Beyond departure: the Greek in Egypt, 1962-1976
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Citation

INTRODUCTION

The study of the 20th century *Egyptiots*, or Greeks in Egypt,[1] has been the subject of a number

of important scholarly works.[2] These works cover primarily the life of *Egyptiots* until the early

1960s, or in a few cases up to 1967, but they do not include and explore the activities of the

Egyptiot community[3] after its largest part departed in 1962. *Egyptiots,* together with other

communities, like the Italians, disappear from historiographical records when they experience

a demographic decline.[4]

This dissertation moves beyond this dominant narrative of absence and departure. It

examines the life of the *Egyptiot* community after its largest part had left (1960-1962) during

the Nasserite period,[5] until the implementation of the *infitāh* policies by Anwar Sadat.[6] It

analyzes the *Egyptiot* presence through the personal, localized and institutional histories in

three locales, in which the community was mostly active after 1962: Cairo, Alexandria and

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[1] I refer to the Greeks in Egypt as *Egyptiot/s* or the *Egyptiot* community, which derives from the *Aigyptiōtēs/Aigyptiōtes* in Greek, a term Greeks in Egypt use as their own identification, with no reference to citizenship.

[2] See for example: Manolis Gialourakis, *Ē Aigyptos ton Ellēnōn*, (Athens: Metropolis, 1967); Alexander Kitroeff, *The Greeks in Egypt 1919-1937: Ethnicity and Class,* (London: Ithaca, 1989); Ilios Giannakakis, *Alexandria 1860-1960*, (Alexandia: Harpocrates, 1997); Floresca Karanasou, "The Greeks in Egypt: from Mohammed Ali to Nasser, 1805-1961," in *The Greek Diaspora in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Richard Clogg (London: Macmillan 1999); Angelos Dalachanis, *The Greek Exodus from Egypt: Diaspora Politics and Emigration: 1937-1962*, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017); Alexander Kitroeff, *The Greeks and the Making of Modern Egypt,* (Cairo: The American University of Cairo, 2019).

[3] By community I refer to the *Egyptiot* inhabitants of Egypt. The term community does not imply a homogeneous body; on the contrary, *Egyptiots* had a very diverse nature when it comes to their social activities, economic status and citizenship, among others. The word *paroikia*, which means 'community' in ancient Greek, was used in the archival material of the period to describe the *Egyptiot* presence in Egypt.

[4] Joseph Viscomi pointed out similar narratives of absence concerning the Italian presence in Egypt after the 1960s. Joseph John Viscomi, "Out of Time: History, Presence, and the Departure of the Italians of Egypt, 1933-present" (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2016), 4. For other scholarly works that cover the departure of other non-Egyptian communities, see: Joel Beinin, *The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry* (Berkeley, 1998); Shane Minkin, "Simone's funeral: Egyptian lives, Jewish deaths in twenty-first-century Cairo," *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice*," 16/1 (2012): 71-89; Anthony Gorman, "The Italians of Egypt: Return to Diaspora," in *Diasporas of the Modern Middle East: Contextualizing Community,* ed. Anthony Gorman and Sossie Kasbarian, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015); Najat Abdulhaq, *Jewish and Greek Communities in Egypt, Entrepreneurship and Business before Nasser,* (London: I.B Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2016); Joseph Viscomi, "Mediterranean Futures: Historical Time and the Departure of Italians from Egypt, 1919–1937," *The Journal of Modern History,* 91/6 (2019): 341–379.

[5] Gamal Abdel Nasser was the second president of Egypt, officially from 1954 until 1970.

[6] Anwar Sadat was the third president of Egypt after Gamal Abdel Nasser, from October 1970, until his assassination in October 1981. *Infitāh* policies were policies of economic liberalization, introduced by Anwar Sadat in June 1974 and amended in 1977.

the Suez Canal region. The main question I explore is: what motivated *Egyptiots* to remain in Egypt after 1962, and how did they carve out an existence for themselves in the face of nationalist economic and social policies so as to create alternative life choices and make their presence permanent? In order to answer this question, I look at *Egyptiots'* personal stories to show the diverse experiences, strategies, opportunities and obstacles in their interaction with the Egyptian state. By discussing their stories, I analyze the ways the *Egyptiot* community negotiated its presence, identity, and feelings of belonging, as a diaspora with transnational agency,[7] both in Egypt and Greece. By belonging, I define all those processes of identification of self and understandings of home (and homeland), as well as foreignness, that occur not only through "place-based emotional attachments," as Anastasia Christou noted,[8] but also through the possibilities and obstacles diasporic subjects encounter both in their host country and their imagined homeland. Then, I examine the impact of nationalist economic and social policies and explore how *Egyptiots* responded to them on a personal and institutional level, through their representative bodies. Specifically, I discuss the antithetical economic and social policies of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat, and analyze how they impacted the *Egyptiot* community.

Beyond Departure reveals the diverse experiences and multiple layers of the economic and social presence in post-1962 Egyptian society of members of the *Egyptiot* community. It challenges the idea that the *Egyptiot* community was in decline or absent from Egypt after its demographic decrease. It also challenges the construction of a homogeneous social and economic post-colonial Egyptian nation-state. In addition, my work speaks purposefully against the homogenization of internal dynamics of the *Egyptiot* communities. Through the

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[7] I do not situate *Egyptiots* exclusively within the framework of Diaspora Studies, as this would imply that they had a singular unifying experience. I demonstrate their agency not only through the diasporic connections they established, but also through their power struggles and identifications they articulate in their everyday experiences and engagements with Egyptian society.

[8] Anastasia Christou, "Narrating lives in (e)motion: Embodiment, belongingness and displacement in diasporic spaces of home and return," *Emotion, Space and Society* 4 (2011): 249-257.

Egyptiots' personal, local and institutional histories, this dissertation demonstrates the many articulations of presence, power and struggle, in a period of the community's so-called 'decline.'

Based on oral interviews and archival research conducted in Egypt and Greece, this research uncovers the continued, yet ignored, engagement of *Egyptiots* with Egyptian society, following the departure of the majority of the community in Cairo, Alexandria, and the Suez Canal region. Therefore, such analysis uses conceptual understandings of presence and absence, post-colonial studies and memory studies, and it contributes to new histories and understandings of social and economic life in post-1962 Egypt. At the same time, such positioning explores the contribution and diversification of diasporic communities, including the *Egyptiots* in Egypt.

The introduction of this dissertation is divided in three parts. Part I "Setting the Scene: The *Egyptiot* Presence until 1962" describes the context around the *Egyptiots'* presence until 1962. By providing some historical background, I explore facets of the economic, social, and political history of Egypt, when the country moved from a period of colonization and economic exploitation to the period of the nation-state building. There I analyze how certain economic and political events impacted the *Egyptiot* community and how *Egyptiots* navigated this transition as a community through its representative bodies. Part II "Narrating the *Egyptiot* Presence" explores how mainstream Egyptian and Greek historiographies have depicted the *Egyptiot* presence in Egypt until the beginning of the 1960s, and discussed it within the confines of the nation. Last, Part III "Organization of Dissertation" provides an overview of the five main chapters, highlighting their scope and analysis, and discusses the methodology and sources used for the analysis of this dissertation.

PART I: Setting the Scene: The *Egyptiot* Presence until 1962

In the first decades of the 19th century, a great number of Europeans, among them Greeks, started to settle in Egypt. This wave of immigration grew in size in the second half of the same century, and by the 1880s the majority of the foreigners[9] in Egypt were Greek Cypriots and Greek Islanders, especially from the Dodecanese, including Kasos and Kalymnos. Greeks came from different parts of Greece and the Ottoman Empire and their reasons for doing so varied in accordance with the different circumstances in each area.[10] Primarily, the reasons for this immigration were economic and social. Protection and privileges extended by Muhammad Ali, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1858, and the cotton boom in the 1860s were some of the reasons that attracted foreigners (among them Greeks) to migrate to Egypt. In the first half of the 19th century, the favorable policies of the Ottoman ruler Muhammad 'Ali (r. 1805-1848)[11] encouraged Europeans to settle in Egypt and gain privileges and protection, under the system of the Capitulations.[12] In order to establish trade with Europe, he called upon European and

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[9] The term 'foreigner' under the Ottoman Capitulations meant expatriate; the one who was governed by the laws of his/her own country. Will Hanley, *Identifying with Nationality: Europeans, Ottomans and Egyptians in Alexandria*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 63. In addition, in the post-1922 and 1927 Egyptian censuses, people of different nationalities, meaning Greeks, Italians, British etc. were described under the term 'foreigners.'

[10] For example, the Greek population from the Aegean islands followed the trade routes south to Alexandria, but the Greeks from the mountainous Pelion area settled in Egypt after the local artisan economy had collapsed. Thus, the population from the Peloponnese left their regions because of overpopulation and difficulties in finding work. Kitroeff, *Greeks in Egypt*, 12. In addition, military events, such as the Greek War of Independence in 1821, can also be considered as having given impetus to the flow of Greeks to Egypt. Lastly, many Greeks came to Egypt from areas under Ottoman rule, especially after the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, in order to avoid compulsory military conscription. Karanasou, "Greeks in Egypt," 29.

[11] He is also known as Mehmet Ali.

[12] The Capitulations *(al-Imtiyāzāt* in Arabic, which translates to 'privileges') were bilateral agreements between the Ottoman Empire and European city-states. They regulated the status of nationals of these European city-states in the Ottoman territory, granted them privileges, and encouraged commercial exchanges. The Capitulations allowed the *Egyptiots* and other foreigners to reside in Egypt without paying taxes. In addition, Mohammed Ali introduced a loose legal structure, whereby foreigners had the protection of their respective consuls, and they addressed their legal issues to the Mixed Courts that were regulated by international agreements for the trial of 'mixed' cases. On the extraterritorial legal identities in Egypt, see: Ziad Fahmy, "Jurisdictional Borderlands: Extraterritoriality and 'Legal Chameleons' in Precolonial Alexandria, 1840–1870," Comparative Studies in Society and History 55, no. 2 (2013): 305–329. On the Mixed Courts see: Saphinaz-Amal Naguib, "Legal Pluralism in the Mediterranean: The Case of the Mixed Courts of Egypt: 1875-1949" in *The Intangible Heritage of the Mediterranean,* ed. Saphinaz-Amal Naguib (Oslo: Unipub, 2002).

Levantine merchants to establish their businesses in Egypt.[13] Greek merchants settled in Alexandria – Egypt's largest port – where they could import and export easily, and better cooperate with Europe. In addition, the British colonial presence after 1882, which granted certain privileges to foreigners, was influential in promoting migration to Egypt.

The *Egyptiot* population reached its peak at the beginning of the 20th century, after the Balkan Wars and World War I. For example, *Egyptiots* numbered 56,731 by 1917 and their number increased to 76,264 in 1927.[14] In this period, Greeks arrived from the Balkan Peninsula and from some islands of the Aegean and Ionian seas.[15] Around 20,000 Greek refugees arrived in Egypt as a result of the Asia Minor Catastrophe of 1922 alone.[16] From 1927 onwards, a constant decline in numbers is seen for the *Egyptiot* and other foreign communities.[17]

While the population mainly settled in Cairo and Alexandria, many Greeks also moved to Suez, Port Said, Ismailia,[18] and the villages and cities around the Nile Delta, like Tanta. A smaller group moved to areas in Upper Egypt as well. The table below shows the geographic distribution of Greek migrants in various parts of Egypt in the early part of the 20th century:

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[13] He also called upon foreign agricultural experts, factory managers and skilled workers. The Greeks had a special advantage here, due to their superior capital resources and commercial contacts with Europe. Karanasou, "Greeks in Egypt," 25.

[14] Dalachanis, *Greek Exodus,* 3. There is a difference in numbers regarding the total population of *Egyptiot*s in Egypt, as well as other foreigners. This is due to the lack of information and dispersed sources. Hence, numbers might change slightly, but they do give us an estimate.

[15] Anti-Semitism in Europe was another factor that led the Greek-Jewish population to settle in Egypt. A. Ntalachanis, "Leaving Egypt: Greeks and Their Strategies, 1937-1967" (PhD diss., European University Institute, 2011), 9.

[16] The term 'Greek refugees' here refers to the Greeks from Asia Minor who were relocated to Greece after the Treaty of Lausanne and the population exchange between Turkey and Greece, as a result of the Greco-Turkish war of 1919-1922. The defeat of the Greek army during this war led to the Asia Minor Catastrophe, as it is generally known, and the Catastrophe of Smyrna (1922). Many of them, since they could not find refuge in Greece, settled in other neighboring countries, like Egypt.

[17] On the population in Egypt from 1907 to 1960, see: Dalachanis, *Greek Exodus,* 3.

[18] Mainly Dodecanese Greeks from Kasos, Symi and Kalymnos, settled in Port Said, Ismailia and Suez between 1859 and 1869, when the Suez Canal was being dug. They settled in these three newly built towns and worked as laborers and petty clerks, for the Suez Canal Company. Karanasou, "Greeks in Egypt," 28.

