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Notes on the Marxian ideal of freedom*

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I. Introduction

1. Marx's ideal of freedom has a threefold structure:

- i) a conception of positive freedom formulated on the level of philosophical anthropology – freedom as the 'essence of the species'
- ii) a philosophy of history in which humanity is seen to proceed through different historical stages of unfreedom and mutual antagonism, ultimately to realize its essence in communist society. This philosophy is accompanied by an economic theory of social change (historical materialism) and an outline of the ways in which free men are related to one another in communism
- iii) a prognosis of the revolutionary conclusion of the last antagonistic stage in history, capitalism, in which the economic contradictions of this system would enable the proletariat to free itself from the chains of capital, thereby creating the conditions for the liberation of humanity as a whole.

If Marx would at all agree with the attribution of 'having an ideal', undoubtedly he would have added that it was a philosophical ideal, capable of being realized in practice, once history had created the material conditions that would turn it into a 'material force'. This image of philosophy as a material force (I, 69) was clearly intended as a spur to proletarian revolution. Its post-revolutionary significance is much less clear.

Since the revolutionary formation of centrally planned socialist systems and their spread over a large part of the industrialized world, it has become rather academic to ask whether the material conditions of a socialist transition towards communism have actually (or 'objectively') been created. Marx's ideal has long become a material force in exactly the sense that he intended. For those who live in capitalist societies and are attracted by Marxism this poses at least two questions. First: exactly what kind of socialism would it

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be worth fighting for? Secondly: would the attainment of socialism necessitate a revolution, or could it gradually be brought into existence by the less risky and expensive means of structural reform? These questions are of course also being asked, with increasing insistence, within 'really existing socialism'.

With respect to the last question I would be inclined to choose the option of reform. But this is irrelevant, for the choice is not mine anyway. However, insofar as such a choice can meaningfully be discussed at all, it depends to a large extent on the answer to the first question. The notes assembled in this paper are directed towards this question, though it should be clearly understood that I do not attempt to provide an answer. Rather, I have tried to present an exposition of the Marxian ideal of freedom under the first two headings mentioned above (sections II and III), in order to test its relevance for a conception of worthwhile and feasible socialism. More specific, it is asked whether Marx's ideas on freedom are useful for the problem of minimizing coercion in the organisation of labour of industrial societies. My main point of criticism is that whereas Marx has many interesting things to say on how various historical manifestations of unfreedom are reflected in the organisation of labour, his concept of free labour in communism – of which labour performed in the 'realm of necessity' is the most important part – is highly unsatisfactory on this point. In section IV I briefly discuss Radoslav Selucky's recent contribution to the problem of labour organisation in socialism (Selucky, 1979), in which the importance of preserving the freedoms of the liberal-democratic tradition in a form of market socialism is argued. I conclude with a few conceptual remarks on the difficulty of combining the liberal-democratic and Marxian ideals of freedom.

II. Essential Man and actual men

2. In a well known paragraph from the Paris Manuscripts, Marx formulates his philosophy of history in a nutshell, when defining communism as

'... the genuine solution of the antagonism between man and nature and between man and man. It is the true solution of the struggle between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution to the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution'. (EPM, 89)

The basic idea is that actual men must wrestle with necessity to stay alive and, doing so, are forced to live together in antagonistic relationships. This condition is diagnosed as unfree when compared to the condition of a philosophical construct – to which Marx assigns ontological reality – Man, the

species-being. The species-being embodies the unity and the essence of all members of the human species. Essentially, Man is a creature of necessity who is at the same time free.

In his account of the species-being (which only occupies a few pages of the manuscript on alienated labour in EPM) Marx follows the ancient philosophical tradition of distinguishing Man from the other species in the animal kingdom by Man's consciousness and his need for self-improvement.¹ Consciousness gives Man an initial degree of freedom with respect to his natural environment, as well as a degree of freedom vis-à-vis his own nature (self-reflection). Man then strives to realize his freedom in his 'conscious vital activity' (EPM, 82) by transforming nature in accordance with his self-created needs.

In contrast to animal 'production', which is totally governed by immediate and unchanging needs, Man is capable of 'producing free from physical need' and of 'producing universally' (EPM, 82). To gain insight into Marx's scattered pronouncements on freedom in communist society it may be helpful to elaborate on these two aspects of human production. They are closely related and may indeed be seen as two distinct 'moments' of liberating activity: material rationality and artistic creativity.²

Production free from physical need first of all refers to Man's capacity of dealing rationally with the necessities of material reproduction by means of the planned utilisation of natural objects (he is a 'toolmaking animal' (CI, 175), using Nature as his 'inorganic body' (EPM, 81). Here, freedom begins with Man's mundane ability to defer gratification of immediate needs. With the energy saved – and this is where the creative moment enters – Man then invents novel products and processes. Gradually the implementation of these inventions leads to the formation of intermediate needs and to the emergence of an ever-growing structure of needs, with natural necessity at its basis. It is one of Marx's firm convictions that the expansion of needs is always more than matched by the increase of Man's capacity to satisfy them.³

Secondly, Marx tells us that Man only starts to produce 'genuinely' once he has learned to produce free from physical need, in the sense just specified (EPM, 82). From here onwards, 'freedom from need' acquires a different meaning – one in which the creative aspect of human production comes to the foreground. It appears that Marx now *presupposes* a large extent of material rationality. And, in additional contrast to animal production, Man 'can freely separate himself from his product' (EPM, 82). Taken together, this means that Man is capable (and desirous) of using his products not only for the satisfaction of existing needs but also for projects of self-development. These are the higher kinds of productive activity, not related to direct reproduction, undertaken for their own sake, and generating more refined types of

individual need. It is interesting to note that Heller (1976, 44-5) remarks that Marx's characterization of communist men as individuals 'rich in needs' is a philosophical construct. Communist men are individuals who have finally become identical with 'Man the species-being'. For, all along, this species-being is 'rich in needs', precisely because he is able to operate free from physical need in both senses of the term.

As said earlier, freedom begins with the simple deferment of gratification. It culminates in Man's universality (he produces 'according to the measure of every species' and his (aesthetic sense (he 'also fashions things according to the laws of beauty'). In the most elevated sense, then, freedom is Man's 'active species-life'. Acting rationally upon the material world, he progressively objectifies himself in Nature, thereby artistically re-creating Nature itself. Ultimately, the free species-being affirms his identity by looking 'at his image in a world he has created' (EPM, 82).

