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9

Birds of a Feather: A Comparative Analysis of White Supremacist and Violent Male Supremacist Discourses

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Organized hate group activism has been on the rise since 2014 in the United States, according to the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), with 2018 marking a 30% increase over the previous year and reaching

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a record high (Beirich, 2019). This trend is prevalent across the globe (Beirich, 2019). Of the 15 hate group ideologies¹ tracked by the SPLC, nine explicitly are linked to white supremacy. In this climate, the SPLC also recently has begun tracking male supremacy; arguing there is an explicit link between the two ideologies (*Male Supremacy*, 2019). Nevertheless, there has been relatively little scholarly attention devoted to the connections between white nationalism and violent masculinist extremism (Berlet, 2004).

While violent male supremacism is not a new phenomenon, a new breed of violent misogynists has gained increasing cultural currency— involuntary celibates or incels. The term “incels” refers to an online subculture in which members define themselves as unable to find sexual or romantic partners despite desiring one (Baele et al., 2019; Pruden, 2021). The hatred stemming from this perceived rejection by society—and women specifically—has, at times, manifested itself both violently in real life and online through the glorification, celebration and promotion of violence against women (Hines, 2019). In recent years, misogynist incels² have been responsible for a number of violent attacks and mass killings targeting mostly women. These attacks, committed on university campuses, crowded sidewalks and in yoga studios, often have been accompanied by *ex-ante* statements by perpetrators. In perhaps the most infamous example, Elliot Rodger emailed a lengthy manifesto to family and his therapist and posted numerous videos online before killing six and wounding 14 people in the college town of Isla Vista, California.

Racism and misogyny both are deeply rooted in mainstream society. However, these bigotries are exploited and amplified by extremist movements rather than caused by them (Berlet, 2004). This chapter explores the intersections of white supremacy with male supremacy—both of which misrepresent women as genetically and intellectually inferior and reduce them to reproductive and/or sexual functions—as discursively

¹ The SPLC breaks down its Hate Map by ideology (e.g., anti-immigrant, anti-LGBTQ, Holocaust denial, male supremacy, etc.).

² Following the Institute for Research on Male Supremacism (IRMS), we recognize the difference between the incel identity and violent misogynist incel ideology (*Recommendations for Media Reporting on Incels— Institute for Research on Male Supremacism*, n.d.). Although we use the term “incel” throughout the body of this chapter, the materials on which the analysis is based originate from misogynist incels who have committed acts of mass violence.

performed in representative samples from the white supremacist canon and violent misogynist, including more recent incels and those violent misogynists who came before them, texts.

Like the male supremacist and incel movements, the white power movement historically has been characterized by sexism and misogyny. This has been evidenced in the movement's attempts to retain European heritage and maintain whiteness by policing the behavior and controlling the bodies of white women. Indeed, reproductive politics are a primary tenet of white supremacist movements (Perry, 2004). This is best understood as a form of social engineering designed to increase white birthrates and counter the effects of women's right to choose and family planning/management (Ross, 2018). Despite this similarity, the influence of white supremacist discourses on physically violent manifestations of the male supremacist movement, such as incels and others, remains understudied.

Research on white and male supremacist ideologies³ mostly has been conducted in conceptual silos, primarily focusing on what sets them apart rather than what unites them. This fractionalization of ideologies neglects broadening the scope of inquiry to include interpersonal physical and sexual violence at play in right-wing extremism (DiBranco, 2020). However, white supremacist and violent misogynist discourses have more in common than not. They exist on a "continuum, moving from online to real life, from movement to movement, from house to street" (Renzetti, 2019). As will be further addressed in the following section, male supremacism can be seen both as a gateway to white supremacism and as sharing a similar user base online but is also its own ideology. Therefore, to further illustrate the largely understudied interconnections between white supremacy and violent manifestations of male supremacism, this chapter focuses on the discursive similarities uniting the violent male and white supremacist ideologies.

³ Carian et al. (2021) mount a compelling argument for considering male supremacy as a political ideology. Following Freedman (2003), we view political ideology as "a set of ideas, beliefs, opinions, and values that (1) exhibit a recurring pattern (2) are held by significant groups (3) compete over providing and controlling plans for public policy (4) do so with the aim of justifying, contesting or changing the social and political arrangements and processes of a political community" (p. 32).

Using a mixed methods approach, including supervised machine learning and qualitative narrative analysis, this chapter compares a corpus of violent male supremacist manifestos and other multimodal content, such as confessional video transcripts and post-facto police interviews, with highly influential white nationalist texts, such as *The Turner Diaries* and the manifestos of violent white supremacists. By doing so, this chapter identifies shared beliefs, tropes and, most importantly, similarities in the justifications for both violence toward and subjugation of “The Other”—conceptualized in terms of gender or race—which is imperative for a thorough understanding of both ideologies. This methodology moves from a group-specific to a discourse-specific analysis to not only highlight the deeply entangled nature of white supremacist and male supremacist movements but also provide a deeper understanding of how the violent male supremacist movement frames itself.

The Conjunction of Male and White Supremacy

White and male supremacist ideologies share radical forms of hegemonic beliefs about the roles and positions of women in Western society. These vary across racial, sexual and class-based identities; however, they generally are based on understandings of a two-sex system and advocate for the subjugation of women and a return to a by-gone “golden” era in which men were indisputably “on top.” These beliefs are a form of sexism shored up by misogyny; a disciplinary mechanism to “police gendered norms and expectations” that under patriarchy intersects with other forms of oppression (Manne, 2018, p. 1). It is the method by which patriarchy as social organization and sexism as ideology are reinforced and provides a warning to would-be transgressors (Manne, 2018; Prasad, 2019). These supposed transgressions are used to justify the organized or “networked” harassment⁴ (e.g., doxxing, cyber stalking, etc.) of women in online spaces (Banet-Weiser & Miltner, 2016; Bratich & Banet-Weiser, 2019; Marwick & Caplan, 2018).

⁴ Networked harassment is common in both white supremacist and masculinist spaces.

Despite having distinct ideologies and community practices, white and male supremacist groups do experience cross-pollination and should not be considered as operating in isolation (Pruden, 2021). For example, Alek Minassian's⁵ statement to police clearly illustrated his vicious attack was a by-product both of frustrations centered on his lack of success with women and engagement with the 4chan message board, which is a popular platform for the dissemination of far-right, misogynist and racist content (Nagle, 2017; Russell & Bell, 2020).

In the following section, we will lay the groundwork for the subsequent analysis of the largely understudied ideological and discursive conjunctures of white supremacy and violent manifestations of male supremacism. The first subsection contextualizes the background and existing research on white supremacy and the Great Replacement. The second subsection examines masculinism and misogyny. The third subsection brings together white and male supremacy. This is imperative for a thorough understanding of both ideologies. The following Data & Methods section outlines specifics about our corpus before moving onto Results and Discussion. In so doing, we hope to shift the focus from a group—to a discourse-specific analysis, which could inform the countering and prevention of violent extremist practices.

