Introduction: region, nation and history
Núñez Seixas, X.M.; Storm, H.J.

Citation

Version: Publisher's Version
License: Licensed under Article 25fa Copyright Act/Law (Amendment Taverne)
Downloaded from: https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3464785

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).
On 13 October 2017, Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, criticized the attempt of the Catalan regional government to secede from Spain by saying, 'I would not like a European Union [. . . ] that consists of 98 states', adding, 'It's already difficult with 28 [member states]’, but ‘with 98 it would be impossible'.1 Obviously, there were legal obstacles as well to accepting the actions of the separatists, since the Catalan referendum on independence, held less than two weeks before, had been declared illegal by the Spanish Constitutional Court and its turnout amounted to barely 43 per cent of the regional electorate. Nevertheless, it is quite ironic that Juncker should oppose a territory much larger than his native Luxembourg becoming a new nation state: the state of Luxembourg actually consists of less than half of the original duchy of the same name, has only about half a million inhabitants and only became an independent sovereign state in 1890 by dynastic coincidence. Catalonia, on the other hand, is a prosperous region with approximately 7.5 million inhabitants and would be a middle-sized state comparable to Austria or Finland.

Luxembourg is therefore considered a nation state, although its size is very limited and it does not have a very unified national culture. Its official languages are German, French and Luxembourgish, which is a Franconian language also spoken in neighbouring areas of Germany, France and Belgium. Catalonia, on the other hand, remains for the moment a region (autonomous community) of Spain, since the attempt to proclaim an independent republic ended in failure. Although, officially, the region is bilingual, and Spanish remains the mother tongue of over half of its inhabitants, Catalan is the primary language of education; Catalan culture is thriving and about half of the electorate consistently votes for nationalist parties. Several scholars therefore argue that Catalonia – like Scotland, Quebec or Kurdistan – is a nation without a state.2

However, in this case the picture is also more complicated, since the Catalan language and culture does not exclusively belong to Catalonia; the language is spoken in a much wider area from the Roussillon region, on the French side of the Pyrenees, to Guardamar in the south-east of Spain, while also including the Balearic Islands. Catalan is even the official language of the independent principality of Andorra. Although some inhabitants of the other Catalan-speaking areas within Spain sympathize with the attempt of the regional government in Barcelona to create an independent state, most of them are satisfied with the considerable level of autonomy that their regions have and do not feel
any inclination to join the Catalan nationalists. In the region of Valencia, there is even a clear tendency to distinguish its own version of the Catalan language as Valencian.

In Roussillon, the Catalan cultural heritage is only celebrated by a limited number of associations which can be subsumed under the label of cultural regionalism. Cultural regionalism is combined with forms of political regionalism in the Balearic Islands and in the Autonomous Community of Valencia (which includes the provinces of Valencia, Alicante and Castellón). Although many inhabitants of the Autonomous Community of Catalonia define themselves as nationalists, others would prefer the label of regionalists, while a considerable part of the population even prioritizes their belonging to the Spanish nation over any regional feelings. In the case of Andorra, Catalan is the only official language of the state, but, in practice, many inhabitants speak Spanish, French, Galician or Portuguese, the latter two because of a large group of immigrants from Galicia and Portugal.

Therefore, the distinction between region and (nation) state is rather arbitrary and the result of historical contingency, as is the distinction between regional and national identities. Catalan culture (and ethnicity) can form the basis for regional identities in Valencia, the Balearic Islands and Roussillon, but also of national identities in Andorra and the territory of Catalonia. There is consequently no clearly defined Catalan people that slowly became aware of its shared history and heritage, while developing the wish to create its own independent nation state. One could even argue that a Catalan national identity is largely the product of the autonomous status of Catalonia.

In *Regionalism in Modern Europe*, we try to disentangle some of these complexities and provide them with a historical background, covering the period from the late nineteenth century until the present. Distinguished specialists from various disciplines examine the process of regional identity construction and regional movements – both of a cultural and political nature – in all parts of the continent. Before explaining the objectives and structure of the volume in more detail, we will first discuss the historiographical debate on regionalism and regional identity construction and provide some definitions.¹

**The historiographical debate (1970s–2017)**

The general shift in the historical analysis of territorial identities, nationalism and ethnicity that has taken place in social sciences since the late 1980s has led historians from structuralism to postmodernism and from privileging the study of the ‘social preconditions’ where nationalism emerges and develops (as was common in the 1970s and 1980s) to researching the cultural processes of territorial identity-building, as well as their reception and reproduction by individuals. This development has also affected the study of regionalism. A parallel phenomenon that has helped focus research on subnational identities was the increasing necessity to study the dynamics of nation-building from below, by adopting a micro-historical outlook that owed much to new directions in historiography from the late 1970s, which emphasized the role of individuals and communities in shaping their own destiny. This approach uncovered...
multiple hybrid identities and national imaginaries perceived through the mirror of local and subnational realities. Contrary to the assertions of some classic approaches to nation-building (beginning with Eugen Weber’s Peasants into Frenchmen, 1976), it revealed that becoming national did not necessarily mean ceasing to be local or giving up one’s hometown pride.¹

The basic questions in current research on nationalism may also be applied to regions, regional identities and regionalism. First, the chicken-and-egg question: What came first, the regions or the regional identity? Moreover, are regions given pre-existing entities, or are they rather a construct of regionalist doctrines and movements? Why are some regions successfully constructed or even invented while others are not? Are regional identities complementary or opposed to national identities? These questions could be broadened by relativizing the term ‘regionalism’ and including other territorial dimensions within it. Is localism a complementary phenomenon to regionalism, or is it more compatible with state nationalism, which tends to enhance local (and urban) identities, seeing them as less threatening?

