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Benevolent conquerors, besieged homelands, threated state: the reproduction of political myths in cold war Turkey

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Citation

Kibris, G. (2022, September 1). *Benevolent conquerors, besieged homelands, threated state: the reproduction of political myths in cold war Turkey*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3455166>

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Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

CHAPTER III: The Quest for A National Leader 1960-1965

3.1. Introduction:

Regarding the rhetorical shift in the balance of power in favor of the ‘common man,’ 1960-1965 might be considered a transition period, which is significant in strengthening the popular reaction against the military/bureaucratic elite. Although the military coup of May 27, 1960 brought the military/bureaucratic elite into power once more, the DP ideological line never lost its supporters, as revealed in the 1965 nationwide elections, which resulted in the victory of the AP, the heir of the DP. In this regard, from 1960 through 1965, two main developments shaped ideological trends; hence the depictions of political myths in cinema: the revenge of the military/bureaucratic elite from the DP, and Turkey’s marginalization by the US in its foreign policy regarding Cyprus. These two developments were born into rural-urban, and older-younger generation encounters inherited from the 1950s. Consequently, the ideological climate created by all these developments influenced how nationalist political myths were reproduced in Turkish cinema.

Thus, this chapter concentrates on the impact of all these changes on the nationalist depictions of the Turkish nation in action/adventure movies produced between 1960 and 1965. As with the previous chapter, I have divided the current chapter into two main sections: the context and the films. The first section has two sub-sections: the first shedding light on the uneasy relationship between the urban alliance formed around the military/bureaucratic elite and the newly rising ‘common man’ discourse; the second dealing with Turkey’s changing foreign policy orientation and the Cyprus issue. The second main section starts with the analysis of political myths in films depicting the Ottoman Empire. Finally, the last sub-section investigates the impact of the May 27 mindset and foreign policy choices in the depictions of national identity in the films about the War of Independence.

3.2. The Context:

3.2.1. “The Revenge of the Establishment” against ‘Common Man’

The major transformation that provided a suitable atmosphere for the reproduction of various political myths, the myth of the warrior nation, mainly, was the military coup of May 27, 1960. The coup increased the military’s role in everyday life and magnified the centuries-long rift between the ‘elites’ and ‘common man’ by punishing the so-called ‘voice of the latter,’ the DP. In the eyes of the DP supporters, the coup aimed to curb their power and influence that had been rising throughout the 1950s. By the same token, Laçiner states that the coup was “the

revenge of the establishment” that enabled the striking back of the old elites, who had been disturbed by the rise of the common man, including rural landowners, the petty-bourgeois, and newly encountered migrants.⁴⁹⁰

The primary justification of the army for the intervention was the undemocratic performance of the DP that had been manifested with its elimination of opposing voices in the military, judiciary, bureaucracy, university, and the press. In fact, accompanied by a day-to-day increase in economic problems, there was discontent in bureaucrats, urban intellectuals, the industrial bourgeoisie, university students, officers, and academics. The peak was the DP’s formation of an investigation committee, claiming that the CHP was getting organized to seize political power illegally by causing an armed struggle.⁴⁹¹ For the CHP and some intellectuals, this was a direct attempt to silence alternative voices. The process ended with the army staging a coup d’état and declaring martial law on May 27, 1960.⁴⁹²

The following period brought extensive changes in the country’s political structure, all of which aimed to stop the development of any DP-type opposition. First, the DP was dissolved, many DP members were put into prison, and a military government was formed.⁴⁹³ Then, three ministers, including Adnan Menderes, the first elected prime minister, were executed for corruption and violating the Constitution. According to the junta, the executions aimed to save democracy and reinstate the Republic’s founding principles. In the same vein, the Preamble of the new Constitution stated that the ‘May 27 Revolution’ aimed to establish the rule of law, human rights, justice, and equality for all citizens, created in line with the ideals of Atatürk.⁴⁹⁴ Here, the word ‘revolution’ is quite significant in revealing the perception of the coup by the junta and its supporters as a radical outbreak from the DP past. Besides, the Constitution redesigned the parliamentary system as a bicameral legislature with a National Assembly and Senate, the latter responsible for checking and balancing the former. According to Dodd, this new structure reveals a certain distrust in how democracy and elections function in the Turkish case. In other words, the elites were suspicious of the choices of the masses, and they wanted

⁴⁹⁰ Sedat Laçiner, “Turkish Foreign policy between 1960-1971: neo-Kemalism vs. neo-Democrats?” *USAK Yearbook of Politics and International Relations*, No: 3 (2010): 172.

⁴⁹¹ Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, 229. The Investigation Committee also attempted to control the press with some legal provisions besides the power to confiscate publications, close newspapers and printing houses. For more details see: Hıfzı Topuz, *II. Mahmut’tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2015), 208-225.

⁴⁹² Hasan Bülent Kahraman, *Türk Siyasetinin Yapısal Analizi-II (1920-1960)* (İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2012), 214, 333; Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 242.

⁴⁹³ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 250-251.

⁴⁹⁴ Sadık Balkan, Ahmet E. Uysal and Kemal H. Karpat (trans.), *Constitution of the Turkish Republic*, Ankara 1961. <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-text.pdf>

to block the formation of another oppressive government similar to the DP.⁴⁹⁵ Thus, although the Constitution was democratic in its outlook, it also reflected the Jacobin mentality of the military/bureaucratic elite.

Mümtaz Soysal, a law professor who was appointed to the Founding Assembly that prepared the Constitution, indicated in the following years that the 1961 Constitution was based on a “dialectic”, meaning that while it aimed to support the democratic system based on elections, it also wanted to continue the top-down reforms imposed by the Republican military/bureaucratic elite.⁴⁹⁶ This is not peculiar given the Turkish army’s central historical role in Turkish political culture, as reflected in the myth of the warrior nation. Throughout Republican history, the army functioned as the protector of the regime against ‘reactionary forces.’⁴⁹⁷ The 1960 intervention, in this context, was basically the consequence of some military officers’ concerns about the survival of the regime.

Indeed, the army was not alone, and the urban bourgeoisie, including a large student population and the intelligentsia, welcomed the coup with the “explosions of public joy” in Zürcher’s words, especially in Ankara and İstanbul.⁴⁹⁸ For them, the coup was the end of a ‘corrupted’ and ‘decadent’ regime.⁴⁹⁹ Besides, from the perspective of the *Yön* (Direction)⁵⁰⁰ circle gathered around the nationalist-leftist journal under the same name, the DP symbolized Turkey’s submission to imperialist powers. The coup, therefore, also symbolized the fight against imperialists by ‘progressive elites’ or the vigorous powers (*zinde kuvvetler*), namely the army, youth, urban bourgeoisie as it had been in the Third World countries.⁵⁰¹ This is why the journal mainly defended neo-etatism in favor of planning and development; and national capital instead of the global capitalism and increasing American influence that had dominated the DP era.⁵⁰²

⁴⁹⁵ Clement H. Dodd, *Politics and Government in Turkey* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), 107-127.

⁴⁹⁶ Mümtaz Soysal, “Anayasa Diyalektiği Açısından Özerk Kuruluşların Görevi,” *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, 24 (4), (April 1969): 111-124.

⁴⁹⁷ Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1977), 194.

⁴⁹⁸ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 244.

⁴⁹⁹ Semih Vaner, “The Army” in *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, eds. Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 251-252.

⁵⁰⁰ For an analysis of *Yön* views see: Hikmet Özdemir, *Kalkınmada Bir Strateji Arayışı Yön Hareketi* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1986), Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, *27 Mayıs ve Yön Hareketinin Sınıfsal Eleştirisi* (İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1970); H. Bayram Kaçmazoğlu, *27 Mayıs’tan 12 Mart’a Türkiye’de Siyasal Fikir Hareketleri* (İstanbul: Doğu Kitabevi, 2013); Mehmet Arı, “Türkiye’de Sol Milliyetçilik (I): Yön Hareketi,” *Birikim*, No. 67 (1994): 25-35; Kemal H. Karpat, “Yön ve Devletçilik Üzerine,” *Forum*, (December 15, 1962; January 1, 1963, January 15, 1963); Kurtuluş Kayalı, “Kalkınmada Bir Strateji Arayışı: Yön Hareketi,” *Tarih ve Toplum*, Vol. 9, No. 51 (March 1988): 61–63.