3. In this interpretation, I have identified material rationality and artistic creativity as the two mutually constitutive 'moments' of free activity. On one hand this is obvious enough: rationalisation, or economizing on resources necessarily involves elements of creativity in the Schumpeterian sense of devising 'new combinations'. Equally obvious, material rationality is the practical foundation of those projects expressing Man's creative urge; it enters into their design, planning and execution. On the other hand, I believe that Marx requires the two 'moments' of activity to be related in the stronger sense of *unification*. Mental acts of creative imagination are liberating only if rooted in the agent's material practice. And Marx considers the latter – viewed in terms of 'production for subsistence' – to be truly human (thus: free) only if it serves the agent's projects of self-development.⁴ It should be clear that this requirement does not present any problems on the ontological level. If we grant that Man, the species-being, is indeed a real entity, it is a *unified* agent. Hence, the two 'moments' of its activity are unified as a matter of course: Man can thus never be unfree.

4. It follows that the contrast between human freedom and unfreedom (alienation) must be confined to the level of *actual societies*, on which many individual 'toolmaking animals' collectively deal with the necessities of material reproduction, acting jointly upon Nature within a social division of labour. Strictly speaking, then, it will not do to compare the various aspects of men's unfree condition *directly* with the description of Man, the species-being. For it has now been established that Man belongs to a logically different category, in which individuality, collectivity and sociality are fused into one. The relevant comparison must therefore be *indirect*; a comparison

between actual men in different phases of recorded history on the one hand and future men in communist society on the other. Each of the latter, as Marx tells us in *On the Jewish Question*, has finally become a species-being 'in his empirical life, in his individual work and individual relationships' (J, 57). Here, 'becoming a species-being' can only mean that communist men have become free in the sense that their activity has acquired the essential characteristics of the species-being's 'conscious vital activity'. Nevertheless, even communist men must cooperate within a social division of labour, for men, unlike Man, must always deal collectively with the necessities of life.

As readers of the Paris manuscript on alienated labour have many opportunities to note, Marx does not distinguish clearly between these two possibilities of comparison. This creates many confusions. For instance, the claim that the social division of labour will ultimately be 'overcome' (*aufgehoben*) does not imply that it ever will be 'abolished'. The often heard opinion⁵ that the division of labour would have to disappear entirely in order that free individuality can blossom forth is a misunderstanding derived naturally from the (incorrect) substitution of the species-being for communist men who have become species-beings.

5. In sections 9 to 13, I shall examine some of Marx's ideas on freedom in communist society. But first it is necessary to summarize his historical conception of unfreedom.

Initially, there exists a close parallel between Marx and Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality*. Although actual men enter the historical scene as tool-making creatures, their tools are not very effective in the beginning. In primitive communism – Marx's shorthand for tribal societies of various kinds – men exist in a passive accommodation with Nature. Their productive acts of hunting and gathering fruit are to be seen as the receiving of gifts from Nature rather than as acts of domination in which Nature is permanently transformed. In this stage, the social productivity of labour – to be interpreted as the collective counterpart of the unified species-being's material rationality – is at its smallest. Marx sometimes creates the impression that this low productivity or 'rate of throughput' is *in itself* an aspect of unfreedom, suggesting that in this stage, men are compelled to long hours of arduous work for a meager subsistence.⁶ But the impression is false. In the sixteenth chapter of *Capital*, vol. I, which deals with the origin of surplus labour, Marx follows Rousseau in evoking the idea of natural abundance as a cause of underdevelopment. When Nature is 'too lavish', as is supposedly the case in 'the tropics with their luxuriant vegetation', she does not impose upon man any necessity to develop himself (CI, 481).⁷

Low productivity is caused by natural abundance relative to primitive

men's elementary and unformed needs. As long as Nature remains 'too lavish', neither productivity nor the structure of needs can expand. It thus appears that Marx's judgement of the unfree primitive state must be understood by reference to the richness and variety of communist men's needs, rather than to their productive efficiency. For although the primitives, judged from the standpoint of developed communism, may perhaps be said to live in 'depressed physical and cultural conditions' (Cohen, 1978, 24) they cannot be presumed to be dissatisfied. Nor are they lacking in free time, individual self-expression or communality. Hence, if the primitives are unfree, low productivity cannot be the source of their unfreedom. This is precisely why Rousseau (who shares the view expressed in the penultimate sentence, but does *not* compare the situation of primitive men to a historical end-state) refuses to see this first stage of history as one of unfreedom. On the contrary, he regards it as the 'golden age of mankind'.⁸

Again in consonance with Rousseau, Marx interprets the further development of unfreedom (in Rousseau: its emergence) as the necessary by-product of technical change consequent on men's forced move from the tropics into the temperate zone. For Marx, that zone is the 'mother-country of capital'; Rousseau regards it as the home of the revolution of 'iron and corn'. Both attribute technical change to the extended division of labour, which arises from the differentiation of the soil, the variety of natural products and the changes of the seasons. In Marx' words, these factors

'... spur man on to the multiplication of his wants, his capabilities, his means and modes of labour. It is the necessity of bringing a natural force under the control of society, of economizing, of appropriating or subduing it on a large scale by the work of man's hand, that first plays the decisive part in the history of industry'. (CI, 481).

If these developments were to be evaluated by reference to primitive communism one should have to say that on Marx's view, freedom was increasing, *ceteris paribus*. However, such a judgement seems foreign to Marx. Initially this has of course to do with the fact that 'things did not remain equal'. As both Marx and Rousseau emphasize, albeit in different terminologies, the higher level of productivity associated with specialized production and trade enables the formation of ruling classes which become able, by virtue of their gradual acquisition of food stores and indispensable means of production, to live permanently off the surplus-labour of propertyless 'immediate producers'. The age of exploitation (Marx) or inequality (Rousseau) is decidedly one of human unfreedom. On this, both authors agree, but for different reasons.