Any attempt at an exhaustive compilation is doomed to failure, given the huge amount of literature dealing with particular territorial units across the Old Continent. However, some remarks can be made about the terminology used. Regionalism was an extremely diffuse concept at the start of the twentieth century. The term was coined at the end of the nineteenth century and applied principally to the French situation – although, in the 1880s, the term was also being used in public debates in Spain.⁵ In 1911, the founder of the Fédération Régionaliste Française, Jean Charles-Brun, stated that the term ‘regionalism’ was successful precisely because of its lack of precision. By that time, ‘regionalism’ meant everything that questioned the ‘excesses’ of state centralism, from the revival of substate folk cultures, local and provincial architecture and arts, the organization of local fairs or the demand for administrative decentralization, up to the more ambitious political goals of the early Breton or Basque nationalist groupings.⁶ This broad category, although centred more on the demands of national movements of East-Central and Western Europe, was taken up again by the French historian Charles Seignobos, who used the label ‘autonomism’ to differentiate political demands for self-government from cultural claims.⁷

Regionalism and, to some extent, localism have played a highly ambiguous role in European history. Regional identities helped fashion the national states that arose in the nineteenth century.⁸ Yet, the resilience of some territorial identities forged during the pre-modern period also contributed to the emergence of several substate nationalisms opposed to the existence of a single nation identified with the territory of the state and advocating self-determination for their specific territories. In fact, regionalist forerunners have generally preceded, but also accompanied, the emergence of substate nationalisms. The many examples of this, from Catalonia to Brittany, make good case studies in the ambiguous processes of region- and nation-building.

A clear definition of what a region is seems as complex and elusive as defining what a nation is. Geographers, economists, political and social scientists have considered regions to be economic entities, historical territories, frontier areas and geographical
units bounded by natural features, but they can also be regarded as a form of collective identity, as an imagined community. A region can be described as a smaller territorial part of a bigger whole, either with administratively defined borders or linked to emotionally defined spatial categories that may act as links between the individual and collective sentiments of belonging, such as Heimat, paese, terruño and kraj. These may be considered an extension of the landscape and characteristics of the space that defines everyday experiences. The region – or any form of local demarcation – is not a pre-existing entity, or a ‘natural’ alternative to the nation state. The contents of a region, its territorial limits and its inclusive or exclusive character cannot be defined objectively unless the objects of study are ‘physical’ regions defined by landscape and nature. In fact, the region is a constructed identity, dependent on social agency. Its members never come into personal contact with all others, and, as such, the region is a putative group, constructed upon the performative utterance of those who claim its existence or believe in it. Similarly, the region can be both a cultural construct and the result of public policy or of a region-building effort carried out by institutions and intellectuals. The question is, To what extent can region-builders be identified with nation-builders? To focus a research agenda on the local sphere and the region does not imply embracing a new ‘regio-primordialism’; it instead involves determining whether that sphere of identification has been more or less successful in relation to others.

To what extent is it possible to analytically differentiate regionalism from nationalism? Most authors rarely identify any differences between them, basically because regionalism has been given little attention in the ‘classic’ nationalism studies. The term ‘regional nationalism’ has been also coined to refer to substate nationalist movements, going all the way from the Czech movement in the nineteenth century to the Sardinian one in the twentieth century. It is a commonly used term among historians and political scientists, and some use regionalism and minority nationalism quite interchangeably. ‘Regionalist’ is used by most francophone authors to refer to ethnonationalist movements in Europe, particularly in Western Europe. Some scholars, primarily political scientists, have argued that regionalism has three characteristics in common with minority nationalisms: 1) the shaping of a territorially-bound collective identity; 2) the development of a cultural, economic or political centre/periphery conflict with the state; and 3) the existence of social mobilization and/or political organizations of a territorial (i.e. regional) character. Thus, regionalism and minority nationalism could be considered as two parallel products resulting from the existence of both an ethno-territorial conflict and social mobilization, with diffuse lines of demarcation. These lines tend to be flexible and subject to change, although two common underlying elements are ethnic mobilization – understanding ethnicity broadly as a social construction of differences based on some malleable combination of primordial elements – and a demand for the territory of interest to be considered a political unit.

Is one to assume that regionalism always serves as the first expression of an ideology that may develop further, into a minority or substate nationalism? Or can regionalism also be seen as a very different phenomenon, intrinsically linked to state nationalism?
Introduction

Some classical definitions of nationalism presupposed that an increase in social communication and a weakening of substate identities were necessary preconditions for nation-building. Regional identities were therefore implicitly perceived as pre-modern vestiges and opposed to national identities. The modern form of collective identity, which was also linked to the legitimacy of power, was to be the nation, which was to become the subject of sovereignty; the regions would remain only as areas of traditional culture, rural values and so on. This perspective permeated historical research on the topic until the early 1990s, holding that the survival of mesoterritorial or medium-range identities and of any form of regional claims during the modern period should be seen as a symptom of weak nation-building and a possible forerunner of minority nationalism.

Similar positions resulted from some of the debates during the 1980s and early 1990s regarding Italian and Belgian historiographies of nation- and state-building in the modern period. All of them claimed that their countries had experienced weak nationalization, expressed as an inverted mirror in the survival of subnational loyalties. Subnational, and particularly regional, assertiveness was regarded as a symptom of weak nation-building and unfulfilled state modernization. This assumption has also decisively influenced French and Spanish academic research on the national question. In the Spanish case, for instance, historical studies of Basque, Catalan or Galician nationalism has led historians in other Spanish regions to highlight any form of regional affirmation and/or local claim for autonomy by applying the same explanatory scheme to all cases. Something similar happened to France in the 1970s: the model applied to Brittany seemed to be valid for many other territories. Regionalism was seen as a forerunner of minority nationalism and, regardless of ideology, all possible predecessors (including federal republicans, monarchists, cultural folklorists, etc.) were lumped into a sort of catch-all movement that would surely result in the emergence of a new substate nationalism. Perhaps only British historians, who were very aware of the exceptional nature of the national question on their island(s), regarded the concept of unity in diversity as a natural outcome of an imperial state. The survival of a post-imperial identity, now reduced to its insular core, would still allow for the integration of different nations into a common polity, in much the same way as the Austro-Hungarian or the Ottoman empires had managed to maintain regional and territorial diversity within their borders before the First World War. Here, the alternative concept of territorial loyalty has been recently proposed as a polyvalent concept, which makes it possible for historians to apprehend the complexity of territorial belongings and their mutations over time.