⁵⁰¹ Kaçmazoğlu, *27 Mayıs’tan 12 Mart’a Türkiye’de Siyasal Fikir Hareketleri*, 45.

⁵⁰² Türkkaya Ataöv, “The 27th May Revolution and Its Aftermath,” *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 1960-1961* (1982), 20.

On the other hand, unlike the urban bourgeoisie and the *Yön* circle, rural countryside, petty-bourgeois, and traditional landowners were silent during the DP members' trials and the subsequent executions of its leading cadre. In fact, as stated by Zürcher and Szyliowicz, there was no evidence of any sharp decrease in Menderes's popularity.⁵⁰³ Even the referendum results for the Constitution, which had 61.7 per cent yes and 38.3 per cent no votes,⁵⁰⁴ revealed that the change was insignificant because this percentage for 'no' was somewhat equal to Menderes' vote in general. This shows that most former DP supporters probably remained loyal to their parties, or at least its ideals.⁵⁰⁵ As a result, as soon as the ban on political parties was lifted in 1961, one of the established parties was the AP, which described itself as the heir of the DP. For this political line, the coup could be a kind of *déjà vu* of the historical oppression of 'common man' by the 'despotic elites.' In this time of junta, the supporters were also afraid of losing the advantages and social mobility they had achieved due to the liberal policies that had enabled the development of rural-originated petty-bourgeois. In fact, in the DP era, the intensified communication through a good network of roads, public transportation, and cars funded mainly by the US were positive developments for the peasants, merchants, and wealthy landowners who could travel quickly to the cities.⁵⁰⁶

Keyder maintains that although migrants to urban centers had been a part of the city economically, they had not integrated culturally. For example, Ankara kept its elitist heritage as the capital of the new and westernized Republic and so discriminated against the migrants in everyday life. The reaction of the migrants to this was to retain their own rural culture in their squatter settlements.⁵⁰⁷ On the other hand, despite cultural disintegration, the increasing economic activity and interconnectedness in the 1950s had already injected everybody's minds with the hope for a future potential social mobility. Many entrepreneurs, small producers of rural origin, or peasants had already come to cities and become more visible. Thanks to the multiparty system, they could find new channels, such as the new political parties, to deliver their demands like the rest of the population.⁵⁰⁸ In fact, the new living conditions of these

⁵⁰³ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 244; Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "The Political Dynamics of Rural Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Autumn, 1962): 430.

⁵⁰⁴ Dieter Nohlen, Florian Grotz and Christof Hartmann (eds.), *Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook, Vol. I Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 254.

⁵⁰⁵ Szyliowicz, "The Political Dynamics of Rural Turkey," 430.

⁵⁰⁶ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 226-228.

⁵⁰⁷ Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey A Study in Capitalist Development*, 136-137. Besides, for an ethnographic study on experiences and self-identification of second generation migrants, females in particular, see: Tahire Erman, "Becoming 'Urban' or Remaining 'Rural': The Views of Turkish Rural-to-Urban Migrants on the 'Integration' Question," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 30 (4), (1998): 541-561.

⁵⁰⁸ Sungur Savran, "1960, 1971, 1980: Toplumsal Mücadeleler, Askeri Müdahaleler," *11. Tez*, No: 6, (1987): 138-139.

migrants were critical in their increasing demands. Many of them did not have sufficient means, so they were living in *gecekondu* settlements, which were close to industrial areas and without infrastructure. As a result, those populist politicians who wanted to gather votes used essential needs such as electricity, running water, and housing licenses as propaganda tools. The period also witnessed a tremendous explosion in housing construction and the rise of apartments for middle-class nearby the *gecekondu* areas.⁵⁰⁹ Given that the *gecekondu* inhabitants worked in the centers, some as the doormen of the newly built apartments or the cleaning ladies, everyday encounters between the middle classes and *gecekondu* inhabitants intensified. Besides, the newcomers mostly embraced their old customs and habits due to their marginalization in the city.⁵¹⁰ Therefore, in most instances, there was disintegration and marginalization instead of the peaceful coexistence both groups. In the late 1950s, when the middle class disintegrated due to increasing inflation and economic crisis, they felt that the migrants had taken their places. Kenneth Fidel states, “The teachers and the government employees were also pushed aside by these people from villages. They could no longer afford to live in the good quarters of the town...They could not afford to buy clothing anymore. All these people were stripped of the one thing that kept them proud throughout the years-the self-respect, and their pride in being the most advanced sector of the population was taken away by the cost of living (due to increasing inflation), and the newly rich farmers and merchants.”⁵¹¹ Therefore, those educated urban classes, who had long been the symbols of Turkey’s modernization, also felt both socially and economically marginalized as they had been pushed aside both by populist politicians, rural capital holders who had recently migrated to the city, and the other migrants who had false hopes regarding upward social mobility. In the end, this meant a rhetorical change in the hierarchical order of elites. Consequently, the anti-intellectual and anti-bureaucratic discourse of the DP line supporters became a significant theme in the dominant political discourse.

However, due to DP’s lack of industrial support, the big industrial bourgeoisie had been discontented with the DP regime. In the 1950s, the *laissez-faire* economic policies and overvalued exchange rates had made importing a profitable business, and therefore, no one was willing to invest in the industry. Thus, the industry was weak.⁵¹² There was also a competition for sharing economic and political resources between rural-based petty merchants and city-

⁵⁰⁹ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 229.

⁵¹⁰ Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey A Study in Capitalist Development*, 136-137.

⁵¹¹ William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 99.

⁵¹² Ayşe Öncü, “Chambers of Industry in Turkey: An Inquiry into State-Industry Relations as a Distributive Domain” in *The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey*, eds. Ergun Özbudun and Aydın Ulusan (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980), 465.

based manufacturers over time. So, the latter defended the planned economy, and the Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi*) was established as an industrial alternative to the DP's emphasis on the petty bourgeois. However, the party later joined the CHP.⁵¹³ Besides, the army officers had issues with the DP regime because they believed that they had lost their favorable status. Hale states that the officers "felt robbed of the central role in Turkish political culture they had traditionally enjoyed."⁵¹⁴ Karpat explains this by referring to interviews he held with several army officers right after the coup. Accordingly, military officers felt their status had deteriorated because of rising inflation and the emergence of a new American-style culture based on material wealth, making them less prestigious in the eyes of the 'common man,' who had rising hopes for social mobility.⁵¹⁵

During the period, the representational power of the army also declined.⁵¹⁶ As Özbudun reveals, with the DP in power, the number of parliament members with a military background decreased from 54.7 per cent between 1943-1946 to 22 per cent between 1950-1954.⁵¹⁷ There were many tradesmen and lawyers in the DP-led parliament, in contrast with the public officials in the previous one. Another point that decreased military officers' status was related to the army's transformation due to the aid Turkey received as a part of the Truman Doctrine and its membership in NATO. The weapons, military training, and organization, in general, were all modernized. This led to an increasing prestige of technical branches with particular contact with the West, such as the air force and navy. The land forces and middle-ranked officers perceived all these "as the degradation of its own institutional prestige and a challenge to its image within society," as Vaner states.⁵¹⁸

The most dynamic group that was not happy with the DP regime was the university students. Ironically, the power of that group rested on the DP, which opened new universities in line with its populist policies. For the DP, this had meant saving university education from the hands of the elites. The point that the DP failed to calculate was the composition of students. According to Kazamias and Szyliowicz, most university students were of middle-class urban origin; their parents were at least workers or state officers, and this continued even in the

⁵¹³ Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey A Study in Capitalist Development*, 142.

⁵¹⁴ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, 98-99

⁵¹⁵ Kemal H. Karpat, "The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-1964: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of a Revolution," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 75, No.6 (Oct. 1970), 1663.

⁵¹⁶ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, 88-99.

⁵¹⁷ Ergun Özbudun, *Türkiye'de Sosyal Değişme ve Siyasal Katılma* (Ankara: AÜHF Yayınları, 1975), 41-42. Özbudun's work is based on an earlier research by Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965).

