



Universiteit  
Leiden  
The Netherlands

## **Kleptocracy and foreign policy change: a political-administrative relations account**

Bin Abadi, A.M.

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## **Chapter Two**

### **Conventional Accounts on Foreign Policy Change**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

The phenomenon of foreign policy change has mainly been studied by IR and foreign policy scholars. This chapter discusses five mainstream theories covered in such accounts: classical realism, neorealism, neoclassical realism, FPA, and bureaucratic politics model. Therefore, the structure of this chapter is as follows: First, the essence of foreign policy change will be explicated; second, the background and basic assumptions of each of those theoretical paradigms will be elaborated; next, their specific insights and findings on the actors, variables, and processes involved in foreign policy change will be discussed; last, the weaknesses as well as the missing links in those models and theories regarding the explanation of foreign policy change of a smaller power toward great powers from the perspective of kleptocracy and political-administrative relations will be highlighted.

#### **2.2 Essence of Foreign Policy Change**

To begin with, it must be noted that foreign policy is different than domestic policy: foreign policy is highly resistant to change. In addition, not all types of changes in foreign policy are the same; there can be significant variations in terms of the scope and domain in which those changes occur. For instance, not all independent states, especially those in smaller powers, possess the same degree of motivation or capabilities to change their foreign policy. Here, it is noteworthy that in the realm of international system, smaller powers do not possess the same resources and leverage as great powers do—whether in terms of economic size, military strength, total population, or technological advancement (Katzenstein, 1985; Keohane, 1969; Krasner, 1976; Kuik, 2010; Rothstein, 1968; Wallerstein, 2004). As a result, smaller powers face immense limitation in terms of their foreign policy options and freedom. They simply do not possess a privilege to change their foreign policy without facing significant costs and risks. Nevertheless, despite this logical hindrance, there are still a number of cases in which smaller powers did change their foreign policy, even to the extent of deliberately jeopardizing their bilateral relations with great powers (Bobic, 2016; Chan, 2010; Garfinkel & Skaperdas, 2007; Katagiri, 2013; Park, 2004; Paul, 1994). This is precisely the dimension of foreign policy change that this research aims to unpack and uncover, involving actors, factors, and processes that play a role in foreign policy change of a smaller power toward great powers. The next sections will critically appraise three different theoretical paradigms on foreign policy change

in terms of their capability to explain the phenomenon in which a smaller power changes its foreign policy toward great powers. The first three sections are allocated to the following theories from realism paradigm of IR studies: classical realism, neorealism, and neoclassical realism. This will be followed by two theories from foreign policy studies: FPA and bureaucratic politics model.

### **2.3 Realism and Foreign Policy Change**

As one of the dominant paradigms in IR, realism provides the most classic explanation for the nature of stakes and risks faced by smaller power in shifting their established foreign relations with great powers. In general, there are three paradigms of realism that predicate on different core assumptions to address foreign policy change of a smaller power: classical realism, neorealism, and neoclassical realism.

Classical realism assumes a state as a unitary actor; it is perceived as the main unit of analysis, operating in an anarchical international system. This core assumption leads to further explanations of the state's motive and behavior; while the state's survival is its *raison d'être*, it must deploy any measure that it is capable of to preserve its existence in the anarchical international system—a world where no higher political authority exists than the nation states themselves. Therefore, each state, as a unitary, rational actor, also consequently adopted a self-help doctrine—to continuously seek to maximize its military and economic power since no other states will automatically come to its defense in this anarchical international system (Kissinger, 1994; Morgenthau, 1985). Thus, a classical realist would expect any nation state to act rationally for boosting its military might and economic wealth, without much consideration of external drives or barriers. Consequently, a classical realist would offer a number of assumptions to answer the question of why a smaller power changes its foreign policy toward great powers.