Rousseau's judgement stems from a *backward comparison*: men have lost

the personal independence which existed in the golden age of hunters and gatherers. In addition, Rousseau denies that the rise in productivity and its attendant 'multiplication of wants' is in any way a contribution to human freedom. By contrast, Marx's evaluations are grounded upon a *forward comparison*, in which the discrepancy is noted between the condition of actual men – now caught in exploitative relations – and the free men of communist society who have overcome their mutual antagonisms. Because of the new kinds of unfreedom that have arisen in class society, Marx can not judge the evolution from primitive communism to be freedom-enhancing on the whole.

This is not simply a question of weighing the negative effects of newly founded class exploitation against the positive effects of human need-expansion. The situation is more complicated. In primitive communism, where no surplus is produced at all, there is no great differentiation in the needs of the individual members of the community. In this exploitation-free society it still makes sense to regard the richness of needs and capacities in society as one of the dimensions of *individual* freedom. This is indeed the reason why primitive communism is said to be unfree with respect to developed communism – both are classless societies. But when, as Marx seems to maintain⁹, the long transition from the one to the other necessarily involves the imposition of class rule, the structure of needs and productive capacities – these are variables defined *on the level of society* – will no longer serve as indicators of the single individual's freedom or unfreedom. Class divisions, based as they are on the division of labour and on power inequalities, generate a differentiation of individual needs and productive capacities along the lines of those divisions.

6. To sum up the foregoing: the initial stage of human evolution is seen to involve an inevitable decrease in freedom, according to Marx's *forward comparison*. The decrease is inevitable because exploitation is necessary for the development of the productive forces and the expansion of human needs. This idea may be generalized, I believe, to the next stages in Marx's philosophy of history, up to the ripest industrial phase of capitalism. In a oft-cited passage of *Grundrisse*, Marx lists the social forms characterizing three historical stages. (He omits primitive communism, but for the purposes of our discussion that stage may be regarded as 'stage zero'):

'Relations of personal dependence ... are the first social forms, in which human productive capacity develops only to a slight extent and at isolated points. Personal independence founded on *objective* dependence is the second great form, in which a system of general social metabolism, of universal relations, of all-round needs and universal capacities is formed for the first time. Free individuality, based on the universal development of individuals

and on their subordination of their communal, social productivity as their social wealth, is the third stage. The second state creates the conditions for the third. Patriarchal as well as ancient conditions (feudal, also) thus disintegrate with the development of commerce, of luxury, of *money*, of *exchange value*, while modern society arises and grows in the same measure'. (G, 158).

In order to generalize the idea of a progressive decrease in individual freedom, it is necessary to explore the connections between exploitation and unfreedom rather more closely than I have done thus far. Marx generally defines exploitation as 'extraction of surplus labour' (CI, 209) from the immediate producers by representatives of the ruling class of property-owners. The condition of individual unfreedom is most naturally associated with that of the exploited parties. Although Marx also stresses the unfreedom of the exploiters, he devotes less attention to this aspect and I will not pursue it here.¹⁰

Surplus labour-extraction renders the immediate producers unfree, or alienated, in two major respects.

(a) The producers are *alienated from the product of their labour*. This applies in a double sense. First, since the entire surplus product of society is appropriated by an alien force – the ruling class – the exploited producers are left with the 'necessary' part of the net social product. This enables them to satisfy only the needs relevant to their reproduction as workers. All other needs go unsatisfied and even remain unarticulated. Secondly, since the composition of the surplus product is largely determined by the special interests of the ruling class, the producers are very often making things to which they cannot even relate as objects of felt need. According to Marx, both aspects of alienation reduce the producer to an 'animal existence', in which he can feel free only in the performance of his animal functions, while feeling himself an animal in his labour, the activity which ideally would constitute his humanity (EPM, 80-81).

(b) Alienation, says Marx, manifests itself not only in the relation of the producer to the product, but also immediately *within the producing activity itself* (EPM, 80). Here, unfreedom consists of the producer's subordination to the representative of the ruling class in the labour process. Confronted by the necessity to produce for an 'alien' demand, the worker is subjected to the means of production which the owners put at this disposal only within the framework of an 'alien' organization of labour, in which he is often restricted to mind-crippling detail functions. Here again, the producer is 'separated' from his essentially human characteristics: his tools and his opportunity to use them in accordance with his own rational insights.

In this summary of 'exploitation as alienation', I have combined several of Marx's early notions of alienated labour with his account of surplus labour

in the first volume of *Capital*, where the emphasis is strongly on the labour process of industrial capitalism. The two go together remarkably well. This is not surprising, since Marx had the political economy of capitalism foremost in mind when writing the manuscript on alienated labour. It is also clear that this early analysis of alienation does not fit in quite so comfortably with the forms of exploitation that belong to Marx's first historical stage, the 'relations of personal dependence'. In pre-capitalist societies surplus labour is of a qualitatively different nature. It is limited by the needs and desires of a relatively small section of privileged families or institutional groupings; it is extracted by virtue of the personal exercise of power, as tribute, in the form of direct labour services for the ruler's household or as labour embodied in food and luxury products which are handed over directly. Also, within fairly wide limits, the choice of production methods – in any case restricted by traditional handicraft mentality – and the organization of work is left to the immediate producers. In cases where the latter does not apply, as in the guild system, the patron typically works alongside his subordinates, rather than directing their labour from above. Finally, the class of pre-capitalist producers is not involuntarily engaged in fabricating the new machines and techniques that will, in Marx's view, adversely affect their future terms of employment and conditions of labour.

It appears that item *b* of the above summary, as well as the second part of item *a*, apply predominantly to the *capitalist* form of exploitation. Also, in a quantitative sense the first part of item *a* is more pronounced in the capitalist system. In terms of the labour theory of value, that system has a greater (and rising) rate of surplus labour than any of its historical precursors.¹¹

7. On this account, then, the evolution from the first stage of 'personal dependence' to the second stage of 'objective dependence' entails a marked decrease in individual freedom, together with the formation of mankind's 'all-round needs and universal capacities'. But this account is incomplete in at least two important respects: commodity alienation on the one hand and the emergence of liberal ('bourgeois') freedom on the other.

