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Disaffected representation in the Netherlands: a non-affected reappraisal

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Disaffected representation in The Netherlands; a non-affected reappraisal*

by M. P. C. M. van Schendelen

Introduction

In most Western countries, masses and elites are linked to each other by the mechanism of elective representation. One aspect of this linkage is the positive or negative orientations of electors and elected towards each other.

In this article we shall present data concerning the political (dis-)affections in the Netherlands of electors and elected towards each other. Before doing this, we shall try to answer two basic questions: how is the linkage of elective representation supposed to work according to recent, theoretical literature and what is the actual nature of the mutual (dis-)affection of electors and elected, according to recent empirical literature?

In most theoretical work, there seems to be a rather implicit, normative bias against political disaffections in the relationship of representation, however much reality the phenomenon of disaffected representation may have; this reality is clearly shown in the case-study of the Netherlands.

For several reasons we do not share this undifferentiated, gloomy view of disaffected representation. First of all, we do not believe that this view is sufficiently empirically sound; secondly, it is our belief that mutual disaffections between electors and elites also have several positive functions connected with the linkage of representation too; and lastly, we see political disaffections as a normal attribute of elective representation in modern, Western societies. We propose, in short, a more positive and, through this, a more balanced view of negative political orientations; a non-affected reappraisal of disaffected representation.

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Elective representation and political affections

Much literature about the relationship between electors and elected is characterized by the assumption that *electors and elected are positively orientated towards each other*. Electors are assumed to have interest in and basic knowledge of the politics of representation; not to abstain from, but to take seriously their obligation to vote; to support the institution of elective representation; and to be prepared to accept their representatives' decisions as binding. The elected, on their part, are assumed to be informed about the citizens' opinions and demands; to consider and support these very seriously; and to accept any new outcome from the ballot-box. The institution of elective representation is considered to be a value in itself.

This type of evaluation of the relationship between electors and elected, between represented and representatives, is clearly shown in the theories of rational democracy (Downs), responsible party government (Janowitz), polyarchy (Dahl) and representative responsiveness (Eulau).¹

Anthony Downs holds the opinion that, in a democracy, the function of elections is to select a government and, because of this, there is mutual dependency between citizens and government, between electors and elected.² The citizens want to have their political demands and preferences satisfied and therefore need a benign and responsive government. The government on its side, wants to keep its political power and, in order to do this, needs the citizens' support as registered in the ballot-box. In a rational democracy, electors and (aspirant-)elected are positively orientated towards each other: each has 'economic' value for the other.

Along similar lines, Janowitz and associates have developed their Responsible Party Model.³ Their central idea is related to competition between political groupings, also including parties, too, but not so much as a means to acquire a low-cost democracy, as is Downs' proposition, but more as a means to guarantee the citizens' influence on the main processes of political decision-making. A party has the obligation to satisfy, as much as possible, the elector's demands or to promote his preferences: in this way, the citizens' influence on the main political processes is effected and sanctioned by an exchange of support (votes) for satisfied demands (decisions). In this market-model of politics, there is also a mutual dependency between electors and elected on the basis of which the one is positively orientated towards the other.

The core of Robert Dahl's theory of poly-archy is the distribution of political power among many different actors ('poly-archy').⁴ Political competition is a necessary condition for such a non-tyrannic regime. Although competition operates through the processes of collective decision-making at elite-level, its main impetus comes from the ballot-box at mass-level. Because the

relationship between electors and elected is basically defined as a necessary method to guarantee a democratic ('poly-archic') system and because such a democracy is seen as a value in itself, this relationship of elective representation is also implicitly valued.

The fourth and last modern theory of elective representation we want to mention here, is the theory of representative responsiveness, as formulated by Heinz Eulau and associates.⁵ In this theory, four components of responsiveness are distinguished: agreement between representatives and represented on a particular policy, constituency service-work, allocation of benefits to the constituency through pork-barrel politics, and symbolic responsiveness in order to generate and maintain support for the representatives. For all these cases of representative responsiveness, some connection (or 'concurrence' or 'congruence') is assumed to exist between constituent preferences and the representative's official behaviour. A constituency, a political grouping of electors or a particular person, then, gets from the representative a policy-position as desired, some help as requested, some political privileges as solicited, and the symbols which satisfy.

The four theories assume a basic harmony between electors and elected, the latter being the choice of the former.⁶ In all four theories there is, more-or-less explicitly formulated, a 'market-model of politics': the (aspirant-)elected are suppliers of those political values for which there is a demand from the elector's side and the electors are suppliers of political power (votes) for which there is a demand from the side of the (aspirant-)elected. In the market-place, demand and supply are assumed to be matched and to reach some point of equilibrium.

Satisfaction, congruency, responsiveness or whatever term is used for this point of equilibrium, are, however, not only a possible end-result of elective representation but also a basic expectation. As well-trained consumers, the electors are assumed to enter the 'market of representation' with expectations of satisfaction; and as conscious producers, the (aspirant-)elected are assumed to gain profit (votes; power) from that satisfaction. The relationship between electors and elected is assumed to be characterised by positive orientations towards each other. Elective representation, therefore, seems to be a relationship of political affection.

Disaffection between electors and elected

Notwithstanding this theoretical literature on the affective side of elective representation, many empirical studies exist which reveal disaffections instead of affections between electors and elected. In fact a large proportion of the populace appears to be very cynical, dissatisfied, negative or disaffect-

ed about their representatives.

Before we start a discussion on some of these studies and their main findings, we ought to insert a short note on terminology. In the field, there appears to be very little basic agreement about the meaning and the use of such varied terms as 'cynicism', 'criticism', 'alienation', 'dissent', 'distrust', 'non-support', 'feelings of illegitimacy', 'low sense of political efficacy', 'discontent', 'dissatisfaction', 'negativism', 'value rejection', 'unhappiness', 'dislike' – to take just a few terms which are used to describe the phenomenon of distance (also another term) between two actors or between an actor and some object. The same variety of terminology applies, however, to the opposite phenomenon, for which are used such varied terms as 'content', 'consent', 'trust', 'satisfaction', etcetera.⁷ As well as the problem that for one and the same phenomenon quite different terms are often used, there is also the problem that for quite different phenomena sometimes one and the same term is used. About this babel of tongues many an author complains, with some despair, that such-and-such '... is an extremely fashionable concept, loosely employed and variously defined'⁸ and he then leaves the matter of terminology at that, or starts, quite pragmatically, his own vocabulary of jargon.

Following this last practice, we shall use the term *disaffection* as an over-all term for that relationship, in which an actor has *negative orientations towards somebody or something else*.⁹ These orientations can be of different types: judgments about the other's behaviour, pre-conceived ideas about the other's value, feelings or antipathy, cognitive criticism, and so on. Different terms as alienation, cynism, distrust etcetera refer, in our approach, to varieties of negative orientations, which are our central concern. The object of the orientation can be a person, a group, an institution, a particular policy, or a particular value-system. We shall leave out of our definition of disaffection the matter of whether these orientations are based in the individual's psychology, his personal circumstances, his group-life, or in his experiences with the political system and related political socialisation: this matter is, for every different population being studied, a question of research and not one of definition.

We shall limit ourselves here to some important examples of that empirical research on political disaffection (to use our catch-all-term) which are related to the 'politics of representation', the linkage between electors and elected. Within this limitation, falls a large part of the empirical research concerning political disaffection, because most of it seems to be related to the elite-mass relationship in general, as seen in such items as 'citizen's trust in government' and 'public support for the President'.¹⁰ A much smaller part of the empirical research concerning political disaffection is devoted to the study of either the

mass-level or to the elite-level. The research on the former category of 'mass-level' is mainly concerned with social disaffection ('trust in your neighbour')¹¹ and that on the latter category of 'elite-level' concerns, for example, the disaffection between politicians and public administrators; this latter research seems to meet so many barriers to accessibility that it is understandable why the number of studies is as small as it is.¹²

Within our limitation to research being on the linkage between electors and elected, we shall focus on three elements of representation: the institution of elections, the role of representatives, and the role of government. The reason for this focus is that these three elements in particular are crucial to the process of representation: through elections, representatives are assigned and mainly through the osmosis of parliamentary and governmental structures, they supply their values, decisions and other political products to the society. Representation, then, exists where 'the people of a nation are present in the actions of its government'.¹³

In many countries, *elections* appear to be considered by a large proportion of the masses as something different from the positive view which was held in the 'market-theories of representation', mentioned above. For Venezuela *Enrique Baloyra* recently discovered a level of 'criticism of the institution of elections', which for 19% of the respondents was labelled as moderate and for 6% as high; for 30% the level was low and for 44%, very low. This (dis-)affection was measured through the use of statements such as 'voting is a very important factor in politics' and 'elections force the government to worry about people's problems'.¹⁴

For Britain and the United States, *Vivien Hart* recently reported widespread scepticism among the respondents about 'the effectiveness of elections in making the government pay attention to the wishes of the people': 29% for the U.K. and 26% for the U.S.A.; the contrasting percentages of those who consider elections as (very) effective are 65% (U.K.) and 62% (U.S.A.).¹⁵ The very same question, posed by *John Ambler* in his survey of French citizens, produced similar results: 24% had (very) low trust in elections and 60% (very) high.¹⁶

These few examples from recent research indicate that substantial percentages of present-day populations have negative orientations towards the institution of elections, through which representatives are assigned. This is, however, slightly in contrast to previous research, such as that done by *Jack Dennis* who reported less disaffection and concluded that 'the future of institutional support (for elections) looks bright'.¹⁷

A famous piece of research on the public's orientations towards *the government* is that done by the *Michigan Survey Research Center* in 1968 and after, and repeated by others.¹⁸ The negative orientations were labelled by the re-

searches as 'political cynicism' and measured through questions such as 'would you say that quite a few (not very many; hardly any) of the people running the government are a little crooked?' and 'would you say that you can trust the people in the government to tell the truth almost all the time, only sometimes or almost never?' In her research among North-American youth, *Sandra Schwartz* found, through such a battery of questions, percentages of strong negative orientations towards the government, of between 23% and 40% for different sub-groupings.¹⁹

Using the same Michigan questions on political cynicism, *Arthur Miller* found important changes in political cynicism and trust among samples of the American electorate between the years 1964 and 1970.²⁰ Cynicism sharply increased and trust in government decreased. In nearly all measurements of cynicism and distrust the percentages of disaffected respondents roughly doubled from about 25% in 1964 to about 50% or more in 1970.

