



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Democracy and Foreign Policy in the Netherlands

Baehr, P.R.

Citation

Baehr, P. R. (1983). Democracy and Foreign Policy in the Netherlands. *Acta Politica*, 18: 1983(1), 37-62.
Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3452327>

Version: Publisher's Version
License: [Leiden University Non-exclusive license](#)
Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3452327>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

prudence of those who have this power committed to them, to be managed by the best of their skill for the advantage of the commonwealth'.²

More than seventy years later Rousseau held substantially the same view:

'Ce qui importe essentiellement à chaque citoyen, c'est l'observation des lois au dedans, la propriété des biens, et la sûreté des particuliers. Tant que tout ira bien sur ces trois points, laissez les conseils négocier et traiter avec l'étranger. Ce n'est pas de là, que viendront les dangers les plus à craindre'.³

Not necessarily as a matter of principle, but mainly for practical reasons, both philosophers held the view that questions of foreign policy should be dealt with in a manner clearly different from other political issues.

Despite the considerable influence these writers have had on the development of modern political thinking, their views on popular control of foreign policy seem to have been virtually ignored. Their views are not reflected in any present-day constitution. On the contrary, in certain systems, such as the American, special provisions have been made to guarantee the influence of the people's representatives on the formation of foreign policy. An explanation for this phenomenon is probably that people would consider it contrary to the essence of democracy to exclude popular influence from this crucial area of policy-making and that, besides, it is often difficult to draw a clear line between domestic and foreign policy.

This paper deals with various aspects of democratic control over foreign policy in the Netherlands. It deals with the role of parliament, political parties and various special interest groups. Concluding observations concern the limits of democratic control.

The present-day situation in the Netherlands is vastly different from that of the nineteenforties and fifties, when the nation was faced with important decisions in the field of foreign policy: membership of the Brussels Pact, NATO and the European Communities – decisions which were of crucial importance to the international position of the Netherlands and which, apart from rather perfunctory parliamentary debates, in the absence of much public interest, were taken in a spirit of consensus. However, since the early sixties this consensus has disappeared. An increase in interest in matters of foreign policy, especially among certain active groups, can be observed. This increased interest goes together with feelings of frustration, because the government has shown itself unable or unwilling to comply with all demands. A great deal of the more fundamental decisions in the field of foreign policy are necessarily of a secret or semi-secret nature. At times it is in fact impossible to supply the needed information to the public; often the authorities consider it undesirable to give full information about the state of affairs. President Woodrow Wilson's principle of 'open

covenants openly arrived at' is seldom – and then only temporarily – put into practice.

When looking at the problem of democratic control over foreign policy in countries as diverse as the United States and the Netherlands, one has to take into account major differences in the political systems, such as have been mentioned by Bernard Cohen.⁴ He has rightly pointed out the differences in the organization of power, the nature of the political party system and the structure of political norms. One has to be aware of these fundamental differences, before one can begin to compare the ways in which democratic control over foreign policy is organized.

Parliament⁵

The possibilities of the Dutch parliament to exert control over foreign policy are based on the constitution. The formal and actual authority to make and determine foreign policy rests in the Netherlands, as in other countries, with the national government. More precisely, it is the Minister of Foreign Affairs who is in charge of foreign relations. He heads the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and directs the representation of the country abroad. Since 1965, a separate Minister without Portfolio has been in charge of development aid. A junior minister (*Staatssecretaris*) is usually charged with problems of European unification and integration. Initiatives in the realm of foreign affairs rest mainly with these officials. It should be noted that such matters as international treaties, the appointment of ambassadors and other important issues of foreign policy must be formally submitted for approval to the Council of Ministers.⁶

The parliament – the two chambers of the *Staten-Generaal*, – must approve declarations of war, unless '... as a result of the actual state of war consultation with the States General has turned out to be impossible'.⁷ It must also expressly or tacitly approve treaties with foreign states.⁸ Furthermore, both chambers of parliament debate the annual budget, which is accompanied by an explanatory memorandum for each department in which the minister states the main lines of policy he intends to pursue. The foreign policy debates in the politically more important Second Chamber are often preceded by public or private sessions of its foreign policy committee. This standing committee is composed of the foreign policy experts of the different fractions; it holds no formal constitutional powers, nor can it prevent proposals from reaching the floor for full parliamentary debate. On his own initiative or on request from the parliament, a minister may prepare a formal paper (*nota*) on any aspect of concern to his department, which will be debated in parliament. Such debates may or may not

lead to further action by either the minister or the parliament. Finally, members of parliament can put questions to the minister in either written or oral form; they may also lead to full-scale parliamentary debates.

Another important constitutional provision states that, in the interest of the development of the international legal order, treaties may deviate from the constitution; such treaties need a two-thirds majority of the votes cast in each chamber of parliament.⁹ The constitution states furthermore that self-executing provisions of international treaties can be invoked in the national courts. They override national laws and even the national constitution itself.¹⁰

The foreign minister is unquestionably *the* dominating figure in the field of Dutch external relations. Members of parliament have often complained of their lack of influence in the field and have shown signs of frustration when confronted with their powerlessness. This may help to explain why the role of the opposition in this respect is also rather limited. It must restrict itself to raising controversial matters and putting critical questions to the minister, whenever an issue arises that merits such questions. An important factor that has contributed to the weakness of the opposition has been the absence, during almost the entire period since the Second World War, of fundamental differences among the major Dutch political parties over foreign policy.¹¹ One of the major reasons for the strength of the foreign minister – as that of other ministers – lies in the coalition character of Dutch politics. In the Netherlands no political party commands an absolute majority in parliament. In the absence of permanent coalitions it usually takes several months of negotiations after the elections to construct a government coalition that can command a parliamentary majority. In recent years this coalition was formed on the basis of a formal agreement (*regeerakkoord*) between two or more parties in which the main policy lines for the newly established government are lined out. Although parliament has the constitutional right to force the resignation of any minister, it has been reluctant to do so for fear of upsetting the carefully balanced and often rather fragile government coalition. The resignation of one minister may lead to the resignation of the entire cabinet, which means another round of lengthy negotiations or new elections – neither of which may be welcome. Thus forcing a foreign minister to resign is a means of last resort that has rarely been used in the history of Dutch foreign policy.¹² Cohen quotes a Dutch member of parliament as saying: 'You don't bring a government down on a foreign affairs issue'.¹³ That feeling, which since 1945 is prevalent among parliamentarians, unquestionably contributes greatly to the political strength of the foreign minister, as exemplified by the long-time (1952–1971) incumbent of the office, Mr. Joseph Luns.¹⁴