The presence of an all-embracing world market and the supremacy of monetary exchange relations constitutes yet another distinct aspect of alienation, inherent in developed commodity production. In contrast to the alienated labour of the exploited producer, which is strictly related to his own powerless and subordinate position vis-à-vis the exploiter, commodity alienation is a collective phenomenon. Within generalized exchange relations (including markets for labour power) the social bonds between people are provided only by their mutual surrender of ownership titles to products or productive resources. The fate of each individual – whether exploiter or ex-

exploited – now depends to a large extent on the proportions of the things exchanged in the market-place. In a truly competitive market system (Marx's theoretical point of reference) these proportions are determined by the 'law of value', which asserts itself through the impersonal forces of supply and demand. No individual is able to control these forces, though they are the result of their collective interactions as 'atomized' producers. As is well-known, Marx interprets generalized exchange as a kind of alienation: a surrender of men's productive powers to the 'world of things'; these things come to be regarded as mysteriously possessing independent values of their own, instead of being seen as what they are, namely products of labour destined to satisfy the needs of individuals in society.

It is of course true that the pre-capitalist stage has its own form of collective unfreedom, religious alienation, the constraining effects of which should be balanced against those of commodity alienation. I submit that Marx judges the second set of constraints to be more of a hindrance. This may be argued as follows. After some point in the history of the first stage, religious constraints prevent men from developing their species-powers of material rationality. When these constraints are finally overcome and the material powers have grown and are revolutionized in modern industry, the emergence of commodity alienation prevents men from consciously subordinating those very powers to their own collective purposes. In some sense (hard to define) the gap between the actual and the possible, as envisaged by Marx, is greater in the last case than in the first. Yet again, we must conclude that freedom has decreased.

But what are we to make of the simultaneous dissolution of the 'patriarchal, ancient, and feudal conditions' and their replacement by the liberties of free speech, contract and political expression, which marks the second stage of 'personal independence'? It would seem that here at last a genuine problem exists of balancing newly created forms of freedom against the multiple alienations of capitalist production. Marx, however, never poses the problem in this way. Although in his early days (1843) he was prepared to defend the freedom of the popular press against the onslaughts of the Prussian government (F, 18), only a year later we see him discussing the 1793 declaration of the Rights of Man in predominantly critical terms, from the perspective of the ultimate species-being. 'Separation' and 'egoism' are the key terms:

'But the right of man to freedom is not based on the union of man with man, but on the separation of man from man. It is the right to this separation, the rights of the limited individual who is limited to himself'. (J, 53).

Equally, the right to own property '... leads man to see in other men not the realisation but the limitation of his own freedom' (J, 53).

As to security, it '... does not allow civil society to raise itself above its egoism. Security is more the assurance of egoism' (J, 54).

In short, none of the 'so-called Rights of Man' is able to transcend the selfish individual of bourgeois society, who is drawn inwards upon his private interest and separated from the community. Marx adds:

'Far from the rights of man conceiving of man as a species-being, species-life itself, society, appears as a framework exterior to individuals, a limitation of their original self-sufficiency. The only bond that holds them together is natural necessity, need, and the private interest, the conservation of their property and egoistic person'. (J, 54).

According to Marx, men, in achieving the new liberties, have become subject to a third type of alienation: political alienation. Each person is now split up into an immediate, concrete person – the bourgeois, with his private interest – and an abstract, allegorical being – the citizen – whom he uneasily acknowledges as his true Moral Self and whom he worships in the State.

Marx's later treatment of 'Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham' in *Capital* (CI, 172) carries this critique one step further. Here, the equal distribution of liberal freedoms is not only regarded as the expression of an alienated consciousness on the plane of ideas. It is also unmasked as the real force inherent in a ruling idea. For as Marx explains: freedom of contract is a necessary condition of capitalist exploitation. Marx's equation reads: the freedom to dispose of one's labour power plus the freedom from the means of production equals the freedom to enslave oneself in a capitalist labour process, or die.

In consequence, Marx does not consider 'bourgeois freedom' to be in itself a step forward on the way to the full freedom of communist man. Via its contribution (at once ideological and institutional) to exploitation and the accumulation of capital it does, however, indirectly serve capitalism's historic mission: the liberation of productive energies, which the proletariat will finally seize and bring under its control. As such, 'bourgeois freedom' is a *productivity-enhancing type of unfreedom*. I will briefly return to this judgement of Marx in section IV.

III. Freedom and necessity in communism

9. In the following five sections, I shall discuss Marx's basic claim that the 'struggle between freedom and necessity' (EPM, 89) is resolved in communism. The exegetical vantage point is the text in *Capital*, vol. III, where Marx re-states that free individuality is based on a high and growing level of labour productivity. Marx then goes on to make four points:

- (1) 'In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production.
- (2) Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilised man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase.
- (3) Freedom in this field can only consist in socialised man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature.
- (4) But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working-day is its basic prerequisite' (C III, 820).

In a recent treatise on Marx, Peter Singer compares this last point with Marx's comments on communism in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*. There, Marx foresees a time when the individual is no longer enslaved to the division of labour and 'labour has become not only a means of life but life's prime want' (GP, 569). According to Singer, the two texts are 'oddly contrasted'. On the one hand, he argues, the points made in Capital imply that even in communism, '... the conflict between freedom and necessity cannot be overcome, and the best that can be done is to reduce the amount of necessary labour to a minimum, thereby increasing the time that we are free'. On the other hand, the *Critique of the Gotha Programme* says that this same necessary labour would become life's prime want – which is 'very different from the clock-watching attitude that takes the shortening of the working day as the prerequisite of freedom' (Singer, 1980, 64).

If Singer were right, then there would be no question of resolving the struggle between freedom and necessity and the transformation of necessary labour into life's prime want would remain a pious hope. But Singer's view is mistaken. It is based on the false assumption that freedom exists only in the 'realm of freedom' and not in the 'realm of necessity' (compare also: Singer, 1980, 54). In fact, Marx does not assert (point 1) that *freedom* lies beyond the sphere of material production. Indeed, he explicitly says that freedom in the

realm of necessity consists in the rational interchange between the associated producers and Nature under conditions appropriate to the producers' human nature (point 3).

Singer's mistake, however, conveniently raises the question which I want to discuss: how are we to interpret freedom in the two realms and how are these realms interrelated? On this, *Grundrisse* contains some interesting material.