Recent research, however, has undermined the classical assertion of region-building as an opposite to nation-building. Some scholars have even theorized that nation-building may also imply building regional or local identities, to the point that the former may depend heavily on the latter, or vice versa. Collective identities, and territorial loyalties, may be regarded as a series of overlapping and complementary concentric spheres – like the layers of an onion – that result from dynamic historical processes, as do all forms of collective identity. In many cases, nationalist movements, ‘nationalizing’ states and long-established nation states that carried out nation-building policies also reaffirmed local and regional identities in order to strengthen the roots of national identity among the

population. Moreover, this phenomenon occurred in diverse currents and varieties of nationalism, as can be seen, for example, in nineteenth-century Germany or in the Soviet Union under Stalin. Promoting regional symbols and patterns of identity was regarded as a way of promoting national identities at the grass-roots level. The case of Germany demonstrated this: love for the Heimat implied love for the Vaterland, as the Heimat – a concept also invented at the end of the nineteenth century – could be extended to a local, classless national community. From the Social Democrats to the Nazis, many social and political actors played the regionalism and Heimat card, and continued to use similar packaging of local identity images to give support to divergent worldviews.

This was not always the case with other European nation states. In the French case, the increasing concern with the cult of ‘local memories’ expressed by small-towns librarians, antiquarians, historians and ‘middling provincials’ was not able to supersede the big debates – Monarchy versus Republic – that affected French political life during the nineteenth century. Still, local nostalgia was often linked with a preference for the social models that were identified with the past. During the Third Republic, on the other hand, regional identification was stimulated from above, especially through education, where the local and regional sphere were encompassed within the larger whole of the nation. In fact, although some forms of regional identity can come into conflict with the national identity, this does not always happen. Regional identities can be sustained by a more or less invented historical tradition, or they may be founded on common cultural traits, fostered by the prior existence of collective political institutions and the production of symbolic frames of meaning that help members of the region to identify themselves as members of a community.

The relationships between empire-, nation- and region-building are not fixed but are subject to constant change over time. However, not all forms of collective identity have a similar political dimension, and not all expressions of subnational identity are infused with present-day political consequences, such as the claim for self-determination, which is exclusive to the realm of nationalism and may turn into open separatism. The same could be said regarding the sensitive aspects of territorial identity; not all sentiments of belonging possess the same level of emotional appeal. The nation is invested with sacredness and strong affective ties, while this is not always the case with subnational identities, although it could be argued that, in dying for the nation, many soldiers also died for the tangible and familiar meanings of the homeland, associated with the places they had experienced. This gave common people concrete reasons to fight: to defend their homes and families as an expression of their nation.

Much new material has been written since the beginning of the twenty-first century concerning the cultural dynamics of region-building, the invention of regions and the place of subnational identities in Europe. Although regionalism as a specific domain of political history has become less visible, there have been some innovative contributions to the reassessment of the transversal influence of regionalist programs within some national traditions of political thought. Regionalism has become a field of study in itself, but the lines of demarcation with the study of nationalism, on the one hand, and of local identities, on the other, are not always clear. Moreover, they will remain so,
Introduction

given that identification processes, forms of territorial loyalty and ways of imagining territory vary throughout Europe and can change over time within a given nation state, territory and area. The very fact that all forms of subnational identity are intertwined has paradoxically contributed to increasing confusion about how to establish differences, how to conceptualize them properly for analytical purposes and how to compare them. Therefore, the lack of authentic cross-European or multiple case-comparative studies is problematic. Comparisons between Eastern and Western Europe, or between Southern and Northern Europe, are still quite unusual in the field of nationalism studies; they are even scarcer in the field of subnational identities. Some comparisons have been made between regions divided by a border in order to understand how subnational identities have evolved differently over time in East and Central European ‘frontier cities’ or in regions belonging to different states, such as Flanders or Catalonia. Although few truly comparative studies are available so far, comparisons have been made between different forms of subnational identity in two or more territories within one nation state or polity. Perhaps as a result of this, much of what was commonly stated about the ‘differences’ in the historical evolution of Eastern and West European subnational identities has reflected the prevailing paradigms of the aprioristic dichotomy between ‘Eastern’ (ethnic) and ‘Western’ (civic) types of nationalism. It has occasionally given rise to an inverted typology – hence the very specific East European concept of Landespatriotismus, initially translated as ‘patriotism of the land’ or ‘loyalty to the land’ where one lives, has sometimes been defined as an implicitly good, supra-ethnic and territorial regionalism based on love of one’s territory, and was considered to be opposed by the ‘nationalizing’ tendencies in the territories of the Austro-Hungarian and Tsarist Empires. Therefore, regionalism in the Central European context was understood as a form of supra-ethnic territorial loyalty similar to the Landespatriotismus, which was devoid of ethnic content and could thus be shared by linguistically or ethnically diverse segments of the population. However, this definition could not be applied in Western Europe. In any case, methodological regionalism continues to dominate the field and most historians have restricted themselves to analysing just one region, and normally their own.

On definitions

Regionalism in Modern Europe is firmly situated within more recent historiographical trends: most chapters will start in the late nineteenth century when regionalism became a mass movement in many parts of Europe and when many regional identities began to be defined more closely. Moreover, we will not only deal with regions where a strong regional movement began to claim political autonomy or even independence but also with those regions where expressions of regional identity largely remained within the cultural sphere. So how exactly could we define regions and regionalism? Some authors have put forward the thesis that regions are solely political-administrative entities. Every territorial community that does not meet this definition would fall into the category...
of mere *ethnies* (a term invented by Anthony Smith). However, defining a *region* as a territory embodied with political-administrative institutions is too reductionist. The term ‘region’ existed before the vindication of decentralization, and may be independent of the demand for political decentralization and the claim of possessing representative or administrative institutions that span the region. The ‘region’ may be merely a cultural or ethnocultural concept, imbued with a religious character, possessing relatively shifting territorial limits; this concentric sphere of territorial identification does not necessarily have to be defined in ethnic terms. A broader definition of regionalism could include *the culture that upholds and therefore shapes in the public sphere the existence of a region as an imagined community*. This community may or may not make political claims but is located somewhere between the nation (subject of sovereignty and territorially broader) and the local sphere (the space of human experience and daily interaction).

