



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Microphone revolution: North Korean cultural diplomacy during the liberation of Southern Africa

Hoog, T.A. van der; Stolte, C.; Lewis, S.L.

Citation

Hoog, T. A. van der. (2022). Microphone revolution: North Korean cultural diplomacy during the liberation of Southern Africa. In C. Stolte & S. L. Lewis (Eds.), *The lives of Cold War Afro-Asianism* (pp. 265-290). Leiden: Leiden University Press. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3486910>

Version: Publisher's Version

License: [Leiden University Non-exclusive license](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3486910>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

CHAPTER 12

Microphone Revolution: North Korean Cultural Diplomacy During the Liberation of Southern Africa

Tycho van der Hoog

Abstract

North Korea is an overlooked actor in studies of Afro-Asian solidarity or the Cold War, even though it developed an independent foreign policy and managed to forge connections to African liberation movements. This chapter explores North Korea's cultural diplomacy during the liberation of southern Africa through the establishment of Juche Study Centers. Juche, the official ideology of North Korea, was marketed in Africa through public meetings at Juche Study Centers, the distribution of translated literature, film viewings, and travel opportunities to Pyongyang. Juche was a vague philosophy that resonated with African views of post-colonial nation-building. Today, few people take Juche seriously but the fraternal ties between North Korea and African political regimes have withstood the test of time.

Keywords: North Korea, Cold War, cultural diplomacy, liberation struggles, Juche

On 8 April 1975, the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) held an extraordinary meeting in Dar es Salaam to discuss the unfolding liberation of southern Africa. The fight for independence had reached a critical stage. Angola and Mozambique were in uncharted territories after the sudden collapse of the Portuguese Empire and would soon descend into civil war, while Rhodesia (modern Zimbabwe), South West Africa (modern Namibia), and South Africa were subjected to white-minority rule. African national liberation movements (NLMs) were at the forefront of the struggle, which was fought on two fronts: the diplomatic arena and low-intensity guerilla warfare on the ground.

“This, for us, is a crucial meeting. The Southern African crisis for us is a matter of life or death”, said Vernon Mwaanga, the Zambian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the assembled OAU Council of Ministers. “Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia have written the history of their independence struggle in blood. Zambian blood is part of the ink with which that history is being written.”¹ The explicit transnational nature of southern Africa’s liberation struggles was particularly felt

in Zambia.² As one of the Frontline States, Zambia harbored freedom fighters from all over the region and suffered therefore from imperial pressure, violence along its borders, and the influx of refugees.³

At the end of his speech, Mwaanga made an interesting observation about the character of the liberation struggles: “A very strange form of revolution seems to be emerging in our ranks and that is ‘Microphone Revolution’, based on making nice speeches for public consumption at home.”⁴ The term ‘Microphone Revolution’ is a useful metaphor to view one of the key questions of this era: peaceful means versus violence, diplomacy versus the armed struggle. It is true that actions speak louder than words. Nonetheless, words mattered during the liberation of Africa, because it was diplomacy that helped NLMs to rally support and aid for their cause from individual governments, multilateral fora such as the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the OAU Liberation Committee, and international solidarity movements. The struggle was often fought through a microphone.

The NLMs operated as ‘governments-in-waiting’ and wielded an elaborate diplomatic strategy, resulting in connections that were truly global.⁵ One loyal but largely unknown ally of African freedom fighters was the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), a country that – according to its own mythology – successfully resisted the yoke of Japanese colonialism and had vowed to support the liberation of Africa. North Korea used this opportunity to disseminate its own brand of socialist ideology, named Juche (주체). Through Juche Study Centers, which were founded across Africa, North Korea facilitated discussions, film screenings, and exhibitions to illuminate Africans about the wonders of North Korea and Juche thought. Texts from Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il were translated into English, Afrikaans, and Swahili. Numerous Africans were invited to travel to Pyongyang for scholarships, military training, or political meetings.

This chapter offers a critical analysis of Juche Study Centers and seeks to understand why they were founded, how they operated, and their impact in Africa. While they may seem like an obscure relic of the past, some Juche Study Centers continue to exist. Their history illustrates the important role that North Korea played in the contemporary history of southern Africa. The DPRK is often misunderstood as a ‘hermit kingdom’, an isolated country without international ties. But in truth, extensive relations existed between African NLMs and North Korea, relations that remain relevant today because several contemporary African governments continue to support the DPRK despite international sanctions against the North Korean regime.

Before focusing on Juche Study Centers, this chapter will first explore the historical background of inter-Korean competition in Africa and the diplomatic connections between exiled African liberation movements and the DPRK. In the next part, Juche will be the central focus. The chapter will discuss the establishment of Juche Study Centers in Africa and how they operated. In addition to public

meetings, the distribution of literature, film screenings and travel are the main components of North Korean soft power. Finally, it will be discussed how Juche inspired African political elites in the development of post-colonial nation states, through examples of African contributions to Juche journals.

Through its novel focus on North Korea, this chapter decenters the roles of China and the Soviet Union during the era of African decolonization. North Korea is an overlooked actor in studies of Afro-Asian solidarity or the Cold War, even though it developed an independent foreign policy and managed to forge connections to African liberation movements that have withstood the test of time. Unfairly, the DPRK is often seen as an agent of either China or the Soviet Union but this was not the case. Juche Study Centers, the topic of this chapter, are an illustrative example of the lived experiences of Afro-Asian connections: exiled African freedom fighters or post-colonial nation-builders engaged with North Korean ideology. As the Cold War progressed, the DPRK gradually became more involved in the pursuit of South-South cooperation, which is why most Juche Study Centers appeared to be active in the 1970s and 1980s.

A Tale of Two Koreas

The Korean peninsula was, prior to the end of the Second World War, colonized by the Japanese Empire. When Japan surrendered in 1945, Korea was divided by the United States (US) and the Soviet Union. For thousands of years Korea used to be a unified state and the post-WWII division was meant to be temporary. However, throughout the subsequent years the leadership in both parts of the peninsula became consolidated and in 1948 two separate states were established: the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north. In 1950 the DPRK invaded the south, signaling the start of the Korean War, which ended with a stalemate in 1953 and has not yet resulted in a formal peace treaty.

The stalemate of the Korean War made both Koreas realize that international allies were necessary in order to strengthen their own contested position as a legitimate government. At this time, the decolonization of the African continent was in full swing, meaning that at a rapid pace new non-aligned countries became independent. Lydia Walker vividly describes this “moment of seeming national possibility of the late 1950s and early 1960s, when at times new states were recognized every week.”⁶ The independent African states became members of the United Nations General Assembly, where they “began to turn the table on the Korean question.”⁷ Korea was the oldest Cold War issue debated in the UN, and African states seemed to favor North Korea over its southern rival.⁸

The ROK was at first uninterested in establishing diplomatic ties with African countries as a result of its Hallstein-type doctrine, which prevented the South Korean government from establishing ties with communist countries or North Korean allies. This policy changed in the late 1960s but South Korea remained an unattractive partner for African national liberation movements, as it was governed by a far-right dictatorship and was strongly aligned with the United States. The US was unpopular in Africa because of its domestic policy of segregation, its ties to the apartheid regime of South Africa and the disastrous Vietnam War.⁹

The DPRK, on the other hand, developed a different strategy and was much more successful in appealing to the NLMs.¹⁰ North Korea was ruled by a charismatic leader, Kim Il Sung, and proudly advertised its own heroic liberation struggle history.¹¹ But perhaps more importantly, the state was some sort of economic miracle. Bombed to absolute ruins during the Korean War, North Korea quickly rebuilt its towns and cities and was for a while economically superior to its southern rival. This ability to rise like a phoenix from the ashes was appealing to African liberation movements, who sought to similarly transform their countries after independence was gained. While during the 1960s most of Africa was liberated, only southern Africa was still largely embroiled in a complicated and often violent struggle against colonialism and white settler regimes. It is therefore that North Korea supported NLMs.