10. As noted before, communist men have finally become species beings. On my reading of the species-being's essential characteristics this implies that communist men, in their social cooperation as communal beings, have finally managed to integrate material rationality and artistic creativity in their 'conscious vital activity', which thereby has become free activity. Far from being restricted to the realm of freedom, therefore, men's free activity ranges over both realms. With respect to material rationality, it is part of the collective enterprise of controlling massive forces of production and generating social wealth on an increasing scale. With respect to artistic creativity, it is the active use of social wealth for purposes of individual self-development and expression. Both moments' of free activity are integrated harmoniously in communism: they influence each other without detracting from each other. Marx explicitly affirms this when he says:

'... free time – which is both idle time and time for higher activity – has naturally transformed its possessor into a different subject, and he then enters into the direct production process as this different subject. This process is then both discipline, as regards the human being in the process of becoming, and at the same time practice, experimental science, materially creative and objectifying science, as regards the human being who has become, in whose head exists the accumulated knowledge of society'. (G, 712).

We may elaborate on this by taking the concept of social wealth as a point of departure. Social wealth is essentially free, or disposable, time, i.e. '... time outside that needed in direct production, for every individual and the whole society' (G, 706). Disposable time is free not only in the sense of being 'time off from work'. It is also time to dispose freely of the products made during work. Some of these products are 'collective goods' (for the whole society) and some are 'private goods' (for every individual). Both enable communist men to use social wealth creatively.

What does this exactly mean? The question turns upon Marx's interpretation of free labour. In a critique of Adam Smith's concept of labour as the 'sacrifice of tranquillity, of freedom', Marx, anticipating Freud, points out that labour, when not appearing as the 'external forced labour' of class society,

and performed in 'normal portions', meets a basic psychological need: the 'suspension of tranquillity'. He then adds:

'Certainly, labour obtains its measure from the outside, through the aim to be attained and the obstacles to be overcome in attaining it. But Smith has no inkling whatever that this overcoming of obstacles is in itself a liberating activity – and that, further, the external aims become stripped of the semblance of merely external natural urgencies, and become posited as aims which the individual himself posits – hence as self-realisation, objectification of the subject, hence real freedom, whose action is, precisely, labour'. (G, 611).

Two basically different kinds of labour in communism may now be identified. First, labour of direct production, or *productive labour*.¹² Here, the measure is given from the outside, in the sense that the labourer is confronted with a collectively articulated set of aims, namely, to produce the goods necessary for the reproduction of individuals as free individuals. These goods serve both the maintenance of life and the creative use of disposable time. The obstacles to be overcome by the labourers, in order that this first set of aims may be attained, are defined, regulated and adjusted by a second collective aim: to minimize the labour time for production of the necessary goods. Productive labour, then, is activity within the realm of necessity.

Secondly, labour outside of direct production, or *unproductive labour*.¹³ Here, the measure of labour is given from the outside in the sense that the objective to be attained is consciously and immediately posited by the individual himself. The measure of labour consists in his own project of using the social wealth at his disposal in the unfolding of his unique capacities and needs. Such projects may or may not be undertaken in tandem with others, with whom the individual freely associates. The obstacles to be overcome in attaining the individual's objective are now defined, regulated and adjusted by himself, or in concurrence with his freely chosen associates. In contrast to productive labour, furthermore, the effort of obtaining the necessary inputs for the realisation of unproductive labour is not counted among the obstacles to be overcome.

Marx cites composing as an example of 'really free working'. This kind of labour is no mere fun, as Fourier seemed to think, but 'is at the same time precisely the most damned seriousness, the most intense exertion' (G, 611). Nevertheless, getting hold of the note-paper to write down the composition, or the orchestra to perform it with at least once or twice does not present an obstacle to the composer. Getting hold of an appreciative audience, on the other hand, may well prove to be difficult.¹⁴ Whatever the case, unproductive labour is 'higher activity' within the realm of freedom, existing alongside 'idle time' (G, 712).

11. Though it is now established that Marx considers both kinds of labour to be free activity, we are still left with Singer's objection: how can productive labour be liberating if it is subject to the 'attitude of clock-watching'? This problem goes to the heart of Marx's conception of labour in communism. Let us see what he has to say on the subject of the economy of time, to which 'all economy ultimately reduces itself' (G, 173). Marx begins by stating the obvious point that time allocated economically, in accordance with given purposes and commitments, is essential for the individual as well as for society under 'communal production' in communism. He then adds something of significance:

'Thus, economy of time, along with the planned distribution of labour time among the various branches of production, remains the first economic law on the basis of communal production. It becomes law, there, to an even higher degree. However, this is essentially different from a measurement of exchange values (labour or products) by labour time. The labour of individuals in the same *branch of work*, and the various kinds of work, are different from one another not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. What does a solely *quantitative* difference between things presuppose? The identity of their *qualities*. Hence, the quantitative measure of labours presupposes the equivalence, the identity of their quality'. (G, 173).

Marx seems to suggest here that in communism, the productive activities of different persons are not to be rendered 'qualitatively identical'; that to do so would somehow be inconsistent with the free character of those activities. Expressed in terms of the labour theory of value, this implies that the 'concrete labour' of individuals in the realm of necessity is not reduced to 'abstract labour', incorporated in products. Thus, in communism, there exists no common measure of 'socially necessary labour time'.

This seems to me an untenable thesis, which is based on Marx's highly problematic concept – to be discussed presently – of individual labour as 'directly social labour'.¹⁵ The thesis is untenable because, as we have seen, the individual's labour within the realm of necessity is subordinated to collectively articulated aims that are to be attained under the régime of minimizing total labour time. In addition, the collective enterprise of production for social needs is conducted within a social division of labour. Indeed, Marx's distinction between the labour of individuals within the same branch of work and the various kinds of work presupposes the existence of a division of labour *in general* – allocation of labour between different sectors, defined by category of goods produced – and a division of labour *in detail* – allocation of labour within technologically separate units of production.

It thus follows that the different productive activities of communist men, however free they may be, are necessarily and continuously being compared,

both with respect to the quantity of labour performed and with respect to the quality and intensity of labour. Also, these activities are being continuously adjusted, both to the overall pattern of demand and to the changing patterns of rational cooperation within producers' units. These comparisons and adjustments are nothing else than the operation of an institutional *system of labour coordination*, which gives rise to a form of 'socially necessary labour time' and in which qualitatively different kinds of concrete labour become measurable on the same dimension of abstract labour-time. In the most general terms of Marxist economic analysis¹⁶, the 'law of value' must also apply in the communist realm of necessity, even though the values of products are not established, as in capitalist commodity production, by their exchange in the market-place.