White Supremacy and the Great Replacement

The perpetrator of the 2019 Christchurch mosque shootings, Brenton Tarrant, published a manifesto, titled *The Great Replacement*, prior to the attacks. The title of Tarrant's manifesto is a reference to the Great Replacement conspiracy theory popularized by French philosopher Renaud Camus. According to Camus, the "native" French population is being replaced by non-white immigrants from outside Europe as a result of massive and uncontrolled migration, which will result in the destruction of France. The same is true for the whole of Europe. For Camus, this phased process represents more than shifting demographics. It is a concerted effort by globalist elites to encourage the "great erasure" of

⁵ The perpetrator of the 2018 Toronto van attack.

French culture, national values and collective memory (Camus, 2012). In his manifesto, Tarrant drew heavily from Camus' replacement theory but also from David Lane's White Genocide Manifesto (Berger, 2016; Coaston, 2019; Davey & Ebner, 2019), which shares the view of white populations being replaced by non-whites through immigration, integration, miscegenation or abortion (Davey & Ebner, 2019; Ferber, 2000; Perry, 2004). Despite similarities in these writings, there are slight differences between the philosophies of Camus and Lane. For example, Davey and Ebner (2019) note both are "interlinked conspiracy theories," but Camus privileges the loss of culture while Lane prioritizes a more explicitly racist narrative (p. 4). According to them both, however, lax policies on immigration are largely to blame, as are women.

At the core of these theories is the idea that white birthrates are falling because white women are not having enough children or are "race-mixing" with non-whites (Bowles, 2019). This presents an urgent and existential threat that must be addressed in ways ranging from the extermination of non-whites to the re-education of white women (Bowles, 2019; Davey & Ebner, 2019; Schafer et al., 2014). Indeed, it is common to see discussions turn toward banning women from the workplace or the abolition of women's right to vote (Bowles, 2019). These views have become far more politically prominent in recent years and have come to dominate among the international extreme right (Davey & Ebner, 2019). Perry (2004) examines the supposed justification for the regulation of reproduction and its intersection with the continuation of the white race. In its conception of gender roles, white supremacist ideology attributes one essential function to women: childbearing. This coalesces with the rise of gendered backlash politics, in which supremacist groups (both white and male supremacists) argue a new feminine gender identity has been constructed by feminists and lesbians in which men are becoming increasingly obsolete. This, in turn, poses a threat to men's masculinity and their patriarchal status but also to the white race as a whole (Perry, 2004).

In this light, abortion and race-mixing are understood as avenues for white men's control of "their" women. White supremacists fear not only the discontinuation of the white bloodline but also the loss of control over white women, which threatens the hegemonic power of white men

(Perry, 2004). In white nationalist terms, this often is called ethnic hegemony or blood sovereignty, but focusing on the reproductive role of women is not confined to explicitly supremacist ideologies and is not a recent phenomenon. For example, Mussolini waged a failed “battle for births” social policy from 1925 to 1938 that encouraged women to have more children and explicitly associated motherhood and family with the Italian nation (Forcucci, 2010). Today, conservative populist politicians and far-right actors around the world also employ these narratives (Pruden, 2020). Feminist scholars long have linked women’s reproductive labor to their expected domestic role (Duffy, 2007; Hartmann, 1979; Hopkins, 2015; Kaplan, 1998; McRae, 2018), and in particular through its connection to the conservation of whiteness (Domosh 2017; Bonds 2020; see also Loyd 2009, 2011; McRae 2018). Of course, placing white women in the role of domestic managers and walking wombs also reinforces normalized male power.

The interlocking of white male privilege and victimization already had been established within white supremacy long before the rise of the so-called “alt-right,” September 11 or the election of Donald J. Trump, (Berbrier, 2000; Daniels, 1997; Ferber, 1998a, 1998b; Hollander, 1999). This conflation of white supremacy and the angry white male identity reframes the phenomenon from a collective movement to the individualized sentiment of a “victimized white male” (Berbrier, 2000, p. 187) that both constructs and capitalizes on a sense of marginalization and oppression and an inability to “take back’ their societies from an invented crisis of white culture” (Ganesh, 2020, p. 2).

Anxieties around the erosion of Western male white structural privilege are at the center of backlash politics writ large in post-war Europe and North America (Hughey, 2014), stemming from a perceived demasculinization of men following women’s entry into the workforce during World War II and subsequent feminist activism challenging male superiority (Anti-Defamation League, 2018; Ferber, 2000; Kimmel & Ferber, 2009). Just as the Civil Rights movement led African-Americans to “forget their place,” so too has the women’s movement eroded the “natural” relationship between men and women (Perry, 2004, p. 79). The promotion of idealized maleness as the dominant social position, specifically middle class, heterosexual white masculinity, positioned against

subordinated femaleness is the dynamic condition known as hegemonic masculinity (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005). Against this backdrop, it is evident that patriarchy as an institutional apparatus, the dominant position of men and the continuation of the white race all hinge on the subjugation of women's bodies, sexuality and capacity for reproduction.

Male Supremacy, Maculinism & Misogyny

Much of the literature on white supremacy is concerned only with the racial component of the ideology; however, feminist scholars have shed light on the relationship between gender, race and other interlocking oppressions present in white supremacist ideologies (see for example Ferber, 1998a, 1998b, 2000). Sexism, misogyny and the protection of patriarchy are the pillars of male supremacism and are crucial to a thorough understanding of the same. While we work within this tradition, a fully intersectional analysis is outside the scope of this chapter, which focuses on recent developments in extreme masculinist ideologies facilitated by the rise of the internet. Specifically, we are interested in male supremacist ideologies as professed by those who have committed misogynist mass violence. There is a growing body of work in this area. For example, Beauchamp (2019) suggests incel ideologies are "Internet-native ideologies" born online and advanced through this modern means of communication despite promoting misogynistic disciplinary beliefs that predate it. Moreover, incels have benefitted from many of the same social mobilization and online communication tools as the Islamic State and violent far-right extremist groups, which tap into grievances around loneliness, isolation, rejection and sexual frustration to fuel violence (Hoffman & Ware, 2020).