Although foreign policy can be the subject of debate in both chambers of parliament, it is the Second Chamber that pays most attention to foreign affairs. The debates cover both substantive matters of policy and organizational or procedural matters. They often go much further than discussing the principles and foundations of foreign policy and may refer to the methods the Minister of Foreign Affairs should use to execute his policies. If one thinks that a parliament should limit itself to the principles and leave the details to the government, this is not an opinion shared by many Dutch members of parliament. Thus in recent years the Second Chamber has repeatedly dealt with the problem of the 'merger' of the separate diplomatic service with the other divisions of the department.¹⁵ Although this matter has been debated for more than ten years and although subsequent foreign ministers have expressed their willingness to bring such a merger about, it has as yet not succeeded – mainly because of resistance from inside the department. Another organizational matter which has drawn the attention of members of parliament is the organization of the human rights division. It has been argued that human rights should be transferred from the international organization division to a separate directorate to emphasize the overall political aspects of human rights, apart from those aspects dealt with by international organizations. A high-level official within the department should be entrusted with the co-ordination of human rights policy both at the intra- and interdepartmental level. Foreign minister Max van der Stoep has rejected these proposals as they would interfere with the existing structure of his department and would cause other divisions to be less involved in human rights. He did, however, set up a departmental co-ordination committee for human rights, which meets monthly to discuss human rights affairs.¹⁶

On the whole, parliamentary efforts to reorganize the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have met only with limited success. One of the problems parliamentarians face is that it is impossible for them to attend to such matters on a more or less permanent basis. Other matters command their attention as well. As organizational matters have to compete with matters of substance in foreign policy, there is usually not enough time left to deal with them exhaustively. The *right* of the parliament to take up such questions is seldom disputed. Its *effect* is only rather limited.

An important point concerns requests for information. As far as parliamentary requests go, the government usually avoids an outright refusal, if at all possible. It may often prefer to give the requested information in confidence to the respective parliamentary standing committee. This type of information cannot of course be used publicly. Therefore it cannot help parliament in its role of what Woodrow Wilson once aptly called 'clari-

fyng public business for public comprehension'. It increases the parliamentarians' knowledge, but they are prevented from using that knowledge publicly. Therefore, one might wonder, in order to serve their function as representatives of the people, they might even be better off *not* having this confidential information at all!

Although the government normally has an advantage of information over the parliament, occasionally it is the other way around. Or, at least members of parliament may present information in public session, which they have received through private channels or through the offices of private or public interest groups. By skillful presentation of such new information parliament may be able to redirect details of foreign policy. It all depends, however, on the susceptibility of the foreign minister to such information. If he is not willing to adapt his policies accordingly, there is relatively little the parliament can do, short of forcing him to resign – a sanction which it is reluctant to apply, as we saw before.

So far we have discussed parliament as an almost monolithic entity facing the government. It is obvious that in general the parliamentarians who belong to the government parties will be more sympathetic towards that government than the members of the opposition. Members of the opposition may be tempted to start conducting foreign policy, *while out of office*. They make promises to foreign government about policies they intend to pursue when their party will occupy the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This has happened occasionally when Dutch members of parliament visited foreign governments or liberation organizations.¹⁷

A more common way for members of parliament to take part in the execution of foreign policy is their membership in governmental delegations to international conferences and meetings of international organizations.¹⁸ This practice is by no means limited to the Netherlands. Many member-states of the United Nations include members of their respective national parliaments in the delegation to the meetings of the General Assembly and to other meetings of UN bodies. The main reason that is usually given for including members of parliament in governmental delegations, is the importance of having them participate in international diplomacy, to make them acquainted with the international background and with the atmosphere in which international negotiations take place. They are then assumed to be in a better position to understand the activities of their government in the area of foreign policy. Furthermore, it has been noted that parliamentarians of different nationalities can have an informal contact with each other and with foreign diplomats, even in cases when official contact on a diplomatic level is not possible because of international tensions.¹⁹ Another argument in favor of including parliamentarians in

governmental delegations is the strengthening of the co-operation between government and parliament in foreign policy.²⁰

There is, however, also a negative aspect to this argument. Members of parliament who have been part of a governmental delegation may later be inhibited in their criticism of the government. Once they have participated in preparing official positions – some of which they themselves may even have presented before an international forum – they may not be able to dissociate themselves from these positions afterwards.²¹

In the Netherlands, the practice of sending members of parliament to international conferences and international organizations was not seriously challenged for a long time. In 1968, however, a Laborparty member, who had served as member of the Dutch delegation to the UN General Assembly, raised the issue in a number of interviews. He argued that as a member of the opposition he should not have been put in the position to help to carry out the government's policies; he expressed himself in favor of an observer status for members of parliament in the delegation.²² In 1970, after having consulted the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Second Chamber, the foreign minister decided to give the members of parliament henceforth the status of 'special observers' in the Netherlands delegation. This practice has since then repeatedly been reconfirmed by subsequent foreign ministers.²³

Though this practice may be of some practical use, I agree with Voorhoeve that membership of parliamentarians in government delegations is 'constitutionally peculiar'.²⁴ The title of 'special observer' is more correct from a formal constitutional point of view; materially it remains curious that members of parliament serve, if only on a temporary basis, in a capacity for which they have not been elected. Even stranger is the Dutch practice to include a representative of women's-, youth- and labor-organizations in the annual UN delegation. It is a remnant of the original idea that the United Nations General Assembly somehow should resemble a kind of world parliament. It has never become clear why the Netherlands government has decided to select these three segments of the population and not others. Although it certainly must be a rewarding experience for the individuals who benefit from this practice, it is a tradition that should be abolished immediately. It suggests a kind of 'democratic' sentiment in a conference which in fact is no more than a meeting of official governmental representatives.

As Voorhoeve has convincingly argued, it is hard to measure the impact of parliament on foreign policy with precision.²⁵ He has rightly drawn attention to the circumstance that the foreign minister sometimes anticipates certain criticism and may adapt his policy accordingly. It is then

impossible to demonstrate with certainty that a change of policy has occurred *because of* parliamentary wishes. In this light I am inclined to qualify Cohen's conclusion that 'parliament, and the parliamentary fractions, have little impact on the foreign-policy decisions of the government'.²⁶ He may have somewhat underestimated the considerable exchange of views that takes place beyond the public view. Cohen is right, on the other hand, if he is referring to those cases in which the foreign minister is strongly opposed to the wishes of parliament. Apart from forcing the minister to resign – which is not done for domestic political reasons – there is relatively little the parliament can do. This conclusion is in accordance with the views held by a majority of the Dutch foreign policy elite – parliamentarians and non-parliamentarians alike – interviewed in 1976.²⁷

We turn now to other methods of democratic control over foreign policy.