It should be noted that these concepts of abstract labour and socially necessary labour time are not identical with the ones defined by Marx in *Capital*. The relation of the former to the latter is that of the general to the institutionally specific.

As is well-known by now, the prime merit of Marx's value-theoretical concept of socially necessary labour time in *Capital* is that it explicates the role of market competition in the system of capitalist labour coordination. Suitably interpreted, Marxian value theory shows us how the process of competition between capitalist entrepreneurs, together with the composition of aggregate demand, which is itself largely based upon the functional distribution of income, determines the profit-maximizing set of production methods by capitalists in various 'branches of work'. In turn, the 'ruling technique of production' determines the labour values of commodities, i.e. the labour time that is socially necessary for their production. Simultaneously, the process of competition tends to enforce the profit-maximizing division of labour in firms within the same branch, given the resistance of the workers against the adjustment of their individual activities by capitalist management.

Now it is only in this specific context that the 'abstraction' of concrete labour is seen to involve the unfreedoms connected with capitalist exploitation and commodity alienation. Accordingly, the connotation of unfreedom, which Marx implicitly attaches to the 'qualitative identity' of individual labours is not inherent in systems of labour coordination *as such*, though it is inherent in the capitalist system. In any case, it is out of place in communist society where, in Marx's words, the individuals subordinate their communal, social productivity as their social wealth (G, 158). In such a society, the system of labour coordination must involve a completely noncoercive method of comparing and adjusting the individual labouring activities to the aim of minimizing socially necessary labour time.

12. Does Marx describe such a method? He does not. Marx's point seems to be that in communism there is no need to institute a system of labour coordination in the first place. He makes this point, be it obliquely, in connection with a comparison between relations of monetary exchange and relations of (communistic) communal production:

'On the basis of exchange values, labour is *posited* as general only through *exchange*'.

But on foundations of communal production,

'... it would be *posited* as such before exchange; i.e. the exchange of products would in no way be the *medium* by which the participation of the individual in general production is mediated. Mediation must, of course, take place. In the first case, which proceeds from the independent production of individuals – no matter how much these independent productions determine and modify each other *post festum* through their interrelations – mediation takes place through the exchange of commodities (. . .). In the second case, the *presupposition is itself mediated*; i.e. a communal production, communality, is presupposed as the basis of production. The labour of the individual is posited from the outset as social labour. Thus, whatever the particular material form of the product he creates or helps to create, what he has bought with his labour is not a specific and particular product, but rather a specific share of the communal production'. (G, 171-72).

This 'directly social' character of individual labour clearly implies that labour coordination evolves *spontaneously*, without any kind of institutional mediator or rule-bound behaviour. Every person, freely 'doing his thing', automatically seems to do the socially right thing, *ex ante*. Instead of capitalism's Invisible Hand, here we have a communal Invisible Mind that guides the actions of individuals in the realm of necessity, infallibly selecting the optimal combinations of myriads of use-values and the methods of production that maximize society's free time.

13. There is a dilemma here. Either the freedom of socialized men in the realm of necessity has become indistinguishable from their freedom in the realm of freedom itself, or the freedom inherent in 'communal production' is in fact severely limited by a set of fully internalized social norms that take the place of rules and institutions. Marx, who does not recognize the dilemma, seems to have the first option in mind.

Obviously the idea of a communal 'Invisible Mind' is inconsistent with Marx's own view of a conscious and rational interchange between man and Nature in the realm of necessity. This view stresses not only the need to produce goods but also the necessity to coordinate millions of individual

decisions – which are not harmoniously integrated *ex ante* – within a *non-coercive organisation of labour*. It is easy to find many statements in Marx's economic writings that support this view. One of them reads:

'It is very characteristic that the enthusiastic apologists of the factory system have nothing more damning to urge against a general organisation of the labour of society, than that it would turn all society into an immense factory'. (CI, 337).

This last 'factory, of which Marx approves by implication, would display none of the restrictive features that Marx discovered in the division of labour of the capitalist factories geared to the production of exchange values. 'Instead of a division of labour', says Marx, such as is necessarily created with the exchange of exchange values, there would take place an organisation of labour whose consequence would be the participation of the individual in the communal consumption (G, 172). Participation in consumption would be paralleled by voluntary participation in this organisation. And at the same time, the participating individuals would be working together with the utmost of technological efficiency. The organisation of labour would be such, that

'... the labouring society relates scientifically to the process of its progressive reproduction, its reproduction in a constantly greater abundance; hence, where labour in which a human being does what a thing can do has ceased'. (G, 325).

As Selucky (1979, 86-87) has pointed out clearly, this image of organisation in a nation-wide 'factory' is hard to reconcile with that of the tacit coordination of activity, springing from communal life.

IV. Marxian and liberal freedoms

14. Whatever the merits of Marx's concept of 'directly social' labour, one may readily agree with Ernst Bloch that it is 'openly utopian'.¹⁷ It is also, to use another word of Bloch, part of a 'concrete' or 'fertile' utopia? This of course depends on what one expects. It can not be denied, I think, that Marx's idea of individual labour in communism is part of the most thoroughgoing conception of freedom as an activist expression of self, in labour to be shared with others. One may sometimes feel that this is what human nature is all about. One could then concede, that the utopia of 'directly social' labour is concrete in Bloch's sense: it makes us aware of the liberating potentialities inherent in our social existence. It also enables some of us to become infuriated at the way in which capitalism – or 'really existing socialism' for that matter – frustrates these potentialities. Thus, it contributes to the sense of alienation, which Heller (1976, 94) regards as the precondition for the formation of

'radical needs', to be articulated in the course of a proletarian class revolution. Be this as it may, something important is lacking. Pre- or postrevolutionaries, not to speak of 'bourgeoisified' social democrats, we cannot really understand how 'directly social labour' works. In this respect utopia fails to deliver the goods. The concrete Marxian utopia, I believe, should do more than inspire a sense of potential liberation. It should present a coherent picture of freedom in social cooperation, the principles of which can be recognized, by *incompletely socialized individuals*, to be present as unrealized possibilities in their own society. This is not a question of 'blueprinting', of laying out a detailed institutional groundplan of the good society. What I would regard as the test case for judging the fertility of the Marxian communist utopia, is an account of the possibility of attaining a non-coercive form of labour coordination in a large-scale, highly industrialized society, where the production of social wealth, in Marx's sense, would become progressively more efficient. Given such an account, one would perhaps be prepared to let individual freedom in the realm of freedom take care of itself.

