korea
2014	Green Climate Fund opens office in Songdo, Republic of Korea

Course of events

From the start, the Swiss Confederation had intensive contacts with the City and Canton of Geneva. Both local entities engaged themselves in this project of making an offer and a bid for the Climate Fund and finding ways to house the UN entity. For example, the Canton offered CHF 810,000 (841,300 EUR in 2022) for the first operating years of the Fund; there was cooperation for the edition of the bid and for the organization of the Board Meeting in August 2012 in Geneva. The Swiss, regional and local actors formed an organizational network to prepare the offer for the Green Fund. After the decision was taken to present an offer, this information was sent to a broader policy network. It included a strong presence of NGOs: environmental NGOs were lobbying for Geneva as the new location for the Fund. The Foreign Ministry orchestrated the campaign, both from Bern and Geneva. It handed in a bid and an offer, the two requested documents. The decision of the member states to establish the Green Climate Fund in the Republic of Korea, came – for most Swiss actors involved – as an unpleasant surprise.

The selection of the future host country for the Climate Fund was one of the main decisions of the second Board meeting in Songdo, 18-20 October 2012, and dealing with this agenda item took significant Board time for two days (Schalatek, 2012). It was also a key deliverable of the Green Climate Fund Board to the Conference of Parties (COP 18) as mandated by the Durban decision in 2011. South Korea was the winner after 2,5 hours of confidential balloting among the 24 Board members behind closed doors under exclusion of alternate Board members, advisors, and registered observers on the third day of the Board meeting. No other results were announced, although eliminated countries were given in writing the number of votes they had received and the round in which they were eliminated. This was a compromise reached at the urging from Namibia. The confidential ballots were sealed and retained by the Interim Secretariat. Five rounds of voting took place. After Switzerland, Mexico was eliminated, then Poland, Namibia, and finally Germany. What had happened beforehand?

As soon as the different candidates handed in the bids in April 2013, the candidates started planning their lobbying strategy as well as their hosting event of the Board of the Green Climate Fund (Green Climate Fund, 2012). All the bids provided information on the following criteria: financial arrangements, legal status, administrative and logistical support, privileges and immunities, and local facilities and conditions (Schalatek, 2012; Green Climate Fund, 2014). The evaluation team of six Board members had been set up. Since late August, the team of six (from Indonesia, Egypt, Spain, USA, Czech Republic and chaired by the Board member from Belize) had reviewed the host country proposals. The evaluation committee qualified three of the bids with only 'green lights' on the five criteria (Switzerland, South Korea, and Germany). The other three had one yellow 'light' (Mexico for local facilities and conditions), a 'red' light (Poland for privileges and immunities), and two yellow lights (Namibia for legal status and local facilities and conditions).

Furthermore, the evaluation committee met with applicant countries in mid-September 2012 in Washington, conducted site visits accompanied by the Interim Secretariat and wrote an evaluation report shared for comments with the host country bidders (Schalatek, 2012). The bidding countries had one last opportunity to present their proposal to the Board, where every country highlighted their own strength. Switzerland touted its international credentials with hosting more than 32 IOs and more than 250 NGOs as well as foreign nationals from 184 countries in Geneva, whereas other bidding countries promised high contributions (South Korea) or highlighted its dedication to the subject of climate change (Germany and Poland). On the voting day, the 20th of October of 2012, President Lee Mying Bak arrived within one hour after the decision to move the Interim Secretariat of the Green Climate Fund to Songdo, to thank Board members to assure them of Korea's commitment (Schalatek, 2012). The Headquarters agreement of the Green Climate Fund with the Republic of Korea was signed on June 10th in 2013.

The Green Climate Fund Success Measures (Geneva)
To define the first type of success, the stages of attracting this case to Geneva is visualized in the following figure. The Green Climate Fund case made it to the first stage: 'factual failure'. Below the figure, these stages are explained (see Table 4.1). The pre-stage is when an IO decides to (re)locate somewhere. This pre-stage started officially in 2010, with the decision to establish the Green Fund at the COP 16 Conference in Cancún. The pre-stage consisted of the announcement that the organization needed a place to settle. The first stage is the Request for Proposals RfP) and the submission of candidates (Stage 1). The next stage was with the first round of voting. Switzerland was out (Stage 2). The second round of voting was the same day, when Mexico was eliminated, followed by the third and fourth round, when Poland and Namibia were out (Stage 3). The final stage was the fifth round, when Germany was out of the bidding game and thereby the Green Climate Fund was placed in Songdo (Stage 4). Geneva and Switzerland made it to the first round, they were eliminated afterwards.

Figure 4.1 First success type for Geneva's failed case: Green Climate Fund

Stage 1: Submission of candidates > Stage 2: 1^{st} voting round > Stage 2: 2^{nd} & 3^{rd} voting round > Stage 4: Songdo wins

For the second measure of 'perceived success', the interpretation of the organizational network prevailed. When they perceived it as a failure, the measure would be perceived a failure, when they saw it as a success, a moderate perceived failure. The involved policymakers perceived the attraction process of the Green Climate Fund as an 'electroshock' in the positive sense. They took steps in the direction of a better host policy for IOs. The collaboration between the Canton, Confederation and the City of Geneva immediately changed because of losing so early in the bidding game. They improved the financing policy, as well as the distribution of security costs. An action plan was drawn up in June 2013 with proposals to strengthen Geneva as a hub for IOs. The second type of success is therefore coined a moderate perceived failure.

Figure 4.2 Second success type for Geneva's failed case: Green Climate Fund



Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Success > Perceived Success

4.1.2 Case 2: The Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat

The road towards the adaptation of the Arms Trade Treaty by the UN General Assembly on April 2^{nd}, 2013, was a nearly bi-decade struggle of intense advocacy and diplomacy. In 2006, the UN General Assembly admitted that the "absence of common international standards on the import, export and transfer of conventional arms"[14] contributed to conflict, crime, terrorism, and the displacement of people. Furthermore, it would undermine peace, security, safety, stability, reconciliation, and sustainable development.

The Treaty is legally binding and obliges states that plan to authorize a transfer of conventional arms to another state first to undertake a risk exploration. This should be based on whether there is a substantial risk that those arms will be used to facilitate violations of humanitarian law or human rights (Callixtus, 2013; Panke, Lang, & Wiedemann, 2018).

14 Under conventional arms fall small arms and light weapons. These are weapons whose ability to damage comes from kinetic or incendiary, or explosive energy and exclude weapons of mass destruction (such as nuclear, biological, radiological and chemical weapons).

In 2008, the initiators asked the UN Secretary-General to establish a group of experts to examine "the feasibility, scope and draft parameters for a comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms" (Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 2013, p. 5).

The UN General Assembly adopted the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat in December 2009, through Resolution 64/48. The Treaty was open to signature in June 2013. With its entry into force on December 24th, 2014, the Arms Trade Treaty aimed to contribute to international and regional peace, security, stability, and promoting cooperation, transparency, and responsible action among the international community, reducing human suffering (Whall & Pytlak, 2014). However, the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat was set up outside the UN Framework, to avoid bureaucracy that could slow down the implementation of the Treaty.

The candidates and decision procedure

The three candidates for hosting the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat were Switzerland (Geneva), Austria (Vienna) and Trinidad and Tobago (Port of Spain). At the time of the vote for the location, there were 69 states entitled to vote, of which 67 were present at the Conference of State Parties in August 2015.[15] The type of co-decision was however not clear from the beginning; it took a while before the State Parties decided that the vote would be secret. The country with the least votes was out first, then there would be a second and final round. In the first round, 14 voted for Austria, 21 for Switzerland and 32 for Trinidad and Tobago. In the second round (probably the same) 32 voted for Trinidad and Tobago, the other 35 for Switzerland.

Table 4.2 Course of events: Establishment of the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat

2006	Identified lack of common international standards in arms trade regulation
2008	Standardization within the EU
2009	UN General Assembly adopts resolution 64/84 for the set up of the Arms Trade Treaty
2011	Four informal meetings of the Preparatory Committee
2013	Host countries formally announce their candidacy, April-September
2013	Verbal notes sent by the host countries

15 At this stage, in 2022, the Treaty has a total of 111 States Parties and 30 States have signed but not yet ratified the Treaty.

2014	Introduction of the offers in all the capitals, May First informal consultation in Mexico City, September Second informal consultation in Berlin, November ATT enters into force, December
2015	1st Preparatory Meeting in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, February Third informal Preparatory Meeting in Vienna, April Final Preparatory Meeting in Geneva, July 1st Conference of States Parties (CSP1) in Cancún: location is decided on, August
2016	2nd Conference of States Parties (CSP2) in Geneva, August

Course of events
When the organizational network started to attract the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat to Geneva in 2013, a reinforcement of collaboration between the confederation and the Canton took place. The strategy described in the report *La Genève Internationale* was put into practice. The Secretariat would be small: only three (as a start) to – eventually – six employees; the attraction of the Secretariat was more a matter of prestige. Also, the process of attracting the Secretariat was not very transparent. According to an employee of the Foreign Ministry, this was difficult: "There was no clear procedure. There was also no clear leadership, nor a centralized process. I remember (…) we didn't even know to whom to send the candidacy to. For the Green Fund there was an evaluation committee, whereas here (…) the process was chaotic" (Interview A12.14). A widespread sentiment among Swiss governmental actors during the attraction of the Secretariat was that there should be learnt lessons after not obtaining the Green Climate Fund.

The negotiations started and ended in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), but the better part took place in the Conference of the Parties (CoP) under the auspices of the UN. Between July 2012 and March 2013, the Arms Trade Treaty was negotiated in two CoPs. It was not possible to reach consensus at these meetings, which was required for the Treaty to be adopted. Consequently, Arms Trade Treaty supporters moved the Treaty to the UN General Assembly where the Arms Trade Treaty was adopted on 2 April 2013 via majority voting. On 12 August 2015, the facilitator of the Secretariat, France, submitted the answers to an extended questionnaire of the three candidates: Trinidad and Tobago, Switzerland, and Austria. These answered questions on logistical aspects, outsourcing options, conference centers and human resources. Also, they added a chapter on 'other remarks': aspects the candidates wanted to highlight to the facilitator.

The voting for the location of the headquarters took place on the penultimate day of the First Conference of States Parties (CSP1) in Cancun, Mexico, 24-27 August 2015. The represented 67 States Parties would vote for Geneva, Port of Spain, or Vienna (First Conference of States Parties, 2015). The non-recorded ballot was conducted as follows: a ballot containing more than one registered preference would be an invalid ballot, the secret ballots would be collected one by one in alphabetical order, the ballot collection and count would be conducted by 1 teller accompanied by 4 verification officers that performed these tasks on a voluntary basis and were drawn from a geographically representative pool and came from States that were Party to the Arms Trade Treaty. A 2/3 majority of votes obtained by one of the three locations in the first round would provide the candidate for consideration by States Parties; if none of the tree locations obtained this majority, a second secret ballot would be conducted. The location that in a second round obtained a simple majority of votes would be the only remaining candidate for consideration by States Parties as the permanent seat of the Secretariat. The first ballot would be conducted Wednesday morning local time, 26 August 2015. The second ballot was conducted no earlier than Wednesday afternoon local time, the same day (First Conference of States Parties, 2015).

The Arms Trade Treaty Success Measures (Geneva)

The winning of the Arms Trade Treaty by Switzerland and Geneva was a moderate factual success: they only just made it to the end. The pre-stage consisted of the adoption of resolution 64/84 by the UN General Assembly in 2009, and the Prep Com meetings in 2011. Two years later, a *Request for Proposals* was sent out. The first stage started when three candidates reacted with verbal notes: Port of Spain (Trinidad and Tobago); Geneva (Switzerland); and later Vienna (Austria) (Stage 1). They introduced the offers until May 2014. During the rounds of voting, in August 2015 in Cancún, Port of Spain was the first winner with 32 votes (versus 14 for Vienna and 21 for Geneva) (Stage 2). Vienna was eliminated with the least votes. The second round of voting resulted in Geneva as the winner with 35 votes versus the same 32 for Port of Spain (Stage 3). In the last stage, Geneva was announced as the winner (Stage 4). The victory was not overwhelming. There was a difference of only three votes between the winner (Geneva) and the second candidate (Port of Spain) that won overwhelmingly in the first round.

Figure 4.3 First success type for Geneva's successful case: Arms Trade Treaty

Stage 1: Letters of intent and offers > Stage 2: 1st voting round > Stage 3: 2nd voting round > Stage 4: Geneva wins

As for the second type of success, the Arms Trade Treaty was a perceived success. Switzerland and Geneva lobbied successfully in the hours between the first and second round of voting. In the year beforehand, from the announcement of candidacy in April 2013 and the introduction of the offers in May 2014, the involved were imposed to lobby. About the attraction process, one of the Parliamentarians stated: "The success is that we elaborated on a strategy (…) In the new strategy the city was completely involved, we had the strategy to guarantee to anticipate on the needs of the IOs" (Interview A13.15). Switzerland and Geneva had put an effort in highlighting the high level of diplomatic representation in Geneva, especially from African countries: "Many Western countries find it important that non-Western countries participate. Trinidad is very favorable from the Global South. A country like Trinidad feels like a winner. Representatives from African countries wondered: how do we get there? There is no hub. A fuzz for diplomats" (Interview A28.31). A Swiss ambassador commented on the success as a victory: "We put our community of disarmament ambassadors in Geneva in the forefront. We have the Conference of Disarmament, which means that there are 55 ambassadors that are accredited as disarmament ambassadors, they meet regularly" (Interview A20.22). The success was therefore also perceived as a success.

Figure 4.4 Second success type for Geneva's successful case: Arms Trade Treaty



Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Success > Perceived Success

Now that I have described both cases and their success measures, I turn to the three perspectives. In each perspective, I first discuss the Green Climate Fund and then the Arms Trade Secretariat. The chapter concludes with a summary of the results.

4.2 Instrumental perspective

Instrumental explanation Geneva's failed case

The Swiss host state policy was shaken up during the crisis in the mid-90s when the WTO almost left, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was successfully attracted to Bonn instead of Geneva. In the renegotiation with the WTO (then GATT) the labor market was opened for spouses of international civil servants, and for missions. A working permit was created for spouses if their partner remained his or her diplomatic status. Later, new changes were made in host state policies. In 2006, a memorandum was published to establish a new host State law. The purpose of the bill was "to consolidate the existing legal bases in the field of host state policy and to establish it based on the constitutional powers of the Federal Council" (Swiss Federal Council, 2006). The memorandum concluded that the adoption of the Federal Law of 2000 on financial aid to the Foundation for Buildings for IOs (FIPOI) only partially filled the gaps. That was one of the reasons the Federal Council proposed the adoption of a new federal law covering the privileges, immunities, and facilities and the financial assistance aspects in the context of the Host State Policy of the Federal Council (Swiss Federal Council, 2006). The law was implemented in 2008. One fundamental difference with the former law was the inclusion of intergovernmental organizations in the provision of immunities and privileges. These quasi-organizations are different from International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) in their structure of their members and their funding, as well as in the tasks entrusted to them. In fact, most of the members of the quasi-intergovernmental organization are states or public-law entities, and most of the financing of the organization is of public origin. These organizations deserved special status, according to the new Act, because "the predominant inter-state nature of this type of organization justifies the granting of a special status in Switzerland, in order to enable it, as well as the intergovernmental organization to accomplish its tasks independently and without Switzerland as a host State deriving financial benefits from its presence on its territory" (Swiss Federal Council, 2006, pp. 16-17).

Host policy goals 2012

A new host state law, referred to as 'Loi Etat Hôte 2007' or 'LEH 2007' had another impact on international Geneva: it constituted the legal basis for acquisitions of buildings for official purposes both for IOs and for the States through their permanent mission. Since 2012, the Confederation could also contribute, on a case-by-case basis, to the rental burden of the IOs located in Switzerland. The goal of the new law was, in short: "not to attract new entities at any cost or to oppose any relocation, but to reinforce the key competences of Switzerland's host state policy and to ensure qualitative development on the territory" (Swiss Federal Council, 2014, p. 29).

Nation branding goals 2012

Nation branding of Switzerland developed since 2002 into a focused promotion of its science and technology, higher education, and innovation environment (Fetscherin & Marmier, 2010). The five branding pillars that Switzerland focused on were (and still are): Peace, security, disarmament; Humanitarian action and law, human rights, migration; Work, economy, commerce, science, telecommunications; Health; and Environment, sustainable development (Group Permanent Conjoint, 2013). Policymakers were, however, ambivalent about these pillars. The areas were broad, and therefore not attracting a niche. Nevertheless, many others did mention the urge to be selective. As one of the respondents said: "Both the Swiss Mission (Foreign Ministry) and us (the Canton) want the same: we don't want to specialize, we want to be generalists. (Interview A4.4)."

Geneva's city marketing goals 2012

Geneva's brand has been under conscious development since 2005. Two surveys were carried out to clarify Geneva's brand image. The questionnaires were given to visitors. The city used the slogan '*Geneva – A world of its own*' (Hyytiäinen, Renko, Gauli, Järvisalo, & Nadan, 2014). On the English website of the city of Geneva in January 2013, the following text was illustrative for the city brand regarding the presence of IOs and international reputation:

> *"Known both as the «smallest of big cities», or the «city of peace», Geneva, among other things, is home to the European headquarters of the UN. Geneva*

> *is linked to Europe's capital cities by its international airport, motorways, and railway network. It is the seat of several major multinationals, as well as the International Red Cross Committee. What is so special about Geneva for the Swiss and the rest of the world? The answer is that it has far greater international influence than any other city of 200'000 inhabitants." (Ville de Genève, 2013)*

Apart from the International character of the City of Geneva and the influence the city aspired to have, Geneva's goals were to be the 'City of Culture' and 'City of Parks', and with the IOs, the international slogan 'City of Peace' was mentioned on the website as well.

Bid for the Green Climate Fund (2012)
The Swiss offer for the Green Climate Fund consisted of three parts: financial, facilities, and legal framework. The first, Switzerland's offer of financial, administrative, and technical support for the Secretariat of the Green Climate Fund, handled the start-up funding, which was 300.000 Swiss Francs for office equipment and 10,000 Francs per workspace. Besides, it offered rent-free offices in a flagship building (of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in Geneva), financial support for the operation,[16] contribution of funding for capacity development,[17] and other support for the Secretariat (administrative and technical issues). The second part, local facilities, was subdivided in four chapters on access to top-quality infrastructure and services; excellent transport connections; access to a dense network of global players, and advantages of a cosmopolitan city. These chapters highlighted all Geneva had to offer with two or more colorful pictures and maps per page. The last part, legal framework, handled the privileges and immunities for the Secretariat and its staff. It offered immunities and privileges to staff, delegates attending conferences, experts on mission for the Secretariat, and family members. Spouses and official partners would enjoy access to the Swiss labor market under the same conditions as spouses of IOs staff in Switzerland, if they resided in Switzerland and lived in the same household. In the bid, the scientific experiences of Switzerland's universities were mentioned, the UNFCCC was highlighted as a resolute advocate of an internationally negotiated solution to the global problem of climate change. Switzerland is portrayed as a determined player in the fight against climate change.

16 3 million Swiss Francs annually from the Swiss government between 2014-2016, and 120,000 Francs from the Canton.

17 One million Swiss Francs annually between 2014-2016 from the Swiss government to support the activities of developing countries relation to the Green Climate Fund's work.

Table 4.3 Alignment between policies and bid for the Green Climate Fund

GCF bid	**Host policy**	**Nation branding**	**City Marketing**	**Policy alignment**
Goals in keywords: / Elements in the GCF bid:	financial assistance, the conditions of reception, work, integration and security in Switzerland of the beneficiaries, a good integration of the so-called 'internationals'	promotion science and technology, higher education and innovation. Pillars: 1. Peace, security, disarmament; 2. Humanitarian action and law, human rights, migration; 3. Work, economy, commerce, science, telecommunications; 4. Health; 5. The environment, sustainable development.	international airport, motorways and railway network. It is the seat of a number of major multinationals, it has international influence more than any other city of 200.000 inhabitants.'	The following elements from the GCF bid showed alignment on the *depth of information* dimension:
Switzerland's offer of financial, administrative, and technical support for the Secretariat of the Green Climate Fund	'Targeted financial assistance' / 'contributes to the good functioning of the organizations established in our country'	'One of the five pillars: The environment, sustainable development'	-	financial support for the operation, contribution of funding for capacity development, and other support for the Secretariat (administrative and technical issues). **Alignment with two policies**
Local facilities and conditions	'The conditions of reception, work, integration and security in Switzerland'	'Focus on science and technology, higher education and innovation environment'	'Geneva is linked to Europe's capital cities by its international airport, motorways and railway network'	A. Access to top-quality infrastructure and services, B. Excellent transport connections, C. Access to a dense network of global players, and D. Advantages of a cosmopolitan city. **Full alignment**
Legal framework	'The good functioning of the organizations established in our country'	-	'	**Alignment with one policy**

Categorical concurrence
When exploring how elements of the bid were mentioned in the policy goals, I found most categorical concurrence with the second element of the bid: Local facilities and conditions. The conditions were mentioned in the host policy goals, in the nation branding goals, and the physical infrastructure and other facilities were mentioned in the city marketing goals. The third element of the bid – legal framework – co-occurred least: only with the host policy goals, where the "good functioning of the organizations established in our country" was one of the main goals. The categorical concurrence was 67 percent, as six of the nine boxes were filled.

Depth of information
The first element in the bid – Switzerland's offer – was mentioned in the host policy and nation branding goals, but not in the city marketing goals. The second element in the bid – local facilities – was mentioned in all the policy goals. The third element of legal framework was only mentioned in the host policy goals. All the elements mentioned above that showed *categorical concurrence* also showed *depth of information*, meaning that all the elements in the bid that co-occurred with the policy goals were elaborated upon, which makes the *depth of information* element also 67 percent.

Perception of host policy and support Geneva's failed case
In the second part of the instrumental perspective, I focus on *perception of policy and support*. I explore the perception of branding policies, the effectiveness of the branding policies to attract them, the elements in the bid, rules and regulations and government support.

The following figure depicts how the policies and conditions were rated by the respondents among the international representatives in Geneva (N=13): the branding polices (visibility and effectiveness), (some) elements in the bids (level of education and expertise labor force, level of English, competitiveness) and the rules and regulations for IOs. Further on, I discuss the background of these ratings.

Perception of branding policies
The way respondents ranked the visibility of the Swiss nation branding was considerably lower than the city marketing of International Geneva. For the effectiveness of the branding activities to attract IOs, the respondents were moderately positive. The pillars to attract IOs were perceived as insignificant: five pillars were set up to focus on in attracting organizations and spent resources. But, as a government official stated: "these pillars are vague, we used to say City of Peace, but we can say City of Humanitarian Affairs, Trade, anything (…) Nonetheless, despite the current situation [budget crisis, 2013] and Geneva being one of the most expensive cities in the world, the working

climate is attractive" (Interview A4.4). This element was coined one plus, because the respondents were positive about branding but negative about the effectiveness of it.

Figure 4.5 Perception of host policy and support Geneva (N=13)



Perception of elements in the bid

The elements in the bid were 'financial and technical support', 'local facilities and conditions' and 'legal framework'. Most respondents were positive about the financial and technical support, but negative about the cost of living in Geneva. One of the respondents of the Red Cross (ICRC) found the "cost of living high; people from embassies have their own currency, the exchange rate is too high" (Interview A24.27). The Green Fund was attracted during a financial crisis, as many mentioned. Related to local facilities and conditions, many were positive, although excellence of the facilities underwhelmed them. Also, the negative attitude towards foreigners in Geneva was in contrast with the 'Cosmopolitan city', as was proposed in the bid. One respondent knew several people who left because of hostility towards them. About the third aspect, the legal framework, respondents were moderately positive. Some agreed that the bureaucracy of obtaining permits for family members is tiring. This element was coined a plus/minus as the attitude was predominantly negative or moderately positive.

Perception of rules and regulations
The rules and regulations for IOs consist of acquiring working permits, legitimation cards, and the implications of the seat agreement, for instance, until what age the children of international staff get immunities and privileges. The different groups rated the clarity of the rules and regulations rather high. Nonetheless, they complained about – the lack and affordability of – housing and the cost of living. Childcare was a problem to them as well because there was often a one- or two-year-waiting list, which was difficult for IO employees who just arrived. Others complained about the boring nightlife, and the watershed in the population of Geneva: locals versus internationals. There was hostility against diplomatic number plates in traffic. One of the municipal employees remarked: "There are a lot of false ideas about us, for instance, that they are taking away our houses, they have the profits, we have the problems". There are some initiatives to try to bring the two worlds together, there are a lot of attempts" (Interview A8.11). A study of the Foundation for Geneva confirms this phenomenon (L'Observatoire de la Fondation Pour Genève, 2013). This element was coined a plus/minus because the rating was high, but complaints were articulated as well.

Perception of government support
About the way possible complaints were handled, most respondents were extremely positive. One Swiss respondent said, about the responsiveness of the government: "When someone has a problem: they take it seriously" (Interview A21.23). An employee at the World Trade Organization found that the handling of complaints had been improved: "Housing for staff has been improved, and there is more of a client-oriented setup. However, the "client is the king" is not the natural attitude here. A lot of the expats find it very hard to adapt. The Japanese and Chinese even have more of a problem here because they are used to be well treated" (Interview A23.25). This element was coined a double plus because of the extreme optimism about how the support had been improved.

Instrumental explanation Geneva's successful case
In April 2013, the Swiss government formally announced its candidacy for the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat. During that time, changes in the host state policy were already on their way. From May 2014 onwards, when the offers were introduced, the Federal Council introduced a host state law in a new 'Message'. Simultaneously, the foreign policy strategy (2012-2015) had stressed the importance of a clear host state policy, by providing for the sustainable promotion of international Geneva in its priority axes (Swiss Federal Council, 2014). "En effet", stated the memorandum enacting the new law: "le rôle d'Etat hôte confère à notre pays un poids politique nettement supérieur à sa taille" or "the role of host state gives our country a political weight far greater than its size" (Swiss Federal Council, 2014, pp. 8).

Host policy goals 2015

The starting point of the new law was a motion tabled in 2012 by Federal Councilor Carlo Sommaruga: "Strengthening International Geneva and Switzerland as places of reception for multilateral international diplomacy" (Swiss Federal Council, 2014). No less than 120 parliamentarians representing political trends and regions of Switzerland signed this. The aim was to lay down the political and strategic framework for International Geneva, namely the strategy pursued by the Federal Council, as well as the necessary financial framework, over several years, to achieve this objective. The financial means to carry out the host state policy of Switzerland were based on two pillars. The first included the funding of IOs, permanent missions, NGOs and other institutions that fell under the host state policy, as well as the promotion of Swiss candidacies for seats of IOs. Secondly, it concerned the financing of infrastructures and their functioning, as well as the construction of the external security measures of IOs.[18]

Nation branding goals 2015

During the attraction of the Secretariat, Switzerland was ranked second in the overall ranking in the Nation branding index of FutureBrand, just after Japan. The second ranking was one place down from 2013, when it was ranked first. Other rankings, such as the Anholt 'Good Country Index', ranked Switzerland 3rd in 2014, based on seven indicators (Anholt Good Country Index, 2014). Furthermore, whereas the Swiss foreign policy of 2012-2015 explained the four main strategic axes as being 'Neighboring countries', 'EU and its member states', 'Stability in Europe and beyond', and 'Strategic partners and global issues', the follow up in 2015, the strategy of 2016-2019 was different.[19] It added peace and security as well as sustainable development to new foreign policy target areas. This change in areas (what Switzerland wanted as an external image) is interesting as there was more overlap with other hubs in the ecology and security field, such as Bonn, Nairobi, and The Hague.

City marketing goals 2015

The slogan 'Geneva, A world of its own' remained unchanged. Surprisingly, on the website of the City of Geneva the only change since 2013 was the paragraph on 'Culture'.

18 The increase in budget was huge: instead of the normal CHF 72.4 million (64,3 million euros) there was an increase of CHF 44.8 to 117.2 million francs (104,1 million euros) for the period of 2016-2019 (Swiss Federal Council, 2014). This amount consisted of the host state policy (72.4 million francs) and additional resources for the implementation of the strategy (30 million francs). In addition, the Federal Council was asking for two commitment appropriations, one for the renovation of the International Conference Center (4 million francs), and a second for buildings to strengthen the external protections of the sites of IOs (11.1 million francs).

19 The 2016-19 strategy focused on "Relations with European Union and EU and EFTA member states", "Relations with global partners", "Peace and Security", and "Sustainable development and prosperity" (Federal Council, 2012; Federal Council, 2016).

Instead of the following sentences: "Geneva is a city of arts and culture. The City was financially responsible for around thirty venues and performance centers, eleven museums, the Municipal library network and Geneva Library (Ville de Genève, 2013)", the website of 2015 phrased it differently: "A dynamic, international city like Geneva devotes a large part of its budget to cultural affairs. Supporting creativity in the arts and facilitating public access to culture in all its forms are the principal policy objectives of the Department of Culture and Sport (Ville de Genève, 2015)". The goals were thus to make Geneva a dynamic, international city, and to facilitate public access to culture.

Bid for the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat (2015)
The fact that the 'gentlemen's agreement' was not written in stone was evidenced by the Swiss participation in the bidding process for the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat: the Swiss did not leave disarmament organizations for Vienna. The bid for the Arms Trade Treaty consisted of two pages: a front cover and a page with four main categories that represent the attractive facts of Geneva and Switzerland. These categories were 'Inclusiveness', 'Expertise', 'Continuity', and 'Switzerland offers'. In a colon alongside the categories the bid explained the omnipresent representatives of more than 170 member states, the expertise in Arms Trade Treaty-related matters, the presence of relevant partners and the four conditions Switzerland offers the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat (Swiss Confederation, 2015). These conditions were office space free of charge for four years, a financial contribution for the first couple of years, privileges and immunities for the staff, and support by the Welcome Center to assist staff and their families in settling in Geneva. Compared to the other offers, this was a limited offer, except for the logistical aspects and facilities: 173 Permanent missions, 68 of the 72 States Parties of the Arms Trade Treaty at the time were permanently represented in Geneva.

Categorical concurrence
The first dimension of alignment was high: 83 percent or ten of the twelve boxes were filled (Table 5.4). The element 'Inclusiveness' in the bid was mentioned in all other policies. The second element 'Expertise' was aligned with two other policies; City marketing goals did not mention expertise. The third element 'Continuity' co-occurred with all the other policy goals. Finally, the bid mentioned 'Switzerland offers' This element co-occurred with two other policy goals, but not with nation branding.

Depth of information
The alignment of the second dimension was lower – 58 percent or seven of the twelve boxes showed depth of information. Especially the 'expertise' goal of the bid, presenting Geneva as a place with a range of stakeholders with broad expertise in Arms Trade Treaty-related matters', highly aligned with the host policy and nation branding goals. The 'peace and security' pillar of the host policy was elaborated on and a nation branding

objective was 'to make Switzerland a key player in solving global problems'. Another example of high depth of information was the 'inclusiveness' goal of the bid – more than 170 UN member states, among them most of the Arms Trade Treaty States Parties represented in Geneva.

Perception of host policy and support Geneva's successful case

Perception of branding policies

The branding policies and their effectiveness to attract IOs was considered good. One of the respondents said about the effectiveness of branding policies: "If you think of Geneva, you think of IOs, I don't think many people know it as the city of Peace. Switzerland's branding is more one of neutrality. I would say the city marketing is more effective" (Interview A32.35). Others were quite as positive about the branding strategies, especially when they elaborated on all the cooperation possibilities in Geneva because of the presence of other organizations specialized in disarmament. This element was marked with two pluses, as most respondents considered this as positive.

Perception of elements in the bid

The four elements in the Arms Trade Treaty-bid were 'inclusiveness', 'expertise', 'continuity', and 'Switzerland offers'. About the inclusiveness, most international employees were negative. Hostility towards foreigners was every day's business. As a disarmament ambassador said: "We had a Moroccan maid at the time, and she was often examined on the streets and questioned what she was doing in Switzerland. Also, we knew an Indonesian couple that left because of hostility" (Interview A18.20). The second element in the bid, expertise, was rated high, explained a Red Cross employee: "…because Geneva offers many higher education opportunities, also for IO staff that is already working in the field. Professionally they recruit internationally, they do not need a lot of local staffers, only for administrative services" (Interview A33.36). The element Continuity, a bit inappropriate as the Secretariat would be new, was not reflected upon. On the last element, Switzerland offers, many commented positive. The offer for the Arms Trade Treaty was ample, said an Arms Trade Treaty-respondent: "The Swiss have given us rent for four years, we deal with the City and the Police department of Foreign affairs with security needs. It works well. Health care is over-medicated in Switzerland: 40 percent of the women have caesarians instead of the normal 15 percent. And we are obliged to have private insurance. Childcare is a mess" (Interview A31.34). Apart from the last comment on childcare – which has its difficulties for foreigners because of capacity problems – the respondents were positive about the elements in the bid, which results in a plus.

Table 4.4 Alignment between policies bid for the Arms Trade Treaty (Geneva)

ATT bid	**Host policy**	**Nation branding**	
Goals in keywords Elements in the ATT bid:	reinforce the key competences of Switzerland's host state policy and to ensure qualitative development on the territory	The five branding pillars and the aim to make Switzerland a key player in solving global problems; on the scientific side, to make Switzerland a key location for scientific research on global governance	
1. Inclusiveness	'To reinforce the key competences of Switzerland's host state policy and to ensure qualitative development on the territory' / 'Relations with global partners',	'1. Peace, security, disarmament'	
2. Expertise	'Peace and Security' as pillar of the Foreign policy 2016-2019.	'To make Switzerland a key player in solving global problems'	
3. Continuity	'The aim is not to attract new entities at any cost or to oppose any relocation, but to reinforce the key competences of Switzerland's host state policy and to ensure qualitative development on the territory'	'To make Switzerland a key location for scientific research on global governance'	
4. Switzerland offers	'By means of targeted financial assistance, the conditions of reception, work, integration and security in Switzerland of the beneficiaries, a good integration of the so-called 'internationals' is one of the keys to the success of Switzerland's host state policy and contributes to the good functioning of the organizations established in our country'	-	

City Marketing	Policy alignment
'Geneva: A world of its own'. The objective: to develop international communication from Geneva, in order to make the assets of Switzerland and International Geneva visible to the international community	The following elements from the ATT bid showed alignment on the *depth of information* dimension:
The brand was 'Geneva: A world of its own'; including all IOs and the international character of Geneva	'More than 170 UN Member States, among them the large majority of ATT States Parties and Signatory States, are represented in Geneva on a permanent basis. **Full alignment**
-	The presence of a range of stakeholders with broad expertise in ATT-related matters will contribute to the Treaty's implementation. **Alignment with two policies**
'Geneva is the seat of a number of major multinationals, as well as the International Red Cross Committee'	By enabling regular exchanges among relevant partners throughout the year, a Geneva-based Secretariat ensures that attention is paid to the Treaty's implementation. **Full alignement**
'[The GCF led to a] modification of the financing policy for building renovations of international organizations or a new distribution of security costs' / 'Geneva is linked to Europe's capital cities by its international airport, motorways and railway network.	office space free of charge for four years, a financial contribution for the first couple of years, privileges and immunities for the staff, and support by the Welcome Center to assist staff and their families in settling in Geneva. **Alignment with two policies**

Perception of rules and regulations

One respondent of the successful case of the Arms Trade Treaty who ranked the rules and regulations quite high, interpreted them as "rather clear": "I haven't heard about discussions on the host state agreement. Our discussion is more about the mandate of our organization. About what our organization could be doing versus what it strategically would be doing" (Interview 23.35). The rules and regulations are quite strict, according to a second respondent: "You need to pay three salaries in advance if you want to get an apartment. When you sublet, insurance is required, and you need a liability contract. The cost of living is so high that both parents have to work to exist" (Interview A24.27). Others were more positive about Switzerland as a host state, and especially the host agreements. "There is a hierarchy, some are better than others. (…) There are some things that could be improved, but it is a generous package. It's efficient and there's a pleasant working atmosphere" (Interview A30.33). The aspect is coined a double plus, as most found the rules and regulations strict, but very well organized (it scored a 8,76, N=10).

Perception of government support

Most problems IO representatives reported about covered housing, high cost of living, childcare, and bureaucracy. In a longitudinal study of the *Fondation* the housing problems had been addressed, "ringing the alarm bells", because the "fate of "International Geneva" faces painful issues regarding housing, mobility and security. The climate has become strained. This was all it took for some of the population and political classes to point a finger at Geneva's international residents. How integrated do they feel in Geneva?" (Fondation Pour Genève, 2013, p. 4). One of the conclusions of the first study was that the "housing problem must be addressed in more detail (…). The same applies to healthcare, education, etc. One important subject is integration" (Fondation Pour Genève, 2013, p. 55). Two years later the question arose: "Must we see an erosion of the attractiveness of Geneva?". The conclusions were mild: the Geneva-based economy suffered from a shortage of qualified staff, which forces companies to recruit their staff from abroad, but policy responses to the vulnerabilities [shortage of housing, inadequate public transport and the quality of the Geneva educational systems] will allow to strengthen the position and improve the wellbeing of the entire population too (Fondation pour Genève, 2015, p. 62). From the interviews, a similar mildness came to the fore: respondents found the conditions beneficial, the cost of living and bureaucracy levels high, while the availability of housing remained problematic. This element was coined a plus, as the respondents did not think the disadvantages outweighed the advantages of living and working in Geneva.

Conclusion

Although the expectation was that the alignment of policies increased the likelihood of success, the results showed the opposite; the failed Green Climate Fund case showed a higher alignment between the attraction policies and the bid. Perception of host policy and support were however higher in the successful case of the Arms Trade Treaty. Although problems as outlined above persisted, government support had been improved.

4.3 Discursive perspective

Discursive explanation Geneva's failed case

The discursive perspective is based on the concept of *similar frames* and derived from questions about normative behavior. By looking at these frames, this approach seeks to explore whether overlapping *priorities and narratives* between groups have a relation with successfully attracting IOs.

Organizational network's priorities and narratives failed case

For the organizational network (N=9), the element of *Relevant centers* can be seen as a leading narrative, especially their absence in the case of the Green Climate Fund. As one of the group members said: "Geneva is not a climate and ecological hot spot. We have health, intellectual property, trade, and humanitarian areas" (Interview A13.15). The other most important elements were settling in and taxes, of which the first was more present in the narratives. One Municipal respondent said: "It is about understanding their needs" (Interview A8.10). Regarding settling in of foreigners, the organizational network showed a positive narrative: contacts between IOs and the Head of Protocol (Foreign Ministry) were excellent and visa arrangements well organized. About the host state agreement, the umbrella for taxes, the respondents agreed it to be one of the crucial ones: "Today it is mostly played on the offer, and if there is a competition between the different centers it is about how much he is going to pay", said a Foreign Affairs employee (Interview A22.24). Livability had been considered to have worsened: "living space, housing for staff, a certain client-oriented attitude is lacking, client is not the king" said one respondent (Interview A29.32). Although one would expect that in the experienced city of Geneva the livability would be great, this appeared to be not the case.

Policy network's priorities and narratives failed case

Within the policy network (N=12), relevant centers, political stability and physical infrastructure were key. Political stability in Switzerland, the highest ranked with relevant centers, was accompanied with a strong narrative. The stability is called an important asset of Switzerland: "the fact that you know that authorities do what they say" mentioned one respondent (Interview A17.19). The policy network, being focused on the retention of IOs, considered retaining as a way of attracting new ones. The following, however, captures a contrasting narrative: "We cannot retain all the administration of the UN bodies (…) It is important that the Headquarters stay, to have all the countries represented here" (Interview A13.15). Related to the retention role, one narrative was about the hospitality policies, starting just after Geneva lost the International Labor

Organization to Canada in 1945. When one of the architects of the Swiss host country policy started his work at the Foreign Ministry the Head of mission told him: "Never forget, if you hear something, a criticism, when someone has a problem: take it seriously. Feel wherever you are as a host country ambassador" (Interview A21.23).

Comparison organizational and policy network failed case
Figure 4.6 visualizes the priorities of the organizational network and the policy network. The numbers on the y-axis represent the mean of the group's prioritization: 5 is highest, 1 is the lowest score of the top-5 priorities. The names of the thirteen most often prioritized elements on the x-axis are shortened. The two groups overlap in their narratives about the increased competition with other host cities and the increased pressure this had put on the host policy. In the priorities, both groups scored relevant centers are nearby and cooperative highest.

Figure 4.6 Green Climate Fund: priorities governmental groups



IO representatives' priorities and narratives failed case
For the international representatives (N=13) the following elements were key: relevant centers, political stability, physical infrastructure, and taxes are beneficial. As the taxes fell under the host state agreement, this appeared to be crucial. Regarding the physical infrastructure, the cooperation with Swiss Air was described as a priority. Related to an earlier case, when the airline decided to skip flights to and from Geneva, a group member said: "Swiss Air forgot the IO dimension. (…) Within 48 hours, the UN Climate Change Secretariat decided that Bonn would be the new location for the Headquarters.

Even WTO considered moving to Bonn". He continued, still agitated: "not only did the Swiss ignore the significant business they were getting from UN travel, but they also assumed that people traveling from the UN would accept to spend three hours more on the flight and go to Zurich instead" (Interview A29.32). The conditions for international employees formed another strong narrative. International representatives found the international schools, universities, and research centers extremely important. An IO employee said: "The Geneva Academy act as a pipeline for many IOs. There is a direct path from these institutions to the UN" (Interview A32.35). These narratives show that the IO representatives considered connectivity paramount, physically as well as virtually.

Comparison between organizational network and IO representatives failed case
Figure 4.7 shows the overlap between the organizational network and the internationals in Geneva. The priorities and narratives overlap most in the relevant centers and taxes. Where they differ is in the international representatives being more concerned with security, the infrastructure for professional networks and the international schools, of which they were more critical (especially the capacity).

Figure 4.7 Green Climate Fund: organizational network and internationals



Discursive explanation Geneva’s successful case

Organizational network’s priorities and narratives successful case

The organizational network attracting the Arms Trade Treaty (N=5) prioritized relevant centers, available labor force and political stability. The group promoted Geneva as a hub for arms control, non-proliferation, and humanitarian issues (Swiss Confederation, 2014). A dominant narrative was that many countries are represented in Geneva: the presence of more than 178 permanent missions was often mentioned. A recurring concept was ‘synergies’, deriving from this presence. One of the parliamentarians combined some of the priorities in his narrative: “the proximity of all the organizations, conferences (…). It is true that we have difficulties, life is costly, but we have an advantage with the location, office space and we have a lot of skilled labor” (Interview A13.15). A former disarmament ambassador answered accordingly: “Geneva is expensive, but the Swiss are always willing to reach deep into the pockets to see if they can offer something acceptable”. Following skilled labor, many mentioned the disarmament community in Geneva as an advantage.

Comparison organizational and policy network successful case

Figure 4.8 shows the priorities of the organizational network attracting the Secretariat and the policy network.

Figure 4.8 Arms Trade Treaty: priorities governmental groups



The overlaps in priorities and narratives between the organizational and policy network I found in the relevant centers and political stability. Differences were that the policy network was more focused on physical infrastructure and livability. About livability one of the policy network actors said: “Nobody wants to leave Geneva. It’s expensive, but they never say it is a reason to leave” (Interview A5.A6.7). Whereas the policy network was prioritizing welcome services and retention, the organizational network was targeting the attraction relevant elements more: relevant centers, physical infrastructure, and taxes.

Comparison organizational network and IO representatives successful case
The following figure shows the overlap between the organizational network and the international representatives. Whereas the organizational network prioritized and told stories about the relevant centers and taxes, many of the international representatives prioritized relevant centers and physical infrastructure. They thought the synergies on disarmament were crucial and were less concerned with taxes.

Figure 4.9 Arms Trade Treaty: organizational network and internationals



Comparing the priorities of all groups with correlation coefficients
Looking at the overlaps between the groups with Kendall’s tau-b, the following comes to the fore. The table below shows the overlap between the groups rating the 17 locational elements (N=17, the other five of the 22 were never mentioned in the top 5). The organizational network attracting the Arms Trade Treaty showed a higher overlap with the policy network and with the IO representatives than the organizational

network attracting the failed case of the Green Climate Fund. However, the number of observations is limited, which I consider in my interpretation, where the overlap in narratives is predominant while the overlap in priorities is more illustrative.

Table 4.5 Correlations failed and successful groups on prioritizing locational elements Geneva

	Policy network	**International Organizations**
Green Climate Fund organizational network (fail)	0.59**	0.47*
Arms Trade Treaty organizational network (success)	0.61**	0.65**

N=17. * p <.05, ** p <.01. Based on 2-tailed Kendall's tau-b.

This table shows that the ranked ordering of elements is strongly correlated across the groups. First, the correlations between rankings of the organizational network that attracted the Green Fund, and the policy network are lower than those between the successful organizational network attracting the Arms Trade Secretariat and the policy network. Correlations between the organizational networks and the international representatives are also lower in the failed than in the successful case. Although these patterns match the expectation that a stronger correlation in rankings of elements is related to the likelihood of success, the substantive differences are small.

Conclusion
The results were as expected: the higher overlap of priorities and narratives between the organizational and policy network the higher the likelihood of success. Strikingly, the overlap between the ranked ordering of the groups shows a stronger correlation for the fourth expectation (organizational network and IOs) than the third (organizational and policy network).

4.4 Relational perspective

Relational explanation Geneva's failed case

Level of network cooperation failed case Geneva
The ratings of network cooperation were high in Geneva, where I found some differences between the failed and the successful case. For the Green Climate Fund, the cooperation was rated an 8,7 out of 10 (N=10). There was monthly communication on a technical level, and twice a year on a political level. When attracting Green Climate Fund, the

meetings were more often. From the moment the brochure and the offer had to be handed in (April 2012) the intensity of the communication between organizational network members and the policy network peaked. The organizational network was unanimously positive: the cooperation was "very good between the City, Canton, and Federal level, regarding strategy, financial support and communication" (Interview A12.14). An actor of the supporting team helping with the campaign stated that the tasks were well distributed: "We were dealing with the campaign, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Environment, Finance. Other government members went to conferences and visits. The host country section played a role, the Canton and the City, and the interim secretariat." (Interview A9.12). Strikingly, although the level of network coordination was high, the attraction of the Green Fund failed.

Political process failed case: Green Climate Fund

Between the Board meeting in Geneva (August) and the decisive Board meeting in Songdo (October) the lobby took place. An organizational network member from the municipal level was negative about the policy game: "It's always talks, it's not really clear who pays for what. It's in the end a diplomatic game. They try to let the member states of the UN pay; blackmailing is part of the game. The strategy should be more integrated; now it's everyone on its own level" (Interview A8.10). The policy game was politicized, also argued another respondent: "Politics clearly plays a role, you can offer excellent conditions and support and fail to attract an IO, simply for political reasons" (Interview A12.14). How the game is played also depends on the view others have of the host country, many agreed. "Regional alliances play a role, but these are often unpredictable" (Interview A3.3) argued another respondent. Despite regular meetings, the strategy remained inadequate. The respondents were too confident in their chances of success, which can be illustrated by the following quote of a respondent who warned his boss before the voting took place and said: "Geneva might not take it to the second round, because you will have these geographic constellations independently". He responded – "Are you crazy?" Look at the evaluation, we are doing better than three or four of them". In retrospect, he stated: "My believe is that when Geneva would have survived the first round, Geneva would have good chances to win." (Interview A27.29). From these quotes the image of a highly politicized process comes to the fore, where global constellations were overruling internal tactics.

Actor centrality Geneva's failed case

To explore *actor centrality,* I zoomed in on betweenness and degree centrality. I presumed that higher those measures, the higher the likelihood of success. As is visualized in graph 4.10, several members played central role in the network of information exchange. Four to eight persons were linked to the organizations in the center. Some of these ties or edges (lines between the dots or nodes) are thick, meaning that they had more contact than the thinner ties.

