



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Party Politics and performance: the case of Dutch cities

Fried, R.C.

Citation

Fried, R. C. (1980). Party Politics and performance: the case of Dutch cities. *Acta Politica*, 15: 1980(1), 61-110.
Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3452053>

Version: Publisher's Version
License: [Leiden University Non-exclusive license](#)
Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3452053>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

- Puzo, Mario (1969), *The Godfather*. London: Heinemann.
- Sahlins, M. D. (1958), *Social stratification in Polynesia*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Sahlins, M. D. (1963), Poor man, rich man, big man, chief. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 5: 285-303.
- Sahlins, M. D. (1968), *Tribesmen*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
- Sahlins, M. D. (1972), *Stone age economics*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Service, Elman R. (1966), *The hunters*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
- Service, Elman R. (1971), *Primitive social organization*. New York: Random House.
- Service Elman ,R. (1975), *Origins of the state and civilization*. New York: Norton.
- Steward, Julian H., *Theory of culture change*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Terray, E. (1977), Event, structure and history: the formation of the Abron kingdom of Gyaman. In: *The evolution of social systems*, ed. by J. Friedman and M. J. Rowlands, pp. 279-302. London: Duckworth.
- Thomas, E. M. (1969), *The harmless people*. Penguin Books.
- Tuchman, Barbara W. (1978), *A distant mirror: the calamitous 14th century*. New York: Ballantine.
- Velsen, J. van (1964), *The politics of kinship*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Wilkinson, R. G. (1974), *Poverty and progress*. London: Watts.
- Wolf, Eric (1966), *Peasants*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
- Woodburn, James (1979), Minimal politics: the political organization of the Hadza of North Tanzania. In: *Politics in leadership*, ed. by William A. Shack and Percy S. Cohen, pp. 244-264. Oxford: Clarendon.

Party politics and performance: the case of Dutch cities*

Robert C. Fried

To many of those concerned with the performance of local government in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, party politics had mainly injurious consequences for performance and therefore no rightful place. In Europe and America both, the party impact on local, particularly urban government, where it existed, was condemned, and where it did not yet exist (because of suffrage restrictions or lack of party organization), was dreaded. The example of corrupt party machines and bosses in American cities illegitimized party control on both sides of the Atlantic. Party ideology was considered irrelevant to municipal affairs; partisans could therefore only be motivated by illegitimate purposes. Middle and upper class conservatives saw in party control a means whereby the least affluent, least educated, least 'public-regarding' elements in the community might violate the rights of property owners and interfere with the management of cities by impartial public-spirited gentlemen and impartial professional officials.¹

In American cities — long managed or mismanaged under the conditions of universal manhood suffrage and competitive party politics — a successful movement was undertaken around the turn of the century to make party control of municipal government illegal. In city after city, parties were formally prohibited from participating in municipal elections. Municipal employees were gradually placed under the protection of civil service. Party organizations were restricted — legally at least — to their roles in state and national government. Stress was placed on the functions of local government in the efficient and economical provision of services rather than the development of training active, informed citizens and responsive government officials.²

Despite similar fears, preoccupations, and efforts, European conservatives were not equally successful in institutionalizing anti-partisan values. With its democratic associations and consequences, partisanship became a standard characteristic of European municipal government, particularly with the advent of universal male suffrage after the turn of century. The norm for the West European cities became multiparty coalition government or, in the case of British cities, government by one of the eventually two major par-

ties. Partisanship became the norm in European urban government because it was so closely identified with the long-awaited achievement of universal male suffrage and representation in politics of social groups long excluded from any share in power. In the European context, partisanship meant the representation of ideological and social movements rather the corrupt political machines and unprincipled rule. But partisanship also became an acceptable institution in municipal government because it was offset by norms and institutions that dampened its impact on decisionmaking. Partisan elections and party control of municipal councils and executives have been combined with (some say overwhelmed by) professionalization of municipal bureaucracies, the imposition of uniform central standards, and the establishment of decision rules that stress the virtues of interparty cooperation and consensual decision-making.³

It is increasingly argued that the cities in the advanced industrial democracies that have preserved some degree of party control outperform those in which elections and government have been made nonpartisan. Non-partisanship, it is said, tends to diminish the responsiveness of urban government particularly to the less affluent, educated, and socially powerful segments of the community. Relatively powerless individuals need party organization to realize the collective power given to large numbers under the rules of democratic competition. Without party participation in elections, the working classes and the poor, it is said, lack the understanding of politics, political interests, and the access to government which they possessed in American cities during the heyday of the party machines and which they continue to possess today in American and European cities with partisan urban government.⁴

It is premature, to say the least, to accept the assertion that partisan urban government is more responsive to lower-class interests than non-partisan urban government. Studies comparing the outputs of partisan and nonpartisan urban governments — all within the United States — point both ways.⁵ Studies comparing nonpartisan U.S. cities with partisan cities in other advanced nations in terms of comparative responsiveness to determine types of interests have not gone beyond the stage of impressionism. The difficulties of comparing the operations of vastly different sets of urban government institutions are matched by the difficulties of operationalizing measures of responsiveness. It is perhaps easier at this stage of development in comparative urban studies to attack the question indirectly through the comparison of findings *within* (rather than among) countries, through a series of country studies rather than direct international city comparisons.

A number of country studies have been made which attempt to show what difference party control actually makes for municipal performance. While

American studies contrast outputs as between partisan and nonpartisan (or 'reformed' vs. 'unreformed' cities), studies in other countries — those in which *all* cities have partisan government — contrast outputs as between cities with different types of party control.⁶ In general, such studies find that some cities in every country tend to be more activist, enterprising, and innovative — more 'socialistic' as it were, than other cities, and therefore possibly more responsive to interests desiring or benefiting from municipal activism. These studies show, however, that the forms of activism are not highly correlated: there is no general activist syndrome. They also show that to predict the extent of municipal activism (almost any form), it is often less useful to know the formal orientation of city political forces than to know such non-political facts as city size, level of economic development, and age structure.