If a certain regionalism demands political-administrative decentralization, we could classify it as a *political regionalism* or even as a *regionalist movement*. There are certainly many regionalisms, or local/mesoterritorial claims, which we shall define as *cultural regionalism*, where political aims do not occupy the centre of their agenda, and the main channel of expression is cultural (be it historiographic, folklore-based, etc.). However, they do advocate the existence of an historical, ethnocultural or simply ‘functional’ territorial entity that is integrated within a greater national narrative. An alternative label to describe this cultural regionalism would be the term ‘regionalized nationalism’, which was coined by Anne-Marie Thiesse for the French case (*nationalisme régionalisé*). In the first case, the claim of some form of self-government and/or decentralization is central to the regionalist agenda. In the second case, that of cultural regionalism, the political agenda generally emphasizes the strength of the ‘greater’ nation by fostering local, provincial or regional layers of identification. Here, the nationalism of the *petite patrie*, *Heimat* and *rodina* may be compared with the nationalism of the ‘most Portuguese village’ (*povo mais português*) of Portugal. However, even in this last case, the images, discourses and distinctive arguments which were used to define the subnational *Heimat*, and originally intended before 1890 to emphasize their peculiar contribution to national glory, may generate potential mid- and long-term territorial conflicts of loyalty with the nation over time. These discourses can be based on history, culture, language or dialects, folklore, the creation of landscape images and so on. Although these arguments were initially conceived as parts of a broader narrative, their autonomous development may be subject to reinterpretation by new actors. Everything depends on who takes up the task of reinterpreting those cultural materials, with which ideological tenets they are combined, and within which political cultures they are embedded.

The critical issue, therefore, is *who* the regionalists are, and *why* they are waving the territorial flag? The particular interests of the actors can lead to very different consequences. The more such mobilization succeeds in gaining social acceptance, the more regionalism will be re-fostered as a self-propelling strategic argument for political mobilization. Some recent twentieth-century examples include the Northern League in Italy, whose invention of the ‘Padanian nation’ relies not on a ‘strong’ nationalist
narrative but rather on ‘light’ secessionist rhetoric, and the short-lived resurgence of Moravian regionalism in Czech lands during the 1990s.\(^{36}\)

A crucial difference between nationalism and regionalism is the demand for political sovereignty. Regionalists do not claim their defined territory to be the subject of collective political rights. They may ask for decentralization, self-government, political autonomy and federalism in variegated forms, but they do not consider their territory to be sovereign. However, there were cases of greater complexity. Some examples of cultural regionalism that gained impetus as a reaction to a centrifugal substate ethnonationalism have evolved into their own separate substate nationalisms, as illustrated by the Walloon movement: since its birth in the nineteenth century, it has largely developed as a response to Flemish nationalism.\(^{37}\)

On several occasions, regionalist claims were cloaked with an ‘ethnonationalist’ rhetoric and vice versa; Catalan nationalists before 1918, and even Czech and Irish nationalists before 1914, often presented themselves in more ambiguous terms. This was a question of strategy that would lead some movements to be ‘association-seeking’ rather than independence-seeking. In this respect, ‘separatism’ is not necessarily a criterion for establishing a typological divide between regionalists and nationalists, since independence may move on or off the agenda of the political elites of a nationalist movement depending on the international circumstances and the political opportunity structure. Within a nationalist movement, one tendency may be hegemonic over another, while pro-autonomy and pro-independence currents can vary over time within more or less diffuse lines of demarcation.\(^{38}\)

This divergence of political strategies concerning the level of self-government to be attained by a substate nation reflected the coexistence of different worldviews within nationalist movements, but it did not always imply a break with the existing polities they belonged to. In Spain, this was the case for conservative Catalanism, a ‘regenerationist’ substate nationalism with an imperial project for the whole of the nation state, aiming at an Iberian federation including Portugal. Certainly, at different moments the short-term political strategies developed by regionalist and nationalist movements may seem similar; Catalan moderate nationalists in the 1910s and 1920s may be compared to the Sardinian regionalists of 1918–1922 as far as their home-rule claims within a polycentric state were concerned. However, the theoretical basis of Catalan ‘moderate’ nationalism was different from that of the Sardinians: they considered their territory to be a nation, which had then the right to decide over its incorporation into a greater unit. Sardinian regionalists never came to define Sardinia as a nation but as a peripheral region of the Italian nation.\(^{39}\) The inverse phenomenon was the multiplication of regionalist movements from above since the implementation of political decentralization throughout Spain in the early 1980s. Many presented themselves as new ‘nationalisms’, although they did not fall into this category from an ideological point of view.\(^{40}\)

Another fundamental difference relates to the degree of discursive articulation, the density of the frames of meaning and the cultural and historic narratives. The regionalists’ discourses as well as their repertory of images concerning the mythical past, the specificity of their culture and the collective awareness of ‘regionhood’ were much
weaker and less articulated than those of (substate) nationalists.\textsuperscript{41} This is in part due to the contradiction involved in claiming that a territory represents a \textit{specific difference} based on a mixture of organic, historic and cultural arguments, while maintaining its compatibility and ultimate \textit{subordination} to a wider, concentric identity that is considered hierarchically superior. Regionalist narratives are always expected to be tributary to a broader national narrative with which they are to merge. However, regionalists are constantly confronted with a long-term contradiction: how to combine an emphasis on the \textit{specific difference} of a territory with the ultimate subordination to a wider sphere of identification. In contrast, national(ist) narratives are autonomous and mostly self-referential, though obviously not less performative than regional(ist) narratives. There are cases throughout Europe that illustrate how one process of region-building turned into full-blown nation-building while another did not, how regional and national identities are shifting and are sometimes contradictory over time and also how different social actors constructed different concepts of the \textit{region} that partially evolved into independent national narratives.\textsuperscript{42}