When starting with betweenness centrality, the actors with a high betweenness centrality, the 'brokers' with a capacity to facilitate or limit interaction between the nodes it links, were the 24 Green Fund Board Members who were lobbied during the final part of the attraction, the others were the UN Office of Geneva, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Those were the most independent actors.

Figure 4.10 Actor centrality during the attraction process of the Green Climate Fund



Key:
Size of the nodes: bigger nodes have higher degree centrality (activity)
Node centrality: the higher the betweenness centrality (independency)
Links between the nodes: frequency of meetings (connected to node activity)
Colors: each color is a different type of node (network diversity)[20]

The degree centrality is visible in the size of the nodes in the graph. This measure defines the degree of participation of each actor in relation to the total number of ties between the actors of the network. The thickness of the ties, edges, or lines between them shows the frequency of interactions, showing how active the nodes were during the process. The member of the Support team, working at the IOs and host policy section of the Foreign Ministry, was the most active and central actor. Other ministries, the FIPOI the building agency, the Mayor and the United Nations Office of Geneva played active roles as well. The following table shows the centrality measures for the five most central nodes, based on the betweenness centrality percentage. These measures show the proportion

20 See for an overview of the colors Table A8 in the Appendices.

of centrality each actor had. Interestingly, the 24 Board members show the highest percentage, meaning that they were actively targeted in the lobby. It also means they were the most independent actors. The second and third were the UN office of Geneva and the Foreign Ministry, the latter showing the highest degree centrality. This actor was, however, active, not the most centrally placed and did not have the broker position as was expected.

Table 4.6 Top five actors: Betweenness measures and node type Green Climate Fund

Node	**Betweenness centrality %**	**Degree centrality %**	**Node type (diversity)**
1. 24 GCF Board members	20	6	1. Federal level
2. UN Office of Geneva	20	4	2. UN/IO
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs	17	10	UN/IO
4. City: External relations	12	9	3. City
5. Swiss Parliament	10	7	4. Parliament

Network diversity and number of nodes failed case Geneva: Green Climate Fund
When exploring network diversity, the findings show six different types of actors. These were from the Federal department (twelve actors, light blue in the graph), the Fondation of Geneva (three, dark blue), the City of Geneva (two, yellow), the Canton of Geneva (three, green), the United Nations (two, purple), and Parliament (one active member, red). This number of six types is coined an 'average network diversity' (between 4 and 6 types).

When zooming in on the network size and the number of 23 actors depicted above, of those 15 were actively involved at the Geneva side. Of the 15 actors four were interacting with the 24 Board members of the Green Climate Fund: The Canton, the City, Swiss Parliament, and the IO Division of the Foreign Ministry. The lack of NGOs is remarkable in this graph, showing no activity. This is even more striking as one of the UN Office of Geneva employees said to have included that in the strategy and one of the reasons why the Green Fund should be in Geneva. The total number of 23 actors is considered an average network size (between 20 and 25 actors).

Relational explanation Geneva's successful case

Level of network cooperation successful case Geneva
The organizational network that attracted the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat to Geneva rated their cooperation quite positively, which is not surprising. The intensity of communication had changed since the last case. The respondents (N=12) rated the

cooperation a 9, which was high. According to an expert, this was all due to an evolution in the host policy. One of the organizational network members found that "It worked very well. We usually have meetings 3 times a year with the *Group permanent conjoint*. It is a place where people can talk freely" (Interview A5.7). There was also a member of the policy network who considered the quality of the communication as improved in two years' time: "It was a 5 or 6 and now it's 9 (…). We have noticed since 3 or 4 years since Didier Burkhalter [the Foreign minister] that it has been improved" (Interview A10.13). Strong personalities played a role in this, he said: "The maintenance of the quality of International Geneva. Sommaruga [the Parliamentarian] is a convincing person, who fights for support for international Geneva" (Interview A10.13). Another type of cooperation took place between some associations for international employees, which was part of one of the key policy goals: to integrate the international staff more into the local community. An organizational network member found, however, that cooperation was especially needed on a Presidential level, as the Swiss President changes every year. The importance of 'strong personalities' is interesting in this regard, as it was not mentioned in the Green Fund case.

Political process successful case: Arms Trade Treaty

Many interviewees felt that the negotiations were taking place outside their sphere of influence. As soon as the embassies got involved, they were offered a note for visits abroad. More than one respondent had mentioned the advantage of hosting a delegation in their own host city. The sense of direction was however felt as relatively absent. With no idea of a clear procedure, the process felt a bit 'out of hand'. One of the network members even called the political process "chaotic" (Interview A12.14). These findings show mixed results about the level of *network cooperation*, although the ratings were high.

Actor centrality Geneva's successful case

When first reviewing betweenness centrality, the actors 'in the middle' with most independence and a broker position were the Foreign Ministry and the Presidential Department of the Canton. Two other central nodes were the Cantonal Welcome center and the building agency (FIPOI) which was involved for the location of the Secretariat. The ties between the Foreign Ministry and the Canton Presidential Department were the thickest, plus the ties between the Foreign Ministry and the Protocol Service of the Canton. What this graph shows is that one actor was the most central in the network, but that the less centralized President Department of the Canton had the most ties with actors in the periphery in the network. The ties with this department were thick, meaning that they often met and had large flow of information. The Foreign Ministry in the middle, shows more than ten individual ties with other actors. Besides, two persons of the Foreign Ministry were centrally positioned in the network, having a high degree of independence.

Figure 4.11 Actor centrality during the attraction process of the Arms Trade Treaty



Key:
Size of the nodes: bigger nodes have higher degree centrality (activity)
Node centrality: the higher the betweenness centrality (independency)
Links between the nodes: frequency of meetings (connected to node activity)
Colors: each color is a different type of node (network diversity)

In the following table, the nodes with the highest percentages of betweenness centrality are depicted. The links or ties between the President Department of the Canton were the most apparent.

Table 4.7 Top five actors: Betweenness measures and node type Arms Trade Treaty Geneva

Node	Betweenness centrality %	Degree centrality %	Node type (diversity)
1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs	12	4.6	1. Federal level
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs	9	3.7	Federal level
3. Canton: Welcome center	8	4	2. Canton
4. Canton: Department President	8	5	Canton
5. Foundations for Buildings for IOs (FIPOI)	7	3	3. Public Private Partnership

Looking at the second measure, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat and President department of the Canton showed the highest degree centrality. Those were the most active actors. NGOs and Public Private Partnerships such as the building agency were also quite active. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDR) was an important collaborator, as well as the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva Disarmament Platform, and Geneva Center for Security Policy. The 69 Signatories of the Arms Trade Treaty were lobbied actively. Not only members of the organizational and policy network, but also players such as the UN Office of Geneva and the Foreign Minister himself aimed to win votes from the 67 represented Signatories.

Network diversity and number of nodes successful case Geneva
In the case of the Arms Trade Treaty, there were eight different types of actors. These were from the Federal department (thirteen actors, blue), Public Private Partnerships (four, dark blue), the City of Geneva (three, yellow), the Canton of Geneva (five, green), the United Nations and other IOs (eight, purple), Parliament (one active member, red), NGOs (four, pink) and a business (one, light blue). This number of eight is marked a 'high network diversity', as more than seven types were involved. In total, the number of network actors, as visualized in the graph above, was 39 which was high.

Conclusion
The intensity of cooperation was high in both cases. The betweenness and degree centrality measures of the Green Climate Fund showed that the position of three main actors was right at the center of the network but that these did not have as many ties with others as in the second Arms Trade Treaty case. The number of node types was average, while the number of actors was low. The case of the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat showed only one central actor but many other less central but very connected other actors. This case showed a high network diversity and a high number of network actors.

4.5 Conclusions Switzerland and Geneva

The alignment between the bid and the attraction policies appeared to be less in the successful case of the Arms Trade Treaty than in the failed case of the Green Climate Fund. This is telling, as it seemed less relevant to have the policy goals aligned than to attend to the needs of the international representatives as a governance network. When zooming in on policy perception and support, international representatives commented more negatively during the attraction of the Green Climate Fund than in the Arms Trade Treaty case. They were complaining during the first attraction process (2011-12) about affordable housing, space in the city and security issues. Another worry was the capacity of childcare. During the attraction of the second case, representatives were slightly more positive; the feeling of security and safety in Geneva was higher. The support had been improved, especially when it came to issues such as allowance of children at international schools.

From a discursive perspective, the overlap of priorities between the organizational network attracting the Green Climate Fund and the other two groups was slightly lower than in the successful case. The overlap between the narratives of the organizational network attracting the Arms Trade Treaty and the other two groups was also higher, especially in their view of the disarmament hub in Geneva. Many of the narratives described the presence of professional network opportunities quite positively.

From the relational perspective, I found that in the successful case of the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat, the respondents rated the cooperation slightly higher. An example is the successful lobby in Parliament to get more funding for the Canton of Geneva to make International Geneva more attractive. Although the differences between these rankings were small, the involved had a more intense cooperation in the second case. What was striking in the network structure, was the different shapes of the graphs. The first diagram showed a relatively sparse information network in which the responsible ministry played a central role, supported by the UN Office of Geneva and the Board Members of the Green Fund. In the second diagram, the network looked denser and even showed networks within networks, or different *cliques*. The most active members were not the most independent ones but were even located in the periphery of the network, meaning that they were highly interdependent with others. The diversity of actor types was high in the successful case and average in the failed case of the Climate Fund. The high level of interaction with NGOs, the United Nations Office of Geneva and the intensity of lobbying persuaded all the countries that voted for Vienna in the first round to vote for Geneva in the second.

"(…) What we encounter is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not sufficiently equipped to attract an IO"
(Quote from an employee of the Central Government Real Estate Agency December 16, 2016, Interview B22.36)

5 The Hague

5.1 The Netherlands and The Hague

Since the Dutch legal scholar Tobias Asser founded The Hague Conference on Private International Law in 1893, The Hague has been a global player in the legal field. Today, this remains the oldest IO in The Hague. Six years later, the young Dutch queen Wilhelmina offered hospitality to the first Peace Conference. This conference of 1899 initiated by the Russian Czar Nicholas II made The Hague a reference point for international law (Eyffinger, 2005). The event founded the establishment of the world's first organization for the settlement of international disputes: The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). Shortly afterwards, the Scottish American billionaire Andrew Carnegie made the necessary funds available to build the Peace Palace to house the PCA. This Palace was built during the Second Peace Conference in 1907 and it was completed, ironically, one year before the outbreak of the First World War. The third Peace Conference, planned shortly afterwards, never took place.[21]

Position of The Hague on the international stage
In 1920, the first Assembly of the League of Nations adopted the Statute of a Permanent Court of Justice. Big leaps were taken all at once: not only the Permanent Court of International Justice made its entrance in the Peace Palace, "Asser's Hague Academy also opened on the same premises" (Eyffinger, 2005, p. 39). After the Second World War, the Permanent Court of International Justice was reorganized under the International Court of Justice. As this is the highest legal authority within the United Nations, The Hague is legally second in the hierarchy of UN cities after New York.

In this era, the Dutch government was willing but not very active in acquiring such organizations. The Cold War was freezing multilateral cooperation, which stopped the creation of IOs (Kaufmann, 2018). Nevertheless, within the Western block major legal institutions emerged in other locations, such as the Court of Justice in Luxembourg and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The end of the Cold War triggered a

21 The alternative Third Peace Conference however took place in June 2015 at the Peace Palace.

resurge of multilateral organizations and in that wave The Hague managed to enlarge and diversify its international hub by acquiring organizations such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the High Commissioner of National Minorities, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Court, Eurojust, and Europol. This era is often called the "renaissance of The Hague" (Lagerwaard, 2005, p. 51). In 2015, The Hague was home to 131 international institutes and agencies, employing 14.000 personnel (The Hague Municipality, 2015). The number of IOs increased from 10 in 2004 to 15 in 2010, and from 20 in 2016 to 22 in 2019 (Decisio, 2011; Decisio, 2020). Apart from many IOs, international corporations are also based in The Hague: Shell, Siemens, and T-Mobile are some examples. Another success for The Hague was the establishment of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers & Specialist Prosecutor's Office, which started in 2015 with its first trials in 2020.

5.1.1 Case 1: The International Criminal Court

The adoption of the Rome Statute of the Court marked the successful conclusion of a fifty-year struggle to establish a permanent body capable of prosecuting international crimes (Combs, 2005). The achievement was an unlikely one. When the Rome Conference opened, no important issues had been agreed upon. The Conference began with a Draft Statute that contained over 1700 sets of brackets with each bracket representing an alternative provision (Combs, 2005). In the end, compromises were reached on all those issues, and the Rome Statute was adopted in an emotional vote of 120 to 7, while 21 countries abstained from voting. Four years later the required sixty States had ratified the treaty.

The countries that showed interest to host the Court were Germany (Nuremberg), France (Lyon) and the Netherlands (The Hague). However, these countries were not actively campaigning for the sea of the International Criminal Court, as the first two countries were quite soon eliminated from the bidding process. A problem was that neither Nuremberg nor Lyon were a sea of government.

The International Criminal Court interrogates and, where justified, tries persons charged with crimes of concern to the international community: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression (CPI/ICC, 2018). Only when national courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute criminals, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction. Another option is when individual states or the UN Security Council refer cases to the court. Up until 2022, the Court indicted 45 individuals, including the Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, the Ugandan leader Joseph Kony, and the Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta. The Criminal Court's governing and foundational document is the Rome Statute. When states ratify the Rome Statute they become Member State of the Criminal Court. Thus far, there are 123 International Criminal Court member states. The following table shows the course of events for the establishment of the Criminal Court:

Table 5.1 Course of events: Establishment of the International Criminal Court

1994	The International Law Commission (ILC) completes its draft statute for a permanent International Criminal Court
1996	ILC completes its draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind.
	Germany (Nuremberg), France (Lyon) and the Netherlands (The Hague) show their interest in hosting the Court
1998	Statute of the International Criminal Court is adopted in Rome on July 17
	Rome Statute is created and signed, the decision of The Hague as its location is taken
2002	Rome Statute is ratified and enters into force, the ICC settles into former PTT Telecom building in The Hague
2003	Eighteen judges and first prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo take oath in March
2004	The Trust Fund for Victims Inaugurated. Second prosecutor takes oath
2006	Seat agreement with the Netherlands is signed

The period between the official opening of the International Criminal Court in 2002 and the signing of the seat agreement in 2006 is important to this study. In this time span, the organizational network was active in negotiations with the Court and policy network to establish the Court. This gives insights in the levels of cooperation, communication, and lobbying within the governmental networks and between them and the IO community – the first International Criminal Court-employees and the IO representatives already present in The Hague.

In 2011, just before the end of the ten years rent-free housing in 2012 a renegotiation took place between the International Criminal Court and the host government about the relocation to the permanent premises, which were not yet finished. With political help and a lobby played out in the media, the Court got funding to stay rent-free for another period of 10 years. The International Criminal Court relocated in 2015 to the *Alexanderkazerne*. These events will not be considered as I focus on the attraction, and not the retention of the IO. This study focuses on the years of the attraction and establishment of the International Criminal Court (1998-2006).

Course of events

On 1 April 1998, at the 57th meeting of the Preparatory Committee, a representative of the Netherlands declared the candidacy of The Hague for the sea of "an international criminal court" (Preparatory Committee ICC, 1998, p. 20). The UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court adopted the

Statute on 17 July 1998 (United Nations, 1998). In accordance with its article 125, the Statute was opened for signature by all States in Rome. Thereafter, it moved to Rome at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy. After that, in New York at the UN Headquarters until 31 December 2000 (Preparatory Committee ICC, 1998).

Mayor of The Hague Deetman was present at the adoption of the Treaty in Rome 15 June - July 17 in 1998. Apart from the Mayor, a limited number of actors from the municipality was invited. The other representatives were ambassadors, advisors and actors of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defense, and Justice. A few days before the decision was taken who would host the Court, Foreign Minister Hans an Mierlo hosted a reception on behalf of the Netherlands. At this reception for 120 people, mayor Deetman and Vice-Mayor Verkerk shook many hands.

The European Economic Community (EEC) had backed The Hague as host city already in a European Community meeting. In this case no voting took place as in most other location decision-making processes of IOs. It was, indeed, agreed within the European Economic Community that The Hague would be the sea of the Court as it was envisaged that the Court would take the building of the International Court of Former Yugoslavia, already running in The Hague since 1994.

The organizational network that attracted the Court was set up during the next phase of the establishment, from scratch. There was no building, no Court, there were no judges, and the host state agreement was still to be created. The Court was attracted, but much needed to be done before it could start its work. As William Pace, godfather of the Criminal Court and chairman of the coalition of non-governmental organizations described in 2001: "According to some, ratification by the required sixty countries would take ten to fifteen years, but the ratifications are coming in. Already 139 countries have signed the statute, of which 32 have now also ratified." (Vreeken, 2001). Pace was right; the number of the required sixty ratifications was reached within nine months. Nevertheless, the implementation was slow. As Pace went on: "We don't understand why the Netherlands' efforts are so minimal. There is still no definitive decision about where the court should be built. There is no beginning of decision-making about a temporary facility – which, incidentally, must be a fully-fledged building, where the court will be housed for five to eight years. We have no proof whatsoever that the Netherlands can do that with the current planning. (Vreeken, 2001)" As a result of "various publications in the media on the preparation of the accommodation of the International Criminal Court", a counselor raised questions in writing. The Mayor and his secretariat answered. Most questions were about the accommodation of the Court. One of the councilor's questions important to this study was: "How is the municipality of The Hague involved in the preparation of the accommodation of the International Criminal Court in The Hague?" (City Council of The Hague, 2001). The answer was as follows:

> *"In the same way that the municipality of The Hague was involved in the acquisition activities that preceded the allocation of the International Criminal Court to The Hague in the Statute in 1998, the municipality of The Hague is involved in the realization of the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Naturally, the center of gravity of the activities lies with the [national] government, which in appropriate forums consults with the parties involved in the establishment of the International Criminal Court. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice have used the period since the signing of the treaty to organize two things:*
> - *Determining the location where the International Criminal Court will be definitively established.*
> - *Taking care of the interim housing for the starting International Criminal Court organization, which will eventually transfer to the final housing" (City Council of The Hague, 2001).*

This answer is interesting because it shows several things: the municipality worked closely together with the Foreign and Justice Ministries in the acquisition of the International Criminal Court as well as in its establishment – and the center of gravity laid with the national government.

Attracting the International Criminal Court: the playing field and its players
The European Community played a role in the development of the International Criminal Court through the support and funding of Non-Governmental Organizations. More importantly, within the European Community discussions arose about the location of the Court and many member states expressed their preference for The Hague. It might have been of importance that the Dutch just ended their Presidency of the Council of the EU (Van Keulen & Rood, 2003). At the plenary meetings in Rome, when the Statute was being discussed, for example Ms. Johnson, representative of Norway, said "the seat should be in The Hague" (United Nations, 1998, p. 65). The United Kingdom's representative, Mr. Lloyd, said: "The Conference should consider favorably the offer of the Government of the Netherlands to host the Court in The Hague" (United Nations, 1998, pp. 66-67). Other states outside the European Community addressed the issue as well at the Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of 'an International Criminal Court' such as the observer of the delegate of Ukraine, Mr. Tatsiy, who agreed that the "Court should be located in The Hague" (United Nations, 1998, p. 85).

Foreign Minister Van Mierlo endorsed – on behalf of the Government of the Netherlands – the statement of the UK and said that his country was in favor of the establishment of 'an' international criminal court with strong institutional and organizational links with the United Nations. The Netherlands supported the system for the exercise of jurisdiction by the court and did not want the court to rely on the ad hoc consent from states.[22] The Foreign Minister assured the Conference that the Netherlands would do everything to be a worthy host to the court.

The International Criminal Court Success Measures (The Hague)

The first type success as fact can be coined a factual success: The host city of The Hague was decided upon as location and this happened overwhelmingly. The pre-stage of attracting the International Criminal Court started in 1994 with the draft statute for a permanent international court. The International Law Commission sent out a *Request for Proposals* (Stage 1); Nuremberg, Lyon and The Hague reacted with a letter of intent (Stage 2). The process of signing the Statute took place in 1997 (Stage 3), the preparations for the campaigns were already well under way. The Statute was adopted in 1998, and with that adoption, the location was decided upon (Stage 4).

Figure 5.1 First success type for The Hague's successful case: Criminal Court



Stage 1: Letters of intent 1996 > Stage 2: three candidates > Stage 3: signing phase > Stage 4: Adoption Rome Statute 1998

The second type of success was a 'perceived success'. The Court was easily attracted but difficult to establish. The organizational network establishing the Court was in great difficulties to get hold of resources, a building and support. "The Foreign Ministry had no money", said the former Mayor of The Hague. He discussed the requirements for the Court building with the municipality of The Hague, but there was a problem with resources when the building would be at the *Alexander Kazerne* in Scheveningen. "I called the Prime Minister, Jan Peter Balkenende", the former Mayor said, "and addressed him as a Christian Democratic Party member, I said we couldn't moan about a piece of land while building an institution bringing peace worldwide. The next Council of Ministers sealed the deal. Defense received its money, [the Ministry of] Finance paid for it. There was a rental structure for ten years" (Interview B41.56). The ambassador to the UN in New York also considered the campaign a success: "It was in article 3 of the Rome Statute; the seat of the Court. (…) We spoke about why The Hague was the best place – and did not know exactly which other countries and cities were interested. (…) A kind of package emerged; a task force was intensely involved in the negotiations between diplomatic departments in The Hague. A bid-book was made" (Interview B42.57). This quote shows that most respondents of the organizational network attracting and establishing the Criminal Court referred to the process as a success.

22 In the end, states can make their own decision to recognize the International Criminal Court. As is well known, the United States, among others, do not recognize the ICC.

Figure 5.2 Second success type for The Hague's successful case: Criminal Court



Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Success > Perceived Success

5.1.2 Case 2: UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships

The UN General Assembly created the International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) on 11 December 1946 to provide healthcare and emergency food to children in countries destroyed by World War II. Seven years later, the UN System adopted UNICEF as a permanent UN arm. UNICEF is headquartered in New York and has several divisions, of which seven are Headquarters Offices. These include the Regional Office for Europe in Geneva, the Supply Division in Copenhagen, the Global Shared Service Center in Budapest, and the Innocenti Research Centre in Florence. The others are the Office for Japan in Tokyo, the Brussels, and Seoul Office in the Republic of Korea. UNICEF reports to its Executive Board to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) which reports to the UN General Assembly (UNICEF, 2017; UN System, 2020).

The Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division is part of the Regional Office for Europe in Geneva. It focuses on UNICEF's work with the private sector. The main tasks of the division are fundraising, engagement and advocacy for children by coordinating fundraising activities and private sector partnerships and engagement for the organization. UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships provided support to 34 National Committees and 21 country offices with structured private sector fundraising activities, as well as many other country offices engaging with the private sector to deliver on the child rights agenda (United Nations Children's Fund, 2016). In the years 2012-2014, the Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division was troubled with negative figures. It was offered a beneficial seat agreement (and a building) by Denmark. The prices in Geneva had gone up, the number of flights decreased, and many employees lived in France (Interview B18.29).

After Denmark made a pitch in 2010 when a new building for UN departments (the UN CITY in Copenhagen) was nearly finished, the Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division started to work on a feasibility study comparing European cities. As part of this process the advantages and disadvantages of the locations of UNICEF operations were being considered. The aim for UNICEF was to explore several options, which would offer efficiency gains and cost savings for the organization. They listed cities and compared their travel hubs, train links and other logistical considerations. The long list changed in a short list and several countries started to make offers; Hungary and the Netherlands followed Denmark. The cities of Copenhagen and The Hague became serious options for UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships. After informal discussions with Denmark and the Netherlands, a UNICEF Division delegation visited Copenhagen and The Hague, and several formal letters went back and forth. The move of the Division would include 170 staff and 40 locally recruited staff members.

An element that might have influenced the serious consideration of UNICEF, was the move of the UNHCR Division of Private Fundraising and Engagement from London to Copenhagen in 2014.[23] The process of this move was already in motion. The UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division was asked by its surroundings: "if they could do it, why couldn't you?" The Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division received the Dutch offer by e-mail in January 2014 and provisional requests were done. The Private Fundraising and Partnerships requested upfront payments for moving staff and their families, and when the Netherlands could not offer these, two bidders remained: Switzerland and Denmark. In November 2014, the Swiss won the bid, and the Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division stayed in Geneva.

Table 5.2 Course of events: The possible relocation of the UNICEF Private Fundraising

2010	Pitch of Denmark to host the UNICEF PFP – before the opening of the UN CITY building
2011	Feasibility long study of UNICEF PFP with European cities and their travel hubs, train links, logistical considerations
2012	Creation of a short list of cities
2013	Letter from UNICEF to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August
2014	Hungarian offer to host UNICEF PFP in Budapest
2014	Visit of UNICEF PFP delegation to Copenhagen, January
2014	Visit of UNICEF PFP delegation to The Hague, January
2014	extra requests from UNICEF PFP declined, September
2014	decision between Swiss and Danish offer, October
2014	Final decision of UNICEF to stay in Geneva, November

Course of events

It was August 23 in 2013 when the initial letter of the Executive Director of UNICEF Martin Mogwanja arrived at the desk of the Ambassador IOs at the Foreign Ministry. The initial letter issued the possible relocation of a part of UNICEF headquarters operations based in Geneva and identified the Netherlands as a focal point (UNICEF, Deputy Executive Director, 2013). The positive response of the Netherlands came four days later. In December, Mogwanja's letter arrived from New York. He wrote to "continue

23 In January 2016 this UNHCR Division moved back to London.

the collaboration and exploratory process UNICEF was undertaking" (UNICEF, Deputy Executive Director, 2013). "UNICEF is undertaking, like many UN agencies," he stated, "a comprehensive review of the efficiency and effectiveness of operations at the global level, to ensure that resources are used as efficiently as possible, and that the organization is best structured to deliver programs to advance the rights of children around the world" (UNICEF, Deputy Executive Director, 2013). Attached to the letter was an indicative list of information of their interest, including UN immunities and privileges, Security, Facilities, Financial, and Local diversity, and services. After the visit of the delegation to The Hague, the Dutch government underlined that the Netherlands was eager to ensure that the process was transparent, and they wished to maintain its good relations with the Swiss government. A second request of UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships arrived by telephone to cover upfront costs 'in cash' (€10 million). Despite the increased budget in the bid (the rent contribution could be converted to a fixed amount in advance) this recruitment was unsuccessful (IOB, 2018).

Attracting Private Fundraising and Partnerships to The Hague: the playing field and its players

In the Netherlands, the Ambassador of IOs was the main actor involved in the attraction process of UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships. Besides, the Foreign Ministry Directorate, the Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN in New York was involved. Another important actor was the Multilateral Institutions and Human Rights Directorate (DMM) of the Foreign Ministry. Competitors actively attracting the Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division were the Foreign Ministry of Denmark and the Swiss Federal Department.

The UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships Success Measures (The Hague)

The first type of success as fact was a moderate factual failure. The process started with the pre-stage: a Danish pitch for the Fund in 2010. Consequently, the Private Fundraising and Partnerships conducted a study on new possible host states and shortlisted The Netherlands, Hungary, Denmark, and their host state Switzerland in 2012 (Stage 1). A year later, the Division sent a letter to the Dutch Foreign Ministry. In 2014, Hungary showed interest as well in hosting the Division. Hungary did however not meet the criteria and dropped out (Stage 2). Later that year, the Private Fundraising and Partnerships delegation visited Copenhagen, The Hague and requested extra information. The extra resources 'in cash' for making the move was, however, declined by the Dutch government (Stage 3). In the fourth stage, only the Swiss and Danish governments were in the in the bidding game. The UNICEF Division, after several reviews under the own work force, decided to stay in Geneva in October 2014 (Stage 4). The following Figure depicts the stage where The Netherlands was rejected as a host after Stage 2.

Figure 5.3 First success type for The Hague’s failed case: UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships



Stage 1: Short list > Stage 2: letter of PFP to Dutch MFA > Stage 3: MFA declines extra requests > Stage 4: Geneva wins

For the second type of perceived success this case was a ‘perceived failure’. Most respondents were negative about the process. The organizational network was under time pressure and the Directorate Multilateral Relations was executing the bid, instead of the department of the Ambassador of IOs, which some considered a failure. Another problem was the lack of conviction: “The question was: to what extent was this serious, and to what extent did they want to be better positioned in Geneva?” (Interview B15.25). The Netherlands could offer 10 years of rent. The former Mayor of The Hague thought the Dutch offer was good and well arranged, but that the management of the Partnership “Did not break through. A short-sighted decision, in my opinion” (Van Aartsen, 2019). An organizational network member thought the offer was insufficient: “We did not have buildings on offer as a municipality, but the national building agency did. (…) Either you keep them empty, and you lose, or you house a UN institution, and you break even. Somehow it doesn’t work that way in the Netherlands” (Interview B25.40). A combination of negligence and insolubility on the government side and short-sightedness on the side of the Private Fundraising and Partnerships predominated according to those involved.

Figure 5.4 Second success type for The Hague’s failed case: UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships

Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Success > Perceived Success

5.2 Instrumental perspective

Instrumental explanation The Hague’s successful case

Where in 1985 a policy evaluation document questioned whether the contribution to the United Nations could be stopped[24], such an attitude was unimaginable a few years later. In 1988 a first host state policy was formulated, underlining the importance of the acquisition, and welcoming of IOs. This was the Fourth Spatial Planning Memorandum

24 The IOB evaluation report stated: “The Netherlands would ridicule itself completely in the international community by withdrawing or terminating a contribution (which, incidentally, is compulsory). The employment of a number of international civil servants of Dutch nationality working at UN level (around 700) would be threatened.” (IOB, 1985, p. 91).

of 1988, that had a paragraph on the "increasing competition on a European and global scale" (Tweede Kamer, 1988, p. 112). It claimed about the government city that "The Hague has good opportunities to attract more IOs and companies and has a residential environment and facilities that meet international standards" (Tweede Kamer, 1988, p. 114).

Host policy goals 2000

The first host policy document highlighted three important location factors: international schools, accessibility and a metropolitan environment combined with recreational areas. After the establishment of the Yugoslavia Tribunal (1993) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague (1998), internationals criticized the way the Netherlands hosted them. Bottlenecks were the incompleteness and timeliness of information about policy developments that had an impact (IOB, 2002). Besides, a dissatisfaction grew about the differences in tax privileges and issues such as infrastructure facilities (hotel and conference capacity, international schools, medical facilities), visa issuance and residence rights. The goals in keywords consisted of 'International urban business environment, accessibility and diversity'.

Nation branding goals 2000

Since 1988, the promotion of respect for human rights was called a cornerstone or the 'main pillar' of Dutch foreign policy, based on the document *Human Rights and Foreign Policy* (1979). Until 2000, spatial economic policy in the Netherlands consisted mainly of equity or equalization to reduce the differences in prosperity between regions. Nation branding of the Netherlands developed more since the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs founded the Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency (NFIA), an operational unit to assist foreign companies to establish their business in the Netherlands and to take advantage of the Dutch business environment. It was, at the time, positioned as a job machine. The idea that foreign companies are good for the economic dynamics and competitiveness of the Netherlands was a guiding principle. The NFIA worked most intensively on branding the Netherlands for foreign investments. The goals were to focus on a "business climate, innovation knowledge industry and technology" (House of Representatives, 1988).

City marketing goals 2000

Project 'The Hague 2025' was a foundation for the policy program of 1998-2000 which was linked to the brand of The Hague (The Hague Municipality, 1997). This vision of the future for the city was focused on 'City of residence by the sea', and 'International city of law and administration'. Two conditions were clean and safe, accessible, and economy. One of the five areas of the city were highlighted to improve was 'The Hague, globally and locally'. This theme was about the diversity (more than 60 nationalities) and it stressed the importance of the EU for the City: "It is important for The Hague that the European Union will develop further and that the city and region The Hague/ Haaglanden will become an important identification point" (The Hague Municipality, 1997, p. 6). In the policy program of 1998-2000 the policy goals were to "tackle the city's recovery, both financially, socially and economically" (The Hague Municipality, 1998, p. 5). Furthermore, to "invest in society, livability, social security, youth, the relationship with the city (relational governance), in the cultural climate, and the municipal organization. Strengthening the economy in The Hague and combating unemployment were "spearheads of municipal policy for the coming period" (The Hague Municipality, 1998, p. 8). No further mention was made of IOs.

Bid for the International Criminal Court (1998)
The bid for the International Criminal Court, 'A Bid for Justice', was finished in the spring of 1998. The Foreign Ministry and the municipality of The Hague worked closely together on the formulation of the bid. It was beautifully designed and edited in English and French. Behind the azure cover with a Lady Justice in a green tile, it showed two introductions of Foreign Minister Van Mierlo and Mayor Deetman. The bid consisted of five chapters. In the first, The Netherlands was mentioned as "home-from-home for diplomats"; the legacy of Hugo Grotius" *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* is mentioned as "the first modern treatise on the waging of war and the laws and regulations governing warfare" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Municipality of The Hague, 1998, p. 4). It mentioned the Dutch efforts in the field of development aid, "the Netherlands being one of the few countries exceeding the UN target for official development aid of 0.7% of GNP" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Municipality of The Hague, 1998, p. 6). Finally, the first chapter mentioned The Hague as a center for international law studies and the experience of the city as host to international courts and tribunals, which makes the Hague "the prime candidate for the seat of the International Criminal Court" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Municipality of The Hague, 1998, p. 6).

The second chapter promised suitable premises conforming to the standards of the Dutch building code: 10 years rent-free from the date on which the Statute enters into force. At the end of the period the Court "may rent its premises, tax-free, at the prevailing market rates", it said (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Municipality of The Hague, 1998, p. 14). The bid offered detention facilities "in the vicinity of the Court's main building" and guaranteed the protection of employees, persons held by order of the Court, and victims and witnesses called to testify before the Court.

In the third to fifth chapters presented The Hague as a city to work and live in and to enjoy. The city as seat of the government, the Queen's residence, parliament buildings and the multilingual staff passed in review. A table showed the Netherlands as the most multilingual country (79 % English, 23 % French, and 66 % German), compared to Germany, Austria, and France. The accessibility and the number of hotels and rooms were mentioned. The coastal dunes, tree-lined avenues, peaceful suburbs and stretches of open countryside were promoted, The Hague was portrayed as one of the most scenic cities in Europe. Housing prices in The Hague and Amsterdam were compared in a table with those in Rome, Milan, Bonn, Frankfurt, Geneva, Vienna, and New York (The Hague's prices were lowest). Cable television was mentioned, as well as the excellent medical care in The Hague: "Ten hospitals in the city and its environs provide medical service of the highest standard. Everyone is entitled to hospital treatment" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Municipality of The Hague, 1998, p. 24). The last part described leisure activities in The Hague, Rotterdam, Utrecht, and Amsterdam, especially museums, orchestras, and The Hague's annual North Sea Jazz festival (which later moved to Rotterdam).

Table 5.3 Alignment between policies and bid for the International Criminal Court

ICC bid	**Host policy**	**Nation branding – spatial economic policy**	**City Marketing – local economic policy**	**Policy alignment**
Goals in keywords / Elements in the ICC bid	International urban business environment, accessibility and diversity	focusing on a business climate, innovation knowledge industry, technology	Invest in society, livability, social security, youth, the relationship with the city	The following elements from the ICC bid showed alignment on the *depth of information* dimension:
1. Democracy, diplomacy and rule of law	government promotes development of inter-national legal order	-	'International city of law and administration'	'The Netherlands: Democracy, the Rule of Law', **Aligned with one policy**
2. International climate	International urban business environment	Innovation and competitiveness in regional clusters	International city of law and administration	'The Hague as a center for international law studies **Aligned with two policies**
3. Cultural diversity	Presence of many and diverse IOs	-	The Hague, globally and locally	'Most multilingual country' **No alignment**
4. Judicial capital	-	-	International city of law and administration	'The Hague: Judicial Capital' **No alignment**
5. City of Justice	-	-	International city of law and administration	'The Hague: a Bid for Justice' **No alignment**

ICC bid	Host policy	Nation branding – spatial economic policy	City Marketing – local economic policy	Policy alignment
6. City to work in	International urban business environment	Focus on business climate, innovation knowledge industry, technology	Invest in society, livability, social security	'multilingual staff easily recruited in and around The Hague' **Fully aligned**
7. City to live in	Maintaining and strengthening the spatial diversity	Improve the attractiveness of the Netherlands	Invest in society, livability, social security	'The Hague: A city to live in' **Fully aligned**
8. City to enjoy	-	-	participation of residents, companies and organizations	'leisure activities in The Hague' **Aligned with one policy**
9. Accessibility	Improving accessibility	achieve an excellent business climate and accessibility	The Hague: clean and safe, accessible and better economy	'Accessibility and the number of hotels and hotel rooms' **Fully aligned**
10. Economy	International urban business environment	Improve attractiveness of the Netherlands by focusing on a business climate, innovation knowledge industry, technology	Invest in society, livability, social security, youth, the relationship with the city	'Facts and figures', the Netherlands and The Hague are laid out in two tables, covering geography, demography and economy' **Fully aligned**

Categorical concurrence
Five fields were highlighted in the bid and visible in all the other policies: the international climate, city to work in, livability, accessibility, and a focus on the economy in a broader sense. Two elements, 'democracy and rule of law' and 'cultural diversity', were reflected in two other policies, and the other three were only aligned with one other policy. City marketing goals showed the highest overlap with the bid, although the term 'city marketing' is overrated. It took until 2004 to promote The Hague as the 'City of Justice and Peace' (The Hague Municipality, 2004). During the campaign for the International Criminal Court, none of the policies focusing on the 'City of Justice' as proposed in the bid. The project 'The Hague 2025' the municipality proposed in 1997 did mention the "International city of law and administration", but The Hague as "Legal capital of the world" had not yet penetrated in the municipal policy, which was more directed at a "relationship of trust between city and administration". The international climate of the city only came off the ground after the turn of the next millennium. The categorical concurrence was high, 73 percent or 22 of the 30 boxes were filled (See Table 5.3).

Depth of information

When looking at how the policy goals elaborated on the elements in the bid, the alignment was coined 'average'. Although the city marketing goals showed alignment with the bid, the solidness was thin: 'International city of law and administration' was not a goal elaborated upon. The same applies to the goal of 'cultural diversity' in the bid: It was aligned with the host policy (Presence of many and diverse IOs) and city marketing (The Hague, globally and locally) but very limited. The following goals did align with the other policies: 'city to work in', 'city to live in', 'economy' and 'accessibility', as well in number as substance. The second step of alignment was only 53 percent or 16 of the 30 boxes.

Surprisingly, although this case showed the highest possible success measures, the alignment between the host and branding policies and the bid for the Court were only average. This result does not support the alignment expectation.

Perception of host policy and support The Hague's successful case

The second half of the perspective discusses perception of host policy and support of the IO representatives in the city (N=13). While discussing the perception of the branding polices (visibility and effectiveness), the rules and regulations and the conditions for international employees (level education and expertise labor force, level of English and French, competitiveness), I make a distinction between the cases in the host city.

Perception of branding policies

The Hague being the 'Capital of Peace and Justice' was evident to most internationals. One OPCW employee stated: "The Hague has a very specific particular brand. (…) What the city does well: it is really geared for IOs, the city has an international feel" (Interview B44.59). About the visibility of the nation branding IO representatives were less positive. The effectiveness of branding policies was perceived higher, especially city marketing. An employee of the NGO Center of International Legal Cooperation (CILC) found that "if you want to bring an IO to a city, marketing strategies are part of it. (…) The Institute for Global Justice is a clear sign of city marketing, a brand of UN, Peace, Justice and Security. However, when ask the baker or the butcher "what The Hague stands for" that is the local football club." (Interview B49.66). The perception was coined a plus/minus because the visibility of both branding policies was rated low. The following figure depicts how the policies and conditions were rated by all IO representatives (N=13 in total).

Figure 5.5 Perception of host policy and support The Hague (N=13)



Perception of elements in the bid

One of the important elements in the bid was ‘City to work in’, which was commented on by the employees by rating the level of education and expertise of the local labor force. This came across as high, although some disadvantages also came to the fore. An NGO-employee found it: “always disappointing, compared to Eastern Europe, what the attitude of young people is. There is more a nine-to-five culture here, less passion of students. I found the level deceiving as well, in terms of languages” (Interview B49.66). When talking about the quality of universities the explanation about the rating was a bit more differentiated. One IO representative in The Hague during the International Criminal Court attraction found that there was “not a university atmosphere, as in Geneva and Vienna” (Interview B55.72). According to this actor, there was also a lack of documents in different languages. The ICP report confirms these observations (Csoti & Van Haelst, 2016, p. 16). This aspect was coined a plus/minus because these elements in the bid were perceived as average.

Perception of rules and regulations

About the rules and regulations for IOs, which could differ from tax-free cars to the ease of getting working permits or the covering of costs for education of family members, the rating was quite high (with a mean of 7,35, N=6). One member of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons found the fact that each IO had its own host agreement was sometimes confusing. Another employee found the Netherlands "not a bad host state. They help out, but that goes with a cost, which is usually quite huge" (Interview B53.70). A representative of the International Court of Justice found that the Dutch host state did not cope well with the sensibility of the people of IOs: "When you try to attract, be flexible. The Dutch are tremendously afraid to improvise. They are very strict and not able to do something not organized. That is a problem" (Interview B55.72). This aspect was coined a plus/minus as well, as the respondents reacted mixed about it.

Perception of government support
About how the complaints of the international employees were handled, I found the following. The respondents criticized the fragmented organization of the institutions working on similar themes. During the establishment of the Court, the Welcome Center in The Hague was still 'under construction', in the Municipal note of 2004, one of the goals was 'Examine the feasibility of setting up a visitor center' (The Hague Municipality, 2004). This was indeed one of the criticisms, as one of the internationals stated: "There is the X-pat desk, but it is not promoted enough. It would be useful to keep several agencies together" (Interview B53.70). About the Court more specifically, policymakers were advised to improve the protection of human rights defenders: "The Hague should organize training sessions for lawyers about international justice, for example" (B45.61). This last element was a minus, as so many aspects were commented on negatively. The expectations of this perspective did not materialize for the first case. Now let's look at the second.

Instrumental explanation The Hague's failed case
In 2001, a policy evaluation group created a framework that could streamline the decision-making procedure as well as improve hospitality, through standardization of the seat agreements (IOB, 2002, p. 14). The main bottlenecks for acquiring new IOs were housing and financing for IOs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013, p. 6). In 2005, the Dutch government advocated a hospitable and generous business climate in which departments operated efficiently and decisively. This Cabinet position marked a turning point in the host policy. More attention was paid to actively hosting and acquiring IOs. In 2008, the Dutch constitution had even been changed: Article 90; The Government shall promote the development of the international legal order" (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2008, p. 22). Most of the measures were adopted in 2007.[25] In the Netherlands, 26 of the 32 IOs accepted the equalization package, which aligned staff members with diplomats regarding tax privileges.

25 A uniform tax agreement was reached with almost all IOs, except for the Taalunie, which did not want to make a distinction between Dutch and non-Dutch employees. (Steering Group Netherlands Host Country, 2007).

Host policy goals 2013

In 2013, the host policy was renewed again. At that time the number of IOs had increased to 34 in the Netherlands. The host policy needed an update because of "increased competition from cities such as Bonn, Geneva, and Vienna and new players on the world stage, such as Qatar" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013, p. 1). The new policy goals formed 'priority and focus' on organizations in the field of peace and justice, organizations linked to established IOs, and organizations in the field of the following top sectors: water, agri & food, horticulture, high-tech systems and innovation, and logistics and energy, referring to the Top Sector Policy. The instruments described in this new policy were focused on buildings, occasional allowances, borrowing facility and a model host agreement (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013).

Nation branding goals 2013

A serious Dutch branding approach started in 2005. The Netherlands Tourism and Congress Bureau would work more intensively with the other parties such as the Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency to send one identity into the world. The policy goals key to nation branding and spatial economic policies were to improve the attractiveness of the Netherlands by focusing on a business climate, innovation knowledge industry, technology – since 1999 especially in IT (Tweede Kamer, 1999) – and accessibility and transport. In 2013, this changed, into policy goals formulated by Netherlands Tourist Bureau attracting tourists and conferences. The four brand values were: Welcoming, Holland as an easy going and hospitable country where anyone can feel at home; Colorful, Holland as an environment with a lot of diversity between landscapes and people; Inventive, Holland as a nation where necessity has led to innovation (such as water management); and Enterprising, Holland as an economic pioneer, not only in the 17th century but also at present" (NBTC, 2013). These four brand values can be seen as nation branding policy goals.

The Hague city marketing goals 2013

The Hague evolutionized into a City of Peace and Justice in the years between 2005 and 2012. Four important changes in policy mark this 'revolution'. Firstly, in 2012, the words 'Peace and Justice' were added to the city coat of arms. Secondly, the new Mayor of The Hague Jozias van Aartsen changed the focus of the city to outward looking, international city of Peace and Justice by strengthening the International Issues department (BIZ, *Bureau Internationale Zaken*). Instead of one contact person, 14 people worked at BIZ. Thirdly, The Hague Institute for Global Justice was established in 2011 as a sign of dedication of the municipality, through investing 17 million euros to make this a recognized international think tank on conflict prevention, rule of law and global governance (Municipality of The Hague, 2011).[26] Finally, The Hague International Center (THIC) was expanded and improved. Starting with two awarded National City Marketing Trophies in both 2010 and 2011, the *City Marketing Vision 2011-2015* described the brand of The Hague. First, the percentage of Dutch people thinking that The Hague was realizing its position as International City of Peace and Justice would have to rise from 21% in 2009 to 30% in 2015. Second, the percentage of residents of The Hague thinking similarly would need to rise from 33% in 2009 to 40% in 2015. Thirdly, 50% of the schools in The Hague would have to include a visit to the Peace Palace in its program (Municipality of The Hague, 2011).[27] These three can be seen as city marketing goals during the attraction of the UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division.

Bid for UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships (2013)

The offer was not a polished bid-book but consisted of three annexes to a letter through e-mail. The first was on information about the possibility of the Netherlands' hosting UNICEF, UN immunities and privileges, Security and staff wellbeing, Facilities and other related services, financial support, local diversity of population and services to UNICEF staff, medical care, and language facilities. The second was about The Hague – Some facts and figures. The third was on Cost saving potential of Private Fundraising and Partnerships offices in The Hague, as well as cost projections, financial issues, office accommodation in The Hague, international and highly qualified workforce, privileges and immunities, and a conclusion. These elements in the offer were provided on three separate moments. The first was when the organizational network had prepared the bid after the first request in December 2013. In this communication, The Hague was

26 This institute was dismantled in 2018 and failed at being an important meeting place and legal think tank internationally, but at the time it was a significant ambition of the local government to set it up.

27 For the vision of 2011-2015 the municipality made use of the Decisio studies that reported the economic benefits of the presence of IOs and NGOs in The Hague. According to the 2013 Decisio report, the economic spin-off of international institutions in The Hague would bring the local economy direct and indirect benefits of 2,7 billion euros. These effects involved 35,500 jobs (Decisio, 2011). The 2011 marketing vision used these numbers and the economic spin-off for The Hague as starting point (Municipality of The Hague, 2011).

positioned as City of Peace and Justice. The long history of The Hague in the field of peace and justice was highlighted, from 1899 when the First Peace Conference was held. The Peace Palace and the International Court of Justice – “the only UN organ not headquartered in New York” – were mentioned as well. It said that the Dutch government was eager to maintain and develop its country’s status. It mentioned The Hague International Zone, and article 90 of the Dutch constitution, which gave the government the task of promoting the development of the international legal order. In the part on ‘UNICEF and The Hague’ the bid explained that in The Hague many organizations help building a world of justice for all. The accessibility, education and childcare in The Hague highlighted the short distance to the international airport, the distances in time of important hubs in Europe by train, the (highest) concentration of international schools in the Netherlands, the University college of Leiden University and the nearness of Technical University of Delft and the Erasmus University Rotterdam.