However, the formal orientations of a city's political forces — where they stand on the general Left-Right political spectrum, is often of useful, if secondary importance in statistically predicting and accounting for diversities in performance levels. Leftist cities often succeed in outputting leftist policy packages; rather more often, conservative political forces succeed in restricting the scope of municipal government. It must be noted at this point that local party organizations in most of the advanced nations are branches of rather centralized national party organizations. Even more important is the fact that local elections are frequently interpreted by the parties and voters as referenda on the *national* performance of the parties. But in spite of apparent voter indifference to local party performance, local party force do manage in many countries — England, Scotland, West Germany, Italy, France, Sweden, and Norway, for example — to produce outputs that roughly accord with rational voter expectations based on party ideology and party location on the Left-Right spectrum. When voters support parties of the Left, they seem to get in European cities a leftist expansion in the scope of government. When they choose the moderates, they generally — as a rough tendency — receive less municipal government. Given the large numbers of rather passive Leftist urban governments and enterprising nominally moderate or even conservative urban governments, the tendencies are not overwhelmingly strong — but they are strong enough to justify the notion that party politics in urban government does provide the voter with some degree of choice.

Does the same apply to Dutch voters? By choosing leftist or rightist city councilmen, can they shape the scope and direction of city government? More specifically, by supporting parties of the Left, can the less affluent voters make Dutch city governments more responsive to the needs of low-income groups?

Why Ties Between Class, Party, and Policy Are Apt to Be Loose

Two sets of reasons work against any direct and tight connection between class, party, and policy in Dutch cities: the weak links between class and party, on the one hand, and the weak links between party and municipal policy, on the other.

(1) *The Weak Ties Between Class and Party*

The ability of Dutch parties to maximize responsiveness to class interests is most sharply impeded by the fact that the primary basis for party voting in Dutch cities is not class, but religion, and the fact that religious and class cleavages do not coincide.⁷ Table 1 illustrates the first fact; Table 2, the second. Table 3, in turn, brings out the striking consequences for Dutch city politics: the great weight of the religious, so-called 'confessional' parties. Confessional parties have won between 40 and 50 per cent of the vote in Dutch cities since World War II. Just as striking is the importance of secularism (as opposed to class) in accounting for the strength of the non-confessional parties. (See Table 1.)

Religious orientations are the single best predictors of party support and of other related features of the party system, such as the number of competing party lists, the number of parties in the city executive, and the degree to which the vote is split (fractionalization). At the community level, Catholicism has accounted for 96% of the variance in Catholic party voting; Protestantism has accounted for 90% of the variance in Protestant party voting; Secularism has accounted for 75% of the variance in support for the Communist-cum-Labor, and Secularism is stronger than class in predicting even the Communist vote. 71% of the variance is in the support for Labor alone. Catholicism predicts more than half the variance in the number of party lists and the number of parties on the B&W. For the Liberals, religion has the same predictive power as income and class: about 39% of the variance in Liberal strength can be predicted by (a) the absence of Catholics, (b) the absence of workers, or (c) average personal income in the community.

The sectarian cast of Dutch urban politics is unusual, perhaps unique among the advanced industrial democracies, matched perhaps only in Israeli urban politics.⁸ Religion has played a major role in the politics of most cities in the advanced world — shaping patterns of voting and political recruitment; inspiring movements for social reform; creating and sustaining a wide range of community social services paralleling; rivaling, or even supplanting public services; and dividing the community into sometimes hostile subcultures and thus creating an agenda for conflict settlement. What is

distinctive about Dutch urban party politics is not so much the confessional/anticonfessional cast (which can be found to some extent in many countries), but the sectarian nature of the system: the splitting of the confessional/anticonfessional forces into so many splinter groups. But even with the splintering, there remains considerable social diversity in the clientele of most Dutch parties because of the cross-class appeal of religion.

Tables 1 and 2 deal with the intercorrelations between party support and sociological variables, looking at all 38 Dutch cities. We can probe further into the structure of party support by looking at the sets of cities in which each of the political forces is strongest. Table 4 lists the centers of political strength for each of the major political forces: the Liberals, Protestants, Catholics, Labor. It lists the cities in which Labor is particularly strong by virtue of available backing from a relatively strong Communist vote. It should be noted that the criterion for political strength — location in the top quartile — means radically different levels of relative power. Catholic strongholds (the top quartile) are cities where Catholic parties receive 50% or more of the vote; strong Labor-Communist cities are those where the two parties receive at least 44% of the vote; strong Labor cities are cities in which Labor receives at least 39% of the vote; strong Protestant cities are those in which Protestant parties receive more than 25%; strong Liberal cities are those where the VVD receives over 12.5% of the vote; strong Communist cities are those in which the CPN receives more than 5.5% of the vote.

Table 5 shows the social characteristics of these somewhat overlapping sets of cities. It is clear that while the social center of gravity may differ from party to party, the differences are not very great. Except for those of the Liberals, perhaps, the party strongholds contain roughly the same class composition. But, even within this similarity, there is diversity, for each political force is tied to a rather different segment of the Dutch lower class. The Catholic parties are strongest in highly industrialized cities, with large working class populations, below-average income, but better-than-average housing. The Protestant parties are strongest in cities that combine considerable industry with relatively low education and income. Leftist cities have poorer housing, but neither unusually many workers nor unusually many people with little education. A simple transference of class interest into party and policy is difficult in the Netherlands because when measured in terms of occupation, income, education, and housing there is only a rough coincidence in the forms of social deprivation.

(2) *Weak Linkages Between Party and Municipal Policy*

Even if the parties represented homogeneous class interests with the Left representing the poor and working classes, and the Right representing the

Table 1: The Sociology of Party Support in Dutch Cities (1966)*

	% Cath.	% Prot.	% No Church	% Managers	% White Collar	% Workers	% in Mfg.	% in Agric.	City Size	Subst. Housing
Communist vote			.59			.35	.31		.33	.38
Labor vote	-.81	.58	.84							.49
Catholic vote	.98	-.85	-.83							-.35
Protestant vote	-.83	.95	.45					.53		
Liberal vote	-.63	.49	.55	.58	.45	-.63	-.41			.54
Average % Labor on B&W	-.66	.44	.72		.29		.32	-.29		
Duration of Labor on B&W	-.42		.48				.28	-.29		.28
Combined Comm. & Labor vote	-.77	.50	.87							.52
Average # Electoral lists	-.73	.65	.60		.45	-.41			.53	.62
Average # of parties on B&W	-.81	.70	.70						.32	.42
Fractionaliz. of vote	-.49	.47	.36							
Labor Burgomaster	-.45		.54					.35		.37

* For the sake of clarity, only correlations with 95% of more probability have been included, even though we are dealing with the universe of Dutch cities, and not a sample.