The nation also creates the region. With the advent and consolidation of the modern nation as the supreme principle upon which to base the territorial legitimacy of power, other territorial loyalties of different extent and nature, which had coexisted as political bodies within the organic order of the early modern composite monarchies, had to be restructured and subjected to a new hierarchy. The emergence of the nation at the end of the eighteenth century transformed those territories into subordinate entities.\textsuperscript{43} It was at this moment when the term ‘region’ began to spread in France and Spain and steadily replace the more archaic term of ‘province’; it was also then that the concept became increasingly associated with the vindication of present-day political rights. Hence, local and regional elites, particularly those who had enjoyed a certain degree of institutional power before 1800, resorted in their political and cultural discourse to the nostalgia of a better past, when the borders between territorial hierarchies were more diluted. This became more evident where the breakdown of the Ancien Régime had been radical, as in France. The appeal to local identity necessarily included nostalgia for pre-liberal times. However, radical republicans who embraced federalism at different moments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were strongly influenced by regionalist tenets, from the Occitan \textit{Félibrige rouge} to some Italian groups influenced by Carlo Cattaneo’s theories, as well as Galician and Catalan regional federalists. They tended to endorse with historical and cultural arguments the legitimacy of the territorial units they want to become subjects of a federation. This introduced a left-wing variant in regionalist discourse that also found stronger continuity during the first decades of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{44} Moreover, in spite of their self-proclaimed internationalism, even socialists and communists were confronted with the issue of subnational identities and the challenge of how to cope with them in order to win adherents for the revolutionary cause. Just the coming of the Second World War and the radical upheaval of state borders brought about by the end of the conflict, as well as the subsequent Cold War period, seemed to ‘freeze’ the relevance of subnational belongings for three decades. However, the internal development of the European Union, as well as the impact of decolonization on new
generations of regional activists gave rise to the so-called 'revolt of the regions', which ran parallel to the development of new social movements, May 1968 and the emergence of new paradigms of left-wing regional discourses. The break-up of the Soviet empire, as well as of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia after the fall of communism, meant a new wave of interest for subnational identities and their amazing capacity of resilience, also demonstrated at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The evolution of regional identities was certainly flanked by the advance of globalization, but did not vanish as a result its advance, as many had predicted.

Structure of the book

Regionalism in Modern Europe aims to provide an overview of the rise and development of regionalism in Europe from the late nineteenth century until the present. One of its objectives is to overcome the traditional case-study approach, which has been dominant among historians thus far. This has led to a methodological regionalism by which the rise of regionalism is primarily explained by internal factors and by focusing on domestic actors. Regionalism clearly was a transnational phenomenon and we should study it as such, although at this stage this is still quite difficult. It will be clear especially in the geographical chapters that historiographical traditions throughout the continent are still quite different; as a result, many authors differ from each other in some of their approaches. Nevertheless, by discussing a preliminary version of all chapters during a workshop at Leiden University in November 2016, we tried to ensure the coherence of the volume, and, as a result, we decided that all chapters will have a comparative approach.

The volume consists of both thematic and geographical chapters. A first group of five chapters deals with cultural aspects of regionalism and discusses the role of language, folklore, nature, food and tourism. All explore the entire long twentieth century and basically cover the whole continent, although it is obvious that in line with the specific expertise of each of the authors, some periods and some parts of Europe receive more attention than others. A second group of three chapters examines the interaction between the ideologies of fascism, communism and democracy with regionalism and are somewhat more limited in their geographical and chronological scope, which is obviously a result of their focus on those countries and regimes that most thoroughly adopted these ideologies. Finally, there is a cluster of nine geographical chapters that generally deal with a number of neighbouring countries following the rise and evolution of regionalism from about 1890 until the present. These chapters deal respectively with the German lands, Scandinavia, the Low Countries, Southwestern Europe, East-Central Europe, the Baltic Area, Russia, Southeast Europe and the British Isles.

The cultural part starts with language: in Chapter 2, Johannes Kabatek explains that the mother tongue is very important for collective identification processes but that linguistic identities are not given. Sometimes, there is a clear tendency towards universalization, such as the Jacobins, who, during the French Revolution, tried to
Regionalism and Modern Europe

impose French upon the entire population. During the Romantic era, there was a trend towards particularism by placing emphasis on language diversity. Mass communication and education generally led to the standardization of languages, but it also led to regional counter movements that promoted the use of local dialects and languages. After the First World War, some of these regional languages became national languages, whereas others remained in a subordinate position. Although structural differences were not decisive in this process, it was more difficult to relegate very distant language such as Welsh, Basque, Estonian or Albanian to a status of mere dialects. A new wave of globalization, from the 1970s onwards, led to a revival of regional languages and sentiments. Some cases, such as the ‘normalization’ of Catalan, were influential examples for other regional movements. Support also came from the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (1982–2010) and the Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights (1996). Immigrants sometimes also adopt regional languages or create hybrid mixed languages of their own, such as the German-Turkish Kietzdeutsch. The revival of some regional languages was a success; in the case of Welsh and Basque, urban neo-speakers now outnumber those for whom either language is their mother tongue.

In Chapter 3, David Hopkin discusses the role of folklore. He explains how the interest in folklore grew rapidly during the Romantic era but that the collectors of tales, legends and songs connected them primarily to the nation. Only towards the end of the nineteenth century did it become more common to inventorize folklore by region, whereby historical regions were preferred over artificial administrative units. In general, the regions were presented as an organic but subordinate part of the national whole. Some regions, such as the Gaelic-speaking West of Ireland or Karelia in Finland, were regarded as ‘relic areas’, whose ancient traditions could form a source of inspiration for the regeneration of the entire nation. Folklorists often tried to protect the authentic cultural traditions against encroachment from the state, urban modernity and commercial interests. During the twentieth century, large-scale projects to map the spatial distribution of folkloric traditions became popular, but were finally abandoned after it became clear that their borders generally did not overlap and that many customs were actually highly transnational. Folklorists also created repertoires of regional folk songs and dances that could be used at festive occasions. Revivalism was largely an urban phenomenon and often started among rural migrants in the larger cities. Sometimes, this led to curious results: the omnipresent drum and pipe band at today’s Breton festivals were invented in Paris and only spread to the region after 1945. Folk festivals, where one could dress up and sing folk songs, became quite popular during the second half of the twentieth century. Whilst before the Second World War, folklore generally was associated with the political right, the folk revival in the post-war period was more left-leaning and even found inspiration in Marxism and anti-colonial movements, while autonomists and separatist ambitions were voiced more openly.