Incels believe society has become a misandrist matriarchy against which men must defend themselves for their very survival (Marwick & Lewis, 2017). As such, their grievances are not only personal (e.g., feelings of loneliness) but also systemic (e.g., an unjust and uneven playing field). In fact, incels see the world as a rigid hierarchy based on appearance and blame women for this state of affairs (Baele et al., 2019; Hoffman et al., 2020). In incel terminology, this hierarchy includes a

minority of alpha males (or Chads) and females (Stacys) at the top, a majority of average betas (or normies) in the middle and, finally, a small group of unattractive incels at the bottom who are exclusively male and victims of involuntary celibacy⁶ (Baele et al., 2019; Ging, 2017; Zimmerman et al., 2018). The hierarchical differences between categories are not based purely on physical characteristics; however, but also incels' ability to see a reality others are either unable or unwilling to perceive (Hoffman et al., 2020). In this way, although they view themselves as physically inferior, the group often positions itself as intellectually superior to "normies."

Drawing on *The Matrix* movies, these privileged insights are referred to as "pills," which are common not only on incel forums but also a feature of other online far-right subcultures. None of these groups are homogenous, and each "pill" sends a message about the strand's worldview. The black pill⁷ is the most commonly found in violent incel ideologies and the one we focus on here. It relates to a belief in biological determinism in which women have a natural tendency, hypergamy, to seek the best genes for reproduction (Baele et al., 2019, p. 13). For this reason, incels who subscribe to the black pill see society as unfair yet inescapable. Coupled with an understanding of society as a sexual economy that functions according to market-like conditions in which competition drives sexual relations, some incels see sexual competition as biologically wired (Gilmore, 2019), while others have called for "sexual marxism"⁸ to combat this imperative (Jennings, 2018). Incels believe hypergamy—the tendency of women to seek higher status relationships or "marry up"—was better managed in a nostalgic and highly patriarchal golden age in which individuals followed strict gender roles informed by the traditional two-sex system and law and social conventions helped

⁶ Not all those who identify as incel also identify as male. In fact, the movement was founded by a woman in the late 1990s, and there are femcels (women who identify as incel), as well as LGBTQ+ individuals who identify as incel. Misogynist incels like those in our corpus, however, would suggest women cannot be involuntarily celibate.

⁷ Beauchamp (2019) describes the black pill as bundling a "sense of personal failure with a sense of social entitlement: the notion that the world owes them sex, and that there is something wrong with a society in which women don't have to give it to them."

⁸ Jennings (2018) defines sexual Marxism as "a system in which every person is somehow matched with a partner of a similar level of wealth and attractiveness."

ensure a fair distribution of sex and relationships (Baele et al., 2019, p. 13) because it was every man's right to have access to a female partner (Zimmerman et al., 2018).

As current solutions to this problem, some incels suggest what has been referred to within the movement as a “sexual welfare state” (Pruden, 2021). Although what this term encompasses varies, it often includes a mix of social policies such as government-enforced or subsidized sex, the revocation of women's rights, a reduction in the age of consent, sexual slavery, redistribution of women and violence against women and feminists—without the social incentives Mussolini included in his battle for birth (It's Time to Save Incels From Themselves, 2019; Scaptura & Boyle, 2019; Williams, 2018; Zimmerman et al., 2018). Feelings of entitlement to women and sex also can predispose men to enact mass violence and exist beyond the relatively closed world of incelism. Research has shown some men may lash out individually and interpersonally (e.g., family, friends or former partners), while others will turn their associated anger outward to more generalized mass targets (Aggeler, 2018; Chavez & McLaughlin, 2018; Scaptura & Boyle, 2019; Wendling, 2018). In fact, Zimmerman and his collaborators (2018) have noted “incel discussions often explicitly connect women's non-provision of sexual access to the need for sexually marginalized men to deploy brutal violence in the public sphere in order to defend this ‘entitlement’” (p. 2).

We consider the violent segment of incelism to be a politically motivated ideology because it is predicated on the notion that the downfall of society is attributable to women and to feminism in particular and that a violent overthrow of the current system is needed “to reclaim a particular type of manhood based on both male and white superiority” (Zimmerman et al., 2018). More broadly, these beliefs are attributable to violent misogyny.⁹ While there is no evidence these incels have formally organized, the attacks committed by self-proclaimed

⁹ Incels are the most recent iteration of violent male supremacism. We highlight incels throughout the chapter but it is important to note that many of the group's beliefs around anti-feminism, recuperative social policy, etc. predate the incel movement and can be seen in earlier violent misogynist writings as well. We do not see them as distinct from violent male supremacism, as both are driven by violent manifestations of misogyny.

incels have been premeditated, politically motivated and often inspired by earlier attacks. Moreover, they systematically have targeted civilians. These attributes suggest that inceldom should be understood as a sub-ideology of male supremacism more broadly and that both inceldom and male supremacism should be explored as forms of violent extremism (Zimmerman et al., 2018). However, we also recognize focusing on the left-behind artifacts of incels and male supremacists who have committed mass violence does risk missing more subtle threats, as Beauchamp (2019) suggests, such as the “acts of everyday violence ranging from harassment to violent assault, or simply [making] the women in their lives miserable” (para. 11). Nevertheless, the justifications for violence expressed by male supremacist mass killers, self-identified incels or otherwise, sheds light on the need to better understand how these varied extremist masculinist groups use networked misogyny¹⁰ to spread their ideology. This is especially true since incels and other violent misogynist groups are not isolated to the internet but are one node in an interconnected and mediated network of misogynistic practices (Bratich & Banet-Weiser, 2019) or, as Romano (2018) puts it, “extreme misogyny evolving from male bonding gone haywire” (para. 3).

White Supremacy and Violent Misogynists

Although white supremacists do not explicitly categorize individuals according to their attractiveness like incels and some other manosphere groups do, these groups share a number of ideological and discursive aspects that make a comparative analysis worthwhile. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) describes the relationship between white supremacy and misogyny as “symbiotic¹¹” (Anti-Defamation League, 2018, p. 5). The ADL admits “not all misogynists are racists, and not every white supremacist is a misogynist” but also suggests that a

¹⁰ Banet-Weiser and Miltner (2016) define networked misogyny as a “virulent strain of violence and hostility toward women in online environments” (p. 171).

¹¹ This symbiotic relationship also exists between white supremacist movements and the broader, more mainstream, white supremacist culture, which feed off one another and reach wider audiences due to the rise of online platforms, blurring the lines between white supremacist and far-right conceptions of gender and race (Ferber, 2004).

“misogynist, deep-seated loathing of women acts as a connective tissue between many white supremacists... and their lesser-known brothers in hate like Incels” (Anti-Defamation League, 2018, p. 5). In fact, the online communities embracing extreme anti-woman ideologies increasingly share the same user base (Ribeiro et al., 2020) with male supremacy often described as a “gateway drug” to the far-right (DeCook, 2019; *Male Supremacy*, 2019; Romano, 2018) and to white nationalism specifically (Lewis, 2019). The idea of using the grievances of “alienated young men” for political mobilization gained efficacy following #GamerGate and was fueled by former *Breitbart News* head Steve Bannon¹² (Rosenthal, 2020, p. 143). DiBranco (2020) adds that misogyny and male supremacy should be considered an ideology in itself rather than only as a gateway.