15. The question arises whether this problem can be solved within a broadly conceived Marxist framework. Recently, there have been several attempts to do so, for example Rudolf Bahro's *Die Alternative*. Here I want to draw attention to work mentioned earlier in these notes: Radoslav Selucky's *Marxism, Socialism, Freedom*.

Selucky criticizes Marx (and Engels) for attributing the unfreedoms of capitalism to the market system as such and for being overly optimistic about the possibility of a rational 'administration of things' within a centrally planned economy (Marx's 'single-nation factory'). He also shows in detail how the pure model of such economies is inconsistent with 'free communal production', if by that term we mean that the workers can freely decide what, how, and on which terms of cooperation they wish to produce.

Selucky's positive contribution is squarely placed within the tradition of self-managing socialism. It may be summarized in two points:

- i) on the conceptual level, he demonstrates that there exist strong structural links between market coordination, 'negative' and 'positive' freedom, whereby the latter is understood as 'individual self-direction' and 'democratic liberty as one's share in the controlling authority' (Selucky, 125-154)
- ii) on the institutional level, he shows how these structural links may be realized in practice within a labour-managed market economy with workers' collectives that possess rights of usufruct to socially owned capital, a democratic multi-party system and direct democracy in local communities (Selucky, 179-189)

The main merits of this book are its extension of the ideas behind the

economic theory of labour-managed firms to political philosophy and especially its lucid confrontation between mainline Marxism and self-managing socialism. Both positions are committed to Marx's activist and expressivist conception of freedom.¹⁸ But when it comes to the question of socialism (or the 'transition' towards communism) they differ radically in their attitude towards Marx's accompanying notion of 'directly social' labour.

Mainline Marxism (including Bloch) steadfastly refuses to abandon that notion. Thus, in the absence of communism's envisaged accumulations of abundance and the lack of its thoroughly (but how?) humanized technology, the individual's labour cannot but become 'directly socialized' from above. Selucky's idea of self-managing socialism, on the other hand, correctly acknowledges the uselessness of 'directly social' labour as a conceptual tool for building socialism. He prefers to suspend judgement on the possibility of a dialectical fusion of individuality and sociality, of men finally becoming species-beings in communism. He concentrates attention on the problem of how to achieve a productive and non-coercive organisation of labour, taking men as they are and institutions as they might be. Selucky strongly insists on the indispensability of the full range of liberal freedoms (save the liberty to own private capital) for the realisation of Marxian freedom. His arguments (summarized in i) and ii)) provide one of the best cases against Marx's assertion that liberal freedoms in fact only constitute a 'productivity-enhancing kind of unfreedom'. As we have seen in section 8 that assertion depends entirely on the historical connection between the 'rights of man' and capitalist exploitation (in its most oppressive phase) Once this connection is severed – as it would *ex hypothesi* be, given the social ownership of the capital stock – it becomes possible to re-interpret the liberal-democratic freedoms as an essential constituent of a more extensive freedom in socialism.

16. I will conclude this paper by making some conceptual remarks on the project of bringing together liberal-democratic and Marxian notions of freedom. In its most general description, the notion of individual freedom refers to a person's domain of uninterfered-with and potentially valuable possibilities of action. By manipulating the terms in this description one may obtain two basic varieties of freedom and one non-basic one.

The first basic variety is *libertarian*, or (personal) rights-oriented. Its proponents typically concentrate on the analysis of interpersonal interferences and seek to delimit the person's free domain of action, by defining mutually compatible sets of personal rights (liberties). In so far as they are concerned with equal liberties, this takes the form of an apportionment of 'rights of way' to persons, together with the corresponding 'duties to refrain', so that each person obtains a domain of equal size. Quite intentionally, libertarians leave

the aspect of 'valuable action' outside the definition of freedom. Within his domain, each person should be unconstrained in the pursuit of the goals that he deems worthwhile. Thus each action is as valuable as the person considers it to be.

At the other extreme, there is the variety of self-developmental, or *expressivist* freedoms. Their adherents predominantly seek to formulate standards for valuing actions in terms of their contribution to the person's growth as a human being – standards which are found in theories of human nature or moral psychology. Marx's species-being is a clear example. Typically, the size of the individual's domain of uninterfered-with action is regarded as of secondary importance. To be sure, it would be desirable if the person's most valued actions were to be protected against interference by others. But still, the expressivists' main concern is that a person should be able to articulate and develop his own conception of value in relation to his fellow men, preferably in a *Herrschaftsfrei* social context. Very often, expressivists are vague on the question what it takes to meet this requirement. Rather than insisting upon rights of free expression, they tend to invoke notions of communality. Again it is not difficult to see how Marxian freedom fits into this category.

Finally, a third variety of freedom may be identified, which is situated between the two extremes. Looked at from one point of view, it may be called 'distribution-oriented'; considered from another, 'needs-oriented'. In this variety, the notion of 'interference' is interpreted broadly. It covers both the constraints on persons caused by other persons (e.g.: your driving a truck through my picnic) and structural constraints, imposed upon the person by social institutions and the distribution of resources. Not content with counting the actions in a person's domain that are merely *possible*, in the sense of being legally permissible, the proponent of distribution-oriented freedom seeks to delimit the area of *feasible* actions, actions that can be performed effectively. He will consider the extent to which persons can, for example, obtain an education or find meaningful work, or take part in political decision-making.

I have classified these kinds of freedom (e.g. 'freedom from want', 'freedom from exploitation', etc.) as *non-basic* because they are very closely related to notions of distributive justice in which the standards of just distribution depend on ideas about what it is that people should have, or have access to, in order to satisfy the needs in virtue of which they may be called 'free' (hence the connotation 'need-oriented'). This variety of freedom shares the libertarian's concern for rights and the expressivist's concern about the prerequisites of a humanly fulfilling existence.

I would suggest that the project of combining liberal-democratic and Marxian freedoms within a conception of labour-managed socialism, such as is proposed by Selucky, requires a close examination of the distribution-

oriented variety of freedom, together with its related notions of distributive justice.