⁵¹⁸ Vaner, "The Army," 237-238.

1960s.⁵¹⁹ This meant that the parents had probably received a Kemalist education, and it is not entirely wrong to assume that the early childhood socialization of those students had been realized chiefly in Kemalist families. This could be one reason why most university students were secular, nationalist, and Kemalist, with very few conservative students among them. They found the DP government to be corrupt and organized many protests due to their powerful student unions, which were significant enough to scare the DP government. The peak of the student protests before the coup were those of 28-29 April 1960, which ended with the death of a student, Turan Emeksiz, due to a police bullet. Immediately after the coup, Emeksiz became a symbol of resistance against the DP's oppression, and his corpse was removed from where it had been buried secretly by the DP to block potential protests. The coup administration reburied him in Atatürk's Mausoleum together with three other students who had died in other demonstrations. A state funeral modeled after that of Atatürk was organized, and the students were given the title of 'Revolution Martyrs.' The names of students were given to roads, schools, and some vehicles. Moreover, some soil samples were brought from different places to put into their graves. These places included the Tomb of Ertuğrul Ghazi, which was the tomb of the father of Osman and the founder of the Ottoman Empire; Aziziye Bastions, which served in the 19th century to defend Ottoman cities from the Russian and Armenian attacks; Çanakkale Martyrs' Memorial, which had been built to commemorate the 253,000 Turkish soldiers who had fought in the Battle of Gallipoli in 1915-1916; Dumlupınar, the district in which the last battle against the Greeks between 1919-1922 had taken place; and finally Cyprus, which had started its struggle with EOKA's advancement of the political union of Cyprus and Greece. All these gestures revered the students to the position of Turkish soldiers that fought to save Turks from oppressors in different periods of history.⁵²⁰

The heroization of students was the new regime's strategy of legitimization by taking its roots back to the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, it reproduced the myth of the warrior nation by leading to the perception of university students as an army of the national mission next to the military's actual army. Therefore, the founding elite, which took power with the coup, turned their faces to the educated youth. For them, the youth of the

⁵¹⁹ Andreas Kazamias, *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 278; Szyliowicz, *A Political Analysis of Student Activism: The Turkish Case* (London: SAGE Publications, 1972), 77. For a comprehensive survey of sources about the class origins of students in Turkey see: Emin Alper, *Student Movement in Turkey from A Global Perspective 1960-1971*, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boğaziçi University (2009); Demet Lüküslü, "60lı Yılları Gençlik Kategorisi Üzerinden Okumak: Modernist Söylemin Savunucusu ve Aktörü Olarak Gençlik" in *Modernizmin Yansımaları: 60lı Yıllarda Türkiye*, eds. R. Funda Barbaros and Erik-Jan Zürcher (Ankara: Efil Yayınevi, 2013), 214-218.

⁵²⁰ Turgay Gülpinar, "Anıtkabir'in Unutulan Kabirleri" in *Neye Yarar Hatıralar? Bellek ve Siyaset Çalışmaları*, ed. Pınar Melis Yelsalı Parmaksız (Ankara: Phoenix, 2012), 81-150.

country, who had received a Kemalist education and were therefore intellectual, were ideal to adopt the duty of continuing Atatürk's revolution as inheritors. They were uncorrupted, idealist, brave, and trustworthy, symbolizing a fresh and dynamic re-start for modernization, which had been interrupted during the DP period. An outcome of this belief was to lower the voting age from 21 to 18.⁵²¹

The youth gained self-confidence, too. In fact, students were already a privileged group consisting of 1.5. per cent of the population aged between 18-24.⁵²² Most of them could find jobs very easily upon their graduation.⁵²³ Nevertheless, the mission attributed to them did not remain unanswered. On the first anniversary of the April 1960 protests, The National Turkish Students Union (*Milli Türk Talebe Birliği*, MTTB) issued a declaration: "As the patriotic youth of a nation which gave thousands of martyrs for generations for the ideal of liberty, by considering liberty more sacred than our lives, we will not refrain from giving new martyrs for this purpose if it is needed".⁵²⁴ Another declaration from the third anniversary says: "The 28-29 Aprils are the celebration of the great victory of the Turkish youth against all kinds of exploiters. On behalf of the Turkish youth that we represent, we continue to remind those who are presumptuous, against the parliamentary regime, against the Constitutional system and laws emanating from it, against Atatürk's principles, who want to overshadow May 27, attack the honorable Turkish army and the Turkish youth, disrupt the unity and tranquility of the great Turkish nation, of 28-29 April and warn them once again to pull themselves together."⁵²⁵ As

⁵²¹ Ümit Güveyi, "Türkiye'de Seçme ve Seçilme Hakkı Boyutunda Yaşanan Demokratikleşme Sürecinin Kısa Tarihçesi ve Bu Süreçte Kadim Türk Kültürünün Rolü," *Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi*, No. 137, (July-Aug. 2018): 51.

⁵²² T.C. Başbakanlık İstatistik Genel Müdürlüğü, *1959 İstatistik Yıllığı* (Ankara: Yeni Cezaevi Basımevi, 1961), 146, 157.

⁵²³ Herbert H. Hyman, Arif Payaşlıoğlu, Frederic W. Frey "The Values of Turkish College Youth" *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 22, no. 3 (Autumn 1958): 289, cited in Alper, *Student Movement in Turkey from A Global Perspective 1960-1971*, 148; Özer Ozankaya *Üniversite Öğrencilerinin Siyasal Yönelimleri* (Ankara Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1966), 75, cited in Alper, *Student Movement in Turkey from A Global Perspective 1960-1971*, 151.

⁵²⁴ "Hürriyet ideali uğruna nesiller boyunca binlerce şehit vermiş bir milletin vatansever gençleri olarak, hürriyeti canımızdan aziz bilerek icabederse bu uğurda yeni şehitler vermekten çekinmeyeceğiz. Bizleri yürekten sarsan hazin bir yıldönümü, hürriyet şehitlerinin aziz hatıraları önünde hürmet ve muhabbetle eğilirken onların ölmez ruhlarını bir bayrak gibi selamlarız." 28 April 1961, "MTTB Declaration," cited in Harun Karadeniz, *Olaylı Yıllar ve Gençlik* (İstanbul: Literatür, 2015), 20.

⁵²⁵ "28-29 Nisanlar Türk gençliğinin, her türlü istismarcılara karşı kazandığı büyük zaferin bayramıdır. Temsilcileri bulunduğumuz Türk gençleri adına kendini bilmezlere, parlamenter rejim aleyhtarlarına, Anayasa düzeninin ve onun ruhundan doğan kanunların karşısında bulunanlara, Atatürk ilkelerine karşı olanlara, 27 Mayıs'ı gölgelemek isteyenlere, şerefli Türk ordusuna ve Türk gençliğine dil uzatanlara, büyük Türk milletinin bölünmez bütünlüğünü ve huzurunu bozmak isteyenlere, daima 28, 29 Nisanı hatırlatır, kendilerine gelmelerini bir defa daha ihtar ederiz." 29 April 1963, "Türkiye Milli Gençlik Teşkilatı (TGMT), Türkiye Milli Talebe Federasyonu (TMTF), Ankara Üniversitesi Talebe Birliği (AÜTB) Common Declaration" cited in Karadeniz, *Olaylı Yıllar ve Gençlik*, 21.

these lines reveal, the students also appropriated and internalized the role of inheritors attributed to them by the ‘establishment.’