North Korea before the 1990s was a vastly different country than it is today. The 1990s signify an important historical juncture, as the Soviet Union was dissolved and North Korea could no longer depend on the Soviet's economic assistance. As a result, North Korea's public distribution system collapsed and a widespread famine ensued. In 1994 Kim Il Sung passed away and his son, Kim Jong Il, took command.¹² Since the end of the Cold War, the DPRK became primarily interested in earning hard foreign currency and was much less interested in promoting its ideology and providing global assistance to newly independent nations.

One question that pervades this story is how we can interpret the motivation behind African-DPRK cooperation. Were these strategies informed by pragmatism or ideology? Ideology, as Christopher Clapham argues, "is not merely an alien imposition on willing Africans. It also strikes a local resonance, and serves to build moral linkages that extend beyond mere economic interests."¹³ This chapter will show that many Africans were indeed receptive to the ideas of Juche philosophy. On the other hand, North Korea was forced to abandon its African Juche Study Centers when it faced economic hardship and focused on earning money instead of spending money. Perhaps we should not think of this question as a dichotomy, because Juche was able to do both: it appealed on ideological grounds to southern African freedom fighters and simultaneously forged practical close connections between liberation movements and the North Korean regime.



Figure 12.1. A DPRK stamp commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Bandung conference. While the stamp proudly depicts the African and Korean peoples standing shoulder to shoulder, North Korea was not present at Bandung! The text in the top-right corner means: Asia Pacific Conference (Bandung Conference) 10 year anniversary. The text in the bottom-light corner means: Joseon stamp.

I contend in any case that it is too easy to simplify this collaboration as a purely communist friendship. We must be careful not to interpret the decolonization of Africa purely in Cold War terms, in other words, as an existential battle between capitalism and communism.¹⁴ This robs African national liberation movements and their North Korean partners of their agency. NLMs and North Korea had mutual interests and were mainly driven by pragmatism, as is perhaps best explained by Eduardo Mondlane, the chairman of the Mozambican liberation movement FRELIMO:

Every time I go to the United States, I am asked again and again whether FRELIMO is “pro-East” or “pro-West”, “pro-communist” or “pro-capitalist”. My answer as president of FRELIMO is that FRELIMO is pro-Mozambican, principally, primarily and finally.¹⁵

North Korea is similarly often misunderstood as a pawn within the greater family of communist states. I disagree with the idea that the DPRK was only an emissary of the Soviet Union or China. After the Sino-Soviet split of 1956 North Korea was able to skillfully maneuver between both major powers while remaining largely independent in its own foreign policy, particularly in Africa.¹⁶ North Korea was not part of the Bandung Conference in 1955, but became a proud member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1976, a major diplomatic achievement because South

Korea was denied membership. The DPRK also became a member of the Afro-Asian Peoples Organization (AAPSO), an institution based in Cairo that fully supported the North Korean plans for the reunification of the peninsula.¹⁷ The DPRK moved through multilateral fora with relative ease and boasted of its allegiance to the new independent nations of the world (see fig. 12.1), but it is mostly the competition with the ROK that motivated its endeavors in the African continent.¹⁸

Diplomacy in Exile

Exile politics were an essential dimension of the liberation wars in southern Africa. Colonial governments violently opposed African national liberation movements, forcing these organizations to establish bases abroad. In places such as Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), Lusaka (Zambia), and Luanda (Angola), the NLMs came in contact with each other, and with non-African governments and aid organizations.¹⁹ The liberation of southern Africa thus had a strong international dimension. Without the material and political support of foreign governments and other organizations the NLMs had little chance of succeeding in their goals.

In their development as full-fledged organizations, liberation movements mirrored the state that they vowed to overthrow. National liberation movements operated as proto-states long before independence: they were ruled by a president, a vice-president, and a central committee that acted as a cabinet, each NLM had an extensive bureaucracy with various thematic departments, an army, and hosted public institutions such as schools and hospitals.²⁰ Foreign missions functioned as embassies and were extremely important in mobilizing international support and material aid.²¹ In exile camps the NLMs were for the first time able to rule over their own citizens.²²

Today, most countries in southern Africa continue to be firmly ruled by parties with roots in the struggle for independence: among them are Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola – Partido do Trabalho, MPLA), Botswana (Botswana Democratic Party, BDP), Namibia (South West Africa People's Organisation, SWAPO), Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, FRELIMO), South Africa (African National Congress, ANC) and Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front, ZANU-PF). Importantly, North Korea established contact with these organizations long before the respective dates of independence.

NLMs usually had to choose between two paths towards independence: diplomacy (negotiation) or war (a violent uprising), and most of them used both. The Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere summarized this dilemma shortly after a debate on southern Africa in the Commonwealth Summit Meeting: “We want majority rule out of a conference or out of a battlefield”.²³ North Korea offered opportunities for



Figure 12.2. Robert Mugabe and Kim Il Sung meet in Pyongyang, in 1993 (AP).

both strategies. Next to military support, the regime forged diplomatic ties with all major liberation movements in the region. One way to do this was by manifesting itself in multilateral fora and the hosting of international conferences.

A diplomatic victory for North Korea was the organization of an Extraordinary Ministerial Conference of the NAM in Pyongyang, from 9 to 13 June 1987.²⁴ The decision to organize this conference was made at the 8th Non-Aligned Summit in Harare, Zimbabwe, in 1986.²⁵ Kim Il Sung expressed in his opening speech his “deep gratitude” to the Zimbabwean government.²⁶ Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister of Zimbabwe and Chairman of the NAM, maintained a personal friendship with Kim Il Sung (see fig. 12.2) and delivered a statement at the Pyongyang Conference.²⁷ After four days of consultations, the conference adopted the Pyongyang Declaration and Plan of Action on South-South Co-operation, an extensive program (22 pages) on the basis of “collective self-reliance”²⁸, a phrase once firmly embedded in the discourse of the NAM but now solely used by North Korea.²⁹ In addition, the Declaration voiced strong support for SWAPO and the ANC and condemned the apartheid regime in South Africa.³⁰

Even more important, perhaps, were the personal invitations of African freedom fighters to Pyongyang. Virtually all leaders of the NLMs in southern Africa, most of them future presidents, met with Kim Il Sung during the Cold War to underline their mutual agreement for cooperation. On 11 June 1986, for example, the North Korean regime arranged a banquet in Pyongyang in honor of SWAPO, the national



Figure 12.3. Kenneth Kaunda, his wife, Betsy Kaunda, and a large Zambian delegation meet with Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang, 1987 (Eugene Makai).

liberation movement of Namibia. Namibia would only be liberated four years later, but Sam Nujoma (the future president) and his comrades were received as statesmen-in-waiting. Nujoma thanked the DPRK “for the practical material assistance, political and diplomatic support” and in turn offered SWAPO’s “full support” for the DPRKs foreign policy objectives.³¹ In his response, Kim Il Sung promised that “his Party and people would firmly stand by SWAPO in the future too, and support and encourage the just liberation struggle of the Namibian people”.³² Such meetings also occurred in the cases of Seretse Khama, Robert Mugabe, Samora Machel, Leabua Jonathan, José Eduardo dos Santos, Kenneth Kaunda, France-Albert René, and other prominent southern African politicians (see fig. 12.3 for an example).