It is, therefore, unsurprising the entanglements between gender and race play an important role in both white and male supremacist ideologies, which define themselves on the basis of characteristics in opposition to racial and gender Others respectively. But, it is not so straightforward. For example, incels of Indian descent often are referred to as “currycels,” while Asian women are called “noodlewhores” (Baele et al., 2019). Both group ideologies structure their beliefs around strong in- and out-groups in which the boundaries are impermeable. Social cohesion is maintained in this system for both white and male supremacists through these determinist perspectives (Ferber, 2000; Lewis, 2004). White supremacists are concerned with safeguarding the white race by controlling female reproduction and bodies, and violent misogynist discourses often are awash in racism and anti-Semitism (Beauchamp, 2019; Hoffman et al., 2020; *It’s Time to Save Incels From Themselves*, 2019).

¹² Far-right media executive and former President Trump advisor Steve Bannon noted as early as 2007 that gamers and other “alienated young men” offered untapped political potential (Rosenthal, 2020, p. 143). GamerGate was a 2014 hashtag campaign that began with an angry ex-boyfriend abusing his former girlfriend online but quickly transformed into the networked harassment—including doxing, death and rape threats—of many prominent women working in the video game, or gaming, industry. GamerGate confirmed Bannon’s beliefs about the political potential of these groups, and he responded by launching the career of right-wing populist misogynist pundit Milo Yiannopoulos at *Breitbart* (Rosenthal, 2020).

Data and Methods

In order to measure the mutually recursive ideological impact of white supremacist discourses and physically violent manifestations of the male supremacist movement on one another, we compared the frequency of words and phrases between foundational texts of white and male supremacists. For the white supremacist literature, we focused on the following seven texts: *Mein Kampf* (Hitler, 1925), Enoch Powell's Rivers of Blood Speech (2007, 1968)], *The Camp of the Saints* (Raspail & Shapiro, 1995, 1973)],¹³ *The Turner Diaries* (Pierce, 1978), *The White Genocide Manifesto* (Lane, 1988), *The Great Replacement* (Camus, 2012) and the Anders Breivik Manifesto (2011). We wanted to include not only some of the canonical white supremacist texts (e.g., Pierce) but also their inspiration (e.g., Powell and Raspail) and some more recent examples (e.g., Lane, Camus and Breivik).

For the violent misogynist texts, we included an exhaustive collection of ex-ante writings of male supremacists, beginning with the incel manifestos of Elliot Rodger and Chris Harper Mercer, transcripts of videos from Elliot Rodger and Scott Paul Beierle, and Alek Minassian's police interview.¹⁴ To cast a wider net into violent male supremacism and demonstrate continuity with incel beliefs, we also included texts from three masculinist extremists sometimes noted as possible post-facto incels,¹⁵ including the suicide note of Marc Lepine, the manifesto of Seung Hui Cho and the blog transcript of George Sodini. Finally, we included the manifesto of Tobias Rathjen, who the popular press regularly speculates was an incel but who is more accurately characterized as

¹³ *The Camp of the Saints* first appeared in French. We used the English translation for this project.

¹⁴ We have removed the police officer's questions and document narrations for a more clear focus on the belief structure of Minassian himself.

¹⁵ We do not take the position that Marc Lepine, Seung Hui Cho and George Sodini are post-facto incels because we see inceldom as a new social movement arising from long-term violent male supremacism. However, Lepine, Cho and Sodini are regularly praised within the incel movement and are connected to it through violent misogyny.

an adherent to the Men Going Their Own Way movement, which is a men's separatist group.¹⁶

We chose to analyze a mix of long-form, more “traditional” texts and ex-ante writings to illustrate the consistency of ideologies across writing styles, as well as the ways in which political ideologies are taken up and disseminated across movements through both formal and informal texts. That said, there is a slippage between formal and informal texts. For example, *The Turner Diaries*, widely considered the “bible of the racist right,” is written in a memoir style much more similar to the ex-ante manifestos than to a traditional book.

Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) was developed by Blei et al. (2003) to distill topics from textual datasets so large that “comprehension cannot be feasibly attempted by reading them” (Liu et al., 2015). LDA previously has been employed successfully to extract important topics from large textual datasets, such as online postings (Arun et al., 2010; Gayo-Avello, 2013; Kennedy et al., 2019; Lokmanoglu & Veilleux-Lepage, 2020; Mittal et al., 2017). In examining the frequencies of words in each corpus, we used term frequency-inverse document frequency (tf-id) weight, which is a statistical measure that calculates how important a word is in each document over the whole corpus (Wu et al., 2008).

We followed the standard steps for LDA textual analysis: (1) preprocessing; (2) determining the number of topics; and (3) setting the control parameters. The text preprocessing was done by first cleaning both datasets, removing grammatical words that lack semantic meaning (e.g., as, and, the), stemming the words and trimming the total dataset. We then ran four different model comparison metrics, including “Griffiths 2004,” “CaoJuan2009,” “Arun2010” and “Deveaud2014,” and tested to establish the most desirable number of topics to be extracted using LDA (Arun et al., 2010; Cao et al., 2009; Deveaud et al., 2014; Griffiths & Steyvers, 2004). The graph find-topic-model resulted in an optimal $k =$

¹⁶ Elliot Rodger committed the 2014 Isla Vista massacre; Scott Paul Beierle, the 2018 Florida yoga studio attack; Chris Harper Mercer, the 2015 Umpqua college attack; Alek Minassian, the Toronto, Canada van attack; Marc Lépine, the 1989 École Polytechnique shooting in Montreal, Canada; Seung Hui Cho, the 2007 Virginia Tech killings; George Sodini, the 2009 aerobics class murders in Collier Township, Pennsylvania; and, Tobias Rathjen, the 2020 Hanau, Germany mass shooting.

15 topics for the white supremacist content and $k = 15$ for the violent misogynist content and provided the most frequent words for each of those topics within the datasets.

Topic clustering was then used to build the comparative analysis between both datasets by merging similar topics into topic clusters. Topic cluster headings for these merged topics were decided upon based on the most frequent 25 words therein. The prominence of each word within the topic across each dataset was aggregated to find the prominence of each cluster (Roberts et al., 2014).