Thus, the May 27, 1960 coup alliance formed by the military/bureaucratic elite, industrial bourgeois, and university students perceived the DP as a threat to the fundamentals of the Kemalist regime. In this regard, the threat of the DP was suppressed, entailing the symbolic suppression of non-elite populations, including those who had just migrated to the city with the hopes of upward social mobility. Having lost its confidence in the electoral choices of those sections of the population, the elite adopted a Jacobin discourse to ‘transform’ society so that it would not produce another DP. One of the reflections of the May 27 coalition mentality in cinema was the social realist movies made between 1960-1965. Although these movies are beyond the limits of the current dissertation, which concentrates on action/adventure films, I must emphasize that they also contributed to the formation of nationalist political myths with their depictions of the youth as idealized nationalist heroes struggling against the bigotry of the periphery, or greedy desires of the capitalists. Moreover, these movies contributed to the imagining of the Turkish nation as fighting together for the same goal despite social class differences.⁵²⁶

3.2.2. Foreign Policy Dynamics:

The end of the 1950s also witnessed Turkey’s isolation in the international arena, mainly because of the army’s questioning attitude towards Turkey’s unequal bilateral relationships and the Cyprus policy. In this context, one of the first things that the junta administration and the first coalition government of İnönü did was to declare internationally that Turkey would continue to follow its commitment to the West.⁵²⁷ The army, however, had a doubtful attitude towards the West because the relations between Turkey and the West did not depend on equal principles and, therefore, were likely to creating new capitulations for Turkey. For example, according to the 1954 Agreement with the US, an American soldier was not under Turkish jurisdiction if he was on duty. Turkish Customs did not even control goods

⁵²⁶ Some of the available social realist films are: *Gecelerin Ötesi (Beyond the Nights)*, dir. Metin Erksan, 1960); *Otobüs Yolcuları (Bus Passengers)*, dir. Ertem Göreç, 1961); *Şehirdeki Yabancı (Stranger in the City)*, dir. Halit Refiğ, 1962); *Şafak Bekçileri (Watchmen of Dawn)*, dir. Halit Refiğ, 1963); *Gurbet Kuşları (Birds of Exile)*, dir. Halit Refiğ, 1964); *Bitmeyen Yol (The Never-Ending Road)*, dir. Duygu Sağıroğlu, 1965); *Suçlular Aramızda (Criminals are Among Us)*, dir. Metin Erksan, 1964); and *Karanlıkta Uyananlar (Those Awakening in the Dark)*, dir. Ertem Göreç, 1965).

⁵²⁷ “The Coup Maker; Cemal Gürsel,” *New York Times*, 28 May 1960, <https://www.nytimes.com/1960/05/28/archives/the-coup-maker-cemal-gursel.html>; “Zorlu, ‘En kısa zamanda seçime gidilecek, dedi,” *Milliyet*, 27 May 1960; “Gürsel ‘Diktatör olmayacağım’ dedi,” *Milliyet*, 28 May 1960; İsmail Arar, *Hükümet Programları, 1920-1965* (İstanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1968), 312-350.

sent to Turkey from the US. There had been some secret agreements as well. As a result, the coup administration was not content with the DP's pro-US policies and favored balanced relations.⁵²⁸

The army's distrust created a convenient intellectual environment to discuss new directions and alternative leanings in Turkish foreign policy. In fact, there were already many criticizing Turkey's close relationship with the West. One group was the Islamists, but at that time, they were weak and did not have much influence on the state when compared to other groups. The two powerful groups were the Kemalists with leftist orientation gathered around the journals, *Yön* and *Aydınlık*.⁵²⁹ According to the authors associated with these groups, Turkey should continue its anti-imperialist fight that had started with Atatürk and the War of Independence.⁵³⁰ In this framework, the authors argued that the West was trying to colonize Turkey as it had done in the Third World countries. Therefore, its relationship with the West would not work for Turkey's benefit; in fact, they would make Turkey much more dependent, unstable, and hence backward.⁵³¹ Besides, these intellectuals thought that the coup was an absolute necessity for saving Turkey from the hands of the imperialists⁵³² because businesspeople and the DP, or any parties in the same ideological tendency, collaborated with these imperialist powers.⁵³³

The cooling of relations between Turkey and the West happened over the Cyprus issue, which had already been a subject of public debate in the 1950s with the EOKA attacking the British and Cypriot Turks, and the subsequent İstanbul Pogrom. In the Zurich and London Conferences of 1959, Cyprus became a Republic under the guarantorship of Britain, Turkey, and Greece, which had symbolic military forces on the island. The junta and the following coalition government of the CHP and AP ratified this agreement and did not vote for the further changes demanded by Makarios III, the Archbishop of the Church of Cyprus, and the First

⁵²⁸ Özgür Mutlu Ulus, *The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey: Military Coups, Socialist Revolution and Kemalism* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 12-14.

⁵²⁹ Mehmet Gönübol, "A Short Appraisal of Foreign Policy of the Turkish Republic," *Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk Yıllığı*, No. 14, (1974): 8.

⁵³⁰ For example, see: Behzat Ay, "Ekonomide Atatürkçülük," *Yön*, No. 48, (Nov. 14, 1962); Niyazi Berkes, "200 Yıldır Neden Bocalıyoruz: VII-Atatürkçülük Nedir Ne Değildir?" *Yön*, No. 63, (Febr. 27, 1963); Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, "Türk Sosyalizminin İlkeleri," *Yön*, No. 56, (Jan 9, 1963).

⁵³¹ Çetin Altan, *Onlar Uyanırken: Türk Sosyalistlerinin El Kitabı* (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2017); Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye* (İstanbul: İleri Yayınları, 2006); Mehmet Ali Aybar, *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm* (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1968).

⁵³² Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Devrim ve Demokrasi Üzerine* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1997); *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün Bugün Yarın* (İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi, 2018).

⁵³³ Mihri Belli, "Ulusal Demokratik Devrim," *Aydınlık*, (May 27, 1966) in *Yazılar: 1965-1970* (Ankara: Sol Yayınları, 1970), 12-24; Avcıoğlu, "Bir Sosyalist Stratejinin Esasları," *Yön*, No. 185, (Oct. 14, 1966).

President of Cyprus.⁵³⁴ However, some bloody incidents started soon after, resulting in intercommunal violence between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The most remarkable incident was that of Bloody Christmas, which occurred on 20-21 December 1963 and led to the death of more than five hundred Cypriots, most of them being from the Turkish side. Consequently, 25,000 Turkish Cypriots had to flee their homes. At this point, Turkey asked for the intervention of the guarantor states, while at the same time, the Turkish Assembly allowed its government to intervene in Cyprus if needed.⁵³⁵ Although the Western powers' reactions were quite adverse, Turkey did not stop and even started to fly over Cyprus in a threatening manner. Finally, in June 1964, the Turkish government received President Johnson's Letter saying that Turkey was not permitted to use US military equipment in operation in Cyprus. The letter also stated that NATO could not defend Turkey in the event of Soviet aggression provoked by possible Turkish military intervention in Cyprus.⁵³⁶ This letter, unquestionably, was a turning point that resulted in the cooling of Turkey's ties with the US by spreading the idea that the Western powers had betrayed Turkey. It also increased anti-imperialist and anti-US sentiments.

Thus, Turkey's foreign policy dynamics were mainly shaped around the deterioration of Turkey's relationships with the West due to the Cyprus issue. Although Turkey tried to approach the SU, this did not fit well into the anti-communist nationalist discourse popularized in the shadow of the Cold War. These situations also provided a suitable playground for the gradual adoption of nationalist political myths that would reflect on action/adventure films.

3.3. Cinema and the Reproduction of Political Myths:

3.3.1. Questioning the Ottoman State in Cinema:

It must be first noted that Turkey's foreign policy moves hardly have any relationship with the depictions of the Ottoman past between 1960-1965. However, the movies depicting the Ottoman Empire were significant in reproducing political myths. I was able to find only four movies about the Ottoman Empire made between 1960 and 1965. Among those, two take the Ottoman Empire as a political entity while the other four use the empire only as a cultural

⁵³⁴ "Appendix 1: Conference on Cyprus, documents signed and initialled at Lancaster House on 19 February 1959," https://www.embargoed.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/1959_London_and_Zurich_-Agreements.pdf; Richard Clogg, "Troubled Alliance: Greece and Turkey" in *Greece in the 1980s*, ed. Richard Clogg (London and Basingtone: Palgrave Macmillan, 1983), 130-131.

⁵³⁵ For details of Bloody Christmas and the trauma it created in Cypriot Turks, see: Etienne Copeaux and Claire Mauss-Copeaux, *Taksim! Bölünmüş Kıbrıs 1964-2005* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), 58-69.