TABLE 1:1[19]

Geographic distribution of Greek citizens in 1917, 1927 and 1937

	1917	**1927**	**1937**
Alexandria	25,393	37,106	36,822
Cairo	15,250	20,115	16,949
Port Said	4,019	5,395	5,118
Suez	1,072	2,045	1,514
Upper Egypt	2,091	2,313	1,673

The *Egyptiot* community in Egypt (and in other parts of the Ottoman Empire before the formation of the Greek state in 1830) can be considered more as a religious group than as an ethnic entity.[20] This is because of the *millet* system of Ottoman administration,[21] in which the head of the Greek Orthodox Church[22] had not only religious but also political power as the head of the Ottoman Greeks. It was later on that the formation of the Greek state and the emergence of Greek nationalism motivated Greeks to consider themselves more as an ethnic group and less as a religious one; something that also applied to the *Egyptiots*.[23] Therefore, over the years, the *Egyptiot* community transformed into an organized ethnic minority.

In order to organize their lives, the *Egyptiot* communities started to establish representative bodies, the so called *koinotētes*.[24] These *koinotētes* were established by

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[19] Geographic distribution of Greek citizens in 1917, 1927 and 1937, Annuaire Statistique in Kitroeff, *Greeks in Egypt,*14, table 1:3.
[20] Ibid., 2.
[21] *Millet* is the term for the confessional communities in the Ottoman Empire.
[22] In that period the head of the Greek Orthodox Church was the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople.
[23] Kitroeff, *Greeks in Egypt,* 2.
[24] *Koinotēta* is the official entity of the *Egyptiot* community. In plural, *koinotētes.* Therefore, by this term, I refer to the institution of the *Egyptiots* in several Egyptian cities, and not to the community itself. The establishment of the *koinotētes* was a common practice among the Greeks in diaspora in order to organize their lives and activities. See, for example the work of Olga Katsiardi-Hering on the *koinotētes* in Trieste: Olga Katsiardi-

donations of the local *Egyptiot* plutocracy, namely by wealthy merchants and entrepreneurs active, among others, in cotton and tobacco industries.[25] The *koinotētes* were legal entities under Greek private law (*Idryma Ellēnikou Dikaiou*), and after 1949 also fell under the Egyptian Ministry of Social Affairs as a charitable institution.[26] They claimed to represent the whole *Egyptiot* community, in contrast to the Italian community, for example, which did not have a single representative body, but had numerous associations and clubs.[27] The prime and basic aim of the *koinotētes* was *Egyptiots'* education and healthcare. Hence, two of the first things *Egyptiots* established were schools and hospitals, through donations from the wealthiest among them.[28] For example, even before the formal establishment of the *Egyptiot koinotēta* in Alexandria (*Ellēnikē Koinotēta Alexandrias*-EKA) in 1843, the small *Egyptiot* community of Alexandria maintained a school and hospital.[29] The *Egyptiot koinotēta* in Cairo followed in 1856, again founding a school and the hospital first.[30] Another thirty-three *koinotētes* were established by *Egyptiots* throughout Egypt, manifesting their active presence.[31] Once the number of the *Egyptiots* increased, so did their activities and power. For example, besides establishing schools and hospitals, the *koinotētes* also established associations, churches and cemeteries for their religious, cultural and social activities, and homes for the elderly and orphanages for *Egyptiots'* wellbeing and healthcare. The *koinotētes*

Hering, *Ē Ellēnikē paroikia tēs Tergestēs, 1751-1830*, (Athens, Ethniko kai Kapodistriako Panepistēmio Athēnōn: 1986).

[25] The intention for the establishment of the *koinotētes* by the wealthy *Egyptiot* merchants was to create solidarity and social and economic networks among them. Kitroeff, *Greeks and the Making,* 37.

[26] The *koinotētes* fall under the Egyptian laws, according to the agreement signed between Greece and Egypt on February 2, 1949. See, for example: *Katastatiko tēs Ellēnikēs koinotētas Alexandreias*, Article 5/1961, ELIA Archive, 4.

[27] Gorman, "The Italians of Egypt,"143.

[28] Efthymios Souloyannis, *Ē Ellēnikē koinotēta tou Kairou*, (Athens: Kontinos Publications, 2001), 36.

[29] The school and the hospital were funded by the donation of the *Egyptiot* Theodoros Tositsas. These two buildings are considered to be the first unofficial presence of the *Egyptiot koinotēta* in Alexandria. Eftymios Souloyannis, *Ē Ellēnikē koinotēta Alexandreias,* (Athens: Ellēniko Logotechniko Kai Istoriko Archeio), 17.

[30] Souloyannis, *Ē Ellēnikē koinotēta tou Kairou,* 36.

[31] After the establishment of the Alexandria and Cairo *koinotētes*, the *koinotētes* in Mansura (1860), Port Said (1870) and Tanta (1880) followed. *Egyptiots* established these thirty-five *koinotētes* in several areas of Egypt. For example, in Upper Egypt, there were the *koinotētes* of Luxor and Aswan, in the Suez Canal region the *koinotētes* of Ismailia, Kantara, and Suez and Port Tawfik, among others.

also owned agricultural land and real estate, and received considerable donations from their members and the Greek state to sustain their activities.[32]

The Transition from the Imperial Subject-hood to the Nation-State Framework

The violent protests against the British occupation in 1919, which were part of a much larger process of decolonization in that period,[33] and Egypt's independence in 1922 opened the path to decolonization and nation building.[34] The demand for the withdrawal of the British brought to the fore the abolition of the Capitulations, as they undermined Egyptian sovereignty. The Capitulations were eventually abolished with the Treaty of Montreux in 1937, but due to a twelve-year period of transition, they remained intact until 1949. As many *Egyptiots* fell under the Capitulations system,[35] which granted economic and residential privileges to foreigners, once they were abolished, a strong sense of insecurity emerged, embodied in several waves of departure.[36]

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[32] I analyze further the *koinotētes'* role in Part II, chapters four and five.

[33] The dynamics of anti-Britishness, and the subsequent crisis it brought about the society, was not exclusive to Egypt. Other countries in the Mediterranean were part of the decolonization process too. In addition, this was also a distinct phase in the making of a global Greek diaspora. For example, on the British colonial presence in the Mediterranean, see: Sakis Gekas and Manuel Borutta, "A Colonial Sea: the Mediterranean, 1798-1856. Introduction", *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d' Histoire*, 19/1, (2012): 1-13; Sakis Gekas, "Colonial Migrants and the Making of a British Mediterranean", *European Review of History: Revue Europeenne d' histoire* 19/1, (2012): 75–92. On the British presence specifically in the Ionian islands, see: Sakis Gekas, *Xenocracy: State, Class, and Colonialism in the Ionian Islands, 1815-1864,* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017). On the British presence in Cyprus and Malta, see: Iliya Marovich-Old, "Nationalism as Resistance to Colonialism: A comparative look at Malta and Cyprus from 1919 to 1940," in *Cypriot Nationalisms in Context: History, Identity and Politics,* ed. Thekla Kyritsi and Nikos Christofis, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). On the Italian and Greek nationalisms and nationhood as a diasporic and transnational phenomenon, see: Konstantina Zanou, *Transnational Patriotism in the Mediterranean, 1800-1850: Stammering the Nation*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

[34] In 1914 Egypt became a British protectorate and remained so until 1922, when Egypt was granted its semi-independence. Even though Egypt was granted independence in 1922, this was very much restrained due to British economic and political influence. The British would evacuate the Suez Canal zone only in 1956, with the beginning of the Suez Crisis.

[35] Not all *Egyptiots* had benefited from the Capitulations. More than a quarter of them acquired Ottoman nationality, and thus were exempt from the Capitulations. I assume this was the case for other foreigners too. Anthony Gorman, "Foreign Workers in Egypt, 1882-1914. Subaltern or labour elite?," in *Subalterns and Social Protest. History from Below in the Middle East and North Africa,* ed. Stephanie Cronin, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 239.

[36] Discussions about the viability of the *Egyptiot* community had started long before 1937 and the abolition of the Capitulations. Literature on this matter was published since 1915. See for example: G. Nikoloaou, *O Aigyptiōtēs ellēnismos kai Ē mellontikē autou katefthyns*, (Alexandria: Patriarchal Printing House, 1915); Eugenios Mihailidis, *O Aigyptiōtēs ellēnismos kai to mellon tou,* (Alexandria: Grammata, 1927).

In this process of decolonization and nation-building, a simultaneous inclusion and exclusion in state-society relations took place. As Sinem Adar highlighted, the modes of inclusion and exclusion should be understood in relation to the transition that arose in society "from imperial subject-hood to national citizenship."[37] The presence of foreigners had brought movement of capital, trade, and new market opportunities,[38] but at the same time exploited the indigenous population. Thus, the Egyptian government had to operate under constraints due to the Capitulations and the benefits the latter had for foreigners. In addition, the British occupation in Egypt in 1882 privileged the position of foreigners even more,[39] as a pretext for protecting foreign communities.[40]

For the *Egyptiots* two matters were the top priorities to consider before the Montreux Treaty. First was the protection of the national legal character of the *koinotētes,* and second, the unconstrained exercise of the *Egyptiots'* professional activities.[41] As Angelos Dalachanis noted, the first point was vital for the *koinotētes*, as it defined "the main institutional mechanism for the perpetuation of the Greek presence in Egypt."[42] This issue was solved in 1949 with a Greek-Egyptian agreement, whereby the representatives of the *koinotētes* secured the maintenance of their national character and management of their property. In the event

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[37] Sinem Adar, "Regimes of Political Belonging: Turkey and Egypt in Comparative Perspective" in Nicole Stokes-DuPass and Ramona Fruja (ed.) *Citizenship, Belonging, and Nation-States in the Twenty-First Century,* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 138.

[38] The inflows of foreign funds were significant in the 1890s, but they were interrupted by the financial crash, and later by WWI. After WWI many foreign companies left the country, and this period was characterized by heavy indebtedness.

[39] Alexander Kazamias has scrutinized the relationship of *Egyptiot*s with the British occupation during Cromer's years (1883-1907), and showed how different groups used their agency to respond to colonial conditions. By exploring the agencies of multiple actors, from the *haute bourgeoisie* to *fellahin,* in relation to the British, Kazamias examined approaches of collaboration, negotiation and resistance. His research deconstructs the monolithic view that all foreign communities, in this case the *Egyptiot*s, supported and benefited in the same way from colonialism. Alexander Kazamias, "Cromer's assault on 'internationalism': British colonialism and the Greeks of Egypt 1882-1907" in *The Long 1890s in Egypt, Colonial Quiescence, Subterranean Resistance,* ed. M. Booth and A. Gorman, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014).

[40] For example, during the British occupation, the state did not invest in education, and missionary schools were established, primarily Catholic and French. Until that period, the British and their successors ignored all other sectors but agriculture, due to partly conscious colonial policy and partly due to shortage of funds.

[41] Dalachanis, *Greek Exodus,*15.

[42] Ibid.

that all of them were dissolved, the property would pass to the Greek state, which is the current owner of these properties.[43] The representatives of the *koinotētes* thus believed that after the transitional period an additional treaty of establishment would take place, which would finalize their status and maintain the privileges of the *Egyptiot* community.

Egypt had indeed promised to sign treaties of establishment with each capitulatory country before the transitional period ended, but these treaties never took place. The new post-colonial world with the emergence of independent nation-states made Egypt abandon this plan regarding *Egyptiot* and other foreign nationals under the Egyptian state. The Egyptian population reacted severely to potential treaties of establishment, as they appeared to be a colonial expression and continuation of the Capitulations.[44] Egypt decided to treat foreigners[45] under the standards of international law, and hence did not grant them any privileges. Instead, their legal position after 1949 became a bilateral issue that depended on the host country.

The abolition of the Capitulations characterized Egypt's slow decolonization, and was followed by several other influential events, including World War II and post-war economic stagnancy. The outbreak of World War II postponed discussions on effective solutions that were supposed to come after the transitional period. However, the end of the war brought to the fore concerns around the viability of the community and the issue of

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[43] Dalachanis, *Greek Exodus,* 16.

[44] Ibid., 31-32.

[45] As noted above, the term 'foreigner' under the Capitulations meant expatriate. However, the term 'foreigner' was kept in the period afterwards, as both the Egyptian authorities and the Egyptian newspapers in the 1960s addressed under this term any person who did not have Egyptian citizenship. See, for example articles in *Al-Jumhuria* and *al-Ahram:* "Ḥusīn al-Shāfaʿī yajtamiuʿ biwazīr khārijīat al-yūnān" (Hussain al-Shafaʿi meets with the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs*), al-Jumhuria*, August 8, 1961; "Wazīr khārijīat al-yūnān baḥatha fī al-Qāhira mushkilat birlīn wa qāʿidat binzirt" (The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs discussed in Cairo the problem of Berlin and Bizerte Base), *al-Ahram*, August 12, 1961. In addition, the *Egyptiot* press also referred to the *Egyptiots* and others without Egyptian citizenship as foreigners (*xenoi*). See, for example: "Ē ergasia tōn xenon" (The foreigners' employment), *Tachydromos*, October 22, 1960. Therefore, I will keep the use of this term for the period under study, referring to the 'foreigner' as a person without Egyptian citizenship and without implying any detachment from Egypt or lack of belonging to the country.