Dictionary methods and sentiment analysis, as a part of supervised machine learning, is a text classification tool, where it allows the machine to search the text and classify it to a pre-made dictionary. Using pre-made dictionaries, the researcher compares different classifications of words, by analyzing the relative frequency of the word in each category (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013). Supervised machine learning is helpful in seeing the classification of words and the distribution for these classifications; hence they can be helpful in analyzing the bigger picture in large N datasets and become even stronger when they are supplemented by unsupervised machine learning. For this data analysis, pre-made lexicon “Bing” was used to compare the “positive” and “negative” words (Liu et al., 2015). In order to longitudinally calculate the sentiment of each dataset, the text was cumulated every 50 lines. In total, there were seven white supremacist texts ($n = 528,273$ unique words) and nine masculinist extremist texts ($n = 53,510$ unique words) in the corpus ($n = 581,783$ unique words total) (Fig. 9.1).

Common overlapping words between the white supremacist and masculinist texts are prevalent (more than 9,200 unique words in common). Although only one of the top 10 words is shared in common (time), the commonly occurring words in the top 200 begin to paint a more vivid picture.¹⁷

¹⁷ Common words between the two corpora within the top 25 include: life/live/living, people and world. Common words within the top 50 include: day(s), women, kids/children and call(ed). Common words within the top 100 include: party, schools, left, black and found. Common words within the top 150 include: future, social, white, reason, police, past, family, understand, set, completely, front and finally. Common words in the top 200 include: power, home, means, mind, middle, kill(ed), single, change, act and lost.




Fig. 9.1 Comparison of common words between white supremacist and masculinist texts

We also computed the most common bigrams between the two corpora. When weighted, the most commonly occurring bigrams across both sets of texts include: tongue sticking, world war, German people, human rights, Soviet Union, German nation, short term, Los Angeles, future generations, world view, United Kingdom, national socialist, North Africa, intelligence agency, Cold War, armed forces, education system, million people, War II and world history. Although the distribution between corpora is less equivalent, other noteworthy bigrams include human rights, education system, white girl, human nature, black people, Jesus Christ, double standard, blood money, ordinary people, political science, politically incorrect, common sense, status quo, machine gun(s), assault rifle and primary goal.

White Supremacist Texts

LDA topic modeling revealed 14 themes and one artifact¹⁸ from the white supremacist texts, including Clash of Civilizations, Cultural Marxism, Racial Hegemony, Religious Violence, Temporality, Civil War, White Rebellion, World War II, Shit Hits the Fan (SHTF) Scenario,¹⁹ The Great Replacement, Education, White Genocide and Immigration. These themes were established based on a qualitative interpretation of the top words and other findings arising from the topic model. They support earlier work on the centrality of The Great Replacement and the victimized white male identity. Although The Great Replacement, Racial Hegemony and White Genocide in particular are commonly

¹⁸ Artifacts occur when topics within a model are semantically similar and, thus, coherent but are not humanly interpretable. For example, a topic could include words like “good,” “well,” “right” and “much,” which are all positively loaded words that may express desire and are, therefore, semantically similar but provide no context for human interpretation.

¹⁹ The SHTF scenario is sometimes referred to as accelerationism, the idea that increased social chaos will break down the existing political system; however, SHTF is not necessarily caused by white supremacists but can be the result of any number of social upheavals or even natural disasters, whereas accelerationism is specifically caused by white supremacist actions.

attributed solely to white supremacy, they also are intimately linked with societal norms around what it means to be a “real” man that emerge from male supremacist beliefs fueled by institutional patriarchy. Within this corpus, narratives of racial and ethnic Others encroaching on white mens’ ability—and perceived masculine entitlement—to start, raise and financially support white families becomes justification for White Rebellion, Civil War and, at times, SHTF Scenarios. Additionally, these themes highlight animosity toward Cultural Marxism and a belief a day of reckoning is on the horizon.

Common bigrams that emerged from the white supremacist corpora illustrate some of these themes. The most prevalent bigrams in these texts (in order of ranking) include: Western Europe(an), justiciar knight(s),²⁰ civil war, knights templar, cultural conservative(s), Middle East, cultural marxist(s)/multiculturalist, European countries, world war, political correctness, pccts knights, foreign policy, German people, Ottoman Empire, political parties, nuclear power, Muslim immigration, human rights, Islamic world, European Union, picric acid,²¹ Saudi Arabia, Frankfurt school, mass immigration, demographic warfare, western world, prime minister and power plant (Fig. 9.2).

Male Supremacist Texts

Thirteen themes and two artifacts emerged from LDA topic modeling of the masculinist texts, including Justification, Sexual Entitlement, Rejection, Attraction, Revolution/Deep State, Martyrdom, Family, Temporality, School, Forever Alone, Backlash Politics, Human Connection and Interracial Dating. As with the white supremacist themes, these were determined based on qualitative interpretation and also lend support to work on masculinism and misogyny that suggests these groups have been red pillled and are, thus, engaged in backlash politics. Moreover,

²⁰ Justiciar was a medieval term for English and Scottish rulers. Anders Breivik wrote that he was a justiciar knight commander for the Knights Templar Europe and a leader in the pan-European Patriotic Resistance Movement. The Knights Templar was a medieval-era Catholic military order. Similarly, the PCCTS knights is a fictional group noted in Breivik’s manifesto created to deploy guerrilla warfare against multiculturalists.

²¹ Picric acid is a component in military-grade explosives.




Fig. 9.2 The sentiment in white supremacist corpora is overwhelmingly negative

these themes indicate the ideological focus on gendered norms around the family and relationships. Additionally, however, these themes also point to notions commonly believed to be more aligned with white supremacy, The Revolution/Deep State theme, for example, indicates the widespread white supremacist conspiracy theory concerning a belief in a deep state cabal that supports the efforts of feminists, Cultural Marxists and so-called social justice warriors in the erosion of primarily white male freedoms. Marc Lepine, for example, wrote that feminists want to “keep the advantages of women... while seizing for themselves those of men.” Seung Hui Cho likens “devout Christians” to a Satanic “American Al-Qaeda” in a manifesto that reads strikingly like Satanic Panic memoirs of the 1980s. Tobias Rathjen repeatedly alludes to a shadowy “secret service” surveilling society in preparation for a “Great Purge.” All of these sentiments have roots in white supremacist conspiracism.

Many of the common bigrams within the masculinist extremist corpus include names and places associated with the violent acts the authors ultimately carried out. Those are not included here. As with the white supremacist data, the most prevalent bigrams our analysis revealed also reflect the themes that emerged from the topic modeling. These bigrams (again, in order of weighted ranking) include beautiful girl(s)/girlfriend, elementary/middle school, popular/cool kids, video games/player, secret service, Jesus Christ, phone call, winter break, degree murder, pretty girl(s), summer camp, social life, beautiful blonde/blonde girls/blonde hair, swimming pool, fourth grade, happy life, beach house, cool kids, playing wow and beta uprising.

Sentiment analysis of the masculinist extremist corpus is, perhaps surprisingly, balanced between positive and negative sentiment. Although there are several negative spikes, there also are significant and somewhat more consistent positive trends.