The second moment was when the additional information was provided on 2 July 2014. Referring to the visit on 11 June 2014 and the additional questions on the potential cost savings from establishing the offices in The Hague, the letter provided information on Cost saving potential, Cost projections (with information on payroll costs), Financial issues – with one-time costs and set-up costs, recurrent costs, and indemnity costs. About the indemnity costs, the Ambassador of IOs could note that the Ministry was not in the position to fund these costs separately, as “the Netherlands already made a considerable contribution to the separation and termination liabilities fund indirectly” (Ambassador IOs, 2014, Letter 2 July). The third moment was after the Division requested to receive up-front costs for the moving of its offices. In the final offer of 24 July, the Ambassador for IOs answered that the upfront costs ‘in cash’ were difficult to provide, but that there was a possibility of a rent-free period of 10 years, and that other resources were made available in 2015. For more financial options, approval “was needed of both the Municipal Executive and the Municipal Council” (Ambassador International Organizations, 2014, p. Letter 24 July). Annex 3 consisted of pictures of the future office building for UNICEF in The Hague, a map of the International District, and some facts and figures about the Cost of Living in The Hague. With these facts and figures, some mention was made of the competitive edge of The Hague. It quoted two representatives of organizations that changed their location from Copenhagen to The Hague.

Categorical concurrence

The categorical concurrence between the elements in the bid and the policy goals was 55 percent or 20 of the 36 boxes. Of the twelve elements in the bid for the Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division three elements were fully aligned with the other policies: 'Security and staff wellbeing', 'Facilities and other related services', and 'Internationally high qualified workforce'. Five of the elements were aligned with two other policies, three with only one policy and two others with none of the policies (Language facilities and Accessibility). The alignment between the host state policy and the bid was greater than the overlap with the city marketing and nation branding. Noteworthily, the host policy and city marketing goals were most aligned with the bid. For instance, the host policy focused on the acquisition of organizations in the field of peace and justice and some of the top sectors, as did the nation branding. The host policy mentioned hospitability; nation-branding policy did as well. City marketing goals were focused on a better participation with its citizens in radiating the same international and peace and justice vibe. The categorical concurrence between the elements in the bid and the policy goals was 55 percent or 20 of the 36 boxes (Table 5.4).

Depth of information

The policy elements elaborated upon was a little lower than the simple 'mentions': 53 percent or 19 of the 36 boxes, which was coined an 'average alignment'. The alignment was visible between the bid and the host state policy, on the immunities and privileges, security and staff wellbeing, facilities, financial support, and four others. Of the twelve goals in the bids, three overlapped with all the other policy goals. The goals in the bid that aligned with the other policies were firmly rooted in the host policies, in the city marketing (facilities, participation of locals, quality experience and international city of peace and justice) and less in the nation branding (hospitability, financial injections and a highly qualified international work force). The elements with no elaboration in the policy goals were 'medical care', 'language facilities and 'accessibility'. The element with only one elaboration in the host policy goals was 'financial support'.

The alignment was not differing significantly from the last case, although this IO was attracted 15 years later. This is striking because one would expect different outcomes with the rapid policy changes.

Table 5.4 Alignment between policies and bid for the UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships

UNICEF PFP bid	Host policy	Nation branding	City Marketing	Policy alignment
Goals in keywords / Elements in the bid for the UNICEF PFP:	recruitment of a new IOs based on thorough preparation in an interdepartmental context, good hospitality, uniform and equal treatment of IO employees	Welcoming, Holland as an easy going and hospitable country where anyone can feel at home; Colorful, Holland as an environment with a lot of diversity.	International City of Peace and Justice, Quality experience, *Hagenaars* participate, Together with the city and Communication.	The following elements from the UNICEF PFP bid showed alignment on the *depth of information* dimension:
1. UN immunities and privileges	Good hospitality, uniform treatment of IOs	-	-	'UN immunities and privileges' **Aligned with one policy**
2. Security and staff wellbeing	field of peace and justice, orgs linked to already established IOs	Holland as an easy going and hospitable country	The Hague International Center (THIC)	'Good living environment for their staff' **Fully aligned**
3. Facilities and other related services	Good hospitality, uniform treatment of IOs	Welcoming, hospitable country	The Hague International Center (THIC)	'Services offered to these orgs and staffs' **Fully aligned**
4. Financial support	A uniform tax agreement	-	-	'financial support' **Aligned with one policy**
5. Local diversity of population and services	-	Hospitable country, diversity	*Hagenaars* participate	'Local diversity' **Aligned with two policies**
6. Medical care	-	'Life Sciences & Health'	-	'A good living for their staff' **No alignment**
7. Language facilities	-	-	-	'A good living for staff' **No alignment**
8. City of Peace and Justice	Priority and focus on peace and justice	-	'International City of Peace and Justice'	'Peace and Justice' **Alignment with two policies**
9. Accessibility	-	-	-	'The accessibility, in Europe by train' **No alignment**
10. Office accommodation	good hospitality	-	Quality experience	'A possibility of a rent-free period **Alignment with two policies**

UNICEF PFP bid	Host policy	Nation branding	City Marketing	Policy alignment
11. Cost saving potential	Cost saving	A financial injection	-	'resources available in 2015' **Alignment with two policies**
12. Internationally high qualified workforce	Top sectors	Cabinet of Rutte I reserved 7 billion	'Quality experience'	'Promoting the development of the legal order' **Fully aligned**

Perception of host policy and support The Hague's failed case

Perception of branding policies

When looking at the policy perception and support, one sees an ambivalent image in 2014 The Hague. One international said: "The Dutch are leaders in technology, they could be bolder in promoting that". This representative found it strange that the Netherlands was not more focused on the UN Environment Program: "because arguably the Dutch are dealing with a lot of climate-related issues. Master's degrees are devoted to water management. This is not present here. In terms of knowledge sharing, it would make sense" (Interview B57.74). About the city marketing the representatives were a bit more positive: "I see a growth in the security topic, the security summit helped," said the same respondent, referring to the Nuclear Security Summit in March 2014, when 84 world leaders came to visit The Hague.

The effectiveness of both branding policies was rated higher than their visibility. A member of the International Community Platform was critical about the city marketing: "The target group should be reached more effectively. The encouraging thing is, we actually have it all here" (Interview B44.60). These issues are also among the conclusions of their annual research, where they suggested that "the existing brands in the region [should be] profiled in a coherent manner" (Csoti & Van Haelst, 2016, p. 32). When talking about the nation branding effectiveness the image was that the Netherlands could put more effort in the endeavor. This ambivalence in responses led to a plus/minus for the perception of the branding policies.

Perception of elements in the bid

When talking about the quality of universities and the level of education and expertise of the labor force, the internationals were quite positive. They found that the labor force in The Hague was "highly educated but shortened on a number of aspects: on technology, but also in other areas" (Interview B44.60). What another IO employee found was that "when it comes to attracting talents, the families of the talents are important (…) The soft aspects are being looked at more: partner schools, healthcare, culture, housing, as it turns out" (Interview B44.60). This was the experience for more employees in the period when the Division was attracted. The perception of the level of English in The Hague was mixed. Although most representatives were generally positive about it, two of the representatives found these qualities "heavily overrated: the Dutch always show a lack of languages" (Interview B50.67). The perception of elements in the bid was predominantly positive and was therefore coined a plus.

Perception of rules and regulations

Concerning the rules and regulations, one NGO employee thought the governmental bodies 'responding quickly'. The rules and regulations for IOs were seen as well-organized since there were more social events for the international community. Since 2009, The Hague International Spirit started, a mission to intensify the interaction between local, political, business, and educational institutions and the international community. They tried to meet the needs of the diplomatic corps in The Hague (The Hague International Spirit, 2009). One of the IO representatives said about this mission that the Dutch: "…do not know the international segment very well; it is due to hesitation, but also to envy. The expats are not viewed entirely positively, it is seen as an elitist thing. It clashes culturally with the egalitarian system. (…) Internationals have different [higher] expectations of services than the Dutch (Interview B44.60). Because of the hesitation and mixed answers, this element was considered a plus/minus.

Perception of government support

Some persistent policy issues played a role as obstacles to the work of international staff: healthcare, housing, and public transport. Respondents experienced problems in the support to their work. One international employee thought the "hospitals and healthcare should be changed, but the one-stop-shop is well-organized, especially digitally" (Interview B51.68). The International Community Platform concluded that, with a score of 6,8 on the perceived quality of life-career ratings, international talent "might consider opportunities elsewhere or not even opt for The Netherlands at all" (Csoti & Van Haelst, 2016, pp. 13-14). Another employee found that the focus should be more on international staff: "The encouraging thing is that it is all present, but in terms of marketing they are not focused on this target group. Much can be achieved with little pragmatic steps (…) such as connecting students with IOs" (Interview B44.59). One of the respondents found the support in finding a house badly organized: "I lost a lot of money in finding our house, it's much better to have a Dutch broker. I wish someone had told me that before [moving to the Netherlands]" (Interview B53.70). This element was considered a minus, because the recognition of the Dutch support systems was predominantly negative.

Conclusion

The findings of policy alignment show, again, that the alignment between the goals and the bid was lower in the successful case than in the failed case, which was not as expected. Surprisingly, the findings do not support the policy perception expectation either. In the time frame the Criminal Court was attracted, the international employees were less enthusiastic about their host country and host city than in the second UNICEF case.

5.3 Discursive perspective

Discursive explanation The Hague's successful case

Organizational network's priorities and narratives successful case
Of the list the respondents could pick, the highest priorities of the organizational network attracting the Court (N=12) were relevant centers, security, physical infrastructure, and taxes. The Mayor of The Hague, Wim Deetman, detected three reasons why The Hague was the most logical location to establish the International Criminal Court. The first was because Secretary General of the UN Boutros-Ghali had called The Hague 'the legal center of the UN' – with The Hague bluff we transformed what he said into, 'legal capital of the world' (Voorhoeve, 2011). The second was that the developing countries were in favor of The Hague as the location of the International Criminal Court, because many had their education at The Institute of Social Studies in The Hague. The third reason was that former communist countries backed The Hague. The Permanent Representative for the Netherlands to the UN in New York said, referring to relevant centers: "The Hague was the legal capital of the world with the International Court of Justice, and the international law tradition played a major role in the negotiations" (Interview B42.57). Another narrative consisted of good infrastructure: respondents often mentioned Schiphol and Rotterdam – The Hague Airport.

Policy network's priorities and narratives both cases
For the policy network (n=38, both cases) the narratives were concentrated on relevant centers and physical infrastructure. Most of the respondents referred to The Hague as legal capital and strengthening the *brand* of the city. About the physical infrastructure an element significantly higher than others,[28] a network member explained: "IOs also look at good housing, financial arrangements, and the package of tax privileges and immunities" (Interview B10.16). Finally, the focus on international schools is noteworthy. There was quite some mention on the importance of schools and educational facilities.

28 Within the policy network (N=38) there was a significant difference in ranking of the elements, as found with the Friedman test, X2 (38) = 125.9, $p < .01$. Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was conducted with a Bonferroni correction, resulting in a significance level set at $p < 0.003$.

Comparison between organizational and policy network successful case
The following figure shows the overlap of the means of the top five priorities between the organizational network and the policy network (5 was highest, 1 lowest of the top 5). The only element differing in the top priorities was physical infrastructure for the organizational network and the higher prioritized international schools for the policy network. In the narratives, the differences were in the physical infrastructure.

Figure 5.6 International Criminal Court: priorities governmental groups



Priorities and narratives IO representatives
For the IO representatives (N=13, both cases) the highest priorities were security, settling in and taxes. The group rated security significantly higher than the other groups in The Hague.[29] It was often mentioned in relation to the establishment of the International Criminal Court, of which an employee said, "The Court is threatened; we need better protection of human rights defenders" (Interview B45.62). Yet another respondent explained: "Security is important. To attract good foreign talent, even if you don't offer reasonable salaries, a crime density is a much bigger turnoff. Hospitals and healthcare are also crucial as this is not something that an IO can correct; we are dependent" (Interview

29 This was found with a Kruskal-Wallis H test: $H(3) = 8.89$, $\rho < .05$.

B56.73). This was also an element present in the literature about the attractiveness of The Hague. The medical facilities are often mentioned as many complaints were issued about this (Csoti & Van Haelst, 2016).

Comparison organizational network and IOs successful case

The following figure shows the overlaps between the organizational network and the IO representatives. It shows that the security element was prioritized higher by the IOs. The overlaps were mainly found in the settling in and relevant centers.

Figure 5.7 International Criminal Court: organizational network and internationals



Discursive explanation The Hague's failed case

Priorities and narratives organizational network

The organizational network attracting the UNICEF-Division (N=5) highlighted taxes in priorities and narratives, as they were negotiating about the financial requirements. One of the leaders of the group explained that the important elements were premises, conference facilities, privileges and immunities, and budget and organization. The narrative around tax issues was also about the harsh negotiation method of the UNICEF

Division. Many believed that the Division was trying to put pressure on its own government with this attempted move. Another strong narrative I found in settling in which was mentioned in combination with living is easy. Linked to the case some found that the living conditions were great but that the negotiations were foremost about the rent-free building.

Comparison organizational and policy network

Figure 5.8 shows the priorities of the organizational and policy network. The overlap was quite low, and taxes was significantly higher for the organizational network.[30] A difference between the organizational network and the policy network was the importance of relevant centers to the policy network, and the lack of importance to the organizational network. An overlap between the organizational network attracting UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships and the policy network was a focus on physical infrastructure and international schools of both groups.

Figure 5.8 UNICEF Private Fundraising: priorities governmental groups



30 A Kruskal Wallis H Test showed this: H(3) = 8,89, ρ = 0,031.

Comparison organizational network and international representatives
Whereas the organizational network prioritized taxes highest, the international representatives prioritized security as most important element. This was also the main difference between the two groups, in priorities and narratives. Another difference I found in the importance of digital infrastructure to the international representatives, as opposed to the organizational network who gave less priority to this. In the following figure, the differences are more visible than the overlaps.

Figure 5.9 UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships: priorities organizational network and internationals



Comparing the priorities of all groups with correlation coefficients
The following table shows that the overlap in priorities in Kendall's tau-b between the successful International Criminal Court organizational network was higher with the policy network and the IO representatives than the failed UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships organizational network. The N is the number of locational elements with which the groups were overlapping with their rating (of the 22 locational elements, four were never mentioned in the top 5). The overlap between the groups was high.

Table 5.5 Correlations failed and successful groups on prioritizing locational elements The Hague

	Policy network	**International Organizations**
International Criminal Court Organizational network (success)	0.76**	0.73*
UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships organizational network (fail)	0.55**	0.55**

N=18. * p <.05, ** p <.01. Based on 2-tailed Kendall's tau-b.

Conclusion

The table shows that the correlations between rankings of the International Criminal Court-organizational network and the policy network and the internationals are higher than those between the failed UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division organizational network and the other two groups. The narratives have shown that the overlaps were higher in the successful case as well.

5.4 Relational perspective

Relational explanation The Hague's successful case

Level of network cooperation successful case The Hague

The organizational network was led by a Network Administrative Organization, in this case the 'Steering Committee', a collaboration between the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry with representatives from Finance, Justice, the Government Building Agency and the Mayor. The cooperation was rated a 6.3 in the case of the International Criminal Court in The Hague (N=10). The head of the Task Force to set up the International Criminal Court rated it an 8 and observed that the collaboration went well "despite the obstacles and problems that we had to solve; people were active in the areas where they had to make a contribution" (Interview B40.55). The meetings to discuss host state issues and the establishment of the Court were not only held in The Hague but also in Brussels at the *Committee juridique*, the legal committee. The position as a host country was "often one in defense" said one respondent who rated the cooperation low. "There was not enough interdepartmental organization", he continued: "in the absence of central direction different voices were heard" (Interview B40.55). This makes clear that there was not one central *story* about the attraction and establishment of the Court.

Political process successful case: International Criminal Court

About the 'rules of the policy game' the members of the organizational network were only moderately positive. A Real Estate Agency respondent meant that it was not clear who was paying for what and he criticized the Foreign Ministry: "The pressure on the host country greatly increased to get money on the table. The Foreign Ministry has shown anything but leadership here. As a Real Estate Agency, we act in an ad hoc-like setting and we want to get that out" (Interview B18.29). This quote shows that the internal policy game showed some hiccups and that the subject of attracting IOs was not high on the standard agendas. The 'policy game' in the Court case respondents found clear. These elements show is that the cooperation levels were average and considered irresolute.

Actor centrality The Hague's successful case

In the Criminal Court case, two of the actors showed the highest betweenness centrality and were the most independent: The Deputy Director of the Task Force and the Task Force. Other highly centralized nodes were the Foreign Ministry and the International Department of the municipality (the forerunner of BIZ). The Mayor of The Hague and the International Criminal Court Registrar showed a lower independence. Four to twelve actors are linked to the central organizations. Many network ties (edges or links between the nodes) were of the same thickness, meaning that the meetings were as frequent. The four actors in the middle can be seen as the ones with a brokerage role in information exchange.

Figure 5.10 Actor centrality during the Rome Conference and establishment of the Internaional Criminal Court



Key:
Size of the nodes: bigger nodes have higher degree centrality (activity)
Node centrality: the higher the betweenness centrality (independency)
Links between the nodes: frequency of meetings (connected to node activity)
Colors: each color is a different type of node (network diversity)

Degree centrality is visualized in the size of the nodes in the graph. The graph shows many middle-sized nodes, such as the involved ministries, the Coalition for the Court and the Support Services of the Court. Strikingly, when looking at the network structure, several sub-networks or cliques are visible in the many departments at the periphery. The table below shows the centrality measures of the five most centralized nodes, based on the betweenness centrality percentage, or the proportion of the whole network. This shows that the Court's Task Force was the most centralized actor, followed by its Deputy Director.

Table 5.6 Top five actors: Betweenness measures and node type Criminal Court

Node	Betweenness centrality %	Degree centrality %	Node type (diversity)
1. Task Force ICC	21	8	1. National level
2. Deputy Director Task Force ICC	19	8	National level
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs	12	5.6	National level
4. Municipality - BIZ	11	4.8	2. City
5. ICC: Registrar	8	2.6	3. UN/IO

Network diversity and number of nodes successful case The Hague

The number of types of actors during the Criminal Court attraction was eight which was high. The national level contained sixteen actors (including three ambassadors, blue), three of the City of The Hague (yellow) four of the International Criminal Court and UN (purple), two of Parliament (red), three NGOs (pink), one advisor (light blue), two EU actors (orange), and the Prime Minister (dark blue). The only actor type that was not represented in the network was the regional level. The ministries were all involved for a variety of reasons. One important group was the municipal network including the Mayor of The Hague who was a driving force behind the establishment of the Court. The Head of the Task Force of the International Criminal Court was part of this group, as it had strong links with the municipal actors. The number of actors was high: 31 nodes are depicted, and those were actively working together with the organizational network consisting of 12 actors.

Relational explanation The Hague's failed case

Level of network cooperation failed case

The level of cooperation was low in the case of the UNICEF Division, the rating for cooperation was a 4,8 out of 10 (N=5). The members of the organizational and policy network marked their own cooperation as insufficient. The organizational network first put together a team, and in this case the Government Building Agency was involved, especially with the government. One of the involved exclaimed about their lack of influence on the process: "What we encounter is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not sufficiently equipped to take on an IO" (Interview B22.36). Another organizational network member described the network efforts as a 'fantastic collaboration' between the municipality and Foreign Ministry: "What we always do of course is explain why The Hague is a great city. But UNICEF started negotiating hard". Another problem was the lack of time. The Dutch delegation asked for a deadline postponement twice, and one of the organizational network members was self-critical when it came to the attraction process, and considered the department was "not running fast enough" (Interview B24.38).

Political process failed case: UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships
One of the Network Administrative Network leading the organizational network explained that the delegation of UNICEF "consisted of an executive director and a deputy, Mrs. Kahn, with maybe 1 or 2 people. She was the negotiator, and it was a bit tricky for the Netherlands: on the one hand we wanted to make a good offer and on the other we knew that Copenhagen has such a beautiful building that they could enter right away" (Interview B15.25). The political backlash of this process was twofold. First, the municipality was in recess during the process which put reservations on the proposed bid. Second, the international game was inscrutable to the involved. As they did not know exactly what to expect, this had an influence on the cooperation and proactive attitude of the network. Both elements of this variable point in the direction of a low level of network cooperation, which was expected in this failed case.

Actor centrality The Hague's failed case
The nodes in the middle, the most independent nodes with the highest betweenness centrality consisted of three nodes: The IO Ambassador of the Foreign Ministry, an advisor of the municipality and the Deputy Executive of the UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships. Four to seven actors were linked to the organizations in the center. Other nodes were less centrally positioned and showed less independence. Following the three mentioned actors, the head of the international department of the municipality was the most centralized. What is striking, is that the Mayor of The Hague did play a role, but at the periphery, with only one tie to a centralized node.

Figure 5.11 Actor centrality during the attraction process of UNICEF Private Fundraising



Key:
Size of the nodes: bigger nodes have higher degree centrality (activity)
Node centrality: the higher the betweenness centrality (independency)
Links between the nodes: frequency of meetings (connected to node activity)
Colors: each color is a different type of node (network diversity)

The size of the nodes visualizes the degree centrality. The most active nodes were the Ambassador of IOs was the most actively involved. Other substantively active actors were the Advisor of the municipality, the Head of the external relations department of the municipality and the Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships. The following table shows that the Municipal Advisor had the highest independence, followed by the Ambassador of IOs of the Foreign Ministry, the Director of UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships and the Government Building Agency. What this table shows is that the highest centralized node took 27 percent of the centrality of the whole network, which was high. When looking at the degree centrality percentages, the IO Ambassador was most active, not the advisor of the municipality. This means that the advisor was most independent and needed fewer contacts to achieve his goals. The IO Ambassador, on the other hand, had most frequent contacts with other, but was indeed less independent.

Table 5.7 Top five actors: Betweenness measures and node type UNICEF Private Fundraising

Node	Betweenness centrality %	Degree centrality %	Node type (diversity)
1. Advisor Municipality BIZ	27	12	1. City
2. Foreign Ministry: Ambassador IOs	22	13	2. National level
3. Deputy Executive Director Management UNICEF PFP	20	8	3. UN/IO
4. Government Building Agency	16	3.6	National level
5. Municipality: Head of BIZ	8	9.5	City

Network diversity and number of nodes failed case The Hague

The number of actor types was six. These consisted of the national level (seven actors, blue), city level (two, yellow), three UN actors (purple), two advisors (light blue), Parliament (one, red) and a Public Private Partnerships (one, dark blue). These 16 actors were collaborating with the organizational network. The only 'other' type of actor was the International Community Platform, a network of internationals in The Hague advocating for a better host policy and better conditions for expats in general. The network size was 16, which was considered 'low' (less than 20 actors).

Conclusion

The level of cooperation was average in the case of the International Criminal Court, it was low in the UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships case, which was as expected. The actor centrality measures showed four big, centralized nodes in the International Criminal Court-case, with high degree centrality measures, with many links to other actors. In the case of the UNICEF Division, the actor centrality showed three nodes in the middle, with not so many ties to others. Interestingly, the first network is denser than the second, and shows several sub-networks within the network. The network diversity showed a high number of actor types in the Criminal Court case a high number of actors involved. In the UNICEF case, I found an average number of actor types and a low number of actors.

5.5 Conclusions the Netherlands and The Hague

The successful attraction process of the Criminal Court showed an average policy alignment between the policies and the bid. In the case of UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships the alignment was also average. Looking at perception of policy and support, I found that the visibility and effectiveness of city marketing and nation branding was rated low by both groups. Rules and regulations were experienced as bureaucratic, and although the clearness was rated high, there was also quite some criticism, especially when it came to negotiations and financial issues, for instance, the fact that the host state agreements were not synchronized across The Hague. In the failed UNICEF case, I found that branding policies were considered inconsistent but also that these had improved since the city was steering (again) towards security themes. Handling complaints had been improved and was more appreciated in the second case.

Discursively, I found high overlaps of priorities and narratives between the International Criminal Court organizational network and the policy network. In the failed case of the UNICEF Division, the overlap was lower between these groups. Compared with the international representatives, the organizational network of the International Criminal Court showed a strong overlap in the security element. Another overlap was in the focus on settling in of foreigners. In the failed case, the organizational network and the internationals overlapped in their focus on Taxes. The overlaps between these groups were higher in the successful case of the International Criminal Court in priorities as well as in narratives.

From a relational perspective in the case of the Criminal Court I found that the network cooperation was average but more positively rated and contextualized than in the failed case of the UNICEF Fundraising Partnership, where cooperation was low. In the failed case, the organizational network had difficulties with persuading the other ministries. Besides, a strong competition of Copenhagen and a hard negotiation style of the Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division from Geneva played a role. The actor centrality measures in the successful case showed some strong actors in the middle with many ties to others, whereas in the failed case there were three highly centralized actors with less ties to others. The diversity and number of actors were high in the successful case and average in the failed case of the UNICEF Division, which was an expected result.

"Austria entered too late and couldn't compete with the offer from Trinidad and Tobago [for the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat]. They talked. Usually they bargain, but they didn't really have anything to bargain."
(Quote from an officer at the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, Interview C4.5)

6 Vienna

6.1 Austria and Vienna

After the end of the Second World War, Austria gained its political independence and sovereignty with the Austrian State Treaty, dating May 15, 1955. Austria started to conduct a foreign policy that enabled to regain prestige and importance, while maintaining a neutral status in accordance with the State Treaty. This Treaty re-established a free, sovereign, and democratic Austria. The attraction of international institutions to Vienna was one of the instruments that contributed to achieving this end. The role of Austria during the Cold War was remarkable. In the State Treaty, Austria committed itself to perpetual neutrality, a neutrality that had been a demand of the Soviet Union that wanted to be sure that Austria would not join the NATO. Austria had no alternative. If it ever wanted to regain its freedom, and for more than nine years there had been every reason to despair of it, there was no other option than to accept the conditions (Halle, 1967; Odd Westad, 2005). After the Russian captivity, Austria became independent by staying neutral.

As early as during the Cold War, Austria served as a podium for international exchange due to its geopolitical position and neutral status. The opening of the Vienna International Center (VIC), also called UNO City in 1979, strengthened this position. For Vienna, the fall of the Iron Curtain equated with the partial loss of the comparative advantage of neutrality. At the same time, however, the opening of Eastern Europe offered it a more central situation than it was in before, when it was located on the borders of Western Europe. As competition was stronger than ever before, the city felt particularly threatened by cities such as Geneva, The Hague and Bonn.

The fact that the number of international civil servants had remained stable since the 1980s (about 4800 in both 1987 and 2002) was not a sign of real development of the city, even though spending had increased. On the other hand, the status of capital is seen as an advantage by policymakers vis-à-vis the IOs because it strengthened the position, image, and visibility of the city around the world (Huber, 2007). Within the EU, Vienna was in the past decades among the most successful ten cities and among the richest six regions of Europe (Popescu & Corbos, 2011). In 2005, Vienna ranked 4th alongside Paris and Stockholm, among top regions of Europe, after London, Luxembourg, and Brussels, in terms of Gross Regional Product per inhabitant (Eurostat, 2005). In 2019, it was still among the eleven top member states of Europe (Eurostat, 2019).

Vienna as host city

Austria attracted its first IO in 1957: The International Atomic Energy Agency. At the time, there was no Foreign Ministry; the Chancellor's Office handled international affairs. Shortly after, Bruno Kreisky came to power as Minister of Foreign Affairs (1959-1966) and Chancellor (1970-1983). As an emblematic figure of the Austrian policy of active neutrality, he contributed to the success of Austria in the field of attracting IOs (Huber, 2007). In 1965, OPEC moved its head office to Vienna from Geneva, including full diplomatic privileges for its entire staff. In 1966, when Kreisky was still Foreign Minister, the United Nations also decided to move UNIDO Headquarters from New York to Vienna. As a reward the Austrian government proposed the erection of a building dedicated to him. These were the premises of the Vienna International Center (VIC) which would prove to be a determining factor for the development of Vienna as a hub.

One of the major IOs was the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, which came into existence during the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The conference aimed to provide a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation between East and West. In 1971, the election of Kurt Waldheim to the post of UN Secretary General allowed the Austrians influence at an international level. The interest taken by Austria to developing countries assured their support in the development of UN agencies in Vienna. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-ban Treaty Organization, in Vienna since 1994, was a success. During that period, an optimistic view of the international community arose, since it was believed that nuclear disarmament was possible. Only the testing of nuclear weapons was still to be banned. Why this organization was established in Vienna and not elsewhere, was mainly because of the presence of the Atomic Energy Agency. Further consideration was the fact that Vienna was an official seat to the UN since 1979.

A failure for the city of Vienna was the establishment of the International Renewable Energy Agency in Abu Dhabi. Germany and Austria backed out of the bidding process when they found out there was an overwhelming support for the United Arab Emirates (UAE). There are reasons to consider that the US backed the UAE in exchange for political, military, and financial help in the Middle East.[31]

31 Wikileaks Cables (Carrington, 2010; The Guardian, 2010).

6.1.1 Case 1: The Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat

The Arms Trade Treaty is discussed in Chapter 4, and so this introduction will only discuss the course of events and playing field and players at the Austrian side.

Course of events in the failed Arms Trade Treaty case Vienna
Austria signed the Arms Trade Treaty on June 3, 2013. Exactly a year afterwards, Austria deposited the instrument of ratification, which included a declaration of the provisional application of articles 6 and 7 of the Arms Trade Treaty. In these articles the member states declared that they prohibited the transfer, as well as the export of conventional arms. Representatives of the Foreign Ministry Department II.8 (Arms control) visited the First Preparatory meeting in Port of Spain in February 2015. At this meeting, 82 states, NGOs, IOs and regional industries attended. An important decision in Port of Spain was the designation of Mexico as the Chair of the First Conference of States Parties (CSP1). Ambassador Jorge Lomónaco, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the UN in Geneva, was elected President of the Preparatory Process and of the CSP1. Afterwards, Vienna organized a third informal Preparatory Meeting in April 2015. A delegation of departments of Arms Control and IOs and Conferences were participating. This delegation wrote a proposal to host the Secretariat. It would be housed in the Vienna International Center, under the umbrella of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

Attracting the Arms Trade Treaty: the playing field and its players
The Arms Trade Treaty was negotiated in two Conference of States Parties. It was not possible to reach consensus at these meetings, which was required for the Treaty to be adopted. Consequently, Arms Trade Treaty supporters moved the Treaty to the UN General Assembly where the Arms Trade Treaty was adopted on 2 April 2013 via majority voting. On 24 December 2014, the Arms Trade Treaty entered into force. On 12 August 2015, the Facilitator of the Secretariat (France) submitted the answers to an extended questionnaire of the three candidates: Trinidad and Tobago, Austria, and Switzerland. These answered questions on logistical aspects, outsourcing options, conference centers and human resources.

The 67 States Parties represented at the First Conference of States Parties in 2015 in Cancún (of the 69 States Parties that were also Signatories) would vote for one of the locations (First Conference of States Parties, 2015). The first ballot took place Wednesday morning local time, 26 August 2015 (First Conference of States Parties, 2015). Vienna received 14 votes, Geneva 21, and Port of Spain 32 (of the 67 States Parties present). In the second ballot on that same day in the afternoon, 35 voted for Geneva versus 32 for Port of Spain.[32]

The Arms Trade Treaty Success Measures (Vienna)

The pre-stage consisted of the adoption of resolution 64/84 and a *Request for Proposals*. The first stage started when three candidates reacted with verbal notes (Stage 1). During the rounds of voting, in August 2015 in Cancún, Port of Spain was the first winner with 32 votes (versus 14 for Vienna and 21 for Geneva) (Stage 2). Vienna was eliminated with the least votes. The second round of voting resulted in Geneva as the winner with 35 votes versus the same 32 for Port of Spain (Stage 3). In the last stage, Geneva was announced as the winner (Stage 4). The attraction to Vienna can be considered a factual failure: Austria (Vienna) was out after the first round of voting.

Figure 6.1 First success type for Vienna's failed case: Arms Trade Treaty

Stage 1: Letters of intent > Stage 2: 1st voting round 2015 > Stage 3: 2nd voting round > Stage 4: Geneva wins

The second type of success was a 'perceived failure'. The attraction process to Vienna was reacted on negatively by most of the involved. One of the organizational network members simply put the reason for the failure of Vienna as such: "Austria entered too late and could not compete with the offer from Trinidad and Tobago" (Interview A4.5). The bid of Vienna and the convincing methods of this department were characterized as "halfhearted" by an involved specialist (Interview A31.34). The network leading the negotiations in Port of Spain, Geneva and Berlin was characterized as 'very small'; it consisted of eight people of four departments, two actors of each. When they visited the negotiation arenas of the Arms Trade Treaty, it was noticeable. Furthermore, the non-proliferation field of Vienna was not as big as Geneva's. The perception was a mixture of a late start, a small network and too little exchange possibilities in the negotiation.

Figure 6.2 Second success type for Vienna's failed case: Arms Trade Treaty

Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Success > Perceived Success

32 Two different sources in The Netherlands and Austria informed on these ballot counts.

6.1.2 Case 2: Sustainable Energy for All

Sustainable Energy for All – abbreviated as SE4ALL and later as SEforAll – started out as an 'Initiative' of the United Nations. In June 2009, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Kandeh Yumkella to chair a new Advisory Group on Energy and Climate Change. The launch of Sustainable Energy for All coincided with the designation of 2012 as the International Year of Sustainable Energy for All, by the UN General Assembly. In 2013, Yumkella was appointed as CEO. This Sierra Leonean agricultural economist and politician was the former Chairman of UN-Energy and the Director General of the UN Industrial Development Organization in Vienna. The location of Vienna for the Temporary Secretariat of the Initiative was therefore a logical step. On March 1st, 2013, Sustainable Energy for All rented an office space of 405 m2 in the Andromeda Tower, near the main UN building (VIC). The organization counted eighteen staff members at the time: seven in New York, and eleven in Vienna.

The goals of the 'Initiative' came from Sustainable Development Goal 7: to achieve universal energy access, improve energy efficiency and increase the use of renewable energy. Underpinning SDG7 and at the heart of the Paris Agreement was the promise that no one is 'left behind' in the global energy transition (SEforAll, 2018). The Sustainable Energy for All was initially a facilitating agency as part of the UN, funded by the World Bank and the Austrian government. The dedication of Ban Ki-moon and Jim Yong Kim (President of the World Bank) played a role in facilitating financial help, managing and collaboration in energy issues. To achieve the goals of Sustainable Energy for All, the organization is cooperating with the OPEC Fund for International Development and OPEC, the Energy community, NGOs, other IOs and the Vienna Energy Forum: a biannual event as a joint initiative of organizations and the federal government. Sustainable Energy for All has a close relationship with the UN Industrial Development Organization.

Table 6.1 Course of events: Establishment of the Sustainable Energy for All

2011	Yumkella appointed by the UN SG as co-chair of the high-level group on SE4All
2012	The GA designated 2012 as the SE4All year
2013	SE4All rented an office of 405 m2. SE4All set up as a UN Initiative; Yumkella appointed CEO (March) SE4All rented 331 m2 extra office space (December)
2015	Request of proposals and letters of intent (April) Bid books from 5 countries: Canada, Austria, Denmark, Barbados, and Italy (May) SE4All Conference in New York Follow-up letters with Austria, Canada, and Denmark Decision to remain in Vienna (January)
2016	Change of status in Quasi International Organization (instead of 'Initiative') Change of name in SEforAll

Course of events
In 2013, as the Sustainable Energy for All was not officially an IO, but neither an International NGO, the status of the organization was a legal challenge for the actors involved. Its staffers preferred not to be part of the UN family. According to one of the employees, this was because they needed 'the flexibility to do business'. The UN is not entitled to take funds from private businesses. In the case of the realization of energy goals, one must cooperate with private funding bodies, was their reasoning. Austrian and New York lawyers were working on the case at the time.

During this search for a new legal status, on December 1st, 2013, the Sustainable Energy for All rented a new floor in the Andromeda Tower: 736 m2 of extra office space. This extra floor, however, was not in the initial agreement with the Austrian government, which had agreed to pay the rent for a period of five years. Sustainable Energy for All bargained with the Austrian government to pay for the extra office floor, otherwise they would leave. Due to discontent at the Sustainable Energy for All about the lack of clarity about its status, the organization issued a Request for Proposal (RfP) for relocation to a new host state. Until May 1st, 2015, the countries were allowed to send their letter of intent. Five countries responded: Denmark (Copenhagen), Austria (Vienna), Italy (Rome), Barbados (Bridgetown), and Canada (Montréal). The bid-books of Italy and Barbados did not meet the criteria. The bidding went on between Denmark, Canada, and Austria.

Sustainable Energy for All started renegotiations with Austria, first with a host country proposal, then with answers to follow-up questions on the host country proposals. In Austria, a consultation started among experts on the absolute or functional immunities of IO employees and how the state should solve the problems when one has no access to the jurisdiction of the state (Reinisch, 2013; Groen, 2016). This led to a new host state law, directed to Non-Governmental IOs, or Quasi-IOs. Consequently, a group of international agencies gained a better position in Austria. One motivation for the Austrian government to go all the way was because it had just failed to attract the Arms Trade Treaty. In 2016, the offer was considered sufficient, including the status of a Quasi IO, with tax benefits. Sustainable Energy for All decided to stay in Vienna. In 2017, the Sustainable Energy for All worked with 5 teams and 32 staff members in two locations: one third in Washington, two thirds in Vienna.

Retaining and attracting the SE4ALL: the playing field and its players
The commitment of Austria consisted of the net rental costs of an office of 405 m2 for five years, the initial rental costs (brokers free), the contribution to office furniture and equipment up to €100.000, and funding for one Junior Professional Officer for two years (Austrian Foreign Ministry, 2015a). When the Initiative also hired the rest of the space on the 15th floor, they occupied a total of 736 m2. The Sustainable Energy for All requested this extra space on the same conditions or it would leave. "In order to keep them here", an organizational network member said, "we had to extent our offer" (Interview C4.5).

The new 'Initiative' – a term not known to the UN legally – had put pressure on its host government. Whilst the 'bidding war' was going on between possible host cities, the Austrian government changed the legal situation in favor of the organization, which had evolved from an Initiative to a Quasi IO by Austrian law. This way, it could enjoy the privileges and immunities, albeit in a limited way.

The Sustainable Energy for All Success Measures (Vienna)

The first success type for this case I coined a factual success. The pre-stage started in 2011, when the UN Secretary General appointment Yumkella as co-chair of the high-level group on Sustainable Energy for All. In the following year, the establishment of the organization began to take shape. The first stage started with the eligibility of five candidates in May 2015 (Stage 1). Follow-up letters are sent back and forth to and from Austria, Canada, and Denmark. Barbados and Italy do not meet the criteria (Stage 2). Negotiations with Denmark and Austria remain when the request of being a Quasi-IO is discussed (Stage 3). The Austrian host state law changes in 2016 and therefore the organization decides to stay in Vienna (Stage 4).

Figure 6.3 First success type for Vienna's successful case: Sustainable Energy for All



Stage 1: Letters of intent > Stage 2: Follow-up letters > Stage 3: Austria writes new law > Stage 4: Vienna wins

The second type was a 'moderate perceived success'. It was successfully retained but most of the involved had their reservations. The Austrian government had just lost the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat when the negotiations on the Sustainable Energy for All were at its peak (August 2015), the necessity to keep this organization was urgent. One of the organizational network members put it as such: "After the Arms Trade Treaty, we didn't want to lose this one. We already had paid for them, not only the rent but also the services and the offices to be adapted. UNIDO is losing member states, so there is less money for them." (Interview C4.4). There was put much effort in keeping them; even the host state law needed to change. Another setback was the pressure the organization had put on the government. As an organizational network member said: "The Sustainable Energy for All wanted us to pay for a bigger office space. I was already saying, let them go, it costs so much money. [But] the organizations have a big say in this" (Interview C4.5). In the end it was a moderate perceived success because they were welcomed in Vienna, but only reluctantly.

Figure 6.4 Second success type for Vienna's successful case: Sustainable Energy for All



Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Success > Perceived Success

6.2 Instrumental perspective

Instrumental explanation Vienna's failed case

Host policy goals 2015

After several changes in 1979[33] and 1992[34], some more elements changed in the host state law. One stood out in 2009: the exemption from the obligation to pay the employer's contribution to the Family Allowance Fund (Bundesgesetz für die Rupublik Österreich, 2009; Daxkobler & Seiler, 2012). Based on a profitability study of the Foreign Ministry, the change was legitimized. The 2009 study 'The immaterial profitability of IOs in Austria' was repeated in 2014. Because of this evaluation, the new objectives were international dialogue, improved legal framework, the promotion of security and a hub for peace, security, sustainable development, and energy policy.

Nation branding goals 2015

The Austrian Republic had been high in the nation brands indexes. In the year the Arms Trade Treaty was attracted and the Sustainable Energy for All had been kept, Austria was tenth in rank, between Denmark (number nine) and New Zealand (eleven) (Future Brand, 2015, p. 11). The Country Brands Index of 2014/2015 qualified Austria as 'country brand' with a competitive advantage: countries with strong positive perceptions: people are more likely to visit, recommend and do business with a 'country brand' (Future Brand, 2015, p. 35). Although there was no active policy in 2015, there was an image of Austria as charming, well-educated, and diligent. The government bet on the positive brand of the landscape, food and drinks, famous old buildings as well as a low criminality rate (Austrian Federal Government, 2015). These can be considered the nation branding goals. Weaknesses of the brand were formed by the narrow-mindedness of Austrians, and their large number of political and economic scandals (Leitner, 2016, p. 15).

City marketing goals 2015

Vienna holds the first place among the safest European cities, with a low crime rate. The Austrian capital is seen as diverse, safe, cosmopolitan, and an attractive city to live in (Mercer, 2017). In the Mercer studies, Vienna has been 'number 1' on the Quality-of-Life criterion for eight years in a row (2009-2017). In a position paper 'Vienna 2016' written in 2006 the metropolis was represented as a "multifaceted cultural metropolis and a hub for Central European business and finance" (Departure Wirtschaft, Kunst und Kultur GmbH, 2006, p. 11). In 2013, the new ambassador for conferences and IOs accentuated that Vienna was focusing on too many topics. The goal from now on was to focus on

33 Possibility to grant privileges and immunities without going through parliament.

34 Limited privileges for Non-Governmental IOs.

security. This ambassador wrote down strategic ideas aimed at strengthening the general structure and developing synergies between organizations. The main policy goal was to contribute to improved efficiency (City of Vienna, 2013, p. 3).

Bid for the Arms Trade Treaty (2015)
The bid book to attract the Secretariat of the Arms Trade Treaty consisted of one page. Austria articulated that effective and result-oriented implementation of the Treaty would be a priority (Austrian Foreign Ministry, 2015b). The City of Vienna would provide a good environment for the location of the Arms Trade Treaty-Secretariat. "Vienna is well established as an effective hub for multilateral diplomacy. This is evidenced through the efficient work of key IOs in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO Prep Com)" (Austrian Foreign Ministry, 2015b, p. 1).

Austria stressed the following elements: the international character, the livability, and the security. The proposal or 'Aid Memoire' concluded with three bullet points: Office space furnished and free of charge for up to 5 years; Generous privileges and immunities; Assistance to states or organizations wishing to open a representation in Vienna. Later, in the follow-up questions, these logistical aspects were specified. The Vienna International Center was mentioned as possible housing, and as alternative office space near the Center or in the city. Other areas were clarified as well: outsourcing options, conference service, human resources and 'other remarks' (public infrastructure, hotels, schools, and banks).

Categorical concurrence
The alignment on the first dimension was high: 83 percent showed categorical concurrence – ten of the twelve boxes were filled (Table 6.2). The bid for the Arms Trade Treaty was especially aligned with the host state policy (international environment, safety and security) and with city marketing (quality of life, safety and security, right kind of expertise) and less with the nation branding goals. The elements in the bid most aligned were 'quality of life' and 'safety and security'; all policy goals mentioned these. Less aligned were 'international environment' and 'right kind of expertise', which were not mentioned in the nation branding goals.

Depth of information
The second dimension – depth of information – showed an average alignment of 67 percent – 8 of the 12 boxes are highlighted (see below). The first element in the bid 'international environment' was least elaborated upon, only in the host state policy, where a focus on 'international dialogue' was mentioned comprehensively. The most elaborated element in the bid in all other policies was 'Safety and security': the host policy mentioned the 'promotion of security', the nation branding elaborated on 'free

of crime, low crime rate' and the city marketing highlighted 'being among the safest European cities'. The other highly aligned elements were 'quality of life' and 'right kind of expertise'. Surprisingly, the 'international environment' element was least aligned, although this was an import aspect to all layers of government.

Table 6.2 Alignment between policies and bid for the Arms Trade Treaty (Vienna)

Type of policy	**Host policy**	**Nation branding**	**City Marketing**	**Policy alignment**
Goals in keywords: / Elements in the ATT bid:	Attract new IOs, Austria and Vienna as hub of peace, security, sustainable development, energy policy and international dialogue.	Strengths of Austria's image were the landscape, food and drinks, famous old buildings as well as a low criminality rate. Austria should be seen as "calm, tranquil and more or less free of crime"	Top quality of life, a multi-faceted cultural metropolis, a hub for Central European business and finance	The following elements from the ATT bid showed alignment on the *depth of information* dimension:
1. International environment	International dialogue	-	Multifaceted cultural metropolis	Effective hub for multilateral diplomacy. **Alignment with one policy**
2. Quality of life	Improved legal framework	Food and drinks, famous old buildings, calm and tranquil	Top quality of life	High quality of life. **Alignment with two policies**
3. Safety and security	Promotion of security	Free of crime; Low crime rate	Among the safest European cities	Most secure capital. **Full alignment**
4. Right kind of expertise	A hub in the promotion of peace, security, sustainable development, energy policy and international dialogue.	-	Capital 1of the struggle against inhuman acts and inhuman treatment	Efficient work of key IOs in disarmament and non-proliferation: IAEA, STBTO PrepCom, UNODC, OCSE. **Aligned with two policies**

Perception of host policy and support Vienna's failed case
Figure 6.5 shows the ratings of IO representatives of the branding policies, rules and regulations, elements in the bid and government support (N=16). These issues are discussed, while making a distinction between the failed and successfully attracted case.

Perception branding policies
Most respondents considered the city marketing more visible than nation branding and more effective to attract IOs. The explanation behind these ratings was diverse. An international employee who rated the visibility of the city marketing an 8 said "Vienna advertises, has a reputation of making it visible. Kids, grown-ups, it's visible with emblems, tokens, newspapers, ads; more in print than on TV. It's visible by greening the city or building housing that is affordable. To Viennese, Austrians but also to internationals" (Interview C21.23). About the nation branding, this respondent was more critical: "there is a new nation branding strategy, but it is not yet visible. The government has developed it: "Building bridges", it has not trickled down to Joe Public on the street. The old nation branding is still present: Mozart, skiing, the waltz, and other cultural clichés." (C21.23). This aspect was coined a plus/minus because the visibility was positively –, but the effectiveness of both policies was negatively perceived.