⁵³⁶ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 107.

backdrop.⁵³⁷ These two films are *Genç Osman ve Sultan Murat Han (Young Osman and the Sultan Murat)*, dir. Yavuz Yalınkılıncı, 1962) and *Harem'de Dört Kadın (Four Women in the Harem)*, dir. Halit Refiğ, 1965). At this point, I should state that the second movie, *Harem'de Dört Kadın (Four Women in the Harem)*, is a drama and not an action/adventure film. Despite that, I included it in my analysis since the number of movies from 1960-1965 is limited.

Furthermore, in the shadow of the 1960 intervention, which declared the previous government illegitimate, my sample depicts the collapse of the Ottoman state mechanism caused by corrupted administrators. Therefore, unlike the sample from the 1950s, which concentrates on the sultans' conquests in different lands, the sample of 1960-1965 shows how things went out of control in the capital city of İstanbul during a period of relative stagnation. In the minds of the filmmakers of the period, this period of relative stagnation could be associated with the DP era, and the attempt to depict this in the movies could be again related to how the military/bureaucratic elite might have felt itself once it lost its power to the masses.

3.3.1.1. The Leader and Internal Others:

Compared to the depictions of the Sultans in the films of the 1950s, *Genç Osman ve Sultan Murat Han (Young Osman and the Sultan Murat)* presents a more in-depth examination of the Sultan's personality. This could be related to the point that unlike the periods of conquests that had occupied the minds of filmmakers in the 1950s, Murat IV reigned in the first half of the seventeenth century, a period of chaos and stagnation, during which the political order was disrupted due to corruption, bribery and racketeering of both bureaucrats and subjects of the empire. Under conditions such as the strangling of his older brother Osman the Young by the Janissaries and the dethronement of his uncle Mustafa I, Murat IV is portrayed in a depressed and paranoid state of mind, continuously living in the terror of being murdered since the time he has crowned at the age of eleven. Thus, this character could be considered not only the representation of a Sultan but also the entire decayed Ottoman political structure.

Taking advantage of Murat's young age, his mother, Kösem, and several bureaucrats try to manipulate him for their interests. When Murat gets older, he realizes that everyone, including the royal doctor who smoked opium despite stern measures, are trying to deceive him. Then he makes the following statements, which seem rather anachronical: "I gave my nation

⁵³⁷ An example to those available films using the Ottoman Empire as a cultural backdrop is *Gönülden Gönüle (From Heart to Heart)*, dir. Süha Doğan, 1961). It tells the amorous relationship of a composer. The other film from the same group but not available, is *Sayılı Kabadayılar (A Few Gangsters)*, dir. Hasan Kazankaya, 1965). It is a crime story in which a gangster wants to take the revenge of his brother.

my word of honor⁵³⁸ (41:34). I will punish those who disturb the order and involve unjust acts. I could even punish my mother for the interests of my state and my nation” (53:34-53:45).⁵³⁹ His choice of the word ‘nation,’ a modern concept, to name seventeenth-century Ottoman society, reveals the filmmakers’ possible attempts to explain contemporary times. The ruler, here, has a ‘national’ mission of protecting the state order and the nation. In this context, he is a victim of his hostile environment, which makes his representation neither positive nor negative, maybe even more positive. Here, to push it a little further, given the absence of entirely negative representation, Murat could be representing an ideal ruler who is aware of his duties, ready to sacrifice even his mother for realizing these goals; but cannot get out of the frame because ‘internal’ enemies surround him. This representation reflects the anti-bureaucratic building block of Turkish nationalism that increases the ruler's power. Then, because Kösem and the bureaucratic circle have already lost their credibility, Murat disguises himself as a commoner and goes out to observe the problems of his subjects with his own eyes. Although what he does is instead policing, his words could be revealing another possible feature of the ideal ruler: direct communication with people without any intermediaries.

3.3.1.2. *The Warrior:*

When Murat of *Genç Osman ve Sultan Murat Han (Young Osman and the Sultan Murat)* is in the streets of İstanbul one day, he meets Rüstemoğlu Osman. This man is young, outspoken, brave, and strong and from somewhere in Anatolia. Here the myth of the national homeland is reproduced in relation to Anatolia, confirming the official discourse based upon the Turkish History Thesis. In this regard, although it could be far-fetched, Osman could be considered the ideal Turkish youth who would be the inheritor of the regime. Osman comes to İstanbul after he fights with men of a beg who wants to racketeer his family. His uncle thinks these men attacked them because it is a period of nepotism in which titles are gained by paying money instead of success and courage. This remark could be seen as a critique of the DP period, in which incapable people had status and influence or, in fact, any corrupted regime that is not merit-based. After this altercation, Osman promises his mother not to fight again but to study in a *medrese* in İstanbul. His mother has always wanted him to do this since he was a child, as shown in a particular scene in which Osman and his nephew ‘play war’ with wooden swords on wooden horses as little children. Watching these two, Osman’s mother and uncle have a short conversation in which the uncle expects Osman to become a brave warrior like all Turkish

⁵³⁸ “Milletime namus sözüm var”

⁵³⁹ “Anam olarak başımın üstünde yerin var fakat devletimin, milletimin menfaati için seni de harcarım.”

men, whereas the mother wants him to receive an education and so become a “great man.” For her, education is the only way for him “to save himself from being enslaved by another man.” (5:29-5:48). In this scene, the uncle seems to contribute to the myth of the warrior nation by emphasizing how warlike Turkish men are. However, what is stated by Osman’s mother is intriguing in the sense that for the first time in my sample of films, a female character, is challenging the myth of the warrior nation by emphasizing education over fighting. However, in the end, Osman becomes a warrior, and this might relate to the legitimacy of the fight. That is to say, the fight that Osman was in his hometown may not be as legitimate as the wars that he participated in as a loyal soldier of Murat. From this perspective, a physical fight with some corrupted men is meaningless because the only way to destroy them is to establish a meritocratic society.

While Osman of *Genç Osman ve Sultan Murat Han (Young Osman and the Sultan Murat)* is hanging around in the open market when he comes to İstanbul, he sees a swindler stealing an older man’s money. Osman helps the older man and gives some money to him. There is also a healthy man pretending to be blind. These scenes represent the corruption in İstanbul and the personality of Osman. Here, the audience automatically creates an association with Anatolia, where Osman is from, and positive features. When Osman and Murat meet, they get along very well and quickly become friends. At some point, Osman learns about the real identity of Murat. This, however, does not influence their friendship. As a result, Osman becomes a *musahib* -an official companion of the Sultan with his honesty and sincerity. The new status makes Osman the prey for bureaucrats who are trying to manipulate the Sultan through him. Of course, Osman never does what they ask him to do, and he always remains loyal to Murat. Besides his loyalty to the Sultan, the audience also witnesses his heroism in the Baghdad expedition. Despite his young age, which makes him ineligible to fight in the Ottoman army, he voluntarily leads soldiers “without receiving orders from anyone” (1:01:38). In the final scene, he plants the Ottoman flag on the walls of Baghdad Castle. Unlike the corrupted bureaucrats of the time, he does this for neither money nor titles, but because he wanted to serve the Sultan, the representative of the state order. This makes him a unique hero in the eyes of the Sultan. Based on these actions, it could be argued that the national hero is also expected to be loyal to the ruler besides being young, fearless, and educated, or at least eager to be educated. He should behave independently of bureaucratic circles and be ready to sacrifice his life for the ruler and everything he symbolizes, such as the state order.