According to Miller, this increase of disaffection towards the government is related in particular to the mass public's dissatisfaction with the policy alternatives that have been offered as solutions to contemporary problems, especially the Vietnam-issue; public cynicism is seen as the result of non-responsive governmental policies.²¹ *Jack Citrin* has commented on Miller's conclusion that the measured increase of cynicism is much more significantly related to disapproval and criticism of the incumbent President and much less to dissatisfaction with policy outcomes.²² In his own research, Citrin stresses moreover, as does Miller, that political factors of disaffection have been neglected in political science and that, often, they are more important than personal characteristics such as race, age and income.²³

These few examples of recent research again indicate how widespread political disaffection towards the government is within the populations under investigation. This finding is relevant for our focus on representation because, in Western democracies, what the government does, is at least supposed to be partly dependent on what the representatives do and allow it to do. The 'market-theories of representation' do not stop being applicable after the legislative vote has been taken, but are also applied in an assessment of the impact of that legislative behaviour on governmental policy-making and its outcomes: to an important degree, representatives function through governmental structures and processes. In this context, the summarized discussion between Miller and Citrin is also relevant. If, in general, political disaffection is strongly caused by political factors, then disaffection about representatives should also be related to these factors and not mainly to personal characteristics. It remains, however, a point of discussion as to whether these political factors are related to policy outcomes or to other political factors in their turn.

The mass public's orientations towards *representatives*, our third element

of representation, come to the heart of our subject: the direct relationship between electors and elected. For the United States, *Glenn Parker* and *Roger Davidson* recently reported important differences between the orientations towards the Congress and of those towards the Congressmen, and also recent changes in these differences.²⁴ In 1968 the Congress was mainly (by 52% of the respondents) evaluated on its domestic policy-making; 54% held favorable judgments and 46%, unfavorable ones. The Congressmen were mainly (by 50% of the respondents) evaluated on their constituency service; by 74% of the respondents the Congressmen were evaluated in positive terms and by 26%, in negative ones. For 1977, however, the authors report important changes. The Congress is now mainly (37% score) evaluated on the basis of its style, ethics and collective behaviour and the results of the evaluations are mainly negative: 70% of the respondents are negative about the Congress' style and a full 100% of those who use these bases of judgment are negative about the Congress' ethics and self-seeking behaviour. The Congressmen are still mainly evaluated on the basis of their constituency work but, given the 38% score, less than in 1968, and 'personal attributes', scoring 36%, is now a close second means of judgment. The people's judgments of the Congressmen are nearly completely favorable, especially concerning the constituency work.

The conclusion that the Congress as an institution attracts rather low scores of political affection, is supported by *Samuel Paterson and associates*, who investigated in Iowa the public's orientations of commitment and compliance to the laws produced by the Iowa legislature.²⁵ A low support for the legislature is held by 53% of the respondents, a medium support by 32% and a high support by only 15%.

The American pattern of the mass public's affection being low for the institution of representation, but high for the representatives themselves seems not to be valid for many other countries, although strictly comparable data are not available. For Japan, *Tadao Okamura* recently reported very high scores of mass cynicism towards the members of the Japanese Diet (69%–77% scores of cynicism).²⁶ For the United Kingdom, *Louis Moss* recently reported a 36% level of political distrust towards the Members of Parliament (versus 60% score of political trust).²⁷ *Mark Hagger* found for France strongly increasing levels of support for a more important role to be played by the National parliament in the French political system (from 41% in 1955 to 63% in 1977).²⁸ For Norway, *Stein Kuhnle* recently reported, seemingly contrary to the American findings, a much stronger disaffection for individual politicians (49%) than for the Norwegian Storting as such (25%); the related percentages of affection being 46% and 73%.²⁹

These few examples of recent research indicate that there is a widespread disaffection among Western populations towards either the institution of re-

presentation or the representatives themselves or both; in most cases, this disaffection is found among one third to one half of the sample, but the range of disaffection is wider than that.

Putting all these findings together, we may draw as a preliminary conclusion that among large parts of Western populations, there are strong negative orientations towards the main elements of representation-in-action: the practice of elections, the elected and their institution, and the representatives' role in the governmental process. This conclusion is preliminary in the sense that the pieces of research, reported here, focus on different aspects and dimensions of representation in different countries and in different times and circumstances. We need comparative and cross-national data before we may make the preliminary conclusion more definite.

A second caveat, in this respect, comes from the fact that all the reported pieces of research have been made at mass-level. They report on only one side of the relationship of representation which, in modern theory, appears to have to be considered as a mutual relationship: no matter how important the electors' view may be, there also remains the question of what the orientations of the elected towards 'the politics of representation' are. This type of research is, however, much more scarce than that at mass level, although there are a few exceptions.

Most research among the elected representatives is related to their role in the governmental process: their feelings of efficacy, their role conceptions, and their decision-making.³⁰ Much less common is research concerning the representatives' orientations towards the institution of representation and their own performances therein. *Samuel Paterson and associates* have done this type of research and found for the Iowa legislators a very high level of support for their legislature and the work being done, as one might well have expected.³¹ In fact, the legislators themselves were, among the five different samples of respondents (mass public, party leaders, attentive constituents, lobbyists and they themselves), by far the most committed and compliant to the legislature's binding decisions.

Almost entirely absent, according to our information, is systematic research on the orientations of the elected towards electors and elections, as elements in the relationship of representation. The topic which is given some attention, is the presumed role-conflict for the representative, when his own political preference is different from the elector's; unless the issue at stake is salient, most representatives are usually inclined not to behave as delegates of the electors, but to follow the lead of their own preference or that of more powerful cue-givers.³²

Completely missing, however, is research among the elected elites about their (dis-)affection towards electors.³³ This lack is in sharp contrast with the

many pieces of research into the other side of the relationship of representation. If the amount and forms of research are valid indications of what are considered to be problems for a society, we are led to conclude that apparently, the mass public's disaffection towards the representatives is considered to be much more of a potential problem for a society, than is the reverse disaffection.

The case of The Netherlands

A lot of empirical research has been published about the Dutch 'politics of representation', both at mass- and elite-level.³⁴ Two main sources of empirical informations are the periodic Electors Questionnaires and the periodic Elected Questionnaires, presently all organised by inter-university groups of political scientists and others.³⁵

Much of this information is like the type of findings mentioned above; that is, it is related to the significance of voting, the role of the Parliament and its Members in the governmental process, and the evaluation of both the institution and the MP's themselves. Before we enter into a presentation and discussion of our own specific data on (dis-)affection and representation in the Netherlands, we shall give a short summary of these earlier general findings, which in many respects are comparable with the data mentioned above for other countries.

One main finding is that more than one third of a mass public sample holds the opinion that 'MP's and ministers don't care much what people like me think'³⁶; 34% of those who have an opinion about 'what the most important tasks of MP's are' (56% had an opinion) consider the MP's performance of these tasks as being (very) poor³⁷; large majorities of electors (50% to 76% for different items) have, however, much affection for the Second Chamber as an institution and hold the opinion (86% score) that its influence on the main political decision-making in the country ought to be strong.³⁸

The MP's themselves strongly agree with this normative view of the electors and also consider the actual influence of their expert members as being very high (second position after Cabinet ministers).³⁹ About the main tasks of the Second Chamber, however, they disagree so strongly with each other that no task is supported by a majority of representatives as being very important while, for almost all of the tasks, the representatives consider the quality of the Chamber's performance to be unequal to the importance of the tasks; this dissatisfaction applies in particular to the task of having contacts with the electors.⁴⁰ Although in the case of conflict between the voters' preference and the representative's preference, most voters (65%) hold the opinion that the representative has to comply with the voters' preference and has to have

as a delegate, most representatives (74%) hold the contrary opinion that their own preference ought to have priority⁴¹; from issue-related research into the MP's opinion-representativeness it appeared that, for several issues, majorities of the electors and the elected have, in fact, opposite preferences.⁴²

The Dutch electors and their political (dis-)affections

In the 1977-Electors-Questionnaire, we incorporated several questions and items, labelled as political efficacy, distrust and cynicism, but covered by our present concept of (dis-)affection. 'Political trust' was defined as the feeling of having individual power to influence the political institutions and processes; 'distrust', as the feeling that undesirable political events (or non-events) take place; and 'cynicism', as disbelief in the 'goodness' of the intentions and behaviour of the political actors.⁴³

Table 1: Political (dis-)affection of the Dutch Electorate

	agree	disagree	don't know	Totals
I Political Efficacy				
(a) MP's don't care much about the opinion of people like me.	41	45	14	100% (N=1.854)
(b) Political parties are only interested in my vote, not in my opinion.	48	43	10	101% (N=1.853)
(c) People like me don't have any influence over what the government does.	46	45	9	100% (N=1.851)
(d) There are so many voters that my vote doesn't count.	11	85	4	100% (N=1.851)
(e) Political parties make many promises, but they do not come to much.	60	29	11	100% (N=1.849)
II Political Distrust				
(a) Many people in the administration are corrupt.	25	46	29	100% (N=1.847)
(b) Political Decisions in the country are taken too often in secrecy.	36	45	19	100% (N=1.850)
(c) MP's care too much about the interests of the powerful instead of the general interest.	45	32	23	100% (N=1.850)
(d) A lot of tax-money is mis-spent by the government.	50	29	21	100% (N=1.851)
III Political Cynicism				
(a) In spite of their better knowledge politicians promise more than they can fulfil.	75	21	5	101% (N=1.314)

(b) Cabinet members mainly take care of their private interest.	27	65	9	101% (N=1.310)
(c) One becomes a Cabinet member more through political friends than through merits.	36	51	14	101% (N=1.314)
(d) In the Second Chamber, there is more jawing than results.	43	47	10	100% (N=1.310)
(e) One becomes a MP more through political friends than through merits.	38	47	14	99% (N=1.312)

Source: *The Dutch Elector 1977* (Voorschoten 1977)

In Table 1 we present the responses of a representative sample of Dutch electors in 1977 on batteries of statements which were developed for the three variables of (dis-)affection. The presentation has been simplified by recording into a dichotomy of agreement and disagreement. The statements about efficacy and distrust were posed in a pre-election survey and those about cynicism, in a post-election survey; this difference of timing explains the different scores of the related samples. For the sake of clarity all statements were systematically formulated in a negative form: 'agreement' indicates disaffection, 'disagreement' indicates affection.