Figure 6.5 Perception of host policy and support Vienna (N=16)



Perception elements in the bid

The four elements in the bid were 'international environment', 'quality of life', 'safety and security' and 'right kind of expertise'. Most were full of praise about the first, the international climate in Vienna. Especially about the *hub* function of Vienna in disarmament issues and the NGOs being around. Nevertheless, some also thought this hub was limited: "[The IO] Wassenaar Arrangement is there, but not everybody has representation in Vienna, because it is more specific" (Interview A31.34). The second aspect, quality of life, was something everyone commented about as positive. Respondents were positive about the third element, safety and security, as they felt safe on the streets at night. As one employee put it: "There are no dangerous zones" (Interview C21.23). The IO representatives were satisfied with the international environment, quality of life, safety and security, but not as positive about the 'right kind of expertise'. It was present in Vienna but not to the extent that an operating Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat could be established, respondents agreed. This aspect was coined a plus/minus because although the first three aspects were positively reviewed, the last one was quite the opposite.

Perception rules and regulations

Most respondents considered the regulations for IOs "not very complex and well organized" (Interview C18.20) or commented on them as "for the moment quite good, but for the partners of expats the access to the labor market is difficult" (Interview C19.21). An NGO-employee found the rules for giving donations too strict: "the fact that donors that give to animal welfare organizations cannot deduct the gifts is doubtful" (Interview C24.26). Some rules and regulations were found bureaucratic and nonsensical. Nevertheless, the government was trying to make them "as flexible as possible" (Interview C30.30), this is also evidenced by the new host state law of 2015 (Parliament of Austria, 2015). This aspect was a plus/minus due to the mixed views.

Perception government support

On how the IO representatives experienced the support from the government, the reactions were ambivalent. Since 2015, the Austrian government attempted to increase the convenience for IOs, in terms of reduction of administrative burden, efficiency increase and the growth of attractiveness of Austria (Austrian National Council, 2015). Nevertheless, some of the international employees in Vienna still thought the offer of incentives to international recruits was uneven, as these were not offered to Austrians. Another much heard criticism in the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat attraction process, was the possibility for spouses to build businesses. A respondent proclaimed about this: "The field should be more coordinated and more inclusive for the private sector" (Interview C20.22). This element is coined a plus/minus as respondents reacted varying on this point.

Instrumental explanation Vienna's successful case

The privileges and immunities changed for NGOs with the new law in 2015, when a plan was worked out for Quasi-IOs: some International NGOs could now be granted privileges and immunities. These were exempted from income tax and the status of the organization was tax free, but there was no full exemption from the public law; social taxes or VAT taxes (Federal Law Gazette, 2015). This process was accelerated during the attraction process of the Sustainable Energy for All. Five goals were formulated in the new host state policy of 2015: Reduction of administrative burden and efficiency increase in foundations and funds; Increase of donations to non-profit organizations; Increase of donations to the assets of charitable foundations; Increase the number of charitable foundations and quasi-IOs in Vienna; To increase the attractiveness of Austria as a location for quasi-IOs (Parliament of Austria, 2015). After the Austrian policy had changed, it became an incentive for many NGOs to find a way to become Quasi-IOs, and for others to move to Vienna. From the moment the new host state law had been changed for Quasi IOs, new organizations were renamed into this new type. Austria then counted, with the Sustainable Energy for All, nine Quasi-IOs.

Nation branding goals 2016

The Austrian government presents itself abroad as a nation that actively secures peace and combat misguided developments on the world stage. The activities launched by Austria in this context include negotiation diplomacy, crisis management, stability policy as well as disaster relief and reconstruction (Republic of Austria, 2019). Key elements in this position of Austria abroad were the focus on peace, security, negotiation diplomacy, crisis management, stability policy, disaster relief and reconstruction, and a sustainable national environmental and energy policy (Austrian Embassy, 2019). These issues can be seen as the goals of the nation branding of Austria.

Bid for the Sustainable Energy for All (2016)

The bid book was not an official paper, but an offer articulated informally by the Austrian government. Follow-up questions were answered later in the process. These revealed the following information about the bid. The first element, 'financial contributions': Austria would provide € 1 million to the establishment of a 'Sustainable Energy for All Global Platform of Regional Energy Centers' jointly steered by Sustainable Energy for All and UNIDO. Furthermore, Austria would provide € 500,000 to Sustainable Energy for All for the support of concrete opportunities and actions to implement the Sustainable Energy for All agenda.[35]

35 Austria would also contribute € 500,000 to ESMAP (Energy Sector Management Assistance Program). Austria had already committed € 4 million for the setting up of additional Regional Energy Centers in Southern and Eastern Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific region. Austria continued to support ECREEE with € 3,2 million. In addition, Austria supported with more than € 6,0 million programs and projects for the concrete application of sustainable energy solutions.

Secondly, the 'facilities' were touched upon. The Partnership could stay in the existing space rent-free for the next three years. The Austrian government was willing to support the cost of an additional space (up to an additional € 400,000 and furniture and equipment – up to an additional € 100,000).

The third element was 'taxation': the proposal referred to additional law in preparation: exemption from employees' income tax as well as other fees and taxes of the NGO itself. The draft law would be decided by the Government before the summer break of 2015 and subsequently sent to Parliament. It could be enacted by the end of the year.

Fourthly, it discussed 'legal status and status for partnership staff': the NGO would apply once for an exemption from work permits for its employees. Once an exemption from the application of the Aliens Employment Act had been granted, no further permits were necessary.

Fifth, it touched upon 'public infrastructure and services', Austria liked to point out that its offer to combine the Sustainable Energy for All Partnership with the UN Industrial Development Organization global network of Regional Sustainable Energy Centers would provide the organization with a global advocacy group for sustainable energy and climate resilience issues, a strong link between international energy and climate agreements and concrete implementation on the ground. The centers would considerably strengthen the implementation capacities of the Sustainable Energy for All initiative. Last but not least, it mentioned 'Amenities': a reimbursement of the rent of the entire space at the 15^{th} floor of the Andromeda Tower (Austrian Foreign Ministry, 2015a).

Categorical concurrence

The first dimension of alignment was average: 61 percent or 11 of the 18 boxes were filled (Table 6.3). The elements were most aligned with the host policy goals, especially the list of goals the Parliament set up to improve the competitiveness of Austria "especially from Geneva" (Parliament of Austria, 2015, p. 5). Answers to the follow-up questions for Sustainable Energy for All expressed all five goals set up by Parliament in order to make Austria a more attractive location. The alignment with the nation branding goals was found in the focus on peace and security but also in the sustainable national environment and energy policy. The city marketing had a low overlap with the bid for Sustainable Energy for All (City of Vienna, 2013).

Table 6.3 Alignment between policies and bid for the Sustainable Energy (Vienna)

Type of policy	Host policy	Nation branding	City Marketing	Policy alignment
Goals: / Elements in the SE4All bid:	Reduction of administrative burden and efficiency increase in foundations and funds; Increase of donations to non-profit organizations; Increase of donations to the assets of charitable foundations; Increase the number of charitable foundations and quasi-IOs in Vienna: To increase the attractiveness of Austria as a location for quasi-international organizations	Focus on peace, security, negotiation diplomacy, crisis management, stability policy, disaster relief and reconstruction, and a sustainable national environmental and energy policy	Leading European metropolis, as an international center, as a cosmopolitan, gender-conscious international city at the heart of Europe	The following elements from the SE4All bid showed alignment on the *depth of information* dimension:
1. Financial contributions	Austria has committed €4 million to the establishment of a "SE4All Global Platform of Regional Energy Centers"	Austria intended to continue its financial support to SE4All activities in the following years	-	Global network of regional sustainable energy centers. **Alignment with two policies**
2. Facilities	Providing improved legal framework conditions	-	-	Provide beneficial contributions. **Alignment with one policy**
3. Taxation	To improve the competitiveness of Austria	-	-	Austrian contribution, hub for sustainable development. **Alignment with one policy**

Type of policy	Host policy	Nation branding	City Marketing	Policy alignment
4. Legal status and status for partnership staff	Providing improved legal framework conditions; draft law should be decided by the government by the end of the year (2015)	Focus on a sustainable national environmental and energy policy	-	Austrian contribution, providing improved legal framework conditions, focus on a sustainable environmental policy. **Alignment with one policy**
5. Public infrastructure and services	Remain an attractive location for the established offices	-	Vienna as a city with citizen-friendly institutions; 'capital of the struggle against inhuman acts and inhuman treatment'; focus on the energy field	Free rent for 5 years, remain an attractive location. **Alignment with one policy**
6. Amenities	The combination between the SE4All Partnership and UNIDO's global network of Regional Sustainable Energy Centers will provide SE4All with a global advocacy group for sustainable energy and climate resilience issues	Austria envisages a pivotal role for SE4All in promoting the newly to be established centers especially by increasing public and political awareness for their important work on sustainable energy	A center of competence for infrastructure and environmental technologies, and Vienna as a city with citizen-friendly institutions	Reimbursement of the rent of entire space at the 15th floor of the Andromeda Tower. **Alignment with one policy**

Depth of information
The elaboration of the elements from the bid in the policy goals was low: 38 percent – there were only 7 of the 18 boxes highlighted. Alignment was found with the host policy goals, less with the nation branding goals and no elements were elaborated upon in the city marketing goals. Most alignment was found in stressing the importance of environment and energy issues. The element aligning most with the policy goals was 'Financial contributions': The host state policy stressed Austria's €4 million commitment to the establishment of a global platform of Regional Energy Centers, and the nation branding mentioned the financial support as well to the organization's activities.

Surprisingly, this successfully attracted showed a very low alignment between the bid and attraction policies, which was not expected in the instrumental perspective.

Perception of host policy and support Vienna's successful case

Perception of branding policies
The city marketing and nation branding policies and their effectiveness to attract organizations were perceived in a mixed way. A respondent of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights said: "there is not a strategy, not anymore. It used to be a neutral country." (Interview C19.21). About the effectiveness of city marketing and nation branding she was more positive about the first than the latter: "there was a lot of discussion around the KAICIID (Kader Abdullah Islamic Center of Intercultural and International Dialogue). Austria signed that treaty but suddenly Austria wanted to change the treaty, unpack the package. In that way, we are not a reliable party; it is about reliability and credibility" (C19.21). The Kader Abdullah Islamic Center of Intercultural and International Dialogue came under fire when the Kurz administration fell in 2019. Due to many negative reports in the media, the Austrian government threatened to shut down the interreligious center. This aspect was coined a plus/minus, as the ratings and narratives had negative and positive aspects.

Perception of elements in the bid
The most prominent elements in the Sustainable Energy for All bid were "A global network of regional sustainable energy centers, contribution to the Sustainable Energy for All for establishment and furnishing the offices, contribution to the sustainable energy sector, exemption of taxes and fees for the Sustainable Energy for All and free rent for five years". As the Sustainable Energy for All was already established and based in Vienna before the renegotiations for a new location started, the Sustainable Energy for All employees were already in Vienna when the Austrian offer came into existence. The Sustainable Energy for All representatives were positive about all elements, especially the first. As a Sustainable Energy for All-employee voiced it: "Vienna has so many

energy organizations, there are road maps and action agendas and more than 100 opt-in countries in Vienna, of which 85 from the developing world" (Interview C21.23). The only element employees and experts were negative about was 'exemption of taxes and fees'. As the Chief Operating Officer of Sustainable Energy for All said: "The Austrians gave us a tax-free status, but not full exemption from the public law, no social taxes or VAT tax exemptions. This increased our costs for 20%. If we were based in Geneva, this would have saved these 20%" (Interview C22.24). This aspect was coined a plus as the reactions were mostly positive.

Perception of rules and regulations

When turning to how respondents perceived rules and regulations for IOs, the following comes to the fore. Respondents found most rules quite strict, but very clear. It was, to some, also related to a large extent to international competition: "I see competition because there are considerations of the *Standortfrage* [location question] which is key to our foreign politics and economic considerations of the city" (Interview C21.23). This employee found the rules and regulations for IOs were part of the international competition, as what other countries do, has an influence on what Austria or Vienna does with their organizations.

Perception of government support

In the latter case of the Sustainable Energy for All, respondents were a bit more positive about the government handling of complaints, although the criticism about Austria being a bit old-fashioned remained. An employee of the Sustainable Energy organization said about this: "The government could be more entrepreneurial! A building for non-United Nations organizations for example" (Interview C22.24). Overall, the support is perceived as sufficient, but with room for improvement. "There is an effort to support international employees", said a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization respondent, "but in the end you have to find your own housing. You have to go through your own tunnel of provisions, the organization gives you startup money and guidance, but you have to do the rest yourself" (Interview C23.25). This element was coined a plus as well.

Conclusion

Whereas the alignment in the failed case of the Arms Trade Treaty was average, the alignment in the successful case was low. This was, again, not an expected result. The perception and support in the first Arms Trade Treaty-case was lower than in the successful Sustainable Energy for All case, as I expected. The host policies and government support had been improved, according to many.

6.3 Discursive perspective

Discursive explanation Vienna's failed case

Priorities and narratives organizational network failed case

For the organizational network attracting the Arms Trade Treaty to Vienna (N=6), physical infrastructure and political stability were prioritized highly, followed hospitals. One of the group members even called the quality of hospitals "responsible for the attractiveness and safety of the city (...). The insurance scheme is important, the UN health care system, they offer rather good coverage of costs. If you're in a situation of distress or disease, they have good services, and you can rely on them" (Interview C9.10). The organizational network that attracted the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat rated hospitals are well organized significantly higher than the other groups. Physical infrastructure was also found as a strong narrative. This was often mentioned in the top three or top five and referred to as an element that needed no explanation (Panke, Lang, & Wiedemann, 2018). About the political stability one group member claimed that "Austria is considered a very politically stable country. We are scoring as the top 3 in health services, leisure and profession" (Interview C8.10). All in all, the organizational network prioritized physical infrastructure, political stability, and hospitals and healthcare.

Priorities and narratives policy network

For the policy network (N=17, both cases) high priorities were political stability, settling in and taxes. The narratives contextualizing these elements were based on the role Vienna played on the international stage. Policy network members explained the political stability of Vienna as a central city between east and west as crucial. One of the main players of the network of Foreign Ministry said: "The reputation of Vienna is mandatory for the other factors (...) Vienna is a bridge by itself, Vienna is the city of dialogue, the city for human security" (Interview C3.3). The 'bridge function' of Vienna was often mentioned, as well as the beneficial tax scheme as an important incentive for IOs: "We hope to be able to grant certain privileges to various types of organizations, we want to give additional tax exemptions", said a legal advisor to the Foreign Ministry (Interview C6.7). The element 'settling in of foreigners is well organized' also belonged to a strong narrative. The policy network stressed the importance of foreigners settling in successfully. As the Expat Center director said: "The fact that there are so many organizations in such a central location and such a high quality of life is really an advantage" (Interview C16.17). Other elements the policy network rated high were livability and relevant centers. The comments on the first element related, without exceptions, to the high rank of Vienna in the 'Livability index': the city of Vienna had been number 1 on the Mercer Quality of Living index since 2009 (Mercer, 2015). On the second element, the network underlined Vienna as a UN and cosmopolitan city. The policy network accentuated settling in and taxes differently than the organizational network.

Comparison between organizational and policy network failed case
The figure below shows the overlap between the organizational and policy network of the failed case. Overlaps between the groups were found in the priorities of political stability, settling in and relevant centers. The main differences were found in the significantly higher ranked hospitals by the organizational network, and the higher ranking of taxes, livability, and international schools by the policy network. Those elements were also accompanied by strong narratives.

Figure 6.6 Arms Trade Treaty: priorities governmental groups (Vienna)



Priorities and narratives IO representatives
The international representatives (N=12) prioritized relevant centers, political stability, security, and level of education labor force highest. Security showed the strongest narrative. An employee of the Sustainable Energy for All, the second case in this study, found this a top priority: "Security and the safety of the country, reliable infrastructure, that one can count on reliable jurisdiction, legislation (…) Vienna is known as a UN headquarter, a nice place with security and political stability" (Interview C21.23). Security issues were also one of the crucial elements for another IO employee, who stated: "Security is among the most important things. Vienna is a capital of stable democracy. It is connected well, which is especially positive" (Interview C30.30). About livability, the following NGO employee said: "There is a good balance: safe city and a balance between what you earn and what you spend. It's very diverse. It offers a quality of living, it's clean

and you can do many things outdoors. Public transport is working excellent" (Interview C24.26). The high quality of life is mentioned by almost everyone in this context.

Comparison organizational network and international representatives
In the narratives of the IO representatives, often the infrastructure, security and taxes were mentioned, more than in the organizational network attracting the Arms Trade Treaty. Most overlap between the Arms Trade Treaty organizational network and the international representatives was found in the relevant centers, physical infrastructure, and the political stability. They found these both crucial. The differences between the groups laid in the significantly higher ranked hospitals by the organizational network and the higher rated security element by the IO representatives, although this was not significantly so. The following figure shows the differences and overlaps in priorities.

Figure 6.7 Arms Trade Treaty: organizational network and internationals (Vienna)



Discursive explanation Vienna's successful case

Priorities and narratives organizational network successful case
The organizational network attracting the Sustainable Energy for All (N=7) ranked taxes highest, followed by relevant centers and physical infrastructure. The reason for this was related to the negotiations between the Sustainable Energy for All and the government

during the process of the Sustainable Energy for All Partnership. The answer to the question why Sustainable Energy for All chose for Vienna, the organizational network member answered: "Security, quality of life and the proximity to other organizations. The interaction with other organiztions, they like to be here because of good communication and good travel connections to Central Asia" (Interview C6.7). The proximity of other centers referred to relevant centers, the good travel connections to physical infrastructure. This was a component of a larger narrative, that not only underlined good travel connections, but also the emerging energy hub. The other organizational network members were also explicit about the emerging energy hub in Vienna. This means that the accent is on the profile that Vienna is known for.

Comparison between organizational network successful case and policy network
The following figure shows the priorities of both groups. A main difference between the groups in the Sustainable Energy for All case is the organizational network's priority of taxes and the priority of political stability by the policy network. Whereas the policy network was focusing on livability and the quality of hospitals and health care, the Sustainable Energy for All organizational network was underlining the energy hub in Vienna and the possibility for the 'Initiative' to network and become a Quasi IO. Overlaps were found in taxes, relevant centers, and physical infrastructure. These three elements were important in both groups' narratives.

Figure 6.8 Sustainable Energy for All: priorities governmental groups (Vienna)



Comparison organizational network and international representatives
The following graph shows the overlaps and differences of the priorities between the Sustainable Energy for All organizational network and the IO representatives (Figure 6.9). A difference between the two groups was the higher ranking of taxes by the organizational network, and of political stability and level of education labor force by the international representatives.

Figure 6.9 Sustainable Energy for All: organizational network and internationals (Vienna)



The international representatives explained political stability and level of education of labor force more often. Security was also mentioned substantively. Other elements the IO representatives rated higher than the Sustainable Energy for All organizational network were settling in, security, international schools, and livability.

Comparing the priorities of all groups with correlation coefficients
Counterintuitively, the correlations between the organizational network attracting the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat and the policy network were higher than in the successful case. On the other hand, the correlations between the organizational network of the failed case and the international representatives were lower than those groups in the successful case. The following table shows these results in Kendall's tau-b.

Table 6.4 Correlations failed and successful groups on prioritizing locational elements Vienna

	Policy network	International Organizations
Arms Trade Treaty organizational network	0.70**	0.47**
Sustainable Energy for All organizational network	0.59**	0.73**

N=19. * p <.05, ** p <.01. Based on 2-tailed Kendall's tau-b.

Conclusion
The organizational network attracting the successful case of the Sustainable Energy for All showed a higher correlation with the international representatives, but a lower one with the policy network. In the failed case, overlaps between the organizational and policy network were low. The overlap with the IOs was higher, both in priorities and narratives.

6.4 Relational perspective

Relational explanation Vienna's failed case

Level of network cooperation failed case Vienna
The organizational network that cooperated to attract the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat consisted of four departments within the Foreign Ministry. The cooperation was rated high, a 7.3 (N=5). After the decision to propose a bid was made, which was quite late in the process, a meeting in Vienna was organized in April 2015. One of the central actors of the organizational network (MFA Department I.5) said about the cooperation: "We don't have strategy meetings. We have irregular ones, when needed, and weekly contact. Whenever the occasion arises, sometimes a small question pops up, then we meet or call" (Interview C3.3). The only delegations that cooperated were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Departments I.5 (IOs) and II.8 (non-proliferation), the head of the Austrian representative in New York and in Geneva: "Two each, so there were eight people in total". This organizational network member rated the cooperation a 10, she said "it was excellent" (Interview C.4.5). Another organizational network member gave the cooperation a 9 to 10: "the cooperation was sincere. It was a joint exercise by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the City, jointly dealt and monitored by the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry. We were constantly monitoring the mood" (Interview C8.10). An organizational network member that was in the Federal Chancellery rated the level of cooperation a 7 and explained: "there is a high integration of politics and economics

and of social institutions. The *Lande* [provinces] play a role as well. They offer facilities, real estate, and help to internationalize" (Interview C7.9). If the cooperation was that convenient during the failed attraction process, then what happened politically?

Political process failed case: Arms Trade Treaty

Representatives of the disarmament department of the Foreign Ministry visited the First Preparatory meeting in Port of Spain in February 2015. At this meeting, 82 states, NGOs, IOs and regional industries attended. Other actors active in the lobby for the Arms Trade Treaty to come to Vienna were the Wassenaar Arrangement, the OSCE, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) where the negotiations took place, and the Federal Chancellor on protocol issues. From the City of Vienna, the international affairs and the political departments were involved. A difficulty at that meeting was that Austria did not have much to offer, stated a Foreign Affairs employee: "They talked. Usually they bargain, but they didn't really have anything to bargain" (Interview C4.5). Another aspect was that the organizational network to attract the Arms Trade Treaty to Vienna was considered very small, compared to the two competitors. Besides, as one of the involved of the Arms Trade Treaty formulated it: "What their lobby consisted of was not slick and compelling. It was not coercive. The MFA of Switzerland was lobbying very hard; Trinidad and Tobago and Switzerland were always very passionate. Trinidad had a big team, Switzerland as well, and Austria, very small" (Interview A31.34). Cooperating with Austria, there were several NGOs but these did not give enough leeway to attract the Secretariat successfully.

Actor centrality Vienna's failed case

The betweenness centrality is seen in the centrality of the nodes. The actors in the middle were two actors of the Foreign Ministry: The Arms Control Department (II.8), and the IOs and Conferences Department (I.5). The UN General Assembly was a third central actor. These can be considered the most independent actors. Those were the ones with the broker function on the information flow. In this case, the graph below shows many actors at the periphery and three in the middle, with ten to twenty ties to others.

Figure 6.10 Actor centrality during the attraction of the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat (Vienna)[36]



Key:
Size of the nodes: bigger nodes have higher degree centrality (activity)
Node centrality: the higher the betweenness centrality (independency)
Links between the nodes: frequency of meetings (connected to node activity)
Colors: each color is a different type of node (network diversity)

The biggest nodes showed the highest degree centrality, meaning that they were the most active with the most ties to other actors in the network. These were, also, the two Foreign Ministry departments (II.8 and I.5) and, to a less extent, the UN General Assembly, and the Austrian UN representative in Geneva. When looking at the table below at the centrality measures, the highest betweenness centrality was distributed between the two Foreign Ministry departments, as was the highest degree centrality.

Table 6.5 Top five actors: Betweenness measures and node type Arms Trade Treaty (Vienna)

Node	Betweenness centrality %	Degree centrality %	Node type (diversity)
1. Foreign Ministry Dep. I.5 IOs & Conferences	14	7	1. National level
2. Foreign Ministry Dep. II.8 Arms Control	14	7	National level
3. UN General Assembly	7.5	4	2. UN/IO
4. Austrian UN Representative in Geneva	4.2	3	National level
5. Federal Chancellor	2	3	3. Parliament

36 Due to missing data, many nodes appear to be in the periphery and have the same size, while in reality this may not have been the case.

Network diversity failed case Vienna
The number of network types was five. The types were the national or federal government (eight, blue), one actor of the City of Vienna (yellow), seven of the UN (purple), one of the Parliament (red), and five NGOs (pink). The NGOs important in the attraction of the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat were linked to a lesser extent with the representatives and ambassadors than with the two main MFA Departments, the UNODC and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Furthermore, the main network members in the organizational network were involved in the two different networks, but not very connected to the 67 Signatories that voted for the Secretariat's location. The number of nodes in this case was 22, which I considered average.

Relational explanation Vienna's successful case

Level of network cooperation successful case Vienna
The rating of the cooperation within the organizational network and between this group and the policy network was high: 7 (N=6). The cooperation was between the DG of the UN Office at Vienna (UNOV) and the legal advisor of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) and law departments of the Foreign Ministry. As one of the main actors of department I.5 explained: "Without additional budgetary provisions growth is not possible – if the political will is there, the budgetary provisions will be provided – the annual budget for rent contributions to IOs stays the same, but we are faced with increasing costs each year" (Interview C4.5). This comes from the Foreign Affairs department, which was not in charge of the resources for attracting or retaining organizations. This department (the network administrative organization) was dependent on the Austrian Development Agency and Law departments, but also the Finance Ministry.

Political process successful case: Sustainable Energy for All
The organizational network was forced to increase its offer substantially and change the federal law on granting privileges to NGOs, this was a key element in the negotiations. Crucial actors in the negotiation arena were the Sustainable Energy for All itself, and other energy organizations. The political support was invaluable to the policy towards Sustainable Energy for All. The Foreign Minister in charge Sebastian Kurz (2013-2017), noted [the importance of]: "The network of Regional Energy Centers, set up by the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) and UNIDO. The centers promote the creation of regional renewable energy and energy efficiency markets and industries in partner countries. (…) Since 2009, ADA has invested more than USD 10 million in the expanding network" (Austrian Foreign Ministry, 2016). As former member of Vienna's city council, Kurz represented a formal and informal link between the City of Vienna and the Ministries. Nevertheless, the government had to choose between two evils: pay a lot to keep the organization, or let the organization go and face failure twice in a row (Arms Trade Treaty and Sustainable Energy for All).

Actor centrality successful case Vienna

The nodes most 'in the middle' with the highest betweenness centrality were the Sustainable Energy for All, the NGO REEEP and the Environment department III.6 of the Foreign Ministry.

Figure 6.11 Actor centrality during the attraction process of the Sustainable Energy (Vienna)



Key:
Size of the nodes: bigger nodes have higher degree centrality (activity)
Node centrality: the higher the betweenness centrality (independency)
Links between the nodes: frequency of meetings (connected to node activity)
Colors: each color is a different type of node (network diversity)

The Sustainable Energy for All appeared to be actor with the biggest 'broker' position in this network, strikingly the subject of the host policy but nevertheless understandable in light of the lobbying context of the case: Sustainable Energy for All brought up the topic of leaving and did everything it could in order to stay in Vienna with improved conditions. The degree centrality shows that the biggest and therefore most active nodes were Austrian representatives to the UN (the International Atomic Energy Agency) and the Foreign Ministry IO department.

When looking at the top five actors and their centrality, it is striking that the most active nodes were an IO and two NGOs, followed by the Foreign Ministry departments. This means that those non-governmental actors show the highest independence in the negotiations. The degree centrality shows a different image: the Austrian representative to the UN showed the highest activity and the second most active node was the NGO Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) – the highest degree centrality is not in this table but visible in the size of the nodes in the graph.

Table 6.6 Top five actors: Betweenness measures and node type Sustainable Energy (Vienna)

Node	Betweenness centrality %	Degree centrality %	Node type (diversity)
1. SE4All	11	5	1. UN/IO
2. REEEP (NGO)	9	5	2. NGO
3. International Renewable Energy Agency	8	4.5	UN/IO
4. Foreign Ministry Dep. III.6 Environment	7.7	5	3. National level
5. Foreign Ministry Dep. I.4 European Law	7.7	5	National level

Network diversity and number of nodes successful case Vienna

The number of types of actors was seven. Nine of them were Federal (blue), two of the City of Vienna (yellow), five UN or IO departments (purple), four NGOs (pink), three advisors (blue), one Public Private Partnership (dark blue) and two companies (light blue). The variety of this collaboration was especially broad. The companies in the energy field had clear stakes in this negotiation which they shared in order to help the Sustainable Energy for All Secretariat. The number of nodes which was 26 in this case, which was high.

Conclusion

Both cases showed high cooperation measures, although in the successful case it was lower. What struck in the structures of the networks was that in the failed case, three nodes in the middle were strongest connected to all other nodes and in the successful case with only one node 'in the middle', the well-connected network was more in the periphery. The biggest nodes formed a network with strong ties (frequent meetings) with smaller, less active nodes, and those were actively lobbying with the IO itself and with different other actors. Although the number of nodes was only slightly higher than in the failed case, the structure may have led to more effect.

6.5 Conclusions Austria and Vienna

In the failed case of the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat the bid showed an average alignment with the attraction policy goals. The successful case of Sustainable Energy for All was to a low extent aligned with the policy goals. These results were the opposite of what I expected. It is striking that less alignment between policy goals appeared to be more successful. It is also noteworthy that the international representatives were not aware of the host and branding policies of Austria and Vienna being aligned, it was not relevant to them. Comparing the policy perception and support, in the failed case the ratings of the city marketing were higher than the nation branding, as well in visibility as in effectiveness. Overall, the perception was lower than in the successful Sustainable Energy for All case. I found one main difference between the cases: respondents were positive about the Sustainable Energy for All bid, and less about the Arms Trade Treaty bid. The only elements they were negative about was that the exemption of taxes and fees was not enough. This was an expected result.

From a discursive perspective, the narratives of the organizational network attracting the failed case of the Arms Trade Treaty were concentrated around the most prioritized elements of political stability and physical infrastructure. In the narratives this organizational network overlapped more with the policy network than the Sustainable Energy for All organizational network did, as was also found in the priorities. I expected the opposite. Compared to the IO representatives, especially in the elements relevant centers nearby and physical infrastructure, the organizational network of the successful Sustainable Energy case showed higher overlaps than in the Arms Trade Treaty case. This means that the overlap with IO representatives led to a higher likelihood of success than the overlap of perceptual frames between the governmental networks.

Relationally, in terms of internal legitimacy, I found that the cooperation was rated higher in the Arms Trade Treaty case than in the Sustainable Energy for All case, but the difference was limited. In the failed case the team was small (six actors) and well-coordinated; the attraction process was a joined exercise between the Foreign Ministry and the City of Vienna. In the successful Sustainable Energy for All case the organizational network was wider. The way the network was organized created disquiet among the actors as the Sustainable Energy for All negotiated hard. What struck in the structures of the networks was the actor centrality. Whereas in the failed case, a small number of nodes was 'in the middle', in the successful case there was only one node 'in the middle', which was strongly connected to the other in the periphery. The organizational network met more frequently in the second case, and they were more involved with other actors, such as NGOs, think tanks, lobby groups (Energy Community) and private organizations (Shell and OilStat). The diversity was higher in the successful case, as was the network size.

"For us it is important that the national authorities understand how important the presence of these IOs is, and that we have to walk the extra mile"
(Quote from an officer at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018, Interview D1.2)

7 Copenhagen

7.1 Denmark and Copenhagen

Copenhagen is the economic, cultural, and governmental center of Denmark. With the Copenhagen Stock Exchange, the city also embodies one of the major financial centers of Northern Europe. Copenhagen is not traditionally a 'global' or 'political' city. It is only since 2005 that the city of Copenhagen has managed to present itself as the Sixth UN city. In 2005, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) started to move its headquarter functions from New York to Copenhagen. This was Denmark's first UN Headquarters, which officially opened in Copenhagen in 2006.

Nevertheless, the global political participation of the nation and city was already visible in 1949 when Denmark became a founding member of NATO. Denmark was also a founding member of European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Regarding its global aspirations, the first UN agency opened in Copenhagen in 1959 – the World Health Organization (WHO). Shortly afterwards, the Government of Denmark offered free office and warehouse space to UNICEF in Copenhagen to accommodate its global supply operations.

The competitive position of the Copenhagen metropolitan region is vital to Denmark, as it contributes nearly half the country's GDP (OECD, 2009). With a population of 2.4 million, the region houses 44% of the Danish population. One corporation was especially important for the growth of international Copenhagen: *By & Havn* (City & Port). The CPH City & Port Development Corporation, run by the national government, private companies, and the city since 2007, started driving the development of the Danish capital (Katz & Noring, 2017). Due to this collaboration, financial injections from several ministries and local incubators, the city started to grow rapidly from the 2010s onwards (Martinez-Fernandez, Sharpe, Andersen, Genoff, & Rovsing Kristiansen, 2013).

The Copenhagen Accord in 2009 (COP 15) put Denmark in a disadvantageous position as a host country. The Climate Summit was a failure, because the Accord between the US and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) was not legally binding and did not commit the countries to agree to a conclusive successor to the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, 2009). According to different media, one of the reasons was the host government (Black, 2009). "The government of Lars Løkke Rasmussen", wrote an environment correspondent, "put forward a draft political declaration to a select group of "important countries" thereby annoying every country not on the list, including most of the ones that feel seriously threatened by climate impacts" (Black, 2009, p. 4). Lars Løkke Rasmussen, a center right liberal, had been in office since April 2009.[37] The departure of the chief negotiator Becker coincided with the growing worries about whether governments would reach a deal after talks in Bangkok made little progress (Meilstrup, 2010; Reuters, 2009).

Copenhagen as host city
A year after the failed Copenhagen Accord, the New UN City was built in the harbor of Copenhagen: a building housing many UN agencies and other IOs, for free. UN City, the building with around 1,500 UN staffers and initiated by the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was built along the harbor in the north of Copenhagen. The building was inaugurated in April 2013 and its residents took office in 2014. The building is unique as it consumes at least 55 percent less energy than a similar-sized office building by way of wind energy, seawater, and solar power. The building is a 'state of the art' landmark for Denmark. One of the ideological architects of the building was Carsten Staur. From 2007 to 2013, he served as Permanent Representative to the UN in New York (and, since 2013, in Geneva).

Staur initiated a campaign to brand Copenhagen as 'capital for administrative and procurement departments of the UN'. Copenhagen has been moving towards becoming *the* administrative center of the UN, especially in terms of procurement. Two other global focal points of Copenhagen were the 'smart city strategy' and its ambition to become the first carbon-neutral capital by 2025. Furthermore, in 2013, the City Council set up an administrative board for smart city initiatives. Its focus is on working with open data and the establishment of a digital infrastructure in the city.

7.1.1 Case 1: United Nations Office for Project Services

The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) was established in 1973 as part of UN Development Program (UNDP) and started self-financing and independently in 1995. UNOPS is an arm of the UN that implements projects for the UN System,

37 His party Venstre is the major party of the center right in Denmark and the second largest party in the country. Nowadays, the Social Democrats run the country (2019-2023).

governments, financial institutions, and other partners. As a member of the UN Development Group, it works closely with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the UNDP, and The World Bank.

UNOPS provides project management, procurement and infrastructure services to governments, donors, and UN organizations, such as the UNICEF and the UK Department for International Development (DFID). UNOPS builds the infrastructure needed for development, such as hospitals, schools and roads in post conflict or disaster areas, as well as in economies in transition. The IO concentrates its efforts in three areas where it has a clear mandate and expertise: procurement, infrastructure, and project management. The personnel of UNOPS are spread over 80 countries.

UNOPS is considered an odd case in the multilateral environment due to its private sector and business-oriented methods and self-financing setup. Its project-based nature and the fact that it keeps a mobile workforce on mostly short-term procurement contracts earned it nicknames such as “the Uber of the United Nations” and “the Multilateral McKinsey” (Nillson, 2015, p. 2). UNOPS supports its partners with the design, restoration and construction of roads, schools, health clinics, schools, and more (UN Executive Board, 2017). For each supported project the organization charges a small fee.

Table 7.1 Course of events: Moving the UNOPS Headquarters

1994	UN General Assembly establishes UNOPS as a separate and identifiable entity
1997	Government of Denmark concludes an Interim Agreement regarding the legal status of UNOPS Division for Procurement Services in Copenhagen
2005	Measures proposed in UNOPS’ 2005 action plan and recognized by the Executive Board of the UNDP and the UNPF include the relocation of UNOPS Headquarters functions from New York
2005	Deadline for submission of offers is set for December 12 (September)
2005	The official proposals, as transmitted by the Permanent Missions to the UN are opened. Offers received from Germany, Spain, Italy, Denmark, and France (December)
2006	UNOPS’ Management Coordination Committee endorses UNOPS’ recommendation to accept the relocation offer from the Government of Denmark (January)
2006	UNOPS relocates its headquarters functions and Europe-based operations to Denmark (Copenhagen) (December)
2009	Official opening of the UNOPS Headquarters in Copenhagen
2013	UNOPS Headquarters moves to UN City Copenhagen

Course of events

The UNOPS’ Division for Procurement Services was already stationed in Copenhagen before it won the bid for the Headquarters. The other host states (and cities) in the competition were Germany (Bonn), Italy (Rome), Spain (Madrid), France (Paris), and the United Arab Emirates (Dubai) that joined the bidding later. When they expressed their interest, UNOPS formalized their decision criteria. They decided on the proximity of airports, time zone to major operations, educational level of labor markets, the post adjustment (salary costs), access to local and international labor markets, and the financial incentives: rental and operational subsidies, moving expenses, training, double occupancy of post.

The main reason UNOPS had to move from New York was due to financial problems. During 2005, UNOPS developed a plan of action to correct the income volatility and high fixed costs to become financially viable in 2006. A few options arose. One was an immediate reduction in the range of services provided to a core set of product offerings and skill sets. In May 2006, Jan Mattsson (from Sweden) was appointed Executive Director of UNOPS. Mattsson was one of the important network members in the process of moving the Headquarters from New York. UNOPS would, under his direction, put in place a dedicated financial cleanup project team. In the meantime, Interim Executive Director Gilberto Flores, who preceded Jan Mattsson, had cut a deal with Denmark: "120 jobs as a quid pro quo for, among other things, a transition fund with very few restrictions." (Russell Lee, 2006, p. 2). There was a problem: the headquarters function remaining in New York did not add up to 120 jobs. A decision was therefore made to relocate operating units as well, including those servicing mine removers in the field. After the submission of offers by Germany, Spain, Italy, Denmark, and France, all completed within four months (from September 2005 to December 12, 2005), two were the most favorable: the proposals of Denmark and Germany.

Attracting the UNOPS Headquarters: the playing field and its players

The organizational network attracting the UNOPS Headquarters to Copenhagen consisted of the State Secretary of the Development Department – Carsten Staur, the 'ideological architect of UN City' -, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Danish representative to the UN in Geneva and in New York, the Ministry of Taxation, Ministry of Commerce, and the UN Foundation. Although the Danish government had agreed to pay the costs of moving the offices including staff from New York to Copenhagen, Lars Hørmann, senior adviser in the UN Office of the Danish Foreign Ministry, was confident that the agencies gave Denmark a net gain: "The presence in Copenhagen means attractive job opportunities for Danes. About one third of the staff in Copenhagen are Danes, and only one third (…) is expected to come from New York" (Development Today, 2006, p. 3). The German bid was competitive but lacked the beneficial relocation costs and post adjustment[38], as well as coverage of telecommunications costs and the

38 The post adjustment is a variable component that is adjusted periodically to reflect changes in the cost of living in a duty station.

annual running costs of the premises. Nevertheless, Copenhagen's cards were better, partly due to the beneficial offer from the Danish government.

The UN Office for Project Services Success Measures (Copenhagen)

The first type of success was a 'factual success'. The pre-stage started in 2005, when the UNOPS management proposed an action plan which the Executive Board of the UNDP recognized. This included the relocation of the headquarters functions from New York. They set the deadline for the submissions of offers for December 12, 2005 (Stage 1). The official proposals came from Germany, Spain, Italy, Denmark, and France (Stage 2). Afterwards, the UNOPS' Management Coordination Committee endorsed UNOPS' recommendation to accept the relocation offer from Denmark (Stage 3). A year later the UNOPS relocated its headquarters functions and Europe based operations to Copenhagen (Stage 4).

Figure 7.1 First success type Copenhagen's successful case: UNOPS Headquarters



Stage 1: Letters of intent > Stage 2: Five candidates accepted > Stage 3: Danish bid endorsed > Stage 4: Copenhagen wins

The second type of success was a 'perceived success', as those involved commented positively on the attraction process. The Danish offer was quite generous. The offer was the first for a UN Headquarters in Denmark and it was also meant to attract many more UN agencies afterwards. One of the network members proclaimed: "It was a very attractive deal for UNOPS. [It was] a huge move of the global headquarters for more than 8,000 employees nationwide. It helped to attract other IOs" (Interview D9.11). There were already plans to establish a UN City building in 2005: "At the time we started negotiations with UNOPS, we also started negotiating with an Inter Agency Group and Copenhagen City on plans to establish a house for all UN organizations to be there and use that to attract more" (Interview D15.17). The Interagency Group negotiated with the city and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to see if the Nordic quarter of WHO and UNDP could join forces. He continued: "When we succeeded to get UNOPS to the city, it sparked the idea to have a more strategic approach and make attractive conditions so it should be possible to attract even more organizations" (D15.17). The overall perception of the organizational network was that the UNOPS Headquarters was a success that led to many other IOs moving to Copenhagen. The attraction also helped the negotiations for the establishment of the UN City building.

Figure 7.2 Second success type Copenhagen’s successful case: UNOPS Headquarters



Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Success > Perceived Success

7.1.2 Case 2: Sustainable Energy for All

The playing field around the Sustainable Energy for All case has been explained in the previous chapter. The Danish organizational network consisted of the Protocol Department, the Climate and Energy Department, the Green Growth Department, and the Environment Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Tax Agency and the Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs, the UN Foundation, and the Danish Representative to the UN in New York.

The Canadian letter of interest was sent late April 2015. Nevertheless, the Canadian government withdrew from the bid a few weeks later. Although they attended the SE4ALL conference in New York in May 2015 with a delegation (the Embassy, Montréal International and some Quebec Representatives to the UN) the new government did not see the attraction as a priority anymore. The remaining bidding countries were Denmark (Copenhagen) and Austria (Vienna); the others, Italy, and Barbados, did not make it to the second round. In the end, it was a choice between Vienna (the status quo) and Copenhagen (with a very generous offer).

The Danish letter of interest was sent in an early stage, the bid book contained an offer with rent-free premises and financial benefits. A problem arose when the attraction process was in full swing: re-elections of the Danish Prime Minister. Helle Thorning-Schmidt, a social democrat who was in office from 2011-2015 called for re-elections in June 2015, exactly after the bid was handed in and after a telephone interview with Sustainable Energy for All. Having this interim government was inconvenient for the organizational network and caused reservations about the bid. The new Prime Minister, the Liberal Lars Løkke Rasmussen who was also in office between 2009-2011, was appointed on June 28, 2015, just before the committee decided on the location. He immediately confirmed and supported the bid. Tax benefits and concrete rules and regulations were however dependent on the status of the partnership to be chosen under Danish law: “Sustainable Energy for All could be established as a non-commercial foundation; another possibility would be the establishment as a not-for-profit association. For these types of organizations, several forms for tax exemptions can apply, including regarding income tax on Sustainable Energy for All” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2015a). These were, however, not the requested privileges and immunities. The decision of the Sustainable Energy for All to stay in Vienna was taken in July 2015, when it was not an 'Initiative' anymore, but a Quasi-IO under Austrian law.

The Sustainable Energy for All Success Measures (Copenhagen)

The first type of success was coined a moderate factual failure, as the host city made it halfway the decision-making process. The pre-stage started with the Sustainable Energy for All renting a floor in the Adromeda Tower in Vienna. When they rented another floor, which was not explicitly agreed upon, the organization sent out a Request for Proposals. The five candidates reacted with letters of intent (Denmark, Austria, Canada, Barbados, Italy) (Stage 1). In the second phase of the process, three candidates sent their follow-up letters (Stage 2), and in the third phase the Austrian government made it clear that they would meet the needs of the organization in offering them special status. This was also the stage where Copenhagen left the process. Such a status was not possible in Denmark (Stage 3). In the last stage, the Sustainable Energy for All announced that they would stay in Vienna. No voting procedure was necessary (Stage 4).

Figure 7.3 First success type Copenhagen's failed case: Sustainable Energy



Stage 1: Letters of intent > Stage 2: Follow-up letters > Stage 3: Austria writes new law > Stage 4: Vienna wins

The second type of success was a 'moderate perceived failure'. Full engagement was important, and yet some organizational network members complained. One of them found an error in the interactions with others, such as institutions dealing with energy. One of the reasons the engagement was not absolute, was due to the internal debate, about whether Sustainable Energy for All was slightly over-demanding. The Ambassador to the UN presented the case to the committee in New York to decide on the location and found that "It took more argument to move them out, since they already were in Vienna" (Interview D15.17). Most of the organizational network members were positive about the process, especially about the engagement. As one of the actors recalled: "We learned how to streamline the processes; the government has not been opposing" (Interview D14.16). Apart from the difficulty in giving the IO tax exceptions in Denmark and the change of government, those involved had a positive judgement of it.

Figure 7.4 Second success type for the failed case of Copenhagen: Sustainable Energy

Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Failure > Moderate Perceived Success > Perceived Success

7.2 Instrumental perspective

Instrumental explanation Copenhagen's successful case

Greater Copenhagen focused on two frameworks and four strategic growth areas in 2005. The frameworks were 'Efficient and sustainable mobility' and 'Highly skilled workforce and internationalization'. The second framework focused on attracting international talent and aimed to internationalize. Also, public-private cooperation needed to be enhanced (The Capital Region of Denmark, 2006, p. 14). The first framework – sustainable mobility – led to investments in carbon emissions, international accessibility, quality of life and health and mobility. The four growth areas were: health and welfare technology growth, green growth, creative growth, and smart growth. There was, however, no explicit mention of the attraction of IOs.

Host policy goals, 2005

When the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote a letter of interest for UNOPS in December 2005, 770 UN staff were based in Denmark. The existing UN organizations were scattered all over the city, but mostly concentrated in the UN House near the city center. The Government of Denmark offered "an attractive business environment" based on the strategy "Denmark in a global economy" (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005, p. 2). The goals of this policy were cohesion and strong competitiveness. World-class education attainment was needed to achieve these goals: 3% of GDP expenditure on research and development and the largest number of business startups and high growth startups in Europe (OECD, 2008).

Nation branding goals, 2005

The Cartoon Crisis of 2005 marked a turning point in the Danish brand. In September 2005 a depiction of Prophet Muhammad in *Jyllands-Posten* caused protests worldwide and Danish products were banned from stores in Islamic regions. In almost all parameters Denmark's ranking worsened, excluding exports (Anholt, 2008). Especially in Egypt and Turkey, the Danes were put on the bottom of the list (50 out of 50). In a study conducted by the Chamber of Commerce of Denmark, internationals described the Cartoon crisis as more harmful to Denmark's brand than Danish companies did (Mordhorst, 2015). This study and the Anholt's Brand Index found that Denmark was generally viewed as a closed society, especially because of the strict visa rules, Danish immigration policy, and the Cartoon Crisis (Mordhorst, 2015). According to the Danish Prime Minister at the time, Anders Fogh Rasmussen (2001-2009 in office), the conflict should be regarded as a window of opportunity: "There is a focus on Denmark, and we shall try to use this actively. Therefore, I have initiated a strategy that will secure a focused, active, and global marketing of Denmark. It will be carried out in close collaboration with the corporate sector" (Angell & Mordhorst, 2015). The following year, the government launched a nation branding program. It included an effort to integrate business with politics and the allocation of resources for strengthening Denmark's reputation. The nation branding program's objective was to improve Denmark's position on the Nation Brands Index (NBI), from its 14th place (in 2007) to among the top 10.