'readjustment'(*anaprosarmogē*),[46] to the new conditions. Neither the Greek community's leadership nor the Greek state seem to have had a long-term policy on how the *Egyptiots* should adjust. The insecurity of this period, together with the post-war stagnation and unemployment were depicted in the declining numbers of foreigners and their waves of departure. For example, the numbers of the *Egyptiots* declined to 57,427 in 1947 (from 68,559 in 1937),[47] with about 1,500 leaving yearly between 1947 and 1956.[48]

Egypt's New Reality

The formation of the Egyptian nation-state and its new socioeconomic policies marked a new reality, with the colonial era that represented the exploitation of the country belonging to the past. On 23 July 1952, Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Free Officers carried out a military coup d'état, with Muhammad Naguib as Egypt's first President and Gamal Abdel Nasser as Deputy Prime Minister. The new government dethroned King Faruq (1936-1952), and demonstrated its commitment to social justice by taking several economic decisions, such as Agrarian Reform (1952) and the building of the High Dam (1952), when they took power.[49] Their movement[50] had a strong nationalist and anti-colonial discourse, even though they did not have a clear political plan. Naguib remained in power until 1954, when Abdel Nasser's political

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[46] I use 'readjustment' in quotation marks, as other scholars have done before, due to the vagueness and ambiguity of the term. See, for example: Anthony Gorman, "The Failures of Readjustment (Αναπροσαρμογή): The Post-war Egyptian Greek Experience," *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Special Issue, 35/2 (2009): 45-60, 47. I explore how the term was understood by the community's members later in the introduction.

[47] Angelos Dalachanis, *Akyvernētē Paroikia: Oi Ellēnes stēn Aigypto. Apo tēn katargēsē tōn pronomiōn stēn exodo, 1937-1962,* (Ērakleio: Panepistēmiakes Ekdoseis Krētēs, 2015), 21.

[48] Alexander Kazamias, "The 'Purge of the Greeks' from Nasserite Egypt: Myths and Realities," *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Special Issue, 35/2 (2009): 13-34. The second largest foreign community, the Italians, also experienced a dramatic decline, with more than 40,000 of them departing Egypt between 1945 and the early 1960s. Specifically, in the case of the Italian community, the fascist regime used Italians as a medium for its political expansion that led to the arrest of 5,000 Italians in the early years of the war. Viscomi, "Mediterranean Futures."

[49] In addition, they introduced the setting up of a National Production Council (1952), the First Industrial Plan (1958-60), the First Five-Year Comprehensive Plan (1960/61-1964/65), and the foundation of a national company for the construction of a steel mill at Helwan (1954), with the state as its major shareholder. Robert Mabro, *The Egyptian Economy, 1952-1972,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 4.

[50] The Free Officers referred to the coup as a 'movement,' and only later they changed the word to 'revolution.' James L. Gelvin, *The Modern Middle East, A History,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 238.

regime officially started. In 1956, when British troops fled Suez, the Free Officers elected Abdel Nasser as the official President of Egypt and approved the new constitution of the country.[51]

Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, intending to finance the Aswan High Dam project using revenue from the canal. In October 1956, with the encouragement of Britain and France, Israel crossed into the Sinai Peninsula. British and French planes started to bombard the Canal Zone, an event that is known in history as the 'Suez Crisis.' While the post-war situation and the Suez Crisis created an unemployment crisis,[52] the gap in the job market was filled by Egyptians who profited by a new law that reinforced their position in the labor market.[53]

New laws that protected Egyptians in labor market were part of a larger Egyptianization policy that had been introduced before the outbreak of WWII in reaction to population increase and rising unemployment. The state, in order to promote the employment of Egyptian workers, introduced the first Company Law in 1947. Law 138/1947, as part of the Egyptianization policy, favored the position of Egyptian citizens in the labor market, as they had to make up 75% of any joint-stock company within three years (1950).[54] Thus, Law 138/1947 demanded that 51% of the capital of any joint company be owned by Egyptian citizens, and Egyptian workers to represent 90% of the employees. This made the distinction between Egyptians and foreigners in the labor market more apparent and intensified the need for Egyptian citizenship.

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[51] Sami Sharaf, *Sanaūāt wa ayām maʿJamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir,* (Al-Qāhira: Dār al-Farsān lilnashr), 219.
[52] When the Allies left Egypt after the war, those foreigners employed in foreign enterprises, and specifically many *Egyptiots* who were very active in the bar and restaurant sector, were affected dramatically by the closure of those enterprises. Foreigners who were involved in military service and were demobilized after the war also faced unemployment when entering the labor market. Angelos Ntalachanis, "The Emigration of Greeks from Egypt during the Early Post-War Years," *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Special Issue, 35/2 (2009): 35-44.
[53] Dalachanis, *Greek Exodus*, 90-92.
[54] The public and agricultural sectors could no longer absorb the need for employment among Egyptians. The new law was aiming to employ Egyptians in companies of the private sector. Ibid., 94-95.

The 1957 Egyptianization laws[55] reinforced actions taken since the 1920s, including the canceling of the Capitulations and Company Law 138/1947. They also came as a response to the tripartite military intervention in 1956.[56] On the basis of the citizen's country's position during the Suez Crisis (i.e. whether the country was friendly or hostile to Egypt), the Egyptianization policy would be imposed with more, or fewer, restrictions.[57] Egyptianization laws entailed full control over the banking, insurance and commercial sectors, targeting specifically the administrative boards and the directors of companies related to these sectors, who had to be Egyptian citizens. In addition, all shares of joint-stock companies had to belong to Egyptian citizens. The 1957 laws did not dictate whether personnel were Egyptian or foreign, as Company Law 138/1947 did. Nevertheless, these laws caused a lot of fear and insecurity about the future of the community.[58]

Furthermore, the new legislation on citizenship introduced by Abdel Nasser aimed to define the Egyptian community, and delineate an attachment to Egypt.[59] Due to the anti-imperial and anti-colonial feelings of the period, the process of naturalization of a foreigner to an Egyptian national started to become more complicated. Consequently, Law 12/1929, which granted Egyptian nationality to those who had a common cultural, linguistic or religious

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[55] I refer here to Laws 22, 23 and 24/1957.

[56] After the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, the Egyptian state nationalized companies of British and French interests, and also precipitously expelled the citizens of those two countries. The obligatory expulsion of the British and French population is demonstrated by a document in the parliamentary archives of the UK: "The Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a report from their Minister in Cairo on 23rd November 1956 to the effect that all members of the British and French communities in Egypt were to be expelled within the next week or 10 days. Thus, each person was to be allowed to take a maximum of £20 with him." Parliamentary Archives of the UK, Egypt, (Expulsion of British subjects), HC Deb November 26, 1956, vol 561, cc30-3. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1956/nov/26/egypt-expulsion-of-british-subjects. The Greek Cypriots and the Greek Jews were exempted from the military decrees. Indeed, Gamal Abdel Nasser with the decree 206, issued in November 17, 1956 exempted Greek Cypriots from all measures targeting British citizens in Egypt. Dalachanis, *Akyvernētē Paroikia,* 102-103.

[57] In the category of hostile countries belonged British, French and Jewish companies that the Egyptian state confiscated in November 1956. In the friendly to Egypt category were citizens of Lebanon, Syria, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, the United States and Greece. The companies of these countries were granted a five-year grace period, before the law's fully implementation. Dalachanis, *Greek Exodus,* 61.

[58] In the next sub-section, "The Different Conceptions of 'Readjustment'", I analyze how the community perceived these changes and what the reactions of its members were.

[59] Gianluca P. Parolin, *Citizenship in the Arab World. Kin, Religion and Nation-State,* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 81.

background, and were already assimilated into Egyptian society,[60] was replaced with the new Law 160/1950. This new Law 160/1950 was based on the right of blood *(jus sanguinis)* and the right of soil *(jus soli)* and made the naturalization process no longer automatic. It stipulated that a foreigner who was born in Egypt could apply and obtain citizenship only if the Ministerial Council agreed that the person met certain criteria, which included knowledge of the Arabic language. Moreover, even if the person was able to acquire citizenship, they were required to wait approximately five years to access to all the sociopolitical rights enjoyed by Egyptians at the time.[61]

The refashioning of the relationship between foreigners, citizens, and the Egyptian state was further complicated by the laws of 1956, whereby a foreigner could no longer hold a ten-year work or residence permit. From that year onward, residence and work permits were limited to one year. This change meant restrictions in the job market and possibly unemployment for *Egyptiots* who were born after 1956 and consequently could only obtain one-year permits. Hence, securing citizenship, as well as residence and work permits, reconstructed the relationships among *Egyptiots* and their relationship *vis-à-vis* the state and other Egyptians.

The Different Conceptions of 'Readjustment' (*Anaprosarmogē*)

Among the solutions for the *Egyptiots'* future were migration to a third country, 'repatriation'[62] to Greece, or 'readjustment' to Egyptian society. Only the last point concerned the permanent residence of *Egyptiots* in Egypt. As I explore below, 'readjustment' was understood in different ways and touched upon several conceptions of belonging and identity among the *Egyptiots*. The contradictory feelings and notions regarding 'readjustment'

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[60] Parolin, *Citizenship in the Arab World,* 81.
[61] Dalachanis, *Akyvernētē Paroikia,* 150-151.
[62] The term 'repatriation' is problematic; therefore, I use it in quotation marks. The reason for this is that many *Egyptiots* were second or third-generation, who were born and grew up in Egypt, without even having visited Greece. Thus, going back to the homeland did not in actuality correspond to reality, but to their imagined homeland.

expressed the 'in-betweenness' and feelings of belonging or not to the changing post-colonial Egyptian environment. *Egyptiots* found themselves in a liminal stage, when they were pushed to the 'limits' by the force of events.[63] Old structures could no longer be taken for granted, so *Egyptiots* had to create new alternatives and possible histories for their lives.

The "mantra of *anaprosarmogē* (readjustment)," as Anthony Gorman referred to it, addressed how *Egyptiots,* both as individuals and through their institutions, primarily through their *koinotētes,* should respond to and accommodate the political, economic and social changes that had been taking place in Egyptian society since the 1930s.[64] Specifically, since the abolition of the Capitulations (1937), its impact on the labor market, and subsequent unemployment, forced the community to reflect and reevaluate its economic and political positioning in the Egyptian society. Thus, reforms on the institutional, economic and political levels, among others, were suggested.

On the institutional level, questions arose concerning the representation of the *koinotētes*, their management and their relation with other actors, namely the Egyptian society and government, the Greek Orthodox Church, and the Greek state.[65] For example, during the 1954 EKA elections, an election pamphlet, *Programma Anaprosarmogēs,* emphasized two main points that could strengthen the ties between Egyptians and *Egyptiots*. These two points concerned the reevaluation of relations between the EKA and its members with other community centers, such as the Greek Orthodox Church and the Greek state. The first request concerned a reconciliation between the EKA and the Patriarchate, as they had not been on good terms for many years.[66] The second point addressed the role of the Greek state in EKA affairs, as the latter should be more cautious and should not allow the Greek

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[63] I use liminality here as an experience "of finding oneself at a boundary or in an in-between position, either spatially or temporally". Agnes Horvath, Bjørn Thomassen and Harald Wydra (ed.), *Breaking Boundaries: Varieties of Liminality*, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015).
[64] Gorman, "The Failures of Readjustment," 47.
[65] Ibid., 51-52.
[66] I discuss the relations of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate with the EKA in chapter four.

government to interfere in *Egyptiot* interests, but only to facilitate them. By working on these two points, next to making the EKA a more democratic institution,[67] the candidates and authors of the pamphlet suggested that the institution and its members would improve their relation with other communities, which would help to secure their residence in Egypt.

The economic 'readjustment' addressed the economic links between *Egyptiots* and the Egyptian market, *Egyptiots* unemployment, and the use of Arabic as a tool to support their position in the labor market. The reforms in the political field mainly concerned the political solidarity of *Egyptiots* towards the Egyptian nationalist cause, specifically, the ways *Egyptiots* should support Egyptian independence in order to secure their future in Egypt.[68] The political 'readjustment' also concerned Egyptian citizenship as a condition for *Egyptiots'* permanent residence in Egypt.[69] Among the community's members there were different understandings of how this political solidarity should best be expressed, what the position of the *Egyptiot* community should be towards Egyptian independence, and last, whether Egyptian citizenship was necessary or not.