Table 2: Lack of Intercorrelation between Religion and Class in Dutch Urban Communities

	% Managers	% White Coll.	% Workers	Income	Mfg.	Agric.	City Size	Subst. Hous.	Randstad*
Catholicism	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	-.29	-.43
Protestantism	—	—	—	—	—	.43	—	—	.28
Secularism	—	.31	—	—	—	—	.28	.45	.48

* Randstad refers to the location (or non-location) of a city in the huge urbanized agglomeration in the western Netherlands, running around Amsterdam south to Rotterdam. See appendix A for precise definition.

Table 3: Average Political Parameters for Dutch Cities

	Average for 38 Cities
Communist vote (1966)	4%
Labor vote (1966)	31%
Catholic vote (1966)	30%
Protestant vote (1966)	17%
Liberal vote (1966)	11%
Average Labor share of College of B&W seats	33%
Average time Labor represented on B&W	5.7 years
Average number of party lists, 1949-70	7.4
Average number of political groups on the B&W, 1953-70	3
Index of fractionaliz. in voting	781

Table 4: Urban Centers of Relative Strength for Dutch Political Forces

Strong Communist and Labor	Amsterdam, Deventer, Dordrecht, Groningen, Leeuwarden, Rotterdam, Schiedam, Velsen, Zaandam
Strong Communist	Almelo, Amsterdam, Deventer, Emmen, Enschede, Heerlen, Kerkrade, Velsen, Zaandam
Strong Labor	Deventer, Dordrecht, Leeuwarden, Rotterdam, Schiedam, Velsen, Vlaardingen, Zwolle, Zaandam
Strong Liberal	Amersfoort, Amstelveen, Den Helder, Dordrecht, Groningen, Hilversum, The Hague, Velsen, Zeist
Strong Catholic	Breda, Den Bosch, Eindhoven, Heerlen, Maastricht, Nijmegen, Kerkrade, Tilburg, Venlo
Strong Protestant	Amersfoort, Apeldoorn, Ede, Emmen, Groningen, Haarlemmermeer, Leeuwarden, Vlaardingen, Zwolle

middle and upper classes, it would be difficult for the various forces to translate class interests directly into municipal policy.

a. *Diversity among Dutch Cities.* First of all, Dutch parties, whomever they may represent, have to operate in and help to administer a wide variety of cities. The Netherlands is smaller than Switzerland (with, however, twice as many people), but its 38 cities and towns of 50,000 or more people (as of 1965) are different in size, density, area, growth rates, social structure, economic function, religion, and politics.

In size, they vary from the three major cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague, with respectively 820,000, 680,000 and 537,000 people) down to the ten towns with between fifty and seventy thousand people. In between are thirteen cities in the range between 100,000 and half a million, and twelve in the 70,000-100,000 range. Average population in 1970 for these cities was 150,000.¹⁰

Table 5: Characteristics of Respective Urban Strongholds of Dutch Parties

	All 38 Cities	Strong Liber.	Strong Prot.	Strong Cathol.	Strong Labor	Strong Labor & Comm.
% managers	3%	4%	3%	3%	4%	4%
% workers	48%	44%	47%	51%	49%	48%
% white col.	14%	16%	12%	13%	15%	16%
% sub. dwel.	19%	18%	18%	15%	21%	25%
% low educ.	80%	76%	83%	81%	81%	81%
per cap. inc.	f4012	f4381	f3762	f3820	f3989	f4054
% Catholic	41%	24%	19%	89%	21%	21%
% D. Ref.	25%	28%	38%	6%	31%	26%
% Reformed (fundament.)	8%	10%	15%	1%	11%	10%
% non-church	28%	36%	31%	6%	37%	42%
% in Mfg.	37%	31%	35%	37%	40%	39%
crime rate/10,000 res.	174	166	134	225	145	183
illeg. births/1000 births	29	31	19	29	26	33
city size	147	138	93	111	146	238
growth, 60-70	14%	15%	22%	12%	15%	10%
Fractional. voting index	781	792	797	720	774	787
Av. ≠ party lists, 1949-70	7.4	7.8	7.9	6.1	7.8	7.9
Av. ≠ parties on B&W, 1953-70	3.65	3.65	3.44	1.91	3.02	3.27

In density, Dutch cities range from Amsterdam with 51 people per acre of built-up land down to Emmen, on the German border, with only 12 people per acre.

In land area, the range is from 131 square miles (Apeldoorn) down to Leiden, with less than five square miles (1965 boundaries).

In religion, which is unusually important in Dutch politics, as we have seen, Dutch cities range from the nine south of the 'great rivers' (Rhine and Maas/Meuse) which are 80% or more Catholic to towns like Groningen in the northeast, which are less than 10% Catholic. But, unlike Groningen, most Dutch cities north of the Rhine/Maas have sizeable Catholic minorities (such as 24% in Amsterdam, 22% in Rotterdam, 29% in the Hague, and 37% in Utrecht, seat of the Catholic primate for the Netherlands). Only six cities have an absolute Protestant majority, most of them small towns. In most places, Protestants are minorities, as are Catholics and seculars. The Protestants are divided in several ways, but principally between the mem-

bers of the established Dutch Reformed Church (about one-quarter of the urban population) and those belonging to the more fundamentalist Reformed Church, with about one-tenth of the urban population.

Secularism — the lack of declared religious affiliation — reaches majority proportions in Amsterdam, in some working-class centers like Zaandam (now Zaanstad), and in some northern cities like Groningen. Declared seculars number fewer than 5% of the population in the Catholic towns of the south. Secularism is strongest in the Protestant (or originally Protestant) provinces and averages 28% for all Dutch cities.