From the table it is clear that, on many statements, large groups of respondents have negative views of disaffection, sometimes even absolute majorities. Strongest affection exists for the institution of voting, for people in the Administration and for Cabinet members. The political parties, as intermediates between electors and elected, have rather low scores of affection; the scores for the Cabinet-members and the people in the administration show much more political affection. The Members of Parliament have an intermediate position: they are more affected than the parties and less than the executives; their scores of disaffection are between 38% and 45% of the samples.

For each variable of (dis-)affection, there appears to exist a satisfying factor-correlation between the statements.⁴⁴ As a matter of fact, different degrees of efficacy, distrust and cynicism could be composed and, next, be correlated with other variables as ideological orientation, education, class, sex, age and residence. Table 2 gives the distribution of these scores.⁴⁵

As the main finding from this table, we consider the fact that political dissatisfaction is found among all categories of independent variables, although slightly more often among some categories than among others. The overall-pattern of correlation is, however, weak, as can be seen from the table. Some pattern is found where the respondent himself is involved in the formulated statement, e.g. in the political efficacy variable; here the factors of political orientation, education and class have some discriminating power. When, however, the respondent himself is not asked to give his judgement on the

Table 2: Correlates of Political (dis)-affection of the Dutch Electorate

variables Independent	Political Efficacy (in %)					Political Distrust (in %)					Political Cynicism (in %)					
	none	weak	medium	much	strong	none	weak	moderate	strong	Total N	none	weak	medium	much	strong	Total N
Political Orientation																
left	7	15	16	20	41	25	26	27	23	415	14	31	21	15	20	293
centre	7	22	22	19	32	25	24	25	25	634	12	31	22	16	19	452
right	6	24	25	19	27	24	25	26	25	474	13	24	17	19	27	341
Education																
lower	14	28	22	16	21	24	23	25	29	1069	15	23	19	18	25	764
secondary	7	17	22	21	33	23	29	24	24	419	12	25	24	18	22	307
higher (non academic)	3	11	21	17	49	30	25	27	18	121	11	46	13	22	8	76
higher (academic)	2	8	15	23	52	35	29	24	12	231	13	44	18	11	14	159
Class																
lower working class	16	29	19	15	21	24	20	27	29	607	16	23	20	17	24	443
upper working class	11	19	25	17	28	26	26	22	26	243	11	24	24	19	22	171
lower middle class	7	18	22	20	34	26	28	24	22	739	14	30	20	15	21	525
upper middle class	4	12	23	22	39	31	30	24	15	120	14	30	22	15	20	74
higher class	3	9	12	21	55	33	27	12	27	33	20	32	8	12	28	25
Sex																
male	9	18	20	19	34	24	25	26	25	883	11	29	21	17	22	628
female	11	25	22	18	25	28	25	24	24	973	17	26	19	17	22	686

Age																
18-24 years	9	15	21	19	36	30	28	22	20	298	16	35	22	13	15	219
25-34	7	19	22	21	31	24	25	27	23	449	11	34	25	15	15	320
35-49	11	22	21	18	28	25	26	22	28	435	15	23	16	20	26	303
50-64	10	26	17	19	28	22	27	26	25	380	15	21	19	21	25	283
≥ 65	14	27	24	13	23	29	19	27	26	289	14	21	18	16	31	189
Residence																
countryside	7	22	22	19	31	28	23	28	21	425	16	29	20	17	18	310
urbanized countryside	14	24	20	18	24	26	25	25	24	375	14	25	21	18	23	277
suburbs	6	16	21	23	35	29	30	21	21	146	20	30	22	11	16	79
small cities	13	21	18	18	30	25	27	23	26	472	14	28	19	18	21	359
large cities	8	22	25	15	30	23	23	24	29	438	10	26	20	16	28	289

Source: Dutch Elector 1977

relationship between the political system and himself, but only his judgement about the politicians, there does not appear to be any systematic pattern. Judgements on the politicians, in terms of distrust and cynicism, seem to be independent from such personal characteristics as ideological orientation, education, class etcetera.

The Dutch elected and their political (dis-)affection

Political (dis-)affection at mass-level has quite widely been researched, both in The Netherlands and elsewhere. This can not be said, however, of political (dis-)affection at elite-level; the elites seem to be supposed to have only political affections.

In order to check this supposition, we extended the 1979-Elected-Questionnaire to include items of political (dis-)affection. Through the use of statements, we asked the Members of Parliament about their affections towards the electors, their party-electors and their colleagues. Nearly all Members of both Chambers participated in the questionnaire and, somewhat contrary to our expectations, nearly all responded to our questions on political (dis-)affection.⁴⁶

Table 3 presents the results. Among the representatives there appears to exist towards the electors an overwhelming political disaffection: citizens have a low level of political knowledge and interest, and care mainly about their private affairs.

Table 3: Political (dis-)affection of the Dutch M.P.'s (in %)

		agree	disagree	n.a./d.k.
I Towards general public				
(a) Most citizens have good knowledge of political affairs.	FC	4	94	2
	SC	12	87	1
(b) Citizens care more about their private interest than about the public interest.	FC	91	7	2
	SC	82	12	6
(c) Most citizens have low interest in politics.	FC	86	12	2
	SC	73	25	2
II Towards party-voters				
(a) Many voters for my party have no clear political preferences.	FC	15	83	2
	SC	6	91	3
(b) Many voters for my party are insufficiently informed about our party's political ideals.	FC	32	62	6
	SC	37	60	3
(c) Many voters for my party have political opinions contrary to our election-programme.	FC	18	76	6
	SC	27	66	7

III Towards other MP's

(a) There are quite of few MP's using Parliament as a springboard for a nice job elsewhere.	FC	64	26	10
	SC	64	29	7
(b) Many MP's wouldn't stick with their job for very long if it weren't for its status and prestige.	FC	47	41	12
	SC	40	48	12

FC = First Chamber (Total N=75; respons N=66)

SC = Second Chamber (Total N=150; respons N=139)

This elite-opinion on the citizen-in-general strongly differs from the opinion on the party-voters: the latter are seen as much more affected. While the large majority of citizens is seen as an apolitical stratum, the minority – in the Dutch system, nearly always small – of adherents of the own party is considered by most representatives as having clear preferences, sufficient information, and socialized opinions. The elected have affection for those who affect them.

As mentioned previously, during the last decade in particular, the Second Chamber was strongly characterized by a high turn-over of Members. Because of this we wanted to know the MP's' opinion on the reasons which their colleagues may have had for their entrance into the Parliament, their period as an MP or their exit from the parliamentary scene.

According to most representatives, there are a lot of MP's who use their membership as a springboard to a nice job elsewhere: this particular statement was formulated after an earlier allegation of the MP Schakel (Protestant) in 1974 which, then, received a lot of sharp and emotional criticism from leading Members and others⁴⁷; in 1979, however, the statement appears to be widely supported. Egocentric satisfaction cannot only be an incentive to leave Parliament, but also a motive to stay: in fact, nearly one half of the respondents say that many MP's would not stand out without their present status and prestige. The status incentive seems to be at least as important as the program-incentive.⁴⁸

The Members of the First Chamber who are not directly elected, but are, instead, appointed by provincial councils, appear to have, on nearly all items, more political disaffections than the Members of the Second Chamber.

The opinions of the MP's accord with basic facts of political science: most people have indeed low levels of political knowledge, interest and involvement in public affairs; the group of party-adherents gets a higher evaluation than the groups which adhere to other parties; and the particular incentive of status and prestige, inside or outside the Parliament, is part of the politics of representation. As such, the responses of the Dutch elected are not very

surprising. Their main importance, however, is that so many of the respondents, quite frankly and straight-forwardly, showed their political disaffection. One may assume that these disaffection orientations are not only caused by the Members' experiences with the politics of representation, but also have effects on their own behaviour towards electors, adherents and colleagues. Disaffection appears to be part of the parliamentary culture.

In Table 4 we give a profile of the disaffected representatives designed on a basis of four structural features: ideological orientation, power of government, size of the parliamentary party and length of membership.

Table 4: Disaffected members of the Second Chamber

Variable	Number of respondents	Disaffected responses (%) on items table 3							
		Ia	Ib	Ic	IIa	IIb	IIc	IIIa	IIIb
I Political orientation									
Socialist (PVDA)	53	83	85	67	8	51	44	71	48
Liberals (VVD)	25	92	96	92	0	37	24	67	37
Christians (CDA)	45	93	86	77	9	28	22	73	42
Democrats (D'66)	8	75	87	25	13	37	0	50	29
II Political power									
Government parties									
(CDA + VVD)	70	93	90	83	6	31	23	70	41
Opposition (PVDA)	53	83	85	67	8	51	44	71	48
Others	16	87	80	62	6	25	7	56	54
III Political size									
Large parties									
(CDA, PVDA, VVD)	123	88	88	76	7	40	32	71	44
Small parties (others)	16	87	80	62	6	25	7	56	54
IV Political experience									
Senior members (before 1977)	74	92	82	70	8	41	29	66	48
Junior members (after 1977)	65	84	92	80	5	35	28	72	41

Example: On item Ia (table 3) 83% of the socialist members of the Second Chamber give the disaffected answer, compared to 92% liberals, 93% christians and 75% democrats.