Discussion

When considered in the context of a qualitative reading of the white supremacist texts, our findings indicate a common narrative across these white supremacist writings of an evil plot not only by outside aggressors²² (e.g., the Zionist Occupied Governments, or ZOG, or a broader deep state cabal) but also by internal do-gooders²³ (e.g., politically correct multiculturalists) to invade the white homeland, victimize white people—especially white women and children—and, ultimately, snuff out the ethno-European identity, which they see as indigenous to Europe and North America, through uncontrolled mass immigration and racial

²² Themes that reflect a plot by outside aggressors include Clash of Civilizations, Racial Hegemony, Religious Violence, SHTF Scenario, The Great Replacement, White Genocide and Immigration. These themes are not mutually exclusive and may appear in more than one aspect of this narrative.

²³ Themes that reflect a concern around internal do-gooders include Racial Hegemony, Cultural Marxism, Civil War, White Rebellion and Education.

hybridization²⁴ (Archambault & Veilleux-Lepage, 2019). As a result, movement adherents proffer a fraternal call to arms to join an impending Civil War (reflected in the theme of the same name) kicked off by a “shit hits the fan scenario” (the SHTF theme) that will liberate the Aryan race and save it from annihilation. This logic of victimhood at the hands of Others, at least in part, allows the easy slippage between white and male supremacism.

The overwhelmingly negative sentiment of the white nationalist texts provides additional context for the wider narrative and indicates white supremacists are highly motivated by an us-versus-them struggle in which they are destined to overcome perceived marginalization and emerge victorious thanks to superior intelligence and unyielding faith in their righteous cause. This victory in the hard-fought war will result in increased freedoms and a return to Constitutional rights (e.g., free speech and the right to bear arms) and, as such, usher in an era of increased societal peace. Perhaps the best example of this belief system is illustrated within *The Turner Diaries* (Pierce, 1978). In this canonical white supremacist text, which easily could be considered a field guide for the violent overthrow of a government, the SHTF scenario occurs when the U.S. federal government confiscates guns and kicks off a race war. The book, written as memoir, details the subsequent “Great Revolution” in which the white race (the true “patriots”) band together, enact vigilante justice and, ultimately, establish separatist white-only zones before “liberating” the “civilized” West and eradicating the East to build a “New Era.” The book’s protagonist, Earl Turner, dies a martyr to the cause in a suicide bombing of the Pentagon.

By comparison, the common narrative that emerges from the violent misogynist corpus evokes wistful nostalgia for happier times (e.g., as a child with their family or in school prior to puberty, as shown in the Family and School themes) but also sees society as irreparably marred by feminization and multiculturalism, which is exemplified by the Justification and Backlash Politics themes. This progressive agenda, as well as the innate nature of women, prevents the relational and sexual success

²⁴ Themes that reflect fears about a disappearing ethno-European identity include Racial Hegemony, SHTF Scenario, The Great Replacement, White Genocide, Immigration, Civil War and White Rebellion.

to which this group of men feels entitled (as noted in the Sexual Entitlement, Rejection, Forever Alone and Human Connection themes) by adopting women's liberation movement principles and encouraging white women to date Black men (seen in the Interracial Dating theme). As a result of feeling deprived of Human Connection since early childhood and resigned to being Forever Alone (both reflected in themes of the same names), violent misogynists discursively resort to Justifications for their planned attacks and often view themselves as Martyrs (i.e., the Martyrdom theme) to the cause, giving society what it rightfully deserves for betraying and victimizing them (Fig. 9.3).

Like the white supremacist corpus, the sentiment analysis of the violent misogynist texts provides additional nuance to this reading. These discursive artifacts left behind by men who have committed gender-based violence see themselves as entitled to a fair shake at happiness, which is characterized by the ability to secure a fun life with a beautiful (usually white) woman at their side.²⁵ For these men, a pretty girl for a partner is the universal entryway into gaining popularity and wider human connection. Because they have been incapable of attracting and/or keeping a female sexual partner, violent misogynists seem to begin by feeling loneliness before evolving into painful misery and finally landing and lingering in rage at both those who enjoy a supposedly more successful social life but also at society at large for setting up and perpetuating an unjust system. This hatred fuels, in turn, murderous inclinations and calls for a so-called beta uprising. It is a cycle of cumulative radicalization that requires additional analysis.

However, it should be noted the sentiment analysis here also points to a drawback of dictionary sentiment methods when used with extremist texts. For example, the positive words in this corpus actually invoke negative connotations when read in the context of male supremacist ideology. Beautiful, attractive, pretty women are something these men feel they can never have. Being socially popular, experiencing love or happiness and getting a fair shake in life are beyond their reach. In contrast, these men

²⁵ Qualitatively, the outlier to this pattern is Virginia Tech shooter Seung Hui Cho. Although his manifesto is deeply misogynist and espouses extensive narratives of rape and sexual violence, he is not focused primarily on women. It also provides evidence of a god complex and a serious pre-occupation with fairness, justice and inspiring future violence.




Fig. 9.3 Male supremacist sentiment analysis

do not see hatred, rage and murder as negative but view them as a sort of justified reparation against a world that has turned its back on them. When viewed in this light, one can see how the sentiment analysis skews positive when, in fact, the corpus itself is overwhelmingly negative. This is particularly true when read through the lens of the black pill, which sees death as the only escape from a life of isolation and loneliness. Taken together, these drawbacks to sentiment analysis from dictionary methods more broadly can be summed up as missing the historical baggage of these words, failing to take into account that words have lives of their own.

In thinking around the shared beliefs, tropes and justifications for violence across male and white supremacists texts in these corpora, several common themes emerge from the top common words, bigrams and qualitative reading. First, there is a focus on women, children and family—in particular, educating current generations about human nature, “accurate” history and how to secure a better future for subsequent generations. For white supremacists, as David Lane writes in the *White Genocide Manifesto* (which includes the 14 Words), “We must secure the existence of our people and a future for White children.” White nationalists, in particular, advocate for housewifery and homeschooling to maintain a pseudo separatism from Others in advance of a truly separate white ethnostate. Of course, this places a disproportionate burden on white women, when compared to white men, not only related to familial obligations but also more broadly for the moral guidance of the white race as a whole. It also unfairly lays blame on already-marginalized Others, such as immigrants and people of color, for the supposedly eroding white family and disappearing white race—even as they look back nostalgically to a time when the (white) nuclear family reigned supreme. Similarly, male supremacists look fondly to the pre-feminist and Cultural Marxist past as a time when women “knew their place” and men supposedly stood a better chance of finding a female “mate” on a similar rung of the sexual marketplace hierarchy. They also often reminisce about happier pre-pubescent family times. Human nature, based in biological determinism and evolutionary biology pseudoscience, is touted as objective fact in both cases, and both white and

male supremacists in the corpora seem to see it as their job to teach the supposed truth of humanity and society to the world.