3.3.1.3. External Others and Their Internal Collaborators:

Directed by Refiğ, *Harem 'de Dört Kadın (Four Women in the Harem)* is set in late 1899 early 1900, in the absolutist period of Abdülhamit II. In general, this period in the movie could be an allegory of the DP period, which turned out to be a tyranny of the majority with its dictatorial measures limiting freedoms of speech and thought. Once more, the audience sees a chaotic atmosphere similar to that faced by Murat IV in *Genç Osman ve Sultan Murat Han (Young Osman and the Sultan Murat)*. The difference, however, is that in *Harem 'de Dört Kadın (Four Women in the Harem)*, in addition to internal enemies represented by evil bureaucrats, there are external enemies. These are European powers, whether British, German, or Dutch, who strive to get several concessions by manipulating the Sultan through some greedy pashas that could be bribed. The protagonist is Sadık Pasha, whom the British pay for influencing the Sultan in favor of England. As opposed to his name, which means 'loyal' in Turkish, this Pasha is disloyal to the Sultan. He is portrayed as fat, bearded, and speaking in a rural accent. Moreover, he is greedy and self-interested. Since he does not seem to deserve his status as a pasha, he could be representing a corrupted society of nepotism instead of a meritocratic one, as also emphasized in *Genç Osman ve Sultan Murat Han (Young Osman and the Sultan Murat)*. This also reflects the audience's expectations of the presence of a kind of dissonance between the pasha and the westernized modern life that any pasha of the time could have. In this context, in one scene depicting Christmas Eve's celebrations, Sadık Pasha suddenly stops the radio playing Western music and starts to dance the tsifteteli, a traditional dance with oriental rhythms. Moreover, Sadık Pasha's impotence and the fact that he cannot have children are also emphasized in several parts of the film. In fact, it is made clear to the audience that his problem is not simply physical impotence but his inability to control the three women in his harem. He is manipulated by those women who are also making some covert plans against Ruhşan, who has been chosen to be the fourth wife.

3.3.1.4. Imperial Landscapes, 'Our' Women and the Potential Warrior:

In *Harem 'de Dört Kadın (Four Women in the Harem)*, Sadık Pasha's harem and the entire mansion personnel could be considered a micro example of the Ottoman Empire, which had already gone out of control. Every morning, when he salutes his personnel, he refers to where they are from. According to what he says, there is a man from the Black Sea region, an Albanian, a Tatar, and another man from Montenegro in this community. His wives also contribute to the picture. The audience is presented the information that the oldest of his wife is Arab, one of the others is Circassian, and the other is Bosnian. These three women coming

from different lands of the empire belittle Ruḥşan, the fourth wife because she is from Anatolia. She is a distant relative of the Pasha and unsurprisingly described as the most innocent, freshest, and purest of all women. She is in love with Cemal, a student of the Faculty of Medicine. Here Cemal could be a representation of university students who are expected to ‘enlighten’ the country. He is the Pasha’s nephew, and despite his uncle, he is a supporter of the Young Turk movement. In the scene in which the Pasha learns about Cemal’s political inclinations, the Pasha calls the Young Turks vagrants who were trying to overthrow the Sultan, destroy the state, and realize freemasonry ideals. He also states: “We owe what we have to the Sultan. How did you forget the filthy Anatolian town that I have brought you from? If I did not bring you..., you would be dead of dirt”⁵⁴⁰ Cemal then says: “Our comfort alone is not that important. All people of Anatolia should live in the same conditions. This is what we are fighting for”⁵⁴¹ Pasha then says: “Is it your business to worry about the people of Anatolia? They, themselves, do not complain about their situation...What are you doing in İstanbul, if you really love Anatolia? Why do you want to get a foot in Europe?”⁵⁴² (1:01:53-1:02:24). In the film, the myth of the national homeland concentrates on Anatolia, and, with these sentences, the Pasha also belittles Anatolia, although he has decided to take Ruḥşan as his fourth wife. Therefore, the real savior of Anatolia is not the Pasha, who could be the representative of the DP; but instead, Cemal, the revolutionary university student who falls in love with Ruḥşan, the embodiment of Anatolia with her purity and innocence. Then, the audience waits for the ultimate union of Anatolia and the young intellectual. However, his plans to go to Paris with Ruḥşan to join the Young Turks there fail after Cemal eavesdrops on the men of a rival Pasha planning to kill Sadık by collaborating with the other nephew Rüştü who, in return, expects to get the title of Major in addition to the mansion and the harem. Then, Cemal sacrifices his love, fights with the men of the other Pasha, and saves his uncle. This narrative implies the presence of internal enemies in addition to external ones. Cemal, however, is loyal and respectful to the elderly. This depiction could give clues and show role models about what is expected from young university students of the early 1960s. They should work for the welfare of Anatolia, and in doing this, they should be loyal to the elderly.

⁵⁴⁰ Eğer rahat yaşıyorsak, refah içinde yaşıyorsak padişahımızın sayesinde. Geldiğin pis Anadolu kasabasını ne çabuk unuttun?...Seni getirtmeseydim pislikten geberecektiniz.”

⁵⁴¹ “Yalnız bizim rahatımız mühim değil; bütün Anadolu insanı da aynı rahata kavuşmalı. Biz bunun için mücadele ediyoruz.”

⁵⁴² “Size mi düştü Anadolu halkının tasası. Hani hallerinden şikayet ettikleri?...Anadou’yu seviyorsunuz da İstanbul’da işiniz ne? Niçin Avrupa’ya atıyorsunuz kapağı?”

It is hard to tell that there is an obvious critique of the Sultan in both films analyzed in this part. What is criticized is the corrupted circle around the Sultan. In both films, the ones who are loyal to the Sultan are Osman and Cemal, the young, brave, and nationally conscious men. Even Cemal's attitude towards the Sultan is not evident because he neither confirms nor rejects his uncle's words about the Young Turks' goals of overthrowing the Sultan and changing the state order. I do not think that the audience also attaches these goals to Cemal because the words are voiced by Sadık and some women in the harem, who are not entirely believable characters. Besides, the emphasis on Anatolia with Osman and Ruḡsan's backgrounds and Cemal's goals could be associated with the re-embrace of Anatolia by the late Ottoman/early Republican intellectuals of the War of Independence who had to deal with the only remaining piece of land in their hands. The May 27 alliance could be perceiving itself in line with these intellectuals and, therefore, could be sympathetic to embrace Anatolia not only to be able to understand ordinary people's wishes but also to gain votes against the political parties in the DP line. Besides, these neither positive nor negative representations of the Sultans could be evidence that the filmmakers started questioning the Ottoman Empire but that questioning also included an embrace of the past and not leaving it in the hands of some ignorant men who do not deserve their power and status like the DP members.

Thus, this somewhat limited number of films reproduces the myths of the warrior nation and its leader through the figures of Osman and Cemal. In this picture, the homeland is Anatolia and, the youth is expected to be its protector while working for the interests of the nation. In this context, as loyal warriors, they should be ready to fight against both internal and external enemies who want to disrupt the nation's unity.

3.3.2. *The Men in Solidarity in the War of Independence:*

The available nationalist action/adventure films representing the War of Independence depict the stories of men fighting shoulder to shoulder for a great nationalist goal regardless of their differences. These films are *Silah Arkadařları* (*Brothers in Arms*, dir. řinasi Özonuk, 1962), *İsimsiz Kahramanlar* (*Nameless Heroes*, dir. Semih Evin, 1964) and *Çanakkale Arslanları* (*The Lions of Gallipoli*, dir. Turgut Demirağ, 1964). In general, these films present an ideal society devoid of any class conflict and works in solidarity for the great goal of saving the 'homeland.' The reaches of the homeland here do not only include İstanbul, unlike what had been mentioned in the War of Independence films of the 1950s, but also an unknown town of Eskişehir in *Silah Arkadařları* (*Brothers in Arms*), historical sites of Antalya, and the battlefield in Çanakkale in *Çanakkale Arslanları* (*The Lions of Gallipoli*). Thus, the films of

the early 1960s give a much broader image of the homeland with their focus on Anatolia. All these corners of Anatolia are expected to be rescued by some ‘saviors’ fighting in solidarity. This could be why the films had titles with plural nouns as indicating an imagined togetherness between co-nationals. In this context, instead of bringing one individual to the forefront, the films of historical and action/adventure genre of the 1960-1965 period focus on a group of men’s nationalist acts.

3.3.2.1. *The Warriors:*

Against a backdrop of the military’s increasing visibility and influence in everyday life, the films adopt a professional observation of the military. Soldiers are presented with their ranks making the audience aware that there were some lieutenants and privates in addition to many high-ranking commanders. This representation guides viewers in showing them to whom to be respectful. So, the ‘common man’ should know his place regarding the military. Besides, the military hierarchies might resemble the societal ones, that is, the social classes. The films, however, do not divide people into compartments; but instead unite and, at the same time, discipline them.