The history of African-DPRK cooperation remains largely unwritten for two reasons. In the first place is it difficult to obtain primary source material. North Korea is not accessible for critical researchers while most liberation archives in southern Africa are closed to the public.³³ In addition, the relationship between North Korea and African countries is tainted by its contemporary illegal nature. Most of the current dealings, such as the construction of monuments by North Korean forced labourers, the repair of military hardware, and the narcotics trade, are illegal.³⁴ The United Nations Panel of Experts, which monitors UN sanctions against North Korea, has reprimanded African governments for their unwillingness in submitting reports and responding to enquiries.³⁵ Thus, research on this topic is sensitive and little work has been done in the past.

Exporting Juche

Usually translated as self-reliance and understood through its main principle that “man is the master of all things”, Juche replaced Marxism-Leninism as the official ideology of the DPRK in 1955. While it is often assumed that Juche serves as North Korea’s guiding principle for policy-making, and is thus closely entangled with its iconic ‘hermit kingdom’ status, Brian Myers has argued that Juche “was never meant to work ideologically.” Instead, the philosophy is part of North Korea’s multi-track discourse, which consists of the inner track (propaganda for domestic consumption only), the outer track (propaganda for domestic consumption but aware of outside monitors), and the export track (propaganda for outsiders). Juche was specifically designed for export.³⁶

Changing the state ideology from communism to Juche made North Korea more appealing to the non-aligned countries of the world, which was an advantage for Pyongyang’s desire to marginalize South Korea during the Cold War.³⁷ Precisely because Juche was vague and emphasized self-reliance, it was remarkably compatible with the philosophies of liberation movements around the world, including those in Africa (see fig. 12.4). After decades of oppression by capitalist colonizers it was only natural that they would take inspiration from socialism while their political programs were built around the ideas of political and economic independence. Mark Nash described how Marxism and communism resonated with nationalist movements in Africa, constituting a “major ideological force in African culture and politics.”³⁸ Juche hinted at key socialist principles and continuously underlined the importance of self-determination.

The main strategy of North Korea to export Juche to the outside world was the establishment of Juche Study Centers in foreign countries. Very little documentation exists of this phenomenon, but during archival fieldwork in Namibia I stumbled upon an extensive collection of Cold War era editions of the ‘Study of the Juche Ideas’ journal. This proved to be an unexpected treasure trove. Published by the International Institute of the Juche Idea (IIJI, an organization founded on 9 April 1978 in Tokyo, Japan) the journal is closely aligned with North Korea and consists of written contributions from Juche followers from around the world. The journal also contains short texts by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and provides basic data about the organization of Juche Study Centers and seminars outside North Korea.

I found the journal in the archives of the former United Nations Institute for Namibia (UNIN), an educational body set up by the United Nations Council for Namibia in Lusaka, Zambia, on 26 August 1976. UNIN was created to facilitate education for exiled Namibians in preparation for an independent Namibia. It was closed in September 1990, six months after Namibian independence, and its archives were donated to the University of Namibia (UNAM), in Windhoek.



Figure 12.4. A North Korean poster depicting the various peoples of the world united through Juche.

It is telling that an educational body for Namibians in exile assembled such an extensive collection of Juche journals, with editions running from 1979 to 1990.³⁹ The journals regularly featured contributions from African authors and therefore provide an unique insight into the reception of Juche in southern Africa. The next sections will describe the organization of Juche Study Centers and the contents of the journal based on the issues that I found in Windhoek.

Juche Study Centers in Southern Africa

The very first Juche Study Center in the world was established in Africa, in Mali to be precise. On 15 April 1969 the “Study Group of the Works of Comrade Kim Il Sung” was founded on the occasion of the 57th birthday of Kim Il Sung.⁴⁰ Mali was the first African country that established full diplomatic relations with the DPRK, in 1958.⁴¹ “Juche”, wrote the journal devoted to this ideology, “like oasis, has been flowing into the hearts of the African people who recently liberated themselves from the colonial rule of imperialism and are on the way of building a new society.” The meeting was attended by several Malian intellectuals. In 1985 the National Committee for the Study of the Juche Idea in Mali was established. Mali was a model for study centers around the world. Local chapters were coordinated through a national committee, and in time continental bodies emerged, such as the African Regional Committee for the Study of the Juche Idea. The International Institute of the Juche Idea is the global body that oversees all activities.⁴²

Based on the available North Korean journals in the UNAM Archives and other archival sources it can be estimated that people from at least 29 African countries were engaged in the study of Juche during the Cold War.⁴³ In reality this number might be higher, for the data set is incomplete because I was unable to track down all editions of the Study of the Juche Idea journals, and archival sources about African-North Korean cooperation are scarce.

While Juche Study Centers were eventually established all across Africa, the majority of local chapters seemed to be located in West Africa and relatively few centers were located in southern Africa. This discrepancy might be explained through the fact that West Africa was the first African region to be liberated from colonialism, and southern Africa the last. Unlike the rest of the continent, southern Africa remained largely occupied during 1960-1990. Political independence and formal diplomatic ties were logical requirements for the establishment and funding of Juche Study Centers. The distinctions between these centers, North Korean embassies and friendship societies were often blurred: Juche meetings were sometimes held in embassy offices and the embassies provided funding and reading material for the study groups.⁴⁴ Independent countries (Zambia, Zimbabwe,

Mauritius, Madagascar, Tanzania) were thus able to host such institutions, while occupied countries like Namibia and South Africa were, for practical reasons, not. When the latter two became independent, it was too late: the Soviet Union had collapsed and North Korea was in dire need of money, and decided to trade its soft diplomacy approach for a quest for hard foreign currency. Juche Study Centers became a lot less important.⁴⁵

During the Cold War, however, the export of North Korean ideology was at full speed. Exiled southern African freedom fighters who were not able to set up or join Juche Study Centers in their home countries frequented study groups in liberated parts of Africa. When Sierra Leone hosted the first Pan-African Seminar on Comrade Kim Il Sung's Juche Idea between 18-20 December 1972, among the fifty delegates from sixteen African countries were representatives from the MPLA and SWAPO.⁴⁶ Zimbabweans studying in Sierra Leone attended the "Group for the Study of the Immortal Juche Idea of the Supreme Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung", prior to Zimbabwean independence in 1980.⁴⁷ SWAPO members attended study groups in Tanzania and Sierra Leone, prior to Namibian independence in 1990.⁴⁸

As reported through descriptions in the Study of the Juche Idea journal, public meetings of individual chapters took place according to a set protocol. Usually a portrait of Kim Il Sung was symbolically placed in the room (this is also a significant custom in North Korea) and sometimes classic books or photographs from the Supreme Leader were displayed. The journal always highlighted the attendance of high-ranking African officials. Sometimes a speech will be given, sometimes a lecture, but the meeting would always adopt a number of proposals, working plans, and letters for Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong Il (and sometimes for both).