City marketing goals, 2006

The ambition of the Copenhagen municipality was that in 2015, the capital should be Northern Europe's most attractive metropolis for living, studying, entrepreneurism and visiting. The 2005-2009 City Development Strategy stressed sustainability, affordability, accessibility to the water and economic dynamism. In addition to that, the city of Copenhagen tried to relax regulations for businesses by initiating the project 'Gearing up Copenhagen' which aimed to secure deregulation and ease business creation by establishing a single-entry point (Cremer, 2016). It entailed a more permissive approach to events and concerts in the public spaces in the city, as well as flexible stalls and outdoor service from restaurants and cafés (OECD, 2008). The city marketing goals were, in short, sustainability, affordability, accessibility to the water and economic dynamism.

Bid for UNOPS, 2005

The Danish host agreement was based on an offer presented in a letter of interest of the Danish government on December 2, 2005. The letter was directed to Executive Director Gilberto Flores and referred to a meeting on November 9, 2005, with the Dutch Transition Advisor Johan van de Gronden and the Delegation from UNOPS (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005). State Secretary Carsten Staur signed the letter; a leaflet describing the package offered by the Government of Denmark was enclosed. First, the Danish Government offered premises free of charge to accommodate 120 professional and administrative staff, consultants, and short-term personnel. Facilities comprised the required meeting, training, crisis management and conference rooms (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005, p. 1). Denmark is mentioned as a low-risk country in terms of threats against international personnel and organizations; the premises foreseen for UNOPS would be fully equipped and ready from early spring 2006, and Denmark would cover the annual running costs of the office facilities (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005).

Secondly, the bid highlighted Denmark's support of UNOPS' ambition to become a competitive partner providing infrastructure and reconstruction support services in post-conflict and crisis countries. Thirdly, Denmark offered an attractive business environment for UN organizations. Fourthly, the bid mentioned the smooth transition for staff, highlighting the family-friendly environment Copenhagen has created with its high-quality international schools (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005, p. 2). The last article of the host state agreement is intriguing; "It is understood that, should the Government enter into an agreement which accords a more favorable treatment than accorded to UNOPS in this Agreement, UNOPS shall have the right to request that similar treatment be also extended to UNOPS" (UNOPS and the Government of Denmark, 2007, p. 17). This shows that Denmark was acting fiercely in the 'bidding war' for IOs.

Table 7.2 Alignment between policies and bid for the UNOPS Headquarters

UNOPS bid	Host policy	Nation branding	City Marketing	Policy alignment
Goals in key words / Elements in the UNOPS bid:	Strong competitiveness and strong cohesion.	Improve Denmark's position on the Nation Brands Index (NBI)	Sustainability, affordability, accessibility to the water and economic dynamism.	The following elements from the UNOPS bid showed alignment on the *depth of information* dimension:
1. Premises free of charge, low risk country	Highly skilled workforce and internationalization		Secure deregulation and ease business creation by establishing a single-entry point	'Denmark fully supports UNOPS' **Alignment with two policies**
2. Denmark supports UNOPS' position as competitive partner	Strong competitiveness	improve Denmark's position on the Nation Brands Index (NBI)	-	'Friendly for staff' **Alignment with one policy**
3. Attractive business environment	Attracting international talent	Integrate business with politics	Relax regulation for businesses	provide to UNOPS and its personnel security **No alignment**
4. Smooth transition for staff, spouse, and children friendly environment	Goal to internationalize	Make Denmark better known through hosting world-class events	Copenhagen based UN Organizations established close relations	'Attractive business environment for UN organizations' **Alignment with two policies**

Categorical concurrence

The first dimension of alignment turned out high: 83 percent or 10 of the 12 boxes were filled. Many elements of the host state agreement were mentioned in the policy goals, especially the last two: attractive business environment and smooth transition for staff, family-friendly environment. The first two – premises free of charge and Denmark supports UNOPS position as competitive partner – were aligned with the policy goals to a lesser extent.

Depth of information

The second dimension showed an alignment of 42 percent where 5 of the 12 elements in the bid were elaborated upon. As depicted in table 7.2 this alignment was low. The alignment was especially found with the host policy and city marketing goals, for example in the first element, premises free of charge. The attractive business environment and Denmark as a global economy were elaborated on in the host policy goals, which aligned with the 'Denmark fully supports UNOPS' aspect of this element in the bid. In the city marketing goals this topic was elaborated on in the 'secure deregulation and ease business creation by establishing a single-entry point'. This policy goal also expressed a strong support for business related initiatives. The other aspect that aligned with host policy and city marketing was smooth transition for staff. The goal to internationalize was articulated and elaborated on in the host policy, and in the city marketing, the goal 'Copenhagen-based UN organizations establish close relations' showed strong alignment.

Perception of host policy and support Copenhagen's successful case

Perception of branding policies

Most respondents found the nation branding more visible than the city marketing and more effective to attract IOs. The explanation behind these ratings was diverse. The city marketing was, in the eyes of a UNOPS Office Manager "Not visible to the UN". He was more positive about the nation branding: "The attention you get from the top is pro UN and UN City, they attracted so many" (Interview D17.19). There were also representatives with the opposite reaction, such as an employee at the World Bank Group, who found the visibility of nation branding lower than the city marketing: "Denmark doesn't have the best reputation any longer because of the refugee policies" (Interview D21.24). Another respondent was positive about the effectiveness of Danish branding: "Denmark got a lot of attention, especially in the US of the democrats: Hilary Clinton and Sanders both referred to the flexicurity model of Denmark and the windmills are important: Denmark owns 80% of the global expansion of windmills" (Interview D24.27). This aspect was a plus minus because the answers were mixed.

Figure 7.5 Perception of host policy and support Copenhagen (N=15)



Perception of elements in the bid

The elements in the bid were premises free of charge, support of UNOPS' competitive position, business environment and smooth transition. Respondents reacted quite positively on the first element; premises free of charge: "I think the most important for UNOPS was cost. Because the organization was in financial chaos with a very high cost for rental office space in New York and the Board in this financial crisis went out and asked member states who can give UNOPS free office space". On the second, support of UNOPS, one respondent said: "The IOs are very much interested in support" (Interview D1.1). Many respondents thought about the next aspect, business environment, particularly when discussing the Danish priorities and possibilities to start a business, related to the program for spouses: "You can do the Startup Denmark program if you are not EU. Business concept, you need some money to start up, prove some things: you need to prove a business concept and you need a business plan" (Interview D4.6). Many were positive about the last element of a smooth transition. The respondents found this very important but thought it took "a bit of time", and some found the process to settle in "relatively smoother in Austria and in the Netherlands, compared to Denmark" (Interview D28.31). This locational item was coined a plus because most of the reactions were positive.

Perception of rules and regulations

The rules and regulations were commented upon quite diversely. One of the UNOPS representatives said: "It is a negotiation; at the time you really needed to do your homework" (Interview D17.19). Another one found the rules and regulations were organized extremely well because "we can hire internationally even for local staff", and she continued: "We can advertise on the website and hire somebody from China or Chili, and they get working permits to work for us" (Interview D21.24). The respondent found that some of the rules were still unclear: "There are still certain aspects of taxation that are in a grey zone and not sorted out, such as ownership of property abroad and where you would be taxed and those kinds of things" (D21.24). Apart from these difficulties, most thought that the rules were well organized. This item was therefore coined a plus.

Government support

In terms of support and how the government handled complaints, the respondents were relatively positive. The International House [the city help desk for expats], one respondent said, "was not very helpful. We have 2,500 expats in total, our capacity is small. To engage is difficult" (Interview D17.19). Political support and funding from the government was considered good, especially in relation to the UNOPS host state agreement. The only problem is the different packages for IOs, one found: "Denmark should give a clearer package across the board. What would make a difference is to retain the privileges and to make it simpler, and I would even say to have a presence of the city of Copenhagen in the building" (Interview D28.31). The respondent made clear that the Danish government should not be overly concerned about the costs of IOs, because they bring in more money paying for housing, food and consumer goods. This subject is considered a plus as the support was seen as sufficient.

Instrumental explanation Copenhagen's failed case

Danish strategies have been called aggressive by other candidates. The Danish International Development Agency (Danida) of the Foreign Ministry launched a brochure in December 2012, titled "We Welcome You in Denmark – Move to The New UN City In Copenhagen" (Danish Foreign Ministry, 2012). It was an offer for all UN organizations settled elsewhere. In 2015, the first strategy paper about hosting IOs in Denmark stated: "There is a tough international competition for the attractiveness of UN organizations. The grant for establishment and the offer for free rent are therefore considered to be crucial elements of Copenhagen's competitiveness as a UN host city." (Development Policy and Global Cooperation, 2015, p. 2). In short, the aggressive characterization of Denmark may have been a realistic representation.

Host policy goals, 2015

However eager Denmark was to host IOs, it needed to be more profitable for the country. The grant for the UN agencies' moving costs and establishment for example, up to USD

100,000 per share – used in 2013 and 2014 – would come to an end: "These 'attractive funds' (…) are no longer sold from 2016 onward" stated a strategic team (Development Policy and Global Cooperation, 2015, p. 2). Other changes were the possible opening of a new campus nearby, an option that would provide a larger number of office spaces. Some advice given to the Foreign Minister showed an overview of Copenhagen's competitors, "Especially with the other European office seats and UN host cities Vienna, Geneva, Rome and Budapest. Denmark has previously assured other host countries that it is only actively seeking to promote the relocation of several organizations to Copenhagen in cases where the issue of relocation is already being discussed or raised from other sources" (Development Policy and Global Cooperation, 2015, p. 3). The Danish government used this advice. Whereas they actively attracted all interested UN organizations in 2012 when filling up the UN City, now, they would only contact organizations looking for relocation, such as UNICEF's Private Fundraising and Partnerships. The Danish host policy goals were to remain a strong supporter of the UN and one of the top donors to UN funds and programs (Development Policy and Global Cooperation, 2015).

Nation branding goals, 2015

One of the actions towards a better brand the Danish government undertook after the Cartoon Crisis was the establishment of an advisory Globalization Council in 2005 (Sørensen, 2008). This resulted in The Globalization Strategy of Denmark: a strategy supported by Danish Parliament. The goal of the strategy was to make Denmark better known through hosting world-class events, improving coordination of the different marketing activities, and assuring more synergy between public and private sector marketing activities. This would be achieved through the joint communication platform and mainly by inviting the world to Denmark and branding the image inside the country. Five special focus areas were Denmark as a creative nation, a study destination, a tourist destination, an investment location, and the modernization of export promotion. By 2015, the Global Strategy aimed to have Denmark ranked among the top 10 OECD and emerging economies in terms of people's perceptions of the country's strengths and skills. Cross-cutting initiatives were the "branding Denmark initiative (the marketing Denmark fund and stronger coordination), public diplomacy, intensified international PR activities, increased use of the internet, and a digital movie about Denmark" (Sørensen, 2008, p. 6). Whether or not these measures helped, the brand of Denmark did become more visible. Denmark increased in the country index from ranking 19th out of 110 countries in 2010 to 9th out of 75 countries in 2015 (FutureBrand Index, 2015). Diplomacy played a more central role in branding and being part of the Nordic Brand became more important to Denmark (Mordhorst, 2017).

City marketing goals, 2015

In 2012, the city of Copenhagen was 3rd in the ranking of the richest cities in the world, 9th in the Mercer Quality of Living Survey and 8th in the top smart cities on the planet. The city has been named the 'most livable' city worldwide and ranked first several times in the World Happiness Report. Copenhagen occupied the top position for its high quality of life and environmental protection (Ni & Kresl, 2011). When Denmark attracted the Sustainable Energy for All, Copenhagen had just been named the 2014 European Green Capital (Pisano, Lepuschitz, & Berger, 2014). According to the City of Copenhagen Municipal Plan of 2015 'The Coherent City', the city should grow towards a sustainable city socially, economically, and environmentally. The policy goals were a "green residential city, coherent, quality of life, growth and jobs, and investment in Greater Copenhagen, with the creation of an international hub" (City of Copenhagen, 2015, p. 7).

Sustainable Energy for All bid, 2015

The bid for the Sustainable Initiative consisted of 12 pages containing six short chapters and a table summing everything up. The six chapters covered financial contributions, facilities, taxation, legal status and status for the partnership staff, public infrastructure and services, and amenities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2015b). The offer started by stating that Denmark was among the first countries supporting Sustainable Energy for All, both politically and financially. Up until that moment the Danish Government had supported Sustainable Energy for All entities with a total of 186.7 million Danish kroner (which was 25.1 million euros in January 2021). The bid also explained why Denmark believes in the Sustainable Energy for All Initiative: the sustainable development goal on energy is a high priority for the Danish Government. The bid included several additional examples of its many contributions to the energy field.

The second section, facilities, promoted the UN City as a certified building with high standards for sustainability and energy efficiency. Denmark also offered one-time financial relocation support covering several specific purposes mentioned in their letter of interest (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2015b).

In the third section, taxation, the offer was straightforward. In terms of tax benefits, they depended on the status of the Initiative (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2015b, p. 6).

The fourth section, legal status and status for partnership staff, stated that "If established as an international not-for-profit organization, Sustainable Energy for All will enjoy the legal status awarded to international non-governmental organizations in Denmark which does not include diplomatic status to neither the organization nor its staff" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2015b, p. 7). It added that if Sustainable Energy for All would establish as an IO under Danish law at a later stage, the organization would be granted those privileges and immunities required to fulfill its mandate in the most effective and professional way.

The fifth section, public infrastructure and services, covered the easy access, sustainable public infrastructure, and the main traffic hub function of Copenhagen Airport. Hotel and meeting facilities were mentioned, as well as the accessibility of education. The highly educated and scientifically advanced workforce was underlined as well; 96 percent of young people having completed secondary education and 47 percent tertiary education (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2015b, p. 9).

The sixth section, amenities, gave an overview of Denmark and Copenhagen as an international hub. It mentioned the focus of Denmark and the UN City on energy and sustainable development, while highlighting the UNEP-DTU Partnership working in the field of climate, energy and sustainable development, and other partnerships. Denmark was later denominated as a 'green growth and clean tech hub'.[39] The high livability rank was also mentioned: Copenhagen had been designated the most livable city in the world in Monocle's Quality of Life Survey both in 2013 and 2014.

Table 7.3 Alignment between policies and bid for the Sustainable Energy (Copenhagen)

Type of policy	**Host policy**	**Nation branding**	**City Marketing**	**Policy alignment**
Goals in keywords / Elements in the SE4All bid:	supporter of the UN. Denmark is among the top donors to UN funds and program.	By 2015, Denmark is ranked amongst the top ten of all OECD countries	City is sustainable socially, economically, and environmentally.	The following elements from the SE4All bid showed alignment on the *depth of information* dimension:
1. Financial contributions	office space free of rent and the opportunity to explore the possibility for additional support	Rent-free offer	Growth and jobs, and investment in Greater Copenhagen	Supporting SE4All, Additional grants **Alignment with one policy**
2. Facilities	global responsibility – UN organizations with the best possible facilities	Great access to operational and strategic synergies	easily accessible location	Rent-free premises, one-time financial relocation support. **Full alignment**

39 Falsely, it said "teach hub" instead of "tech hub". Such small mistakes probably did not affect the decision that was taken, but it shows inaccuracies in the making of the bid.

Type of policy	Host policy	Nation branding	City Marketing	Policy alignment
3. Taxation	The grant of the UN agencies' moving costs no longer sold	-	-	No tax benefits, except research positions. **No alignment**
4. Legal status and status for partnership staff	Denmark takes its global responsibility seriously		-	No diplomatic status for staff unless SE4All is established as an IO under Danish law. **Alignment with one policy**
5. Public infrastructure and services	the top in international quality of life indexes	Highly developed infrastructural capabilities	most livable city, high accessibility	Well-connected city with sustainable public infrastructure. **Alignment with two policies**
6. Amenities	Great opportunities for families	expatriates in Denmark express high satisfaction	Prime location, high security, (…)	International hub with focus on energy and sustainable development, green growth and clean tech**. Alignment with two policies**

Categorical concurrence

The categorical concurrence between the bid and policy goals was 78 percent or 14 of the 18 boxes (Table 7.3). I found several co-occurrences between the bid for Sustainable Energy for All and the attraction policies. The elements in the bid overlapped especially with Denmark's host policy, albeit often negatively. For instance, when the bid's goal was mentioning Taxation, the host policy stated, 'the grant of the UN agencies' moving costs are no longer sold'. The alignment with the city marketing and nation branding were similar. The only elements that had a very low alignment with policy goals were taxation, and legal status and status for partnership staff.

Depth of information

The second dimension of alignment was average: 50 percent or 9 of the 18 boxes were highlighted. This means that only 9 of the 14 found co-occurrences were elaborated upon. Host policy and city marketing goals were most aligned with the bid. The most developed element in all the policy goals was facilities. The second-best covered elements were public infrastructure and services in which the host policy and the city marketing goals were specified, and amenities which was broadly covered in host policy and nation branding goals. The alignment between the elements in the bid and the city marketing goals was mainly found in the green residential city, in the investment of an international hub and in the sustainable angle the city marketing promoted. These issues were also crucial in the bid. This shows that policies need to be explicitly directed to the IO the city and host state want to attract.

Perception of host policy and support Copenhagen’s failed case

Perception of branding policies

A respondent from the Danish Refugee Council found the UN City “an enormous boost and a move forward of the visibility of Copenhagen. There were people in Geneva who felt overwhelmed by Copenhagen” (Interview D24.27). A last observation of someone who thought the city marketing was less visible than the nation branding came from a UNHCR employee who stated: “Denmark is visible at the airport. Carlsberg, Tuborg, the Danish flag, they are more visible than Copenhagen” (Interview D27.30). When responding to the effectiveness of city marketing and nation branding in order to attract IOs, there were also more positive ratings of the national than the local policies.[40] One of the IO representatives who found the effectiveness equally effective, “an 8 or 9”, considered Wonderful Copenhagen [a local branding organization] “fairly successful: first in features was the bicycle, that was in the *New York Times*, there is even a word for it: to make a city bicycle friendly is *to Copenhagenize*” (Interview D24.27). To attract IOs, some thought the branding policies were crucial. One of the IO representatives thought the nation branding was “a 7, in terms of innovation or green solutions. I think Denmark is very strong in wind power” (Interview D23.26). He rated the effectiveness of the city marketing “a 5 or 6, for IOs it is not about trying to convince them, it is more about the labor force and the cost here” (D23.26). The branding policies were coined a plus minus, as the reactions were mixed.

Perception of elements in the bid

Many IO representatives talked about the competition that Copenhagen experienced. On the elements in the bid, which were mainly financial, tax and facilities issues, the competitiveness was high. As one of the respondents said: “there could be a competition about who gets the donors and who gets the funds within the UN system” (Interview D17.19). Another representative voiced it as such: “I heard that some cities are quite upset with Denmark for having been so aggressive in attracting entities, including entities that had moved from Geneva, Vienna or elsewhere, or that these places were interested in attracting from somewhere, so it has created some friction between

40 With a mean of 5.1 for city marketing and a minimum of 2 and a max of 8.5 versus a mean of 6.2 with a minimum of 3 and a max of 8.5.

countries" (Interview D21.24). About the financial issues, especially the cost of the labor force, IO representatives were quite positive: "Here in Copenhagen, most of the staff is locally recruited. Having access to that work force that is capable is very important. Because local labor force is less costly" (Interview D23.26). From the part of the UNDP, this respondent added: "We are exploring other locations: New York, Kuala Lumpur, they are looking into it" (D23.26). The perception of the elements in the bid is coined a minus, as the competition was felt, in a negative way, on most of the elements in the bid.

Perception of rules and regulations and support

The rules and regulations were not well organized, according to most IO representatives. This was because of a change in the law for obtaining identity numbers. In Denmark, everyone owns a digitalized CPR number, where all social services are stored and several other services can be accessed, such as educational facilities, but also telephone company agreements and bank accounts (FYI Denmark, 2019). Since 2016, European citizens can obtain this number in the UN System: they can choose between a residential CPR or an administrative CPR. With the residential CPR they get the Danish benefits but loose the UN ones (such as owning a tax-free house abroad or other VAT regulations). Since 2016, non-EU members can only get an administrative CPR, whereby many online self-services are inaccessible (Protocol Department MFA, 2018). Due to this change, one respondent even felt "treated as an insignificant minority" (Interview D26.29). Another said that the problems with CPR numbers "creates a divide between internationals in this house, it is not One UN" (Interview D19.21). These issues were considered as the main problem in the reception of the policy by IOs: "Families need to be integrated if you want to attract people in the long run" (Interview D18.20). The rules and regulations were coined a minus because of these issues.

Government support

In the period when the Sustainable Energy IO was attracted, the main problem was the legitimation cards and the minimum help international employees experienced from the International House Welcome Center with problems concerning housing, healthcare, and their status when coming from a non-EU member state. "The big difference is that Scandinavian countries tend to be more digital, so many things are linked to an identification number" said one UN employee, who thought the difficulty was mainly "that they have not extended the CPR scheme to the UN staff, which they should" (Interview D28.31). He found that the level of trust the government had in international employees was problematic. "They are tying lots of things to the CPR number to fight immigration and money being transferred, but the solution would be to extend the CPR system, all the UN staff within the UN are quite legal" (D28.31).

Conclusion
In the successful UNOPS-case the bid was less aligned with the host and branding policy goals than in the failed Sustainable Energy for All case, which showed an average alignment. This is the opposite of what I expected. When looking at policy perception and support, the international employees were more positive about the host policies and elements in the bid in the first and successful UNOPS case, which was due to host policy changes, for the worst.

7.3 Discursive perspective

Discursive explanation Copenhagen's successful case

Priorities and narratives of the organizational network
For the organizational network attracting the UNOPS Headquarters, the following elements were the highest priorities: taxes, relevant centers, political stability and physical infrastructure. The narrative explaining taxes was clear, as one respondent said, "The fact that IOs will have free housing, the tax settlements and a satisfactory host state agreement are bottom line" (Interview D16.18). Relevant centers and political stability were not prominent in the narratives, although the element of relevant centers was mentioned several times. The success of the new building UN City had, according to some, a 'flywheel effect' for other UN agencies since the opening in April 2013 (Interview D3.4). Another important representative of the organizational network, working at the Protocol Department of the Foreign Ministry found the decision mostly political: "The most important element is free housing. Settlements for foreigners are well organized: if these things are satisfactory, then the reputation of the city is important" (Interview D16.18). Regarding the physical infrastructure, the organizational network members underlined 'being a major hub' as a goal they praised their connectivity to African countries. The number of flights to Central Europe was limited, which some found a concern.

Priorities and narratives of the policy network in both cases
The policy network retaining IOs (N=15) highlighted phyisical infrastructure, political stability and livability. Many were working on making foreigners feel at home and underlined livability, since Copenhagen was also one of the highest ranked in that area (World Happiness Report, 2017; Social Progress Index 2017, 2017). A bit lower on the list but prominent in the narratives was the level of education of the labor force. In the narratives the context for this latter became clear: "The level of education of the labor force is high in Denmark; it is quite easy to get qualified staff. We heard that some of them at that time wanted to renew their staff and (…) they were certain that kick starting the organization in Denmark was an option (Interview D1.1). The policy network was eager to mention the high level of expertise in Copenhagen. They thought the availability

of a labor force was not a problem for IOs (hence the low rank). Another narrative I found concerned security: "A lot of conferences were moved because of people's fear of terrorism. We have seen that lately when there had been a terrorist attack in Istanbul, they don't want to place next year's conference there" (Interview D13.15). This respondent and others did not hesitate to add that Denmark was one of the safest countries.

Comparison of organizational and policy network in the successful case
The following figure shows the priorities of the two groups in the UNOPS case. The most remarkable difference is the taxes element, which the organizational network ranked higher. Labor force availability was rated significantly higher by the organizational network than by the other groups.[41] The differences in the narratives, especially on the labor force issues were framed differently by the policy network. They focused more on the level of education and were leaning on a presumed sufficient availability in the city. Two elements with overlap were physical infrastructure and political stability.

Figure 7.6 UNOPS: priorities governmental groups



Priorities and narratives of international representatives in both cases
The group of international representatives (N=12) prioritized physical infrastructure, settling in, and level of education of the labor force. About settling in, one also found "time

41 A Kruskal Wallis H Test showed this: $H(3) = 7.13$, $\rho = 0.068$

zones very important. What I observe is that IOs chose more central points" (Interview D23.26). The hospitals, international schools and dual career items were overrepresented in the narratives of international representatives. Many found international schools crucial as part of the quality of life element. As a member of the Danish Refugee Council said: "We hear a lot that people like it here, they are biking, the kids are in school, living is easy." (Interview D24.27).

When the second case was attracted, the international representatives demonstrated a negative narrative about foreigners settling in. As one of the UN employees explained, there were two concerns: within a family only one type of CPR could be obtained, meaning that when one member gets the administrative 'second rank' CPR number, their spouse can work, but they remain invisible in the digital system. It is difficult to get health insurance, a bank account, an internet connection, and a mobile phone contract. In the narrative many mentioned the impracticalities that accompanied it. To give one example: Since children get dental care at national schools and not at international schools, some international children could not get a dentist appointment, as one UNHCR employee explained: "UNOPS recently wrote an e-mail to the whole UN family that there was an emergency, if anyone knew a dentist, as the daughter of an employee was in heavy pain and could not be received anywhere until finally one dentist agreed to help her" (Interview D19.21). "It is fine the admin CPR" she continued, "but it has its shortcomings, and we believe it only needs a little fix, a twist in the software so they are visible, but not really receive what a tax paying citizen is receiving" (D19.21). Secondly, a UNOPS employee found the divide between EU- and non-EU-members ridiculous: "the UN is all about equal opportunities. This is not possible with a permit system like this" (Interview D18.20).

Comparison of organizational network and international representatives in the successful case

The differences between the UNOPS organizational network and the international representatives were concentrated around the elements livability and settling in. The internationals rated dual careers significantly higher than the other groups. Other elements connected to livability such as international schools and hospitals were crucial to the internationals. An overlap was found in the physical infrastructure, settling in and labor force issues. All in all, there were many differences between the two groups.

Figure 7.7 UNOPS: organizational network and internationals



Discursive explanation Copenhagen's failed case

Priorities and narratives of organizational network in the failed case

The Sustainable Energy for All organizational network (N=7) prioritized relevant centers significantly higher than the other groups.[42] One narrative on this was voiced by the former State Secretary: "It is important that you can move to an environment where there is UN presence already, you can buy into common services and by that have a more cost-efficient business case" (Interview D15.17). This cost-efficiency reason was a leading narrative of the organizational network. Other priorities were level of education of the labor force, physical infrastructure, and taxes. About the first, a Foreign Ministry actor stated that "organizations move to a location where the level of education is high, the staff is highly qualified here. Quite a few Danes work on UN contracts in the UN City. This is important that there are people here for the higher functions" (Interview D1.1). A much-discussed element was taxes. This component was crucial for the attraction of Sustainable Energy for All, as the organization requested a non-existent status for its employees. As one of the organizational network members said: "Organizations use the host state agreement to bargain for support, core support, and projects. They will use that

42 A Kruskal Wallis H Test showed this: $H(3) = 7.13$, $\rho = 0.072$

information to put pressure on their current host government" (Interview D1.1). The organizational network actor added: "For us it is important that the national authorities understand how important the presence of these IOs is, and that we have to walk the extra mile" (Interview D1.2). This actor referred to the internal lobby to emphasize to other departments the importance of hosting IOs and the drive required as an organizational network.

Comparison of organizational and policy network in the failed case

The policy network rated physical infrastructure and taxes highest, and the Sustainable Energy for All organizational network rated level of education of the labor force and settling in higher. This was also manifested in the narratives. Many policy network members boasted about the highly educated workforce in Copenhagen. This was also something they thought the IOs considered interesting. Differences between the groups were that the policy network never mentioned the availability of the labor force and they rated the cost of hiring and digital infrastructure higher than the organizational network did. The organizational network attracting Sustainable Energy for All prioritized taxes. Figure 7.8 depicts these priorities.

Figure 7.8 Sustainable Energy for All: priorities governmental groups (Copenhagen)



Comparison of organizational network and international representatives in the failed case

The main overlaps between the Sustainable Energy for All-organizational network and the internationals were the focus on livability and physical infrastructure. The organizational network was focused on the so-called hard factors, such as taxes, political stability, and physical infrastructure – whereas internationals prioritized soft factors such as livability. One of the IO representatives said: "Looking at the Budapest example, that governments do go the extra mile to have the organizations on their territory" (Interview D25.28). What this means, is that they also found that the organizational network needs to take the process seriously and do everything they can to attract IOs successfully. It is striking that few priorities correspond, except for physical infrastructure and livability. Figure 7.9 shows the priorities of both groups.

Figure 7.9 Sustainable Energy for All: organizational network and internationals (Copenhagen)



Comparing the priorities of all groups with correlation coefficients

The table below shows the overlap between how the groups rated the 20 locational elements. The organizational network attracting the Sustainable Energy for All showed a higher overlap with the policy network than the organizational network attracting the successful UNOPS-case did. This was an unexpected result. When looking at the overlap with international representatives, the successful case showed a higher overlap than the failed Sustainable Energy for All case, which I expected.

Table 7.4 Correlations failed and successful groups on prioritizing locational elements Copenhagen

	Policy network	International Organizations
UNOPS organizational network	0.38**	0.54*
Sustainable Energy for All organizational network	0.55**	0.3

N=20. * p <.05, ** p <.01. Based on 2-tailed Kendall's tau-b.

Conclusion
The results are only partly as expected. The differences between the organizational network attracting the UNOPS and policy network were about labor force availability and taxes which were rated higher by the organizational network. The Sustainable Energy for All organizational network showed higher overlaps with the policy network, both in priorities and narratives. The overlaps with the IO representatives were higher in the successful case. This was as expected, but the organizational network and the policy network show lower overlaps in the successful case, which I did not expect.

7.4 Relational perspective

Relational explanation Copenhagen's successful case

Level of network cooperation in the successful case: UNOPS
Although the rating of cooperation within the organizational network and between them and the policy network was average: 6,6 (N=8), the comments were not extremely negative. One of the policy network members said: "We meet on a regular basis and within International House, we meet all the time. Apart from some issues with the State Administration, the cooperation is quite good" (Interview D5.8). A problem a respondent identified was the bureaucracy: "if they need extra support we need to find out where and who to go to and that takes time, especially when you are just too late and have to wait for eleven months" (Interview D13.15). As it was a relatively new process for everyone, not everything went smoothly, argued another respondent: "There was internally a good cooperation, but between the local and the state level, it was sort of a mixture" (Interview D3.4). This Project Manager of UN City referred to the need for calibration between the different layers of government. When talking about cooperation, this respondent mentioned that the Department for Multilateral Cooperation was the main partner. He explained that the municipality was not involved, except for the International House (helping foreigners settle in): "We get assistance of them to get all the paperwork done. But if you are UN staff, then it is an issue for Protocol of the Foreign Ministry, but they

don't have the resources International House has, therefore sometimes issues take time" (Interview D3.4).

Political process in the successful case: UNOPS

The rules of the policy game were clear to the organizational network of UNOPS Headquarters, but not to most members of the policy network. One of them, the project manager of UN City, replied that there is a "Gentlemen's agreement, part of this is that you do not attract from developing countries" (Interview D3.4). About the political process of attracting organizations, many network members referred to the lacking strategy of Denmark. As one respondent said: "I think that the rules are probably clear, but there is no strategy. Although I am working with the attraction of investors, talent, and companies, I am not informed about what the State wants; how do we want to be a hub of the UN? There is no plan" (Interview D4.5). The rules of the policy game related to competition were not clear to a project manager of the Mayor's office either. She questioned, "What does the competitiveness do, which factors are we competing on? Are we competing on price, are we competing on the weather, which we always lose? I think it is unclear. Sometimes another country is not better than us on those factors, but they win" (Interview D13.15). To many, the political process was a puzzle they could not solve, which can mainly be contextualized by the inexperience of the involved.

Actor centrality in the successful case for Copenhagen

The following graph shows the UNOPS network actors during the attraction process. The nodes 'in the middle' were the State Secretary for Development Policy of the Foreign Ministry, the UN Development Program, and the acting head of UNOPS. The first two had a measure of 24 percent, the third of 16. This is a rough estimate, but it means that their paths were shortest between the other actors. They can be considered the most independent actors. The three less central actors were the Multilateral Department of the Foreign Ministry and the Protocol Department of the Foreign Ministry.

Figure 7.10 Actor centrality during the attraction of the UNOPS Headquarters



Key:
Size of the nodes: bigger nodes have higher degree centrality (activity)
Node centrality: the higher the betweenness centrality (independency)
Links between the nodes: frequency of meetings (connected to node activity)
Colors: each color is a different type of node (network diversity)

Table 7.5 Top five actors: Betweenness measures and node type UNOPS Headquarters

Node	Betweenness centrality %	Degree centrality %	Node type (diversity)
1. State Secretary for Development Policy	24	10	1. National level
2. UN Development Program	24	10	2. UN/IO
3. UNOPS Acting Head	16	6.5	UN/IO
4. Foreign Ministry: Multilateral Department	9.6	8	National level
5. Executive of Multilateral Department	6.6	8	National level

The nodes with the highest degree centrality and high activity were the State Secretary, the Executive of Multilateral Department and the Multilateral Department, all part of the Foreign Ministry. The UN Development Program was a big node as well; this UN program was a crucial negotiator. When looking at the edges or contacts and lines between the nodes, the State Secretary for Development Policy (Carsten Staur) shows four thicker edges representing the intensity of contacts, with the UNDP, the Permanent Representative in New York, the Executive of the Multilateral Department, and the Multilateral Department in general. Other thicker edges were found between the UNOPS acting head (Karsten Bloch) and the Protocol Department and between the UNOPS acting head and the Executive of the Multilateral Department, and between the Representative in Geneva and the Multilateral Department. The Minister for

Development Cooperation (Ulla Tørnæs) also shows intense contacts with Gilberto Flores and Jann Mattsson, both executive directors of UNOPS.

Network diversity in the successful case for Copenhagen
When discussing network diversity, I found only two types of actors: fourteen on the national level (including three ambassadors and the State Secretary, blue), and three UN actors (purple). This number was particularly low and can be explained by the inexperience of Copenhagen and Denmark to attract UN Headquarters. Finally, the number of nodes was low (17 nodes). The negotiations with UNOPS made the main actors see that the establishment of a entire building for UN agencies was within reach.

Relational explanation Copenhagen's failed case

Level of network cooperation in the failed case for Copenhagen
The mean rating of the cooperation was relatively high: 7 (N=7). The substance of attracting and retaining IOs was better developed, and the subject of sustainable energy was close to the brand of Denmark and Copenhagen. One of the organizational network members, who rated the cooperation a 9, said: "The cooperation works when it is needed. If I want to handle something with the city, I see them" (Interview D9.11). About the cooperation one group member responsible for UN City at the Foreign Ministry thought there was "a bit of room for improvement" in the cooperation during the Sustainable Energy for All attraction process: "We had to explain what we were asking for and why the UN City was important to other departments, with the Ministry of Taxation for instance" (Interview D14.16). A formalized or weekly meeting would not have been more efficient, she said: "weekly meetings are a time killer" (D14.16). When talking about the rules of the policy game, she found them "rather clear, as we think it was a transparent process, what plays in was basically the fact of not being able to place the bid without reservation" (D14.16). From these observations about cooperation (mixed) and rules of the policy game (transparent but without clear strategy) the image of Copenhagen being willing but not persistent presents itself. Although the networks were better developed, the cooperation could be improved.

Political process in the failed case: Sustainable Energy for All
When the bid was placed, the Prime Minister called for elections and the government was interim for a while. About the political process and the rules of the policy game, one respondent said: "It shouldn't be too clear, right? The world changes so there are fundamental rules with that, and there might pop up issues when special agreements are to be made, but the rules are all written down in the host agreement" (Interview D9.11). The main problem during the Sustainable Energy for All-attraction, was the lack of space. The UN City was considered full and "we need some space to attract them. Then we can start professionalizing. It would be a different game if we had tens of thousands of places

to offer, instead of 400. We should think bigger” (D9.11). This meant that an internal lobby was needed about expanding the UN building. Another group member thought the rules of the policy game were a 5 for clarity, because Denmark and Copenhagen needed to have a more strategic and streamlined process and be more attentive to UN organizations. Many agreed that the rules of the policy game could be clearer, especially in the suasion of other entities within the Danish government – especially the Tax Ministry.

Actor centrality in the failed case for Copenhagen

The actors with the highest betweenness centrality were the Ministry of Climate and Energy, and Executive of the Multilateral Department of the Foreign Ministry. These can be considered the most independent actors. Another node close to the middle was the Minister for Development Cooperation.

Figure 7.11 Actor centrality during the attraction of the Sustainable Energy (Copenhagen)



Key:
Size of the nodes: bigger nodes have higher degree centrality (activity)
Node centrality: the higher the betweenness centrality (independency)
Links between the nodes: frequency of meetings (connected to node activity)
Colors: each color is a different type of node (network diversity)

The nodes with the highest degree centrality were the Ministry of Climate and Energy, the Minister for Development Cooperation, and One UN of the UN City Building. Those had the most ties to other actors in the network and were the most active. The following table depicts the four nodes with the highest betweenness centrality. Those nodes exerted the most control over others.

Table 7.6 Top five actors: Betweenness measures and node type Sustainable Energy (Copenhagen)

Node	Betweenness centrality	Degree centrality	Node type (diversity)
1. Ministry of Climate and Energy	20	9.4	1. National level
2. Executive of Multilateral Department	13	4	2. National level
3. Minister for Development Cooperation	9.7	5.8	3. National level
4. NIRAS Research Institute (NGO)	7.6	5	4. NGO
5. Ministry of Taxation	6	5	5. National level

Network diversity in the failed case for Copenhagen

The number of types of actors was four, which was low. Sixteen actors were from the national government (blue), four actors from the UN (purple), two actors from Public Private Partnerships (dark blue) and two NGOs (pink). The city representatives were missing in the network. The number of nodes was 25 in the case of the Sustainable Energy for All, which can be considered high.

Conclusion

The network cooperation was average in the UNOPS-case, but the meetings were regular, and the involvement was high. In the second case of Sustainable Energy for All the network cooperation was higher, but actors were critical, and some thought it cumbersome they still had to explain the importance of the UN to colleagues. The actor centrality showed mixed results in the UNOPS case: the structure of the network was sparse, not many actors were involved. In the second case more network actors were involved, but only one node was 'in the middle' and the actors did not show high activity. Network diversity showed a low number in the UNOPS-case and a slightly higher number in the failed case, which was not as expected.

7.5 Conclusions Denmark and Copenhagen

From an instrumental perspective, during the first case of the UNOPS Headquarters the bid was aligned with the policy goals to a low extent. In this case no elements were aligned with all the other policies. In the second Sustainable Energy for All case, I found clear links between the bid and the policies, which resulted in an average alignment. Again, this case shows that less alignment was more advantageous than more alignment between policy goals. When zooming in on policy perception, staffers noted that the city marketing was not visible to the UN during the UNOPS attraction. The nation branding was more visible and more effective in this group's opinion. In the second case internationals were less positive about the brand of Denmark's strict stance on the refugee crisis. This had a carry-over effect on the host policies towards IOs in the sense that from 2016 onwards, CPR citizen service numbers were available to EU-members but not to non-EU members.

Discursively, the overlap of priorities and narratives between the organizational network and the policy network was higher in the failed Sustainable Energy case in the successful UNOPS case. This was not as expected. The overlaps between the narratives of the UNOPS organizational network and the policy network were low, especially as labor force issues were framed differently by the policy network. The overlap in prioritizing elements between the UNOPS organizational network and the international representatives was average, whereas the organizational network of the failed case showed a low overlap with the internationals. The internationals rated dual careers significantly higher than the other groups.

From a relational perspective, the UNOPS organizational network rated the cooperation lower than the Sustainable Energy for All organizational network, although network cooperation was talked about more positively when discussing the UNOPS case. In the second case, there was good cooperation within the network, but actors also needed to persuade other ministries at the highest level, which they failed to do. When discussing actor centrality, independency or betweenness centrality seemed to have played a role. In the failed case, only one actor showed a high centrality and in the successful case, there were three actors in the middle. A high degree centrality, showing their activity based on the frequency of meetings, seemed to be related to success. The number of nodes was low in the successful case and average in the failed case. The network diversity was not as expected either: the successful UNOPS case showed two different types of actors and the failed Sustainable Energy for All case four.

8 Comparative analysis

8.1 Introduction

This chapter compares the results from my previous case studies based on an instrumental, discursive, and relational perspective. I will start by explaining the different outcomes of the two success measures for all the cases. To what extent were the cases a success when using the two success yardsticks developed in this study? This is briefly explained for each case. Then, I will focus on my expectations and analyze for each expectation whether the independent variables may have affected the outcome. Each expectation will be discussed by moving from the least successful case to the most successful. Finally, I conclude with a summary of my findings.

8.2 Measures of Success

The first type of 'success as fact' was explored by defining up to when the host city was still in the 'bidding contest' for the IO. In each case, I established four stages, starting with the Request for Proposals or RfP, and each city's letter of intent (Stage 1), followed by either a voting procedure (Stages 2–4) or a procedure without voting. When a city withdrew or was rejected before the voting procedure started, the case was considered a factual failure. When it was eliminated after the first round of voting it was considered a moderate factual failure. When it made it to the last round, or it won but not overwhelmingly, it was considered a moderate factual success, and when it won overwhelmingly it was considered a factual success. The four stages were marked as degrees of success, and details are given in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1 Eight cases and the degrees of factual success

Degrees of success	**Case, place (voting / no voting)**		
Factual failure	Green Climate Fund, Geneva (voting)	Arms Trade Treaty, Vienna (voting)	
Moderate factual failure	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships, The Hague (no voting)	Sustainable Energy for All, Copenhagen (no voting)	
Moderate factual success	Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat, Geneva (voting)		
Factual success	International Criminal Court, The Hague (no voting)	UNOPS, Copenhagen (no voting)	Sustainable Energy for All, Vienna (no voting)

The remarkable cases from Table 8.1 are the UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships case in The Hague and the Arms Trade Treaty case in Geneva. The first is distinctive because it failed but, looking at the phase in which the Netherlands dropped out, it was not at the very beginning. Therefore, this is coined a moderate factual failure instead of a factual failure. The second is noteworthy because the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat case is labeled as a moderate factual success even though it was won by Geneva. This is because it was not an overwhelming success. Geneva lost in the first round of voting, and in the second, it won against Trinidad and Tobago by only three votes (out of 67).

The second type is 'success as interpretation'. A case was considered a perceived failure when it did not attract successfully and was not *perceived* as a success by the organizational networks. A case was viewed as a moderate perceived failure when the organizational network perceived the case as a success, although it did not successfully attract the IO. This could be due to a shift in the agenda-setting of attracting IOs, or an increase of collaboration or resources for the endeavor. A case was a moderate perceived success when it successfully attracted the IO, but the organizational network perceived the case as a failure. A case was a *perceived success* when the successfully attracted case was perceived as such. Table 8.2 shows the outcomes of the cases by type of success as interpretation.

Table 8.2 Eight cases and the degrees of perceived success

Degrees of success	**Case, place (voting / no voting)**		
Perceived failure	Arms Trade Treaty, Vienna (voting)	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships, The Hague (no voting)	
Moderate perceived failure	Green Climate Fund, Geneva (voting)	Sustainable Energy for All, Copenhagen (no voting)	
Moderate perceived success	Sustainable Energy for All, Vienna (no voting)		
Perceived success	International Criminal Court, The Hague (no voting)	Arms Trade Treaty, Geneva (voting)	UNOPS, Copenhagen (no voting)

In contrast with the first type of success, the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat case is now among the successful cases, as the policymakers involved perceived it to have been an outright success for Geneva. On the other hand, the UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships case, a moderate failure according to the previous success yardstick, is now a perceived failure, as it was commented on negatively by those involved. The Green Climate Fund case, which was a failure according to the previous success type, is now labeled a moderate perceived failure, as it was perceived to be a success – due especially to the profits that Geneva experienced following their failure to attract the IO. Also notable is the change in relative position in the table of Sustainable Energy for All case in Vienna. Whereas in the last measure the case was considered a factual success, it is now downgraded to a moderate perceived success, as the organizational network was less than satisfied with the effort and expenses involved in achieving the outcome.

8.3 Policy design and perception

The instrumental perspective focuses on policy alignment and perception. The following sections compare the eight cases discussing the two expectations.
The first expectation is:

> E1: *The more the bid books are aligned with the attraction policies, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

In Table 8.3, the light grey boxes show a high policy alignment, the dark grey boxes an average alignment, and the black boxes a low policy alignment. One would expect to see black boxes in the top left corner (the failed cases) and light grey boxes in the bottom right corner (the successful cases). Surprisingly, this is not the case: the most successfully attracted IOs show a low and average alignment between the policies and the bids, whereas the failed cases reveal a higher alignment.

Table 8.3 Instrumental perspective: policy alignment

	Factual failure	**Factual measured failure**	**Factual measured success**	**Factual success**
Perceived failure	Arms Trade Treaty Vienna (0.67) *	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships The Hague (0.53)		
Perceived Relative failure		Sustainable Energy for All Copenhagen (0.5)		
Perceived Relative success	Green Climate Fund Geneva (0.67)**			Sustainable Energy for All Vienna (0.39)

	Factual failure	Factual measured failure	Factual measured success	Factual success
Perceived success			Arms Trade Treaty Geneva (0.58) *	UNOPS HQ Copenhagen (0.42) ** International Criminal Court (0.53)

* The figures are the generated measures of alignment between bids and policy goals on the dimension of depth of information.

** Light grey for low policy alignment (up to 50%), dark grey for average policy alignment (50–60%) black for high policy alignment (higher than 60% overlap).

Failed cases in the top left corner show a high and average policy alignment, the opposite of what I expected. The bid book for the Arms Trade Treaty in Vienna overlaps most with the host policy of being a hub for peace, security, and international dialogue, business, finance, and quality of life. The bid for the UNICEF Division in The Hague aligns most with host policy goals, too. This is also true for Sustainable Energy for All in Copenhagen, whose bid shows average overlap with the host policy goals, but also with the city marketing. The bid for the other failed case, the Green Climate Fund in Geneva, also shows most overlaps with the host policy goals of financial assistance, welcoming attitude, work, and security in Switzerland, as well integration of the internationals. What these failed cases have in common is that their bids are averagely or highly aligned with the host policy goals. Furthermore, two of the cases were in the favorable position of being already seated elsewhere and did not necessarily have to relocate. Maintaining the status quo is easier than moving the IO or department; therefore, these processes involve an additional difficulty for the potential host city.

Of the successful cases in the bottom right corner, the Sustainable Energy for All in Vienna shows the lowest alignment (in black). The bid for this case was most aligned with the host policy goals, such as 'attract new international entities'. Notably, the UNOPS case – a success in both fact and interpretation – reveals a low level of policy alignment. The bids for the Arms Trade Treaty in Geneva and the International Criminal Court in The Hague reveal an average alignment with the host state, nation branding, and city marketing policy goals. Contrary to what was expected, these four cases show that the lower the alignment was, the higher the likelihood of success.

The second expectation is about the perception of host policies:

> E2: *The more positively the respondents in the city perceive the host policies and support, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

In Table 8.4, the failed cases in the top left corner are expected to show dark colors – a more negative policy perception. In the successful cases in the bottom right corner of the table, one would expect light grey boxes: a more positive policy perception of the IO representatives. Policy perception is explored with four different questions regarding what the people involved thought of the branding policies, the elements in the bid, the rules and regulations for IOs, and government support. A positive policy perception appears to be related to the likelihood of success. Indeed, in Table 8.4, the top left corner is filled with darker colors than the bottom right corner of the table. The only exception is the International Criminal Court.