Jan-Henrik Meyer examines in Chapter 4 how the relationship between nature and regionalism evolved during the long twentieth century. Not only did the region’s cultural heritage have to be protected, but the same was true with its natural patrimony. As a consequence, many of the early regionalist movements began to make inventories of
their region’s natural highlights, in order to render them accessible to visitors and, if required, to protect them against the levelling forces of modernity. During the first half of the twentieth century, efforts to protect the natural environment were mostly stimulated by urban intellectuals and governmental agencies. The local population, who often had a more utilitarian attitude towards nature, sometimes opposed protective measures, such as the creation of national parks. In the communist bloc, nature in theory did not fall prey to capitalist exploitation; however, the new socialist economy did not regard ecological motives very highly, while frequent environmental disasters eroded the local and regional support for the communist regimes. In Western Europe, new regional ecological movements arose in the 1970s, often to protest against a specific threat such as the building of a nuclear power plant or a specific form of pollution. More recently, the protection of characteristic landscapes can clash with attempts to combat climate change by introducing windmills or new power lines.

Chapter 5 deals with the rise of regional foods that, according to Kolleen Guy, largely emerged as a consequence of the globalization of food markets towards the end of the nineteenth century. Mechanical refrigeration, combined with trains and steamships, made the transport of agricultural products and regional specialities over longer distances possible and profitable. Although there were considerable differences in food habits across Europe before the twentieth century, which were largely determined by climate, agricultural traditions and the use of microbial cultures to preserve food, in general people ate whatever was available. Only among the rich, who travelled and could afford to consume luxury items from abroad, there was some awareness of geographical differences and regional specialities. The globalization of the food market led to the rise of the large-scale commercialization of food production, particularly in Northern Europe. In Southern Europe, there was more support for the protection of regional food production and many products came to be seen as part of the cultural patrimony of the nation. External factors also had a large impact; emigrants often remained heavily attached to their regional foodways, thus creating new export markets for regional products. But there was also a growing international demand for ‘authentic’ products, such as chateaux wines, and this constituted an important stimulus to market products as connected with a specific terroir. The earliest attempts to protect regional food products date from the late nineteenth century, but this task has nowadays been largely taken over by the European Union.

The impact of tourism on regional identities is shown by Eric Storm in Chapter 6. Since the Romantic era, rural areas were regarded as the heartland of the nation. However, they only became accessible to a growing number of tourists by the development of secondary railways and the introduction of bicycles and automobiles later on. The demand from tourists for characteristic products was met by inventing regional dishes and new folkloric festivals. Many hotels, restaurants and second homes were built in neo-vernacular styles, therefore making many regions more ‘typical’ than they had ever been. After 1945, mass tourism focused more on the beaches of the Mediterranean and a vogue for modernist buildings now converted many sleepy fisher villages into modern bathing resorts. However, this tendency towards more uniformity was countered after
about 1970 by a growing interest in cultural heritage, which has even led recently to the transformation of old industrial complexes into regional tourist attractions. Roots or ‘homesick’ tourism of migrants to the regions where they or their ancestors had been born has also stimulated the protection of regional heritage. All in all, tourism had a considerable impact on the regional identities of most European regions; existing differences were highlighted largely for commercial reasons, while new ones were created.

The ideological part starts with Chapter 7 in which Xosé M. Núñez Seixas shows how regionalism was strongly promoted under fascist regimes, such as those of Mussolini, Hitler and Franco. Some attention is also paid to Vichy France and Salazar’s Portugal. The author makes clear that the first priority of all fascist and para-fascist dictators was to create a strong state; separatist tendencies or even pleas for regional devolution were, therefore, anathema. There was no clear fascist idea on regions and regional cultures, and no clear distinction was drawn between the local and the regional. However, in practice, all fascist regimes tried to increase the attachment of the population to the homeland by promoting regional folklore, customs, dialects and sometimes even the instrumental use of regional languages and/or dialects. The strong interest in the past also stimulated the study and revival of local and regional history, traditions and folklore, while natural heritage was protected. Regionalist images also pervaded exhibitions, publicity and commercial culture. Although regional attachment was unmistakably subordinate to national loyalty, fascist respect for subnational plurality also made it possible for some regionalist cultures to survive the regimes and resurface after the transition to democracy.

Chapter 8 deals with communism, both in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union was set up as a federation of a dozen Soviet Republics, some of which were further subdivided into autonomous republics and even autonomous regions. Regional economic councils were set up to help coordinate economic planning, while regional studies flourished. Nevertheless, in the early 1930s, regional studies was one of the first victims of the Stalinist purges and in 1932, the regional economic councils were abolished as well. The Soviet Union became an even more strongly centralized state. This centralist model was also imposed on Eastern Europe, and the break with Tito’s Yugoslavia was at least in part related to his plans to take federalism seriously. Tito subsequently turned to economic regionalism; local and regional workers’ councils formed the heart of the political and economic organization of the Yugoslav federation. Attempts to reform communism in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia often involved measures of economic regionalism. Even in the Soviet Union, the regional economic councils were reintroduced for a short time in the late 1950s. Economic decentralization went further in Yugoslavia but did not help the country to overcome the crisis and stagnation of the 1970s. In the end, the entire system collapsed in a very short period after the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

Regionalism in the democratic states of Western Europe is discussed in Chapter 9 by Daniele Petrosino. Regional identity construction took already place in the nineteenth century and in various European countries there were movements that advocated regional autonomy before 1945. In the immediate post-war period, a few regions were
created, for instance, in Italy, but they did not have much practical implications. The process of regionalization only began in earnest in the 1970s. The establishment of new administrative regions created new opportunities for the articulation of local and regional interests, thus increasing political pluralism. From the late 1980s, the growing global competition between regions and the development of regional policies by the European Community enhanced the political and economic role of regions, while richer regions such as Catalonia, Bavaria and Northern Italy increasingly complained about the redistribution mechanisms that transferred part of their wealth to less-developed parts of the country. These tendencies seem to have become even more pronounced after the financial crisis of 2008. Traditional nation-wide ideological parties seem to lose ground to regional parties who claim to more directly represent the wishes of the population, while the wish to secede even became acute in Scotland and Catalonia.