On special occasions, meetings could last several days, such as the "National Meeting on Socialist Revolutionary Charter of Madagascar-Juche Idea", held in Antananarivo, Madagascar, from 31 August to 2 September 1988. Gatherings like these were given special attention in North Korean propaganda: descriptions boasted about the number of participants and reported glowing well-wishes from foreign attendants for Kim Il Sung. Organized under the auspices of the National Committee for the Study of the Socialist Revolutionary Charter of Madagascar and the Juche Idea of the Malagasy Vanguard of Revolution (short titles were never North Korea's forte), this meeting was apparently visited by some 200 persons, "including senior officials of the party and government".⁴⁹ Occasionally a pan-African seminar was organized, for example in Sierra Leone in 1973 (see fig. 12.5).




Figure 12.5. Book cover of *The great idea of Juche radiates over the revolutionary struggle of the African peoples*, published in preparation of the Pan-African seminar on the Juche Idea in Sierra Leone, 1973.

Inspiration for the Party

Walker stressed that “Independence was not simply a rupture: it involved the re-routing and re-visioning of continuities of rule.”⁵⁰ During the tumultuous wars of liberation in southern Africa, exiled liberation movements had years and sometimes decades to imagine the state before they were able to actually produce the state. As governments-in-waiting they absorbed ideas on how to organize a state and create a nation.⁵¹ The ideology of Juche provided several appealing ideas on this matter. We can see this influence clearly in the African submissions to the Study of the Juche Idea journal, which details how Juche can be applied to the development of recently liberated African countries.

The Study of the Juche Idea mainly consisted of submitted articles by non-Korean authors and a significant part of them were from Africa. North Korean state propaganda can become monotonous and repetitive since it is designed by the Kim regime, but the journal is written by real, non-Korean people and gives us thus an insight into the global appeal of Juche. In the case of the African contributions the authors were usually well-established men in high-ranking positions in society: journalists, ruling party officials, Members of Parliaments, or university employees. To a certain extent, Juche provided the ideological scaffolding that was useful for the construction of one-party rule.

Take for example Edson Shirihuru, in the early 1980s a Member of Parliament for ZANU and a man with impeccable struggle credentials in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. He attended the West African Regional Seminar on the Juche Idea in Lagos, Nigeria, in June 1980 and this experience encouraged him to establish the National Committee for the Study of the Juche Idea in Zimbabwe shortly thereafter.⁵² In 1981 he published the article “Sovereign State Power and Building of National Economy in New-Emerging Countries” in the Study of the Juche Idea.⁵³ Referring to the selected works of the “respected and beloved” Kim Il Sung, Shirihuru argued that it was “very important to use state power as a powerful weapon” to consolidate national independence.⁵⁴ Shirihuru later became the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), an extremely important position within the Zimbabwean state, until he died in custody in 1993 following the disastrous end of a mysterious love affair.⁵⁵

Juche and African state ideologies complemented each other well. In southern Africa, the first independently elected governments were former liberation movements and these organizations strongly believed that they not only deserved, but were also destined to rule. Their rule was legitimized by their role in the revolutionary liberation struggle. In this respect Juche formed a useful inspiration – it was exactly the sort of vague ideology that emphasized the importance of a glorious revolution and the privilege to rule by a single, united organization. The DPRK was

irrefutable evidence of this idea. Despite enormous external pressure, the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) had governed North Korea since its inception in 1948. While in truth this history is far more complicated, North Korean mythology constantly connected the earthshattering victory over Japanese colonialism to the eternal rule of the WPK.

In 1988, the Study of the Juche Idea organized a roundtable to discuss Kim Jong Il's text "On Some Problems of Education in the Juche Idea." The participants included several educators from Zambia and Zimbabwe who reflected upon the value of Juche for their respective home countries. It was particularly the following excerpt of Kim's philosophy that resonated with them:

"For the popular masses to be an independent subject of the revolution, they must be united into one organization with one ideology under the guidance of the party and the leader. Only the masses who are united in this way can shape their destiny independently and creatively. The subject of the revolution means the integrated whole of the leader, the party and the masses."⁵⁶

The African participants of the roundtable used the transformation of their national liberation movements into independent governments to illustrate the usefulness of Juche philosophy. The participants included a delegation from the UNIP School in Zambia. Zambia was ruled by the United National Independence Party (UNIP) of Kenneth Kaunda and had recently become a one-party state. The Zambians underlined the similarities between the teachings of Kim Jong Il and Zambian humanism, a philosophy developed by Kenneth Kaunda. The dean, D.S. Bwalya, wrote that the "principle of revolutionary duty and comradeship" revolves around unity and "the cohesion of the leader, the party and the masses." K.M Mutumweno, a senior teacher at the UNIP School, argued that the University of Zambia should award the "outstanding thinker and theoretician" Kim Jong Il an honorary degree.⁵⁷

Another member of the roundtable was Kempton Makamure, a professor at the Law Faculty of the University of Zimbabwe. He explained the "correctness" of Kim's philosophy through the "national-liberation struggle of the Zimbabwean people" and underlined the importance of uniting around one leader, who should preside over one organization: "a single ideology under the guidance of the party." This also referred to ZANU, the former liberation movement that has ruled Zimbabwe since 1980, while its leader Robert Mugabe was in power until 2017. At the time of the roundtable, ZANU was eliminating its opposition under the guise of protecting the hard-won independence. The feared Fifth Brigade, trained and armed by North Korea, killed more than 20,000 people in Matabeleland, where Mugabe's main opposition resided.⁵⁸ Makamure wrote that Juche "provides us with a powerful theoretical and practical weapons capable of building up the firm independent

subject of the revolution". James Bwerazuva, the rector of the Mkoba Teachers College and participant of the roundtable, agreed:

"But, today the absolute majority of the Zimbabwean people are firmly united as one under the leadership of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Premier Mugabe to become the independent subject of history, and are building a new life in Zimbabwe. Indeed, the proposition that the independent subject of history means the integrated whole of the leader, the party and the masses is a valuable truth that can be clarified only by the Juche idea."⁵⁹

In a different article, from 1986, F.K. Chihota explained the intimate knowledge of ZANU officials of Juche. Chihota was the Deputy Chairman and the Secretary General of the National Committee for the Study of the Juche Idea, the organization founded by former Member of Parliament and intelligence director Shirihuru. In a piece aptly titled 'Beamlights of Juche Also Here in Zimbabwe' Chihota detailed that seminars of local Juche Study Centres were sponsored by the Ministry of Education and the Department of Information of ZANU, and visited by "high-ranking" government officials and party members. "In the coming years, under the guidance of the ZANU (PF)", promised Chihota, we will further deepen our study of the Juche idea".⁶⁰

But despite the profuse language that celebrated the eternal friendship between the Korean and African peoples, the story of the Juche Study Centers shows that the relationship between North Korea and southern Africa was mainly pragmatic. It was a terrific advertisement for the anti-imperial credentials of the DPRK, but there is no evidence of genuine collaboration between North Korean and African intellectuals in the pursuit of Juche thought. North Korean citizens never visited the study centers, except for the occasional diplomat. There are no examples of joint articles or books by African and Korean authors. The appeal of Juche seemed to be limited to certain African elites that were closely intertwined with the prevailing regimes of their countries, and did not reach the masses. But as Frederick Cooper recently pointed out, "unequal relationships are still relationships and they can be pushed and pulled on."⁶¹ It is a fact that the Study Centers did exist and managed to excite interest in Juche, and thereby in North Korea.