Notes

1. Marx's account of human nature is consonant with Rousseau's (in the *Discourse on Inequality*). As will appear below, there is also a parallel in both authors' philosophy of history.
2. Depending on the context, one may interpret 'material' generally as 'practical' or more specifically as 'economic' or 'technological'. Likewise 'artistic' can be taken specifically, as referring to Art in the aesthetic sense, to science and technological innovation, or more generally, as a synonym of 'imaginative'. I would suggest that the general meanings are the most appropriate since the species-being is, as I will argue below, a unified entity.
3. If it is correct that Marx held this view as an ontological *a priori*, it would explain his 'law of increasing development of the productive forces'. Of course that does not mean that this law might not be taken more seriously if it were to be justified scientifically. Cohen (1978, 150-157) attempts to provide such a justification.
4. 'Eating, drinking, procreating, etc. are indeed truly human functions. But in the abstraction that separates them from the other round of human activity and makes them into final and exclusive ends they become animal'. (EPM, 81).
5. Recently expressed (in an otherwise excellent book) by Selucky (1979, 24) and in a lecture on the 'Irrelevance of Marxism for Feasible Socialism' by Alec Nove, February 1980.
6. Compare: '... the savage must wrestle with Nature of satisfy his wants'. (C III, 820).
7. For Rousseau this is the reason why man initially remains in his natural state of isolated existence. Marx applies the same idea to 'primitive communism', which corresponds in many respects to Rousseau's pastoral society, the 'golden age'.
8. For description of the golden age and personal independence in Rousseau, see Van der Veen, 1980.
9. The theme of the necessity of classes and exploitation in Marx and Engels is analysed in considerable detail in Cohen, 1978, 207-215.
10. This is not to say that it is irrelevant, or unproblematic. On the one hand, the exploiters, as a class, are freed from (productive) labour and become able to pursue politics, philosophy and high culture. (This in itself is a problematic theme which turns upon the conception of the exploiter as a *property-owning non-worker* (EPM, 86), though Marx does later recognize (C III, ch. 23) that at least some exploiters organize, coordinate and supervise production, thus performing labour of direction and labour of exploitation' (C I, ch. 13)). The status of the ruler as a 'non-worker' is one of 'freedom and happiness', in stark contrast to the forced labour of the exploited producers (G, 162). On the other hand, Marx sees the condition of the exploiters as alienated (hence: unfree) (EPM, 87), although in later work he again concedes that even so, the exploiter feels comfortable enough and even manages to possess in his alienated condition 'a semblance of a human existence' (HF, 134).
11. This proposition does not rule out the possibility, noted by Marx, that some

pre-capitalist systems of production which are inserted into the capitalist world-market (e.g. slavery on American cotton plantations) may have comparable or even higher rates of surplus labour than industrial countries.

12. 'Productive labour' is to be interpreted here as the labour performed within the social relations of 'associated producers', and in contrast to productive labour in capitalism, which Marx defines as surplus value-producing labour, and which he regards as coercive: 'To be a productive labourer, therefore, is not a piece of luck, but a misfortune' (CI, 477).

13. 'Unproductive labour' is to be considered as the analogy, in communism, of unproductive labour in capitalism, which is essentially 'labour paid out of revenue'. The difference is that in capitalism, unproductive labourers work directly for the households of the ruling class (as well as performing services within the financial and commercial sectors – an aspect which I shall here ignore) whereas unproductive labour in communism is self-fulfilling use of free time, 'financed' from social wealth which is distributed according to needs.

14. This difficulty of course will always remain, even if every single species-being would 'become a Beethoven'. Or if not that, if everyone's compositions would be 'original'. Compare Ollman (1978, 23), who discusses Marx's grudging admission (GI, 189) that even in communism, few painters will rise to the level of a Raphael. The difficulty also draws attention to the fact that in communism, idle time, time devoted to passive consumption of others' creative expressions, might not simply be a question of sitting around with a few beers, and listening to a song, but might again involve 'the most damned seriousness' in the business of being and imaginatively appreciative member of the audience. Considerations like these lead some people to suspect that communism may be something of a bore.

15. In analyzing this concept, I have benefited from the account in Selucky (1979, ch. 2).

16. Defined, for instance, by Rubin, 1972, part II, and extended in Krause, 1979.

17. In Bloch, 1959, 1141-43 'directly social' labour is not mentioned explicitly. It is presupposed however in Bloch's conception of the relation between individual and society within the 'classless collective'. That conception is termed 'openly utopian'.

18. It is to be noted that Selucky, at his most negative, displays only an attitude of mild disbelief towards the utopian elements in Marx's version of free individuality in communism. He never says that they are unattractive.

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Kwantitatief vergelijkende beleidsanalyse met betrekking tot subnationale overheden: een overzicht*

door Bas Denters

1. Inleiding

Sedert het begin der zestiger jaren is er met name in de Amerikaanse en Engelse vakpers een stroom van publikaties op gang gekomen met als centrale probleemstelling: Op welke wijze kunnen verschillen tussen het beleid van subnationale overheden worden verklaard uit enerzijds sociaal-economische en demografische variabelen en anderzijds politieke systeemkenmerken?

Dit onderzoek is doorgaans gebaseerd op relatief grote aantallen onderzoekseenheden en meestal gekwantificeerde variabelen. Veelal wordt gebruik gemaakt van bestaand statistisch materiaal. De analyse-techniek is overheersend de correlatie- of regressie-analyse.

Dit artikel beoogt allereerst de lezer een beeld te geven¹ van de plaats van de kwantitatief vergelijkende beleidsanalyse ten opzichte van traditionele benaderingen van de studie van lokale en regionale politieke systemen. Vervolgens zal gepoogd worden de inhoud van een aantal klassieke kwantitatief vergelijkende onderzoeken weer te geven. Tenslotte zal een systematisch overzicht worden gegeven van de kritiek die de klassieke benadering heeft losgemaakt. In dit verband zal ook aandacht worden besteed aan enige meer recente onderzoeken waarin op een aantal punten aan deze kritiek is tegemoetgekomen.

Dit artikel zal zich slechts bezighouden met de kwantitatief vergelijkende beleidsanalyse met betrekking tot subnationale overheden *binnen één nationale staat op één tijdstip*. Dit betekent een afbakening in drie richtingen. Ten eerste zal voorbij worden gegaan aan de vergelijking van het beleid van nationale

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