Political parties

One of the main functions of political parties in democratic systems is to act as organizations of candidates for public office. These candidates and the programs which they present are meant to provide the voters with alternatives at the polls. In this respect political parties can be regarded as a stage preceding parliamentary control. However, studies on the behavior of the Dutch voters do not lead to the conclusion that foreign policy issues play an important role in deciding their votes.²⁸ The national elections of 1981 may to some extent have been an exception in this respect. The modernization of theater nuclear forces (TNF) played an important role in the shaping of the parties' programs. However, as the campaign progressed, it seems that this vital defense issue was not very much emphasized by the various political parties – with the possible exception of the liberal party (VVD) – as they all had strong internal differences of view on the subject. There was little inclination on the part of the major political parties to stress these differences. Everts has however, pointed out in a preliminary study that the nuclear weapons issue nevertheless became a major issue in the campaign due to the impact of public interest groups which expressed a rising public concern, as reflected in public opinion data.²⁹ But even that impact was only limited:

'While it is impossible or at least very difficult to establish with any certainty the degree to which considerations of foreign policy actually affected voting behaviour, there is some evidence that a minority among the electorate did indeed change their vote according to their preference, with respect to nuclear

weapons. This effect, however, was much smaller than opinion surveys on the topic would lead one to expect'.³⁰

An overall analysis of the 1981 elections does not seem to indicate that foreign policy issues were of great importance in making people decide their votes. In response to a general question ('Why have you voted for this party?') most people gave rather vague and general answers (religious belief, the party program, tradition etc.). Only 5% referred to one or more specific issues.³¹ So far at least there seems to be no reason to alter the view that foreign policy issues do not play an important role in deciding people's votes – not even in 1981.

Within the political parties it is usually a relatively small group of people that is involved in formulating the part of the party program that deals with questions of foreign policy. Van Staden quotes the then international secretary of the Laborparty as saying:

'Of the party as such it can be said that it functions only in main lines as intermediate structure for decisionmaking with respect to foreign policy. Main lines are established during party conferences. Afterward, it is only a very limited group of party members that functions as intermediate structure in the decisionmaking in foreign policy'.³²

It should be noted that, compared to the other major Dutch political parties, the party conferences of the Laborparty pay a great deal of attention to issues of foreign policy and national defense. Questions such as NATO-membership, recognition of the German Democratic Republic, South African Apartheid, TNF and matters of development co-operation have received much time and attention at its party conferences. Yet, the impact of the party's views has on the whole remained limited.³³ This observation is also true – or perhaps even more so – for the other major Dutch political parties. The members of parliament – though put forward as candidates by their political parties – are not bound to follow their party's instructions with respect to either domestic or foreign policy issues. They have a 'responsibility of their own', as members of parliament declare whenever they disagree with views of party organs. This entails of course the risk that they may not be put up as candidates again for the next election, but by that time so much may have happened that the disagreement in question may have been forgotten in the meantime. Memories are short in politics.

What is true for members of parliament, is even more true for government ministers. As long as they remain within the broad outlines of their party's political and election program – which often is suitably general, if not vague, with reference to foreign policy – they remain relatively free to conduct foreign policy along the lines they see fit. A typical example in

1975 of disagreement between the foreign minister and his political party is related by Voorhoeve.³⁴ Foreign minister Max van der Stoel – as well as prime minister Den Uyl and defense minister Vredeling, all members of the Laborparty – disagreed with a resolution adopted by the partyconference to the effect that the Netherlands should leave NATO if it had not made 'an essential contribution to detente' within three years. Continuation of NATO-membership, which was to be reconsidered regularly, was made conditional on a peace and detente policy. Other demands included a non-first use declaration by NATO with respect to nuclear weapons, rejection of a European nuclear force, nuclear free zones in Europe, no nuclear tasks for Dutch forces in NATO, a unilateral cut of Dutch army's ready troop strength by 20% if international troop reduction negotiations failed and, finally, a reduction of defense expenditures to 3% of GNP before 1978. The government ministers had the advantage of being supported by the Laborparty's parliamentary fraction which also kept its distance from the partyconference's resolution.³⁵ Van der Stoel, although relatively unpopular among some of the younger, more radical members of his party because of what was considered to be his too careful and accommodating views toward NATO and the United States, remained in office. In view of the conflicts with his party it is interesting to note that he became again foreign minister when the Laborparty returned to power in 1981. The support he received from the leader of his party, Mr. Joop den Uyl, was clearly of crucial importance in this respect.

Van Staden has made a distinction between *direct* and *indirect* influence by political parties on foreign policy.³⁶ Influence is directly exerted if a political party approaches the government with the request to adopt or to reject a certain policy. Influence is exerted indirectly if a party makes pronouncements on situations in, or policies of other nations, which may have repercussions for Dutch foreign policy or the international position of the Netherlands. Het gives the example of the meetings of solidarity with Israel which were held by Dutch political parties during the Octoberwar of 1973, which were considered by the Arab states as unfriendly activities on the part of the Netherlands government.³⁷

In regard to political parties, as we saw before with parliament, the government may resort to anticipatory reactions. The government may take the reactions of voters, as expressed by the political parties, into account when preparing its policy positions. Van Staden has called attention to this phenomenon, when he pointed out that sometimes efforts are made on the part of the government to mollify its potential supporters.³⁸

It is not possible to determine the influence of Dutch political parties on foreign policy with any degree of certainty. Of some relevance may be

what members of the Dutch foreign policy elite *think* that the influence of political parties is. In a survey conducted in 1976 among members of the foreign policy elite³⁹ 46% attributed 'much' or 'rather much' influence to political parties (table 1).

Table 1: Influence on foreign policy perceived as 'much' of 'rather much' (in %)

'Officially foreign policy is formulated by the minister of foreign affairs. Next to him other groups influence the making of foreign policy. Please indicate of the following listed groups whether you think that they have much, rather much, some, very little or no influence in the making of foreign policy'.	
The cabinet	87
Officials and diplomats	67
Second Chamber	62
Political parties	46
Business	22
Press	16
Television	16
Radio	9
Labor unions	8
Public interest groups	4
Churches	3

Source: Peter R. Baehr et al., *Elite en Buitenlandse Politiek in Nederland* 's-Gravenhage: Staatsuitgeverij, 1978, p. 154.

The table shows that those groups which, because of their formal position are close to foreign policy-making (the cabinet, parliament and high officials and diplomats) are also considered to be most influential. Although political parties receive a higher score than public interest groups, Van Staden has argued that the assumed influence of the former is partly based on activities of the latter.⁴⁰ He emphasizes the point that public interest groups try to exert influence on the making of foreign policy *via* political parties. He warns against the danger that political parties, out of fear of appearing not sufficiently 'radical' or 'progressive' are taken in tow by certain public interest groups, which are more singleminded in their approach to politics and fail to view their political demands in relationship to overall policy. Thus the coherence if not the continuity of foreign policy may be endangered. We shall return to this point at the end of this paper.

One way to make foreign policy more responsive to domestic political reality has been the suggestion to furnish the foreign minister with a special political advisor. It is hardly surprising that the top officials in the depart-

ment were not in favor of that idea, whereas a majority of the foreign policy experts within the political parties rather liked the idea (table 2).