The general representation of these groups of ‘saviors’ is centered on a military-style brotherhood within the groups. Men are all friends, and as friends, they sing, smoke, dance, and wrestle. All these strengthen their togetherness in the eyes of the audience. In fact, the viewers could even envy the friendly and heroic war atmosphere. The characters’ hometowns, and references to their occupations do not divide the group. In *Çanakkale Arslanları (The Lions of Gallipoli)*, there is a soldier from Adana who is a shopkeeper alongside a farmer from İzmir. This information on what they do for a living and where they are from could be a reminder that petty-bourgeois and farmers, a part of the former DP electorate, had fought for the same national goal together with intellectuals, journalists, or teachers, who had been portrayed as the most active groups in the movies of the 1950s. This shows how unified the Turkish nation is despite its differences.

Furthermore, what unites the characters in films is not only their nationalist goals but also what they remember about the past, as Ernst Renan would agree. In their viewing experience, the audience could quickly build links between different periods. For example, in *Silah Arkadaşları (Brothers in Arms)*, there is an older man called Sergeant Kazım, who plays his war trumpet from time to time, even in completely unrelated scenes. The townspeople explain the reason for his behavior as a mental disorder because he is the only survivor of his battalion in the Battle of Gallipoli. A similar example could be given from *İsimsiz Kahramanlar*

(*Nameless Heroes*), where an older man mentions that he lost his arm in Gallipoli. A woman confirms that two family members died in the same battle (20:41-22:08). Thus, any viewer watching these scenes could connect the Battle of Gallipoli and the War of Independence. Interestingly, Gallipoli was a relatively new reference for filmmakers because there was no reference in the available group of movies from the 1950s. Therefore, they probably could not decide, for a while, ways to adopt this late Ottoman war into the official nationalist discourse. In the early 1960s, foreign policy developments might have helped them, given the powerholding elites' questioning of Turkey's dependence on the West and the resentment caused by the Western powers' attitude in the case of Cyprus. Therefore, Gallipoli might have functioned to boost the decreasing Turkish self-confidence. Besides, in this later appropriation of Gallipoli, *Çanakkale Arslanları (The Lions of Gallipoli)*, as a film commissioned by the Turkish Military Forces, probably acted as a guideline providing the 'necessary' official clues for narration to the filmmakers. In the end, these movies formed a grand narrative that contextualized Cyprus as a repetition of past traumas that had been faced in previous wars.⁵⁴³

3.3.2.2. *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk:*

As in the films of the 1950s, the films of this section include many references to Atatürk. The difference, however, is that this time he is portrayed as a part of the narrative, not as a mysterious savior whose pictures suddenly appear on the screen accompanied by a voice-over describing his heroic acts. For example, in *Çanakkale Arslanları (The Lions of Gallipoli)*, he commands soldiers, talks to them, makes phone calls, and gives orders. Although only his back is shown, the audience immediately grasps the message that Atatürk was a great man of the military, and that his genius shaped the fate of the Battle. This representation does not only strengthen Atatürk's image but also enhances the legitimacy of both the Battle of Gallipoli and the War of Independence by connecting them as the former being the precursor of the latter. In this picture, the soldiers' sole duty is to follow Atatürk's orders without questioning, no matter what their ranks, hometowns, jobs are. This is what was expected from the idealized citizen in the minds of the powerholders in 1960-1965. From their perspective, the Turkish nation should not diverge from Atatürk's path.

⁵⁴³ For a compact review of the commemoration of the Gallipoli Campaign during the AKP era and a brief background, see: Sibel Baykut, "The Re-contextualization of the Battle of Gallipoli through Commemorations," *Intercultural Understanding*, Vol. 6, (2016): 7-15. Another source that focuses on celebrations and some speeches by politicians: Yücel Yanıkdağ, "The Battle of Gallipoli: The Politics of Remembering and Forgetting in Turkey," *Comillas Journal of International Relations*, No.2, (2015): 99-115.

3.3.2.3. *The Military/Army Nation:*

The movies about the War of Independence feature young and ambitious lieutenants such as the Lieutenant Doğan in *Silah Arkadaşları (Brothers in Arms)*, but it is hard to tell that these characters are sufficiently at the forefront. They fight together with soldiers of other ranks and are in close contact with civilians. Although they lead the other people, the movies impose where they should stand vis-a-vis the high-ranking soldiers. That is to say, the lieutenants are expected to be the leaders of the lower-ranking soldiers and civilians, but they know their place with respect to their commanders. This expectation, of course, finds its way into the idealized Turkish youth of 1960-1965. Consequently, these young people must respect the elderly, stay away from violence, and take Atatürk's principles as their guidance in transforming society.

One particular character could be regarded as the target of the May 27 coalition's perspective of transforming the people of Anatolia. He is a young rurally-based private in *Çanakkale Arslanları (The Lions of Gallipoli)*. He is unsophisticated, pure, has a slight accent, sometimes sings folk songs, and hangs around with a donkey to search for water for his legion in the scenes where he is at the forefront. The audience is not provided his real name, but other soldiers call him Keloğlan, meaning 'the bald boy,' although he is not bald. This character is a reference to another character with the same name in folk literature, a folk hero living with his poor mother somewhere in Anatolia. In his stories, he first seems to be easily fooled. In reality, he is cunning and always finds practical solutions to different problems, even the Sultan.⁵⁴⁴ In the eyes of the filmmakers of 1960-1965, he could be representing the rural masses of Anatolia. For example, when he gets caught by the British soldiers while searching for water, he deceives them by saying that his commander sent him to take water to enemy trenches. The British commander believes in him and even appreciates the Turkish side for behaving in such a noble way. Using this as an opportunity, later, Keloğlan learns about where the enemy stores its guns. At the end of the story, the Turkish side uses this piece of information to defeat the enemy. Thus, as a representative of the 'common man,' he saves his own life by turning a disadvantaged situation into an advantaged one and makes a significant contribution to the war. The message here could be that the people of Anatolia should be re-discovered because they are hidden gems. Considering the other characters from Anatolia, such as Osman of *Genç Osman ve Sultan Murat Han (Young Osman and Sultan Murat)*, the filmmakers, in general, could be said to be re-

⁵⁴⁴ Hasan Bülent Paksoy, *The Bald Boy and the Most Beautiful Girl in the World* (Texas: Aton, 2003). http://vlib.iue.it/carrie/texts/carrie_books/paksoy-8/The_Bald_Boy_Keloglan_and_the_Most_Beautiful_Girl_in_the_World.pdf

embracing Anatolia for the survival of the nation. To extend the analysis further, this could be an attempt to grasp why the DP had been victorious in the rural hearts of Anatolia.

3.3.2.4. *The Others:*

Who is the enemy, then? The heroes fight against both external and internal enemies. The most potent external enemies are Western states, which are generally described twofold. First, their technological superiority is emphasized to increase the Turkish side's heroism by conveying that it could defeat its enemies despite the lack of technology. Second, in *Çanakkale Arslanları* (*The Lions of Çanakkale*), the British side is depicted as noble, heroic, and quite respectful to war codes. For example, they do not shoot an already wounded enemy man or kill their prisoners of war. There are several scenes in which the British commanders appreciate the Turks' strength and bravery. When his army leaves Çanakkale at the end of the film, the British commander says that the entire of humanity lost 550,000 of its children in this war (2:19:17-2:19:25). By mentioning a strikingly negative side of the war, the filmmakers might have wanted to emphasize the civilized nature of the Turks through the British character. According to the given message, Turks represent humanity besides the British, and Turks are never warlike. This point is understandable only in relation to the image that the new government wanted to convey to the world. On the one hand, it could also be interpreted as a challenge to the myth of the warrior nation. On the other, it supports the idea that Turks fight only when they have a legitimate cause. This message here legitimizes the wars that Turkey had in the past. A controversial depiction of external enemies is available in *İsimsiz Kahramanlar* (*Nameless Heroes*), which starts with two drunk French soldiers harassing several Turkish women in the streets of İstanbul.