Table 8.4 Instrumental perspective: Policy perception and support

	Factual failure	**Factual measured failure**	**Factual measured success**	**Factual success**
Perceived failure	Arms Trade Treaty Vienna *	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships The Hague		
Branding policies	+/-	+/-		
Elements in the bid	+/-	+		
Rules and regulations	+/-	+/-		
Government support	+/-	-		
Perceived Relative failure		Sustainable Energy for All Copenhagen **		
Branding policies		+/-		
Elements in the bid		-		
Rules and regulations		-		
Government support		+/-		
Perceived Relative success	Green Climate Fund Geneva			Sustainable Energy for All Vienna
Branding policies	+			+/-
Elements in the bid	+/-			+
Rules and regulations	+/-			+
Government support	++			+

	Factual failure	Factual measured failure	Factual measured success	Factual success
Perceived success *Branding policies* *Elements in the bid* *Rules and regulations* *Government support*			Arms Trade Treaty Geneva ++ + + +	UNOPS HQ Copenhagen +/- + + +
Branding policies *Elements in the bid* *Rules and regulations* *Government support*				International Criminal Court The Hague +/- +/- +/- -

* The first plus or minus is for Branding policies, the second is for Elements in the bid, the third is for Rules and regulations, and the fourth is for Government support.
** Black for low perception of host policy and support (only +/- or minuses), dark grey for average perception of host policy and support (at least one plus), light grey for high perception of host policy and support (at least three pluses).

As expected, the failed cases in the top left corner show a more negative perception of policy and support on the part of the people involved. The rules and regulations for IOs are especially negatively rated by the IO representatives. The perception of the host policy and support is lowest in the Sustainable Energy for All case in Copenhagen. The representatives of IOs perceived the elements in the bid particularly negatively. The fact that Denmark could not offer the organization tax-free status caused some irritation. On top of that came the problems with the identity numbers that were not workable for the IO employees from non-EU countries. What these failed cases have in common is that many elements are considered a plus/minus, that is, a mix of positive and negative perceptions and support ratings.

Of the successful cases in the bottom right corner, the Arms Trade Treaty in Geneva shows the most positive perception of policy and support measures. The elements in the bid were perceived positively, with some disadvantages, for example, the differences between host agreements of IOs were seen as hierarchical. The IO respondents rated the support positively, although they considered the Swiss to be strongly regulated in the area of rental accommodation.

The exception is the International Criminal Court in The Hague, a case which shows unexpected results. During the attraction of this IO, a problem arose around the hospitality of the Dutch government, which, according to many, was considered insufficient. In addition, there was an impression that the protection of human rights defenders could be improved. The IO representatives were critical toward host policies and negative about policy support, whereas, in the later UNICEF case, these elements were considered more positively. Apart from the International Criminal Court case, the results in the table show that the expectation emerges as true. Clearly, when host policies and support are *positively perceived*, almost all IO cases are successfully attracted.

8.4 Similar perceptual frames

The discursive perspective concentrates on the similarity of perceptual frames of different groups while discussing their priorities and narratives.

The third expectation is:

> E3: *The more the priorities and narratives overlap between the organizational network and the policy network in the host city, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

Table 8.5 shows the cases with high degrees of overlap of priorities in light grey, average overlaps in dark grey, and low overlaps in black boxes.[43] One would expect that for the failed cases in the top left corner of the table the degrees of overlap would be *low* (black) and that for the successful cases in the bottom right corner the degrees of overlap would be *high* (light grey). However, the table shows mixed results. In the failed cases, the degrees are *average* and *high*, whereas in the successful cases, all shades of grey and black appear. The results reveal that the degree of overlap of priorities and narratives between the governmental groups has no relationship with success.

43 In fact, the measures are continuous, but for the sake of presentation, I used intervals.

Table 8.5 Discursive perspective: Overlap of priorities and narratives of organizational and policy networks

	Factual failure	**Factual measured failure**	**Factual measured success**	**Factual success**
Perceived failure	Arms Trade Treaty Vienna 0.70	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships The Hague ** 0.55		
Perceived Measured failure		Sustainable Energy for All Copenhagen 0.55		
Perceived Measured success	Green Climate Fund Geneva 0.59			Sustainable Energy for All Vienna 0.59
Perceived success			Arms Trade Treaty Geneva 0.61	UNOPS HQ Copenhagen 0.38 International Criminal Court The Hague 0.76

* The figures between 0 and 1 are in Kendall's tau-b, the overlap between the groups (with an N of 17 to 20 locational elements).

** Black for low overlap of priorities and narratives (below 0.5 Kendall's tau-b), dark grey for average overlap of priorities and narratives (0.5 to 0.6 Kendall's tau-b), light grey for high overlap of priorities and narratives (higher than 0.6 Kendall's tau-b).

Starting with the top left corner where the failed cases are positioned, the results show that in three of the four cases the overlaps were average. This was not foreseen, as I expected that these measures would be low. One of these failed cases even shows an opposite result: in the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat case in Vienna, the overlaps between the government groups are high. This is noteworthy, as this is the 'most failed' case in the graph where many aspects of the process went wrong, except being 'on the same page' between the government groups. It is also possible that the organizational and policy networks paid too much attention to aligning their perceptual frames, and too little to the external stakeholders and their perceptual frames.

In the successful cases in the bottom right corner, I expected the measures of overlap to be high, but this corner shows mixed results, as well. Two cases that do show expected results are the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat case in Geneva and the International Criminal Court case in The Hague. These show high overlaps of priorities and narratives between the government groups, but the other two show average and low degrees of overlap. This means that the similarities of the perceptual frames do not necessarily need to be high to succeed. The case of the UNOPS Headquarters in Copenhagen is the exception here, as it shows the lowest degree of overlap while being one of the most successful cases. This case shows that achieving success is within reach, even with a limited similarity in frames between the government groups.

The fourth expectation is:

> E4: *The more the priorities and narratives overlap between the organizational network and the IO representatives in the host city, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

Table 8.6 shows the degrees of overlap of priorities and narratives between the organizational networks and the IO representatives in the eight cases. Again, I expected that in the failed cases (top left corner) overlaps would be low (black boxes) and that the successful cases in the bottom right corner would be high (light grey boxes). Most cases show the anticipated results. This table illustrates that a higher overlap of priorities and narratives between the organizational network and the IO representatives will indeed lead to a higher likelihood of success. Nevertheless, there are some nuances.

Table 8.6 Discursive perspective: Overlap of priorities organizational network and internationals

	Factual failure	**Factual measured failure**	**Factual measured success**	**Factual success**
Perceived failure	Arms Trade Treaty Vienna 0.59	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships The Hague** 0.55		
Perceived Measured failure		Sustainable Energy for All Copenhagen 0.30		
Perceived Measured success	Green Climate Fund Geneva 0.59			Sustainable Energy for All Vienna 0.73

	Factual failure	Factual measured failure	Factual measured success	Factual success
Perceived success			Arms Trade Treaty Geneva 0.65	UNOPS HQ Copenhagen 0.54
				International Criminal Court The Hague 0.73

* The figures between 0 and 1 are in Kendall’s tau-b, the overlap between the groups (with an N of 17 to 20 locational elements).

** Black for low overlap of priorities and narratives (below .5 Kendall’s tau-b), dark grey for average overlap of priorities and narratives (.5 to .6 Kendall’s tau-b), light grey for high overlap of priorities and narratives (higher than .6 Kendall’s tau-b).

Top left of Table 8.6, the lowest overlaps between the organizational network and IO representatives are in the Copenhagen Sustainable Energy case. Of the failed cases, it is striking that the ‘moderate factual failed’ cases show lower overlaps of priorities and narratives between the different groups than the ‘most failed’ examples. Nevertheless, the table shows that the overlap of perceptual frames is moderate or low in these failed cases.

In the bottom right corner of Table 8.6, the highest measures of overlap are in the International Criminal Court case in the Hague and the Sustainable Energy for All case in Vienna. Another high overlap of priorities and narratives is found in the Arms Trade Treaty case in Geneva. One notable exception in this table is the UNOPS case, where I found an average degree of overlap between the two groups. One explanation for this might be that Copenhagen, and Denmark, did not have much experience as a host candidate during the attraction of UNOPS in 2007. Furthermore, the attraction process took place at a high level, and mostly in New York, so it might have been hard to develop a similar perceptual frame with the IO representatives already in the city.

Remarkably, the overlap between different groups (governmental and employees of IOs) shows a greater relation to network success than the overlap between similar government groups. These results are in line with the results of the first perspective, where a higher positive perception of host policy and support on the part of IO representatives appears to be partially related to success.

8.5 Network characteristics

The relational perspective explores the contribution of internal legitimacy (perceived good cooperation), actor centrality, and network diversity and size.

The fifth expectation is:

> E5: *The higher the perception of good cooperation between the main players, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

This expectation would translate to a table where the failed cases in the top left corner would show low levels of internal legitimacy, assessed through perceived good cooperation (black boxes), whereas the successful cases (bottom right) would indicate high levels (light grey). However, Table 8.7 reveals mixed results. In the failed cases (top left), most levels of cooperation are high – there is one exception – whereas in the successful cases, some show *high* or *average* results. These results show that perceived *good cooperation* possibly does not contribute to real success. The table not only indicates that more high levels of good cooperation are among the failed cases, but also that the most successful cases show only an *average perception* of good cooperation by those involved.

Table 8.7 Relational perspective: perceived network cooperation

	Factual failure	**Factual measured failure**	**Factual measured success**	**Factual success**
Perceived failure	Arms Trade Treaty Vienna 7.3*	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships The Hague ** 4.8		
Perceived Relative failure		Sustainable Energy for All Copenhagen 7.0		
Perceived Relative success	Green Climate Fund Geneva 8.7			Sustainable Energy for All Vienna 7.0

	Factual failure	Factual measured failure	Factual measured success	Factual success
Perceived success			Arms Trade Treaty Geneva 9.0	UNOPS HQ Copenhagen 6.6
				International Criminal Court The Hague 6.3

* The figures from 1 to 10 are grades the respondents gave for cooperation within the organizational network attracting the IO (N=10–15).

** Black for low network cooperation (rated below 5 on a 1–10 scale), dark grey for average network cooperation (5 to 7 on a 1–10 scale), light grey for high network cooperation (higher than 7 on a 1–10 scale).

Focusing on the top left corner of Table 8.7, the highest grades for network cooperation are found in the Geneva Climate Fund case. In the 'most failed' Vienna Arms Trade Treaty example, the cooperation was good but started late. Similarly, in the case of the Copenhagen Sustainable Energy example, the cooperation level was also high. The exception in this corner of the table is the UNICEF case in The Hague showing *low perceived* cooperation. What has proved disappointing to the organizational network is the network's misjudgment of how serious the IO was in its intention to leave Geneva. Also of note, with a summer recess combined with a freshly elected government installed in The Hague during the process, it would prove difficult to provide timely information when required.

In the bottom right corner, the highest level of network cooperation is in the Geneva Arms Trade Treaty case. In the Vienna Sustainable Energy for All case, the participants were positive about the energy hub that had influenced the process. In both cases, a previous failure would play a role in the extra boost the collaboration then received. The third case in the bottom right corner is the International Criminal Court case, where the cooperation levels were rated as average. In the other *average measure* of cooperation – the UNOPS Headquarters case – the participants wanted to offer more value to IOs through better regional urban cooperation.

In all these cases, the political developments in the background played a role during the attraction processes. Most difficulties occurred when the government suddenly changed or when departments did not take responsibility for attracting the IO. How the involved perceived their cooperation did not play a serious role in their success in these cases. The sixth expectation is:

E6: *The higher the actor centrality of the involved, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

As I explore actor level properties by looking at *betweenness* and *degree centrality*, while not ignoring the structure of the network itself, I will first discuss the two centrality measures and then the network graphs.

Betweenness centrality marks the probability of any node being the shortest path between any pair of actors. In other words, the node with the highest betweenness centrality has the shortest paths between other actors and consequently acts more independently in the network. The measure is expressed in percentages and can therefore be better assessed within a network than across networks. Nevertheless, comparing the most independent nodes across networks does indicate how big or autonomous the main node was within that network.

In Table 8.8, one would expect low levels of betweenness centrality in the top left corner where the failed cases are positioned (black boxes) and high levels in the bottom right corner (light grey). However, the table shows mixed results. Low and high levels appear in both corners, as well as average levels of betweenness centrality, meaning that the betweenness centrality on the actor level contributes only partially to success.

Table 8.8 Relational perspective: betweenness centrality

	Factual failure	**Moderate factual failure**	**Moderate factual success**	**Factual success**
Perceived failure	Arms Trade Treaty Vienna 14*	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships 27**		
Moderate perceived failure		Sustainable Energy for All Copenhagen 20		
Moderate perceived success	Green Climate Fund Geneva 20			Sustainable Energy for All Vienna 11

	Factual failure	Moderate factual failure	Moderate factual success	Factual success
Perceived success			Arms Trade Treaty Geneva 12	UNOPS Copenhagen 24
				International Criminal Court 21

* The measure is expressed as the percentage of the maximum possible betweenness that an actor could have had. In this table, the percentage shown is that of the actor with the highest betweenness centrality in the network.

** Black for low betweenness centrality of the most independent actor in the network (below 15%), dark grey for average betweenness centrality of the most independent actor (16–20%), light grey for high betweenness centrality (more than 20%).

In the top left corner of Table 8.8, the betweenness centrality measure of the 'most failed case' is low. This can be explained by the distribution of power in the network: more than one actor had the highest level of independence. That the betweenness centrality of the UNICEF case is highest of all can be explained by the power of only one actor in the middle, the Ambassador of IOs in the Foreign Ministry, who was most independently involved. The other two cases in the top left corner show average results.

In the bottom right corner, the results show that the most successful UNOPS case shows a high betweenness centrality. This means that there were only a few actors indicating high independence and that the network was sparse. Although most cases show that a dense network with many involved (and quite active) actors contributes to success, this case is an exception. In the International Criminal Court case even more is revealed. The betweenness centrality is similarly high, but the network contains many sub-networks where the distribution of power still lies with a few sizeable nodes in the middle. This would explain the high centrality measure. The other two cases show low betweenness centrality characteristics. In both cases, this could be explained: more of the involved actors took responsibility in the process and acted quite independently. These findings show that the independence of a few actors 'in the middle' of the network was crucial.

Although it seems that betweenness centrality has little effect on achieving success, the above results can be explained. First, the measures indicate that when there are several actors who are jointly centrally positioned, the betweenness centrality of the 'most central actor' is lower. Second, the centrality measures show that a sparse network has higher measures than a dense network, but that this is not necessarily a better situation.

Table 8.9 shows the levels of degree centrality of the most active actor in the network. Again, this could be a person or an organization, and this measure is in percentages. The reason why these percentages are lower is that with *betweenness centrality* the measure shows the position of someone in the network (how centrally one is positioned) whereas *degree centrality* shows how active the actors were (how often they met with others). With degree centrality, the activity is spread over a larger network of actors, which results in a lower percentage and degree centrality for each actor. Table 8.9 shows mixed results, implying that a high degree centrality (or activity) for the most active actor contributes only partially to success.

Table 8.9 Relational perspective: degree centrality

	Factual failure	**Moderate factual failure**	**Moderate factual success**	**Factual success**
Perceived failure	Arms Trade Treaty Vienna 5*	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships 13**		
Moderate perceived failure		Sustainable Energy for All Copenhagen 10		
Moderate perceived success	Green Climate Fund Geneva 10			Sustainable Energy for All Vienna 5
Perceived success			Arms Trade Treaty Geneva 5	UNOPS Copenhagen 10 International Criminal Court 8

* Degree centrality refers to the number of ties or connections a node (network participant) has to other nodes. The measure is expressed in a percentage as well, of the most active actor compared to the other actors in the network.

** Black for low degree centrality of the most active actor in the network (below 10%), dark grey for average degree centrality of the most active actor (10–13%), light grey for high degree centrality (more than 13%).

The failed cases are positioned in the top left corner. The most failed case, that of the Vienna Arms Trade Treaty, shows the lowest degree centrality. This indicates that the most active actor in the network shared its activity with many others; it was not convincingly more active. The highest degree centrality is in the other failed case of the UNICEF Division attracted to The Hague. The most active actor in that case was the Ambassador of IOs at the Foreign Ministry. The other two failed cases show average degree centrality measures.

In the bottom right corner, the measures are average and low, meaning that a high level of activity did not seem to contribute. This can be explained by the types of actors involved. In the networks of those successful cases, the most active nodes were operating at a higher political level. For example, in the Arms Trade Treaty in Geneva, the Foreign Minister was actively involved, and in the Sustainable Energy for All case in Vienna, the level of the actor was higher as well. The stakes were high in both cases, as the cities had each just lost an IO (Geneva lost the Green Climate Fund, Vienna the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat). In the two most successful cases, the measures of degree centrality were average. These cases also indicate that a high level of activity is not necessary when the actors involved are acting on a high political level and share the responsibility with others.

What applies to betweenness centrality applies also to degree centrality. The results can be explained by the types of actors involved. If these were actors at high political levels, then a higher activity of actors was often not necessary. One can imagine that in the case of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, the Prime Minister had only to intervene once or twice to exert influence. The same would have been true for the Geneva Arms Trade Treaty case, where the Secretary of State gave an influential speech. When looking at activity by actors, it makes a considerable difference what type of actors they were. Therefore, it is not the case that network activity did not have an effect, but rather that it depended on who or what department showed high network activity. It is helpful to present network structures for this understanding.

The following graphs in Figure 8.1 - Figure 8.8 show the network structures. These offer another useful representation of betweenness and degree centrality, while also visualizing how the most important actors are positioned in the middle or on the periphery of a network.

Figure 8.1 Network graph Green Climate Fund (failed, Geneva)



Figure 8.2 Network graph Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat (success, Geneva)



Figure 8.3 Network graph International Criminal Court (success, The Hague)



Figure 8.4 Network graph UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships (failed, The Hague)



Figure 8.5 Network graph Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat (failed, Vienna)



Figure 8.6 Network graph Sustainable Energy for All (success, Vienna)

Figure 8.7 Network graph UNOPS Headquarters (success, Copenhagen)



Figure 8.8 Network graph Sustainable Energy for All (failed, Copenhagen)



Key:
Size of the nodes: bigger nodes have higher degree centrality (activity)
Node centrality: the higher the betweenness centrality (independency)
Links between the nodes: frequency of meetings (connected to node activity)
Colors: each color is a different type of node (network diversity)

Among the failed cases in the graphs above, it is noticeable that the network structures were often sparse. For instance, for Geneva, the density was lower in the failed case (Fig. 8.1) than in the successful one (Fig. 8.2). The second and third failed cases show similar images. The failed Sustainable Energy for All case in Copenhagen (Fig. 8.8) shows a sparse network with only one highly centralized node, the Ministry of Climate and Energy. These cases have in common that the number of centrally placed actors with *high independence* is low and that the level of information exchange is similarly low.

The successful cases show that a denser network with formed sub-networks on the periphery can be of more value. In the Geneva Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat case (Fig. 8.2), for example, the Foreign Ministry was the most centrally located along with the Presidential Department of the Canton, which contained the highest measure of degree centrality. The International Criminal Court case network shows two nodes in the middle, linked to the Ministry of Social Affairs and forming a sub-network with other ministries and even the Prime Minister and the Brussels Legal Committee. The same applies to the third successful network, that of the Sustainable Energy for All case in Vienna, where the IO itself was in the center. These cases reveal that a dense network with sub-networks formed on the periphery invariably contributes to success.

The exception of the graphs above is Copenhagen's successful UNOPS case (Fig. 8.7). Although a sub-network can be detected on the periphery, the network is sparse and the activity of the actors low. The sub-network in the periphery may have played an important role, as well as the political weight brought to bear from the actors involved. Examples of highly placed actors in this case would be the State Secretary for Development Policy, the acting head of UNOPS, and the Minister for Development Cooperation.

Finally, the seventh expectation based on network-level properties is:

> E7: *The higher the network diversity and number of the actors involved, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

In Table 8.10, the expectation is that the top left corner with the failed cases shows low degrees of network diversity (black boxes), whereas, in the bottom right corner with the successful cases, the network diversity would be high (light grey). The results are consistent with this expectation, with only one exception. The findings show that a high level of network diversity contributes to successfully attracting IOs.

Table 8.10 Relational perspective: network diversity

	Factual failure	**Factual measured failure**	**Factual measured success**	**Factual success**
Perceived failure	Arms Trade Treaty Vienna 5*	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships The Hague ** 6		
Perceived Relative failure		Sustainable Energy for All Copenhagen 4		
Perceived Relative success	Green Climate Fund Geneva 6			Sustainable Energy for All Vienna 7
Perceived success			Arms Trade Treaty Geneva 8	UNOPS HQ Copenhagen 2 International Criminal Court The Hague 8

* The range in the empirical data is between 3 and 8 actor types.
** Black for low network diversity (less than 4 types), dark grey for average network diversity (4 to 6 types), light grey for high network diversity (more than 6 types).

In the top left corner, the cases show an average network diversity. These failed cases have four to six types of network actors of the total of 11 actor types (See Table A8 in the Appendices). The lowest number of actor types in the top left corner is four – in the Copenhagen Sustainable Energy for All case. Noticeably, in this case, hardly any NGOs participated. The second-lowest number of types of actors is in the Vienna Arms Trade Treaty case (five types). In the third and fourth failed cases, the Geneva Green Fund and UNICEF in The Hague, six types of actors were involved. In both cases, the government types were well represented, but NGOs and businesses were not involved.

In the bottom right corner, the number of types of actors was higher in three cases. In the Vienna Sustainable Energy case, the number was seven. Here, the variety of actors was broad, companies were involved, and different types of advisors were present: a legal advisor of the ministry, specialists, and an energy think tank. In the second and third successful cases, the Geneva Arms Trade Treaty and the International Criminal Court in The Hague, the number of types totaled eight. Here, the variety of actors was extended with the involvement of the Swiss Parliament (Geneva) and EU actors (The Hague). The Hague also included the Prime Minister and Parliament during the process.

The exception in this table is UNOPS, a successful case involving only two types of actors. They were the IOs (UNOPS Headquarters and UN Development Programme) and the national government (different ministries, ambassadors, ministers, and protocol departments). Notably, although the government was inexperienced, it succeeded despite using only two types of actors. NGOs and other IOs were not involved, nor were specialists, advisors, or the city of Copenhagen.

The second part of the actor-level properties expectation is about the number of actors involved. In Table 8.11, one would expect to see low numbers of actors in the top left corner and high numbers in the bottom right. However, the table shows a mixed pattern. The result of this part of the expectation is that the number of network actors contributes only partially to success.

The numbers in the top left corner are generally lower than those in the bottom right. The lowest number of actors was found in the UNICEF case in The Hague (16 actors). In the Vienna Arms Trade Treaty case, the number was 22; the main nodes in the middle were involved with 19 other nodes, mainly on the periphery. In the Geneva Green Climate Fund case, the number of nodes was 23; many of these were also to be found on the periphery.

In the top left corner, the numbers were low to average, whereas in the bottom right corner they were all high. The highest number of actors was the Arms Trade Treaty case in Geneva (39 actors). UNOPS in Copenhagen was an exception. In this successful case, the network consisted of 17 actors, which were also mostly positioned on the periphery. The results show that, although the UNOPS case is an exception, a higher number of actors seems partially related to the likelihood of success in attracting an IO.

Table 8.11 Relational perspective: network size

	Factual failure	**Factual measured failure**	**Factual measured success**	**Factual success**
Perceived failure	Arms Trade Treaty Vienna 22*	UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships The Hague** 16		
Perceived Relative failure		Sustainable Energy for All Copenhagen 25		
Perceived Relative success	Green Climate Fund Geneva 23			Sustainable Energy for All Vienna 26
Perceived success			Arms Trade Treaty Geneva 39	UNOPS HQ Copenhagen 17 International Criminal Court The Hague 31

* The figure is between 14 and 25 main nodes.
** Black for low number of nodes (lower than 20 nodes), dark grey for average number of nodes (20 to 25 nodes), light grey for high number of nodes (higher than 25 nodes).

8.6 Conclusion

As discussed, some of the findings were as expected, while others were contrary to my expectations. My main points are briefly summarized below.

In the instrumental perspective, I initially explored the alignment of the attraction policies with the bid books to attract the IOs. This resulted in an almost opposite outcome: the failed cases showed a high and average alignment, whereas the successful cases showed a low alignment – except for the International Criminal Court case. The more the content of the branding and host policies corresponded with the bid book for the IO, the less likely it seems that the IO was successfully attracted. This was the most surprising result. In the second part of the instrumental perspective, I looked at policy perception and support. A positive perception of host policies and government support did bear a relation to success, albeit not convincingly. When the group of IO representatives referred positively to the branding policies, elements in the bid, rules and regulations for IOs, and government support, the processes were usually more successful. Understandably, the order in which organizations were brought in played a role. In all cities except for Copenhagen, the timelines showed that the IO representatives were less satisfied in the first case than in the second. The cases in Copenhagen are probably an exception because the Danish rules and regulations for IOs changed in 2016. Since then, employees from non-EU states have had to obtain an administrative identity card, with all the difficulties that that entails.

The discursive perspective showed that the similar frames – consisting of prioritizing locational elements and narratives closely connected between these governmental groups – showed only a partial relationship with success. These results showed that the considerable overlap in priorities and narratives between the organizational and the policy networks did not automatically lead to network success. For instance, when the organizational network was composed in an extremely ad hoc fashion, as in the UNOPS case, the levels of overlap of priorities and narratives were low but the network was still quite effective. When the organizational network showed high overlaps with the policy network, the endeavor could still fail, such as in the Vienna Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat case. The alternative expectation worked well: the overlaps of priorities and narratives between the organizational network and the IO representatives showed a strong correlation with the likelihood of success. When the perceptual frames of the IO representatives overlapped with the views of the organizational network, the likelihood of success was higher.

With the relational perspective, I focused on network cooperation and structure, looking at actor centrality and network diversity and size. The results of this perspective were mixed. The level of cooperation among the organizational network members did not show a relationship with network success. High levels of actor centrality indicated a correlation with success, albeit partial. The findings were especially noticeable in the network structure. Where there were a couple of strong nodes in the middle connected to smaller sub-networks, I found a higher likelihood of success. Network diversity showed a strong relationship with a successful outcome. The more diverse the core networks – the organizational networks and surrounding actors – preferably with specialists, businesses, IOs, and NGOs, the higher the network success. Involving senior, highly placed political actors in the process also contributed to network success. A higher number of main nodes in these core networks also showed a relationship to fortunate outcomes, except in the successful UNOPS case in Copenhagen, where the number of actors was low.

At the end of the described results, I can identify two variables that have appeared to contribute highly to success in the eight cases: overlap of priorities and narratives between the organizational network and the IO representatives (Expectation 4), and network diversity and size (E7). Unexpectedly, perception of the host policy and support (E2) and degree and betweenness centrality (E6) contributed only partially to success. The determinant with an almost opposite result to what was expected was the alignment of attraction (host and branding) policies with the bid books (E1). Two variables did not contribute to success: the overlap of priorities and narratives between the organizational and policy networks (E3), and network cooperation (E5).

9 Conclusions and discussion

9.1 Introduction

In this book, I focus on how governance networks in small to medium-sized cities – Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen – attract IOs and how they succeed or fail. The central question is: *What contributes to the successes and failures of governance networks in small to medium-sized Western European host cities in attracting International Organizations?* In the light of collaborative governance literature, the concept of governance networks is used as an umbrella for the following three groups: organizational networks attracting IOs, policy networks retaining them, and the IO representatives in the candidate cities. I explore eight cases using these perspectives. In the empirical chapters, I research how the processes of IO attraction correspond with expectations and their underlying mechanisms. My explorative analysis shows that some of my expectations are substantiated, while others are not. In this chapter, I will summarize and reflect on these findings.

In the following sections, I will first summarize my findings and then explain the broader implications of this study, both for theory as well as practice. I conclude this chapter with concluding remarks and avenues for future research.

9.2 Reflection on the findings

The instrumental perspective has led to an unexpected outcome: in contrast to what I expected, the findings show that the more host policies are aligned with the bid book for the IO, the less likely the IO attraction is to be successful. Additional qualitative findings also give reasons to suggest that the process is probably more successful when the bid focuses predominantly on the needs of the IO itself and less on aligning with host and branding policy goals. For this perspective, I also find what I did expect: that a positive perception of host policies contributes partially to success in attracting new IOs. One example of this is the UNOPS case in Copenhagen, where the perception of the elements in the bid and the rules and regulations was quite positive: the 'premises free of charge' element in the bid was the most important asset for new IO employees to move to Copenhagen. They were interested in the good support they heard about.

For the discursive perspective, I find that overlap of perceptual frames between governmental groups does not contribute to the likelihood of success. This finding is unexpected and suggests that the alignment of priorities and narratives within governmental networks does not automatically lead to success. However, for the overlap of perceptual frames between the governmental network and IO representatives, I do find a relationship with success. This finding is in line with my earlier observations, showing that putting more emphasis on the needs of the IO could be rewarding in the process of attracting an IO.

Contrary to my expectations, I find that, for the relational perspective, no relation exists between network cooperation within the organizational network and the likelihood of success. In addition, I find that a high centrality in a network is partially related to success, but that, especially, network diversity contributes to success, and to a lesser extent network size. Table 9.1 summarizes these findings:

Table 9.1 Perspectives, expectations, and outcomes

Perspective	**Expected contribution to success:**	**Outcome as expected:**
Instrumental	1. Alignment of host policies with bid book	Opposite
	2. Perception of host policy and support	Partially
Discursive	3. Similar frames between organizational and policy network	No
	4. Similar frames between organizational network and IO representatives	Yes
Relational	*Internal legitimacy:* 5. Network cooperation	No
	Actor-level properties: 6a. Betweenness centrality 6b. Degree centrality	 a. Partially b. Partially
	Network-level properties: 7a. Network diversity 7b. Network size	 a. Yes b. Partially

The empirical findings based on my case studies lead to three main conclusions. The first concerns the need for a more externally aimed orientation of governance networks. Especially when the organizational networks attracting IOs are more attentive to the specific needs and wishes of IO representatives, the processes tend to be more successful.

My second conclusion is based on the finding that broader actor centrality in the network leads to success. When reviewing network structures, I found that having several actors centrally positioned is better than only one. Furthermore, the existence of sub-networks and linkages between the core network and these sub-networks are important and lead to a further increase in the likelihood of success.

My third conclusion is based on my findings on the last expectation dealing with network diversity and number of nodes: network *diversity* and, to a lesser extent, network *size* positively affect the likelihood of success.

9.3 Theoretical implications

My first conclusion, that governance networks need a more external orientation when attracting IOs, is related to all three perspectives.

Conclusion 1. The need of an external orientation when attracting IOs
Looking first from an instrumental perspective, I found that the alignment of the bid book with policy goals is counterproductive. When formulating a bid for an IO, governance networks are more successful when they are outward-looking instead of inward-looking. When the bid book considers what the needs of the specific IO are and is less aligned with host policy goals, it tends to be more successful.

My conclusion has implications for the literature on collaborative policy designs, in which public actors often seek to optimize alignment between policy goals. As Rogge (2018) argues, targets need to be consistent with long-term targets to be successful. Furthermore, "consistency and coherence" are crucial in successful policy formulation (p. 44). Others agree, like Mukherjee and Bali (2019), who state that a successful policy design needs "coherence, consistency, and congruence" (p. 4). My finding contradicts this line of thinking. For the cases of attracted IOs I studied, more coherent policies lowered the likelihood of success. Of course, this is a result based on a sample of eight cases, but it is nonetheless remarkable. One of the explanations of this finding is that a host policy needs flexibility. The more a bid book is aligned to the wishes and the nature of the IO, and the less it is bound by existing policy document guidelines, the higher the likelihood of success. One example of this is the successfully attracted Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat to Geneva. After having lost the Green Climate Fund, the organizational network in Geneva 'walked the extra mile': the network adapted the bid book more consistently to the IO. Moreover, a great deal of the elements in the bid were left open for further discussion, which led to a flexible attitude. A second example is the failed case of The Hague, where the policy alignment was also higher than in the successful case. Although the annexes for the bid were quite complete, some of the requests had to wait and could not be fulfilled. The governance network was more resistant towards the UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division. This means that when strictly adhering to nation host policy formats and marketing strategies, bid books are likely to fail in attracting an IO, at least in the cases I studied.

The second part of the instrumental perspective also supports this conclusion. When studying how the 'target group' of IO employees perceived host policies, I find that a more positive perception of host policies and government support leads to a higher likelihood of success. It matters how 'policy recipients' or IO employees perceive policymaking. It is therefore crucial that governance networks have an external orientation in which their host policies are adaptable to the needs of the IOs. If the IO employees are more satisfied with the government support received from the host city and state, this has an impact on attracting new IOs. In Vienna, for example, when international employees note that their field is supported sufficiently – in the successful case – they comment more positively on host policies, and this also attracts more new activity in that field – of sustainable energy in this case. In Copenhagen, where the employees are disappointed about the administrative change in obtaining identity numbers for non-EU citizens, a substantial part of the international community is dissatisfied, and this has a carry-over effect to possible new international employees. Theoretically, this finding is consistent with the policy success literature (McConnell, 2010; McConnell, Grealy, & Lea, 2020), which agrees that higher benefits for the target group lead to more policy program success.

Taking this a step further, since this finding indicates that a positive perception of host policies by policy recipients could potentially lead to more network success, it also addresses the 'success for whom' question, which offers an important nuance in the discussion on policy success (McConnell, Grealy, & Lea, 2020). In this literature, little attention has been paid to this question, and although I conducted a limited study, it adds to the discussion: the perceptions of policy recipients can potentially have a positive effect on policy success. A further analysis of these processes in this light is still needed to make this a more robust contribution to the policy success literature. For this purpose, using a 'success for whom' heuristic can have an added value to this finding, by first *capturing* actor success by focusing on how the existing IO representatives affect the possibility of attracting new employees, then *explain* their success, and finally *evaluate* it (McConnell, Grealy, & Lea, 2020, p. 605).

The discursive perspective also emphasizes the need for an externally oriented governance network, but in a different way. When looking at the overlap of perceptual frames, I expected that governmental groups would make better policy decisions when they shared a similar discourse (Peters, 2012). Contrary to my expectations, the findings do not support this. I find no relationship between a discursive overlap between governmental networks and success. The opposite may not be true either: networks are not more successful when showing less overlap in their priorities and narratives. What *does* lead to a higher likelihood of success is a similar frame between different networks. The overlap of priorities and narratives between the organizational network attracting the IO and the IO representatives does lead to a higher likelihood of success. This finding has links to the first perspective; the more the policies are adapted to the needs of policy recipients, the better.

This result reflects a finding in the literature on normative institutionalism. Schimmelfennig and Thomas (2009) have used this theory to analyze how bargaining processes take place in the EU. Although this is a different type of study, they argue that when different groups have similar normative frames, it contributes positively to the ability to reach agreement – better than between similar groups. This supports my finding that governance networks need to be externally oriented to be successful.

Finally, based on the relational perspective, I can draw a similar conclusion. The finding concerning network cooperation shows that a positive perception of cooperation among the network members does not lead to success in attracting IOs. My relational expectations originate from the network performance indicators of Kenis and Provan (2009): mandated/voluntary inception, form of governance, and developmental stage of the network. These lead to my concepts of *internal legitimacy*, *actor-level properties,* and *network-level properties.* The variable of network cooperation is based on the first concept, internal legitimacy. Although Kenis and Provan (2009) suggest that the need for a high internal legitimacy applied only to voluntary networks, I expected that the cooperation levels should be high, especially in mandated networks led by Network Administrative Organizations (NAOs). This expectation was wrong. In fact, there is no relationship at all between good cooperation and success, implying that a high degree of internal legitimacy in an organizational network is not linked to success. This also implies that NAO-led networks might need another assessment criterion for their effectiveness. I would propose using *external legitimacy* as a criterion, which refers to a positive assessment of network cooperation by outsiders such as the policy recipients, funders, regulators, the public, and the media (Kenis & Provan, 2009). An outside observer can often provide more valuable information about network effectiveness than an insider who can often be too involved in the middle of the process to provide insight into what is going well.

Networks need an external orientation to attract IOs successfully. As shown, this is supported by all three perspectives. Firstly, from the policy alignment and perception perspective, secondly from a discursive perspective where the overlap of perceptual frames works better between different than similar networks; and finally, from a relational perspective where a positive perception of network cooperation does not lead to higher levels of success.

Conclusion 2: Network centrality and the existence of sub-networks contribute to success in attracting IOs

My second conclusion relates to network centrality. Having several central actors contributes to success. It is better to have a few actors primarily responsible for the attraction process than only one – such as in the UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships case in The Hague. Furthermore, the existence of sub-networks linked to the core of the broader network also contributes to success.

What I find in terms of network centrality is that the frequency of meetings does not have an effect, but the type of actors matters. In some successful cases, I find that although actors of high political standing do not frequently meet with others, their involvement can be crucial. For example, one meeting with the Prime Minister might affect success more than several meetings with the Secretary of State. An example in the case of the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat attracted to Geneva is that Foreign Minister gave a speech at the right event at the right time. This may have been the last push that got member states to vote for Switzerland and Geneva. Another example is the way the Dutch Prime Minister got involved in the attraction of the International Criminal Court. His activity was only at the periphery of the network and quite limited, whereas the effect of his involvement has presumably been considerable.

The importance of sub-networks aligns with earlier work by Provan and Sebastian (1998) and Provan and Lemaire (2012), who argue that the existence of sub-networks (which they call *cliques*) can lead to higher network effectiveness. Moreover, the importance of single actors as bridges between networks and sub-networks is found in the work of Granovetter, who developed a long-standing hypothesis on 'the strength of weak ties' (1983), arguing that weak ties had a strength, as they could be crucial bridges between two densely knit groups of close friends or coworkers. When looking, for example, at the network graph of the Sustainable Energy case attracted to Copenhagen, one of the most influential ties is the Ministry of Taxation, which does, in the end, have a decisive say in the failure to attract the Quasi-IO by preventing the granting of tax exemptions. This is an actor in between sub-networks. A more positive example is that of the network attracting the same IO to Vienna. Two of the most important nodes, the Legal advisor of the Foreign Ministry and the Energy department of the Foreign Ministry can be considered *weak ties* or 'institutional plugs' located in the periphery, but nevertheless linking two sub-networks. These two are decisive actors, making sure that the network 'walks the extra mile'. In the network graphs, these 'weak ties' link cores and sub-networks and turn out to be key characters in gaining success. In recent studies, these single actors – or 'institutional plugs' (Bosselaar & Bannink, 2021) – are considered promising players in networks (Van Duijn, Bannink, & Ybema, 2022). This advances the literature on network governance, as it suggests that the interactions of participants in the network might have more explanatory value than governance modes (Kenis & Provan, 2009) or building relations between actors (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). This finding contributes to the literature by adding empirical detail and exploring the actors' positions in the networks and how these might have been decisive for successfully attracting IOs.

More actors in the core of a network, as well as actors who can bridge between the core and different sub-networks, are important for success. A third aspect is that the high activity of actors does not contribute to success, but that it does matter what types of actors are involved. This argues for a more actor-oriented approach to governance network analysis.

Conclusion 3: The diversity of a network and the number of actors therein contribute to success in attracting IOs

My third and last conclusion, that a *diverse* network contributes to success, suggests that involving many different actors in an organizational network is important. For instance, NGOs, experts, businesses, and academics – or 'Third UN' – play a crucial role. I find that the most diverse networks are also the most successful. One telling example is the case of Geneva's successfully attracted Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat. In this case, the number of actor types is high: eight types that range from public, private, municipal, regional, political, non-profit, and administrative levels. The diversity of this network shows that many different types interact. The intensity of the lobby, through the interaction with NGOs, and the United Nations Office of Geneva most probably led to a persuasion of all countries that voted for Vienna in the first round, to vote for Geneva in the next. This finding is in line with studies in the lobbying literature, such as the work of Junk (2019), who shows that diverse networks have a higher level of lobbying success. It also supports the 'strange bedfellows' argument of Phinney (2017) who, in his qualitative analysis, finds that diverse coalitions in broader networks help groups to increase their power. The inclusion of other actors contributes to network diversity and, as I find, to network success.

The number of actors also partially contributes to success. This conclusion indicates that the developmental stage of a network affects success. The longer a candidate city and host country have experience with attracting IOs, and the longer they have time available to establish 'playbooks' for organizational networks to use when attracting IOs, the higher diversity and number of actors there will be in the network.

This conclusion indicates that involving actors from different backgrounds contributes to successfully attracting IOs. Furthermore, including more actors in the network also contributes partially to success.

Assessment theoretical framework

The findings have consequences for the three independent perspectives I used in developing my expectations. On the other hand, the three perspectives also have consequences for the findings of this work.

As discussed, I found substantiation for most expectations based on each of the perspectives, while for others these were only partially supported or not supported at all. As the three perspectives are looking at the eight cases with different emphases and interpretations, asking questions based on different frames, the answers are also quite different. Interestingly, the perspectives are complementary to each other. The insight of the instrumental perspective is that policy alignment is no guarantee for success. The perspective reveals what is being omitted, and how alternative frameworks are essential. It shows that policy *goals* do not need to be aligned, but rather host policies need to be aligned with the policy *needs* of the IO representatives (the policy recipients).

The second perspective focuses on narratives of collaborating networks in the cities, thus explaining the attraction of IOs in a contextual way. This perspective implies that the 'perceptual frames' of these different stakeholders are important, especially if the organizational networks consider the priorities of the IO representatives and not those of the policy network. This implies that, when wanting to predict or explain the actions of governmental groups while attracting IOs, these might need to be less concentrated on internal overlaps of priorities and contextual narratives.

The third perspective looks at the network actors, the lobbying power and influence of the core network, and the political circumstances in which these networks operate when attracting IOs. When predicting or explaining the attraction of IOs in this way, the answers imply that having more than one centralized actor in a network, creating sub-networks, and including a diverse set of actors contribute to success.

These three perspectives give a richly varied overview of what works best when governance networks attract IOs. I have shown that the perspectives are independent in their answers to different questions, emphasizing distinctive characteristics. This leads to solutions to some puzzles I noticed. I have found that attaining the alignment of policy goals, as often propagated in collaborative policy design literature (Mukherjee & Bali, 2019; Rogge, 2018) has not been found beneficial for attracting IOs. Also, I have shown that similar perceptual frames within a network are less likely to result in success than those between the governance network and IO employees. This advances the theory of *overlapping discourses*, as it gives evidence that an overlap of narratives between different groups is more advantageous than between similar groups, when pursuing successes in attracting IOs. The third theoretical advancement this study has achieved is that it shows that 'institutional plugs' (Bosselaar & Bannink, 2021) or so-called *weak ties* are essential for an effective network governance. This leads to the suggestion that more attention is needed for the specific actors and their characteristics in networks, instead of how networks 'as a whole' or *whole networks* operate, as suggested by Provan and Lemaire (2012). In line with this, the practical implications will be discussed in the following sections.

9.4 Practical implications

My main findings, as discussed in the preceding section, can also be used to formulate suggestions that are important for governance networks aiming to attract IOs. First, maintain an external orientation of the network and good contacts with the IOs already established in the host city. Second, ensure there is a (networked) continuity of the host policy within the host city and state. Finally, maximize the diversity of the network, including as many actors and encouraging as much enthusiasm as possible. These three suggestions are in line with the three conclusions above, although they are related more to practical than theoretical implications. The following sections explore the suggestions in more detail.

1. Keep an external orientation of the network

A first suggestion is that the network should be less focused on internal coordination and more on external relationships. Rather than considering host policies and attraction *on paper*, it is important to consider the needs and wishes of the specific IO. While doing so, it is crucial to tighten relations abroad and with international partners in the host city.

Additionally, it is crucial to maintain good contacts with the IOs that have already settled in the city. Ambassadors and international employees can act as agents for the voting member states of the IOs, as they also have many external contacts that can use their influence. It is therefore crucial that international employees be taken seriously. Handling complaints in the city is crucial for a good relationship with IO employees. Naturally, governance networks must weigh up whether these complaints are justified, but the findings of the study suggest that diplomatic relations should not be disrupted by complaints that have not been dealt with. It is worthwhile to consider the policy recipients' perceptions of host policies and governmental support.

Furthermore, personal relationships appear to be crucial in this respect. An example is Geneva, where the governance networks honor the tradition of 'being a host', which penetrates the attraction processes for IOs and enhances awareness among practitioners. In cases where the respondents negatively perceive host policies, attraction processes tend to fail.

2. Networked continuity of host policy

The attraction of IOs is a networked endeavor that happens once or twice a decade. As it only occasionally takes place more often, these types of processes are rare and not embedded in existing policies. Nevertheless, it is important to have a ‘playbook’ ready in case it occurs. Other departments of involved ministries are best to be informed on a regular basis about established IOs, possible future IOs, and the advantages of hosting IOs. This will help to gather resources to offer a future IO an attractive location. In this effort, the ad hoc character of the policy could be diminished by updating other ministries in bi-annual or quarterly interdepartmental meetings. By informing other ministries more often, the effectiveness of the effort can be increased.

Furthermore, I find that having several core players in the center of a network is more effective than a single responsible actor ‘in the middle’. Shared responsibility is therefore recommended. Finally, in some cases where higher-ranking political actors are involved in the network, the chances of success increase. An example is the Prime Minister in the case of the International Criminal Court in The Hague. It might be desirable to involve high-profile players who can warm up other ministries and ensure a support base is present.

3. Diversity and number of actors involved and ‘Walking the extra mile’

A third suggestion is that networks involve different actors in the process, both additional IOs and NGOs as well as specialists in the field of the new IO, and other ministries to generate interest. Diversity in the governance network brings more synergies and more ideas and creativity. For example, in the Sustainable Energy for All case in Vienna, many types of energy-related NGOs, businesses, and specialists were involved, making it an undivided interest for different actors that the Quasi-IO would remain seated in Vienna. With these various parties involved, convincing other ministries of the importance of attracting and hosting IOs is more likely.

Finally, it is important to create motivation and enthusiasm in the network. The most successful networks are the ones prepared to ‘walk the extra mile.’ This term is mentioned several times in the interviews and shows that ‘getting the most out of it’ is an essential condition for network success. This also means that the organizational network in charge of attracting the IO is best consisting of a competent team that does not have a ‘nine-to-five’ mentality. In this light, it is crucial that network actors do not underestimate what attracting an IO means for the urban environment, the region, and the host country, and for the network itself. The process entails a lot of groundwork and requires substantial effort and drive.

9.5 Limitations and future avenues

This study has revealed many aspects related to IOs, cities, and the successes and failures of governance networks attracting IOs to cities. Nevertheless, there are questions remaining about the way these networks can attain more influence and organize a better lobby. In this section I will discuss some of these questions while plotting avenues for future research.

In this thesis the processes of attracting IOs have been studied exploratively for the first time. While doing this, I have shown that IO employees in candidate cities prioritize a favorable host state agreement, international schools, livability, and dual-career possibilities, whereas governmental networks often focus on political stability, hospitals, and relevant centers. This discrepancy can be reduced by being more in touch with IO employees and their needs. One of the remaining questions is *how* the priorities and narratives of governmental networks can be better aligned with those of IO representatives, and how the two groups can, in practice, remain more in continuous deliberation about what they find important, regardless of busy work schedules and governmental staff changes.

In line with these questions, the first conclusion of this study shows that policy alignment when attracting IOs does not substantially contribute to success. A promising avenue for future research would be to explore when such alignment does and when it does not contribute to success. Which policy types benefit from alignment, and which need more flexibility? When looking at educational curricula, for instance, studies have shown that these do benefit from alignment (DeLuca & Bellara, 2013), whereas attraction policies for IOs, as seen in eight cases, do not.