Table 2: Desirability of appointing political advisors by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (in %)

'Do you consider it desirable that a Minister of Foreign Affairs has his own political advisors at his disposal?'

	desirable	not desirable	don't know
Business	16	84	0
Officials	19	76	5
Advisory bodies	34	66	0
Parliamentarians	36	59	5
Church leaders	44	49	7
Public interest groups	47	47	6
Media/universities	48	52	0
Political parties	63	31	6

Source: Baehr et al., *op. cit.*, p. 164.

It also appeared that the views on this question varied with political background. Supporters of the Laborparty were in favor (68%), whereas this was only the case with minorities of the christian-democrats (21%) and the liberals (18%).

After the elections of 1981 the new government opted in favor of the appointment of political advisors. Since then a number of ministers among whom the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Van der Stoel adopted this practice. His successors, Van Agt and Van den Broek, discontinued the practice. It lasted not long enough to tell, whether it gave the party an opportunity to exert more direct influence on foreign policy or vice versa.

From a point of view of increasing democratic control over foreign policy an increased influence of the political parties should not necessarily be seen as a positive development. Whereas parliamentarians are elected to represent the people in controlling, among other things, foreign policy, there is not necessarily a democratic element in the ways political parties operate. Within the parties it can be an establishment, a party oligarchy that takes all important decisions, which have to be accepted by the members.

Special interest groups

The phenomenon of special interest groups dealing with aspects of foreign policy has gained in importance in recent years. The term 'pressure groups' which was often used in the past and which had a certain pejorative

connotation, has been replaced by the term 'action groups' (*actiegroepen*) which are found in all walks of public life in the Netherlands. We shall refer to 'special interest groups' to include both groups that represent particular group interests, for instance in the field of business and economics, and single purpose or action groups. These special interest groups have the advantage over political parties that they can act more quickly and more directly. They have no need to consider their positions with regard to other political issues or their relations with other parties, for instance within a coalition-government. They can devote all their time, energy and enthusiasm to further the one purpose they have in mind, and try to persuade parliamentarians, political parties and the government to adopt their position.

'Representative groups' represent particular group interests with regard to almost any issue area, including the realm of foreign policy. Much has been written about the 'military-industrial complex', although it has appeared difficult to pin down its influence with regard to concrete issues of foreign policy.⁴¹ Multinational corporations provide another example of a group interest that reaches across national boundaries. The labor movement has also made an effort to organize itself internationally – so far with mixed results.

The war in Vietnam showed a great upsurge of activities by special interest groups both in the United States and elsewhere. Also in the Netherlands many groups exist that deal with foreign policy issues on either a geographical or functional basis. Examples of the former are provided by the committees dealing with Southern Africa, Chile, Indonesia and the Palestinians respectively. Examples of the latter are Amnesty International, the Netherlands Organization for Development Cooperation (NOVIB) and the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV).⁴² All of them try to influence foreign policy with regard to particular concrete issues.

The issue of the war in Vietnam has been an obvious example of the activities of such groups, but there are many others such as the antinuclear tests of the 'sixties, the activities in support of developing nations or against what remained of western colonialism in Africa. In recent years a great deal of activity has focused on human rights issues and the problem of nuclear armament. The effectiveness of such actions is a matter of debate.⁴³ The least one can say is that these groups succeed in getting publicity for issues or certain aspects of issues on which the government might prefer to remain silent. These groups can speak out where a government may hesitate to do so for fear of violating the 'domestic jurisdiction' of another government – one of the reasons why national governments often refuse to

comment on political situations in other countries. Even more important may be the fact that special interest groups through private channels sometimes possess knowledge and information, which national governments and parliaments lack. Well-known examples of such groups are Amnesty International and the Southern Africa Committee (formerly Angola Committee) in the Netherlands.⁴⁴ This knowledge and information provides the special interest groups with a measure of authority which will make decisionmakers prepared to listen to them, when they express their views.

The activities of the IKV have been dealt with extensively by Everts.⁴⁵ Therefore I shall limit myself to one aspect of its activities which has more general implications. This refers to the mass demonstration against nuclear weapons in Europe, organized by the IKV on 21 November 1981 in Amsterdam. It drew approximately 400,000 participants which made it the largest demonstration of its kind ever held in the Netherlands. Much thought has been given to the question of what the precise meaning of such a demonstration is for government policy or what it *ought* to be. Should the fact that so many of its citizens feel sufficiently motivated to come to Amsterdam to demonstrate for a day have a drastic impact on a government's policy? And if so, what should the government do? Undoubtedly, the participants in the manifestation came to Amsterdam with different motivations and different purposes in mind.⁴⁶ Many came to oppose the basing of modernized theater nuclear arms in Western Europe; others emphasized the importance of including the situation in Eastern Europe as well. The organizers made an effort to avoid the demonstration from turning into exclusively an anti-American or anti-NATO meeting.⁴⁷

The way the Amsterdam demonstration was interpreted afterward was in itself an interesting political phenomenon. Many – if not most – Dutch political leaders tried somehow to identify themselves with the cause of the demonstrators, even if they had not participated themselves in the demonstration. During a meeting of his party that same day in Breda prime minister Van Agt expressed his sympathies and those of his party with the demonstrators in Amsterdam and announced 'new initiatives' by his cabinet with respect to the coming American-Soviet arms control negotiations.⁴⁸ Questioned a few days later by members of the parliamentary opposition he said that he wanted to express the concern felt by the government with regard to the continuing arms race and nuclear armament in particular. He referred to the 'grand' (*groots*) demonstration and denied that he had 'endangered parliamentary democracy' by arousing expectations among the people which he could not fulfill – as the opposition had suggested.⁴⁹ Mr. Van Agt said that he was sure that this event

would influence the behavior of governments here and elsewhere: 'The fact that so many people have expressed their concern about nuclear armament leaves no government unperturbed'.⁵⁰ In an editorial the leading Dutch quality paper *NRC Handelsblad* commented that the fall offensive of the peace movement would have a political impact, 'but nobody knows as yet in favor of whom'.⁵¹

The least that can be said is that the form – if not the substance – in which strategic options are presented has changed. Thus it was argued by some commentators that President Reagan's 'zero option' proposal was somehow connected with the impact of the peace demonstrations in Bonn, Brussels, Amsterdam and other Western European capitals.⁵² It has also been said that the NATO Council of Ministers in its December 1981 meeting stressed the 'peace' issue more than ever before, influenced as it appeared to be by the massive peace demonstrations.⁵³ There is, however, also considerable evidence that there existed little, if any understanding in Washington for Western European concerns. Protests were laid by an Assistant Secretary of Defense to 'Protestant Angst', and European church leaders were charged with exploiting fear of nuclear war in order to revive flagging church membership;⁵⁴ President Reagan envisioned a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union that would be limited to Europe and not erupt into a world war; he also suggested that peace movements in Western Europe were directly or indirectly financed by the Soviet Union, implying that therefore their views could be discounted. These statements indicate by no means a strong positive impact by the peace movement – at least not on the government of the United States!