Generally, classical realist scholars emphasize that states have two strategic options: armament (balancing) or alliance (bandwagoning; Kaufman, 1992; Morrow, 1993; Schweller, 1994; Walt, 1985). According to Morrow (1993), “Great powers ensure their own security through internal balancing....Minor powers are not strong enough to provide a decisive margin for one major power against the other or to challenge a major power alone....Major powers in a bipolar world do not depend on their allies' efforts and so do not fear either entrapment or abandonment” (p.209). Therefore, due to their limited resources and capability, smaller powers are assumed to prefer bandwagoning with great powers rather than resorting to balancing. A number of studies explain the reasons behind smaller powers' foreign policy change toward

great powers from this state-centric perspective: political executive leaders' anomalous belief (Chan, 2010; Garfinkel & Skaperdas, 2007), regime stability (Katagiri, 2013), and domestic crisis (Bobic, 2016; Park, 2004; Paul, 1994). Chan (2010) and Garfinkel & Skaperdas (2007) focused on the "anomalous belief" factor, in which smaller power tendencies of choosing a tougher stance, and ultimately leading to war, against great power can be attributed to misperceptions, misunderstandings, or to irrationality and base instincts.<sup>1</sup> Katagiri (2013) introduced the importance of organizational stability, which roughly translates into regime stability for state actors and acts as a catalyzing factor for political executive leaders of a smaller power to change the state's foreign policy against a great power.<sup>2</sup> Park (2004) and Paul (1994) identified domestic crisis—deepening economic and political turmoil—as one of the ultimate push factors for political executive leaders of a smaller power to change their established foreign policy and wage war against a great power in order to ensure popular support.<sup>3</sup>

Classical realism's predominantly domestic-centered perspective has been challenged by a new version of realism, known as structural realism or neorealism. Its main proponent, Kenneth Waltz, in his 1979 book *Theory of International Politics*, reversed the classical realists' focus on the domestic factors by highlighting instead the impact of anarchy in the international system: international structure emerges as an aggregate of the interaction of states and then constrains them from taking certain actions while propelling them toward others. Again, the state is considered as a rational, unitary actor, but neorealists or structural realists are fundamentally different from classical realists: While the latter assume the state as a proactive actor that is immanently seeking to maximize its military and economic power, the former hold a view that states are predominantly reactive actors and that it is the external threats or incentives, known as "structural factors," that ultimately influence a state's foreign policy. This is from where neorealism derived its other name: structural realism (Waltz, 2000).

Describing his structural realism theory, Waltz argues that an international political system constrains and shapes the behavior of the units (or states) through the reinforcing mechanisms of socialization and competition. Over time, states learn because they observe the misfortune of others who not conform to the dictates of the system. There are three distinct

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<sup>1</sup> Classic examples of such cases are Iraq's decision under Saddam Hussein to go into war against the United States, its former implicit ally during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988); Panama's Manuel Noriega's declaration of war against the United States (1989); and Taliban's decision in 2001 to not hand over Osama Bin Laden to the United States, their former ally against Soviet's invasion in Afghanistan (1979–1989).

<sup>2</sup> Vietnam's Communist Party is a prominent example in this regard: When they went against China, their ally during the Sino–Vietnamese War (1979).

<sup>3</sup> Classic example of the domestic crisis case is the 1982 Falklands War launched by the then domestically problematic Argentines military dictator, Leopoldo Galtieri, against the United Kingdom.

pathways that explain a smaller power's foreign policy change along the lines of structural realism-based reasoning: the foreign support (Rothstein, 1968; Weitsman, 2013), the window of opportunity (Bobic, 2016; van Evera, 1999), and change in great powers' politics (Mearsheimer, 2014; Walt, 1985). The existence of foreign support or alliance is one of the leading factors that compels executive leaders of smaller powers to change their foreign policy and choose to go against a great power.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, "window of opportunity" refers to "the time period within which an actor can provide maximum benefit to itself before circumstances change, diminishing the value of potential benefits" (Bobic, 2016, p.20).<sup>5</sup> Change in great powers' politics is another influential factor stemming from international structure that prompts foreign policy change of smaller powers. The emergence or decline of a superpower affects the material and security interests of a smaller power to a great extent. Due to the push for survival, smaller powers keep revising their dependency over any great powers—to the extent that it is unsurprising that certain countries are willing (and quick) to abandon their once strongly defended ideology for the purpose of adopting new rising superpower's ideology (Walt, 1985).

In short, the unitary view of the government—also known as a "billiard ball" model—presented by classical realism is also shared by neorealism. However, this view proved to be inadequate to explain the outcome of foreign policy in a number of cases in which the combination of the structural factor and the more nuanced domestic factor provides more precision (Christensen, 1996; Rose, 1998; Schweller, 1998; Wohlforth, 1993; Zakaria, 1999). Consequently, both classical realism and neorealism are unable to tackle the remaining theoretical puzzles posed by this research: the relations between changes in political-administrative configurations and foreign policy change.