Soft Power through Literature, Film, and Travel

Cultural diplomacy was used to boost North Korea's image in Africa.⁶² While South Korea concentrated on trade diplomacy, North Korea was interested in "concluding cultural agreements" with African partners and relied "heavily" on cultural diplomacy.⁶³ Juche Study Centers were a key component in the display of North Korean soft

power in Africa. In addition to the organization of public meetings, the Centers had a key role in the execution of cultural diplomacy, for example through the distribution of North Korean literature and the organization of film viewings.⁶⁴ The Centers were also a gateway for travel to Pyongyang, so that African elites could attend training sessions or political meetings. This section will describe how Juche Study Centers were important hubs for the distribution of North Korean soft power during the Cold War.

The personal papers of Mose Penaani Tjitendero, a high-ranking SWAPO official, show that North Korean literature easily appeared on the bookshelves of key figures in Africa's liberation struggles.⁶⁵ In 1964 Tjitendero traded South West Africa for exile in Tanzania and steadily climbed the ranks of SWAPO. He eventually became the first speaker of the National Assembly of Namibia and was declared an official national hero when he passed away in 2006. His personal papers are preserved in the UNAM Archives and a sizable collection of North Korean books and journals indicates his interest in the DPRK, while bulletins from the DPRK embassy in Windhoek illustrate the post-colonial presence of North Koreans in Namibia.⁶⁶ Whether this kind of literature had any effect on Tjitendero and other freedom fighters is hard to say.

Tjitendero is not an exception. Archives all around southern Africa hold North Korean literature, which was also routinely gifted to African leaders during the visits of North Korean delegations. In 1973, for example, the North Koreans visited Botswana and provided the cabinet of Botswana with a number of presents. The British High Commission in Gaborone noted that the visit was "a fully mounted propaganda exercise":

Books and brochure and photographs of the illustrious (almost deified) leader of the national Kim Il-Sung, praising the glories of the North Korean brand of national socialism were dished out by the hundredweight to all Ministers and Senior Civil Servant and to anyone else who fancied a set of the red-covered publicity material. The "independent" nature of Northern Korean communism was discernible from a total absence in the literature of any references to Mao Tse-tung or other occupants of the Chinese Pantheon.⁶⁷

In addition, the cabinet received Korean porcelain and "pieces of fabulous Korean dried root with alleged aphrodisiacal qualities" (the British embassy in Gaborone gleefully commented that they: "don't know if there were any private requests from Ministers for second helpings"). The Koreans travelled through Lusaka in order to circumvent problems with the South African authorities.⁶⁸ Such visits were fairly typical and were usually reciprocated by African delegations to North Korea. While speaking at a mass rally in Pyongyang in 1976, Seretse Khama, the first president of Botswana, professed his admiration for Juche, "which he likened to Botswana's national principle of ipelegeng/boipelego (self-reliance/self-help)."⁶⁹

Literature for the global export was translated and produced by the Pyongyang Foreign Languages Publishing House, an organization that falls under the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Workers' Party of Korea.⁷⁰ The Pyongyang Foreign Languages Publishing House published books by North Korea's leaders, which often concerned the development of Juche. Examples are titles such as "On carrying forward the Juche idea" or "On the Juche idea of our party" by Kim Jong Il, which I found in the National Library of Namibia.⁷¹ The apartheid regime in South Africa and Namibia banned these books because of its communist contexts. The words of Kim Il Sung and others were not only translated into English, but also in specific African languages such as Swahili and Afrikaans. In the National Archives of Namibia I found copies with titles such as "Basiese beginsels van die opbou van die revolusionere party" (Basic principles of building the revolutionary party) and "Die historiese les van die opbou van sosialisme en ons party se algeme lyn" (The historical lesson of building socialism and our party's general policy).⁷² In Tanzania, North Korean newspaper articles were translated into Swahili by the local Peter Msungu, who visited North Korea and was a member of a Tanzanian Juche Study Center. Msungu, however, "pretended to do the work himself" and instead delegated the work to a friend while cashing in on North Korea's remuneration.⁷³

In addition to translated books from its leadership, the DPRK distributed international newspapers (such as the Pyongyang Times) and magazines (such as Korea Today or the Foreign Trade of the Democratic People's Republic). The latter, to take one example, is an English language monthly magazine which explains the rules and regulations of the DPRK on joint ventures and features successful North Korean businesses. In a Namibian archive I found a copy from 1987 (three years before Namibian independence) which, among other things, contained a colorful feature of the West Sea Bathing Resort, a popular holiday destination.⁷⁴ This goes to show that the DPRK was actively seeking to monetize their fraternal ties with newly or soon-to-be independent nations in Africa.

In Zimbabwe in the 1980s, the local Juche Study Centers stimulated the development of the 'Kim Il Sung Bookshop' in Harare, where such pamphlets were distributed.⁷⁵ Those interested in Juche could also enjoy a range of publications from the IIJI. The bookshop not only sold the Study of the Juche Idea, it also offered the bulletins 'Age of Juche' and the 'Banner of Independence', both produced by the IIJI. In 1973 a "Kim Il Sung Works' Library" was funded by North Korea in Mauritius.⁷⁶ Zimbabwe and Mauritius were not exceptional cases. In 1989, the IIJI had distributed North Korean propaganda to eighty countries across the world.⁷⁷

Art has always played a vital role in North Korea, where it serves the political leadership.⁷⁸ "Film show is one of the important methods," wrote Chihota, the Deputy Chairman and Secretary General of the National Committee for the Study of the Juche Idea in Zimbabwe. "Since all the people cannot visit Korea to see the




Figure 12.6. A North Korean poster depicting Kim Il Sung admired by his African supporters. Notice the Juche banner.

realities there, film shows were frequently arranged to show the realities of Korea where the Juche idea has been materialized and realize the correctness of the Juche idea.”⁷⁹ It is noteworthy that the first-ever Non-Aligned Movement Film Festival was held in Pyongyang, on 1 September 1987. The theme was “The Role of the Film Industry in the Anti-Imperialist Struggles.”⁸⁰

North Korean films highlighted the amazing qualities of Kim Il Sung and were famously anti-American.⁸¹ In the earlier-mentioned visit from North Korea to Botswana, a film show was organized at the Capitol Cinema and publicly announced over Radio Botswana.⁸² Juche Study Centers all across the continent organized film screenings and in some cases the North Koreans produced films in Africa. In Tanzania, a North Korean camera crew shot the Swahili documentary film “Tanzania Yasonga Mbele” (Tanzania Forges Ahead). British diplomats predicted that this endeavor promised to be “an effective piece of propaganda” because it would show “Tanzanians parading in the North Korean way” and would be a pioneering step in a young and upcoming film industry.⁸³ Film screenings were also held in other parts of Africa.⁸⁴

Every once in a while the DPRK would organize Juche seminars in Pyongyang, allowing foreign delegations to visit the socialist paradise on earth. In the 1980s alone, at least 200 students from various African countries (including Madagascar,