Jeremy DeWaal initiates the geographical part with Chapter 10 on the German-speaking parts of Europe. He makes clear that the use of the term Heimat to denote a rootedness in a local or regional homeland was the product of the Romantic era. The regionalist Heimat movement became a mass phenomenon only after German unification in 1871. In general, regionalism defended a unity in diversity nationalism and this was also true in the German-speaking parts of Switzerland and the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy. The attachment to the region seemed to have increased under the Weimar Republic; the number of regionalist publications grew enormously and Heimatkunde became a school subject. Although the Nazis paid lip service to the regionalist ideals, they in fact subordinated everything regional to the nation and to their plans for territorial expansion. Just as in 1918, after the end of the Second World War, separatist fantasies did not enjoy much resonance. However, in the uncertain circumstances after the defeat, the Heimat idea reached new heights. This would only change in the 1960s, when particularly the more internal and backward-looking aspects, added to the expellee demand for their right to Heimat, irritated many of the younger generation. Nevertheless, from the 1970s onwards, regionalism made a comeback and now also became associated with increasing protests against environmental pollution, technocratic (re-)construction projects and excessive centralization.

Chapter 11 focuses on regionalism in Scandinavia. Peter Stadius explains that political regionalism is not very important in the Nordic countries, although regional identities did play a crucial role. Karelia in Finland, Dalecarlia in Sweden and Telemark in Norway were perceived as national heartlands, as idyllic rural regions where the authentic traditions of the fatherland were still alive. An added advantage was that Karelia seemed to be untainted of Sweden influences, whereas Dalecarlia had played a vital historical role in the resistance against the ‘occupation’ of Sweden by the Danish kings in the late medieval period. Border regions such as Scania, the Torne Valley Region and the Åland Islands also developed a strong sense of regional identity, partly for linguistic and historical reasons. More complicated was the regional identity of the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland. It continues to have a very strong institutional and cultural infrastructure, but does not have a unified territory. From the 1960s onwards, the Sami also created their own transnational border region in the Arctic North. A final
fascinating case is the transborder region of Öresund that came into existence when in 2000 a new bridge connected Sjælland in Denmark and Scania in Sweden, and which presents itself as a dynamic, modern Euro region.

Regionalism in the Low Countries is explored by Joep Leerssen in Chapter 12. The strong decentralized nature of the political system in the early modern period and the rather arbitrary division between the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg after 1830 led to strong particularist feelings in almost all provinces. Within the Netherlands, Frisia, which had its own language and traditions, was seen as a kind of national heartland and separatism never made any headway. Particularist feelings also led to manifold expressions of cultural regionalism in two other peripheral regions, which, moreover, were Catholic instead of Protestant: Brabant and Limburg. Whereas in the Netherlands religion caused division, in Belgium, language was the main dividing mechanism. During the twentieth century, Flemish regionalism developed into full-blown nationalism, while as a compromise solution from 1962 onwards the country was administratively split up along linguistic lines. As a reaction, a Walloon movement also developed, which could be seen as a kind of Belgian ‘rump nationalism’. Luxembourg forms a fascinating case of a provincial movement whose cultural explorations became – through geopolitical developments and dynastic accident – the basis of a new national imagined community.

Xosé M. Núñez Seixas and Fernando Molina examine the development of regionalism in South-western Europe – France, Spain, Italy and Portugal – in Chapter 13. In France, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nation-building was accompanied by region-building but did not lead to political decentralization. In Italy, urban identities were generally stronger than regional ones and it was mainly the economic imbalance between the different parts of the country that led to regionalist feelings in the South and Sardinia. Regions did not have an important role in Portugal, where larger municipalities built strong local identities, but peripheral islands, such as the Azores, voiced claims for decentralization. In Spain, the rise of nationalist movements in Catalonia, the Basque Country and, later on, Galicia complicated the picture, although cultural regionalism continued to flourish in all parts of the country. Regionalism never became monopolized by one ideology, but there was a clear shift towards the political right during the interwar period. Because of the fascist appropriation of regional folklore and traditions, regionalism received a setback in the post-war period. However, from the 1960s onwards, economic efficiency and the Europe of the regions, on the one hand, and a new left-wing interest in ‘internal decolonization’, on the other, provoked a comeback. First in Italy after 1947, and then since the 1970s, political decentralization was pursued in all four countries, with Spain, partially driven by the strong nationalist movements in its periphery, taking the most drastic measures.

The focus shifts to the eastern parts of the continent in Chapter 14, written by Irina Livezeanu and Petru Negura, which analyses the developments in the regions that are located in Romania and Moldova. The shifting state borders and nation-building policies largely determined the context in which region-building activities could be deployed. Although many attempts were made to weaken or disrupt existing (regional) allegiances in order to strengthen the attachment to the new nation states, the memories
of smaller provincial or regional administrative units did not disappear and often were invoked to express discontent with the growing intervention from a centralized state, be it from Bucharest in Romania, from Kiev or Moscow in Moldova or from Chisinau in Transnistria. How exactly these tensions worked out during the long twentieth century is explained in detailed sections on Transylvania, Banat and Bessarabia/Moldova.