Dutch cities also have different social mixtures. Old people make up 6% of the residents of Amstelveen, the middle-class suburb south of Amsterdam, as compared to 12% in Amsterdam itself. Young people between 5 and 14 years of age — the school-age population — make up seventh of Amsterdam's population, but more than a fifth of Emmen's population. The Amsterdam and Rotterdam labor forces include virtually no farm workers, but the latter constitute one-fifth of the labor force of Haarlemmermeer. Of the employed residents of Amstelveen, eight per cent are executives and supervisors, and 28% are workers; Kerkrade, a mining center in the south, has, in contrast, few people in management (1.5%), but a large number (2/3) in the wage earner (worker) category. The Hague, as one might expect in the seat of Dutch government, had a large number of white collar workers ('administrative personnel') — 24% — as compared to the 6% to be found in Emmen.

Emmen, with its few managerial and white collar employees, not surprisingly has the lowest income per resident among the Dutch cities — 3100 guilders in 1970; a high proportion of adult residents with only a primary education — 91%; and a high proportion of low-income workers — 15%. The economic contrast with Amstelveen is stark: 5500 guilders in per capita income; 38% with more than a primary education; and only 2% in the lowest income category.

Amstelveen, as a postwar suburb (pop. 70,000), has few (1.5%) dwellings built before 1906 in contrast to old centers like Amsterdam and Leiden, where more than a quarter of the dwellings predate the Housing Act of that year. Dwellings built since World War II are scarce in the older cities undamaged during the war (such as Amsterdam, Haarlem, and Leiden), while they predominate in such cities as Eindhoven (home of Philips) and, of course, Amstelveen. There is, of course, much more substandard housing in the centers with older housing. In one-third of the major Dutch cities and towns, less than four dwellings in five have a private bath or shower (66% in Amsterdam). Only in one Dutch city does the housing reach U.S. or British norms in dwelling amenity — Amstelveen, with 97% of the dwelling

possessing a private bath or shower. Less than 2/3 of the dwellings in Amsterdam had this amenity in 1971.¹¹ Few (6%) dwellings in Amsterdam are owner-occupied or detached single-family structures (less than 1%), while owner-occupancy and single-family dwellings are common in such provincial towns as Apeldoorn, Emmen, and Ede.

Cities vary greatly in their transportation system and problems. Bikes are used to get to work by one-fifth of the people in Rotterdam and one quarter of the people in Amsterdam, but over half the people in most of the smaller provincial centers. Public transportation is important in Amsterdam and Rotterdam (28-29% of commuters); private car usage, in Amstelveen (48%).

Thus the thirty-eight cities and towns of this study include working-class cities, industrial and middle-class suburbs, ports, university towns, and retirement centers; cities isolated in the midst of bleak polder landscapes and cities that merged into vast metropolitan conurbations; tourist attractions and seldom-visited marketing, mining, or industrial towns; cities with quaint medieval cores and those with centers characterized by the most up-to-date in architecture and site planning.

One should not, of course, overstress the diversity among Dutch towns and cities. Unlike Swiss towns, Dutch towns are populated by people with the same national origins, speaking the same language.¹² Unlike Swiss towns, Dutch towns have relatively few foreign workers. Rather striking is the fact that in most of them, four-fifths of the residents were either born in the city itself or in the surrounding province. Two-thirds of the people in Amsterdam and Rotterdam were born within the city limits! Racial minorities — particularly immigrants from the former Dutch empire — do not constitute more than a small percentage of the population of any city.

But within a framework of racial, linguistic, and ethnic homogeneity, the cultural, social, economic, and political diversities are great — enough to impede any easy application of party principle, program, or line uniformly in all Dutch cities and towns.

(b) *Centralization.* The second major reason why party impact, or at least uniform party impact, is unlikely in Dutch cities derives from the fact that the Netherlands is a unitary state in which the central government exercises considerable control over local affairs.^{11*} The Netherlands has largely retained the French system of provincial and local government established under Napoleon. The country is divided into eleven provinces, each headed by a prefect-like official, the *Commissaris der Koningin* or Queen's Commissioner. Each province is, in turn, divided into communes, headed by burgomasters appointed, like the Queen's Commissioners, by the national government. Thus the chief executive at both the local and the provincial level is not locally elected. However, this authoritarian structure from Napoleonic-

days is offset by the existence of elected representative assemblies at the provincial and local level. At each level, these assemblies elect a collegial executive, the Provincial Executive (*Gedeputeerde Staten*) and the College of Burgomaster and Alderman (*College van Burgemeester en Wethouders*, or College of B&W), to share responsibilities of executive leadership with the executives appointed from above.

The province itself delivers few services, mostly in the area of public works, planning, culture, welfare, and public utilities. One of its chief responsibilities is to exercise oversight over the activities of all communes within its territory. The Queen's Commissioner tends to play little direct role in municipal policymaking or politics, except by providing guidelines to newly installed burgomasters and by advising the government on burgomaster appointments, transfers, and promotions. Much more direct influence is wielded by the collective Provincial Executive, consisting of elected party politicians, and by the Provincial Clerk, a civil servant. The Provincial Executive must ratify a number of municipal decisions, including the municipal budget, and it plays a key role in securing resources for cities from the national government ministries. Dealing with the provincial authorities on behalf of the commune is one of the major tasks of the city burgomaster.^{12*}

The governmental arrangements for cities are established under the Municipal Act of 1851, which fixes the principle that all local governments, whether Amsterdam or Katwoude (pop. 285), shall have the same organization and authority. Each of the 580 communes is headed by a burgomaster appointed by the national government on the advice of the provincial Queen's Commissioner and the national Minister of the Interior. Burgomaster appointments to communes with 50,000 or more people are made by the Dutch cabinet itself, though nominally by the Crown. Burgomasters are usually professional city administrators. With luck, they can work up from smaller to larger cities, though they normally spend one or more six-years terms in the same city. They are seldom appointed to their own cities. The burgomaster presides over both the municipal council (7-45 members, elected for four years) and over the College of B&W, (2-6 members); he is a voting member only of the latter. As a representative of the national government, he can suspend city council of college decisions he considers illegal or inexpedient, passing the matter to the national government for final decision; and he is individually in charge of the municipal police. He can be removed by the national government from office for failure to perform his duties satisfactorily, as when the Burgomaster of Amsterdam was removed following riots in 1966.