For example, during the pan-community meeting which took place in May 1957 before the visit of the Prime Minister of Greece, Konstantinos Karamanlis,[70] to Egypt, the representatives of the *Egyptiot Koinotēta* in Alexandria (EKA), the Greek Chamber of Commerce in Alexandria (GCCA), the *Egyptiot Koinotēta* in Cairo (EKC) and the Greek Chamber of Commerce in Cairo (GCCC) expressed their bitterness in a letter to Abdel Nasser, and requested the exemption of *Egyptiots* from the new legislation.[71] However, the

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[67] This referred to the EKA's role in the past with the Greek government and the British. The EKA served more the interests of a plutocracy, being close to these two actors, instead of being an open and democratic institution. Gorman, "The Failures of Readjustment," 51-52.

[68] Ibid., 47-48; 53-54.

[69] Themistoklis Matsakis, *To Dilēmma tou Aigyptiōtou Ellēnismou*, Cairo, 1961, 17.

[70] Konstantinos Karamanlis was appointed as a prime minister by King Paul in 1955, and he won the elections in February 1956.

[71] The representatives of these institutions referred to the Egyptianization laws. The Greek ambassador and the Greek consuls of Alexandria and Cairo also joined the meeting. After that meeting, Dimitris Lambros, the ambassador of Greece in Egypt, reported to the Greek Foreign Office that there were three conditions concerning *Egyptiots'* residence in Egypt: the learning of the Arabic language, especially for young *Egyptiots,*

left within the community supported the process toward Egypt's sovereignty.[72] It adapted its

definition of what it meant to be an Egyptian, advocated the continued presence of *Egyptiots*

in Egypt, and saw other *Egyptiot* institutions as potential roadblocks to that sovereignty.[73]

For example, Sophianos Chryssostomidis, a leftist journalist and editor in-chief

(1953-1961) of the Cairo-based newspaper *O Paroikos,* argued that departure was

unavoidable since the community had not adapted to the changing Egyptian environment.[74] In

his meeting with Karamanlis, Chryssostomidis stated that the *Egyptiots* were not particularly

interested in obtaining Egyptian citizenship.[75] Chryssostomidis asked Karamanlis if he

intended to request Egyptian citizenship for *Egyptiots*, assuming that this was a responsibility

of the Greek government. Karamanlis replied that he would not make such a request on

behalf of the members of the community, unless they did it themselves.[76] As Chryssostomidis

emphasized later on his article in *O Paroikos*, such a request was never made by the

community's institutions. Neither the community's leadership, such as the Alexandrian

koinotēta – the oldest among the *koinotētes* – seized the opportunity to bring the citizenship

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the orientation towards a more technical education, and last the *en masse* acquisition of Egyptian citizenship. He thus emphasized that if Egyptian citizenship was not be beneficial for them in the future, *Egyptiots* would be able to recover the Greek one. Sophianos Chryssostomidis, "The Left, Nasser, and the Exodus of the Greeks from Egypt," *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Special Issue, 35/2 (2009): 155-159, 157.

[72] For example, the Greek-Egyptian Cooperation Committee, which was founded during the Suez Canal Crisis, did not demand such favorable treatment, as the community's institutions did. Instead, the committee openly supported the Egyptianization measures, acknowledging Egypt's sovereignty, similar to the newspaper *O Paroikos*. Nevertheless, the committee was not invited to the meeting with the community's institutions, but expressed its points through a memorandum. According to the Greek-Egyptian Cooperation Committee, *Egyptiots'* 'readjustment' had to be implemented on three levels: psychological, professional and educational. On the psychological level, *Egyptiots* should accept Egypt as their homeland and dismiss their national chauvinism. On the professional level, they supported the learning of Arabic and the acquisition of Egyptian citizenship. On the educational level, they proposed a more extended summit where educators and community bodies would be involved and participate. In addition, the committee requested the continuation of professional rights to those who held a residence permit, the facilitation of Egyptian citizenship to all *Egyptiots*, and as a last resort, in case *Egyptiots* were not needed in Egypt, the Egyptian state to assist their departure. Dalachanis, Greek Exodus, 64; 66-67.

[73] Chryssostomidis, "Ē Ellēniki paroikia"; "Left."

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid., 157-158.

[76] Dalachanis noted that Karamanlis submitted a request for dual citizenship during his visit in 1957. Nevertheless, due to the lack of interest by *Egyptiots* in acquiring citizenship *en masse* on the one hand, and the fact the Egyptian state did not have this issue among its priorities on the other, no fruitful outcome came out of this, and hence no solution to the unemployment issue materialized. Dalachanis, *Greek Exodus,* 100.

issue to the fore when Karamanlis visited Egypt.[77] Hence, moves towards the acquisition of

Egyptian citizenship were taken on an individual base, and never *en masse.*

According to Chryssostomidis, psychological factors prevented *Egyptiots* from asking

for Egyptian citizenship, as it was understood to be an emotional detachment from Greece.[78]

The feeling of 'in-betweenness' was highlighted here, as *Egyptiots* tried to avoid a "binding

element with the host country"[79] by not obtaining Egyptian citizenship. Indeed, some of my

interviewees, those who were older by the time these events took place, commented that they

expressed no interest in having Egyptian citizenship, since they felt 'Greek,' or at least more

Greek than Egyptian, and they considered Greek citizenship superior to Egyptian.[80]

Even though *Egyptiots* had been living in Egypt for many years, the privileged

environment of the Capitulations until the late 1940s emphasized the superiority of

Europeans over Egyptians, with Greece holding a particular position due to its ancient past

and heritage. Therefore, *Egyptiots* imagined themselves as part of Greece – beyond borders –

and longed for the 'imagined' homeland.[81] In addition, the 'closed' ethnic structure of the

community, together with the lack of action towards an *en masse* acquisition of citizenship by

the community's institutions, among other reasons, ensured that Egyptian citizenship, even

when the procedure was easier and the conditions existed, was simply not a priority.

Furthermore, many *Egyptiots* felt Egyptian citizenship would not prevent them from

remaining disadvantaged in a job market that favored Muslim Egyptians; one more reason

that hindered applying for citizenship *en masse.*[82]

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[77] Chryssostomidis, "The Left," 157-158.
[78] Ibid. In addition, Irakleitos Souyioultzoglou emphasizes the mechanisms of colonization of the *Egyptiots'* collective memory by the community's institutions. He stresses how the community's institutions incorporated socially the members of the *Egyptiot* community, but isolated them from the Egyptian environment. Irakleitos Souyioultzoglou, "H 'Ellēnikē' Aigyptos ōs topos istorias kai mnēmēs," (PhD diss., Panteion University, 2017).
[79] Dalachanis, *Greek Exodus,* 98.
[80] Interviews conducted with *Egyptiots* in Cairo and Alexandria, Egypt, between June 2015 and January 2016. Unless otherwise stated, all interviews were conducted in Greek and translated into English by the author. I will delve more in depth on the issue of citizenship and its perceptions by the *Egyptiots* later in the dissertation.
[81] I expand my analysis on this point in the second part of the introduction.
[82] Dalachanis, *Akyvernētē Paroikia,* 153.

In the mid-1980s, Egyptian citizenship started to be given to *Egyptiots*, due to the bilateral agreement between Egypt and Greece, but still in limited numbers. As I explore in the coming chapters, the experiences among *Egyptiots* concerning citizenship were not uniform. They differed and depended on their connections with the Egyptian authorities, their place of residency, and their subsequent work environment, and on other practicalities in their day-to-day life, manifesting the diversity among the *Egyptiot* community and the different ways economic and political developments affected them.

Ministerial Decree 263/1960

In October 1960, Alexander Kazoulis and Giagkos Chryssovergis, the President and General Secretary of the Greek Chamber of Commerce in Alexandria (GCCA), addressed concerns around foreigners' employment to P. Mamopoulos,[83] the representative of the Greek Chamber of Commerce (GCC) in Athens.[84] The issue at hand was the new decree 263/1960 that was scheduled to come into effect in November of that year.[85] Decree 263/1960, which was introduced by the Minister of Social Affairs and Labor, Mohammed Tawfek Abdel Fatah, comprised 20 articles concerning the employment of foreigners in Egypt.[86] Article 1 declared that any foreigner that wished to work had to obtain a work permit to be allowed to work in the country.[87] The term 'work' here referred to any kind of industrial, commercial, agricultural, or financial activity, including housework. Article 5, which the representatives of the GCCA addressed to Mamopoulos, was the most critical in specifying the terms of the

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[83] Mamopoulos's full name was not stated in their correspondence.
[84] Alexander Kazoulis and Giagkos Chryssovergis to P. Mamopoulos, Number 165/60, noted as 'extremely urgent,' October 24, 1960, Chambre de Commerce Hellenique D'Alexandrie, Archeio Emporikou Epimelētēriou Alexandreias.
[85] Article 8, Ministerial Decree No. 288/14-11-1960 of the Decree 263/1960, Chambre de Commerce Hellenique D'Alexandrie, Archeio Emporikou Epimelētēriou Alexandreias.
[86] Ibid.
[87] The annual work permit could be renewed by paying five EGP to the assigned office. Article 7. Ibid.

new regulations. It stated that all foreign workers and employees could obtain work permits once they complied with certain conditions approved by the National Department of Labor. The article also stipulated that work permits would be assigned to foreigners depending on the needs of the public sector, the non-competition of foreigners towards the Egyptian labor force, the condition that the share of foreigner workers in a business should not exceed 15% of the total staff, and that their salaries should not exceed 25% of the total payroll of the business.[88]

Article 5 was modified by Article 2, which essentially exempted businesses with five or fewer employees from the decree and its aforementioned conditions.[89] This meant that the small and medium-sized businesses that many *Egyptiots* and others operated at that time had more space and flexibility to function in the post-colonial Egyptian society and market.[90] Even though there were certain exceptions to these rules, a general feeling of having no future anymore in Egypt was present.

According to Kazoulis and Chryssovergis, this new law would be the 'last straw'[91] for the 47,673[92] remaining *Egyptiots*. They stated:

> Dear Mr Mamopoulos, […] As of last Thursday, the 20th of this current month, when the above-mentioned Law was published in the press, all the Greeks in Egypt, regardless of class or occupation, are in a PANIC, since it was determined that the number of foreigners in any type of business cannot exceed 15% of the total number of employees. This is a complete extermination targeting Greeks (given other foreigners have

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[88] Article 5. Ministerial Decree No. 288/14-11-1960 of the Decree 263/1960, Chambre de Commerce Hellenique D'Alexandrie, Archeio Emporikou Epimelētēriou Alexandreias.

[89] Article 2. Ibid.

[90] The decree did not apply either to those foreigners who worked for the government or for the public sector, to those that fell under a special bilateral agreement between the UAR (United Arab Republic) and the state a foreigner was affiliated with, or to those who held diplomatic or other special passports. Article 2. Ibid.

[91] They referred to it as '*charistikē bolē*' in Greek. Alexander Kazoulis and Giagkos Chryssovergis to P. Mamopoulos, Number 165/60, noted as 'extremely urgent,' October 24, 1960, Chambre de Commerce Hellenique D'Alexandrie, Archeio Emporikou Epimelētēriou Alexandreias.

[92] This is the official number for 1960 according to the Egyptian statistics. General Population Census of Egypt, Cairo, 1960. However, Kazoulis and Chryssovergis stated in the letter that *Egyptiots* at that time numbered about 60,000 people. Ibid.

already left the country), with many of them likely to be fired and some of our businesses to be shuttered.[93]

The way the word 'PANIC' was fully capitalized in the letter was telling, reflecting the alarm that had overwhelmed *Egyptiots* who, regardless of class and occupation, would be led into calamity. Another passage in the letter noted that existing residence permits were virtually worthless since they could no longer secure the position of *Egyptiots* in the Egyptian labor market. With earlier labor market reforms, introduced in 1956, the authorities had ceased issuing ten-year work and residence permits and instead offered a one-year document that had to be renewed annually (which was not automatic).

In addition, even those who had obtained a ten-year residence permit earlier than 1956 had to apply for and obtain a one-year work permit.[94] Further along in the letter, the officials of the GCCA requested that a minister from Greece visit Egypt and discuss these issues with his Egyptian counterpart in person, as they believed that pressure from the local community institutions or the Greek diplomatic body in Egypt was insufficient to solve the situation, exacerbating the pervasive feeling of panic among the *Egyptiot* diaspora.[95]

The techniques of ordering and classification were highlighted here, with economic and nationalist policies to define a new Egyptian national, spatial body. The classifications were conceived in this national spatial body, and hence the question raised was how this Egyptian national space should look, and who could be a part of it. As Ghassan Hage noted:

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[93] Alexander Kazoulis and Giagkos Chryssovergis to P. Mamopoulos, Number 165/60, noted as 'extremely urgent,' October 24, 1960, Chambre de Commerce Hellenique D'Alexandrie, Archeio Emporikou Epimelētēriou Alexandreias.