Russia and the Soviet Union, and their way of dealing with regional differences, are discussed by Mark Bassin and Mikhail Suslov in Chapter 15. They assert that because of the vast extension of the Tsarist Empire and its fluctuating borders, which were difficult to protect, centralism has been a defining feature of the Russian state since early modern times, regardless of the actual regime that was in power. Local and provincial authorities did not have much autonomy and unless the central state was in disarray – which was the case around 1917 and in the 1990s – expressions of regionalism from below were strictly monitored or even suppressed. Nevertheless, a progressive, federalist tradition emerged that pleaded for reconnecting with the ancient ‘democratic’ traditions of the former provinces, while there were also more conservative back-to-land regionalists. The example of Siberia, which is described in more detail, shows that the regionalist movement was dominated by ethnic Russians. They presented Siberia as a kind of Russian heartland. While complaints about excessive centralism and colonial exploitation were voiced regularly, demands for political autonomy or even secession only flared up briefly during the Civil War and after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Chapter 16 on regionalism in the Baltic states and Poland is written by Jörg Hackmann. The first to develop a sense of regional identity were the Baltic Germans in the Tsarist Empire. During the late nineteenth century, regional or national movements also developed among Lithuanians (both those residing in the Russian and the German Empire), Latvians and Estonians and in various Polish areas within the German and Austrian Empire. At the end of the First World War, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became independent nation states where regional differences were frowned upon as remainders of imperial rule. The main exceptions were Upper Silesia and the Kashubian region within Poland, where expressions of cultural regionalism were tolerated as long as they remained subordinate to a larger Polish identity. Obviously, the communist era that began in 1945 was not very favourable to any form of regionalism, although the Estonian and Latvian song festivals continued to exist, while within Poland the Kashubs retook their activities in favour of their own language, folklore and culture after the death of Stalin. In the late 1980s, Gorbachev’s perestroika brought new freedom, which first expressed itself in environmental protests in Estonia and Latvia. Soon the so-called Singing Revolution led to the independence of the three Baltic states. The presence of large numbers of Russians – which generally was seen as problematic by the new authorities – prevented the development of strong regionalist movements within Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This was different in Poland where regionalism gained strength from the 1980s onwards in the Kashubian region, Upper Silesia and in the territory of former East Prussia.

South-eastern Europe, which is a more neutral term than the Balkans, is discussed in Chapter 17 by Tchavdar Marinov. It provides a broad geographical overview of the
Regionalism and Modern Europe

various regional movements and focuses on the most significant examples. Within Croatia the regions with the most active regionalist movements were Dalmatia and Istria, which both had been part of the Venetian empire; recently, Istria has even secured a semi-autonomous status. Vojvodina is an interesting case, because it is largely a new, twentieth-century invention, and the current regionalist movement is multi-ethnic and uses the six official languages of the region. Other idiosyncratic cases are those of Montenegro, Bosnia and Macedonia; their regional identities became more pronounced because of the rise of rivalling nationalist groups, such as Serbs, Croats and Bulgarians, and in the 1990s, they all became nation states themselves. The chapter ends with some short reflections on regionalism in Romania – where the case of Transylvania shows some interesting parallels with Vojvodina – and Greece. In the end, the legacies and influence of Austro-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, communism and the European Union led to various surprising outcomes, some areas became part of homogenized nation states, other regions cherished their distinct cultural traditions, while a few exceptions developed strong regional identities and eventually became fully-fledged nation states.

Finally, the somewhat exceptional situation of the British Isles is explained in Chapter 18 by James Kennedy. First of all, the United Kingdom is a composite monarchy that has never been transformed into a centralized nation state as is the case in most Western European countries. Moreover, the constituent parts are called nations, although only Ireland became an independent nation state. Irish, Welsh and Scottish movements that wanted to strengthen their cultural identity and protect or increase their political autonomy are called nationalist, although most of their members wanted to remain within the union. The strong rivalry between the four nations impeded the development of strong regional identities within them; with the exception of Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, the situation in each of the four constituent parts was very different; Scotland still had a lot of institutions that functioned largely independent of London, while Wales had been formally incorporated into England. Northern Ireland, although it came into being because its Protestant majority fiercely opposed Irish Home Rule, was the first to receive its own parliament in 1921. Nevertheless, expressions of cultural regionalism in both literature and folklore could be found in regions such as Cornwall, Yorkshire and so on. Both the partial dismantling of the welfare state and the heavy industries in the 1980s, which were mostly located in peripheral parts of the United Kingdom, increased the appeal of nationalist parties in Scotland and, to a lesser extent, Wales. In the late 1990s, referenda on devolution were held in Scotland and Wales, while the Troubles in Northern Ireland were brought to an end in 1998 with the Good Friday Agreements. Partly instigated by the European Union, counties and regions also received more competences, which particularly led to the strengthening of metropolitan regions, such as Greater London.

The volume ends with Chapter 19, in which the editors Xosé-M. Núñez Seixas and Eric Storm draw some preliminary conclusions, based on the broad overview offered in the rest of the chapters, on the rise and evolution of regionalism in Europe during the long twentieth century. What patterns, turning points, similarities and differences can be
observed between the different parts of Europe? What influence did the various cultural and ideological factors have? They also suggest that further research is needed about the interaction between localism, regionalism, nationalism and imperialism, while it would be worthwhile to compare the situation within the different parts of Europe with the development of regionalism in the rest of the world.

Leiden and Santiago de Compostela, December 2017

Notes

1. 'Juncker: "If we allow Catalonia to separate, others will do the same", El País (13 October 2017), https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/10/13/inenglish/1507907261_402876.html.


3. These parts are largely based on Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, 'Historiographical Approaches to Sub-national Identities in Europe: A Reappraisal and Some Suggestions', in Region and State in Nineteenth-Century Europe: Nation-Building, Regional Identities and Separatism, ed. Joost Augusteijn and Eric Storm (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 13–36.


Regionalism and Modern Europe


17. Alon Confin, Germany as a Culture of Remembrance: Promises and Limits of Writing History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). See also chapters by Núñez Seixas, DeWaal and Petrosino.


Regionalism and Modern Europe


32. On the changing relations between nationalism and culture, see Joep Leerssen, National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006).


45. The workshop was funded by the Leiden University Institute for History, the Leiden University Fund and the Chair of Modern European History of Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, for which we are very grateful. Formatting and editing of the manuscript was also possible thanks to the financial support of the research group *Hispona* (University of Santiago de Compostela).