A second set of remaining questions is about the core players and high-ranking political actors in these kinds of processes. In some of the case studies, it appears that when political stakes are high, a contribution from political actors such as the Prime Minister can be very effective. Questions are: In which situations is the effect the strongest? and what does this mean for the strategy of attracting IOs? It would be worthwhile to investigate situations when the deployment of higher-ranked political actors *does* make a difference and when it does not.

An intriguing question that remains after this study is about the conceptual framework I used. When focusing on governance networks and their successes and failures from three complementary perspectives, I have used a broad scope to study the processes of attracting IOs. This decision has the advantage that the empirical material is studied in-depth, and that I gained new insights for each of the perspectives. There were some insightful advancements of the different theories I used. However, the decision also comes at the cost of developing cutting-edge theoretical advancement for each of the perspectives. Some questions remain, such as: had I only used one theoretical perspective, what would have been the consequences? What would have been the result of using a different methodology, such as process tracing methods, or a more quantitative mixed methods approach? Or when the theoretical framework would have been supplemented with a fourth, a lobbying perspective, looking at the material purely from an interest group scope, what would have been the empirical and theoretical advancements? These questions may pave the way for more research on this important topic.

To conclude, I would like to refer to the case introduced in the Prologue. An Intergovernmental Organization, the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecast (ECMWF), needed to find a new location for its EU funded Copernicus program. The city of Bonn was selected after a biennial struggle of candidate states and cities that needed to find their way in the competition for such a big opportunity, at the start of the global pandemic.

How this process ended can be associated with my three conclusions. Firstly, the governance network attracting the ECMWF Copernicus program to Bonn deployed an external lobby, commencing by handing in a bid in tandem with Helsinki. Secondly, the Federal Government was deeply involved in the Bonn offer, which was quite attractive, and lobbied intensively to gain votes from the IO member states. Thirdly, the network involved North Rhine-Westphalia's Prime Minister, as well as the Mayor of Bonn and climate related businesses, experts, and NGOs. Bonn can be seen as a climate hub for UN organizations and climate related IOs. So, was it sheer luck? Yes, and no. To uncover underlying motivations and to find answers to the other questions posed in the Prologue, more research will be needed.

Epilogue

The European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF), the independent Intergovernmental Organization based in Reading, moved to Bonn in 2021. Whilst the first wave of staff is accommodated in temporary offices, it is expected that the new and permanent ECMWF offices will be ready by 2026. The following categories were used by an evaluation committee to assess the proposals from member states: Scientific & Social Environment (40%), Facility (20%), Financial Conditions (30%), and Connectivity & Sustainability (10%). Each of the four criteria was broken down into sub-categories to ensure that nothing was overlooked. The submission of the recommendation to the ECMWF Council was on 17 November 2020. The member states voted on 9 December 2020. After the submissions, the evaluation committee declared the UK's bid inadmissible because they could not guarantee that in their new situation outside of the EU the Copernicus program would continue to be supported by EU funds.

The voting method had been disputed for a long time. The big countries agreed that how much they contributed to the ECMWF should weigh most heavily in the vote. The smaller countries argued – understandably – for 'one country, one vote.' In the end, it boiled down to 50/50: half the weight of the vote was determined by the contribution of that country, thus favoring the larger countries. Of the eight bids, five made it above the line with a positive review. Spain, Germany, and France topped the list after Ireland and Austria dropped out with the fewest votes. Although Spain was favored in the first round, Germany won in the deciding round. This could be explained by the following three reasons.

First, from the 34 member states voting for the best proposal, one was already on Bonn's side: Helsinki (or, rather, Finland). All member states could vote for themselves if they had handed in a bid, so it was Germany 'plus one' from the beginning. This means that the network of the Bonn delegation was extensive; it collaborated externally. Secondly, Germany's bid was attractive. It promised a gigantic glass building near other UN institutions and offered a world-class scientific environment and beneficial conditions. Bonn's brochure was phenomenal. There was also an original video placed on their website where rubber ducks spoke in favor of Bonn as the best place to settle for ducks. The setting was a conference room with an English-speaking 'head duck' who gave a convincing talk about Bonn being an attractive city at the heart of Europe. Internal sources have, however, indicated that this video was not the deciding factor, which was, ultimately, the discussion about the weight of the vote. This was also part of my conclusions, where I found that lobbying externally for votes is an element to focus on as an organizational network. Thirdly, it was important for the ECMWF to spread their offices across the EU: with the next supercomputer to be housed in Bologna, Italy, while the headquarters and most forecasting would remain in Reading, UK, the choice of Bonn was a strategic one. Furthermore, Bonn already hosted other climate related IOs, which added attractiveness. Bonn is seen as a *hub* for IOs, which is always an important aspect that IOs consider before moving.

References

Abélès, M. (2011). *Des anthropoligues à l'OMC: scènes de la gouvernance mondiale.* Paris: CNRS.

Adler, P., & Florida, R. (2020). Geography as strategy: the changing geography of corporate headquarters in post-industrial capitalism. *Regional Studies, 54*(5), 610-620.

Allison, G., & Zelikow, P. (1999). *The Essene of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.* Boston, MA: Little Brown.

Ambassador International Organizations. (2014, July 2). Possible relocation of UNICEF's PFP. *WOB-request – letters back and forth from December 2013- November 2014.*

Amiri, S., & Sevin, E. (2020). *City Diplomacy. Current Trends and Future Prospects.* Los Angeles: Palgrave Macmillan.

Anckar, C. (2008). On the Applicability of the Most Similar Systems Design and the Most Different Systems Design in Comparative Resaerch. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 11*(5), 389-401.

Andrews, R., Boyne, G. A., Meier, K. J., O'Toole Jr., L. J., & Walker, R. M. (2012). Vertical Strategic Alignment and Public Service Performance. *Public Administration, 90*(1), 77-98.

Angell, S. I., & Mordhorst, M. (2015). National Reputation Management and the Competition State. *Journal of Cultural Economy, 8*(2), 184-201.

Anholt, S. (2008, December 4). *Denmarks International Image*. Opgeroepen op August 2019, van kommunicationsmaaling.dk: https://kommunikationsmaaling.dk/artikel/denmarks-international-image/

Anholt Good Country Index. (2014, March 8). *Good Country Index*. Retrieved January 7, 2019, from Results: https://www.goodcountryindex.org/results

Appel, B. J. (2018). Intergovernmental Organizations and Democratic Victory in International Crises. *The Journal of Politics, 80*(1), 274-287.

Arms Trade Treaty Provisional Secretariat. (2016). *The Arms Trade Treaty 2016*. Retrieved January 8, 2016, from http://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/index.php/en/the-arms-trade-treaty

Austrian Embassy. (2019, May 1). *International Organizations in Austria*. Retrieved June 14, 2019, from Austrian Embassy Washington: https://www.austria.org/international-organisations-in-austria

Austrian Federal Government. (2015, May 10). *Austria brand image hit*. Retrieved June 15, 2019, from Nation-branding.info: http://nation-branding.info/2008/05/10/austria-brand-image-hit/

Austrian Foreign Ministry. (2015a). *Follow-up questions on host country proposals.* Vienna: Fderal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs.

Austrian Foreign Ministry, d. I. (2015b, January 15). Austrian offer to host the ATT Secretariat in Vienna. Aide memoire. Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Vienna.
Austrian Foreign Ministry. (2016). *Follow-up questions on host country proposals.* Energy Department. FMA.
Austrian National Council. (2015). *Resolution of the National Council of 9 December 2015.* Vienna: Federal Council of Austria.
Ayers, R. S. (2015). Aligning Individual and Organizational Performance: Goal Alignment in Federal Government Agency Performance Appraisal Programs. *Public Personnel Management, 44*(2), 169-191.
Badache, F. (2020). A representative bureaucracy perspective on workforce composition in international organizations: The case of the United Nations Secretariat. *Public Administration, 98*, 392-407.
Bishop, M. L., Girvan, N., Shaw, T. M., Solange, M., Kirton, R. M., Scobie, M., Anatol, M. (2011). *Carribean Regiona Integratoin.* IIR Report.
Black, R. (2009, December 22). *Why did Copenhagen fail to deliver a climate deal?* Retrieved July 30, 2019, from BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8426835.stm
Board of the Evaluation Committee. (2012). *Report of the Host Country Evaluation Committee.* Songdo, Republic of Korea: Green Climate Fund.
Boräng, F., & Naurin, D. (2015). 'Try to see it my way!' Frame congruence between lobbyists and European Commission officials. *Journal of European Public Policy, 22*(4), 499-515.
Borgatti, S. P., & Everett, M. G. (1997). Network analysis of 2-mode data. *Social Networks, 19*, 243-269.
Borgatti, S. P., & Halgin, D. S. (2011). On Network Theory. *Organization Science, 22*(5), 1168-1181.
Bosselaar, H., & Bannink, D. (2021, September 8). The plug – building the collaborative governance of wickedness. *A case study of active labour market policy-implementation*. Conferentiepaper EGPA, Brussels, Belgium.
Bovens, M., & 't Hart, P. (2016). Revisiting the study of policy failures. *Journal of European Public Policy, 23*(5), 653-666.
Bradley, S. (2013, September 24). *Swiss seek to boost city's intellectual impact.* Retrieved December 21, 2015, from SwissInfo.ch: http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/international-geneva-_swiss-seek-to-boost-city-s-intellectual-impact/36926686
Bundesgesetz für die Rupublik Österreich. (2009). *Änderung des Bundesgesetzes über die Einräumung von Privilegien und Immunitäten an internationale Organisationen.* Vienna: Republik Österreich.
Callixtus, J. (2013). Reflections from the Arms Trade Treaty Negotiations: CARICOM Punching and Succeeding Above Its Weight. *Caribbean Journal of International Relations & Diplomacy, 1*(1), 93-109.
Campbell, S. (2000). The changing role and identity of capital cities in the global era. *paper presented at the annual meeting of American geographers.* Pittsburgh, PA.

Carrington, D. (2010, December 3). *WikiLeaks cables: US backs UAE bid to host green energy agency This article is more than 10 years old*. Retrieved April 9, 2021, from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/dec/03/us-uae-green-energy-irena

City Council of The Hague. (2001, Juni 8). Beantwoording Schriftelijke Vragen. *RIS 087343*. Den Haag, Zuid-Holland, the Netherlands: Gemeente Den Haag.

City of Copenhagen. (2015). *City of Copenhagen Municipal Plan 2015: The Coherent City.* City of Copenhagen, Centre for Urban Development. Copenhagen: City of Copenhagen.

City of New York. (2016). *United Nations impact report 2016.* Available at: https://www1.nyc.gov/site/international/programs/un-impact-report-2016.page. New York: Mayor's Office for International Affairs.

City of Vienna. (2013). *Smart City Wien. Framework Strategy Overview.* Smart City Wien. Vienna: City of Vienna.

Combs, N. (2005). The International Criminal Court: An Analysis. In P. J. Van Krieken, & D. McKay, *The Hague: Legal Capital of the World* (pp. 345-436). The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press.

Compton, M. E., & 't Hart, P. (2019). How to 'See' Great Policy Successes: A Field Guide to Spotting. In M. E. Compton, & P. 't Hart, *Great Policy Successes* (pp. 1-20). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

CPI/ICC. (2018, December 18). *About the ICC*. Retrieved March 25, 2019, from International Criminal Court: https://www.icc-cpi.int/about

Cremer, J. (2016, December 6). *Why Denmark is suffering a branding crisis (and qhat can be done about it)*. Retrieved August 1, 2019, from The Local. Denmark's news in English: https://www.thelocal.dk/20161206/why-denmark-is-suffering-a-branding-crisis-and-what-can-be-done-about-it

Cristofoli, D., Meneguzzo, M., & Riccucci. (2017). Collaborative administration: the management of successful networks. *Public Management Review, 19*(3), 275-283.

Csoti, I., & Van Haelst, N. (2016). *Global Talent Regional Growth. Working towards an Integrated Talent Attraction and Retention Plan for the Metropolitan Region The Hague/Rotterdam.* International Community Platform. The Hague: ICP.

Dairon, E., & Badache, F. (2021, December). Understanding International Organizations' Headquarters as Ecosystems: The Case of Geneva. *Global Policy, 12*(7), 24-33.

Danish Foreign Ministry. (2012). *We Welcome You in Denmark Move to the New UN City In Copenhagen.* Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danish International Development Agency. Copenhagen: DANIDA.

Daxkobler, K., & Seiler, M. (2012). Austria. In M. Lang, P. Pistone, J. Schuch, C. Staringer, & A. Storck, *Tax Rules in Non-Tax Agreements* (pp. 51-114). Amsterdam: IBFD.

Death, C. (2011). Summit theatre: exemplary governmentality and environmental diplomacy in Johannesburg and Copenhagen. *Environmental Politics, 20*(1), 1-19.

Decisio. (2011). *Den Haag 'Internationale Stad van Vrede en Recht' Economische impact internationale organisaties.* Amsterdam: Decisio.

Decisio. (2020). *The Hague, international city of peace and justice. An economic effect analysis of the international non-profit sector.* Amsterdam: Decisio.

Dellepiane, S. (2015). What are case studies and What are they good for? *Case Study Methods course* (p. 14). Essex: Essex University.

DeLuca, C., & Bellara, A. (2013). The Current State of Assessment Education: Aligning Policy, Standards, and Teacher Education Curriculum. *Journal of Teacher Education, 64*(4), 356-372.

Departure Wirtschaft, Kunst und Kultur GmbH. (2006). *Position Paper 'Vienna 2016'. International activities of the City of Vienna.* Vienna: City of Vienna.

Development Policy and Global Cooperation. (2015). *Alternative strategy for attracting UN organizations to Copenhagen.* Copenhagen: Foreign Ministry.

Development Today. (2006, December 31). Copenhagen courts the UN. UNOPS head office to move to Denmark. *Development Today*, pp. 1-3.

Ege, J., & Bauer, M. W. (2013). International bureaucracies from a Public Administration and International Relations perspective. In B. Reinalda, *Routledge Handbook of International Organization* (pp. 135-148). London/New York: Routledge.

Emerson, K., Nabatchi, T., & Balogh, S. (2011). An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance. *JPART, 22*, 1-29.

Eurostat. (2005, January 20). *EUROSTAT Your key to European Statistics*. Retrieved May 10, 2019, from Economy and finance: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/search?p_auth=4EpiElNh&p_p_id=estatsearchportlet_WAR_estatsearchportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=maximized&p_p_mode=view&_estatsearchportlet_WAR_estatsearchportlet_theme=PER_GENSTA&_estatsearchportlet_WAR_estatsearchportlet_

Eurostat. (2019). *GDP per capita in 281 EU regions.* Brussels: Eurostat.

Eyffinger, A. (2005). Living up to a tradition. In P. Van Krieken, & D. (. McKay, *The Hague: Legal Capital of the World* (pp. 29-45). The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press.

Falk, M., & Hagsten, E. (2018). The art of attracting international conferences to European cities. *Tourism Economics, 24*(3), 337-351.

Federal Council. (2012). *Swiss Foreign policy Strategy 2012-2015 Federal Council report to Parliament on the strategic axes of foreign policy.* Bern: Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA.

Federal Council. (2016). *Swiss Foreign Policy Strategy 2016-19: Federal Council report on the priorities for the 2016-19 legislative period.* Bern: Swiss Fderal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA.

Federal Law Gazette. (2015). Federal Law on the Granting of Privileges to Non-Governmental International Organisations. *Federal Law Gazette*, pp. 889-934.

Fetscherin, M., & Marmier, P. (2010). Switzerland's nation branding initiative to foster science and technology, higher education and innovation: A case study. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 6*(1), 58-67.

Field, A. (2009). *Discovering Statistics Using SPSS.* Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

First Conference of States Parties. (2015). *Informal Ballot Procedure (Non-recorded procedure w/ secret ballot).* Cancun: Arms Trade Treaty.

Fondation Pour Genève. (2013). *Impact of the International Sector on Geneva and the Lake Geneva Region.* Université de Genève, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, The Graduate Institute, Université de Lausanne. Geneva: The Observatory of the Fondation Pour Genève.

Fondation pour Genève. (2015). *Strengths and Synergies. The impact of the International Sector on Geneva and the Lake Geneva Region.* Université de Genève, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Graduate Institute Geneva, Université de Lausanne. Geneva: The Observatory of the Fondation Pour Genève.

Future Brand. (2015). *Future Brand Index 2014-15.* London: Future Brand.

FutureBrand Index. (2015). *Future Brand Denmark 2015.* London: FutureBrand.

FYI Denmark. (2019, January 31). *CPR number*. Retrieved July 22, 2019, from FYI Denmark. Expat llife in Denmark: https://www.fyidenmark.com/CPR.html

Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. (2013). *The Arms Trade Treaty (2013). Academy Briefing No. 3.* Université de Genève, The Graduate Institute Geneva. Geneva: Université de Genève.

Gerring, J. (2007). *Case Study Research. Principles and Practices.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gerring, J. (2009). The Case Study: What it is and What it does. In C. Boix, & S. C. Stokes, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics* (pp. 91-122). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Godfroij, A. (1995). Public policy networks: Analysis and management. In W. J. Kickert, & F. A. Van Vught, *Public Policy & Administration Sciences in The Netherlands* (pp. 177-196). Hempstead: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Golbeck, J. (2013). *Analyzing the Social Web.* Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Granovetter, M. (1983). The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited. *Sociological Theory, 1*, 201-233.

Gray, J. (2018). Life, Death, or Zombie? The Vitality of International Organizations. *International Studies Quarterly, 62*, 1-13.

Green Climate Fund. (2012). *Report of teh Host Country Evaluation Committee.* Green Climate Fund, Meeitng of the Board. Songdo, Republic of Korea: Green Climate Fund.

Green Climate Fund. (2014). *About the Fund*. Retrieved May 5, 2014, from Green Climate Fund: http://www.gcfund.org/home.html

Groen, R. (2016). The Policy of Attraction. Comparing three cities on their policy toward international and nongovernmental organizations: The Hague, Geneva and Vienna. *Urban Research & Practice, 9*(3), 250-274.

Grosveld, H. (2002). *The Leading Cities of the World and their Competitive Advantages. The perception of 'Citymakers'.* Naarden: World Cities Research.

Group Permanent Conjoint. (2013). *La Genève Internationale et son avenir.* Geneva: Republique et Canton Genève / Confédération suisse.

Halle, L. J. (1967). *The Cold War as History.* London: Chatto & Windus.

Hasnain-Wynia, R., Sofaer, S., & Bazzoli, G. (2003). Members' Perceptions of Community Care Network Partnerships' Effectiveness. *Medical Care Research and Review, 60*(4), 4-62.

Hill, M., & Hupe, P. (2002). *Implementing Public Policy.* London: Sage Publications.

Hood, C., & Margretts, H. Z. (2007). *The tools of government in the digital age.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

House of Representatives. (1988). *Perspective and policy.* The Hague: IOB.

Howell, D. C. (2013). *Statistical methods for psychology.* Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.

Howlett, M. (2011). *Designing public policies: Principles and instruments.* New York: Routledge.

Howlett, M., Mukherjee, I., & Rayner, J. (2017). Elements of Effective Program Design: A Two-Level Analysis. In M. M. Howlett, *Handbook of Policy Formulation* (pp. 129-144). Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Howlett, M., & Mukherjee, I. (2018). Introduction: The Importance of Policy Design: Effective Processes, Tools and Outcomes. In M. Howlett, & I. Mukherjee, *Routledge Handbook of Policy Design* (pp. 3-19). New York: Routledge.

Howlett, M., & Rayner, J. (2018). Coherence, Congruence and Consistency in Policy Mixes. In M. Howlett, & I. Mukherjee, *Routledge Handbook of Policy Design* (pp. 389-403). New York: Routledge.

Hu, R., Blakely, E. J., & Zhou, Y. (2013). Benchmarking the Competitiveness of Australian Global Cities: Sydney and Melbourne in the Global Context. *Urban Policy and Research, 31*(4), 435-452.

Huber, N. (2007, september). Les politiques d'accueil d'organisations internationales: pomparaison des cas de Genève, Vienne, La Haye et Bonn. *Scriptie*. Genève, Zwitserland: Universiteit Genève.

Human, S. E., & Provan, K. G. (2000). Legitimacy Building in the Evolution of Small-Firm Multilateral Networks: A Comparative Study of Success and Demise. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 45*, 327-365.

Hyytiäinen, S., Renko, J., Gauli, R., Järvisalo, S., & Nadan, K. (2014). *How to build successful city brands? – Case Zurich, Geneva, Stockholm, Helsinki.* HAAGA-HELIA University of Applied Sciences, Experience and Wellness Management. Helsinki: HAAGA-HELIA.

IOB. (1985). *Heroverweging Internationale Organisaties 1985.* Den Haag: IOB.

IOB. (2002). *Zetelverdrag? Eindverslag van de werkgroep beleidskader voor werving en opvang van internationale organisaties.* Den Haag: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken.

IOB. (2018). *Nederland als gastland voor Internationale Organisaties.* Directie Internationaal Onderzoek en Beleidsevaluatie, Ape. Onderzoek & Advies. Den Haag: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken.

Ireland, R. M. (2006). Capital Question: Efforts to Relocate Kentucky's Seat of Government. *Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, 104*(2), 249-83.

Isett, K., LeRoux, I., Mischen, K., & Rethemeyer, R. (2011). Networks in Public Administration Scholarship: Understanding Where We Are and Where We Need to Go. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 21*(1), 157-173.

Joor, J. (2013). Proloog: De Haagse Vredesconferentie van 1899. In J. Joor, & H. Verrijn Stuart, *Bouwen aan Vrede. Honderd jaar werken aan vrede door recht. Het Vredespaleis 1913-2013* (pp. 17-32). Den Haag: Carnegie Stichting.

Juenke, E. G. (2005). Management tenure and network time: How experience affects bureaucratic dynamics. *Journal of Public Administration Research, 15*, 113-31.

Junk, W. M. (2019). When Diversity Works: The Effects of Coalition Composition on the Success of Lobbying Coalitions. *American Journal of Political Science, 63*(3), 660-674.

Katz, B., & Noring, L. (2017). *The Copenhagen City and Port Development Cooperation: A Model for Regenerating Cities.* Washington: Brookings Institution Press.

Kaufmann, D. (2018). *Varieties of Capital Cities. The Competitiveness Challenge for Secondary Capitals.* Cheltenhem, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Kearney, A. (2015). *The A.T. Kearney Global Cities Index and Global Cities Outlook*. Retrieved March 10, 2016, from https://www.atkearney.com/research-studies/global-cities-index/2015#sthash.USxfJl7E.dpuf

Kenis, P., & Provan, K. (2008). Het network-governance-perspectief. In T. (. Wentink, *Business Performance Management. Sturen op prestatie en resultaat* (pp. 296-312). Meppel: Boom Academic.

Kenis, P., & Provan, K. G. (2009). Towards an Exogenous Theory of Public Network Performance. *Public Administration, 87*(3), 440-456.

Kenis, P., & Raab, J. (2020). Back to the Future: Using Organization Design Theory for Effective Organizational Networks. *Perspectives on Public Management and Governance, 3*(2), 109-123.

Klaster, E., Wilderom, C. P., & Muntslag, D. R. (2017, June 6). Balancing Relations and Results in Regional Networks of Public-Policy Implementation. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 27*(4), 676-691.

Klijn, E.-H., Steijn, B., & Edelenbos, J. (2010). The impact of network management on outcomes in governance networks. *Public Administration, 88*, 1063-82.

Lagerwaard, B. (2005). The Hague in the world. The world in The Hague. In V. Krieken, & McKay, *The Hague. Legal capital of the world* (pp. 47-60). The Hague.

Leitner, C. (2016). Nation Branding. Austria as a brand. *Seminar paper* (pp. 1-35). Vienna: Grin Verlag.

Maertens, L., Kimber, L. R., Badache, F., & Dairon, E. (2021). Time and Space in the Study of International Organizations: An Introduction. *Global Policy, 12*(7), 5-13.

Mariotti, S., Piscitello, L., & Elia, S. (2010). Spatial agglomeration of multinational enterprises: The role of information externalities and knowledge spillovers. *Journal of Economic Geography, 10*(4), 519-538.

Marshall, N. (2007). Can policy perception influence social resilience to policy change? *Fisheries Research, 86*, 216-227.

Martinez-Fernandez, C., Sharpe, S., Andersen, M. M., Genoff, R., & Rovsing Kristiansen, K. (2013). *Measuring the Potential of Local Green Growth. An Analysis of Greater Copenhagen.* OECD, OECD Local Economic Development Working Papers 2013/01. Paris: OECD.

McBeth, M. K., Jones, M. D., & Shanahan, E. A. (2014). The Narrative Policy Framework. In P. A. Sabatier, & C. M. Weible, *Theories of the Policy Process* (pp. 225-266). Philadelphia, PA: Westview Press.

McConnell, A. (2010). *Understanding Policy Success.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

McConnell, A., Grealy, L., & Lea, T. (2020). Policy success for whom? A framework for analysis. *Policy Sciences, 53*, 589-608.

McConnell, A., & Tormey, S. (2020). Explanations for the Brexit policy fiasco: near-impossible challenge, leadership failure or Westminister pathology? *Journal of European Public Policy, 27*(5), 685-702.

McGuire, M. (2006). Collaborative public management: Assessing what we know and how we know it. *Public Administration Review, 6*, 33-43.

McGuire, M., & Agranoff, R. (2011). The Limitations of Public Management Networks. *Public Administration, 89*(2), 265-284.

Meier, K. J., & O'Toole, L. J. (2001). Managerial strategies and behavior in networks: A model with evidence from US public education. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 11*, 271-94.

Meijers, E., Spaans, M., Louw, E., Hoogerbrugge, M., & Priemus, H. (2013). *Den Haag Internationale Stad. Verkenning ontwikkelingsfactoren.* Technische Universiteit Delft, Faculteit Bouwkunde. Delft: OTB Research Institute for the Built Environment.

Meilstrup, P. (2010). The Runaway Summit: The Background Story of the Danish Presidency of COP15, the UN Climate Change Conference. In N. Hvidt, & H. Mouritzen, *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2010* (pp. 113-136). Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Mercer. (2012, september 12). *Quality of living Ranking Highlights - Global*. Retrieved september 12, 2014, from Quality of living Ranking Highlights - Global: www.mercer.com

Mercer. (2015, January 31). *Quality of Living City Ranking*. Retrieved June 6, 2019, from Mercer Mobility Exchange: https://mobilityexchange.mercer.com/Insights/quality-of-living-rankings

Mercer. (2017, March 14). *Vienna Tops Mercer's 19th Quality of Living Ranking*. Retrieved May 1, 2017, from Mercer Newsroom: https://www.mercer.com/newsroom/2017-quality-of-living-survey.html

Meyer, G. (2013). Genève et les organisations internationales: une histoire locale de l'International. *Bulletin de la Société d'Histoire et d'archéollogie de Genève, 43*, 86-94.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2013). *Netherlands host country summary 2013.* The Hague:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Municipality of The Hague. (1998). *The Hague – International*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (2015a). *Copenhagen - UN City.* Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (2015b). *Hosting the Sustainable Energy For All-Partnership.* Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.

Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. (2008). *The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.* The Hague: Constitutional Affaris and Legislation Division.

Mires, C. (2013). *Capital of the world: the race to host the United Nations.* New York: New York University Press.

Mordhorst, M. (2015). Public Diplomacy vs Nation Branding: The Case of Denmark after the Cartoon Crisis. In L. Clerk, N. Glover, & P. Jordan, *Histories of Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding in the Nordic and Baltic Countries* (pp. 237-256). Leiden/Boston: Brill Nijhoff.

Mordhorst, M. (2017). Nordic Branding. *Project Overview*. Oslo, Norway: University of Oslo.

Mukherjee, I., & Bali, A. S. (2019). Policy effectiveness and capacity: two sides of the design coin. *Policy Design and Practice*, 1-12.

Mukherjee, I., & Howlett, M. (2018). Gauging Effectiveness. First and Second-Best Policy Design. In M. Howlett, & I. Mukherjee, *Routledge Handbook of Policy Design* (pp. 375-388). New York: Routledge.

Municipality of The Hague. (2011). *Citymarketing Visie Den Haag 2011-2015.* Den Haag: Bureau Citymarketing.

Nauright, J. (2004). Global games: Culture, Political Economy and Sport in the Globalised World of the 21st Century. *Third World Quarterly, 25*(7), 1325-1336.

NBTC. (2013). *Holland Brand Guide.* NBTC. The Hague: NBTC.

Nederhand, J., Van der Steen, M., & Van Twist, M. (2019). Boundary-spanning strategies for aligning institutional logics: a typology. *Local Government Studies, 45*(2), 219-240.

Ni, P., & Kresl, P. K. (2011). *The Global Urban Competitiveness Report.* CHeltenham, Northhampton: Edward Elgar.

Niezen, R., & Sapignoli, M. (2017). *Palaces of hope: the anthropology of global organizations.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Nillson, E. R. (2015, 10 5). Contracting for Excellence. *Explaining change through professional influence in the United Nations Office for Project Services*. Copenhagen, Denmark: Copenhagen Business School.

Odd Westad, A. (2005). *The Global Cold War.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

OECD. (2008). *OECD Entrepreneurship Review of Denmark.* Paris: OECD Publishing.

OECD. (2009). *OECD Territorial Reviews: Copenhagen, Denmark.* Paris: OECD Publishing.

Panke, D., Lang, S., & Wiedemann, A. (2018). *Regional Actors in Multilateral Negotiations. Active and Successful?* London: Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd.

Parliament of Austria. (2015). *Host state law 2015.* Government bill - 889 of the supplements XXV. GP. Vienna: Foreign Affairs.

Peters, B. (2012). *Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism.* London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Phinney, R. (2017). *Strange Bedfellows.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Picot, A. (1965). *Le rayonnement international de Genève.* Neuchâtel: Du Griffon.

Pisano, U., Lepuschitz, K., & Berger, G. (2014). *Urban Sustainable Development Approaches of Three Different Cities: Copenhagen, Newcastle, Vienna.* Institute for Managing Sustainability, European Sustainable Development Network Office. Vienna: ESDN.

Popescu, R., & Corbos, R. (2011, August). Vienna's Branding Campaign – Strategic Option for Developing Austria's Capital in a Top Tourism Destination. *Theoretical and Empirical Researches in Urban Management, 6*(3), 43-60.

Porter, M. (2000). Location, Competition, and Economic Development: Local Clusters in a Global Economy. *Economic Development Quarterly, 14*(1), 15-34.

Preparatory Committee ICC. (1998). *United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.* Rome: ICC.

Protocol Department MFA. (2018). *Guide for Diplomats in Denmark.* Copenhagen: Master Web.

Provan, K. G., & Kenis, P. (2008). Modes of network governance: Structure, management, and effectiveness. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18*, 229-52.

Provan, K. G., & Lemaire, R. H. (2012). Core Concepts and Key Ideas for Understanding Public Sector Organizational Networks: Using Research to Inform Scholarship and Practice. *Public Administration Review, 72*(5), 638-648.

Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. (2001). Do Networks Really Work? A Framework for Evaluating Public-Sector Organizational Networks. *Public Administration Review, 61*(4), 414-423.

Provan, K. G., & Sebastian, J. G. (1998). Networks within Networks: Service Link Overlap, Organizational Cliques, And Network Effectiveness. *Academy of Management Journal, 41*(4), 453-463.

Provan, K., & Milward, H. (1995). A Preliminary Theory of Interorganizational Network Effectiveness: A Comparative Study of Four Community Mental Health Systems. *Administrative Science QUarterly, 40*(1), 1-33.

Provan, K., & Milward, H. I. (2002). Collaboration and Integration of Community-Based Health and Human Services in a Nonprofit Managed Health Care. *Health Care Management Review, 27*(1), 21-32.

Pülzl, H., & Treib, O. (2007). Implementing Public Policy. In F. Fischer, G. J. Miller, & M. S. Sidney, *Handbook of Public Policy Analysis* (pp. 89-108). Boca Raton, London New York: Taylor and Francis Group.

Raab, J. (2011). *Exploratory Network Analysis with Visone.* Tilburg: Department of Organizational Studies/Tilburg University.

Raab, J., Mannak, R. S., & Cambré, B. (2015). Combining Structure, Governance, and Context: A Configurational Approach to Network Effectiveness. *JPART, 25*(2), 479-511.

Reinisch, A. (2013). *The Priviliges and Immunities of International Organizations in Domestic Courts.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Republic and State of Geneva. (2013). *Solutions for a better world.* Office of the Delegate for international Geneva, Department of Security. Geneva: Atar Roto Presse SA.

Republic and State of Geneva. (2020). *Services for NGOs*. Retrieved November 17, 2016, from International Geneva: http://www.geneve-int.ch/services-ngos

Republic of Austria. (2019, June 18). *Austria's Position in the World*. Retrieved June 19, 2019, from Austrian Embassy Washington: https://www.austria.org/position-in-the-world

Reuters. (2009, October 12). *Denmark's top climate negotiator quits ahead of talks*. Retrieved July 31, 2019, from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-denmark-negotiator/denmarks-top-climate-negotiator-quits-ahead-of-talks-idUSTRE59B41T20091012

Rittberger, V., Zangl, B., Kruck, A., & Dijkstra, H. (2019). *International Organization.* London: Macmillan International Higher Education.

Russell Lee, M. (2006, January 23). At UNOPS, Side Deals for Danish Relocation. *Inner City Press*, pp. 1-3.

Salisbury, P. (2016). An analysis of Glasgow's decision to bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games. *Sport in Society*, 1-18.

Schalatek, L. (2012). *Inching Forward. The Second Meeting of the Green Climate Fund Board and the Nitty-Gritty of GCF Operationalization.* Heinrich Böll Stiftung. Washington D.C.: Heinrich Böll Stiftung.

Schermers, H. G. (1991). International Organizations. In M. Bedjaoui, *International Law: Achievements and Prospects* (pp. 67-100). Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Schimmelfennig, F., & Thomas, D. C. (2009). Normative Institutionalism and EU foreign policy in comparative perspective. *International Politics, 46*(4), 491-504.

Schmidt, V. A. (2008). Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse. *Annual Review Political Science, 11*, 303-326.

Scott, J. (2013). *Social network analysis.* Thousand Oaks: Sage.

SEforAll. (2018, May 1). *About us*. Retrieved May 24, 2019, from Sustainable Energy for All: https://www.seforall.org/about-us

Social Progress Index 2017. (2017, March). *CEO Michael Green on the 2017 Social Progress Index*. Retrieved July 18, 2019, from Social Progress Imperative: www.socialprogressimperative.org/ceo-michael-green-on-the-2017-social-progress-index/

Sørensen, B. V. (2008). Action Plan for the Global Marketing of Denmark. *Thinking Regionally, Acting Globally – Creating a Brand Image for the Baltic Sea Region*. Riga.

Sørensen, E., & Torfing, J. (2007). *Theories of democratic network governance*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sørensen, E., & Torfing, J. (2009). Making governance networks effective and democratic though metagovernance. *Public Administration, 87*(2), 234-258.

Steering Group Netherlands Host Country. (2007). *Report 2007*. The Hague: Dutch Foreign Ministry.

Steunenberg, B. (2001). *Institutionele verandering. Naar een bestuurskunde tussen 'vloeibare' en 'gestolde' voorkeuren*. Bussum: Coutinho.

Strauss-Kahn, V., & Vives, X. (2009). Why and where do headquarters move? *Regional Science and Urban Economics, 39*(2), 168-186.

Swiss Confederation. (2014). *Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations Office and to the other International Organizations in Geneva*. Geneva: Swiss Confederation.

Swiss Confederation. (2015). *Geneva Candidate for the Secretariat of the Arms Trade Treaty*. Swiss Confederation. Bern: Swiss Confederation.

Swiss Federal Chancellery. (2019, March 29). *Facts and Figures about International Geneva*. Retrieved May 4, 2018, from Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations Office and to the other international organizations in Geneva: https://www.eda.admin.ch/missions/mission-onu-geneve/en/home/geneve-international/faits-et-chiffres.html

Swiss Federal Council. (2006). *Message relatif à la loi fédérale sur les privilèges, les immunités et les facilités, ainsi que sur les aides financières accordés par la Suisse en tant qu'Etat hôte (Loi sur L'Etat hôte, LEH)*. Conseil fédéral suisse. Bern: Conseil fédéral suisse.

Swiss Federal Council. (2014). *Message concernant les mesures à mettre en œuvre pour renforcer le rôle de la Suisse comme Etat hôte*. Bern: Swiss Federal Council.

Tallberg, J., & Zürn, M. (2019). The legitimacy and legitimation of international organizations: introduction and framework. *The Review of International Organizations, 14*(4), 581-606.

The Capital Region of Denmark. (2006). *Regional growth and development strategy*. Greater Copenhagen, Region. Hillerød: Centre for Regional Development.

The Guardian. (2010, December 3). *US embassy cables: the documents*. Retrieved April 9, 2021, from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/201549

The Hague International Spirit. (2009). *Intervention de Son Excellence M. Jean-François Blarel, Ambassadeur de France*. The Hague: THIS.

The Hague Municipality. (1997). *DEN HAAG 2025. Woonstad aan zee; Internationale stad van recht en bestuur.* Gemeente Den Haag, Bestuursdienst. Den Haag: Gemeente Den Haag.

The Hague Municipality. (1998). *Nieuwe impulsen voor Den Haag. Beleidsprogramma 1994-1998.* Den Haag: Gemeente Den Haag.

The Hague Municipality. (2004). *Den Haag, residentie van recht en vrede. De uitbouw van Den Haag als stad van internationale en juridische organisaties Een actieprogramma voor de periode 2005-2006.* Den Haag: Gemeente Den Haag.

The Hague Municipality. (2015). *The Hague International City of Peace and Justice.* Department of Information and External Relations. The Hague: Tuijtel.

Theisens, H. (2012, November 27). Governance in Interessante Tijden. Een essay. *Intreerede voor de aanvaarding van het Lectoraat Public Management*. De Haagse Hogeschool.

Torfing, J., & Triantafillou. (2017). *Interactive Policy Making, Metagovernance and Democracy.* ECPR Press.

Torfing, J., Peters, B. G., Pierre, J., & Sørensen, E. (2013). *Interactive Governance. Advancing the Paradigm.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Turner, E. A. (2010). Why Has the Number of International Non-Governmental Organizations Exploded since 1960? *Cliodynamics: the Journal of Theoretical and Mathematical History, 1*, 81-91.

Turrini, A., Cristofoli, D., Frosini, F., & Nasi, G. (2010). Network Literature about Determinants of Network Effectiveness. *Public Administration, 88*(2), 528-550.

Tweede Kamer. (1988). *Vierde nota over de ruimtelijke ordening.* Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal. Den Haag: Tweede Kamer.

Tweede Kamer. (1999). *Dynamiek in netwerken.* Den Haag: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal.

UN Executive Board. (2017). *Annual Report.* UN, Executive Board of the UNDP, the UNPF and the UNOPS. New York: UN.

UN System. (2020, July 1). *United Nations Children's Fund*. Retrieved August 2020, from United Nations System. Chief Executives Board for Coordination: https://www.unsystem.org/content/unicef

UNAIDS. (2010). *The Governance Handbook.* Geneva: UNAIDS.

UNFCCC Conference of the Parties. (2009). *Copenhagen Accord.* UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Copenhagen: UN FCCC.

UNICEF. (2017, October 2). *Struture and contact information*. Retrieved August 2020, from Unicef for every child: https://www.unicef.org/about/structure/index_headquarters.html

UNICEF, Deputy Executive Director. (2013, December 10). UNICEF. *Office of the Executive Director*. New York, New York, United States: UNICEF.

Union of International Associations. (2020). *Yearbook of International Organizations 2020-2021.* Brussels: BRILL.

United Nations. (1998). *United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishement of an International Criminal Court.* Rome: UN.

Van Aartsen, J. (2019, February 11). Re: Beste Rosa. The Hague.

Van der Voet, J., Kuipers, B. S., & Groeneveld, S. (2016). Implementing Change in Public Organizations: The relationship between leadership and affective commitment to change in a public sector context. *Public Management Review, 18*(6), 842-865.

Van Duijn, S., Bannink, D., & Ybema, S. (2022). Working Toward Network Governance: Local Actors' Strategies for Navigating Tensions in Localized Health Care Governance. *Administration & Society, 54*(4), 660-689.

Van Keulen, M., & Rood, J. Q. T. (2003). The Netherlands' Presidency of 1997. Between ambition and modesty. In O. Elgström, *European Union Council Presidencies. A comparative perspective* (pp. 71-86). London: Routledge.

Ville de Genève. (2013, January 16). *Welcome to Geneva*. Retrieved January 8, 2019, from Vile de Genève. Site Officiel: http://www.ville-geneve.ch/welcome-geneva/

Ville de Genève. (2015, March 20). *Welcome to Geneva*. Retrieved January 18, 2019, from Ville de Genève. Site Officiel: https://web.archive.org/web/20150315075503/http://www.ville-geneve.ch/welcome-geneva/

Voorhoeve, J. (2011). *Den Haag als mondiale stad.* Den Haag: De Haagse Hogeschool.

Vreeken, R. (2001, juni 8). Internationaal Strafhof Den Haag wordt ramp. *De Volkskrant,* p. 1.

Wasserman, S., & Faust, K. (1994). *Social Network Analysis.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Yin, R. K. (2014). *Case Study Research. Design and Methods.* Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, Inc.

Weiss, T. G. (2013). Reinvigorating the 'Second' United Nations. People matter. In B. Reinalda, *Routledge Handbook of International Organization* (pp. 299-311). London/New York: Routledge.

Whall, H., & Pytlak, A. (2014). The role of Civil Society in the International Negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty. *Global Policy, 5*(4), 453-469.

World Happiness Report. (2017, March 3). *Denmark*. Retrieved July 18, 2019, from World Happiness Report: www.worldhappiness.report/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/03/HR17.pdf

Zakocs, R. C., & Edwards, E. M. (2006). What Explains Community Coalition Effectiveness. *American Journal fo Preventive Medicine, 30*(4), 351-361.

Appendices

Table A1 Western European Cities with their focal areas (selected cities in grey)

Western European and Others Group*	**Capital cities (or city experienced with attracting IOs)**	**Focal area for attracting IOs**	**No. of inhabitants in the city**
1. Andorra	Andorra la Vella	-	22,256
2. Austria	Vienna	Peace, non-proliferation, humanitarian	1,9 million
3. Belgium	Brussels	EU focus, financial	1,2 million
4. Denmark	Copenhagen	Humanitarian, procurement, life sciences, green tech	1,3 million
5. Finland	Helsinki	Energy, forestry, finance, humanitarian	1,3 million
6. France	Paris, Toulouse, Lyon, Strasbourg	Global health, education, sports, finance	2,2 million, 447,340; 513,275; 467,438
7. Germany	Bonn	Climate, energy, sustainability	329,673
8. Greece	Athens	Migration, wildlife, Balkan	3,1 million
9. Iceland	Reykjavík	Human rights, education, gender equality	131,136
10. Ireland	Dublin	Humanitarian, migration, finance	1,2 million
11. Italy	Rome, Bologna	Energy, space, international transport	2,8 million; 394,843
12. Liechtenstein	Vaduz	-	5,696
13. Luxembourg	Luxembourg City	Finance, trade	124,528
14. Malta	Valletta	Migration, trade	355,000
15. Monaco	Monaco (city-state)	Science, sports, travel	38,300
16. Netherlands	The Hague	Peace, justice, security, humanitarian, life sciences	883,720
17. Norway	Oslo	Migration, equality, green energy	1,03 million
18. Portugal	Lisbon	Migration, finance	2,04 million
19. Spain	Madrid, Barcelona	Energy, health, democratization	3,2 million; 1,6 million
20. Sweden	Stockholm	Development, space, democratization	1,6 million
21. Switzerland	Geneva	Peace, humanitarian, economy, health, environment	201,818

Western European and Others Group*	Capital cities (or city experienced with attracting IOs)	Focal area for attracting IOs	No. of inhabitants in the city
22. Turkey	Ankara	Finance, labor, migration, humanitarian	5,7 million
23. United Kingdom	London	Finance, maritime, geology, sports, migration	9,8 million

* For reasons of the specific empirical background, I decided that the broadest definition of 'Western European' was the most appropriate, as the unofficial Regional Group in the UN 'Western European and Others Group' acts as voting blocs and negotiation forums.

Table A2 Failed and successfully attracted cases (successful in grey, failed in black)

	UN Head-quarters	UN Departments	Other Head-quarters	IO Departments	Quasi-IOs
Geneva		Green Climate Fund (2012-13)	Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat (2015)	DNDi (2003)	
		IRENA (2013) FAIL	GAVI (2000)	FIND (2003)	
			GCERF (2014)	GAIN (2003)	WADA (2000)
			Global Fund (2002)	MPP (2010)	
THE HAGUE		UN-MICT (2010)	International Criminal Court (1998-2001)	NCIA (2012)	
		OPCW-UN Joint Investigation Mechanism (JIM) (2015)	ICMP (2015)		
		SCSL (2002) / RSCSL (2012)	KSCSP (2015)		
		UNICEF Private Fundraising and Partnerships (2015)			

	UN Head-quarters	UN Departments	Other Head-quarters	IO Departments	Quasi-IOs
VIENNA		IRENA (2013) FAIL	Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat (2015)		REEEP (2004)
			FRA (2007)		Sustainable Energy for All (2013)
			KAICIID (2012)		
			IACA (2011)		
COPENHAGEN	UN Office for Project Services (2006)	UNHCR (2014)	GBIF (2001)	Eurofish (2009)	Copenhagen Consensus Center (CCC, 2007)
		UNFPA (2012)		ECO (2012)	Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS, 2014)
		UN Women (2013)			Copenhagen Center on Energy Efficiency (CCEE, 2013)
		WFP (2001)			Sustainable Energy for All (2013)
		IOM (2009)			
		UNEP - DTU Partnership (2014)			

Table A3 Questionnaire

We are about to do a game with cards.	
–	Can you please divide these cards with factors, looking at the third column of the list, into two halves? One is most important, the other least?
–	After that, can you please give me a top 5 list of factors that are most important for IOs and INGOs to settle in a city?
–	Can you make a top 5 list of factors that are least important?
–	Please try to make both a top 3.
1.	Why are these the top 3 important for you?
2.	Why are these the top 3 least important for you?
3.	Were these top 3 factors important as well for the [specific case] to settle in this city? If you do not know this, can you tell me who might?

4.	How do you think this city scores on these most and least important factors?
5.	What do you think of the level of education, including higher education and universities? Can you give me an answer in the scale of 1 (very poor) to 10 (excellent)
6.	What do you think of the level of expertise and labor force in this city? Can you give me an answer in the scale of 1 (very poor) to 10 (excellent)
7.	What do you think of the level of English in this city? Can you give me an answer in the scale of 1 (very poor) to 10 (excellent)
8.	How do you see the rules and regulations for International Organizations? Can you give me an answer in the scale of 1 (very poorly organized) to 10 (very well organized)
9.	Do you know Organizations that came to or founded in here recently?
10.	Do you know why these Organizations chose this city as their settlement place?
11.	This city has a focus on (…). Can you explain to me how this developed, and why?
12.	Do you know any INGO or IO that recently left this city e for another city? Do you know why?
Competitiveness	
13.	Is there competition between this city and other cities? Can you give me an answer in the scale of 1 (very little) to 10 (very much)
14.	If so, how do you notice this?
15.	Could you give any examples?
Branding	
16.	Is there a strategy for 'City marketing'? How is this visible? Can you give me an answer in the scale of 1 (very unclear) to 10 (very clearly)
17.	Is there a strategy for Nation Branding? How is this visible? Can you give me an answer in the scale of 1 (very unclear) to 10 (very clearly)
18.	Is the city marketing or nation branding effective in your opinion, in order to attract more IOs and INGOs to the city? Can you give me an answer in the scale of 1 (very little) to 10 (very much)
19.	Do you think the international community in this city is growing or declining?
Policy / Political Process	
20.	To what extend were you involved in the location decisions of IOs? 1 (none) – 10 (completely)
21.	Can you reconstruct the chain of events with me for the attraction of [case 1]?
22.	Can you reconstruct the chain of events with me for the attraction of [case 2]?
23.	To what extend are you involved in communication with the city and country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)? 1 (none) – 10 (completely)
24.	How often did you meet as organizational network?
25.	How often did you meet others outside the organizational network?
26.	With which institution do you have most contact, the City, Region or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
27.	Which institution is the most important for attracting and retaining IOs in this city?
28.	Are there other institutions that deal with attracting and retaining IOs?
29.	How is the cooperation between these institutions (i.e. local versus national government)? Can you give me an answer in the scale of 1 (very poor) to 10 (excellent)?
30.	What other actors were involved in the attraction process of this IO?