Just as city council decisionmaking tends to be dominated by the full-time College of B&W, the College itself tends to be dominated by the central-

ly appointed burgomaster, with his prestige, his connections with provincial and national agencies and political forces, his professional experience, and his public support.¹³ The burgomaster tends to be given higher performance ratings by the Dutch public than aldermen or city council members. In the 1972 voting survey, 48% of those surveyed thought that the burgomaster was doing a good job as compared to 35% who praised the aldermen, and 26% who praised the city council. Feelings about aldermen and city councilmen were much more mixed, at least partly because performance judgments involved a number of different aldermen and councilmen.¹⁴

In the larger Dutch communes — those with which we are dealing — the aldermen on the B&W (i.e. the elected members of the city executive) are generally assigned responsibility for the direction and management of a specific set of municipal departments. They are full-time, salaried political executives. Nonetheless, when the elected politicians on the college are given the equivalent of ministerial portfolios for specific city departments, the burgomaster tends to remain the dominant influence on the city executive. The burgomaster is the only professional administrator on the executive. If the burgomaster takes the portfolio for specific areas such as finance, housing, or planning, he (or she) remains the generally acknowledged coordinating authority among the city departments. Despite growing functional specialization and functional hierarchy, the burgomaster has remained the key intermediary between functional city departments and their provincial or national counterpart agencies. The burgomaster is the acknowledged representative of the city in all dealings with the province and the national government. His rights remain exclusive unless, of course, an alderman happens to be also a member of the provincial council or parliament.¹⁵

On their own, as national officials, burgomasters handle such matters as public security, civil defense, the award of royal honors, application for parole, and military services.

Centralization of control over Dutch cities operates through national legislation, which determines the organization and authority of Dutch communes; through provincial level supervision; through central appointment of the city mayor. It also operates through national legislation that sets bounds to local decisionmaking, requires certain local actions, and subjects local decisions to provincial or central ratification. In most policy areas, some municipal action is either mandated or pre-empted by higher level decisions. Crown appointment of the municipal executive is a traditional form of control; newer forms of centralization take the form of national legislation and central administrative inspection in a growing number of specific functional areas. Centralization undoubtedly promotes some standardization and equalization of performance in such fields as social welfare, education, pu-

blic health, and housing.

Most spectacular is the centralization of municipal finance.¹⁶ Local taxes play less role in municipal finance in Holland than in any other advanced industrial democracy. Dutch municipal government is financed largely through grants from the national Municipal Fund and from categorical national and provincial grants for such specific purposes as teacher salaries, police, and housing. Most direct and indirect forms of taxation have been pre-empted by The Hague, leaving local authorities with the ability to raise only 10-15% of their operating revenues from taxes they themselves levy (streets, entertainment, dogs, canals) or those collected by the state but under locally set rates (land and property).

Dutch municipalities incur considerable debts for public improvements, but provincial and central permission is required for all loans. The province, in addition, has authority over the annual budget and over all major financial transactions.

When basic services are delivered directly by central or provincial government; when the financial cost (and thus much of the political cost) of municipal services are borne by central or provincial government; and when municipal operations themselves are hemmed in by central or provincial directives or incentives, it may be difficult for political forces in a city or set of cities to differentiate their municipal product from that of other cities.

c. *The Burgomaster Ideology of Role.* Closely related to the constraints on product differentiation created by centralization are those created by professional ideology.¹⁷ What little we know about this constraint suggests that burgomasters are expected to produce much the same product: they are expected (or they feel they are expected) to be activists in promoting the development of local service and the procurement of national funding. To the extent that service in the national Corps of Burgomasters inculcates and reinforces this activist concept of the burgomaster role, one should expect to find a rather uniform level of municipal activism throughout Holland.

d. *The Conventions of the College of B&W.* It has been customary when electing the College of Burgomaster and Aldermen in Dutch cities to elect people from all major political sectors, majority and minority alike. By law, the authority of the College is collective. Representation of all major forces on the college has, of course, tended to blunt the impact of the council majority. Unlike classic British parliamentary norms that confer total executive power on the majority power or coalition, norms in Holland (as in Switzerland) give a share of executive power — national, provincial, and local — to all major political forces. Thus even in cities dominated by voters of the Left, conservative party leaders may control some city departments and, presumably, decisions of some consequence. On the B&W, the normal rule

is not majoritarianism, but proportionalism. Decisions are made by reciprocity, logrolling, and multilateral exchange rather than head-on confrontation of majority and minority. Since disagreements on the B&W are not publicized, members are relieved of accountability to their party confreres outside and this allows them leeway to produce interparty accommodation.

'Responsible party government' — clear party stands and clear party responsibility for the use of power — is also discouraged by the principle of specialization within the B&W. Major decisions are made collegially, while 'lesser' decisions fall to the individual aldermen. The principle of collegiality can be used by minority aldermen to compromise the thrust of majority preference; the (contrary) principle of specialization among aldermen (analogous to the decision rule of 'individual ministerial responsibility') can be used to force majority representatives into automatic ratification of proposals from each department head. Once recommendations of each department are collectively sanctioned, men of all parties on the B&W tend to become their automatic defenders, even though such proposals may reflect minority or departmental point of view rather than the points of view of their own political party.¹⁸

Only in recent times have the parties of the Left — probably the most disadvantaged — attempted to change the rules of the game. They have pressed not only for local election of the burgomaster — which seems a radical innovation in the Dutch context — but also for the principle of 'program colleges', i.e. colleges entirely controlled by the council majority and elected on the basis of a common electoral program and a common desire to give a distinctive impress to a municipal policy.

Traditional 'harmony' or 'mirror' colleges have the advantage of giving aldermen of all parties considerable freedom to arrive at acceptable agreements on city policy without much outside pressure from the public or party rank and file. The principle of the 'program college' while sharpening party responsibility to the electorate in general has the immediate practical effect of sharpening aldermanic responsibility to watchful outside party officials.¹⁹

e. *The Multiplicity of Parties.* Another reason why it must be difficult for any Dutch political force to make any impact on local policy is the simple fact that there are so many parties and it is so difficult for any of them to win much power. Table 3 gave some information about the major political forces, but it vastly oversimplified the nature of the Dutch party system. Dutch politics traditionally provides encouragement and support for a seemingly unlimited number of splinter parties, both in the fragmentation of leadership and support patterns and the system of proportional representation. Just as Dutch society has historically provided a haven for a multiplicity of religious sects, Dutch politics has provided a home for a multiplicity

of splintered parties. Thus the results of the municipal elections of 1953 were reported by the Central Bureau of Statistics in terms of eight general political groups, five types of combined lists, and a fourteenth category for 'others'. In 1974, columns were needed for thirteen general political groups, six coalition types, (as no. 20) and 'others'. Protestants are currently divided into six groups; Catholics into two groups. Protestants and Catholics have in some places joined together in still another grouping (Christian Democratic Appeal). The secular forces are splintered into eight political parties and one general coalition (Progressive Accord, including Labor, Democrats, Radicals, and sometimes the Pacifist Socialists).