In contrast to the two variants of realism theories that provide either an external structure-based approach (neorealism or structural realism) or an internal state-based approach (classical realism), the third theory in realism paradigm—neoclassical realism—links both the structural and the internal perspectives in explaining foreign policy-making process. This variant of realism theory differentiates a state actor by analyzing it not as a unitary actor, but

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<sup>4</sup> For instance, Bashar al-Assad from Syria received strong support from Russia both militarily and diplomatically (at the United Nations) against US regime-change interventions. The decision by Kim Il-Sung, the leader of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (or North Korea), to invade the Republic of Korea (or South Korea) and start the Korean War in 1950 was also due to the support that he received from Stalin (Soviet) and Chairman Mao (China).

<sup>5</sup> For instance, the Mujahideen of Afghanistan received Stinger anti-aircraft missiles from the United States to counter the invention of the Soviet Union (1979–1989), albeit not having any formal alliance with Washington. Another infamous example was the United States' temporary support to Saddam Hussein's aggression against Iran during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988).

rather as a combination of different actors, thereby making it better equipped to tackle the remaining two puzzles.

“Neoclassical realism is an emerging school of foreign policy theories that seeks to explain

why, how, and under what conditions the internal characteristics of states—the extractive and mobilization capacity of politico-military institutions, the influence of domestic societal actors and interest groups, the degree of state autonomy from society, and the level of elite or societal cohesion—intervene between the leaders’ assessment of international threats and opportunities and the actual diplomatic, military, and foreign economic policies those leaders pursue” (Taliaferro, 2009, p.4).

In short, it posits an imperfect “transmission belt” between systemic push and pull, on the one hand, and the actual foreign economic and military policies states select, on the other.

To understand foreign policy change from the perspective of neoclassical realism, it is essential to analyze its basic analytical construct. Neoclassical realism systemizes through the following three different variables at three different levels of analysis by different units of analysis: independent variable (structural or external factors), intervening variable (domestic factors), and dependent variable (foreign policy outcome of a state).<sup>6</sup> Consequently, neoclassical realism gives more weightage to the structural factor in triggering the smaller states’ foreign policy change, but in a different degree compared to the neorealist assumption. There are four broad categories of intervening unit-level variables that have been discussed by neoclassical realist scholars: the images and perceptions of political executive leaders, strategic culture, state–society relations, and domestic institutions.<sup>7</sup> In essence, all four categories of intervening variables reflect the various constraints on the central actors (political executive leaders), the interactions within and between decision-makers and general public, and the processes and mechanisms by which foreign policy is formulated; each of these categories can affect the manner in which states respond to external stimuli. However, the most relevant intervening variable to be discussed from the perspective of this research is domestic political institution.

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<sup>6</sup> While Type-I and Type-II neoclassical realism accounts mainly for foreign policy of individual states, Type-III provides a broader explanation for its dependent variable: international politics. See Ripsman et al. (2016).

<sup>7</sup> These variables clearly include psychological, bureaucratic/organizational, societal, and institutional models, which Ripsman et al. (2016) admit to be reflecting alternative approaches to another research paradigm in political science sub-discipline: FPA.

As Ripsman et al. (2016) put it,

“Formal institutions, organizational routines and processes, and bureaucratic oversight, often established by constitutional provisions with clearly specified rules and regulations set the broad parameters within which domestic competition over policy occurs....Consequently, they determine who can contribute to policy formation, at what stage of the policy process, and who can act as veto players, using their power to block policy initiatives in order to reshape governmental policies” (p.75).

While this variable seems capable to account for the dynamics of political-administrative configurations in foreign policy change, it is still underdeveloped. This is because most of the scholars and subsequent works that adopted this variable focus more on political executive-legislative relations, party systems, and the autonomy of the political executive.