Second, there is a pervasive through line of the need for some sort of violent rebellion or overthrow of the existing politically correct status quo because it results in a double standard that marginalizes the ordinary man and privileges the Other (those traditionally understood as oppressed, be they people of color or women). White supremacists see a wide variety of SHTF scenarios around every turn. Whether this is caused by a natural disaster, a civil war or, in many cases, the machinations of a deep state secret society, the looming event will necessitate white men's enlistment to the cause for the protection of the white family and, ultimately, the white race. "Real" men will volunteer, and everyone else will be labeled race traitors. Male supremacists, too, call for an uprising. As Chris Harper Mercer wrote in his manifesto, "Every country in the world should be a battleground" where "blood will flow." For misogynist incels, this so-called "beta uprising" is in response to, as Alek Minassian said in his police interview before claiming to have been in touch with both Elliot Rodger and Chris Harper Mercer on 4Chan, not only an inability to "get laid" but also oppression at the hands of society—based primarily on physical appearance that is out of their control. However, earlier male supremacist killers also recognized supposed inequities aimed at themselves. Marc Lepine, for example, saw the mass murder of women he identified as feminists as part of a rational political plan aimed at ending special privileges for women, many of which had been stolen from men.

Additionally, in both white and male supremacist groups more broadly, calls for revolution sometimes feature accelerationist—the concept of hastening societal collapse to rebuild the world according to their conservative beliefs and traditional values—tones. This rebuilding looks very much like the United States 1950s, where communities were frequently segregated by race, sundown towns were prevalent, and women married young, bore and raised children, and lived the majority of their lives within the four walls of their homes. Not all male supremacists are racist, and many are not white, so not all of them would be overtly interested in segregation or sundown towns; however, the concept of easier access to women and a more institutionalized way

to keep women in their supposedly rightful place (i.e., the private sphere) is clearly appealing to them all the same.

Third, this revolution and/or accelerationist perspective is understood not only as common sense for those who have taken the red and black pills but also as an urgent human rights issue that most impacts the every man and, therefore, must be addressed immediately before all is lost. Elliot Rodger, for example, writes that his story is one of “war against cruel injustice,” while *The Turner Diaries* equates gun ownership with civil rights, and Enoch Powell explicitly states, “The discrimination and the deprivation, the sense of alarm and resentment, lies not with the immigrant population but with those among whom they have come and are still coming.” In framing their perceived plight as a matter of human rights and social justice, white and male supremacists are strategically deploying the language of the progressive Left, including the very multiculturalists and feminists they so despise. This co-optation of sorts is, perhaps, most clearly evident in the central tenets and associated discourses of men’s rights movements (MRM), which frequently invert feminist calls for social justice to apply to men (e.g., the MRM association National Coalition for Men bills itself as a civil rights organization and, as but one example, suggests men and women are equally at risk of domestic violence and, in fact, men are actively ignored by the media and discriminated against by policymakers).

These themes can be mapped onto the collective action framework and are more fully explicated in the context of the qualitative narrative analysis below. Collective action frames are the culturally and historically specific but active and interpretive construction of meanings by social movement actors that aid in mobilization and legitimatization of group action (Benford & Snow, 2000). They consist of three core framing tasks, including diagnostic, prognostic and motivational. For the diagnostic frame, both groups identify similar problems and assign blame to the same parties. In many cases, the solutions to these problems and what mobilizations should occur—the prognostic frame—also are very similar. Finally, the motivational frame or justification for action follows a comparable rationale in both cases. The remainder of this discussion will address these in more detail.

The diagnostic framing of both violent male and white supremacists found in these texts expresses a deep sense of nostalgia for happier times. For the white supremacists, this is a time when white people (and, men, specifically) were in the majority and in control of society through inequitable power dynamics. Women and ethnic and racial minorities “knew their place” and societal structures and systems privileged keeping white men at the top of the hierarchy. Male supremacists, too, wish for a time when men were on top and better able to successfully initiate romantic relationships and control “their” women. These men also regularly seem quite wishful for a return to the happier times of their childhood when they were blissfully unaware of the injustice in the world.

In assigning blame for the disappearance of these so-called better times, both white and male supremacists exemplify what has come to be known as backlash politics and assign blame broadly to three things. First, both groups blame feminists and the women’s movement for shifting the power balance through gains in women’s rights and, ultimately, the feminization of contemporary society they see as having made men a marginalized and oppressed group. Second, both male and white supremacists blame widespread multiculturalism for their collective plight. In the case of white supremacists, this is discursively constructed in the rhetoric of white genocide and the dangers ethnic and racial Others pose to white women and children.

In the case of violent male supremacists, however, multiculturalism has lowered their chances for securing a sexual partner because of its promotion of interracial dating. Importantly, white supremacists also see race-mixing, which they often call hybridization, as a threat to the white race. White women who date, marry and/or have children with racial or ethnic Others are viewed as “race traitors.” Finally, there is a general hostility toward the culture of political correctness, which both groups blame for pushing them to the fringes of society and see as standing in the way of taking back the power they deserve. Both of these groups have taken the red pill (or the black pill as the case may be) and so believe they see the truth of the world as it really is. The ability to speak freely, without fear of repercussions, about these issues is of the utmost importance to both groups.

Following from these diagnostic collective action frames, both groups included in this corpus also profess similar solutions and mobilizations, or prognostic frames. This narrative often revolves around a fraternal call to arms that gets discursively constituted as the epic quest of a hero's journey and may result in martyrdom, which is not only the ultimate sacrifice to the cause but also the ultimate personal reward in becoming essentially sainted within the movement. For both groups, this righteous path typically precludes a place for women to enact this sort of sacrifice; however, there are some differences in the underlying belief structures of this prognostic frame. For example, white supremacists see the white plight as possible to overcome through a white rebellion and violent overthrow of polite society, whereas violent misogynists largely see their circumstances as permanent and their plight as insurmountable. This is particularly true of black pill adherents represented in this corpus who view death as the only escape, while the more "temperate" red-pilled misogynists may also espouse other alternatives, including enforced monogamy and the legalization of rape—ideas which are not far off from white supremacist movements that at the most extreme view women as nothing more than walking wombs but always situate women in subordinate roles.