A scale developed by Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor measures fractionalization in party voting; the scale runs from 0 (total one-party monopoly) to 1000 (complete fractionalization).²⁰ On this scale, Belgian cities, according to Michael Aiken and Roger Depre range from 309 to 725 and have an average score of 606.²¹ The cities in Holland are still more fractionalized; they range from 613 to 926 (!) and have an average score of 781.

A list of the 'major' political forces in contention in 1974 may convey some of the distinctive flavor of Dutch local politics:

- * Anti-Revolutionary (AR)
Farmer Party (BP)
- * Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)
- * Christian Historical Union (CHU)
Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN)
Democrats 1966 (D'66)
Democratic Socialists 1970 (DS'70)
- * Reformed Political Association Calvinist Political Union (GPV)
- * Catholic People's Party (KVP)
Progressive Accord (PAK)
- * Protestant-Christian List (PC)
- * Protestant-Christian Combined List (PCG)
Political Party of Radicals (PPR)
Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP)
Party of Labor (PVDA)
- * Roman Catholic List (RK)
- * Calvinist Political Party (SGP)
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (Liberal) (VVD)

* confessional party or coalition

A multiplicity of parties has meant that no party, except the Catholics, has ever won a clear majority in any city. Catholics have won overwhelming

majorities in their nine strongholds, but absolute majorities have been extremely rare for any other party and in any other cities. Outside the Catholic south, the need for sectarianism has to be tempered with the need for interparty accommodation. The result has been 'proportionalism' throughout the Dutch political system: an attempt to allocate values — power, policies, positions — in proportion to votes.²² Distinctive party impact has been possible only in Catholic cities; elsewhere there has been a felt need to play down party principle in favor of proportionalism and pragmatism.

f. *Convergence in Policy Orientation among the Parties.* One more reason, if indeed any other be needed, why distinctive policy outputs should not be expected on the basis of differential party control is the convergence among the several parties in their social and economic orientations. This phenomenon has been noted at the national level and may well have occurred at the local level. Each political force, including the Liberals, has a tradition of municipal activism. The great expansion in municipal activity was carried out, after all, before the rise of the Socialist movement by progressive sectors of the Liberal movement throughout Europe. All during the nineteenth century, municipal spending levels rose, municipal public utilities were acquired and created, and progressive income taxes were established — in spite of the laissez-faire ideology of the Liberals, the narrow property-based franchise, at-large council elections, and centrally appointed mayors.²³

Reasons to Expect Some Party Impact on Policy

Confessionalism; urban diversity; centralization; the standardizing role of the burgomaster; the conventions of executive appointment and decision-making; heterogeneity in party clienteles; and the sheer multiplicity of parties discourage, but do not preclude some uniform party impact on municipal output. In choosing a party to support, Dutch urban voters have some reason to expect that the act of voting will have policy consequences.

First of all, the same parties operate nearly everywhere; their branches contest elections at all levels of Dutch politics, national, provincial, local. Each political force makes an effort to instill a common approach to local problems among its local adherents through its own municipal association and party units devoted to local questions. Each political force publishes its own local government journal. Local elections are conducted throughout the Netherlands in nationwide campaigns, based on nationwide programs for local government. Thus Dutch national party headquarters assume responsibility for particular types of action at the local level.

Then, too, sectarianism — so many parties tied closely to so many 'spiri-

tual families' — suggests that party principles are held with earnestness and sincerity. The 'pillarization' (verzuiling) of Dutch society into separate sub-cultures — each with its own mass media, schools, labor unions, municipal associations, recreational groups, libraries, churches, political parties — suggests policy differences are taken very seriously and are likely to find expression when politically possible.

Despite the convergence in policy orientation at the national levels, the parties are still differentiated in policy outlook at the local level, or are thought to be. In a report on Dutch cities to the English Royal Commission on Local Government, Dr. A. H. Marshall reported that the Dutch Labor Party 'tended to favor more public services, leasing rather than the sale of land, and subsidies for transport'. Labor was 'more inclined to tolerate deficit financing and took rather different views on denominational schools from those held by other parties'. He was also told that the more conservative parties opposed local government interference in 'matters in which religion may play a role (education, culture, health, etc.)'.²⁴ Professor Leemans, although writing about Amsterdam, where interparty differences may be particularly strong, notes that the 'subjects on which major parties still differ include the type and level of local taxes and duties, the level of charges for public utilities, housing policy and the extent to which the municipality should assume tasks or leave them to the private sector'.²⁵

Though the confessional parties have mixed social roots and permit a variety of interpretations and extensions into Christian doctrine in the social and political sphere, some confessional party impact on municipal policy-making should be expected. Johan Goudsblom has noted for example that

many Roman Catholic municipalities in the southern provinces have local ordinances forbidding such varied activities as the sale of contraceptives or mixed swimming of men and women in swimming pools. Several staunchly Calvinist villages in the northern parts have similarly 'puritan' municipal legislation.²⁶

Confessional parties might be expected to behave as social-conservative parties favoring (1) minimal government activities in the fields of education, welfare, culture, health, recreation, and (2) rather active governmental regulation of private morals and behavior ('law and order').

Thirdly, each of the political forces possesses, as we have seen, urban centers of particular strength. This is obviously the case with the Catholics, who overwhelmingly dominate the politics of nine southern cities. It is also true, if much less true, for the other political forces, which do manage to concentrate some support or to form powerful coalitions in particular places. Leftist parties, for example, have been very strong in such cities as Amster-

dam, Groningen, Deventer, Rotterdam, Schiedam, Dordrecht, and Zaanstad.