#### **2.4 Foreign Policy Analysis Models of Foreign Policy Change**

FPA can be considered a subfield of IR (Hudson, 2005; Kaarbo, 2015). Hudson (2005) described FPA as a theoretical paradigm with “an actor-specific focus, based upon the argument that all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups” (p.1). Khong (2014), on the other hand, differentiated the three analytical constructs of FPA: the decision-makers, the decision-making process, and the decision outcome. Therefore, a typical FPA analysis revolves around the cognitive aspect and ideological convictions of key decision-makers as well as the input of other relevant actors, for example, the government agencies and the pressure groups such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). FPA scholars examine how these actors interact during the decision-making process by constructing a narrative of how the decision was reached (Khong, 2014).

Hitherto, there are a number of FPA scholars who have already addressed the problem of foreign policy change (Goldmann, 1982; Gustavsson, 1998; Hermann, 1990; Holsti, 1982). A central assumption in much of this literature is that

“foreign policies tend to be rigid; once a particular policy has been put in place, institutional inertia and vested interests have a stabilizing effect, making it highly resistant to change....The analytical task is therefore to identify the circumstances under which such obstacles break down, thus creating an opening for change” (Gustavsson, 1998, p.3).

In particular, Gustavsson (1998) suggested that the simultaneous occurrence of three particular conditions may facilitate a change in foreign policy: “changes in fundamental structural

conditions, strategic political leadership and the presence of a crisis of some kind.” (p.27) While structural conditions can create pressure for change, they cannot, by themselves, lead to changes. To influence the outcome, structural conditions need to be perceived and acted upon by political agents, typically a reform-oriented individual who recognizes a moment of opportunity and decides to launch a favored political proposal. The chances of success will be higher if this is tied to a crisis of some kind as crises tend to unlock the prohibitions on institutional conditions and increase the propensity to take political risks.<sup>8</sup>

However, the explanatory capacity of all FPA models reviewed in this chapter can be considered inferior to that of neoclassical realism. Due to its systematic framework of allocating different degrees of influence in foreign policy-making process to different actors at different levels of analysis, ranging from the external stimuli (the main push factor) to the internal process (the transmission belt), neoclassical realism proves to be better equipped as compared to the cognitive-dominated theory of FPA to answer this research’s theoretical puzzles. In a way, FPA does acknowledge the influence of both external and internal factors in the making of foreign policy change; the only difference is that it assigns more weightage to individual decision-makers’ cognitive capability of interpreting and transforming both the external and internal pressure into foreign policy change than neoclassical realism. Instead, neoclassical realism clearly and systematically distinguishes between the external factors (structural factors) and the internal factors (both political environment and decision-makers’ cognitive realm). Furthermore, neoclassical realism also assigns different degrees of weightage to the structural and the internal factors in decision-making process that leads to foreign policy change of a state; the former is posited as a more critical stimuli for foreign policy change, while the latter is included as an intervening factor that determines the form of the eventual foreign policy change.

Nevertheless, due to the broad range of intervening variables offered by neoclassical realism—psychological, strategic cultural, the state–society relation, and domestic political variables—its capability to explain the internal dynamics of foreign policy-making process among different actors in a specific case from specific perspective can still be improved. For instance, to address the theoretical puzzles of this research, one can resort to the domestic

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<sup>8</sup> It must be noted that Gustavsson proposed all three preconditions for change in foreign policy in the same year (1998) that Gideon Rose coined the term “neoclassical realism.” Therefore, despite Gustavsson’s intention to actually improve and contribute to FPA, his work coincidentally converged with Rose’s neoclassical realism conception. Nevertheless, as Kaarbo (2015), Ripsman et al. (2016), and Taliaferro (2009) explained, neoclassical realist theorists did incorporate some of FPA’s premises into their intervening variable.

political variables offered by neoclassical realism, but this particular variable still suffers analytical bias toward the political executive leaders at the expense of the accounts from the bureaucrats in foreign policy-making and foreign policy change. Therefore, a novel combination of neoclassical realism's basic assumption, particularly its domestic political variable, and another model or approach that specifically addresses the role and influence of the bureaucrats is needed. This is the reason behind the inclusion of the bureaucratic politics model into this review chapter.