In summary it can be said that special interest groups supplement the activities of the parliament and political parties in the democratic control over foreign policy. Their organization is often of a somewhat less formal type which enables them to react quicker to new developments. They have contributed to what is often seen as the 'politicization' of the foreign policy-making process.

Politicization of foreign policy

In the Netherlands more people and more groups tend to get involved in and to express themselves on political questions – including foreign policy – than ever before. This phenomenon which is often called one of 'democratization', does not necessarily signify an increase of the possibilities for democratic control. While public groups on the one hand may function as a help to the bodies that traditionally control the political process – parliament, political parties – they may on the other hand also help to confuse

issues or to give too strong an emotional or ideological emphasis to certain issues at the expense of others. Van Staden has called attention in this context to the augmented ideological loading of Dutch foreign policy since the early 'seventies.⁵⁵ He has criticized by implication this ideologization of foreign policy which is '... tantamount to the application of rigid moral standards to the making of foreign policy decisions. It comes down to the judging of international developments in terms of good and evil, rather than in terms of what is feasible and [what] not'.⁵⁶ An interesting, but relatively minor example of this thinking was supplied by the people who founded the committee 'We go to Moscow', with the aim to organize a peace manifestation on the Red Square in Moscow. This was thought to provide an answer to the supposedly too anti-American character of the Amsterdam demonstration of 21 November 1981. A few thousand Dutchmen apparently expressed their willingness to participate in this counter-demonstration.⁵⁷ The Soviet authorities were not amused. The request was rejected. Secretary Lochschin of the Peace Committee of the USSR expressed 'surprise' at the request and stated that the Dutch committee apparently was badly informed about the efforts that were made in the Soviet Union to further international peace.⁵⁸ Such rather amateurish efforts at making foreign policy do not facilitate the task of the foreign minister. He is faced with a continuous stream of requests, which he must find impossible to honor. A rather new development is that local and regional representative bodies tend to express themselves publicly on issues in the field of foreign policy and of national defense that used to be reserved to the national government. Thus it is not uncommon that municipal or provincial councils pass resolutions forbidding the placement of nuclear weapons on their territory. If this turns out to be a permanent trend, it may impede the possibilities of the national government to decide on such issues of vital importance to national security. One can sympathize with the concern felt by these local communities, but the final decisions in this field should be left to the national government, as controlled by the nationally elected democratic assemblies.

An astute foreign observer foresaw some of these developments more than twelve years ago. Robert W. Russell, a visiting American professor, observed that a more active public involvement in policy-making would seem likely to restrict the freedom of manoeuvring the foreign minister. The first effect he expected from politicization in the Netherlands was that there would be quantitatively less Dutch foreign policy regardless of changes in its content.⁵⁹ There seems to be considerable evidence that bears out this prediction, as Voorhoeve has made clear.⁶⁰ Russell also predicted that an increased involvement by the masses in

foreign policy would mean a tendency to move away from the United States and NATO, possibly toward neutrality, but clearly toward a more favorable attitude toward the Soviet Union, more interest in disarmament and lessened military appropriations.⁶¹ Although not all of these predictions have as yet materialized, one cannot deny that there exists at least a tendency in that direction. Van Staden has indicated, quoting Irving Kristol, that it is easier for a relatively small nation, such as the Netherlands, to follow a policy of 'clean hands' in international relations: 'Indeed, unlike great powers, small states can afford the luxury *not* to act and to pursue a pseudo-foreign policy based upon solemn exhortations to the rest of the world to save itself'.⁶² It is against this background that the idea should be viewed that the Netherlands should set an example for the rest of the world to follow, that it should serve as a kind of pilot country (*gidsland*).⁶³ This phenomenon – missionary thinking, clean hands and a strongly ideologized foreign policy – is strengthened if it happens to accord with thinking on an official level – as is increasingly the case today, as witnessed by an increase in neutralist thinking in the Netherlands. It has already served to coin a new term, 'Hollanditis' – originally used to criticize recent developments in Western Europe,⁶⁴ but now increasingly adopted as a term of approval by the peace movement ('Let Hollanditis spread all over Europe').

The limits of democratic control

We turn finally to the limits of democratic control over foreign policy and whether and to what extent it can be increased. Voorhoeve has posed the question whether Dutch foreign policy should be called undemocratic:

'If democracy would mean that a large share of the population has to participate actively in decision-making, this conclusion would be correct. One would also have to conclude then that the foreign policies of most, if not all, democracies have usually been undemocratic. If a democratic foreign policy means, however, that the barriers are low against those who want to participate to study the problems and devote some time to establishing contact with the foreign policy makers, the conclusion is not correct'.⁶⁵

He prefers to characterize Dutch foreign policy as a 'meritocracy' where participation is 'earned' by those who have knowledge, judgment, a desire to take part, and have or make time for the subject.

An often heard argument is that democratic control over public policy in general and over foreign policy in particular should be increased. New ways should be thought up to make democratic control more effective. A

minimum condition for such control would seem to be a political system in which the free exchange of information is guaranteed and in which the right to debate and the freedom to criticize the government's policy are assured. More than that: the government might even actively stimulate such debate by handing out information, as it were, to the interested public, by encouraging from time to time a thorough public discussion of the fundamentals of its foreign policy. One of the few governments that have ever taken the initiative for such a debate, has been the government of Canada. It did so in the context of a 'thorough and comprehensive review' of Canadian foreign policy and stimulated the debate by publishing a series of popularly written booklets on various aspects of Canadian foreign policy.⁶⁶ This argument may be carried a little further by not stopping at a public debate of foreign policy, but by actually giving the people an effective voice in the decision-making process. Referendum procedures which are used in some countries for this purpose have often been subjected to severe criticism.⁶⁷ It can be abused and it can also mean a weakening of parliamentary power. Yet, it can also be argued that in important matters such as joining or leaving international organizations or a potentially supranational community, the voice of the people as a whole should be heard. Recent history has shown in the case of the EEC referendums in Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Ireland and – most recently – Greenland that the people, after extensive debates in which all political parties, special interest groups and newsmedia took part, can express a clear preference. It has been said that in some of these cases the debates which preceded the referendums were often rather violent and emotional and that many people voted for or against entry in the European Communities for the wrong reasons. But who can say that the debates among the official decisionmakers themselves never become emotional or violent and that they always reach their decisions in a purely rational way and for the 'right' reasons?