Ever since the Social-Democratic Party was founded in 1894, and particularly since the advent of universal suffrage in 1917-19, the Left has been troubled by the question of whether to accept aldermanic positions in cities where the party lacks a clear majority (most major cities). As radical Marxists, many Social-Democrats believed the party should not bother with local action (given the limited possibilities for social revolution at that level) and should not legitimize bourgeois institutions through the simple fact of participation. Reformist elements succeeded, however, in winning party consent for some participation at the local level just before World War I (Participation in the Dutch national government was accepted by the socialists only in 1939). Reformists won approval for socialist acceptance of aldermanic positions even where the party had no majority and acceptance meant collaboration on the B&W with the parties of the bourgeoisie. Acceptance of aldermanic power allowed Socialists to have a definite impact on municipal policy. Dr. F. M. Wibaut, for example, was elected a *Wethouder* (alderman) in Amsterdam in 1914, was given charge of housing and labor matters, and became the driving force behind a massive program of slum clearance and low-cost housing construction in the city. By 1953, the Labor party (as the Social Democrats reconstituted themselves after World War II) had aldermanic seats in thirtythree of the 38 major Dutch cities and towns, including some of the Catholic towns. Presumably, as with Wibaut in Amsterdam, aldermanic power has allowed the Left to carry out its program, particularly in cities with relatively strong Labor and Left representation on the council and the College of B&W²⁷

Connected with this is the fact that burgomasters, though appointed by the central government, are usually appointed in accordance with the local balance of power. The party affiliations of burgomasters are well-known and are taken into account. Catholic burgomasters are appointed to head Catholic cities; Labor burgomasters are appointed to leftist strongholds; Protestant or Liberal burgomasters are appointed to head the more moderate, non-Catholic cities. Thus the vote of the burgomaster on the College of B&W can be cast to reinforce the stand of the locally dominant political forces.

To be sure, one should not exaggerate the political role of the burgomaster. While some burgomasters actively participate in the party caucuses preceding council meetings, most attempt to play a more impartial role, at least locally. Burgomasters tend to avoid local party activity but often to participate actively in party politics at the provincial or national levels. Their party connections are seen as useful to the city in procuring favorable action

at those higher levels of government. Also the match between burgomaster party affiliation and the local balance of party power is only approximate. The national government sometimes appoints burgomasters to cities in which the burgomaster's party is not dominant, as when the cabinet (controversially) appointed a Catholic as burgomaster of the Hague. The cabinet does this in order to allocate burgomaster positions among the cities in rough proportion to the national strength of each force. (No Communist burgomasters have been appointed, however). The correlations between Labor party voting or Labor-cum-Communist voting and Labor affiliation of the burgomaster is not .9 but only .6: not all leftist cities have Labor burgomasters; not all Labor burgomasters administer leftist cities.²⁸

The way in which burgomasters are appointed and aldermen selected has probably been most disadvantageous to the parties of leftism and social innovation — one reason why the Left for some time has been pressing for the local election of burgomasters and the election of majoritarian 'program colleges' rather than the traditional 'mirror' or proportional city executives.

A final reason why some party impact may be found in Dutch city policy-making lies in the fact that much of the centralization in the Dutch system of government is nominal only. In spite of centralizing controls in legislation, administration, and finance, Dutch cities retain freedom of maneuver and initiative. Mayors are centrally appointed, but they are firmly expected to act as agents of the municipality, rather than as agents of the central Ministry of the Interior. Queen's Commissioners, heading the provinces, are subject to national direction; burgomasters are not. Burgomasters are considered to be the first citizens of their communes, rather than outsiders imposed from on high, although, on occasion, city councils have protested against particular appointments or demanded removal of particular burgomasters by the central government.

As with other centralized unitary regimes, many, perhaps most influence patterns are mutual, rather than unilateral. Penetrating central powers to review, reject, modify, or demand local action are, in fact, seldom exercised. As a Labor party publication notes (in a plea for more local democracy and autonomy), 'national and provincial authority influence is for an important part merely formal influence'.²⁹ Larger cities seldom have their decisions challenged; as in other systems, centralization tends to restrict the action of the smaller, less professionally developed local authorities. The tradition of municipal autonomy, dating from the period in which national greatness was associated with the greatness of the Dutch cities, remains quite strong. Characteristically, Dutch law permits local governments to pass ordinances on all matters of local concern: there is no 'Dillon's Rule' to stifle local initiative. Even in some matters involving national policy, such as education,

city planning, and housing, 'national legislation', writes Professor Leemans, 'gives a considerable amount of free discretion to municipalities'.³⁰

Even in matters of finance, where the level of centralization seems impressive, the Union of Municipalities states: 'municipalities in the Netherlands enjoy a large measure of financial autonomy'.³¹ It is true that payments from the national government constitute nine-tenths of local income, but allocations from the Municipal Fund (42% of operating revenues on the average) are determined by a board dominated by local government representatives. Though objective criteria are used (in order to ensure 'proportionality' among all the political forces), some room is left for municipal effort to increase shares through the pleading of 'special needs'. Monies from the Municipal Fund are not earmarked for particular purposes, leaving cities a relatively large degree of discretion in how they are to be spent. The autonomy of poorer cities, moreover, is enhanced by the equalization provisions in the allocation formula.

Cities are free to press for more money from the fund; to apply for loans; to adjust local tax rates and even the rates of some nationally collected taxes (land and house taxes); they are free, within the limits, of course, to set the charges for public utilities. They are free to produce operating deficits and hope to secure supplementary funds from the Ministries of Interior and Finance. Thus centralization permits considerable diversity in local enterprise and initiative. Not surprisingly, there are major differences in municipal output. To these we now turn.

Performance Differences Among Dutch Cities

Choosing indicators of municipal performance is a delicate and far from noncontroversial matter. Indicators may be challenged on several valid grounds: (1) because they indicate more the performance of higher government levels than that of the municipalities; (2) because they do not relate to what various municipal elites are actually attempting to achieve or what various groups in the community would actually like; (3) because they do not indicate stable levels of performance but possibly the accidental levels of a particular year or set of years; (4) because they reflect the performance criteria of only particular groups; (6) because they do not measure distribution or impact; (7) because they do not reflect differential needs, resources, and costs; (8) because they do not measure or reflect valued outputs based on symbolism, style, access, or representation (rather than service).

