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Summaries

International labor division, dependency and economic growth: A cross-national study

by R.A.G. van Puijenbroek and L.B. van Snippenburg

In this study we investigated the hypothesis that a subordinate position on the national markets of goods and capital retards economic development.

A model was constructed, founded on ideas derived from dependencia-theory and works of Galtung and Bornschieer.

The variables in the model are trade dependency, stock of foreign capital, flow of foreign capital, state strength, level of economic development and economic growth.

By using multiple regression analysis in which we specified curvilinear and non-additive relations the following results are obtained:

- a strong curvilinear relationship between level of economic development and economic growth,
- a positive effect of flow of foreign capital on economic growth,
- a negative effect of stock of foreign capital on economic growth,
- weak interaction effects of the intensity of trade and the structure of trade on economic growth,
- no effect of state strength on economic growth.

Limits to proportional representation – some empirical analyses concerning the decentralisation of municipal government in Amsterdam

by Kees Aarts

The transfer of municipal policy tasks to 17 newly elected district councils in Amsterdam is viewed as a factual change from a one-district to a 17-district electoral system. On the basis of Douglas Rae's work, this viewpoint gives rise to two hypotheses concerning the proportionality

between vote and seats shares of parties. First, as a result of decreased district magnitude, the average deviation between these shares in the 17 district councils is expected to increase in comparison with the city council. Second, as the actual PR-formula to be used in the districts is subject to a political decision, the hypothesis that the largest averages formula yields more disproportionate results than the largest remainders formula is put to a test. The empirical tests, using data from 5 heterogeneous elections, affirm both hypotheses. Clearly, two simultaneous causes of larger disproportionality are at work: decreased district magnitude and use of the largest averages formula. Closer inspection of the results reveals that the latter formula benefits not just any large party, but almost exclusively only *the* largest party, which as a consequence should attach a great interest to this method.

Finally, the possibility of malrepresentation by manipulation of district borders under PR is investigated. Analysis of the spatial stability and skewness of the partisan vote distribution suggests that the necessary conditions for manipulation are fulfilled. Two new, rather conservative areal divisions of the city of Amsterdam show that such manipulation is possible, albeit not leading to spectacular results.