Improving the means of democratic control at the national level would only partly answer some of the problems which have arisen in recent times. 'Multinational politics'⁶⁸ develops freely, almost entirely devoid of democratic control. This means that new methods of democratic control at the multinational level will have to be thought out. These new methods will have to go beyond such relatively traditional ideas as a further strengthening of the European Parliament. It seems that what is needed is the development of at least some kind of a sentiment of a 'multinational political community'.⁶⁹ What would be needed to bring about such a community would be the perception among the people – or at least among the elites – of a common interest, possibly combined with the perception of

an external danger threatening this common interest. This would help to create the social climate in which the institutional arrangements for new means of democratic control would flourish. Until such a social climate has been created, scholarly efforts can be most effectively directed towards increasing the understanding of multinational politics; political scientists may lay the groundwork on which new institutions for popular control can be built later.

Conclusion

The case for strengthening democratic control over foreign policy rests ultimately on an article of faith. This is the assumption that the world and the people in it will be better off, if they are given a certain measure of control over public policy in general and foreign policy in particular. This is an assumption which as such is unfalsifiable. Whether one wants to accept it or not, will depend on what one considers desirable for mankind. Is it a peaceful world without armed conflicts? Or is it a world in which all human beings have an equal share in the world's resources? Both views of an ideal world may easily come in conflict with each other and neither may be furthered by a greater measure of democratic control over public policy. Most of us may be too sceptical to accept Immanuel Kant's optimistic view that full participation of the citizens in decision-making on matters of war and peace in a 'republican' form of government would guarantee the establishment of peace.⁷⁰ It should be kept in mind moreover that Kant's was a rather limited concept of active citizenship, i.e. those who held the vote excluded women as well as apprentices, servants, woodcutters, plowmen and resident tutors.⁷¹ The people, when given power, are not necessarily more peaceful than their governments if their perceived interests clash with those of other people.

However, one need not be as optimistic about the possibilities of democratic control as Kant to become as pessimistic as some other writers.⁷² If one grants the people too much of a say, this will introduce vile emotionalism and irrationality into the field of foreign affairs – so the argument goes. This argument has already been dealt with, when we discussed the possibilities of using referendum procedures in the field of foreign affairs. Again, granting the possibility or perhaps even the likelihood of emotions and irrational views in the discussion of foreign policy and conceding that Almond was perhaps right in attributing 'moods' to the general public⁷³ – who tells us that government officials are not subject to moods and who is going to decide what is the correct degree of rationality or irrationality in the field of foreign affairs? Public discussion of foreign policy does entail

certain risks. It depends on one's ultimate values whether and to what extent one is prepared to accept such risks.

In pondering how far one is prepared to go in subjecting foreign policy to a greater measure of democratic control, the twin aspects of coherence and continuity should be considered. One may consider coherence in foreign policy too much endangered by a larger measure of popular control. Sudden reversals and changes in foreign policy may make a nation into an unreliable and untrustworthy partner in international relations. Also the need for a certain degree of continuity in foreign policy has been stressed at various times. One may wonder of course how coherent and continuous traditional foreign policy-making has been and what precisely would be the consequences, if the need for coherence and continuity would be less emphasized than it is today. Nevertheless, one should be conscious of these factors and take them into account before arriving at conclusions.

What finally remains is the apparent need for secrecy in foreign affairs. Instances abound of prospective political leaders having clearly expressed their wishes for openness in foreign policy, who abandoned these views quickly once in power. The new revolutionary government of the Soviet Union immediately published the secret foreign policy documents of the prerevolutionary regime, but that was to be the first and last instance of such openness in Soviet foreign policy.

The question properly phrased should evidently not be *whether* there is a need for secrecy in foreign affairs, but *how much* secrecy is needed. It is very difficult to be specific in regard to this question, except to say that democratic control over foreign policy, in order to be effective, is in dire need of certain vital information. To provide this information may conflict with traditional conceptions of the need for secrecy in dealing with foreign nations. Again, one may ask oneself whether the traditional ways of dealing with foreign nations have always been that overwhelmingly successful. It would all depend on how one wants to define a concept such as 'success'. Clear criteria do not appear to exist as to how far secrecy in government with regard to foreign relations should go. The point of these concluding observations has merely been to question the unavailability and traditionally felt need for coherence, continuity and secrecy in dealing with foreign affairs, at least as far as it hampers a larger measure of democratic control.

Recent history would seem to suggest that the United States and the Netherlands are two countries in which the limits of democratic control of foreign policy are continually put to a test. More systematic information is needed about the actual process of the ways in which domestic actors try to influence foreign policy and to what extent these efforts meet with success.

To gather such information for the Netherlands, an interuniversity research group is now engaged in the second part of a study on domestic influences on foreign policy-making. Some information about this research program is provided in an appendix to this paper.

Appendix: Research project on domestic influences on foreign policy-making in the Netherlands

The research project consists of three related parts:

- (1) a general section in which a scheme of analysis is developed, in which the factors that play a role in the process of domestic influences on foreign policy are discussed;
- (2) a number of case-studies related to a set of different issue-areas and to controversial decisions;
- (3) a section in which conclusions are drawn on the usefulness of the scheme of analysis formulated in the first section.

The results of the case-studies may lead to a readjustment of the scheme of analysis.

Hypotheses will be formulated that will be partly tested in the case-studies. One of the hypotheses is that efforts to influence foreign policy decision-making can succeed only with parliamentary support. A second hypothesis is that the definition of the decision situation plays a central role in the determination of influence processes. Political struggle will to a large extent be determined both by the content of the issue in question and by the definition of the decision situation. It is assumed, for instance that the degree of autonomy of the Netherlands and the consensus in the society, varies with the degree to which the policy process extends to mass-groupings in the society. Also, the greater the degree of autonomy and the stronger the consensus in the society, the greater are the possibilities of influence for domestic actors on foreign policy. The success of the efforts to influence will be greater in an early phase of the decision-making process than in a later phase.

The case-studies have been selected to cover various issue-areas of foreign policy. Next to the general questions more specific questions will be asked in the case-studies for purposes of comparison, such as:

- to which aspects of foreign policy are efforts to influence directed? What was the content of the proposed policies?
- which groups and institutions have tried to influence policies? How and in which phase of the process of decision-making?
- what kind of wishes did they have with regard to the policy at stake? Did they want to change or support the proposed policy?
- which conditions determine the effectiveness of efforts to influence by various groups and institutions?

The procedure consists of a qualitative analysis of public sources, like the proceedings of both chambers of parliament, government papers, pronouncements by government officials in organs of international organizations or at international conferences, interviews and other public statements, publications of special inte-

rest groups. Also the data of public opinion polls and of the material collected in the first part of the research project, which was already published, are used. Furthermore, interviews are held with persons who can supply general information, like members of government, parliamentarians, civil servants and spokesmen of special interest groups.