[94] Article 8 referred to those foreigners who had obtained a ten- or five-year residence permit. They, and the one-year permit holders, had to renew their permits a month prior to expiration day. Article 8, Ministerial Decree No. 288/14-11-1960 of the Decree 263/1960, Chambre de Commerce Hellenique D'Alexandrie, Archeio Emporikou Epimelētēriou Alexandreias.

[95] Indeed, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Euangelos Averoph, visited Egypt in 1961, after the introduction of the Nationalization Law, on July 26th of that year. Averoph met with Abdel Nasser, and they discussed labor issues, regarding the *Egyptiot* workers, and the national compensations that Abdel Nasser promised to give to those whose properties had been nationalized. Several Greek governmental newspapers covered Averoph's visit. See, for example, *Kathēmerinē's* article: "O k. Averōph eixe makran synomilia meta tou k. Naser" (Mr. Averoph had a long discussion with Mr. Naser), *Kathēmerinē*, August 10, 1961, 8.

"'Too many' cannot be conceived outside of a definite national space against which it obtains its significance, yet neither can it be conceived except against a desired national space where there aren't 'too many.'"[96] Thus, what was being preserved was the relationship between 'race' or 'ethnicity' with an imagined national space, where these categories of spatial management could take place.[97]

A passage in an article from the Greek language newspaper *Tachydromos,* published in Alexandria, further highlighted the temporality and fragmentation of foreigners' position in the labor market. The article stated:

> We need to explain here that the 'temporary' status provided to the holder of 'a ten-year permit' renders him immobile in his work environment and s t a t i c [*sic*]. It means he is unable to develop any kind of economic or other activity, which is not in the best interests of the country's economy.[98]

The way the word 'static' was drawn out in this passage revealed that the author of the article thought that the limitations of the restrictive permit were seriously felt. Besides the fact that the new rules would severely curtail the kinds of professions foreigners could pursue, they would also restrict foreigners to jobs within their assigned regions of residence.[99] In effect, as the article noted, whereas before they had been able to access the labor market on equal terms with Egyptian citizens, the *mutamaṣirūn*, or 'Egyptianized foreigners,'[100] were now being

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[96] Ghassan Hage, *White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society*, (New York: Routledge, 2000), 39.

[97] Ibid., 38.

[98] "Ē ergasia tōn xenōn" (The foreigners' employment), *Tachydromos*, October 22, 1960, Chambre de Commerce Hellenique D'Alexandrie, Archeio Emporikou Epimelētēriou Alexandreias.

[99] Article 11 of the 263/1960 decree stated that employee's place of work should be within the area of which the employee was allowed to work. Ministerial Decree No. 288/14-11-1960 of the Decree 263/1960, Chambre de Commerce Hellenique D'Alexandrie, Archeio Emporikou Epimelētēriou Alexandreias.

[100] *Mutamaṣirūn* (in plural) means Egyptianized foreigners. As Anthony Gorman has stated, the term *mutamaṣirūn* itself has its own political and historical connotations by detaching the foreign communities from Egyptian society on the grounds they were not Egyptians but instead 'Egyptianized'. See Anthony Gorman, *Historians, State and Politics in Twentieth Century Egypt: Contesting the Nation* (London: Routledge, 2003), 175.

relegated to 'guests' under the custodianship of the 'host' Egyptian state.[101]

Another article in *Tachydromos* referred to the appointment of employees or clerks in public institutions and organizations, and in limited liability companies (Société Anonyme Companies-SA) of which the Egyptian Government held 50% of the total shares.[102] This matter seemed to be of great concern for the representatives of the *Egyptiot* communities. Cryssovergis and Kazoulis expressed their worry in a letter to the Greek ambassador in Egypt, Dimitris Lambros, stating that the limited number of *Egyptiots*, and other foreigners, in any type of limited liability companies would lead to 'repatriation' to Greece, as many *Egyptiots* would be left unemployed.[103]

In another letter addressed to the ambassador, both presidents of the *koinotētes* in Alexandria and Cairo, as well as both presidents of the GCC in the two cities warned again of 'repatriation' and tried to ask for an exception based on the bilateral agreement between Egypt and Greece, so as to secure the employment status of the *Egyptiots*.[104] Warnings about 'repatriation' and the departure of more *Egyptiots* came often from the representatives of the

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[101] According to Clive Barnett, 'Otherness' is strongly linked to concepts of hospitality and who is eligible to receive it. The concept of hospitality does not merely refer to exclusion or inclusion, but rather illustrates temporality. See Clive Barnett, "Ways of Relating: Hospitality and the Acknowledgement of Otherness," *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2011): 6. On the delineation of the Greek community in Egypt as guests, see also Eftychia Mylona, "A Presence Without a Narrative: The Greeks in Egypt, 1961–1976," *Revue des Monde Musulmanes et de la Mediterranee*, Vol. 144 (2018): 181.

[102] The decree mentioned in the article announced that the aforementioned institutions and companies were not allowed to hire any employee and clerk whose annual income exceeded 1,500 Egyptian pounds or 15,000 Syrian pounds. If institutions and companies had already in their personnel employees exceeding this annual income, they had to ask for a presidential decree for approval within three months. "O diorismos pantōs ypallēloy me apodoxas pleōn tōn 1500 lyrōn etēsiōs prepei na epikyroutai dia proedrikoy diatagmatos" (The appointment of an employee with a salary of more than 1,500 EGP a year must be ratified by presidential decree), *Tachydromos*, October 22, 1960, Chambre de Commerce Hellenique D'Alexandrie, Archeio Emporikou Epimelētēriou Alexandreias.

[103] Giagkos Chryssovergis and Alexander Kazoullis to Dimitris Lambros, 150/60, October 17, 1960, Chambre de Commerce Hellenique D'Alexandrie, Archeio Emporikou Epimelētēriou Alexandreias.

[104] Letter from the presidents of the *koinotētes* and the Chamber of Commerce in Alexandria and Cairo to the Greek ambassador in Egypt, Dimitris Lambros. No exact date was stated on the letter, Chambre de Commerce Hellenique D'Alexandrie, Archeio Emporikou Epimelētēriou Alexandreias.

Egyptiot institutions to Greek officials in order to put pressure on them to help solve these issues.[105]

The 263/1960 decree related to the 19/1959 law regarding foreigners' employment conditions. The law was enacted in 1959, but came into effect in November 1960, through the 260 and 263 decrees. A letter to the Greek ambassador in Egypt right before Gamal Abdel Nasser's trip to Greece highlighted the concerns of the community's institutions.[106] The first point was to as for a significant delay of the Egyptianization *(Aigyptiopoiēsē)* process, meaning here the nationalization of certain institutions, such as Greek banking institutions, agencies of foreign institutions and factories, and if possible, towards the Greek insurance companies. The *koinotētes* were quite concerned about the banks' national character, fearing that it would change and impact negatively on *Egyptiot* economic activities.[107]

The second point was the exception of the *Egyptiots* from the decree that prevented foreigners from following certain occupations. The cotton production sector was highlighted in the text, as one chiefly occupied by *Egyptiots* in the past.[108] The third point concerned freelance occupations, which should be equally accessible to Egyptians in Greece as to *Egyptiots* in Egypt. The fourth point addressed issues of gaining Egyptian citizenship. This

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[105] The Greek government did not see favorably the 'repatriation' of the *Egyptiots* to Greece. Until the end of 1961, there was a lack of preparation by the Greek side, socially and politically, regarding the arrival of the *Egyptiots*. The fear of 'repatriation' or of another wave of immigration, such as that which followed the Asia Minor Catastrophe, was an evident aspect in the studies of some historians, as well as being present in the national anti-government press. See, for example: Dalachanis, *Akyvernētē Paroikia*, 242-244.
In addition, there was no discussion regarding the lives of the newcomers, or the places and conditions they were supposed to live in. The feeling of the *Egyptiots* being 'at the mercy of fate' was apparent in the opposition press of December 1961. See, for instance, the two articles of *Eleutheria* under the same heading: "To neo kyma prosphygōn" (The new wave of refugees), *Eleutheria,* December 20, 1961, 5; *Eleutheria*, December 14, 1961, 5. One of the two articles stated that the Greek government did not take seriously the situation of the *Egyptiots* because there was no law of expulsion, like in the case of British nationals.
[106] Anastasios Theodorakis and Giagkos Chryssovergis to Dimitris Lamrbos, Doc 63/60, May 20, 1960, Chambre de Commerce Hellenique D'Alexandrie, Archeio Emporikou Epimelētēriou Alexandreias.
[107] It was stated that the nationalization of two Greek banking institutions, *Ethnikē* and *Emporikē Trapeza Ellados*, would not be possible since their headquarters were in Greece and not in Egypt. Ibid.
[108] *Egyptiots* were connected to global capital through the cotton and banking industries until the beginning of the 20th century. On this matter, see Matoula Tomara-Sideris, *Oi Ellēnes tou Kairou,* (Athens: Kerkyra- Economia Publishing, 2007), and Kitroeff, *Greeks in Egypt.*

point focused particularly on equal rights for *Egyptiots* in the labor market.[109] In order to highlight the declining numbers of *Egyptiots*, the loss of labor and its future implications, the document stressed the role of *Egyptiots* in the Egyptian economy, and their willingness to "continue being respectable economic contributors."[110] Furthermore, it stressed their non-threatening position in the political life of Egypt.

Decree 263/1960 prevented foreigners from following certain occupations, causing concern amongst the *Egyptiot* population.[111] Nevertheless, those *Egyptiots* already in those occupations were exempted by law, which meant that the law did not allow any space to those who were entering the labor market at the time.[112] In addition, an employer or owner of a business was obliged to hire an Egyptian in the event that a foreigner was fired or resigned from a job.[113] This condition lessened employment opportunities even more, and prioritized the position of Egyptians in the labor market.

Moreover, the Agricultural Reforms (*al-Islāh al-Zirāʿī*) affected the agronomist *Egyptiots*, who now faced high unemployment, as they had been working mostly on land owned by *Egyptiots*, which had since been naturalized by the state.[114] Grocery store owners, bakers and coffee sellers seem to have been affected too due to the law regarding shareholdings in businesses, as well as the lack of products available in the market. In

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[109] This point focused on the importance of citizenship in the labor market, despite the fact that those who obtained citizenship could not have any political rights for the first five years after its acquisition.

[110] Anastasios Theodorakis and Giagkos Chryssovergis to Dimitris Lamrbos, Doc 63/60, May 20, 1960, Chambre de Commerce Hellenique D'Alexandrie, Archeio Emporikou Epimelētēriou Alexandreias.

[111] These occupations included bankers, insurers, lawyers, jewelers, pawnbrokers, stockbrokers, chartered accountants, microbiologists and opticians. In addition, there were those occupations related to cotton production, such as traders, commercial agents, brokers, classifiers and those who weighed the cotton, and any freelance profession foreigners exercised. *Apagoreuetai eis tous xenous*, April 24, 1962, File: Correspondence 1960-1963, Chambre de Commerce Hellenique D'Alexandrie, Archeio Emporikou Epimelitiriou Alexandreias, 1.

[112] Ibid.

[113] Ibid.

[114] Ibid, 2.

addition, there were rumors that the state would open big bakeries in the cities to regulate the

sales of bread,[115] something that would dramatically affect bakers' economic activities.

These concerns were not limited to the loss of occupations, but also extended to the

regulations and new authorities that had control over the labor market. The new

Governmental Institutions, such as the Department of Labor (*dieuthynsē ergatikēs*

dynameōs), owned the right to regulate and classify the labor market on behalf of the

Egyptian state, exercising a managerial capacity over the national space. In this case, both

foreigners and Egyptians were becoming objects to be managed.[116]

The importance of Egyptian citizenship was highlighted in the correspondence of the

officials of the GCCA over the first years of the 1960s, where it was stated that *Egyptiot*

employers were still recruiting *Egyptiot* employees (*omogeneis*) on the condition that they

held Egyptian citizenship.[117] This element stressed once more the closed ethnic network in

which some *Egyptiot* businesses operated. This network continued after the population

exodus in the early 1960s, as a means of expressing solidarity among those who remained.

However, this time a new condition was added; the acquisition of Egyptian citizenship.

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[115] *Apagoreuetai eis tous xenous*, April 24, 1962, File: Allēlografia 1960-1963, Chambre de Commerce Hellenique D'Alexandrie, Archeio Emporikou Epimelitiriou Alexandreias, 2.

[116] For example, concerning the import-export trade, both foreigners and Egyptians were affected by the new decree due to the establishment of the Governmental Institutions that took completely under their control the performance of the import-export trade of the country. Ibid.

[117] On one of those documents, it was noted that no *Egyptiot* with Egyptian citizenship was found to be recruited for a job. Ibid.