## **2.5 Bureaucratic Politics Model and Foreign Policy Change**

Having discussed several major IR theoretical paradigms that address the phenomenon of foreign policy change from broad and multiple perspectives, this section now moves to discuss a specific account in foreign policy-making that includes bureaucrats as a significant actor in foreign policy-making process: the bureaucratic politics model. The central argument of "bureaucratic politics" proponents is that "Foreign policy decisions are a resultant, or product, of bargaining between individuals as representatives of organizations" (Christensen & Redd, 2004). There are two basic assumptions that underlie "bureaucratic politics" perspective: First is the assumption that actors in foreign policy-making process define their preferences according to their membership in their particular organization; second, these actors then attempt to maximize their organization's influence in the policy-making process (Allison & Halperin, 1972; Christensen & Redd, 2004). Allison and Zelikow (1999) provided ground-breaking accounts of bureaucracies promoting policies that advance their interests and budgets. Given this predisposition of bureaucracies, a nation's foreign policy is the result of the push and pull among multiple agencies. Zakaria (1999), on the other hand, detected that bureaucratic politics explains "why different bureaucracies adopt different policies," thus making assumptions about the preferences of decision-makers.

In essence, the bureaucratic politics model conceptualizes the governmental apparatus as a decentralized and pluralist framework within which several "players" interact. Allison and Zelikow (1999) posited,

"The governmental (or bureaucratic) politics model sees no unitary actor but rather many actors as players—players who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems as well; players who act in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals; players who make government decisions not by a single, rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics. (p. 144)

Therefore, the different players are not distinctively organized according to a clear and functional division of work—their policy domains partly overlap instead.

As a result of these overlaps, each player then must defend their viewpoint as well as interests against other players. To ensure that the government's actions are going to reflect their vision or serve their own interests, each player must negotiate with each other. As Allison and Zelikow emphasized,

“The organizing concepts of this paradigm can be arranged as strands in the answers to four interrelated questions: Who plays? What determines each player's stand? What determines each player's relative influence? How does the game combine player's stands, influence, and moves to yield governmental decisions and actions?” (p. 164).

The above-mentioned questions were then elaborated by Allison and Zelikow in order to construct their bureaucratic politics model further. Regarding the first question, Allison and Zelikow clarified that it refers to “whose interests and actions have an important effect on the government's decisions and actions?” This is where Allison and Zelikow famously adopted the adage “Where you stand depends on where you sit.” In other words, an official's position on an issue depends on where they are located (on a chart). Hence, “players” are often equated to bureaucratic units that are in competition. Allison and Zelikow then stresses the fact that individuals' ideas and interests generally correspond to the bureaucratic unit to which they belong. Therefore, an organizational culture is assumed to promote the uniformity of ideas within a bureaucratic unit. In such a culture, the career prospects offered by the growth of an organization are conducive to convergence of interests. Conversely, the different ministries involved may have opposing points of view on a given foreign policy issue.

However, it must be noted that the different teams in a bureaucratic game are not necessarily whole departments. In fact, they can be specific groups from the same department. Differences can occur where hierarchical fault lines can see a ground-level staff to go against managers. Functional divisions may also occur, causing units on the same hierarchical level to go against one another. In this so-called “bureaucratic game,” the head of government is considered an additional player, first among equals (*primus inter pares*), who is entirely responsible to defend his vision and interests. They do not necessarily have the monopoly of power and usually refrain from concluding a debate arbitrarily. In fact, when they have resolved to make a certain decision on some issues alone, they can still be swayed by discussions with other bureaucratic players (Christensen & Redd, 2004; Rosati, 1981).

Indeed, the bureaucratic politics model factors in the significant role and influence of political executives and bureaucrats into foreign policy-making process. Therefore, both

executives and bureaucratic actors in foreign policy-making process define their preferences according to their membership in their particular organization. Accordingly, both actors attempt to maximize their organization's influence in the policy-making process, including pushing for foreign policy change when they deem such move as necessary for the sake of their interests. However, the model has two caveats. First, it does not sufficiently account for the impact of structural forces on the interests of both political executives and bureaucrats; this can be rectified by combining the model with the neoclassical realism theory. Second, it does not emphasize a distinction in the degree of autonomy possessed by the bureaucrat vis-à-vis their political masters (bureaucratic autonomy). Consequently, the model alone cannot explain to what extent the bureaucrats in a smaller power possess the freedom to formulate their own preferences vis-à-vis great powers. To rectify this second weakness, the model should be combined with another theory that is deeply rooted in the political-administrative relations. This specific task of theorizing a novel model to analyze a smaller power's foreign policy change toward great powers by combining some aspects of neoclassical realism with the bureaucratic politics model and another theory that touches upon the political-administrative relations is assigned to the next chapter.