Towards the citizen-in-general, the more rightist parties (Liberals and Christians) appear to have more disaffection than the more leftist parties (Socialists and Democrats). The Socialists appear to be the most disaffected respondents with regard to the party-adherents; their opinion may be related to the

highly decentralised and fragmented nature of their party, because of which, more so than is the case with other parties, many conflicts and disagreements arise from the level of the rank-and-file and can endure for a long time within the party. The Socialist Party has, besides, always been characterised by strong 'pastoral' or 'paternalistic' relationships between an intellectual party-leadership and a deferent mass of adherents. Towards their 'colleagues' in Parliament, the respondents of the three older parties (PvdA, CDA, VVD) are close to each other in their opinions.

The respondents from the Government-parties are the most disaffected towards the citizen, but, because of the effect of the peculiar nature of the Socialist opposition party, less towards the party-adherents.

The size of the parliament party is hardly an element in the judgement of citizens, but in the judgement of the adherents is, again, felt the particular effect of the large Socialist Party. Political size appears to be highly important in the judgement of the colleagues in Parliament. In particular the members of the large parties where, in fact, by the very size itself, the turn-over is always larger than in small parties, express disaffection about the spring-board incentive of a lot of MP's; and they value the parliamentary membership itself less than others as a compelling source of status and prestige by which the members are maintained in their position.

Between senior members and junior members there are, on the whole, hardly any significant differences of disaffection; the main exception is the slightly less negative judgement of the juniors on the political interest and the involvement of the citizens in public affairs. The relative unimportance of seniority in the Dutch Second Chamber might be caused by the weakness of its operationalization: because the factual turn-over was so high, January 1, 1977, had to be chosen as its breaking-point, but it is doubtful whether members, who were recruited in 1976, can be really considered to be seniors in 1979.

Political disaffection appears, in short, to be only weakly related to our four structural features: orientation, power, size and seniority. About the citizens and about the ex-members, the respondents express strong disaffection, almost irrespective of their structural features; the main exception is political size as a factor of judgment about the ex-colleagues. About the adherents, the judgements of the respondents are also very close to each other, but at a lower level of disaffection; the main exception here is the relatively disaffected Socialist Party.

The gloomy view of disaffected representation

About 40% of the sample of Dutch electors express disaffection about their

representatives in the national Parliament; this figure appears to be comparable with many other countries. About 80% of the Dutch representatives express some kind of disaffection about the citizens: this figure cannot be compared with other countries because of the absence of research elsewhere.

Both findings are contrary to the view that representation is a linkage, characterized by mutual affection between electors and elected. This view is explicitly held as applicable to the mass-public and has resulted in a widespread advocacy of organized political socialization, better political communication and citizenship-training. The same view is also implicitly held as applicable to the elites, who are considered to have, as representatives, an almost self-evident affection for the represented.

This normative view of mutual political affection between electors and elected prevails in both Western and Marxist literature, at least as far as the authors refer to their own political system; if they refer to 'the opposite system', then, rather comically, political disaffection between electors and elected is quite often considered to be a healthy state of affairs, because it could indicate the class struggle within the Capitalistic societies and the nearness of their collapse (so the Marxist view goes⁴⁹) or the beginnings of liberalisation of the totalitarian Communist systems (so the Western view goes⁵⁰).

The Western view that political affection between electors and elected is to be seen as an indicator of the health of the democratic political system, seems to be based on a mixture of Hobbesian and Platonic thinking. Man's initial state is seen as being characterised by egocentrism, natural disaffection to others, and a surplus of aggression. However, the primary mechanism that transforms this initial state of conflict into a state of peaceful harmony, is not seen to be the State-as-Leviathan, but is any agent of political socialization, such as the school, the family, the party or some other structure. Man is a crude animal, but he can learn to become a 'zoön politikon', in particular through the educational system.⁵¹ In her content-analysis of German curricula of civic education at high-school level, *A. Oppenheim* clearly shows what emphasis is put on items of political affection: tolerance, respect for other opinions, love of people and native land, love of peace, international conciliation, christian charity, and so on, are the main topics of education.⁵²

As a second mechanism, which transforms disaffection of the election into affection, is seen the behaviour of the elected themselves. They have to act as living examples of political affection. They have to be decent and honest, tolerant and democratic; and in the end, they have to be responsive to the electors (or to make legitimate the reasons why they could not be responsive).⁵³

Disaffection of the electors, in short, is seen as an indicative dependent variable of a malfunctioning political socialization and/or a failure of elite-

responsiveness; and political affection as the dependent variable of the opposite processes.

In addition, there is voluminous literature in which political (dis-)affection is seen as an independent variable to the political system as well, with, in particular, political stability and democracy as the dependent variables. For *William Gamson*, trust in authorities is a necessary condition for the effectiveness of leadership: 'the loss of trust is the loss of system power, the loss of a generalized capacity for authorities to commit resources to attain collective goals'.⁵⁴ Political trust in leaders – especially when in combination with a low level of participation – then improves the stability of the political system.

Robert Lane is one of the many who have listed the traits of the non-democratic personality which first our catch-all terms of disaffection.⁵⁵ Especially when combined with a high level of political participation, these traits are considered to be a great danger to political democracy. Taking up, again, the concept of political trust, *Arthur Miller* extends the Gamson proposition mentioned above: 'democracy rests upon the trust that citizens extend to their government'.⁵⁶

Most notable are, finally, those authors who do not approach the problem of affection and democracy as a possible relationship, but as a means of identification by definition. *Almond and Verba* explicitly define the individuals of 'the civic culture' as 'positively oriented to the input structures and the input process'.⁵⁷ Along the same line of thinking, *Sidney Verba and Norman Nie* exclude from the operationalization of their concept of democratic participation the activities which are generally recognized as illegal and illegitimate.⁵⁸ For these authors, the relationship between political affection and democracy is not an empirical one which exists or does not exist and can be refuted or verified, but a normative relationship by declaration or by definition.

In defense of disaffected representation

Posing the 'non-affected' question of 'disaffection, so what?' we shall set out here three different lines of defense for the case of disaffected representation. Firstly, an empirical line from which we combat the allegedly strong correlation between affection and representative democracy. Secondly, a functional line from which we pinpoint some positive functions of disaffection for the politics of representation. Finally, a theoretical line from which we consider, as a quite normal characteristic of elective representation in Western societies, some degree of political disaffection, at both mass- and elite-level.

An empirical defense

The search for statistically valid correlations that may explain the phenomenon of political disaffection, has produced voluminous literature containing statements of the following nature: blacks are more distrustful of politics than whites; upper socio-economic status persons, especially those with higher education, are more likely to develop a sense of civic duty; negative evaluations about the political system are associated with low levels of political action; and highly authoritarian personalities are not likely to participate in politics.⁵⁹ Orientations of political alienation, distrust, cynicism, or, taking all together, political disaffection, seem to be strongly correlated to psychological and social shortages (being independent variables) and to low levels of political involvement, participation and democratic behaviour (being dependent variables).

These types of conclusions, based on statistical correlations, require at least two comments. First of all, more recent research, whether it be of the type of secondary or primary analysis, quite often produces results which do not show the strong correlations previously alleged; this more recent research is, frequently, based on better definitions and operationalisations, on more longitudinal and comparative analysis and on refined techniques and methods of measurement.⁶⁰ Sometimes these newer results are even contradictory to the old ones: an excellent example is provided by the on-going research into the authoritarian versus democratic personality.⁶¹ Although, of course, we do not wish to deny what we cannot refute by better research and analysis, we do wish to stress here that the developments in the academic field, which so often expose weaker or even contradictory findings instead of providing stronger and confirmatory ones, should stimulate our reluctance to take any statistical correlation for granted. To give just two stimulating examples of newer insights: the alienated are as likely to come from higher SES groups as from the lower ones⁶²; and social background variables are neither strongly nor consistently correlated with political trust.⁶³ From a traditional point of view our previously reported findings are at the least paradoxical too, because political disaffection appeared to be much stronger among the Dutch MP's who normally have superior political knowledge, information, interest and involvement, than among the electors who normally do not have these attributes.

This brings us to our second comment. If we do not chiefly search for correlations, but also look at the absolute figures and their distribution over cross-variables, then we are compelled to draw the conclusion that political disaffection is nearly always distributed among all categories, however uneven the distribution may be: among the lower and upper SES groups, the

young and the old, the poorly-educated and the well-educated, those who are interested in politics and those who are not, and those with high so-called democratic values and those without.⁶⁴ Even if there is some strength of correlation, the other categories of the matrix still show some disaffection which has to be explained.

Perhaps, as Jack Citrin suggests, the normally used independent cross-variables are not well-chosen and political disaffection has less to be explained by personal or social deficiencies than by more political attitudes, such as, for example, criticism, opposite preferences, political experience, or just a sidered to be a deficient trait, but also to be related to the individual in his surplus of political information.⁶⁵ In fact, the common choice for psychological and social background variables to correlate with political disaffection, is based on an usually implicit premise in which disaffection is not only considered to be a deficient trait, but also to be related to the individual in his own social context. The present empirical insights clearly suggest the need for an other theory of disaffection which is both more political and unbiased. Where political affection is seen as a political response to political events at mass- or elite-level (these events being attitudes, behaviour, policies or whatever other focus of affection there may be), political disaffection should be viewed in the same way.⁶⁶ That disaffection has negative implications for the stability and democratic contents of the political system, ought not to be automatically assumed, but ought to be provided by further empirical research. Perhaps then, not disaffection orientations, but affective orientations will appear to be most harmful to the system or, just another possibility, perhaps both orientations are not all obviously harmful.⁶⁷

Although the discussion so far has mainly concerned the disaffection of the masses, this can also be applied to the elite-level. The high levels of disaffection of the Dutch representatives towards the citizens and their parliamentary colleagues cannot be interpreted as simply a psychological or social deficiency – then the lower levels of disaffection at mass-level become, in this traditional view, a paradox as mentioned – nor as an orientation caused by specific, structural characteristics (ideology, power, size, seniority). We may have to conceive of it as a response to events at mass- or elite-level. For example, the MP's distrust of the citizen might be based on his experience that the citizen is, indeed, highly uninformed, disinterested and egocentric, just as most political science research asserts. The representative's disaffection towards the represented is, then, explained by the very nature of the factual relationship of representation and not by something outside it. Perhaps there is every reason for both represented and representatives to have disaffection for each other.