The framework of the publication will be as follows:

o. The process of foreign policy-making

- The decision situation
- The phase of decision-making
- The decision-making process
- A scheme of analysis of factors that play a role in the process of domestic influences on foreign policy

A. Inputs – environmental factors

1. The external (foreign) operational environment

- Introduction
- The division of power in the world and the position of the Netherlands
- The external economic dependence of the Netherlands
- Membership of international organizations and alliances
- The relationship between the Netherlands and the United States and the German Federal Republic

2. The internal (domestic) operational environment

- Material resources
- The political culture and opinions
- The role of different actors in the process

B. Policy-makers and decision-making process

3. The policy-making and – executing apparatus – civil servants and diplomats

- Recruitment and socializing
- Communication
- The psychological environment of the policy-makers

4. The process of decision- and policy-making

- The structure of the decision-making apparatus and the policy-formation
- Decisions
- Policy execution
- Control of policy by the parliament

C. Some case-studies of foreign policy issues

5. Some case-studies

- Security policy (modernization of theater nuclear forces)
- European integration and economic co-operation (the European agricultural policy)
- Aid and development policy
- Human rights, other world interests (Argentina and Chile, Greece, South-Africa)
- Specific regions (the Middle East)

D. Conclusions

6. Conclusions, readjustment of the scheme of analysis.

References

1. Leslie Lipson, *The Democratic Civilization*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 569.
2. John Locke, *Second Treatise of Civil Government*, ch. XII.
3. 'Of essential importance to each citizen domestically is the observation of the laws, the property of goods and the security of private matters. As long as everything goes well with these three points, the councils should negotiate and deal with foreign countries. It is not from there the dangers which should be feared most, will come'. – Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Lettres écrites de la montagne* VII, seconde partie, in: *Oeuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau*, Paris: Hachette, 1905, vols. 3-4, p. 217.
4. Bernard C. Cohen, 'Political Systems, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: the United States and the Netherlands', *International Journal* XXXIII: 1 (Winter 1977-8), pp. 196-197.
5. Some of the points discussed in this section have been brought up before in: Peter R. Baehr, 'Parliamentary Control over Foreign Policy', *Government and Opposition* IX: 2 (Spring 1974), pp. 165-188. See also: Joris J. C. Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles: A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy*, The Hague etc.: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979, pp. 77-84.
6. *Rules of Procedure of the Council of Ministers*, articles 2b, c and d.
7. *Netherlands Constitution*, article 59.
8. The Constitution so far listed explicitly the rules under which such approval was to be given expressly or tacitly. However, the revised Constitution, which will come into force in 1983, leaves this matter to be dealt with by law: 'The manner in which approval is given is determined by law, which can provide for tacit approval'.
9. *Netherlands Constitution*, article 63.
10. *Netherlands Constitution*, articles 65 and 66.
11. Cf. Peter R. Baehr, 'The Foreign Policy of the Netherlands', in: J. H. Leurdijk (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of the Netherlands*, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978, pp. 3-27.
12. Voorhoeve, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
13. Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 201.
14. Cf. Baehr in Leurdijk, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

15. Most recently in *Proceedings Second Chamber*, 41st meeting, 9 February 1982, pp. 1835-1836 and 42nd meeting, 10 February 1982, p. 1945.
16. *Proceedings Second Chamber*, 42nd meeting, 10 February 1982, p. 1942.
17. A well-known example was the visit by a group of Dutch parliamentarians to the Polisario movement – the Algerian-backed movement for Western Saharan independence. In the course of this trip a landmine almost destroyed the vehicle which carried the parliamentarians.
18. The following observations are in part based on an earlier study. Cf: Peter R. Baehr, *The Role of a National Delegation in the General Assembly*, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1970, pp. 79-90.
19. Cf. Chadwick F. Alger, 'United Nations Participation as a Learning Experience', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXVII, 1963, p. 423 and Arnold Beichman, *The 'Other' State Department, the United States Mission to the United Nations-Its Role in the Making of Foreign Policy*, New York & London: Basic Books, 1968, p. 194.
20. Cf. E. van Raalte, *Het Nederlandse Parlement*, 's-Gravenhage: Staatsuitgeverij, 6th ed., 1977, p. 230.
21. Cf. the American Senator Arthur Vandenberg who remarks in his memoirs that he found it difficult to oppose in the Senate a decision that he had helped to prepare in the United Nations, Arthur H. Vandenberg Jr. (ed.), *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952, p. 331.
22. 'Kamerlid Wierenga: Kritiek op de UNO Delegatie: Wat Luns heeft bepaald gebeurt', *De Volkskrant*, 26 June 1969; see also Peter R. Baehr, 'Kamerleden in Regeeringsdelegaties: Een Oud Probleem Opnieuw Bezien', *Acta Politica*, V:1 (October 1969), pp. 3-19.
23. Most recently by Mr. Van der Stoep *Proceedings Second Chamber*, 42nd meeting, 10 February 1982, p. 1946.
24. Voorhoeve, *op. cit.*, p. 79. Cf. also statement by Mr. F. Bolkestein, *Proceedings Second Chamber*, 41st meeting, 9 February 1982, p. 1835.
25. Voorhoeve, *op. cit.*, p. 82.
26. Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 201.
27. P. R. Baehr et al., *Elite en Buitenlandse Politiek in Nederland*, 's-Gravenhage: Staatsuitgeverij, 1978, pp. 158-159 and: Peter R. Baehr, 'The Dutch Foreign Policy Elite: A Descriptive Study of Perceptions and Attitudes', *International Studies Quarterly* XXIV: 2 (June 1980), p. 257.
28. Cf. *De Nederlandse Kiezer '72*, Alphen aan den Rijn: Samsom, 1973; *De Nederlandse Kiezer '73*, Alphen aan den Rijn: Samsom, 1973; *De Nederlandse Kiezer '77*, Voorschoten: VAM, n.d.; A. Th. J. Eggen, C. van der Eijk and B. Niemöller (eds.) *Kiezen in Nederland*, Zoetermeer: Actaboek, 1981.
29. Philip P. Everts, 'Foreign Policy and the 1981 Parliamentary Elections in the Netherlands', Paper presented at the Colloquium on Elections and Foreign Policy of the Société Européenne pour l'Etude des Relations Internationales, Corfou, 16-19 September 1981, p. 29.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Eggen, Van der Eijk and Niemöller, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-77.
32. Harry van den Berg, 'Buitenlandse politiek als functie binnen een politieke partij, as quoted in: A. van Staden, 'De politieke partijen en het buitenlandse beleid', *Internationale Spectator* XXXI: 1 (Jan. 1977), p. 56.
33. Well-known is the comment by Mr. Henk Vredeling – himself a socialist and then Minister of Defense – on a motion adopted by the Laborparty conference on defense