<u>*Egyptiots'* Long 'Crisis'[118] and their Declining Numbers</u>

The early 1960s mass departure characterized a period of transition and demarcated another space of 'rupture' in the context of departures and the protracted 'crisis' experienced by the *Egyptiot* community after the 1930s. The *Egyptiots'* departure in the early 1960s was not inevitable, at least not for everyone.[119] The Egyptianization laws of 1957, the socialist laws at the beginning of 1959, and the Nationalization laws of 1961 were not the only reasons propelling the *Egyptiots*' departure. Nevertheless, they did act as transformative events. They characterized this last phase of 'crisis' that created a qualitative change in the composition of the *Egyptiot* community, with two-thirds of *Egyptiot* having left by 1967.

Law 19/1959 and Decree 263/1960, however, continued to call attention to the need to acquire Egyptian citizenship, bringing the community to a critical point, as action had to be taken. The concerns about citizenship and the declining numbers of the *Egyptiots* were depicted in the *Egyptiot* press of the period. For example, on 1st January 1961, *O Paroikos* newspaper wrote about the tough year *Egyptiots* had been through, and stated that the solution was found in two places, towards either 'repatriation' or a complete readjustment of attitudes to Egyptian citizenship. The article mentioned that this first day of the year should

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[118] I write the word crisis in quotation marks, not because I believe that the departures in the 1960s did not constitute a real crisis and brought panic to some of the community's members. As I explore in the thesis, the declining numbers of the *Egyptiots* did put pressure on some of the community's members and brought them insecurity and fear. In other cases, as I explore in chapter one, the laws and departures did not affect *Egyptiots'* lives, depicting the different responses of the community's members to the events that took place in this period of time. I want to demonstrate using this word in quotation marks that the 'crisis' among the *Egyptiot* inhabitants did not occur in a moment, or emerged out of a singular event. Reinhart Koselleck has explored in length the temporal experiences of crisis. Reinhart Koselleck and Michaela W. Richter, "Crisis," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 67/ 2 (2006): 357-400, 358. There is a vast scholarship on the concepts of crisis. See for example: Enrik Vigh, "Crisis and Chronicity: Anthropological Perspectives on Continuous Conflict and Decline," *Ethnos*, 73/1 (2008), 5-24; Janet Roitman, *Anti-Crisis*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014); Dimitris Tziovas, *Greece in Crisis: The Cultural Politics of Austerity*, (London: I.B Tauris, 2017); Maria Boletsi, Janna Houwen and Liesbeth Minnaard, *Languages of Resistance, Transformation, and Futurity in Mediterranean Crisis-Scapes: From Crisis to Critique,* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020); Maria Boletsi, Natashe Lemos Dekker, Kasia Mika and Ksenia Robbe, *(Un)timely Crises: Chronotopes and Critique*, (Cham: Springer International Publishing AG, 2021).
[119] Angelos Dalachanis showed the political and economic developments that led *Egyptiots* to depart before and during the 1960s. He also stated that those reasons were not strong enough for everyone to leave the country. Dalachanis, *Akyvernētē Paroikia,* 355.

be dedicated to full attention to the issues of *paroikia,* or the community of *Egyptiots*,[120] and to the realization that: "either we leave or stay, we should rely only on ourselves."[121]

By 'relying only on ourselves' *O Paroikos* highlighted that *Egyptiots* should realize that help might not come from places from which it was expected, like the Greek government. This stressed the tensions between the *Egyptiot* diaspora and the Greek state, with *Egyptiots* thus needing to negotiate their space in the new Egyptian socioeconomic and political environment. *O Paroikos* emphasized that *Egyptiots* should take responsibility for their lives, organize themselves, and adjust to the new conditions, if they did not want to leave.

In another article in the same paper, the Patriarchate of Alexandria advised the Greek people to stay calm, united and [be] patient.[122] Announcements of a similar tone were expressed by the community's leadership. For example, Nikolaos Pierrakos, the president of the Cairo *koinotēta*, tried to reassure *Egyptiots* about their position in the labor market.[123] He stated that the *Egyptiot* community would not be damaged by the new legislation, as the country's leadership had secured an equal position for them in the market. He then stated that it was not wise, and in some cases even dangerous, for people to migrate without planning it well in advance, with the same applying to 'repatriation' to Greece. "This could be fatal" he continued, and instead he suggested people remain in Egypt. [124] He then assured his readers that this situation would pass and better days would come for the *paroikia*.

Decree 263/1960 triggered feelings of pessimism and anxiety among members of the community; departures accelerated in the final months of 1960. *Egyptiots* left in even greater

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[120] *Paroikia* means here the community of *Egyptiots*.
[121] "To neon etos" (The New Year), *O Paroikos*, January 1, 1961, 1.
[122] "To *paroikiakon* 1960" (The *paroikia* in 1960), *O Paroikos*, January 2, 1961, 3.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Another passage mentioned the meeting between the Greek Ambassador Lambros and the Egyptian Minister of Labor, Abdel Fatah. Lambros stated in the article that the issue regarding decree 263/1960 had been solved. However, another article on the same page stated that the additional decree concerning the labor practices of foreigners was signed, and it did not correspond to what Lambros assured, exposing the fact that the ambassador and the Greek government did not solve the issue, as expected by *Egyptiots*. Ibid.

numbers in 1961 when the nationalization laws were implemented, reaching their peak in 1962. According to the Greek National Centre of Social Research on the issue of the Greeks Abroad,[125] *Egyptiots* were estimated at around 17,000 in 1967, as the table depicts:

Table 1:2

Number of *Egyptiots* Living in Egypt by Year

	1947	**1960**	**1963**	**1967**
Cairo	15,600	13,600	10,000	6,500
Alexandria	30,700	24,600	12,000	8,000
Suez	7,200	6,200	2,100	1,500
Total (including other areas)	57,500	47,700	27,500	17,000

Source: Greek National Centre of Social Research on the Greeks Abroad.

The massive departure[126] of *Egyptiots* between 1960 and 1962 was confirmed by the dramatic reports that appeared in the Athenian newspapers, as stated in Alexander Kazamias' article, and further supported by a statement of the British consul at Alexandria, who informed his embassy in Cairo that the Greek Community of Alexandria "is expected to show a loss of 8,000 to 10,000 in the course of 1962."[127]

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[125] *Apodēmoi Ellēnes* [*Greeks Abroad*] (Athens: Ethnikon Kentron Koinōnikōn Ereunōn, 1972), 70.
[126] Important scholarship has been written on the *Egyptiot* departure from Egypt. See, for example: Kitroef, *Greeks in Egypt*; Karanasou, "The Greeks in Egypt"; Kazamias, "Purge"; Chryssostomidis, "The Left"; Chryssostomidis, "Hē Ellēniki paroikia Aigyptou"; Dalachanis, *Greek Exodus*. Some studies that discussed this topic portrayed Gamal Abdel Nasser as the main protagonist responsible for the *Egyptiot* departure. See, for example: Gialourakis, *Ē Aigyptos;* Giannakakis, *Alexandria 1860-1960*; Nikos Sideris, "The Greek Settlers' Flight from Egypt: The Psychological Aspects," *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora,* Special Issue, 35/2 (2009):145-151.
[127] F0371/165428, Consul Dundas in Alexandria to British Embassy in Cairo, 14.6.1962. Kazamias, "Purge," 17.

Nevertheless, the numbers of the *Egyptiots* who left Egypt varied from one source to another. For example, with regards to the *Egyptiot* population in the Suez Canal zone, Constantine Daratzikis, the Greek consul of Port Said (1966-1967) and Cairo (1972-1976) published in a more analytical number of the population in 1967.[128] Specifically, Daratzikis stated that the number of *Egyptiots* in Port Said was 1,180 and 385 in Ismailia, which amounted to 1,565 *Egyptiots* in total. However, he excluded the cities of Port Tawfek, Port Fouad, Kantara and the city of the Suez itself, even though a high number of *Egyptiots* were still living in the Suez Canal zone.[129] In addition, with regards to the *Egyptiot* population of Cairo, the director of the Xanakeios school stated almost the double number of the existing population there.[130] Specifically, he mentioned that about 45,000 *Egyptiots* in total lived in Egypt by 1966-67, and out of them, 12,000 *Egyptiots* lived in Cairo.[131]

As has been shown so far, the 'crisis' among the *Egyptiot* inhabitants did not occur in a moment, or emerge out of a singular event. The structural weakness or void of the previous years,[132] caused by several transformative economic, social, and political events, that emerged as ruptures, created a strong feeling of insecurity and of 'in-betweenness' for the future life of *Egyptiots* in Egypt. The long-term crisis accelerated major shifts in the community's social fabric, which disrupted what Cornelius Costarioadis called a society's 'instituted imaginary,' "definite meanings that assure continuity and determine a society's mode of living, of seeing

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[128] Konstantinos Daratzikis, *O Ellēnismos Diōrygos tou Suez kai Kairou kata toys polemous 1967 kai 1973*, (Athens: University of Crete, 1994).

[129] Ibid.

10. In another part of this essay, Daratzikis mentioned that in 1973 the Greeks throughout Egypt dropped to 12,000. Ibid., 24.

[130] *Xenakeios Nychterinē Epaggelmatikē Scholē Ellēnikēs Koinotētas Kairou, Scholikon Etos 1965/1966,* M. Tomprōf, November 25, 1966, File: *Ekpaideusē/34*, Archeio Ellēnikēs Koinotitas Kairou.

[131] Ibid.

[132] Reflecting on the works of Michel Foucault, Slavoj Zizek and Alain Badiou, among others, Christos Lynteris highlights that crisis emerges out of the structural weakness or void of the previous situation that caused the crisis. This void lay in the center of the crisis, and the truth is hidden until the moment this crisis emerges. Christos Lynteris, "The Greek economic crisis as eventual substitution," in *Revolt and Crisis in Greece, between a present yet to pass and a future still to come*, ed. Antonis Vradis and Dimitris Dalakoglou (Oakland, Baltimore, Edinburgh, London & Athens: AK Press & Occupied London, 2011), 207-208.

and of conducting its own existence."[133] The 'crisis', besides being economic and political, was revealed as existential for a large proportion of the *Egyptiots*, who were called to decide how to respond and make their residence permanent, both on individual and institutional levels.

PART II: Narrating the *Egyptiot* Presence[134]

Egyptian historiography has described the lives of the *Egyptiots* until the mid-1950s.[135] Sometimes, this description takes on nostalgic colors, with the *Egyptiot* as a hero who defended Egyptian interests, or other times carries a negative image, a greedy usurer who has victimized Egyptian peasants.[136] After the 1950s the Egyptian national narrative emphasized the Arab nation and Arab unity in the construction of a homogeneous social and economic post-colonial Egyptian state. With the 1956 constitution, the Egyptian state stressed being an Arab country, openly claiming a different cultural orientation from the past.[137] The *Egyptiot* inhabitants, as part of the 'Egyptianized' foreigners or *mutamaṣirūn*, were excluded from mainstream historiography, having no place in the Egyptian national community.[138] This denial in historical literature, together with socioeconomic policies during Gamal Abdel Nasser's period, reinforced the Egyptian national narrative of only the Egyptian community belonging to the nation in the process of nation-building. In contrast, the Greek national narrative demarcated how a diasporic community could represent the nation beyond its 'borders' by exposing two

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[133] The core of these institutions is what Castoriades calls 'imaginary significations,' a projected image of society. These are significations that orient the values and activities of the members of a society, and these significations cannot be supported, justified or refuted rationally. Cornelius Castoriadis, *The imaginary institution of society*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 155; 145.

[134] Parts of this section have been published in: Mylona, "Presence without a Narrative."

[135] Nabil Sayyid Ahmad, *Al-nashāṭ al-iqtiṣādī li-l-ajānib wa-atharuhu fī-l-mujtamiʿ al-misrī min 1922 ilā1952*, (Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Misriyya al-ʿāmma li-l-Kitāb, 1982); Sayyid Ashmawy, *Al-Yunāniyyūn fī Misr 1805-1956,* (Cairo: Ein, 1997).

[136] Abdulhaq, *Jewish and Greek,* 12.

[137] William Cleveland and Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East,* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2013), 291.

[138] Gorman, *Historians,* 174.

interrelated, nostalgic narratives. The ethnocentric narrative emphasized a superior Greek identity, and the cosmopolitan one stressed the economic vigor of the community, the loss of privileges, and the economic decline that came with the 1937 Treaty of Montreux and the end of the Capitulations. Nostalgia here refers to the idea of a loss of a tolerant past, a mourning of cosmopolitanism and grief regarding contemporary society, as described by Will Hanley.[139]

It is noteworthy that the interest in Greek diaspora is relatively recent.[140] Starting mostly after the 1970s, and partly influenced by Marxist historiography, the emphasis in academic study shifted away from the history of the Greek state towards the history of the Greek communities abroad.[141] Greek national historiography, for nostalgic and nationalist purposes, has often portrayed the history of the Greek diasporic communities through a continuous existence in host countries, going far back in time.[142] The word *paroikia*, meaning 'community' in ancient Greek, was used to describe these temporary settlements that Greeks had established since ancient times for the purpose of migration and colonization, as the word diaspora demonstrates. These settlements of the old diasporic Greek communities had an ultimate goal of 'Hellenizing' the places where they settled and building new cities with the values of their own civilization.[143] They were often able to achieve this goal due to their cultural, military, and economic hegemony. The new form of *paroikia* that was seen after the 16th century, and in Egypt after the 19th century, was smaller in size and became a minority migrant community in the host country, for which the dynamics were completely different primarily because of size and divergent historical contexts.