Some positive functions of political disaffection

It is our philosophical belief that nothing is good or bad in isolation and that, in our case, the question whether political disaffection is good or bad can only be answered by evaluating its effects or functions. Our criterion of judgement here shall be whether the relationship of representation is strengthened or not. The concept of strengthening can be made operational along the lines of any theory of representation. Limiting ourselves to the four modern 'market-theories of representation' mentioned before, any positive function of political disaffection should mean, then, that demand and supply are better matched and brought into equilibrium. This criterion can be applied to Downs' theory of rational democracy in which mass-preferences are matched with elite-programmes; Janowitz' theory, which focusses on the voter's influence on political decision-making through the medium of responsible parties in exchange for votes; Dahl's theory of non-tyrannic rule, made possible by the ultimate check of a pluralistic electorate; or Eulau's theory of responsiveness, where ultimately the elected do what the electors want.

As a primary positive function of political disaffection of the mass-public, we consider the stimulus which it might create for the representatives to formulate new programmes, to improve the voter's chances for political influence, to diminish elitism, or to change policies. The rationale behind this assumed stimulus is that the disaffected citizen could be made affective to the respective representative(s) and, through this, become a supporter who gives his vote. Disaffection of electors towards some (or perhaps all) of the elected attracts, then, new (aspirant-)politicians to the market of representation who provide a better adapted supply of values. Because entrance to the market is open, political disaffection at mass-level therefore stimulates political *competition at elite-level*. The same applies to political disaffection at elite-level toward the electors: the gap of representation which it creates, can attract new (aspirant-)elected to the market and stimulate their political competition.

As a second positive function of political disaffection at mass-level, we see the critical power it can have against the elected; in fact this refers to the so-called 'political criticism' variable. Of course, we have to distinguish here between the active and the inactive disaffected people: the former being those who demonstrate their disaffection through their 'voice' within the political system and the latter being the people who adopt exit-behaviour, turning away from the political system, and abstain, by definition, from any critical activity. The active-disaffected people produce dissensus with the representatives and, through this, initiate political debate between masses and elites; such debate can be considered as one of the pillars of democratic representation.⁶⁸ The polemics can be directed against the institution of representation,

the outputs of representation, or the representatives themselves and may influence those who have power over that institution within the political order, over its outputs or over the elected themselves and who, by these means, are able to meet these critical *polemics*. This scenario is not a necessary or inevitable chain of events, but is partly dependent on a basic preference of all related actors for a better and stronger relationship of representation; alternative scenarios, in which an opposite preference is valid, are here left out of consideration, because in these cases political disaffection has no positive function for representation at all.⁶⁹ Our basic argument, in short, is that active disaffection at mass-level, from its critical nature, can have a strengthening effect on the relationship of representation.⁷⁰

This not only applies to the masses' disaffection for the elites, but also to the reverse relationship. Elites which are strongly disaffected towards the citizens, as the Dutch representatives appear to be, and who reveal that disaffection can have, through their critical voice, a stimulating effect on the citizen's role-conception, his behaviour as a citizen, and his socialization. Disaffection, in short, can be seen as some kind of therapeutic means to better representation.

A third function is closely related to the second, but is on a more aggregate mass-level: political disaffection can become a form of political opposition, and a *countervailing power* within the political system. It is a check on (and sometimes, perhaps, a balance to) the behaviour of the representatives, precisely because mass-disaffection indicates a low appreciation of and genuine concern with their functioning as representatives.⁷¹ What the elected are doing (or fail to do), is not taken for granted or made legitimate, but is questioned and disapproved of: such attitudes can be transformed into countervailing activities. The difference with the second function is that the manifestations of disaffection now go beyond the limits of debate and polemics into organised action. These who are dissatisfied, distrustful, cynical or have whatever other form of disaffection, can make their personal resources available to countervailing groups.⁷²

Our three main positive functions of political disaffection are closely related to modern conceptions of representation. One can, of course, also look at earlier conceptions, such as the classical theory of aristocratic representation, well-formulated by Aristotle and made popular by Edmund Burke in his plea for trusteeship⁷³, which is particularly appropriate in stressing the positive side of mass-disaffection and especially inactive disaffection: it creates *room for leadership*, in our case, elective leadership.⁷⁴ In this type of theories of so-called democratic elitism the elected leaders have, as their first and main obligation, the production of so-called general welfare, public interest or such like. In these theories, in fact, a correlation is assumed to exist be-

tween disaffection and civic incompetence: participation by the disaffected should hamper that public welfare.

Finally, when one adopts a still broader perspective and conceives of representation as a second-best form of democracy, necessitated by the scale of the political system⁷⁵, then political disaffection at both mass- and elite-level can function as a stimulus to develop new structures and processes of *more direct* democracy such as, for example, smaller political communities (within a larger one or not), through which the mutual relationship between electors and elected can be strengthened.⁷⁶

So far we have distinguished five positive functions of political disaffection: more political competition, polemics, countervailing power, room for leadership and more direct relationships. Whether these functions are operative or not and if so, to what degree, depends, of course, on many political factors and actors of whom many may have no interest at all in facilitating these positive functions. But the core of our discussion is that there are at least five reasons to see political disaffection as a functional means to strengthen the relationship of representation and, through this, to evaluate it in positive instead of negative terms.

The normality of disaffected representation

The general appearance in most Western countries of political disaffection of the mass public towards the elected elites and perhaps, should there be more comparative research, also of these elites towards the mass public, could be an indication that there are definite structural causes behind the phenomenon of disaffection; causes which are based on the politics of representation itself. If this assumption proves to be valid, then there is still less reason to see disaffection as a deficiency and more to reconsider the usually negative views of disaffection.

As a primary structural cause of disaffection we see the market-structure of the politics of representation. Its basic characteristic is the matching of preferences of electors and elected. Any preference or *choice* implies, however, by definition, a non-preference for the alternative. Affection for the one candidate or party or policy or whatever else, implies less affection, or disaffection, for the alternative. In a 'multi-multi-party system', as in the Netherlands, it becomes, therefore, quite logical that most representatives have disaffection for the citizen-in-general, because most citizens have no preference for them but always for some minority-party. Quite indicative in this respect, is our finding that the representative's affection for his adherents is relatively strong. Affection is, then, first of all a relationship of identification with somebody else; and disaffection, a relationship of non-identification.

If this is true, then the size of political disaffection in the electoral market should in some way correlate with the degree of fragmentation of that market: the more fragmentation, the higher the scores of political disaffection. Where party-fragmentation is low or cross-cut by other structures such as constituencies, or countered by electoral rules, one might expect a rather high level of mutual political affection between electors and elected. For the United States, where all these factors apply, Parker and Davidson, as mentioned above, have indeed reported an exceptionally high level of mass-affection for the representatives⁷⁷; of course, further comparative research is needed here.

A second structural cause which is related to the market-structure of representation, is the element of political *competition between the elites* themselves. In the end, all (aspirant-)elected need as much voting support (affection) from the masses as possible, and an effective means to meet that need is the stimulation of public disaffection for competitors; in any case, that disaffection is a great facility and resource.⁷⁸ In a competitive process where the stakes are high, any competitor will appreciate himself and depreciate the other competitors. Because of this, in the politics of representation, the competing elites themselves are an important source of disaffection: they unveil each other's mis-behaviour, they stress scandals, they try to stimulate the public's distrust of their competitors, and so on. These rumours, exaggerated or not, can make a lasting impression on both the electors and the elected and, through this, be an important cause of political disaffection for the elites.

For The Netherlands, this tentative reason for disaffection seems to ring true. It may be, as Lijphart maintains⁷⁹, that during the period between elections the Dutch political leaders have usually shown a remarkable preparedness to 'pacification', that is, to conciliate and to compromise with each other, but, at election and at other times, when there is a good chance of gaining or challenging governmental power, they have also always shown a remarkable preparedness for confrontation; this applies, in particular, to the last decade, when the political stability at elite-level and the stability of the electoral votes were both low and it is to this decade which our reported data of strong disaffections apply. In fact, pacification and political control through confrontation can be seen as two sides of the same Dutch coin.⁸⁰

As a third structural cause of disaffection we see what Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte have called '*the size of democracy*'.⁸¹ When the size of societies grows, the possibilities for structures and processes of direct democracy decrease and the need for representatives of the people increases. The linkages between masses and elites, between ruled and rulers, then, inevitably, change from primary-group-characteristics into secondary-or-even-aggregate characteristics. The interactions and communications between ruled and rulers

become less frequent, less personal, less intense, and less convergent and the changes for mutual misunderstanding, disagreement and disaffection increase in proportion. Some degree of mutual disaffection is, then, quite normal for any mass society.

Only historical research can reveal whether the nature of the interactions and communications between electors and elected has changed in this way during the growth of the mass society. It is a fact that for The Netherlands, however, only 4% of the citizens have ever had any contact with an MP and that less than 10% of the MP's consider individual citizens to be an important source of information for their own legislative activities.⁸² The direct linkage between Dutch electors and elected is, indeed, quite weak.

We consider the growth of 'the size of government' to be a fourth cause of disaffections. In many Western countries (and not only there) the public sector has been greatly expanded in the last century and, in particular, the last decades.⁸³ There is more public expenditure, more income-transfers, more legislation to the society, more employed people within the public administration, etcetera. There is, in short, 'more government' in the society. This fact increases the frequency and the intensity of interactions and communications between masses and elites. These increased and manifold contacts between the two main levels of politics generate more orientations and evaluations towards each other, with more chances of dissensus, criticism, conflict and, in short, mutual disaffections. Where the institutions of representation (Congress; Parliament) are seen as a main source and motor of the 'growth of government', they also become a focus of disaffection.