Finally, the motivational frames across both groups are highly affective and draw on normative masculine ideals centered around a Western white, heterosexual middle-class masculinity to justify associated violence and amplify the importance of the respective causes. For both groups, the urgency with which these motivational frames are presented is attributed to nothing less than the potential eradication of traditional—and, by extension, correct—ways of being in the world. The fraternal call to arms functions as a form of reparations for the perceived disappearing ways of life. White supremacists believe the white race is disappearing because of a sickness in society and that it is their duty to perpetuate the race. But there also is an imminent threat to their ability to do this because the safety of both present and future white wives and children are at risk. Therefore, if they want to ensure the safety of their families, they must be prepared to fight for the cause. If they are not willing to do so, they are considered race traitors and will not be welcome in the "New Era" society. This sense of masculinity is to be protected for the betterment

of the “civilized” white race. For violent male supremacists, on the other hand, the argument is similar but framed in a slightly different manner. The male sex has been emasculated and oppressed because of a sickness in society. Things are bad for those who conform to normative, idealized masculinity but they are far worse for those outside the norm. Those who see this truth have a duty to reinstate men to their rightful place of power, but for those men who cannot conform to this notion of masculinity or who are unhappy with their place in the hierarchy, the only resort is a disciplinary campaign of terror that will push society more in line with their distorted sense of equity and justice.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has provided empirical evidence that extends our understanding of the symbiotic beliefs, themes and tropes nested within distinct white and violent male supremacist ideologies. They are, in fact, birds of a feather. As expected, misogyny is prevalent throughout both the white and violent male supremacist texts. Both movements are preoccupied with women’s reproductive and sexual function and see women as property to own and control. They discursively frame this narrative as based in a “natural” two-sex system that precludes those deemed deviant (e.g., the LGBTQ+ community and racial and ethnic Others) from participation in order to restore their rightful place in society. Feminists, multiculturalists and political correctness have run amok and are to blame for this state of affairs. Therefore, only a hero’s quest can right this so-called wrong. There are some limitations to this study, however. First, including the Breivik and Rathjen manifestos in the white and male supremacist corpora, respectively, precludes the opportunity to examine the extent to which they actually look like both white supremacy and violent misogyny. While this was a methodological decision in the research design, future plans include analyzing them as a third corpus. Similarly, there are longer violent misogynist texts (e.g., Roy Den Hollander’s autobiography and Julius Evola’s *Men Among the Ruins*) that could have been included. This, too, was a conscious decision; however, based on our findings, future work will include these

more formal, long-form texts. Despite these limitations, this research does push the study of white and violent male supremacist movements a bit further and illustrates the importance of continuing investigation of these two movements. We envision future work in this area using larger data sets and employing distributional semantic approaches, which may provide predictive value. We hope others will continue building on this work as well.

Policy Implications

There are three broad areas of policy implications that arise from this study related to: (1) women, children and families; (2) calls for rebellion; and (3) human rights subversion. First, it is clear from these results that discussions around the well-being of women, children and families that emanate from white and male supremacists are less about mental and physical safety and more about maintaining the structural power of white men—often at the expense of white women and children and all people of color. More and more, these discourses are being mainstreamed into conservative politics at all levels, from local school boards to the federal government, as far-right actors run for elections by spreading mis/disinformation and conspiracism. As but one recent example, three far-right evangelicals flipped control of North Idaho²⁶ College's Board of Trustees, leading the college president to resign, amidst accusations the community college was using tax payer dollars to fund #BlackLivesMatter protests (it wasn't) and indoctrinating young people into radical multiculturalist politics with its diversity programs, which evidence does not support (Pettit, 2021). This is merely one example of the strategic politics of these groups. To better mitigate the spread of mis/disinformation and conspiracism in political advertising, we recommend campaign advertising reform that targets outright falsehoods and patently conspiratorial claims. Additionally, supposedly non-partisan

²⁶ Not coincidentally, Idaho is one of five Northwestern U.S. states identified by a growing traditionalist political movement for evangelicals and self-described libertarians to relocate to be among likeminded people. This is a similar strategy to some white nationalist groups who call for a white ethnostate or Pioneer Little Europe communities.

organizations at the local level, like school boards, should implement actionable behavior clauses that can more easily remove far-right actors for cause.

Second, in order to slow the spread of the dangerous language and calls to arms associated with white and/or male rebellion, the social media platforms where it is most commonly circulated need to be held accountable. These companies must retrain their algorithms to better identify and remove it. In conjunction with improving algorithms for automatic detection of calls for an uprising (by white and male supremacists—and others), social media companies should be financially responsible for employing specialists to moderate extremist content. It is insufficient to hire precarious, underpaid workers (sometimes in the world's most marginalized places) to make these content moderation calls. Not only are they ill-equipped to discern coded language and symbols used by many extremist groups, but they are often traumatized by repeatedly viewing and interacting with it (Jereza, 2021).

Finally, related to the ways in which these groups invert human rights narratives for patently anti-progressive ends, we make two recommendations. First, human rights non-governmental organizations should develop curriculum and public service announcements to counter this phenomenon and set the record straight. Second, journalists must stop quoting these narratives when proffered by interview subjects without also contextualizing and problematizing them.

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Appendix

See Tables 9.1 and 9.2.

Table 9.1 Top words in white supremacist texts

| Word | tf_idf |
|---------------------|----------|
| manifesto | 0.010578 |
| immigrant | 0.010411 |
| zionist | 0.009384 |
| Tl | 0.009254 |
| genocide | 0.007685 |
| islamic | 0.007219 |
| muslim | 0.006072 |
| Cd | 0.005967 |
| Parliament | 0.005606 |
| Dependants | 0.005518 |
| Immigrant descended | 0.005518 |
| wolverhampton | 0.005518 |
| Monsieur | 0.005502 |
| Nocence | 0.005398 |
| katherine | 0.005329 |
| Muslims | 0.005314 |
| miscegenation | 0.004859 |
| Self-evidently | 0.004859 |
| sophistry | 0.004859 |
| Statistic | 0.004859 |
| Ganges | 0.004838 |
| recognizing | 0.004692 |
| Thatds | 0.004612 |
| Turner | 0.004527 |
| Intent | 0.004192 |

Table 9.2 Top words in male supremacist manifestos

| Word | tf_idf |
|--------------|----------|
| feminists | 0.065785 |
| Youre | 0.040914 |
| Fuck | 0.037503 |
| Ive | 0.033869 |
| black | 0.031772 |
| christ | 0.031582 |
| sighs | 0.029236 |
| fucked | 0.028835 |
| annex | 0.026314 |
| frontline | 0.026314 |
| lepine | 0.026314 |
| gonna | 0.02475 |
| youdre | 0.02344 |
| alright | 0.021005 |
| defenseless | 0.020184 |
| Im | 0.01992 |
| girls | 0.019505 |
| jesus | 0.019156 |
| blackness | 0.015836 |
| rape | 0.014417 |
| soul | 0.014417 |
| uhuh | 0.013524 |
| surveillance | 0.013499 |
| blond | 0.013494 |
| smirking | 0.013494 |
| idm | 0.01338 |

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