The idea of a continuous existence in the host country, as in the case of the *Egyptiots* located in Alexandria since the Hellenistic period, was reflected in ethnocentric narratives,

[139] Will Hanley, "Grieving Cosmopolitanism in Middle East Studies," *History Compass*, 6/5 (2008): 1346.

[140] Notably, the *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, the leading journal in the field, started in 1974.

[141] Dimitris Tziovas, *Greek Diaspora and Migration Since 1700: Society, Politics and Culture,* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 3.

[142] Ioannis Hasiotis, *Oi Ellēnes stē Diaspora, 15c.-21c.,* (Athens: Greek Parliament, 2006), 13.

[143] Ibid., 14.

which stressed the "symbolic cohesion of ancestral nationality," as Stathis Gourgouris puts it.[144] This phenomenon surfaced in the 20th century when a new cultural 'Great Idea' emerged in diasporic Greek communities, creating the idea that Greece existed as a 'virtual empire' outside national borders.[145] This concept reinforced the idea of a defined 'imagined community,' one that was sovereign even outside national borders,[146] by disconnecting the presence of the community from its historical context and presence in Egyptian society. The narrative here emphasized the superiority of the Greek national identity and minimized the fact that the *Egyptiots* were an integral part of Egyptian society. Hence, this created individual and communal identities, as well as transnational and emotional ties to the 'homeland,' because shared cultural values existed between the *paroikia* and the 'homeland.'[147] In this narrative, everything seemed to belong to a particular past—a past that was a historic continuation of the 'Great Idea,' and a prosperous community that reflected the strong nation-state of Greece. By confirming and reinforcing national borders, Greeks here had as a mission to 'Hellenize' and civilize the Eastern Mediterranean.

An example of this narrative can be drawn from the work of Efthymios Souloyannis on the Greek community in Cairo, in which he describes how:

> The Hellenic *paroikia* was playing an active role both in the society of the country and in its market, as well as in the international market. We could say that it is a historical continuation of the 'Great Idea,' whereby a different kind of nationalism and patriotism got created, in relation to the ones in the mainland.[148]

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[144] Stathis Gourgouris, "Concept of 'Diaspora' in Contemporary World" in *Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks: Four Centuries of History,* ed. Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, Gelina Harlaftis and Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou, (Oxford: Berg, 2005), 389.
[145] Tziovas, *Greek Diaspora*, 7.
[146] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism,* (London: Verso, 1983), 6.
[147] Maria Christina Charziioannou, "Greek Merchants in Victorian England" in *Greek Diaspora and Migration Since 1700: Society, Politics and Culture,* ed. Dimitris Tziovas, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 45.
[148] Souloyannis, *Ē Ellēnikē koinotēta tou Kairou*, 29. (my translation)

Souloyannis stresses the important role of the *Egyptiot* community in the Egyptian market and society, which also contributed to the economic prosperity of Egypt outside national borders. In a different part of this work, Souloyannis stated that what should be kept as a memory is the "best pages of the Hellenic diaspora," meaning the period when the *Egyptiots* in Egypt achieved economic and social prosperity.[149] Due to the fact that the *Egyptiot* communities were included in Greek national objectives until the beginning of the 20th century, as part of the Greek diaspora, the historiography highlights their presence in support of the 'Great Idea,' both politically and materially.[150] The domestic problems of the Greek state, such as the defeat in Asia Minor in 1922, led the *Egyptiot* communities to become the 'helper' for needy Greeks in Greece. The wealthiest *Egyptiots* not only provided the *Egyptiot* population with financial support[151] but also sent important donations to the Greek state.[152] This economic power and contribution made the *Egyptiot* presence very evident and important in literature.[153]

These ethnocentric narratives interrelated with cosmopolitan ones, in that both expressed a nostalgia for the past. This nostalgia can be seen in the works that revealed the exceptional economic and social role of the *Egyptiots* from the mid to late 19th century and, hence, their social and economic contribution to the Egyptian state. An important study on the economic history of the *Egyptiots* and, in particular, on cotton production is Matoula Tomara-Sideris' *Oi Ellēnes tou Kairou [The Greeks of Cairo],*[154] in which she named the families of the *Egyptiots* who were involved in the process of cotton production. Tomara-Sideris stressed the demographic superiority of these families over other foreign communities, as well as the

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[149] Souloyannis, *Ē Ellēnikē koinotēta tou Kairou*, 31-32.
[150] One of the most important aims of the Greek state for the Greek communities in Egypt was that they be used as political and economic outposts in the Eastern Mediterranean. Kitroef, *Greeks in Egypt*, 144.
[151] Philanthropy among the wealthier *Egyptiots* involved financial help for the communities and the *Egyptiots*. Some examples are the Averoph School for Girls in 1897 and the Kaniskerion Orphanage in 1926.
[152] Such as the Archeological Museum (1866) by Eleni Tositsa and the substantial donations for the National Technical University at the end of the 19th century by Georgios Averoph.
[153] See, for example: Athanaese G. Politis, *L'Hellénisme et l'Egypte moderne,* vol. I, vol. II., (Paris: Alcan, 1929 & 1930; Syndesmos Aigyptiotōn Ellēnōn, *Oi Ellēnes stēn Aigypto, 4.000 chronia parousia*, (Athina: Syndesmos Aigyptiotōn Ellēnōn, 1982; Souloyannis, *Ē Ellēnikē koinotēta tou Kairou.*
[154] Matoula Tomara-Sideris, *Oi Ellēnes tou Kairou,* (Athens: Kerkyra- Economia Publishing, 2007).

distinctive role they played and the contribution they made to the economic and social life of both the *Egyptiot* community and the Egyptian state. Their contribution as merchants and cotton producers from the mid-19th century until the first quarter of the 20th century was emphasized due to the donations they made to *Egyptiot* communities— to hospitals, elderly care homes, schools, and other community institutions. Tomara-Sideris' work not only highlighted the economic contribution of these benefactors to the community but also the social and national consciousness they developed. The social consciousness seemed to be a shared characteristic among the urban elite benefactors who functioned as "organic cosmopolitan intellectuals of the international bourgeoisie."[155]

The element of 'organic cosmopolitanism'[156] developed out of the perception of an ethnic exceptionalism and, hence, a superior position of *Egyptiots* among the Egyptians. This perception made the *Egyptiots*, among others, such as Italians, Syrian-Lebanese, Armenians, Jews and Maltese, part of a 'cosmopolitan past,' presented either as "colorful accessories of an idealized 'cosmopolitan' past or as 'middlemen' or 'agents' of European 'capitalist penetration'", as Kazamias stated.[157] This historiography stressed the cosmopolitan narrative, highlighting the association of foreign communities—in this case, the *Egyptiots* —with the colonial past and their particular legal status under the Capitulations.[158] As Hanley emphasized, cosmopolitanism focuses on a certain category of foreigners, the wealthy and elite, ignoring the 'lower-class' of Europeans and Egyptians.[159] Thus, this romanticization and idealization of

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[155] Tomara-Sideris, *Oi Ellēnes tou Kairou,* 85.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Kazamias, "Cromer's assault," 253.
[158] On this point, see: Marius Deeb, "The Socioeconomic Role of the Local Foreign Minorities in Modern Egypt, 1805-1961," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 9, (1978); Robert Ilbert, *Alexandrie, 1830-1930: histoire d' une communauté citadine,* (Cairo: Institut Français D' archéologie Orientale, 1996); Robert Ilbert, Ilio Yannakakis, and Jacques Hassoun (eds), *Alexandria 1860-1960: The Brief Life of a Cosmopolitan Community*, (Alexandria: Harpocrates, 1997); Anthony Hirst and Michael Silk, *Alexandria, Real and Imagined,* London: Ashgate, 2004).
[159] Hanley, "Grieving Cosmopolitanism," 1352.

multiculturalism or cosmopolitanism ignored the actual historical context, perceiving foreign communities, again, as a homogenous elite benefitting from the colonial project.[160]

By narrating the history of the *Egyptiots* until the mid- 20th century, when the abolition of the Capitulations was implemented (1949) under the Treaty of Montreux (1937), the presence of the *Egyptiots* in Egypt holds a temporal limitation. Their existence in the socioeconomic life of Egypt seems to last until the period of the Capitulations, when the community was considered foreign—a foreign element within Egyptian socioeconomic life. Moreover, this perception assumes that the Capitulations applied to all *Egyptiots,* which was not the case. Anthony Gorman has highlighted that more than a quarter of the population held Ottoman nationality, and, due to this fact, were exempt from the Capitulations.[161]

This approach simplifies the community's image down to a foreign group that merely arrives, works, and leaves, thus emphasizing only the loss of privileges, while the social and economic boom should be mentioned, praised, and remembered. The years of demographic decline and economic shrinkage, in which the presence of the community departs from this past, do not fit into this narrative. Additionally, the community here seems to form a guest presence vis-à-vis the legitimate Egyptian host, which becomes the dominant actor in the Egyptian national narrative.[162]

Challenging Ethnocentric and Cosmopolitan Narratives

Recent historiography has developed more nuanced approaches, shedding light upon the complexities of class structure, political affiliations, economic developments, and multiple

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[160] Vivian Ibrahim, "Beyond the cross and the crescent: plural identities and the Copts in contemporary Egypt," *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 38/14 (2015): 2584-2597.

[161] Gorman, "Foreign Workers," 239.

[162] As Clive Barnett has underscored, the 'otherness' is being constructed along the lines of one being the recipient of hospitality, based on perceptions of absence through distance. Barnett, "Ways of Relating," 6. Therefore, the concepts of absence and presence raise questions as to who is being acknowledged, or in other words, who or what ought to be present. Rhys Dafydd Jones, James Robinson and Jennifer Turner, "Between absence and presence: Geographies of hiding, invisibility and silence, *Space and Polity*, 16/3 (2012): 257-263, 262.

identities among the *Egyptiots*. Alexander Kitroeff's *The Greeks in Egypt 1919-1937: Ethnicity and Class*[163] disaffirms the ethnocentric narrative, by exposing the class distinctions among the *Egyptiot* population in Egypt. He analyzes the structure and contribution of other parts of the community, like the working class, and he demonstrates the class-based character of the community rather than the ethnic one. With regards to tobacco workers, Kitroeff clearly states that they were part of a *proletarian* diaspora, while producers like the Salvagos were part of a *mobilized* diaspora.[164] Kitroeff highlights the transformation of the Greek community from a small merchant one into a socially stratified ethnic minority, pointing out that identity cannot have a common perception in a period of changes. By exposing the many levels of social class within the community, Kitroeff accommodates both ethnicity and class, without excluding one or another.[165]

Another important work that questions the homogeneity of economic and social status, as well as the political stances, of the *Egyptiots* in Egypt, is Anthony Gorman's study *Foreign Workers in Egypt, 1882-1914. Subaltern or labour elite?*[166] By exposing the role of foreign workers in Egypt vis-à-vis the Egyptian ones, Gorman attempts to deconstruct the binaries that modern Egyptian historiography has placed between these two groups, exposing their subaltern agency against capital via the internationalist anarchist current.[167] Stressing class elements instead of the workers' ethnicity, Gorman reveals their important role in the formation of international or mixed unions. He places foreign and Egyptian workers in encounter, and refutes the reductionist idea that foreign workers are different from Egyptian ones—and therefore are the ones who benefit by the colonial rule.

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[163] Kitroeff, *Greeks in Egypt.*
[164] Here I am using the concepts of diasporas as mentioned in the work of John Armstrong, *Mobilized and proletarian diasporas.* John A. Armstrong, "Mobilized and proletarian diasporas," *The American Political Science Review,* 70/2 (1976): 393-408.
[165] Kitroeff, *Greeks in Egypt,* 2.
[166] Gorman, "Foreign Workers".
[167] Ibid., 241.

Other works, like that of Najat Abdulhaq and Angelos Dalachanis, go further in time, reaching the period of the 1960s. Abdulhaq, in her study *Jewish and Greek Communities in Egypt, Entrepreneurship and Business before Nasser,* reveals the contribution of Greek and Jewish minorities in the social and economic life of Egypt. She argues against the notion that foreign communities in Egypt stayed only due to the Capitulations and the privileges they obtained because of their special status.[168]

Dalachanis' work *The Greek Exodus from Egypt: Diaspora Politics and Emigration, 1937-1962*[169] underlines the social, economic, and political transformations that took place in Egypt, highlighting their impact on the *Egyptiot* community, and hence the new dynamics they created. In his study, he analyzes the *Egyptiot* presence from the end of the Capitulations until the mass departure in the early 1960s, in relation to other factors, such as Cold War politics, push factors for migration, and the decision making of leading members of the community. By exposing the complex dynamics between the Egyptian state and other actors, Dalachanis challenges the view that Abdel Nasser was responsible for the *Egyptiot* departure. Nevertheless, even though these works challenge ethnocentric and cosmopolitan narratives and explore other aspects of the *Egyptiot* presence in Egypt, they only go as far as the 1960s, leaving the presence of the *Egyptiots* after this period, once again, unexplored.