31. Have there been recent changes in the process in attracting and retaining IOs? Can you elaborate on this?	
32. How do you see the rules of the 'policy game' in order to attract and retain IOs? Can you give me an answer in the scale of 1 (very unclear) to 10 (very clear) can you elaborate?	
33. What do you think of the possibilities of improvement for these processes?	

Key: Q5-8 and 13-18: variable 2 (perception host policy and support); Q1-4: variables 3 & 4 (overlap priorities and narratives); Q24-26, 32: variable 5 (network cooperation); Q20,23,29: variable 6 (actor centrality); Q27,28,30: variable 7 (network diversity); Q21,22: dependent variable Y1 (factual success); Q33: dependent variable Y2 (perceived success).

Table A4 Coding Scheme

Open coding pilot study	**Axial coding**	**Final code**
Attractiveness factors	Priorities / narratives	Discursive
Branding/Reputation	Competitive cities	Instrumental
Case	*Case description*	
Cooperation governance	Network characteristics	Relational
Cooperation organizations	Collaboration	
Coordination organizational networks	Coordination	
Distributive factor	Priorities / narratives	Discursive
General information	*Case description*	
International competition	Conditions in the city	Instrumental
IOs, NGOs, other institutions	Collaboration	Relational
Local government	Network actors	
National government	Network actors	
Networks	Network description	
Public policy/political process	*Case description*	
Public Private Partnerships	Network actors	Relational
Regional government	Actor involvement	
Strategies	Policy design	Instrumental

Table A5 Codes per perspective

Codes instrumental perspective:
Branding policies
Main elements bid
Rules and regulations
Perception and support
Codes discursive perspective:
Locational elements
Case specific
Codes relational perspective:
Cooperation and communication
Negotiations
Competition Eleven labels for network diversity:
Local government, provincial/ Cantonal government, national/federal government, Prime Minister/President, Parliament, Public Private Partnership, UN, EU, NGO, International Organization, advisor/expert.

Table A6 List of respondents (anonymized)

Interviews Geneva:

Local, regional, or national governance (LG, RG, NG), Research Institute (RI), Permanent Representative (PR), IO- and INGO-employees, Public Private Partnerships (PP)

Organization	**Date**	**Code**
A1. Centre d'Accueil Genève Internationale (CAGI) (LG)	1) 26-04-2013	A1.1)
A2. Permanent Mission of The Netherlands in Geneva (PR)	2) 24-04-2013	A2.2)
A3. Permanent Mission of The Netherlands in Geneva (PR)	3) 09-12-2015	A3.3)
A4. Département présidentiel République et canton de Genève (RG)	4) 29-04-2013 5) Jan 2014 6) 08-12-2015	A4.4) A4.5) A4.6)
A5. Swiss Mission, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (NG)	7) 26-04-2013	A5.A6.7)
A6. Swiss Mission, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (NG)	26-04-2013	A5.A6.7)
A7. Service du Protocol, Canton Etat Geneva, (RG)	8) 25-04-2013 9) Jan 2014	A7.8) A7.9)
A8. Service of External Relations, City of Geneva (LG)	10) 30-04-2013 11) Feb 2014	A8.10) A8.11)
A9. Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (NG)	12) 11-04-2014	A9.12)
A10. Centre d'Accueil Genève Internationale (CAGI) (LG)	13) 10-12-2015	A10.13)
A11. Centre d'Accueil Genève Internationale (CAGI) (LG)	10-12-2015	A11.13)

Organization	Date	Code
A12. Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (NG)	14) 08-12-2015	A12.14)
A13. Foreign Affairs Committee (NG)	15) 10-12-2015	A13.15)
A14. Fondation Pour Genève (PP)	16) 29-04-2013	A14.16)
A15. Fondation Pour Genève (PP)	17) 30-04-2013	A15.17)
A16. Local government (LG)	18) 25-04-2013	A16.18)
A17. Entre Actes (PP)	19) 08-12-2015	A17.19)
A18. Ambassador of Disarmament (NG)	20) 20-08-2018	A18.20)
A19. Kingdom of the Netherlands (NG)	21) 04-09-2018	A19.21)
A20. Foreign Ministry Switzerland (NG)	22) 31-08-2018	A20.22)
A21. Swiss Mission, Foreign Ministry Switzerland (NG)	23) 04-09-2018	A21.23)
A22. Swiss Mission, Foreign Ministry of Switzerland (NG)	24) 07-09-2018	A22.24)
A23. World Trade Organization (WTO) (IO)	25) 23-04-2013 26) 09-04-2014	A23.25) A23.26)
A24. Comité International de la Croix Rouge (ICRC) (IO)	27) 24-04-2013	A24.27)
A25. Comité International de la Croix Rouge (ICRC) (IO)	24-04-2013	A25.27)
A26. European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) (IO)	28) 26-04-2013	A26.28)
A27. Office of the DG UN Office at Geneva (IO)	29) 11-12-2015 30) 04-09-2018	A27.29) A27.30)
A28. UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (IO)	31) 16-03-2017	A28.31)
A29. INSEAD (PP)	32) 15-11-2017	A29.32)
A30. Inter-Parliamentary Union (IO)	33) 29-08-2018	A30.33)
A31. Arms Trade Treaty (IO)	34) 07-09-2018	A31.34)
A32. UNIDIR (IO)	35) 03-09-2018	A32.35)
A33. ICRC (IO)	36) 02-11-2018 37) 12-11-2018	A33.36) A33.37)

Total Geneva: 37 interviews with 33 interviewees

Interviews The Hague:

Local, regional or national governance (LG, RG, NG), Research Institute (RI), IO- and INGO-employees (IO/INGO), Public Private Partnerships (PP)		
Organization	**Date**	**Code**
B1. City of The Hague (LG)	1) 12-03-2013 2) 19-03-2013	B1.1) B1.2)
B2. The Hague International Centre (LG)	3) 19-03-2013	B2.3)
B3. Municipality of The Hague (LG)	4) 27-03-2012 5) 09-04-2013	B3.4) B3.5)
B4. Chamber of Commerce South-West Netherlands (RG)	6) 15-01-2013	B4.6)

Organization	Date	Code
B5. Municipality of The Hague (LG)	7) 14-01-2012 14-03-2013 8) 02-12-2016 27-01-2017	B5.7) B5.8)
B6. Municipality of The Hague (LG)	9) 09-04-2013	B6.9)
B7. Municipality of The Hague (LG)	10) 17-01-2013 11) 14-03-2013	B7.10) B7.11)
B8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NG)	12) 19-03-2013 13) 02-12-2016	B8.12) B8.13)
B9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NG)	14) 19-03-2013 15) 11-04-2013	B9.14) B9.15)
B10. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NG)	16) 19-03-2013 17) 10-01-2014	B10.16) B10.17)
B11. Municipality of The Hague (LG)	18) 17-04-2013	B11.18)
B12. Municipality of The Hague (LG)	19) 02-04-2013	B12.19)
B13. Netherlands Permanent Representative to the EU (NG)	20) 02-04-2014	B13.20)
B14. Dutch Parliament (NG)	21) 31-03-2014 22) 24-10-2016	B14.21) B14.22)
B15. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NG)	23) 02-04-2012 24) 09-06-2015 25) 25-05-2017	B15.23) B15.24) B15.25)
B16. Municipal Council (LG)	26) 09-07-2012	B16.26)
B17. Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (NG)	27) 24-03-2015 28) 14-11-2016	B17.27) B17.28)
B18. Executive Office - Rijksvastgoedbedrijf (NG/PP)	29) 24-03-2015	B18.29)
B19. Association of Netherlands Municipalities (RG)	30) 16-01-2013	B19.30)
B20. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NG)	31) 08-09-2015 32) 11-11-2016	B20.31) B20.32)
B21. Executive Office Rijksvastgoedbedrijf (NG/PP)	33) 10-10-2016 34) 19-12-2016	B21.33) B21.34)
B22. Executive Office Rijksvastgoedbedrijf (NG/PP)	35) 10-10-2016 36) 19-12-2016	B22.35) B22.36)
B23. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NG)	37) 02-12-2016	B23.37)
B24. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NG)	38) 23-11-2016	B24.38)
B25. Advisor (LG)	39) 29-11-2016 40) 18-05-2017	B25.39) B25.40)
B26. Municipality of The Hague (LG)	41) 02-12-2016	B26.41)
B27. Municipality of The Hague (LG)	42) 20-01-2017	B27.42)
B28. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NG)	43) 01-02-2017	B28.43)
B29. Municipality of The Hague (LG)	44) 01-02-2017	B29.44)
B30. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NG)	45) 14-03-2017	B30.45)
B31. West-Holland Foreign Investment Agency (WFIA) (PP)	46) 28-01-2016	B31.46)
B32. Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency (PP)	47) 28-01-2016	B32.47)
B33. West-Holland Investment Agency (WFIA) (PP)	48) 19-04-2013	B33.48)

Organization	Date	Code
B34. West-Holland Investment Agency (WFIA) (PP)	49) 16-11-2016	B34.49)
B35. Expat Center Amsterdam (PP)	50) 18-06-2015	B35.50)
B36. The Hague International Centre Municipality of The Hague (LG)	51) 08-06-2018 19-06-2018	B36.51)
B37. Municipality of The Hague (LG)	52) 30-08-2018	B37.52)
B38. Municipality of The Hague (LG)	53) 19-10-2018	B38.53)
B39. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NG)	54) 23-10-2018	B39.54)
B40. Advanced team ICC (NG)	55) 5-11-2018	B40.55)
B41. Former Mayor (LG)	56) 4-12-2018	B41.56)
B42. Kingdom of the Netherlands (NG)	57) 20-11-2018	B42.57)
B43. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (IO)	58) 15-04-2013	B43.58)
B44. International Community Platform (PP)	59) 02-04-2013 60) 04-11-2016	B44.59) B44.60)
B45. International Criminal Court (ICC) (IO)	61) 19-04-2013 62) 14-12-2016	B45.61) B45.62)
B46. Decisio (RI)	63) 10-12-2014	B46.63)
B47. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (RI)	64) 09-07-2012	B47.64)
B48. Faculty of Architecture and The Built Environment, University of Delft (RI)	65) 17-09-2015	B48.65)
B49. Center for International Legal Cooperation (CILC) (INGO)	66) 19-04-2013	B49.66)
B50. Professor public diplomacy, Leiden University (RI)	67) 28-10-2016	B50.67)
B51. Baker Tilly Berk (RI)	68) 15-12-2016	B51.68)
B52. International Criminal Court (ICC) (IO)	69) 18-05-2017	B52.69)
B53. International Criminal Court (ICC) (IO)	70) 18-05-2017	B53.70)
B54. International Court of Justice (ICJ) (IO)	71) 12-06-2018	B54.71)
B55. UNICEF PFP (IO)	72) 26-10-2018	B55.72)
B56. International legal advisor (NGO)	73) 2-11-2018 74) 12-11-2018	B56.73) B56.74)

Total The Hague: 74 interviews with 56 interviewees

Interviews Vienna:

Local, regional or national governance (LG, RG, NG), Research Institute (RI), Permanent Representative (PR), IO- and INGO-employees, Public Private Partnerships (PP)		
Organization	**Date**	**Code**
C1. Austrian Representative to the UN (PR)	1) 31-10-2014	C1.1)
C2. Austrian Representative to the UN (PR)	2) 28-02-2017	C2.2)
C3. Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs (NG)	3) 29-10-2014	C3.3)
C4. Department for International Conferences and IOs (NG)	4) 29-10-2014 5) 02-03-2017	C4.4) C4.5)

Organization	Date	Code
C5. Municipality of Vienna (LG)	6) 30-10-2014	C5.6)
C6. Federal Ministry Republic of Austria (NG)	7) 04-03-2015 8) 02-03-2017	C6.7) C6.8)
C7. Federal Chancellery of Austria (NG)	9) 19-02-2015	C7.9)
C8. Permanent Representative of Austria to the UN (PR)	10) 18-2-2015	C8.10)
C9. Permanent Representative of Austria to the UN (PR)	11) 18-2-2015	C9.11)
C10. Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs (NG)	12) 18-02-2015	C10.12)
C11. Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs (NG)	13) 05-03-2015	C11.13)
C12. European and International Affairs, Municipality of Vienna (LG)	14) 29-10-2015	C12.14)
C13. Vienna Service Office, Municipality of Vienna (LG)	15) 28-10-2014	C13.15)
C14. Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs (NG)	16) 02-03-2017	C14.16)
C15. Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs (NG)	02-03-2017	C15.16)
C16. Expat Center Vienna (PP)	17) 30-10-2014	C16.17)
C17. Director, Business Development – International Organizations, at Montréal International (MI), Montreal's Economic Development Agency (PP)	18) 06-12-2016 19) 10-02-2017 (Skype)	C17.18) C17.19)
C18. United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (IO)	20) 19-02-2015	C18.20)
C19. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) (IO)	21) 19-02-2015	C19.21)
C20. REEEP (INGO/Quasi organization)	22) 20-02-2015	C20.22)
C21. Sustainable Energy for All (INGO/ Quasi organization)	23) 20-02-2015	C21.23)
C22. Sustainable Energy for All INGO/ Quasi organization)	24) 02-03-2017	C22.24)
C23. Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-test-ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) (IO)	25) 20-02-2015	C23.25)
C24. Vier Pfoten (INGO)	26) 20-02-2015	C24.26)
C25. Global Responsibility (INGO)	27) 31-10-2014	C25.27)
C26. European Stability Initiative (ESI) (INGO)	28) 28-10-2014	C26.28)
C27. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)	29) 29-10-2014	C27.29)
C28. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)	29-10-2014	C28.29)
C29. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)	29-10-2014	C29.29)
C30. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) (IO)	30) March 2015	C30.30)
C31. Wassenaar Arrangement (IO)	31) 03-03-2017	C31.31)
C32. Wassenaar Arrangement (IO)	03-03-2017	C32.31)
C33. UNIS (IO)	32) 28-10-2014	C33.32)

Total Vienna: 32 interviews with 33 interviewees

Interviews Copenhagen:

Local, regional or national governance (LG, RG, NG), Research Institute (RI), Permanent Representative (PR), IO- and INGO-employees, Public Private Partnerships (PP)		
Organization	**Date**	**Code**
D1. Department for multilateral cooperation, climate change and gender equality (NG)	1) 11-04-2017 2) 16-04-2018	D1.1) D1.2)
D2. Dutch Foreign Ministry (PR)	3) 11-04-2017	D2.3)
D3. UN City (NG/IO)	4) 12-04-2017	D3.4)
D4. Copenhagen Capacity (PP)	5) 19-04-2017 6) 17-04-2018	D4.5) D4.6)
D5. International House (PP)	7) 20-04-2017 8) 16-04-2018	D5.7) D5.8)
D6. International House (PP)	9) 16-04-2018	D6.9)
D7. International House (PP)	16-04-2018	D7.9)
D8. Office of Business and Growth (LG)	10) 16-04-2018	D8.10)
D9. UN City – One UN (NG)	11) 17-04-2018	D9.11)
D10. Protocol Department (NG)	12) 19-04-2018	D10.12)
D11. Work In Denmark East (NG)	13) 25-04-2018	D11.13)
D12. Wonderful Copenhagen (RG)	14) 03-05-2018	D12.14)
D13. Wonderful Copenhagen (RG)	15) 07-05-2018	D13.15)
D14. Embassy and Permanent Mission of Denmark (NG)	16) 09-05-2018	D14.16)
D15. Permanent Mission to the UN (NG)	17) 11-05-2018	D15.17)
D16. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NG)	18) 24-04-2017	D16.18)
D17. Copenhagen Centre on Energy Efficiency (RI)	19) 12-04-2017	D17.19)
D18. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) (IO)	20) 10-04-2017	D18.20)
D19. UNHCR (IO)	21) 12-04-2017 22) 19-04-2018	D19.21) D19.22)
D20. NIRAS (RI)	23) 18-04-2017	D20.23)
D21. UNOPS (IO)	24) 14-03-2018	D21.24)
D22. UNDP (IO)	25) 17-04-2018	D22.25)
D23. UN CITY Common services Admin (IO)	26) 17-04-2018	D23.26)
D24. Danish Refugee Council (NGO)	27) 18-04-2018	D24.27)
D25. UNHCR (IO)	28) 18-04-2018	D25.28)
D26. UNHCR (IO)	29) 18-04-2018	D26.29)
D27. UNHCR (IO)	30) 18-04-2018	D27.30)
D28. UNICEF (IO)	31) 18-04-2018	D28.31)

Total Copenhagen: 31 interviews with 28 interviewees
Total: 174 interviews with 150 interviewees

Table A7 Locational elements

Please make a priority of the five most and least important locational elements, and then three most and least important ones for IOs to settle in your city			
Reputation of city and country	Goodwill of the City	Settling in of foreigners is well organized	Working permit, residence permit, quality of working spaces, living spaces, ease of municipal administration, central point for ex-pats at the City Hall
	Security	Security is well organized in this city and country	Benevolence and support of the community, police and justice system, safe living and working environment
	Political stability	Political situation is stable	Political security, easy to vote, involvement of local and national governments with ex-pats
Physical connectivity and amenities	Digital infrastructure	Digital infrastructure is working well	Rapid internet connection, satellite tv,
	Infrastructure	Physical infrastructure is working well (connection to airport and public transport)	Connection airport and city, park facilities, train connection, airports, highways, drainage, electricity, water,
	Medical facilities	Hospitals and health care are generally well organized	Nearby hospitals, costs of mental health care, hygiene, level of medical care
	Regulations for spouses	Dual career possibilities are well organized	Rules, regulations and possible job-tracks for the spouses. Special attention for professional growth of international spouses
Livability	Education	International schools and universities are present and well organized	Level of education, international childcare, possibility to achieve an international baccalaureate, costs of education
	Nature	Climate / weather is relatively safe and friendly	Vulnerability for natural disasters, climate, possibilities for recreation
	Recreation	Cultural and commercial recreation is available and of high standard	Hotels, Cafes, restaurants, museums, opera houses, shops, gyms, swimming pools
	Quality of life	Living is relatively easy in this city	Housing, living situation, cost of living, attitude of locals, living area, contact with neighbors

Enterprise Hub	Taxes	Tax settlements are beneficial in this country	Host state agreement – and other settlements for IO employees
	Startups	Starting up a company (BV or otherwise) is relatively easy	Climate for startup of new organization or company
	Banks	Banking services are well organized	Safe money transfer, exchange rate, reliable banks
Work force	Price labor force	The cost of hiring labor force is reasonable	Human Resources, administrative and security labor forces are reasonably priced
	Level labor force	Level of education of labor force is reasonably high	High level of education for labor force at IOs and NGOs
	Availability labor force	Labor force is available in this city	Availability of cleaning, administrative staff, technicians, HR-employees, facility managers
Virtual Connectivity	Education and research	Universities and research centers are of high standard	Level of higher education and research centers, possibility of internships, level of English, accessibility of research and higher education
	Research instruments	Research instruments are generally easily available	Availability of local instruments (grants e.g.) for research projects
	Relevant Centers	Relevant centers are nearby and willing to cooperate	Availability of other organizations, cooperation, partner organizations, mother or daughter organizations
	Professional networks	Infrastructure for professional networks is well organized	Network possibilities, business clubs, embassies, expat-clubs, social facilities, conferences
	Legal centers	Issuing of rules is available and understandable	Nearness and understanding of rules and regulations – in understandable languages

Table A8 Network diversity: types of actors and colors in graphs

Type of Actor	**Color in graphs**
1. Municipality	Yellow
2. Canton / Region / Province	Green
3. Ministries / National / Federal	Turquoise
4. Parliament / Political actor	Red
5. Public Private Partnership	Dark blue
6. IO / UN	Purple
7. NGO	Pink
8. Policy advisor / Specialist / Research institute	Blue
9. European Union	Orange
10. Business	Light blue
11. Head of State / Prime Minister	Darkest blue

Summary

'Walking the extra mile.' How governance networks attract International Organizations to Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen (1995-2015)

The number of International Organizations (IOs) has increased in the last few decades, and so has the number of cities that are eager to attract them. IOs bring in prosperity, an enhanced reputation, and they often act as a magnet to other interesting international enterprises, people, and activities. However, competition between cities has increased, and while cities and host states work to attract IOs whenever the opportunity arises, the best procedures and strategies have not yet been well analyzed. This thesis explores the successes and failures of governance networks attracting IOs to four small to medium-sized cities: Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen. In doing so, it uses insights of public administration within the field of governance networks. The study's subject is limited to IOs with universal (worldwide) membership. The processes of attracting and retaining IOs have received little attention in public administration. This research links international relations with local components. A focus on how networks lobby, and how they are composed and operate, sheds new light on this theme.

The research question is: *What contributes to the successes and failures of governance networks in small to medium-sized Western European host cities in attracting International Organizations?* The analysis of eight case studies of failed and successfully attracted IOs seeks to answer this question. This study uses three different perspectives: an instrumental, discursive, and relational. The focus of this study is on how headquarters or departments of IOs are attracted, while also considering the local dynamics of these processes.

This research attempts to contribute to the governance network literature. Many studies indicate that more internal cooperation and the development of coherent policy work well, but this study questions that and finds that other aspects may be more important. This research links lobbying literature with network literature and international relations with a local perspective. This interdisciplinary way of looking from the network perspective provides innovative insights into thinking about local policy processes around IOs.

The first and second chapters of the thesis motivate and describe the three perspectives, on which the sub-questions and expectations are based:

- *Instrumental*: *How does host policy design and its implementation contribute to success?*
  - **Expectation 1:** *The more the bid books are aligned with the attraction policies, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

  - **Expectation 2:** *The more positively the respondents in the city perceive the host policies and support, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

- *Discursive: How do overlaps of perceptual frames of the networks involved contribute to success?*
  - **Expectation 3:** *The more the priorities and narratives overlap between the organizational network and the policy network in the host city, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*
  - **Expectation 4:** *The more the priorities and narratives overlap between the organizational network and the IO representatives in the host city, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

- *Relational: How do network characteristics – such as the level of cooperation, centrality, diversity, and size – contribute to success?*
  - **Expectation 5:** *The higher the perception of good cooperation between the main players, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*
  - **Expectation 6:** *The higher the actor centrality of the involved, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*
  - **Expectation 7:** *The higher the network diversity and number of the actors involved, the higher the likelihood of success in attracting IOs.*

The first sub-question builds on instrumental concepts and is derived from collaborative policy design literature (Howlett, Mukherjee, & Rayner, 2017) and implementation and perception studies (Hill & Hupe, 2002; Pülzl & Treib, 2007). The second question is approached with a discursive approach and stems from institutional and discursive literature (Peters, 2012; Boräng & Naurin, 2015). The third question originates from network performance literature (Kenis & Provan, 2009; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2011) and policy network analysis (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Scott, 2013).

To nuance the outcomes of the attraction processes, I approach success in two ways: success as fact and perceived success, mainly following McConnell's (2010) realist approach. Both are successes by degree, of which the first is established as identifiable moments in time. I categorized a case as a factual failure (falling out of the race early in the process), moderate factual failure (first stage), moderate factual success (one of the last two options or only just won with small margins), or a factual success (won with a large majority). The second measure of success is perceived success. I identified four degrees: a perceived failure (a failure that is perceived as a failure), a moderate perceived failure (a failure perceived as a success), moderated perceived success (a success with clear drawbacks), and a perceived success (a success perceived as a success).

The cities are selected based on similar size, Western European, that have experiences with attracting IOs in similar topics. In these cities, eight cases are selected, a failed and a successfully attracted case per city. These cases are of all sorts of size and type, differing from IO, UN, and Quasi-IO (a hybrid between NGO and IO). For the qualitative analysis, I used in-depth interviews (N=175 interviews with 150 respondents), over 200 documents containing bid books, policy strategies, correspondence of governments with IOs, records of city council meetings, websites, and policy reports about host policies.

Scholars in the field of governance and public policy often agree that better policy alignment and cooperation in networks increase the chance of success. The findings of this study contradict this. In the reality of governance networks attracting IOs, considering the interests of IOs proved to be more important than having matters 'in order' internally. This result is found on different levels. First, the findings suggest that host policies need flexibility and adaptability in the topics and needs of the IO that they want to attract. Secondly, the overlap of priorities and narratives between governmental groups led only partially to network success. Thirdly, my observations suggest that there may not be a link between perceived good network cooperation by those involved and the likelihood of success. These findings suggest that it is not so much internal coordination that is crucial in a governance network attracting IOs, but rather being externally oriented and considering the needs of employees of IOs.

The second finding is that 'betweenness centrality' (how many connections someone had) shows more effect on network success than 'degree centrality' (how frequently actors met). Having more than one central actor and the presence of sub-networks contribute to success. Furthermore, the political context and actor types could have a crucial effect on the process. The importance of sub-networks agrees with the work of Provan and Sebastian (1998) and Provan and Lemaire (2012). Taken together, these findings suggest that looking more at the actor level when analyzing governance networks could be rewarding. This furthers the theory of 'institutional plugs' or single actors whose influence might be more important than the mechanisms of networks at large (Bosselaar & Bannink, 2021) .

The third finding of this thesis is the importance of the diversity of the governance network. The more diverse the core networks – the organizational networks and surrounding actors – preferably with the 'Third UN' (specialists, businesses, academics, NGOs), the higher the network success. An explanation for this finding is that, again, it is not the internal coherence of the governance network that leads to success, but diversity and the inclusion of 'others' in the network and surrounding actors. This finding reinforces the recent findings of Junk (2019) who showed that diverse networks have a higher level of lobbying success, and Phinney (2017), who provided a rich qualitative analysis with his positive findings of the 'strange bedfellows' argument.

I have found that attaining the alignment of policy goals, as often propagated in collaborative policy design literature (Mukherjee & Bali, 2019; Rogge, 2018) has not been found beneficial for attracting IOs. Also, I have shown that similar perceptual frames within a network are less likely to result in success than those between the governance network and the to-be-attracted IOs. This advances the theory of *overlapping discourses*, as it gives evidence that an overlap of narratives between different groups is more advantageous than between similar groups, when pursuing successes in attracting IOs. The third theoretical advancement this study has achieved is that it shows that 'institutional plugs' (Bosselaar & Bannink, 2021) or so-called *weak ties* are essential for an effective network governance. This leads to the suggestion that more attention is needed for the specific actors and their characteristics in networks, instead of how networks 'as a whole' or *whole networks* operate, as suggested by Provan and Lemaire (2012).

Practical implications

My findings lead to several suggestions that are crucial for governance networks attracting IOs. First, keep an external orientation of the network and maintain good contacts with IOs in the host city. Secondly, make sure there is a continuity of the host policy within the city and state. Thirdly, the diversity and number of network actors could be increased with as much enthusiasm as possible.

1. Keep an external orientation of the network

A first suggestion is that the network can be less focused on internal coordination and more on external relations. Rather than considering host policies and attraction *on paper*, it is important to consider the needs and wishes of the specific IO. While doing so, it is crucial to tighten relations abroad and with international partners in the host city. Furthermore, it is crucial to maintain good contacts with the IOs that have already been settled in the city; diplomatic relations should not be disrupted by complaints that have not been dealt with.

2. Networked continuity of host policy

It is important to have a 'playbook' ready in case an IO attraction process occurs. Other departments of involved ministries are best to be informed on a regular basis about established IOs, possible future IOs, and the advantages of hosting IOs. That will help to gather resources to offer a future IO an attractive location. In this effort, the ad hoc character of the policy could be diminished by updating other ministries in bi-annual (or more frequent) interdepartmental meetings.

Furthermore, having more than one actor 'in the middle' and creating shared responsibility contributes to success. Moreover, in some cases, I find that when higher-ranking political actors are involved in the network, the chances of being successful increase. Involving such a high-profile actor can warm up other ministries and make sure the support base is present.

3. Diversity and number of actors involved and 'Walking the extra mile'
A third suggestion is that networks involve different actors in the process, both additional IOs and NGOs as specialists in the field of the new IO, and other ministries to generate interest. Diversity in the governance network brings more synergies, ideas, and creativity. Moreover, the needs of the IO can be better explored when a diverse set of actors is involved.

Of course, it helps to create enthusiasm in the network. The most successful networks were prepared to 'walk the extra mile.' This term is mentioned several times in the interviews and shows that 'getting the most out of it' is an essential condition for network success. In this light, it is crucial that network actors do not underestimate what acquiring an IO means for the urban environment, the region, and the country, and for the network itself. It entails a lot of groundwork and requires substantial effort and drive. The more responsibility is centrally arranged and shared among different actors, the higher is the likelihood of success.

My proposed avenues for future research are first to find out which policy types benefit from alignment, and which need more flexibility, such as the policies to attract IOs. The second is on the several actors 'in the middle' of the network and the high-ranking political players involved in the governance network attracting IOs. The third would be about the consequences of applying the three perspectives I used. When adding a fourth, interest groups perspective, what would have been the empirical and theoretical advancements? Further research into this proposed angle can be a fruitful endeavor.

Nederlandse samenvatting

'Walking the extra mile' Hoe beleidsnetwerken Internationale Organisaties aantrekken in Genève, Den Haag, Wenen en Kopenhagen (1995-2015)

Het aantal Internationale Organisaties is de afgelopen decennia toegenomen, evenals het aantal steden dat deze graag wil aantrekken. Internationale Organisaties (vanaf hier IO's) brengen welvaart, een betere reputatie en werken vaak als een magneet voor andere internationale instellingen, non-gouvernementele organisaties (Ngo's), ondernemingen, mensen en activiteiten. De concurrentie tussen steden om hier een graantje van mee te pikken is toegenomen. Zodra er een IO 'op de markt komt', op zoek is naar een vestigingsplaats, komen potentiële steden en gastlanden in actie, maar een vaste procedure ontbreekt, en van strategie is ook niet altijd sprake. Dit proefschrift gaat over hoe beleidsnetwerken in kleine tot middelgrote, West-Europese steden, IO's aantrekken. De onderzoeksvraag is: *Wat bepaalt het succes en falen van beleidsnetwerken in kleine tot middelgrote West-Europese gaststeden bij het aantrekken van Internationale Organisaties?* Door middel van een analyse van acht casestudies van mislukte en succesvol aangetrokken IO's probeer ik deze vraag te beantwoorden. Het onderzoek richt zich op IO's met mondiale activiteiten en niet op bijvoorbeeld IO's die zijn opgezet door de EU voor regionale taken.

Dit onderzoek heb ik uitgevoerd aan de hand van de inzichten van de *governance netwerken* literatuur. Daarbij maak ik gebruik van drie verschillende invalshoeken: het instrumentele, discursieve en relationele perspectief. De focus van dit onderzoek ligt op hoe hoofdkantoren of afdelingen van IO's worden aangetrokken, waarbij wordt ingezoomd op de lokale dynamiek van deze processen.

Met dit onderzoek heb ik geprobeerd een bijdrage te leveren aan de literatuur over beleidsnetwerken, door een bredere scope te bieden dan gewoonlijk wordt toegepast. Naast prestatie-indicatoren, zoals netwerkstructuur, -grootte en -samenwerking, heeft dit onderzoek meerdere invalshoeken. Ten eerste het beleidsontwerp en de beleidsperceptie in het instrumentele perspectief, ten tweede een discursief perspectief waarin narratieven met elkaar vergeleken worden en ten derde een relationeel perspectief. Dit beoogt een verrijking van de netwerkliteratuur en bevordert de discussie over wanneer en waarom netwerken succesvol zijn of falen.

Dit onderzoek wil ook bijdragen aan de *collaborative governance* literatuur. De meeste onderzoeken wijzen uit dat meer samenwerken en het ontwikkelen van coherent beleid goed werken, maar dit onderzoek toont aan dat andere factoren belangrijker kunnen zijn. Bovendien verbindt dit onderzoek internationale betrekkingen met lokale componenten. Een focus op hoe netwerken lobbyen, samengesteld zijn en opereren werpt nieuw licht op deze thematiek. De literatuur over lobbyen en netwerken is te verbinden met de leer van de internationale betrekkingen en zijn lokale invalshoek. Deze interdisciplinaire manier van kijken biedt vernieuwende inzichten in het denken over lokale beleidsprocessen rond IO's.

Hoofdstuk 1 en 2 motiveren en beschrijven de drie perspectieven, waarop de deelvragen en verwachtingen zijn gebaseerd:

- *Instrumenteel: Hoe leiden de beleidsontwerp en -uitvoering tot succes?*
  - **Verwachting 1**: Hoe meer de bidbooks zijn afgestemd op het aantrekkingsbeleid, hoe groter de kans op het succesvol aantrekken van IO's.
  - **Verwachting 2:** Hoe positiever de respondenten in de stad het beleid en de ondersteuning van het gastland ervaren, des te groter de kans om met succes internationale organisaties aan te trekken.

- *Discursief: Hoe leiden de overlappingen van perceptuele frames van de betrokken netwerken tot succes?*
  - **Verwachting 3:** Hoe meer de prioriteiten en narratieven elkaar overlappen tussen het organisatienetwerk en het beleidsnetwerk in de gaststad, hoe groter de kans dat internationale organisaties succesvol worden aangetrokken.
  - **Verwachting 4:** Hoe meer de prioriteiten en narratieven elkaar overlappen tussen het organisatienetwerk en de IO-vertegenwoordigers in de gaststad, hoe groter de kans dat IO's met succes worden aangetrokken.

- *Relationeel: hoe leiden de netwerkkenmerken tot succes, zoals de mate van samenwerking, centraliteit, diversiteit en netwerkgrootte?*
  - **Verwachting 5:** Hoe hoger de perceptie van een goede samenwerking tussen de belangrijkste spelers, hoe groter de kans op het succesvol aantrekken van IO's.
  - **Verwachting 6:** Hoe hoger de centraliteit van de betrokkenen, hoe groter de kans op het succesvol aantrekken van IO's.
  - **Verwachting 7:** Hoe groter de netwerkdiversiteit en het aantal betrokken actoren, hoe groter de kans op het succesvol aantrekken van IO's.

De eerste deelvraag bouwt voort op instrumentele concepten en is afgeleid van literatuur over samenwerkend beleidsontwerp of *collaborative policy design* (Howlett, Mukherjee, & Rayner, 2017) en implementatie- en perceptiestudies (Hill & Hupe, 2002; Pülzl & Treib, 2007). De tweede vraag wordt benaderd vanuit de institutionele en discursieve literatuur (Peters, 2012; Borång & Naurin, 2015). De derde vraag is afkomstig uit literatuur over de prestatie-indicatoren van netwerken (Kenis & Provan, 2009; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2011) en netwerkanalyse (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Scott, 2013).

Om de uitkomsten van de processen tot het aantrekken van IO's te nuanceren, onderscheid ik twee vormen van succes: feitelijk succes en geïnterpreteerd succes. Dit heb ik gedaan volgens de realistische benadering van McConnell (2010), die onderscheid maakt tussen objectief vast te stellen en subjectief ervaren beleidssucces. Feitelijk succes heb ik 'gemeten' aan de hand van identificeerbare momenten in de tijd. Ik onderscheid een proces als feitelijk falen (vroeg in het proces uit de race vallen), matig feitelijk falen (eerste fase), matig feitelijk succes (een van de laatste twee opties, of net gewonnen met kleine marges) of een feitelijk succes (gewonnen met een grote meerderheid). De tweede maatstaf voor succes is het ervaren succes. Ik onderscheid vier niveaus: een waargenomen mislukking (een mislukking die als een mislukking wordt geïnterpreteerd), een matige waargenomen mislukking (een mislukking die als een succes wordt geïnterpreteerd), een matig waargenomen succes (een succes dat als een mislukking wordt beschouwd) en een waargenomen succes (een succes dat als een succes is ervaren).

De vier steden zijn geselecteerd op basis van vergelijkbare grootte, West-Europees, het hebben van ervaring met het aantrekken van IO's die gericht zijn op vergelijkbare onderwerpen. Vervolgens zijn per stad twee IO-casussen geselecteerd, waaronder één mislukte en één succesvol aangetrokken casus, in het tijdframe van 1995-2015. Voor de kwalitatieve analyse heb ik interviews gehouden (N=175 met 150 respondenten) en daarnaast documenten bestudeerd, zoals bidbooks, beleidsstrategieën, correspondentie van overheden met IO's, dossiers van gemeentelijke en ministeriële vergaderingen, websites, evaluaties en beleidsrapporten over het gastlandbeleid.

Conclusie 1: Een extern gericht netwerk draagt bij aan succes in het aantrekken van IO's. Wetenschappers op het gebied van governance en openbaar bestuur zijn het er vaak over eens dat betere afstemming van beleid en samenwerking in netwerken de kans op succes vergroten. De bevindingen van dit onderzoek spreken dit tegen. In de realiteit van governance netwerken die IO's aantrekken, blijkt het belang van IO's belangrijker te zijn dan de zaken intern 'op orde' te hebben. Dit resultaat is terug te vinden op verschillende niveaus. Ten eerste suggereren de bevindingen dat gastland- en gaststadbeleid flexibiliteit en aanpassingsvermogen nodig hebben ten opzichte van de onderwerpen en behoeften van de IO die men wil aantrekken. Ten tweede leidt overlap van prioriteiten en narratieven tussen overheidsgroepen slechts gedeeltelijk tot netwerksucces. Ten derde suggereren mijn observaties dat er mogelijk geen verband bestaat tussen een goede netwerksamenwerking van de betrokkenen en de kans op succes. Deze bevindingen suggereren dat niet zozeer interne samenwerking cruciaal is in een beleidsnetwerk dat IO's aantrekt, maar eerder externe gerichtheid, rekening houdend met de wensen van internationale werknemers.

Conclusie 2: Meer dan één centrale actor en het ontstaan van sub-netwerken dragen bij aan succes in het aantrekken van IO's.

De tweede belangrijkste bevinding is dat meerdere centraal gepositioneerde actoren in het netwerk beter uitpakt dan slechts één verantwoordelijke actor of departement. Daarnaast toont het relationele perspectief dat het ontstaan van subnetwerken in de periferie van het grotere netwerk bijdraagt aan succes. Verder is ook aan de oppervlakte gekomen dat niet de frequentie van de activiteit van de actoren, maar eerder het type actor belangrijk is gebleken. Het doet ertoe op welke connecties die centraal gepositioneerde actoren een beroep kunnen doen voor ondersteuning. Uit het onderzoek kan worden opgemaakt dat de juiste verbindingen – of 'institutionele stekkers' (Bosselaar & Bannink, 2021) – van belang zijn voor beleidsnetwerken. Het belang van die subnetwerken versterkt het werk van Provan en Sebastian (1998) en Provan en Lemaire (2012).

Conclusie 3: Hogere diversiteit en meer actoren in het netwerk dragen bij aan succes in het aantrekken van IO's.
De derde bevinding van dit proefschrift is het belang van de grootte en diversiteit van het beleidsnetwerk. Hoe diverser de kernnetwerken – de organisatienetwerken en omringende actoren – bij voorkeur door de 'Derde VN' erbij te betrekken (specialisten, bedrijven, academici, NGO's en anderen), hoe groter het netwerksucces. Een verklaring voor deze bevinding is dat het niet de interne samenhang van het beleidsnetwerk is die tot successen leidt, maar diversiteit en de inclusie van 'anderen' in het netwerk en de omringende actoren. Deze bevinding versterkt bevindingen van Junk (2019) die concludeerde dat diverse netwerken een hoger niveau van lobbysucces kunnen bereiken. Daarnaast is de bevinding in lijn met conclusies van Phinney (2017) die het 'vreemde bedgenoten'-argument ondersteunen. Hierin heeft hij laten zien dat het betrekken van verschillende – en soms vijandige – actoren in een lobbynetwerk bij kan dragen aan grotere lobbysuccessen.

Ik heb geconstateerd dat het bereiken van de afstemming van beleidsdoelen, zoals vaak wordt gepropageerd in de literatuur over collaboratieve beleidsontwerp, niet gunstig is gebleken voor het aantrekken van IO's. Ik heb ook aangetoond dat vergelijkbare perceptuele frames binnen een netwerk minder kans op succes hebben dan die tussen het governance netwerk en de internationale gemeenschap in de gaststad. Dit bevordert de theorie van overlappende discoursen, omdat het bewijst dat een overlap van narratieven tussen verschillende groepen voordeliger is dan tussen vergelijkbare groepen bij het nastreven van succes in het aantrekken van IO's. De derde theoretische vooruitgang die dit onderzoek heeft bereikt, is dat het laat zien dat *institutional plugs* (Bosselaar & Bannink, 2021) of zogenaamde *weak ties* essentieel zijn voor een effectieve netwerk governance. Dit leidt tot de suggestie dat er meer aandacht nodig is voor de specifieke actoren en hun kenmerken in netwerken, in plaats van hoe netwerken 'als geheel' opereren, zoals gesuggereerd door Provan en Lemaire (2012).

Mijn bevindingen leiden tot een aantal suggesties die cruciaal zijn voor beleidsnetwerken die IO's aantrekken:

Suggestie 1. Houd een externe oriëntatie van het netwerk
Een eerste suggestie is dat het netwerk zich minder kan richten op de interne afstemming en meer op de externe relaties. In plaats van het gastlandbeleid en de aantrekkingskracht op papier te bekijken, is het belangrijk om rekening te houden met de behoeften en wensen van de specifieke IO. Daarbij is het cruciaal om de relaties in het buitenland en met internationale partners in de gaststad aan te halen. Verder is het van belang om contacten met de IO's die zich al in de stad hebben gevestigd goed te onderhouden, waarbij de diplomatieke betrekkingen niet verstoord mogen worden door klachten die niet in behandeling zijn genomen.

Suggestie 2. Netwerkcontinuïteit van gastlandbeleid
Het aantrekken van IO's is een gezamenlijke inspanning op gemeentelijk en landelijk niveau, die per vestigingsplaats slechts één of twee keer per decennium plaatsvindt. Vanwege het incidentele karakter, zijn deze processen niet ingebed in bestaand beleid. Toch is het belangrijk om een 'toolkit' paraat te hebben. De verschillende afdelingen van betrokken ministeries kunnen het beste regelmatig geïnformeerd worden over gevestigde IO's, mogelijke toekomstige IO's en over de voordelen van het huisvesten van IO's. Dat helpt om middelen te verzamelen om een kandidaat-IO een aantrekkelijke locatie te bieden. Daarbij zou het ad hoc karakter van het beleid kunnen worden verminderd door ook andere potentieel betrokken ministeries tijdig te informeren in, bijvoorbeeld, halfjaarlijkse interdepartementale bijeenkomsten.

Indien hogergeplaatste politieke actoren bij het netwerk betrokken zijn, is in sommige casussen gebleken dat de kans op succes toeneemt. Ten slotte lijken meerdere centrale kernspelers effectiever dan slechts één verantwoordelijke centrale actor. Een gedeelde verantwoordelijkheid is daarom aan te bevelen.

Suggestie 3. Diversiteit en aantal betrokken actoren en 'de extra mijl lopen'
Een derde suggestie is dat netwerken verschillende actoren in het proces betrekken, zowel extra IO's als Ngo's als specialisten op het gebied van de nieuwe IO, en andere ministeries om interesse te wekken. Diversiteit in het governance netwerk zorgt voor meer synergiën, meer ideeën en creativiteit. Bovendien kunnen de behoeften van de IO beter worden verkend als er een diverse set van actoren bij betrokken is.

Uiteraard helpt het om enthousiasme in het netwerk te creëren. De meest succesvolle netwerken waren bereid 'de extra mijl' te lopen. Deze term wordt in de interviews meermaals genoemd en laat zien dat 'het maximale eruit halen' een essentiële voorwaarde is voor netwerksucces.

Ten slotte stel ik drie mogelijke opties voor toekomstig onderzoek voor. De eerste is om uit te zoeken welke beleidstypen baat hebben bij afstemming, en welke meer flexibiliteit nodig hebben, zoals het beleid om IO's aan te trekken. De tweede heeft betrekking op de hooggeplaatste politieke spelers die betrokken zijn bij het netwerk om IO's aan te trekken. De derde is een aanbeveling om in een vervolgonderzoek te kijken naar de gevolgen van het toepassen van de drie perspectieven die ik heb gebruikt. Wat zouden de empirische en theoretische ontwikkelingen zijn geweest als men een vierde perspectief van belangengroepen zou toevoegen? Verder onderzoek naar deze voorgestelde invalshoek kan een vruchtbare onderneming zijn.

About the Author

Rosa Groen (Amsterdam, 1979) went to school in Amsterdam, to the Spinoza Lyceum (VWO, 1991-1998) and the Joke Smit College (1999). She has a Bachelor's and a Research Master's degree in Early Modern History (University of Amsterdam, 2001-2005 and 2005-2007). These degrees were followed by a post master in modern history (Complutense University of Madrid, 2008), and the Post Academic Program in Newspaper writing and Journalism (Erasmus University, 2009). Between 2010 and 2015, Groen worked as a lecturer and researcher at The Hague University of Applied Sciences (THUAS) at the Bedrijfskunde program and the Lectorate International Peace, Justice, and Security led by Prof. dr. ir. J.J.C. Voorhoeve. With a grant of THUAS and a PhD-grant for teachers of the Dutch Research Council (NWO) Groen prepared her PhD-project.

In 2016, Groen started as a PhD Candidate at the Dual-PhD Center and the Graduate School at the Institute of Public Administration at the Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs of Leiden University in The Hague. During this PhD-trajectory (2016-2021), over ten field trips were made to Geneva, Vienna, and Copenhagen. Besides, Groen followed academic courses at Essex University (Regression with R, Case Study Methods, 2015), University of Amsterdam (Academic English, 2015), The University of Bamberg (Process Tracing Methods, 2016), the Netherlands Institute of Governance in Utrecht (Getting it Published, 2017), and Leiden University (Qualitative Research Methods, 2017). She also obtained the Basic Qualification in Education (VU Amsterdam, 2013) and the Basic and Senior Qualifications in Examination (THUAS, 2018).

Next to her PhD, Groen remained being a lecturer, providing courses on international relations, hybrid organizations, public management, external student projects, and final projects at THUAS. At conferences, she helped organize scholarly panels of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (Ifrane, 2014), the Captains' Conference of the International Community Platform (The Hague, 2017), the European Group for Public Administration conferences (Lausanne, 2018; Brussels, 2021), and the Netherlands Institute of Governance (Utrecht, 2021).

Since 2020, Groen has a researcher's position at the Lectorate Changing Role of Europe/ European Impact Hub, led by Professor of Applied Sciences dr. M. Van Keulen. Groen conducted research for the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations, and the Ministry of Finance. Currently, she works on the projects Youth, Peace, and Justice in The Hague, and EU Mobile Citizens in small to medium-sized cities in collaboration with the Institute of Security and Global Affairs of Leiden University, the HiiL, VNG, Eurotowns, a dozen small to medium-sized cities across the EU, local youth organizations in The Hague, The Hague Municipality and many students of the European Studies and *Bestuurskunde/Overheidsmanagement* programs.