In terms of non-Muslim minorities, a double-sided depiction can be observed in *Çanakkale Arslanları* (*The Lions of Çanakkale*). In the film, the audience sees two Greek priests with opposing ideas. The first works for the Greek Megalo Idea and therefore asks Aleko, the little bakery boy, to bomb the Turkish arsenal. The second perceives himself as a member of the Turkish nation, whether or not his name is Aleko, Dmitri, or Yael. He says that he is benefiting from the auspices of the Turkish nation and that he is strictly against religious men's involvement in political issues (1:00:34-1:00:47).⁵⁴⁵ Aleko follows the latter, and at one point, even sacrifices his life to protect the Turkish arsenal against the first priest. This two-dimensional portrayal of non-Muslims could be considered an attempt to emphasize the unity

⁵⁴⁵ "Mademki bu topraklarda yaşıyor ve onun nimetlerinden istifade ediyoruz biz de bu memleketin evladınız. İsmi Aleko da Dimitri de Yael da olsa Türk'sün."

of the Turkish nation in its ideals. Therefore, although the myth of ethnic homogeneity is challenged with these representations, the idea of the Turkish nation's unity in terms of ideals is strengthened.

The other internal enemies are gypsies depicted in *Silah Arkadaşları (Brothers in Arms)*. This is the first time the audience meets this group. The difficult point, however, is that it is unclear whether the filmmakers see the gypsies as a separate ethnic group or otherwise. In the story, they pop up as a handful of dancing vagrants who have just started to live in a town of Eskişehir, which is mostly empty because the able-bodied men had been recruited. It is not explained why the gypsy men are in town instead of war. This specific town has another group of others: the bandits. It is not known why these characters have become bandits, but they cooperate with the gypsies to racketeer the townspeople. Their accomplice in the town is a timber merchant who receives his share from the money collected by the bandits. This whole set of disorder and chaos is expected to be solved by Lieutenant Doğan, who is responsible for punishing internal enemies while some of his friends are fighting in trenches against external enemies. Therefore, Doğan could symbolize the military/bureaucratic elite's return to Anatolia and its desire to deal with internal enemies.

Another internal enemy to the nation is the Sultan. At this point, a very interesting scene in *İsimsiz Kahramanlar (Nameless Heroes)* of a prostitute and French soldier who are engaging in sexual intercourse brings how internal enemies are perceived to the fore. The prostitute makes one of the most radical speeches of the history of Turkish cinema, in my opinion: "That Archduke, or king or the Sultan, whoever they are, it is as if they are different from you or me. They say he (the Sultan) is descended from the sky; he (the Sultan) is a member of the dynasty. Have you ever seen a man in the toilet? There, what the Sultan does is the same as what tramps like me are doing. But they regard the whole universe as a toilet and have defecated on it..." (09:09-09:23).⁵⁴⁶ Here, she tears apart the sky and brings the ruler down to the earth. In doing this, she considers the Sultan, an internal enemy who has betrayed the homeland and the nation. In her words, "he (the Sultan) has sold the homeland to enemies." Similarly, in another scene, the old man who lost his arm in the Battle of Gallipoli says to his daughter: "Do you see that beautiful palace?...This nation made them (the Sultan and his bureaucratic circle) pursue their lives in palaces like this, but they sold these glorious lands which had been watered by the blood

⁵⁴⁶ "Arşidük mu kral mi sultan mı e haltsalar sanki benden senden farkı var. O gökte zembille inmiş hanedanmış o. Sen hiç kenefte adam gördün mu orada padişah da aynı isi yapar benim gibi berduşlar da..."

of martyrs to the enemies.”⁵⁴⁷ Hearing this, his daughter warns him to be quiet against denouncers and the imperial guards that torture the rebellious voices.⁵⁴⁸ The father’s answer is again quite courageous: “Let them denounce me. There is nothing that they can take away from me anymore if I cannot speak freely in my homeland” (20:41-22:08).⁵⁴⁹ These lines justify the War of Independence, which is against both internal and external enemies.

3.4. Concluding Remarks:

The first half of the 1960s was shaped by the May 27 coup, which brought the military/bureaucratic elite’s reinstatement of its power against the newly rising classes such as tradesmen, petty-bourgeois, and peasants. For the military/bureaucratic elite, which had played a determining role in politics since the late 19th century, the new classes were just ignorant masses dragging the country into authoritarianism, chaos, and uncertainty. To save the regime, therefore, an adjustment had to be made by the ‘progressive elite,’ which also included university students that were perceived as the idealist inheritors of the early Republican elite. The result was fierce suppression of the opposing voices, even in the form of execution. This also meant the crystallization of the rift between traditionalist and western-oriented ‘progressive,’ rural and urban, and the non-educated and educated classes.

In this environment which was dominated by the Jacobin mentality of creating an ideal Turkish national out of the ‘common man’ that would not support the values of Menderes, filmmakers were interested in Anatolia. Nevertheless, they omitted to represent ethnic and class differences. Instead, the strategy was to emphasize the birthplaces of characters as the defining elements of their heterogeneity. With this, the military, bureaucratic elite attempted to form a re-attachment with the lower classes of rural origin. Consequently, movies depicting the past from the period either take place somewhere in the periphery or include characters originating from different parts of Anatolia. In the same vein, unlike the high-ranking soldiers of the War of Independence films of the 1950s, low-ranking soldiers and civilians adopt influential roles, as in the case of Kelođlan in *Çanakkale Arslanları (The Lions of Gallipoli)*. The message was that all members of the nation fight in solidarity as the parts of an organic whole by adopting the same nationalist goal regardless of their social classes or birthplaces. They all fight in solidarity as if they are a family, therefore symbolizing the nation itself.

⁵⁴⁷ “Bak görüyor musun su güzel sarayı ah ah Yazıklar olsun o akıtılan kanlara. Bu millet onları böyle saraylarda yaşattı onlar ise şühedanın kanlarıyla sulamış bu aziz toprakları düşmanlara sattılar. Tüh Allah belalarını versin!”

⁵⁴⁸ “Baba sus! Duyarlarsa jurnal ederler.”

⁵⁴⁹ “Etsinler! Benden alacakları bir şey yok artık. Kendi vatanımda konuşamayacak olduktan sonra bu kolumu iye kaybettim ben vücudum kursun yarasıyla dolu bütün bu mücadele işgal altında yaşamak için miydi?”

Furthermore, younger characters are taken as the inheritors of the founding elite. Therefore, while the youth is associated with the coup alliance's values, the Ottoman Empire is represented as corrupted and decadent as the symbol of something outdated. These representations also fit into the post-coup conjuncture in which the Ottoman past is associated with the corrupted DP. In this context, the nation's leadership must be assumed by uncorrupted, young, educated, loyal, and nationalist males, who are aware of social problems such as medical school student Cemal in *Haremde Dört Kadın* (*Four Women in Harem*). At this point, although education is shown as the only way to have respectability and upward mobility against the nepotism of the DP, there are also cases in which these men had to change. For example, Rüstemoğlu Osman in *Genç Osman ve Sultan Murat Han* (*Young Osman and the Sultan Murat*) reneges on this promise to his mother and joins the Ottoman army to defend the Sultan because corrupted bureaucrats are deceiving the Sultan. Thus, in some cases, the young and educated male finds himself in a position of giving up his titles and fighting together with soldiers. Therefore, in their portrayals as the ideal warriors of the leader, these characters never behave independently of the ruler or the military.

All these representations militarized everyday life of the early 1960s, which had already been under the influence of the deteriorating relationships with the West over the Cyprus issue. As a result, by the end of the 1960-1965 period, filmmakers had become eager to reproduce the myth of national mission by completing the official foreign policy discourse. Here, like the representations of enemies in the 1950s, the enemy is not entirely obvious, probably because the government did not want to offend the Western bloc. The mission of the nation, in this context, is to bring civilization and peace to all corners of the homeland as benevolent conquerors.

Thus, the 1960-1965 period might be interpreted as a period of intervention to the masses' interests and tastes by the military/bureaucratic elite. The films are never independent of the dominant codes of Turkish politics. Therefore, they all reproduced political myths, specifically the myth of warrior nation, by preparing the ground for the post-1965 period in which aggressiveness and militarism would dominate.