Tanzania and Zambia) were invited to attend Juche courses.⁸⁵ Such meetings, for example the ‘Seminar on Treatise of Secretary Kim Jong Il “Let Us Advance under the Banner of Marxism-Leninism and the Juche Idea”, held on 11 September 1983, were regularly frequented by African visitors, in this case by delegations from Madagascar and Tanzania.⁸⁶ In the case of Zimbabwe, between 1982 and 1984, 30 people had been sent to Pyongyang to acquaint themselves with the finer details of Juche thought, sometimes up to three months at a time.⁸⁷ In addition to seminars about Juche, North Korea also invited delegations from NLMs for political meetings, and hosted all sorts of political conferences.⁸⁸

First-hand reports from Africans visiting North Korea are rare, especially in the case of southern Africa.⁸⁹ One exception is O.T. Mupawaenda, a Deputy Librarian of the University of Zimbabwe in the 1980s. He visited Pyongyang for a month, together with two fellow countrymen (a lecturer in law and a Ministry of Justice officer). Sponsored by North Korea, these gentlemen received an all-expenses-paid trip around Pyongyang in 1986. Mupawaenda submitted an exultant article to the Study of the Juche Idea journal, with the title “Present Times and Idea of Independence, Friendship and Peace”.⁹⁰ Interestingly, he also wrote about his experiences in a Western scientific journal, published by the US-based SAGE Publications. “The Korean experience”, said Mupawaenda in 1987, “was far more rewarding, gratifying and interesting than previous visits to other countries, socialist, capitalist or non-aligned.”⁹¹

Conclusion

Mwaanga, the Zambian Minister of Foreign Affairs, condemned the ‘Microphone Revolution’ that he witnessed in southern Africa, a revolution based on speeches for “public consumption at home.”⁹² While he surely was not referring to North Korea, this concept is an apt description for the rise of Juche Study Centers across the region.⁹³ The metaphor of a microphone is not only useful to determine who speaks, but also to determine who listens. Juche was an ideology specifically developed to boost North Korea’s global image, a tool in the soft diplomacy strategy that the East Asian state deployed across the world. The exiled national liberation movements of southern Africa were particularly receptive to this message.

Juche was part of the ‘export track’ of North Korean propaganda, as Myers has argued, while Juche Study Centers were simultaneously fantastic sources for the ‘inner track’ of North Korean propaganda: domestic North Korean media made grateful use of the African love declarations for their country. North Korean citizens were thus constantly reminded that Kim Il Sung was indeed a leading world figure and that foreign leaders envied the DPRK (see fig. 12.6 for an artistic

illustration). But during the Cold War many Africans seriously considered Juche to be an inspirational ideology and used the opportunity of the Centers to meet people, read literature, watch films, and travel.

Today, no party or government official in southern Africa is involved in the development of Juche thought. Hardly anyone outside of North Korea takes this philosophy seriously. Even a former North Korean Party Secretary for Juche, Hwang Jang Yop, admitted that Juche was created to enhance North Korea's standing in the world when he defected to South Korea, thus shattering its last shreds of credibility.⁹⁴ When in the 1990s the communist system collapsed in North Korea the export of Juche was no longer a priority and earning hard foreign currency became the number one objective. Juche Study Centers largely disappeared in Africa, except for a few cases that resolutely continue.⁹⁵ Examples can be found in South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Nigeria, Ethiopia, the DR Congo, and Guinea.⁹⁶ Juche has been largely reduced to a niche phenomenon, in some cases upheld by local chapters from the Korea Friendship Association, which was founded in 2000 and is formally recognized by the DPRK.

Assessing North Korea's practical contribution to the liberation of southern Africa, it is likely that their military support was in the end much more influential than their soft diplomacy. Yet, the impact of the latter must not be underestimated. In addition to the (domestic) propaganda opportunities for North Korea, Juche helped to strengthen the ties with African liberation movements. This is where the true significance of Juche comes to light: it highlighted the DPRK as an example of a successful party-state based on the mythology of a liberation struggle. North Korea not only actively helped NLMs to achieve power through military aid, it subsequently provided inspiration to remain in power despite mounting pressure from opposition parties or foreign governments.

North Korea had then a similar effect on Africa as China has today, which in the words of Clapham is "likely to adapt and modify the African experience, but is highly unlikely to change it fundamentally."⁹⁷ The global Juche revolution never happened. But today, most of southern Africa is ruled by former NLMs that were supported by the DPRK during the Cold War. These movements have evolved into government administrations that continue to cooperate with the DPRK. One significant revenue stream for North Korea is the lucrative construction business in Africa, as North Korean art studios design and build monuments, cemeteries, museums and other public buildings.⁹⁸ In addition, North Korea also engages in a plethora of illicit activities and military cooperation.⁹⁹ This proves that the African-DPRK relationship is not dead, it is merely adapted to changing circumstances. In this way the DPRK has turned soft power into hard currency.

Notes

- ¹ NAN, CCO, 39/12/1/3/1, Vredesoffensief in Afrika/Zambia, 1975.
- ² J. Alexander, J. McGregor and B.-M. Tendi, “The Transnational Histories of Southern African Liberation Movements: An Introduction,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43:1 (2017), 1-12.
- ³ G.M. Khadiagala, *Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security 1975-1993* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1994).
- ⁴ NAN, CCO, 39/12/1/3/1, Vredesoffensief in Afrika/Zambia, 1975.
- ⁵ T.A. van der Hoog, *Monuments of Power: The North Korean Origin of Nationalist Monuments in Namibia and Zimbabwe* (Leiden: African Studies Centre Leiden, 2019), 43.
- ⁶ L. Walker, “Decolonization in the 1960s: On Legitimate and Illegitimate Nationalist Claims-Making,” *Past & Present* 204:2 (2019), 227-64.
- ⁷ J. Owoeye, “The Metamorphosis of North Korea’s African Policy,” *Asian Survey* 31:7 (1991), 630-45.
- ⁸ S.-S. Park, “Africa and Two Koreas: A Study of African Non-Alignment,” *African Studies Review* 21:1 (1978), 73-88; Owoeye, “North Korea’s African Policy,” 630-45.
- ⁹ Owoeye, “North Korea’s African Policy,” 630-45.
- ¹⁰ Park, “Africa and Two Koreas,” 73-88.
- ¹¹ The Soviet Union and China, two other important communist donor countries, were, in contrast to North Korea, never colonized. The DPRK consistently emphasized its anti-colonial history.
- ¹² Although prior to Kim Il Sung’s death, Kim Jong Il already diverted power to himself.
- ¹³ C. Clapham, “Fitting China In,” in C. Alden, D. Large and R. Soares de Oliveira (eds.), *China Returns to Africa* (London: Hurst, 2008), 364.
- ¹⁴ Similar to how Matthew Connally warned for the broad consensus among historians that “a Cold War dichotomy framed U.S. policymakers’ perceptions of the emerging Third World”, see: M. Connally, “Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict During the Algerian War for Independence,” *American Historical Review* 105:3 (2000), 739-69.
- ¹⁵ UNAM Archives, PA 3/5/1/4, Voices of liberation in Southern Africa: The perimeter of the white bastion / Wolf Roder. – Waltham: African studies association, 1972.
- ¹⁶ This was also the impression of British diplomats working in Africa. “I have seen no reason yet to change the assessment that North Korea does not act as a Soviet or Chinese surrogate”, wrote the diplomat P.J.D. Whitehead in 1985. “The North Koreans have pitched their appeal, in the eyes of recipients of their aid, very much as a small, unthreatening country, seeking and promoting independence of great power influence.” NAUK, FCO 21/3213, Relations between Uganda and North Korea: P.J.D. Whitehead to Mr Currie, 12 July 1985. See also Owoeye, “North Korea’s African Policy,” 630-45.
- ¹⁷ NAI Library, Pamphlet Collection, Regional cooperation: AAPSO.
- ¹⁸ And of course, similar rivalries to the DPRK-ROK competition existed in the past. Examples are the competition between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China, and the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.
- ¹⁹ See H. Macmillan, *The Lusaka Years: The African National Congress in Zambia, 1963-1994* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2013); G. Roberts, *Revolutionary State-Making in Dar es Salaam: African Liberation and the Global Cold War, 1961-1974* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).
- ²⁰ H. Melber, “Southern African Liberation Movements as Governments and the Limits to Liberation,” *Review of African Political Economy* 36:121 (2009), 451-59.
- ²¹ SWAPO, for example, opened a full-fledged Diplomatic Mission in New Delhi, India, on 22 May 1986. Sam Nujoma travelled to India and was welcomed by Rajiv Gandhi, “in a ceremonial welcome