- matters: 'Partyconferences do not buy jetfighters'.
34. Voorhoeve, *op. cit.*, p. 140.
35. *Ibid.*
36. Van Staden, *op. cit.*, p. 60. Cf. also: Bernard C. Cohen, 'The Influence of Special-Interest Groups and Mass Media on Security Policy in the United States', Paper presented at the symposium on 'Democracy and Foreign Policy', March 25-26, 1982 at Noordwijkerhout, p. 2.
37. Van Staden, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
38. *Ibid.*
39. The survey included 450 persons in leading positions within the following sectors of society: the churches, business, special interest groups, news media and universities, political parties, advisory bodies and labor unions.
40. Van Staden, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
41. Cf. Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.
42. Cf. P. R. Baehr, 'De rol van de non-gouvernementele organisaties en de rechten van de mens', in: Ph. P. Everts & J. L. Heldring (eds.), *Nederland en de Rechten van de Mens*, Baarn: Anthos, 1981, pp. 119-120.
43. Cf. Lester W. Milbrath, 'Interest Groups and Foreign Policy', in: James N. Rosenau (ed.), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, New York & London: The Free Press/Collier-McMillan, 1967, pp. 231-251. Cf. also: 'De grote teleurstellingen van de IKV Secretaris', *Elseviers Weekblad* 21 November 1981.
44. In the recent parliamentary debates on the budget for foreign affairs most speakers, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs himself, referred to information provided by Amnesty International. Cf. *Proceedings Second Chamber*, 41st, 42nd and 43rd meetings, 9-11 February 1982, *passim*. Cf. also Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26.
45. Ph. P. Everts, 'The influence of mass media and special interest groups on security policy in the Netherlands', paper presented at the symposium on 'Democracy and Foreign Policy', March 25-26, 1982 at Noordwijkerhout.
46. The Center for Peacestudies at the University of Nijmegen conducted a survey among the participants. 38% of the demonstrators had come to Amsterdam in the first place to express their concern about the nuclear arms race and 29% to put concrete demands to the government. Cf. B. Schennink, T. Bertrand, H. Fun, *De 21 november demonstranten: wie zijn ze en wat willen ze?* Soest: Uitgeverij Jan Mets, 1982, p. 114.
47. According to newspaper accounts, peace movements from fifteen Western European nations decided not to hold anti-American demonstrations during the visit by President Reagan to Western Europe in June 1982. Such outbursts would not, it was stated, contribute to the cause of peace. Cf. *De Volkskrant*, 3 March 1982.
48. *Trouw*, 23 November 1981.
49. *Proceedings Second Chamber*, 25th meeting, 3 December 1981, pp. 755-756.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 757.
51. *NRC Handelsblad*, 23 November 1981.
52. Cf. Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 51.
53. *NRC Handelsblad*, 12 December 1981.
54. *International Herald Tribune* 27 November 1981. According to Bernard Cohen, this Assistant Secretary, Mr. Richard Perle, when working in the Senate, 'was widely acknowledged to be one of the most wellinformed individuals on national security matters'. Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
55. Alfred van Staden, 'American-Dutch Political Relations since 1945: What has changed and why?' in: J. W. Schulte Nordholt & R. P. Swieringa (eds.), *A Bilateral*

Bicentennial: *A History of American-Dutch Relations, 1782-1982*, Amsterdam: Meulenhoff International, 1982, p. 93.

56. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.

57. *De Volkskrant* 11 February 1982.

58. *De Volkskrant* 19 February 1982.

59. Robert W. Russell, 'The Atlantic Alliance in Dutch Foreign Policy', in: Leurdijk, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

60. J. J. C. Voorhoeve, 'De slinkende rol van Nederland', *Internationale Spectator* XXXV: 2 (February 1981), pp. 69-78.

61. Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

62. Van Staden, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

63. Cf. Bas de Gaay Fortman, 'De Vredespolitiek van de Radicalen', *Internationale Spectator* XXVII: 4 (22 February 1973), pp. 109-113.

64. Cf. Walter Laqueur, 'Hollanditis: A New Stage in European Neutralism', *Commentary*, August 1981, pp. 19-26.

65. Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles*, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

66. Cf. *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, published by authority of the Honorable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa: Queen's Printer of Canada, 1970; see also: Bruce Thordarson, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision-Making*, London: Oxford University Press, 1972.

67. cf. David Butler & Austin Ranney (eds.), *Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory*, Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, 1978.

68. Kaiser has defined multinational politics as follows: 'Those forms of politics in which the social and domestic political processes of one or several national state systems develop systems of interaction with the external activities of national state actors or international organizations'; Karl Kaiser, 'Transnationale Politik: Zu einer Theorie der Multinationalen Politik', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift Sonderheft 1* (1969) pp. 89-90.

69. Cf. Karl Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957.

70. Cf. Immanuel Kant, 'Zum Ewigen Frieden', *Kleinere Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie, Ethik und Politik* ed. Vorländer (Leipzig 1915), p. 127 as quoted in: Iring Fetscher, *Modelle der Friedenssicherung*, München: Piper, 1972, p. 54.

71. Cf. W. H. Walsh, 'Immanuel Kant', *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, New York & London: Macmillan/Collier-Macmillan, 1967, vol. IV, p. 322.

72. Walter Lippmann, *Essays in the Public Philosophy*, New York: Mentor Books, 1956, pp. 23-24.

73. Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, New York: Praeger, 2nd ed., 1960, p. 53. William Caspary, 'The 'Mood Theory': A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy', *The American Political Science Review* LXIV: 2 (June 1970), pp. 536-547.

Onderzoek

A decision theoretical analysis of decisions of the Dutch government with respect to the intervention of the Security Council in Indonesia in the winter of 1948/1949*

by I. N. Gallhofer, W. E. Saris

1. Introduction¹

During World War II the Netherlands East-Indies, later Indonesia, was occupied by Japan. On August 17, 1945, after Japan's capitulation to Allied power, Sukarno, an Indonesian nationalist leader, proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Indonesia. This government exercised its authority mainly on the most densely populated and economically most developed islands of Java and Sumatra.

When the Dutch returned under the leadership of the lieutenant Governor-General H. J. van Mook, they reinstated control mainly on the islands outside of Java and Sumatra. At this time Van Mook developed the idea that the archipelago should be reorganized on a federal basis comprising four equally autonomous components – Java, Sumatra, Borneo and the Great East – which should become sovereign after an interim-period in which the Dutch still would exercise the power, and form the United States of Indonesia (USI). The latter also would be linked with the Kingdom of the Netherlands by a Union, headed by the Queen, in order to look

* This research was made possible by the research grant nr. 43-114 of the Dutch organization of the advancement of pure research (ZWO). We want to thank the former Prime-Minister, dr. W. Drees sr. for the extra information he gave us and for making it possible to have access to his private archives.

We also thank the secretary and the vice-secretary of the Dutch Council of Ministers, mr. J. H. Kist and drs. E. Stolk who gave us access to the required minutes of the Council of Ministers. For the access to documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the former Ministry of Overseas Territories we thank the secretary general mr. F. Italianer and the vice-secretary general mr. J. W. van den Akker. Last but not least we thank the coders, J. Keessen and M. Stouthard for their careful work.