Table 2.1  
*Conventional Accounts on Foreign Policy Change*

Theory/ Dimension	<i>Cause(s) of foreign policy change</i>	<i>Process(es) of foreign policy change</i>	<i>Main actor</i>	<i>Point of weakness(es)/ missing links</i>
<b>Classical Realism</b>	Leaders' anomalous belief; regime stability; and domestic crisis	Direct: from state's interests into foreign policy change	State as an unitary actor, pursuing its own interests	Overestimating state's unitary preferences; underestimating structural pressure for foreign policy change
<b>Neorealism (Structural Realism)</b>	Threats and rewards from structural actors (foreign countries)	Direct: from external pressures into foreign policy change	State as unitary actor, predominantly responding to external pressure(s)	Black-boxing internal dynamics; overestimating structural pressure for foreign policy change
<b>Neoclassical Realism</b>	Threat and rewards from structural actors, interpreted and transformed by domestic actors	Indirect: from external pressures to domestic consideration into foreign policy change	Executives, politicians, political party, and economic and societal groups	Domestic politics variables needing improvement to account for dynamics in political-administrative relations and foreign policy change
<b>Foreign Policy Analysis</b>	Cognitive aspect and ideological convictions of key decision-makers as well as the input of other relevant domestic actors	Direct and indirect: leader's cognitive primacy in some models, leader as intermediary in other models	Executives and political leaders	Overestimating the cognitive and ideological convictions of decision-makers; obscuring the differences between the external and the domestic factors

<b>Bureaucratic Politics Model</b>	Political bargaining among different domestic groups to maximize each group's interests	Indirect: 'action-channel'; policy change affected by resource ownership	Executives and bureaucrats	Insufficient accounts on the impact of structural forces upon the political executives' & bureaucrats' interests and issues of bureaucratic autonomy
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**2.6 Conclusion**

This research specifically addresses the impact of kleptocracy on foreign policy change and establishes that not all IR and foreign policy theories can explain such a phenomenon. To that end, this chapter filtered out IR theories that lack the capability to explain the source, nature, and international effect of kleptocracy. This resulted in realism as the only IR theory that can explain the impact of corrupt practices such as kleptocracy on smaller powers' foreign policy reconfiguration vis-à-vis great powers in an uncertain, anarchical system of international politics.

This chapter reviewed and identified the gap in three different variants of realism theory to explain foreign policy change. While classical realism overestimates a state's unitary preferences and underestimates structural pressure for foreign policy change, neorealism black-boxes the state's internal dynamics and overestimates the structural pressure for foreign policy change. Although the third realist paradigm—neoclassical realism—acknowledges the significance of external threats and rewards on domestic decision-makers' foreign policy-making process, it needs improvement to account for dynamics in political-administrative relations that result in foreign policy change.

In addition to realism, this chapter also reviewed two theories from foreign policy study perspective: FPA and bureaucratic politics model. While it is argued that FPA's focus on cognitive factors in foreign policy-making has reduced its capability to explain the role of political-administrative relations in mediating kleptocracy's impact on foreign policy change, the bureaucratic politics model offers insufficient accounts on the dynamics of executives' and bureaucrats' interests as well as overestimates the autonomy of the latter over the former. However, the model does offer an insight on domestic political bargaining in foreign policy formulation process; it is just that it has yet to be developed from the perspective of kleptocracy and its effect on political-administrative relations.

Chapter Three will proceed to theorize a novel model to analyze the impact of kleptocracy on foreign policy change from the perspective of political-administrative relations. To do so, the available insights and assumptions from IR theories discussed in this chapter will be extracted and constructed upon further. As discussed above, the combination of the basic assumption of neoclassical realism and the essence of the bureaucratic politics model complement each other; while neoclassical realism provides a structural–internal construct, a vertical analytical construct on foreign policy change, the bureaucratic politics model contributes a political-administrative construct, a horizontal analytical construct on foreign policy change. Nevertheless, both theories have inherent weaknesses that demand modifications in order to efficiently explain the impact of kleptocracy on foreign policy change from the perspective of political-administrative relations. The details of this extraction and modification of theories will be presented in the next chapter.