accorded generally to heads of government.” He mission was celebrated as SWAPO’s first embassy. UNAM Archives, PA4/1/4/113, (i) First SWAPO’s Embassy abroad Inaugurated.

²² C. Williams, *National Liberation in Postcolonial Southern Africa: A Historical Ethnography of SWAPO’s Exile Camps* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

²³ NAN, CCO, 39/12/1/3/2, Vredesoffensief in Afrika/Tanzania/Koerant uitknipsels, 1975-1976.

²⁴ See for extensive documentation of the conference the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea, which closely monitored North Korean activities during the Cold War: ROKDA, 25166, 남남협력에 관한 비동맹 특별 각료회의. 평양, 1987.6.9-6.13. 전17권 (V.1 기본대책) (and the next 16 volumes).

²⁵ ZANU-PF, *Zimbabwe News*, Vol 20, No. 9, September 1989; See for more details about the meeting in Harare: NAUK, FCO 21/3602, North and South Korea and the Non-Aligned Movement Summit, Harare, August-September 1986.

²⁶ Kim Il Sung, “Let Us Develop South-South Cooperation. Congratulatory Speech at the Extraordinary Ministerial Conference of Non-Aligned Countries on South-South Cooperation”, in *Kim Il Sung: Works 40* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1995).

²⁷ Mugabe also spoke at the World Youth Festival in Pyongyang, in July 1989. UNAM Archives, PA4/1/2/73/22, Report of the delegation of the United Nations Council for Namibia to the extraordinary ministerial conference of the movement of non-aligned countries on South-South co-operation, held at Pyongyang from 9 to 13 June 1987, A/AC.131/260, 5 October 1987; NAUK, FCO 21/4436, World Youth Festival, Pyongyang, North Korea, July 1989.

²⁸ UNDL, A/42/411, Letter dated 87/07/06 from the Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.

²⁹ K. Fischer, “Collective Self-Reliance: Failed Idea or Still a Valuable Contribution Worth Considering?” Paper Presented at the Conference “(Conflicting) Political Ontologies and Implications for Transformative Action,” University of Ljubljana, 27 May 2016. The term is still being used in official DPRK communication.

³⁰ UNAM Archives, PA4/1/2/73/22.

³¹ SWAPO Information Bulletin, June 1986, part of the uncatalogued Franz Irlich Collection of the Namibia Scientific Society.

³² UNAM Archives, PA44/1/4/115, (iii) Leader of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Pledges Support for SWAPO, 21/86.

³³ C. Saunders (ed.), *Documenting Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2010).

³⁴ See for instance A. Berger, *Target Markets: North Korea’s Military Customers in the Sanctions Era* (London: Routledge, 2016); J. Rademeyer, *Diplomats and Deceit: North Korea’s Criminal Activities in Africa* (Geneva: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2017); The Sentry, *Overt Affairs: How North Korean Businessmen Busted Sanctions in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Washington: The Sentry, 2020); The Sentry, *Overt Affairs: Artful Dodgers: New Findings on North Korean Sanctions-Busting in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Washington: The Sentry, 2021).

³⁵ For example in the case of Namibia. S. Iikela, “UN Sets Deadline for North Korea Ties,” *The Namibian*, 7 May 2019.

³⁶ B.R. Myers, *North Korea’s Juche Myth* (Busan: Sthele Press, 2015).

³⁷ Myers, *North Korea*, 5.

³⁸ M. Nash (ed.), *Red Africa: Affective Communities and the Cold War* (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2016), 7-21.

³⁹ UNAM Archives, PA4/5/421, Study of the Juche Idea: 1979-1990; UNAM Archives, PA3/6/117, Study of the Juche Idea. – Tokyo: International Institute of the Juche Idea, 1982.

⁴⁰ UNAM Archives, PA4/5/421, No. 45, April 1989.

⁴¹ I. Dobrzeniecki, "Juche Ideology in Africa: Its Origins & Development," *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia* 32 (2019), 117-38.

⁴² UNAM Archives, PA4/5/421, No. 45, April 1989.

⁴³ Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

⁴⁴ In Tanzania, for instance, the Tanzania-Korea Friendship Society was founded in 2 April 1970. The society held regular monthly meetings at the North Korean embassy in Dar es Salaam, during which Juche texts were discussed. The society was led by Chief Adam Sapi and Peter Msungu. NAUK, FCO 95/860, Tanzania: relations with North Korea: C.T. Hart to M. Bryan, 28 September 1970. See also Dobrzeniecki, "Juche Ideology in Africa," 117-38.

⁴⁵ Interview with a defected North Korean diplomat with working experience in Africa, 19 July 2021.

⁴⁶ Dobrzeniecki, "Juche Ideology in Africa," 117-38.

⁴⁷ UNAM Archives, PA4/5/421, Vol. 2, No. 1, April 1979.

⁴⁸ UNAM Archives, PA4/5/421, No. 48, January 1990; Vol. 2, No. 1, April 1979.

⁴⁹ UNAM Archives, PA4/5/421, No. 24, January 1984.

⁵⁰ L. Walker, "Decolonization in the 1960s," 227-64.

⁵¹ See also H. Melber, "From Liberation Movements to Governments: On Political Culture in Southern Africa," *African Sociological Review* 6:1 (2002), 161-72.

⁵² UNAM Archives, PA4/5/421, No. 33, April 1986.

⁵³ Shirihuru received military training from China in the 1960s, which he completed with Emmerson Mnangagwa. They were part of the 'Crocodile Group' or 'Crocodile Gang', which attacked white-owned farms in Rhodesia. Mnangagwa became later responsible for the North Korean trained Fifth Brigade. E. Mnangagwa, "My Life in Politics," *The Herald*, 24 November 2017.

⁵⁴ UNAM Archives, PA4/5/421, Vol. 4, No. 3, October 1981.

⁵⁵ Rashiwe Guzha, a secretary in the CIO, disappeared in May 1990 and has never been found. She had allegedly broken off a love affair with Shirihuru, who then murdered her and dissolved her body in acid. Shirihuru died under mysterious circumstances in August 1993, while awaiting trial. L. Guma, "The Love Scandals that Rocked Zanu-PF," *Bulawayo 24*, 27 January 2018.