In particular for the Netherlands all this might be valid. The public sector has been greatly expanded into a so-called Welfare State, where public expenditure has now risen to 67% of the National Income and the income-transfers (as part of this expenditure) to 25% of the National Income; in addition, there is much more legislation, much more complexity and differentiation of governmental structures, many more employed people within the public administration, and so on.⁸⁴ Through these developments, the chances of mutual disaffections between ruled and rulers have also increased. Most important for our theme is, that The Netherlands can be reckoned as belonging to the category of countries in which nowadays the institution of representation is seen as a main cornerstone of a democratic society; whether this view is true or false is much less relevant than its mere existence. The Dutch Parliament is seen by the mass-public as the institution primarily responsible for the governing of society, as the main director and controller of the executive.⁸⁵ When the outputs and the outcomes of government are disliked by citizens, then they evoke disaffections at mass-level towards the representatives who apparently have failed to meet the high standards of 'parliamentary rule'.

tary rule'.

Related to this 'myth of parliament'⁸⁶, there is the 'myth of rationality', which can produce political disaffections and, through this, be considered as a fifth cause of these. In many Western countries the politicians themselves hold high the normative model of rational government, which is in contrast with the incremental model of pork-barrel politics, compromises, political deals, under-informed decision-making, non-decision-making, and whatever else that forms a part of both the factual and the disapproved ways of politics. Any gap between the ideal and the real workings of politics can produce disaffection orientations – and, in particular, dissatisfactions –, firstly at mass-level, where there is a belief in the ideal, and secondly, at elite-level, once these disadvantageous effects of 'the myth of rationality' are experienced.

The ideal of rationality is very much alive in The Netherlands. Most political recruitment is officially based on criteria of merit, qualifications, specialized know-how and trained experience. This not only applies to the recruitment of public servants, but also to that of ministers and many of the representatives who are supposed to be specialists in their area of public policy-making. The decision-making of the Second Chamber, for example, is mainly determined by the cue-giving of the party-specialists to their colleagues.⁸⁷ But behind all this exterior of rationality, there is the reality of bargaining, compromise, pork-barrel politics, and power-politics, which is inevitable in a highly fragmented and unstable system of competing minorities at elite-level. Promises to the citizens, as laid down in, for example, party-programmes and Speeches of the Queen, often have to be forgotten or brought up to date ('actualized' is the Dutch euphemism⁸⁸) and compromises in policy-making, agreed upon after laborious negotiations, often have to be imposed on the organizations, groups and citizens who stand outside the Dutch political circuit. The continuous contrast between the lofty ideal of politics and its normal reality can be expected to be an important source of political disaffection of the Dutch public and, through the previously mentioned feedback-process, also of the Dutch representatives.

Less strictly related to the political system, but also a possible cause of disaffections, is the development of a more 'open society' in many Western countries. Its basic and very liberal idea is that group-control is replaced by individual responsibilities (which, of course, are not unrelated to socialization by groups). An interesting yard-stick for the testing of the openness of a society is the degree to which the electors can freely change their vote-preference for a party and also the degree to which they exercise this option. In a closed society, the outcomes of the ballot-box can be forecasted in a quite accurate way: one only needs information on the main group-determinants; for example: religion, class, language or ethnic affiliation. The related groups

keep the individual behaviour under effective social control. In a more open society, however, these group-determinants are weaker and the probability of fixed preferences, loyalties and affections of the masses to the elites, and the reverse, diminishes. Disaffection and change of affection become possibilities to consider and, quite simply because of this, their chance of occurrence increases.

Until the mid-sixties, The Netherlands could be seen as a rather closed society, ruled by four so-called pillars which had strong internal social controls. Information about somebody's religion and class-position was almost always enough to forecast his behaviour at the elections and also on many other occasions. The political culture was strongly in favour of fixed party-identification, loyalties and deference to the elites. Many intermediate groups of social control (churches, schools, associations) watched over and formed this political culture.⁸⁹ Although, because of changes in the Dutch Election Laws, it is difficult to make reliable comparisons between then and now, it is interesting to note that the percentage of voting now has decreased by 10-15 percent of those who have the right to vote, while the floating vote, as measured by opinion-polls and by shifts of seats between parliamentary parties, has increased up to 30% of the electorate.⁹⁰ These changes are strongest in the southern provinces of the country, which, in former days, were characterized by an extremely closed (Roman Catholic bound) political culture, but nowadays have a much more outwardly-orientated ('open') political culture. Orientations towards the political system have become less a group ('pillar') concern, because the old pillars have crumbled, and much more an individual concern, through which the chance of a variety of orientations strongly increases. Given the earlier Dutch rule of political affections, any increase in variety implies an increase in mass-disaffections towards the elites, among whom the representatives occupy an outstanding place.

As a seventh and final cause of political disaffection, we wish to consider the *pluralistic nature* of most Western societies: this has both cultural and structural aspects.

In a cultural sense there is, in most of these countries, a large variety of needs and demands. Even when people have similar preferences, there are still quite often differences of intensity and ranking of these preferences. This does not only apply to the mass-level, but also to the elite-level, although, at the same time, in many countries, the power-structure is such that many of the elites have to forget about their own various and individual preferences and have to comply with the wishes of a few decision-making leaders. A normal effect of a heterogeneous society, however, is that not all the people can be satisfied at the same time. Political responsiveness differentiates between groups in the society, at mass and elite-level. In countries where the political

culture is strongly fragmented and heterogeneous and, in fact, consisting of a collection of subcultural minorities, bound together by some fundamental cultural features, there the choice is always between the production of differentiated political outputs for different groups at one time or that of general political outputs which satisfy different groups in turn. The first solution is very costly and can, because of this, satisfy nobody in the end; the second solution always fails to satisfy most groups, but can, if the distribution is shown to be equal in the long run, eventually provide general satisfaction. But whatever the choice, there is always a high chance of dissatisfaction about unfulfilled preferences, distrust about the reasons for not-fulfilment, cynicism about the politicians' capabilities, or the occurrence of any other type of political disaffection at mass-level.

The structural aspect of a pluralistic society refers to the variety of groups, organizations, associations and so on. These groups often have an intermediate function between the masses and the elites of a society. Mass-media, opinion-leaders, pressure-groups, party-organizations and so on, however, not only transfer preferences of the masses to the elites and vice versa, but they also have their own impact on these communicative processes. 'Impact' can mean the formation of preferences and ideas, selective support, distortion of communication, the propagation of their own interest and anything else which goes beyond the mere linkage between elites and masses. Particularly relevant here, is John May's theory about the role of middle-elites in the opinion-structure of political parties: they take extremist positions between top-elites and masses.⁹¹

All these intermediate structures and middle-elites are typical of a pluralistic society and play their own role in the formation of political (dis-)affection at mass- and elite-level. They can stimulate political affection as well as disaffection. Under some circumstances, they even strive for the growth of one or the other type of orientation. This depends, in particular, on their position in the society's power-structure: a labour-union may be inclined to propagate mass disaffection towards a rightist parliamentary majority and government, while the employers' union may do the opposite; mass-media and opinion-leaders often have their own preferences for one particular kind of society and therefore publicize their related affections and disaffections towards one or the other group of elected or electors.

The Netherlands can be considered to be a pluralistic society, not only because of its traditional heterogeneity of pillars, but even more so because of its recent de-pillarization through which the many intermediate structures gained freedom from the pillars' political control, to express their own preferences and interests. Nowadays, there is more rather than less cultural and structural variety, although this variety is less segmented and more cross-cut

keep the individual behaviour under effective social control. In a more open society, however, these group-determinants are weaker and the probability of fixed preferences, loyalties and affections of the masses to the elites, and the reverse, diminishes. Disaffection and change of affection become possibilities to consider and, quite simply because of this, their chance of occurrence increases.

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than before.

For the government and its osmosis with the leaders in parliament, it has, for this reason, become more difficult to satisfy many social groups at the same time or to distribute equally its products among the different groups in the long run. Because of the recent, relative decline of economic growth and governmental income, this difficulty has now even increased.⁹²

We have considered so far the possibility of seven structural and normal causes of political disaffections between electors and elected: choice, competition, more secondary relationships, the growing public sector, myth of rationality, the open society, and the discriminating responsiveness of pluralistic systems.

These 'causes' deserve two additional comments. Firstly, they are not unrelated to each other. There can be strong correlations between one and another cause of political disaffection, because all are part of the usual politics of representation in Western societies. Our sevenfold distinction is, in short, an analytical scheme and not more than that. Secondly, these causes have to be conceived as propositions, based on current macro-political thinking, and not as tested relationships between two or more events. In spite of (or indeed because of) their plausibility, these assumed relationships between the normal politics of representation and the general appearance of political disaffections need to be tested by empirical research of both a comparative and a historical nature.

Preliminary conclusions

There is a widespread and popular belief, also evident in political science literature, that political affection is a value in itself and political disaffection is a vice to be cured.

Limiting ourselves to the mutual relationships between electors and elected in Western political systems, we started with an short outline of four recent 'market-theories' of elective representation, all of which assume a basic harmony between electors and elected in the end. A short survey of recent empirical data revealed, however, that the Western masses do not have the political affection towards the politics of representation, assumed in modern theories; about the reverse orientations of the elected towards the electors, empirical data were unavailable.

Research into the Dutch politics of representation reveals, however, that there is strong mutual disaffection between electors and elected in the country. These findings are in contrast to the normative conceptions of harmonic representation and shall, most probably, receive a gloomy response from that

side.

Instead of sharing that gloomy view of political disaffections, we took a more non-affected position and posed the question: 'disaffections, so what?'

We brought up empirical criticism and doubts about the view that disaffection is mainly a deficiency or disease, correlated with specific personal and social circumstances; a more empirically based view seems to be that disaffections are related to the very politics of representation, placed in its wider political context. In addition, we distinguished five different positive functions of political disaffections: they stimulate competition between elites, they have a critical function, give countervailing power, and, applying wider theoretical perspectives, they give room for leadership or a stimulus for more direct democracy. Finally, we discussed seven reasons why political disaffections can be seen as a normal phenomenon of Western societies in which there is elective representation. Given the present state of research, there appears to exist about a one-third disaffected population of electors and, perhaps, about a three-quarter disaffected stratum of representatives. When a phenomenon has such a general appearance, then we consider the nearly world-wide condemnation of it – as is the case in the prevailing literature – to be rather senseless, as any criterion of evaluation must possess discrimination.