In similar ways, *Beyond Departure* moves away from the mainstream Greek and Egyptian ethnocentric and cosmopolitan narratives that narrated the *Egyptiot* presence within temporal limitations and the confines of the nation, either by focusing on the community's glorious past or on its guest presence. Nevertheless, my research demonstrates that the *Egyptiot* presence did not pause or end with Gamal Abdel Nasser's policies and the community's demographic decline. This thesis goes beyond 1962 and explores the

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[168] Abdulhaq, *Jewish and Greek Communities,* 146.
[169] Dalachanis, *Greek Exodus.*

motivations, strategies, obstacles, and alternative environments *Egyptiots* created on a personal, collective and institutional level in order to make their presence permanent. In addition, it analyses *Egyptiots'* lived experiences of labor, class and citizenship, and the different articulations of belonging and identity members of the community imagined and fashioned.

PART III: Organization of Dissertation

Beyond Departure explores facets of the personal, local and institutional histories of the *Egyptiots* after 1962 through two parts. Part I: "Personal and Local Histories of the *Egyptiots:* Alexandria, Cairo and the Suez Canal Region" focuses on the personal and local histories of the *Egyptiots* after 1962 in these three active communities. By discussing facets of the *Egyptiots'* social and economic environments after 1962, my research examines some of the reasons and motivations that made *Egyptiots* remain in Egypt.

Chapter One, "Stories of Remaining," discusses some of the *Egyptiots'* motivations and strategies for remaining in Egypt. I demonstrate how staying was more beneficial than departure and how property ownership, employment, citizenship, issues of financial struggle, family attachment and education anchored *Egyptiots'* presence in Egypt. I analyze how *Egyptiots* negotiated their presence in mind and practice, which alternative environments they created, and how they tried to respond to obstacles and opportunities on a personal level.

Chapter Two, "Socioeconomic Environments of *Egyptiots* after 1962: Alexandria and Cairo" moves from the personal to the local. It discusses *Egyptiots'* economic activities in the two largest *Egyptiot* communities after 1962. It examines which political changes and socioeconomic developments impacted these activities, and explores the commonalities and differences of these two communities towards labor, class and citizenship. Chapter Three

"The Suez Canal Region as a Socioeconomic Environment of *Egyptiots* after 1962" looks at the third largest presence of *Egyptiots* in Egypt, namely at the communities of the Suez Canal region. It investigates which social processes and political and economic factors defined *Egyptiots'* experiences of employment, class, citizenship and geographic and social mobility until 1967 and 1973, when *Egyptiots* evacuated the cities of the canal due to the Arab-Israeli wars. Both chapters two and three reveal the range of *Egyptiots'* historical experiences in these three locales and demonstrate the non-homogeneous character of these communities.

Part II: "Agency, Negotiation and 'Readjustment' on Institutional Level: The Case of Alexandria" discusses the institutional life of the *Egyptiots* through the case study of the Alexandrian community and its institutions. I chose to focus on the Alexandrian community's institutions, not only because the EKA was the oldest among the *Egyptiot koinotētes* established in Egypt, but rather because it also claimed--and was granted by the Greek government--an exceptional cultural, economic and political capital that other *koinotētes* did not have. Therefore, my interest was to explore how the EKA negotiated its presence as both a local and diasporic institution, not in periods of growth this time, but in periods of so-called 'decline.' Moreover, I analyze how it used its capital and agency to navigate first its institutional property and vitality, and second, educational matters such as the Arabic language and technical education, thereby contributing in an important way to the vitality of the community.

Chapter Four, "Maintaining the *Koinotēta:* The EKA's Role and Agency as Seen Through the Management of its Property," discusses how the EKA operated as both a local and diasporic institution on matters concerning its real estates and agricultural property. It explores how the EKA's role and agency was manifested through the management of its properties and human resources. It analyses how the EKA reevaluated its relations with other community actors, such as the Greek Church and the Greek state, and what kind of strategies

and goals it undertook to maintain its presence in Alexandria. Chapter Five, "Educational matters and the *Koinotēta's* 'Adjustment' Policies," delves into the topic of education by discussing what policies and goals the EKA implemented towards the learning of the Arabic language and technical education. It discusses how the EKA reevaluated its educational system in order to respond to changes in the labor market, as these two topics were very relevant for *Egyptiots'* position in the labor market, and furthermore, for their presence in Egypt.

Part II demonstrates how the policies of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat impacted the institution concerning its property and educational matters. Furthermore, both chapters explore how the EKA, as both a local and diasporic institution, preserved its autonomy, cultural and political capital, and maintained its right to imagine and fashion the community's identifications and belonging, even in periods of population shrinkage.

Methodology and Sources

This research is based on a number of archival sources that have never before been discussed by other researchers, and on thirty-six oral accounts, conducted with *Egyptiots* in Egypt and Greece. I also discuss newspaper articles from the *Egyptiot* press, such as the Cairo based newspapers, *FŌS* and *O Paroikos*, and the Alexandria based newspaper *Tachydromos*, Egyptian governmental newspapers, such as *Al-Jumhuria* and *Al-Ahram*, the Greek governmental newspaper, *Kathēmerinē*, and the Greek opposition newspaper *Eleutheria*.[170]

Chapter One is based primarily, but not exclusively, on the interviews I conducted with *Egyptiots* in Cairo, Alexandria and Athens. Some interviews also took place over the

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[170] The articles from the *FŌS* newspaper have been collated from the *koinotētas'* archive in Cairo (Archeio Ellēnikēs Koinotitas Kairou). The articles from the *Tachydromos* newspaper have been collated from the Greek Chamber of Commerce in Alexandria (Archeio Emporikou Epimelētēriou Alexandreias). The articles from the *O Paroikos, Al-Jumhuria, Al-Ahram, Kathēmerinē* and *Eleutheria* newspapers have been collated from the Library of the Hellenic Parliament in Athens.

phone and email correspondence.[171] Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five are based primarily

on the analysis of primary sources from different *Egyptiot* institutions and secondary sources.

I chose to analyze material primarily, but not exclusively, from the community's institutions,

for two main reasons. First, the archives of the community's institutions provide a rich

documentation of *Egyptiot* activities in the period I discuss, which are not depicted elsewhere

and have not been explored by other researchers. Second, my first intention was to

complement this documentation with archival material from the Egyptian National Archives

in Cairo, as it would enrich the analysis of the social and economic *Egyptiot* presence after

1962. However, access to the Egyptian National Archives for a researcher who investigates

Egyptian history after the 1960s is very limited, if not impossible. Thus, this limits my

analysis to the available sources found through the community and other institutions I discuss

below. In order to shed light on the political and socioeconomic events of that period, I have

also incorporated into these chapters some of the oral accounts I conducted with *Egyptiots.*

Chapter One discusses *Egyptiots'* personal stories, taking into account the socially

constructed notion of collective memory, as their stories were narrated in the light of the

present.[172] Thus, in order to evaluate my material in terms of reliability, I tried to distinguish

information about their personal stories and how their life experiences felt,[173] taking into

consideration that collective memory is always plural (collective memories).

My interviews were based on a semi-structured questionnaire with both open and

closed questions. This allowed the interviewees the space to share a range of feelings and

reflections on different aspects of their life in Egypt. In my attempt to create a broader

historical interpretation, I grouped the interviews around certain themes and placed them in a

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[171] In most cases, I use the real first names of my interviewees, as agreed with them during my interviewees.
[172] Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 34.
[173] Paul Thompson, *The Voice of the Past: Oral History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 272.

wider context.[174] Having already answered a number of questions around the topics I wanted to discuss, my interviewees were mostly willing to explore even more themes, giving me valuable information about their personal lives, and their lives in relation to the *Egyptiot* community and the Egyptian society. In order to diversify my material, I collected interviews from 15 women and 21 men born between the late 1920s and the late 1960s. The interviewees also differed in socioeconomic status, profession, political viewpoints, and origins. My analysis also exposed the non-homogeneity of the *Egyptiot* community by depicting multiple and diverse voices and lives.

The *Egyptiots* I interviewed all had migrant backgrounds, as their families had come to Egypt for economic reasons from different parts of the Ottoman Empire or the newly founded state of Greece in the mid or late nineteenth century. My interviewees, mostly second or third generation migrants, continued to be connected to Greece, embarking on short visits, even if their families came from different parts of the empire (meaning not from Greece when it was a part of the Ottoman Empire). These visits—which related to leisure, consumption, education or investments in Greece—afforded them a certain type of mobility and scope to negotiate their presence on a transnational level and within the Egyptian social structure. Hence, they were simultaneously mobile and rooted. For these reasons, the interviews enabled me to investigate how concepts of mobility and rootedness were expressed and what they entailed for *Egyptiots* in Egypt.

The topic of the *en masse* departures and the nationalizations in the early years of the 1960s was a starting point between my interviewees and myself, since my intention was to understand why they remained, while the majority of the *Egyptiots* departed. As we were discussing those who departed and how these departures brought certain changes to the community as a whole, my intention, and I believe theirs too, was to move beyond this phase,

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[174] Thompson, *Voice of the Past,* 270.

and discuss their lives afterwards. Their stay in Egypt was not a reaction or an answer to others' departure. Nevertheless, it was not a first choice for everyone either. As I discuss in this chapter, both everyday factors and practical reasons, and the way they perceived their lives at that stage, played an important role in their decision to stay, making their presence permanent.

Chapters Two and Three discuss the social and economic presence of the *Egyptiot* communities in Alexandria, Cairo and the Suez Canal region. These chapters do not attempt to provide a complete economic and social history of the *Egyptiots* in Egypt. The scattered information found in the different archives I discuss below could not completely depict their economic and social presence. These chapters discuss *Egyptiots'* economic activities in these three communities through the analysis of Greek and Arabic archival material collated from the Greek Chamber of Commerce in Alexandria (GCCA) and in Cairo (GCCC), the archives of the *Egyptiot koinotētes* in Alexandria and Cairo, the Greek Consulate in Cairo, the Hellenic Literary and Historical Archive in Athens (ELIA) and the Library of the Hellenic Parliament in Athens. I also examine student registration cards from the Greek community high school in Alexandria, Averofeio, the alumni registrations from the Ampeteios Gymnasium school in Cairo, and a limited number of archival records coming from the Spetseropouleio Orphanage in Cairo. In addition, I analyze different forms of identifications, such as registration documents in Arabic and in Greek, from the communities in the Suez Canal region including the Suez, Port Tawfik, Port Said, Port Fouad, Ismailia, Kantara and Sinai.[175] I also use birth and health certificates/health ID cards, *shahāda al-milaād,*[176] of

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[175] The cities of Suez and Port Tawfik were under the consulate of Suez. The consulate of Port Said was responsible for the cities of Port Said, Port Fouad, Ismailia, Kantara and Sinai. The archival material that is discussed in this chapter was found at the community's archive in Cairo, as the material was moved there after the dissolution of the *Egyptiot koinotētes* of the Canal. The archival material came primarily from the cities of Suez, Port Tawfik and Ismailia, and limited material has been found from the other cities.

[176] This material indicated information concerning the origins of the child's father, the father's occupation and his nationality, among others. However, a small number of children were orphans in the sense of having no father, thus there was no occupation written on their card. Next to this information, the cards mentioned the child's vaccinations, and where the birth took place. In most cases, the cards indicated as the place of birth the

Egyptiot children who were born and registered in Suez and Ismailia, and student cards, [177] *biṭāqa madrasīya/ atomiko deltio mathētou* of the Suez and Port Tawfik community school to examine how political, economic and social changes shaped *Egyptiots'* labor practices and experiences of class and citizenship.

Chapters Four and Five look at the institutional life of the Alexandria-based *Egyptiot* community through the archival material coming from *Egyptiot koinotēta* in Alexandria (*Ellēnikē Koinotēta Alexandreias*-EKA) that has been collated by its different institutions: among others, its schools, orphanage, and home for the elderly, and through the correspondence of the EKA's board members. In addition, I examine material related to the Alexandrian *koinotēta* from the Hellenic Literary and Historical Archive Society (ELIA) in Athens.[178]

French hospital or the hospital *Hilāl Āhmar* (Red Crescent), where the child's registration usually took place two or three days after birth.

[177] As the above material, the students' cards also indicated information regarding citizenship, occupation and origins, and in addition the place of the family's residency. Important to note is that the health certificates and the students' cards most of the times came in one envelope attached to each other and provided complimentary information for the child and the family.

[178] In the introduction, I also used material collated from the National Center for Social Research (EKKE) in Athens.