⁵⁶ UNAM Archives, PA4/5/421, No. 40, January 1988.

⁵⁷ UNAM Archives, PA4/5/421, No. 40, January 1988.

⁵⁸ Van der Hoog, *Monuments of Power*, 52-53.

⁵⁹ UNAM Archives, PA4/5/421, No. 40, January 1988.

⁶⁰ UNAM Archives, PA4/5/421, No. 33, April 1986.

⁶¹ L.A. Lindsay and M.E. Ochonu, "History Class: An Interview with Frederick Cooper," *Africa is a Country*, 18 November 2020.

⁶² Owoeye, "North Korea's African Policy," 630-45.

⁶³ Park, "Africa and Two Koreas," 73-88.

⁶⁴ In the 1960s and 1970s North Korea clearly outperformed South Korea in terms of cultural diplomacy. Today it is the other way around. As Yongkyu Chang rightly states, "current transcontinental cultural exchange is predominantly led by the South". See Y. Chang (ed.), *South Korea's Engagement with Africa: A History of the Relationship in Multiple Aspects* (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 5.

⁶⁵ This was also recognized by British diplomats in the case of Eastern Africa, where one bureaucrat was "struck how frequently the works of Kim Il-sung appeared on officials' desks". This worried

the British Foreign Office, who called for a “comprehensive study of the North Korean role” in Africa. NAUK, FCO 21/2319, Relations between North Korea and countries other than the UK: W.N. Wenban-Smith to Mr. Elliot, 29 October 1982.

⁶⁶ In addition to North Korean books, Tjitendero the monthly magazine ‘Korea Today’, and the ‘Pyongyang Review’. UNAM Archives, PA3/6/67, Korea today. – Pyongyang: The Foreign Language Magazines, 1992; UNAM Archives, PA3/5/3/273, Pyongyang review. – Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1988.

⁶⁷ NAUK, FCO 45/1283, Diplomatic relations between Botswana and other countries: G.D. Anderson to S.G. Cook, 8 March 1973.

⁶⁸ NAUK, FCO 45/1283.

⁶⁹ B.T. Manatsha, “Geopolitical Implications of President Seretse Khama’s 1976 State Visit to North Korea”, *Botswana Notes and Records* 50 (2018), 140, 145.

⁷⁰ North Korea Leadership Watch, “KWP Propaganda and Agitation Department,” November 2009.

⁷¹ NLN, F001 – LCA/06128, On carrying forward the Juche idea / Kim Jong Il; NLN, F001 – LCA/01319, On the Juche idea of our party / Kim Jong Il.

⁷² NAN, F002-AA/0251, Basiese beginsels van die opbou van die revolusionere party: verhandeling geskryf ter geleentheid van die 47ste herdenking van die stigting van die Werkersparty van Korea/ Kim Jong Il; NAN, F002-PA/0805, Die historiese les van die opbou van sosialisme en ons party se algeme lyn: toespraak voor die senior amptenare van die Sentrale Komitee van die Werkersparty van Korea, 3 Januarie 1992 / Kim Jong Il.

⁷³ NAUK, FCO 95/860.

⁷⁴ UNAM Archives, PA4/5/138, Foreign Trade of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: 1987. 31 years later, the US president would praise North Korea’s “great beaches” upon meeting Kim Jong Un.

⁷⁵ UNAM Archives, PA4/5/421, No. 33, April 1986.

⁷⁶ Young, “Guerilla Internationalism,” 106.

⁷⁷ UNAM Archives, PA4/5/421, No. 45, April 1989.

⁷⁸ M.-K. Yoon, “Aestheticized Politics: The Workings of North Korean Art,” unpublished PhD thesis (Leiden University, 2014). The DPRK also organized other forms of cultural displays in Africa, such as photographic exhibitions, advertisements in African newspapers, and the organization of mass displays. Various independent African nations signed cultural agreements with the DPRK. NAUK, FCO 31/948, Political relations between Somali Democratic Republic and North Korea; NAUK, FCO 105/1889, Bilateral relations between Lesotho and communist countries; NAUK, FCO 106/850, Political relations between Zambia and communist countries; NAUK, FCO 36/2764, Involvement of Korea in Rhodesian problem.

⁷⁹ UNAM Archives, PA4/5/421, No. 33, April 1986.

⁸⁰ UNAM Archives, PA3/6/89, Newsletter [Non-Aligned countries]. – Harare: The COMINAC II Secretariat, 1987-1990: Vol 5 No 2, September-December 1987.

⁸¹ Young, “Guerilla Internationalism,” 110-11.

⁸² NAUK, FCO 45/1283.

⁸³ FCO 31/692, Relations between North Korea and Tanzania: C.T. Hart to M. Bryan, 17 April 1970.

⁸⁴ For example in Burundi, Somalia, Uganda, Niger, Guinea, Liberia, and Mali. B.R. Young, “Guerilla Internationalism,” 107-08.

⁸⁵ Dobrzeniecki, “Juche Ideology in Africa,” 117-38.

⁸⁶ UNAM Archives, PA4/5/421, No. 24, January 1984.

⁸⁷ UNAM Archives, PA4/5/421, No. 33, April 1986.

⁸⁸ Another example is a journalism conference held in Pyongyang in 21-26 June 1983. Nearly 3000 delegates from all across the world flocked to the DPRK in the Year of World Communication to learn about the power of information and communication. SWAPO, among other delegations, participated. UNAM Archives, PA1/14/1/1, *Namibia Today*, Lusaka, Zambia (official organ of SWAPO): *Namibia Today*, 2:1, 1978.

⁸⁹ See for other African memories of travels to Pyongyang: B.R. Young, “One African Man’s North Korean Juche Adventure,” *NKNews*, 7 March 2013; M. Macías, *나는 평양의 모니카입니다* (Goyang: 예담, 2013).

⁹⁰ UNAM Archives, PA4/5/421, No. 46, April 1989.

⁹¹ O.T. Mupawaenda, “A Zimbabwean Librarian Visits North Korea,” *Information Development* 3:1 (1987), 44-45.

⁹² NAN, CCO, 39/12/1/3/1, *Vredesoffensief in Afrika/Zambia*, 1975.

⁹³ In an interview with Tanzanian Daily News, Mwaanga explained that political speeches were not enough – he felt that the practical experience of the Frontline States was being marginalized in favor of passing fiery resolutions. This occurred at a time when African states had diverging views on the détente policy of South Africa. See NAI Library, Pamphlet Collection, Zambia: Foreign Relations.

⁹⁴ Myers, *North Korea*, 6. Another example is the story of Kim Young Hwan, a South Korean national who joined the northern Worker’s Party of Korea from abroad but lost his belief in Juche after meeting Kim Il Sung and realizing it was a sham. Choe Sang-Hun, “One Man’s Tale of Two Koreas, Changed Allegiances, Torture and Fear,” *New York Times*, 23 August 2012.

⁹⁵ See for example <http://www.juchea.com/> (last accessed 10 November 2020).

⁹⁶ Data from 2018, see Dobrzeniecki, “Juche Ideology in Africa,” 117-38.

⁹⁷ Clapham, “China Returns to Africa,” 369.

⁹⁸ Van der Hoog, *Monuments of Power*.

⁹⁹ J. Rademeyer, *Diplomats and Deceit*. See the Panel of Experts reports of the United Nations for several examples of military cooperation between North Korea and numerous African states.