Our 'non-affected reappraisal' of the phenomenon of political disaffection should, however, not be understood as being a reversed normative view, in which disaffections are conceived as a virtue and affections as a vice to be cured. Precisely because of the present, rather primitive state of empirical research into the relationship between representation and (dis-)affection, there is every reason to avoid also such a reversed normative position and to prefer a more open-minded and balanced view. Whether political disaffections are good or bad for elective representation should remain a question which perhaps may be answered after, but certainly not before further empirical research.

Notes

1. We consider these theories to be normative because they contain criteria enabling one to evaluate elective representation; most often the choice of these criteria is not discussed by the authors themselves, who, because of this, sometimes give the impression that they consider their theories to be strictly empirical and not normative at all.

2. A. Downs: *An economic theory of democracy*, New York (Harper and Row), 1957.

3. M. Janowitz a.o.: *Toward a more responsible Two-Party System*, Washington (American Political Science Association), 1950 and M. Janowitz and D. Marvick: *Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent*, Ann Arbor (University of Michigan), 1956.

4. In particular, R. Dahl: *A preface to democratic theory*, Chicago (University Press), 1956.
5. H. Eulau and others: *The politics of representation*, Beverly Hills (Sage), 1978, in particular, chapter 3: The puzzle of representation.
6. Although recently formulated, these theories are, in fact, based on many classical ideas of representations, such as Burke's 'common interest', Rousseau's 'volonte-générale' and even Aristotle's stress on the welfare function of representative leadership. See M. P. C. M. van Schendelen: *Politieke Vertegenwoordiging*, in Percy B. Lehning en M. P. C. M. van Schendelen (red.): *Actualiteit van politieke filosofie*, Amsterdam (Intermediair), 1981, chapter 3.
7. See, for example, the lists of terms mentioned by Vivien Hart: *Distrust and Democracy*, Cambridge (University Press), 1978, p. 3 and Jack Citrin and others: *Personal and Political Sources of Political Alienation*, in *British Journal of Political Science*, volume 5, 1975, page 1-31.
8. Citrin and others, *Personal and Political Sources*, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
9. The same 'catch-all term' was chosen by (among others) Arthur Miller: Rejoinder to 'comment' by Jack Citrin, in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 68, 1974, page 989-1001. To the reading of this article, one should add A. Miller: *Political Issues and Trust in Government 1964-1970*, *ibidem*, page 951-972 and Jack Citrin: *The political relevance of Trust in Government*, *ibidem*, page 973-988.
10. L. Milbrath and M. Goel: *Political Participation*, Chicago (Rand McNally), 1977 (second edition), page 63 and following give a good overview and reference.
11. For example, Alan Hughes: *Psychology and the political experience*, Cambridge (University Press), 1975.
12. An example for The Netherlands of this latter category is S. Eldersveld and others: *Elite perceptions of the Political Process in The Netherlands*, in M. Dogan (ed.): *The Mandarins of Western Europe*, New York (Wiley), 1975, page 129-162.
13. H. Pitkin: *The Concept of Representation*, Berkeley (University of California Press), 1967, page 235.
14. E. Baloyra: *Criticism, Cynicism and Political Evaluation; a Venezuelan Example*, in *American Political Science Review*, volume 73, 1979, page 987-1002. See for his measure also E. Baloyra and J. Martz: *Political Attitudes in Venezuela*, Austin (University of Texas Press), 1979, appendices.
15. Hart: *Distrust and Democracy*, *op. cit.*, page 50. To another measure of distrust we have, however, strong objections. Disagreement with the statement, 'Some people say that voting is the only way a citizen can have any say about the way the government runs things' could mean two opposite things: there are many ways and there is no way. This statement is, mirabile dictu, frequently used in this kind of research. See also James Wright: *The Dissent of the Governed*, New York, (Academic Press), 1976, page 122.
16. John Ambler: *Trust in Political and Nonpolitical Authorities in France*, in *Comparative Politics*, volume 8, 1975, page 31-58; mentioned figures on page 36.
17. Jack Dennis: *Support for the Institution of Elections by the Mass Public*, in *American Political Science Review*, volume 64, 1970, page 819-835; citation on page 834. His data are from 1966.
18. See note 10.
19. Sandra Schwartz: *Patterns of Cynicism*, in D. C. Schwartz and S. K. Schwartz (eds.): *New Directions in Political Socialization*, New York (Free Press), 1975, page 188-202; data on page 193.

20. See note 9.
21. Ambler: *Trust*, *op. cit.*, page 51 stresses the possible shift from a short-term dependent relationship between the two variables into a long-term independent relationship.
22. See note 9.
23. See Citrin's work, mentioned in note 7. Same position is taken by Baloyra; see note 14.
24. G. Parker and R. Davidson: *Why do Americans love their Congressmen so much more than their Congress?*, in *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, volume 4, 1979, page 53-61. See also T. Cook: *Legislature versus Legislator*, *ibidem*, page 43-52.
25. S. Patterson and others: *Representatives and Represented*, New York (Wiley), 1975, page 47, and *Citizens, Leaders and Legislators*, London (Sage Series), 1974.
26. T. Okamura: *Political Cynicism in Japan*, paper *International Political Science Association* (Moscow 1979).
27. Commission on the Constitution: *Devolution and other aspects of Government*, London (HSMO), 1973, page 20.
28. M. Hagger: *Parliament and the Public*, paper *International Political Science Association* (Moscow 1979).
29. S. Kuhnle: *Towards a Crisis in the Norwegian Welfare State*, paper *European Consortium of Political Research* (Florence 1980).
30. See the many surveys of 'parliamentological' studies. For example, H. Eulau and K. Hinckley: *Legislative Institutions and processes*, in J. Robinson (ed.): *Political Science Annual 1966*, Indianapolis (Bobbs Merrill), 1966, pages 85-190 and N. Polsby: *Legislatures*, in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds.): *Governmental Institutions and Processes* (Handbook of Political Science, volume 5), Reading (Addison Wesley), 1975, page 257-320. A survey with references to the Dutch system gives M. P. C. M. van Schendelen: *Parliaments in debate (Dutch)*, in *Acta Politica*, volume 13, 1978, pages 107-137. A suitable 'survey of surveys' in the *World-wide Bibliography on Parliaments*, Geneva (International Centre for Parliamentary Documentation), 1978 (7th edition).
31. See note 25.
32. See note 30 for parliamentary role-conflicts and their solutions.
33. There is some research among other politicians than national representatives. See, for example, P. D. Stewart: *Attitudes of Regional Soviet Political Leaders*, and M. Driver: *Individual differences as determinants of aggression*, in M. G. Hermann (ed.): *A psychological examination of political leaders*, New York (Free Press), 1977, pages 239-273 and 337-353. Also D. C. Schwartz: *Political Alienation and Political Behaviour*, Chicago (Aldine), 1973.
34. M. P. C. M. van Schendelen: *Het Nederlandse parlement onderzocht*, in U. Rosenthal and others: *Ministers, ambtenaren en parlementariërs in Nederland*, Groningen (Tjeenk Willink), 1975, 135-151. About the Dutch political system in its widest context, a survey of literature is provided by A. Hoogerwerf: *Politologie in Nederland 1948-1978*, in *Acta Politica*, volume 14, 1979, pages 145-183.
35. The main publications of the Electors Questionnaires are *The Dutch Voter 1971*, Meppel (Boom), 1971; *The Dutch Voter 1972*, Alphen a/d Rijn (Samsom), 1973; *The Dutch Voter 1973*, Alphen a/d Rijn (Samsom), 1973; *The Dutch Voter 1977*, Voorschoten (VAM), 1977; all these are in Dutch, but of the 1972-73 questionnaires there are excellent English code-books available. Of the Elected Questionnaires, initiated in 1968 and 1972 by the University of Leiden, there do

not exist full and published reports or codebooks, but several books and articles are based on materials from these two Questionnaires. A third Elected Questionnaire ('parlementsenquête') has recently, in 1979-1980, been held; this research was based on full inter-university co-operation, directed by this author, and financially supported by the Netherlands' Organisation for the Advancement of Pure Research (ZWO). Its main publications are: M. P. C. M. van Schendelen, J. J. A. Thomassen en H. Daudt (red.): 'Leden van de Staten-Generaal . . .', Den Haag (VUGA), 1981 and M. P. C. M. van Schendelen: *Codebook Questionnaire 1979-1980 Dutch Members of Parliament*, Rotterdam (Erasmus University Press), 1981; this bi-lingual codebook can be ordered at the Faculteit der Sociale Wetenschappen, Erasmus Universiteit, Rotterdam.

36. Wright: Dissent of the Governed, *op. cit.*, page 122.
37. J. van Putten: *Dissatisfaction about politics*, (in Dutch), Meppel (Boom), 1971.
38. The Dutch Voter 1977, *op. cit.*, chapter 5.
39. H. Daalder and G. Irwin: Interests and Institutions in The Netherlands, in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, volume 413, pages 58-71.
40. M. P. C. M. van Schendelen: *Parliamentary Information, Decision-making, and Representation* (in Dutch), Rotterdam (University Press), 1975, chapter 6.
41. The Dutch Voter 1971, *op. cit.*, page 59 and J. Kooiman: *Speaking about the Chamber* (in Dutch), Den Haag (Staatsuitgeverij), 1976, chapter 5.
42. G. Irwin and J. Thomassen, Issue- consensus in a multi-party system, in *Acta Politica*, volume 10, 1975, pages 389-420.
43. The Dutch Voter 1977, *op. cit.*, chapter 4.
44. After principal factor analysis, each set appeared to be based on one factor. Detailed statistical information can be obtained from the author.
45. See for the operationalisations of these variables the codebooks related to the Dutch Voter 1977, published by University of Leiden, Department of Politics. Our summary scores in table 2 are composed of the sum of disaffected responses on each item, for each respondent; for example, the column 'none efficacy' refers to the respondents who on no item expressed disaffected feelings, the column 'weak' to one such an expression, etcetera.
46. See note 35, at the end.
47. M. P. C. M. van Schendelen: The Second Chamber as a Career-channel (in Dutch), in *Beleid en Maatschappij*, volume 2, 1975, pages 50-58.
48. U. Rosenthal and M. P. C. M. van Schendelen: Status-politics in The Netherlands, in *Acta Politica*, volume 8, 1975, pages 255-276.
49. See, for example, W. Kalenski and others: *Politologie in den USA*, Berlin (VEB Deutscher Verlag), 1971, and the *Kleines Politisches Wörterbuch*, Berlin (Dietz Verlag), 1978, which gives the official Communist views.
50. See, for example, the writings of the many Eastern so-called dissidents (and, sometimes, the refuzniks as well). In Western literature, the political disaffections in Eastern countries are often brought under the label of Human Rights; see for an official Western view the *Country Reports on Human Rights for 1979*, Department of State, United States Government, Washington, 1980.
51. E. Becker: *Beyond Alienation; a philosophy of education for the crisis of democracy*, New York (Braziller), 1967. An analysis of educational thinking in this field gives Henry Perkinson: *Since Socrates*, New York (Longman), 1980. A good

survey of educational practices and problems is provided by W. Langeveld: *Political Education for Teenagers*, Strasbourg (Council of Europe), 1979.

52. A. Oppenheim: *Civic Education and Participation in Democracy*, London (Sage Series), 1977.
53. About these 'parliamentary ethics', see, for example, D. Tacheron and M. Udall: *The Job of the Congressman*, Indianapolis (Bobbs Merrill), 1970 (second edition), which is some kind of a manual for congressmen. For The Netherlands, there is the booklet of the former and late Second Chamber's Chairman A. Vondeling: *Schijn des Kwaads*, Den Haag (Staatsuitgeverij), 1978.
54. W. Gamson: *Power and Discontent*, Homewood (Dorsey), 1968, page 43. W. Gamson: Political trust and its ramifications, in G. Abcarian and J. Soule (eds.): *Social Psychology and Political Behaviour*, Columbus (Merrill), 1971, pages 41-58. See also Milbrath and Goel: Political Participation, *op. cit.*, page 73 and ff. and P. M. Sniderman: *Personality and Democratic Politics*, Berkeley (California Press), 1975.
55. R. E. Lane: Notes on a theory of democratic personality, in G. Drenzo (ed.): *Personality and Politics*, New York (Anchor), 1974, pages 423-438. Most famous, of course, is José Ortega y Casset: *La Rebelión de las Masas*.
56. See note 9, page 1001.
57. G. Almond and S. Verba: *The Civic Culture*, Boston (Little Brown), 1965, page 30.
58. S. Verba and N. Nie: *Participation in America*, New York (Harper and Row), 1972, page 3.
59. These examples are taken from Milbrath and Goel: Political Participation, *op. cit.*
60. The need for this is clearly but unintentionally shown by A. M. Rose: Alienation and Participation, in *American Sociological Review*, volume 27, 1962, page 834-838, who, on page 835, writes that 'the group leaders are much less alienated than is the general population'. Alienated from what? From the political community system. Whose system? That of the group leaders, of course. It is really not at all surprising that alienation from political system diminishes as one's power position grows more close to that system . . . to one's own system!
61. Milbrath and Goel: Political Participation, *op. cit.*, pages 80-83.
62. Milbrath and Goel: Political Participation, *op. cit.*, page 65.
63. Citrin, note 9 above, page 973.
64. Perhaps we have to solve even more paradoxes such as the well-known one that both the most and the least satisfied people show more political participation. See R. A. Dahl: *Modern Political Analysis*, Englewood Cliffs (Prentice Hall), 1963, chapter 6.
65. See notes 7 and 9.
66. G. Di Palma: *Apathy and Participation*, New York (Free Press), 1970, especially chapter 5: Political opposition, disaffection and participation.
67. 'The evidence reviewed here thus suggests that, whatever else political alienation might be, it most definitely is not a threat to democracy', so James Wright: Dissent of the Governed, *op. cit.*, page 256.
68. D. Thompson: *The democratic citizen*, Cambridge (University Press), 1970.
69. Then it can have two opposite effects: a call for more direct democracy or a call for elitist leadership.
70. 'There is one safeguard known generally to the wise, which is an advantage

and security to all, but especially to democracies as against despots. What is it? Distrust.' So Demosthenes remarks in his Philippica, as cited by Vivien Hart: *Distrust and Democracy*, *op. cit.*, preface.

71. Same position by Citrin, note 7 above, page 3.
72. See note 66.
73. See note 6.
74. B. Berelson and others: *Voting*, Chicago (University Press), 1954, page 306 and ff. See also note 55.
75. R. Dahl and E. Tufte: *Size and Democracy*, Stanford (University Press), 1973.
76. Wright: Dissent of the governed, *op. cit.*, chapter 10: political alienation and democratic stability, a dissenting opinion.
77. See note 24.
78. In political science, much more attention should be given to the positive functions or resource aspects of phenomena, which are persistently described in negative terms such as 'political problems', 'crises', 'urgencies' and comparable so-called elite-concerns. In fact, almost any political problem can be used advantageously by someone; experienced politicians can, to some degree and to their own advantage, inflate a phenomenon into a problem and a problem into a crisis, which has mobilizing power. Most political scientists, however, take the alleged problems and crises for granted and treat them as independent variables for the politicians. See further, M. P. C. M. van Schendelen: *Viscosity and Governability of the political system* (in Dutch), in *Beleid en Maatschappij*, volume 7, 1980, pages 50-59 and idem: *Crisis of the Dutch Welfare State?*, *op. cit.*, and, for a Dutch case-study, idem: *Government and Parliament in Crisis-times* (in Dutch), Alphen a/d Rijn (Tjeenk Willink) 1979 and the polemics about this book between E. van Thijn and the author in *Acta Politica*, 1980, blz. 542-551.
79. A. Lijphart: *The politics of Accomodation*, Berkeley (California Press), 1968.
80. M. P. C. M. van Schendelen: Philarization and Restoration in Dutch Politics (in Dutch), in *Beleid en Maatschappij*, volume 5, 1978, pages 42-54. See also note 78.
81. See note 75.
82. The Dutch Voter 1973, *op. cit.*, page 137 for the electors' data and M. P. C. M. van Schendelen: Information and Decisionmaking in the Dutch Parliament, in *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, volume 1, 1976, pages 231-250 for the legislators' data.
83. See, for example, G. Warren Nutter: *The Growth of Government in the West*, Washington (Enterprise Institute), 1978 and R. Freeman: *The Growth of American Government*, Stanford (Hoover Institution), 1975.
84. M. P. C. M. van Schendelen: Crisis of the Dutch Welfare State?, paper *European Consortium of Political Research*, (Florence, 1980).
85. M. P. C. M. van Schendelen (ed.): *Kernthema's van de politicologie*, Amsterdam (Boom), 1981 (2^e editie), hoofdstuk 5.
86. See also the polemic book of R. March: *The myth of Parliament*, Ontario (Prentice Hall), 1974, who, however, uses the term 'myth' for a different reference, namely the gap between the Confederate Ideals and the Canadian practice of representation.
87. See note 40 and 82.
88. M. P. C. M. van Schendelen: The Speeches of the Queen 1969-1975 (in Dutch) in *Beleid en Maatschappij*, volume 3, 1976, pages 224-234.
89. H. Daalder: The Netherlands, in R. Dahl (ed.): *Political Oppositions in*

Western Democracies, New Haven (Yale University Press), 1966, pages 188-236; see also note 79.

90. Data from the Dutch *Central Bureau of Statistics*, The Hague; The Dutch Elector 1977, *op. cit.*, chapter 17; and M. P. C. M. van Schendelen: The Dutch Second Chamber as a career channel, paper *British Political Science Association* (Warwick, 1978).

91. J. May: Opinion structure of political parties, in *Political Studies*, volume 21, 1973, page 135-151.

92. For data see M. P. C. M. van Schendelen: A crisis of the Dutch Welfare State? *op. cit.*

1. Inleiding

Nu vijfentwintig jaren geleden schreef de heer M. Mulder een theorie (1972) die beoogt te verklaren waarom en waarom niet mensen zullen proberen de veranderingen in macht te maken en wijzen te overtuigen, of, in een later, door eerste schrijver vaak gezegd: de theorie beoogt te verklaren hoeveel mensen zullen investeren om hun relatieve macht tegenover anderen te vergroten. Zoals ook uit het succes van Mulders boek blijkt, mag de theorie zich in een grote mate hebben verheugen. Dat is te begrijpen. Want niet alleen dat het hier om een relevant probleem gaat (machtsverhoudingen bestaan immers in alle sociale verbanden en zijn van doorslaggevende betekenis voor het functioneren van die verbanden en van de individuen daarin), bovendien ontbreekt er nu hier een (veel te zeldzaam) voorbeeld van een echt sociaal- of gedragswetenschappelijke theorie. Dat wil zeggen, het is van samenhangend aard, het maakt met een zekere voorspellende kracht. Dat betekent niet dat de theorie van Mulder boven kritiek verheven zou zijn - integendeel. Wel verstaat hij zeer terecht genomen te worden dat hij in andere verbanden terecht, voorspellingen doet, want hij heeft weliswaar een heel uitgebreid

Maar wat hij nu juist heeft bedoeld is dat de theorie weinig aandacht verdient van de andere politieke wetenschappen - en nog minder van de andere wetenschappen. Het is op een politieke wetenschappelijke manier te zeggen dat de theorie van Mulder zelf op een politieke wetenschappelijke manier enige jaren geleden, dat is inderdaad merkwaardig omdat macht en het streven ernaar van oudsher centrale thema's waren van de wetenschap der politiek en omdat verschijnselen als revoluties, oorlogen en geweld in zijn geheel op te vatten zijn als de uitdrukking van het streven naar machtsverschillen te veranderen en te behouden. Het is dus niet verwonderlijk dat de theorie van Mulder in het Nederlandse politieke denken een belangrijke plaats heeft ingenomen.

Deze zullen wij nu in de eerste paragraaf (2) trachten te sketchen en in de tweede paragraaf (3) ingaan op enkele van de belangrijkste punten daarvan, om tenslotte (paragraaf 4) een aanwijzing of vertijding ervan te geven. Om de gedachten te bepalen van het boek van Mulder werk