At this exploratory stage in comparative urban studies, we must settle for the performance indicators that are available in full knowledge that these indicators are subject to one or more of the above defects. The indicators

used in this study are chosen from among those published by the Association of Statistical Bureau Chiefs in Amsterdam. The defects of individual indicators are, it is to be hoped, cancelled out or mitigated by the use of a number and variety of indicators and by the use of factor analysis to detect underlying performance commonalities. Indicators have been chosen that relate to known interparty differences, and should measure, if only crudely, relative party success in goal achievement. They relate to functions over which municipalities are likely to have some measure of control. Even where national functions are involved, such functions may be performed subject to some degree of pressure from local public and elite opinion.

Whatever the decline in communal autonomy; however small the Netherlands; however uniform in legislation, finance, language, ethnicity, and race — there are sizeable differences in the outputs of Dutch municipal governments.

1. Tax Policy:

— Per capita local taxes are ten times higher in Rotterdam than in neighboring Vlaardingen.

2. Housing Policy:

— More than half the households in Heerlen live in public housing; less than one-fifth in Haarlemmermeer.

— Two-thirds of the new dwellings in Leeuwarden were completed under the Public Housing Act (*Woningwet*) between 1955-1970; only one quarter in Kerkrade.

3. Cultural Policy:

— There were nearly five times as many public library books circulated in Zaandam between 1965-1970 as in Den Bosch.

— Public libraries have five times as many books per resident in their collections in Haarlem as in Dordrecht.

— Groningen has nearly fifty times more public library cardholders per resident as Haarlemmermeer.

4. Regulatory Policy:

— There are 75 times as many city ordinance violations per 100,000 residents in Eindhoven as in Amersfoort.

— Five times as many traffic citations are issued per 100,000 residents in Groningen as in Ede.

— There are twenty times as many arrests for public drunkenness per 100,000 residents in Maastricht as in Haarlemmermeer.

5. Recreational Policy:

— Emmen has nearly four times as many soccer fields per 100,000 residents as the Hague.

— There are fifteen times as many tennis courts per 100,000 residents in Hilversum as compared to Velsen.

— There are three and a half times as many gyms per 100,000 residents in Amstelveen as in Haarlem.

6. Health Policy:

— There are more than seventeen times as many child welfare centers per 100,000 residents in Emmen as in Amsterdam.

— There are more than ten times as many physicians in child welfare center per 100,000 residents in Haarlemmermeer as in Delft.

— The utilization rate of health centers by infants is more than twenty times higher in Amstelveen as in Delft.

— The utilization rate of centers by children is nearly nine times greater in Den Helder as in Delft.

7. Welfare Policy:

— Haarlem spends four times as much per resident on public assistance as Amstelveen.

8. Land Policy:

— Dordrecht owns nearly eight times as much real estate per resident as Hilversum (1968).

9. General Scope of Government:

— Den Bosch had an operating deficit for 15 of the 16 years between 1955 and 1970; Deventer had a deficit for only two years.

— Amsterdam has four times as many city employees (non-educated, non-public safety, non-public utility) per thousand residents as Kerkrade.

— The Hague has twice as many public safety (police and fire) employees per 10,000 residents as Zeist.

— Deventer has 690 city education employees per 100,000 residents; Heerlen, 5 per 100,000.

— Rotterdam has a per capita municipal debt eight times greater than Nijmegen.

— Amsterdam spends three times as much per resident as Haarlemmermeer.

If factor analysis is used to detect underlying commonalities of performance (and to simplify the analysis), four major factors emerge, accounting for 52% of the total variance among the outputs (Table 6).³² These factors can be labelled 'Law Enforcement/Welfare', 'Secular Culture', 'Health/Recreation', and 'Activism'. Since some of these factors are not very homogeneous (e.g. Law Enforcement/Welfare), the reader may prefer to look at the single output variables rather than the composite factor.

We are not making the assumption, however, that leftist activism *ipso facto* constitutes responsiveness to the needs and preferences of workers and

low-income households. We do not have much information on the output preferences of various social groups in Dutch cities. What we have suggests the need for caution in assuming automatically that leftist activism is wholeheartedly supported by those with presumably greater need for public services. In point of fact, in national voting surveys in 1967 and 1972, Labor party supporters overwhelmingly opposed any increase in government spending. Nearly sixty percent opposed more spending; about 10% favored more spending; the remaining third of Labor voters preferred existing spending levels. Support for less spending was greater among Labor voters than among voters of any of the other parties. Support for higher spending was strong in the Pacifist Socialist and in middle-class parties like the Progressive Radicals and the Democrats.³³ Conceivably, those opposed to greater spending may nonetheless also be in favor of greater governmental activism, but the surveys do not tell us whether this kind of inconsistency is common.

There may be a discrepancy between the preference and felt needs of party clienteles and actual party programs and policies — we cannot tell. For the purposes of this study, we shall assume that the leftist parties, in their effort to be responsive to perceived needs of their clienteles, are likely to press for a larger scope of municipal government, higher taxation, and more municipal activity in the fields of health, housing, recreation, welfare, education, and culture. The confessional parties are considered as being more likely to press for reduced activity in those spheres, but perhaps stepped up regulatory activity and stringent law enforcement. The Liberals, as middle-class free-thinkers are more likely to press for tennis courts, rather than soccer fields; to support secular efforts in education and culture; and otherwise to restrict the scope of government, particularly in welfare and public housing.

Is this, in fact, the pattern of Dutch local government?

The Impact of Politics on Performance

1. *The Extent of Impact*

One of the emphasized questions in recent research on subnational government outputs concerns the relative importance of political as opposed to economic, social, or cultural variables as determinants of output. Does the size of a city, its growth rate, its occupational structure, its age structure, its level of economic development, its religion, or its class structure have more to do with its governmental performance than the way it votes, the kind of parties it brings into power, and the way those parties interact? If we look at the specific output measures in Table 7, we find political variables explaining more of the variance (singly) than non-political variables in only

Table 6: Outputs Factor Analysis*

	Factor 1 'Law & Welfare'	Factor 2 'Secular Culture'	Factor 3 'Health & 'Recreation'	Factor 4 'Activism'
Misdemeanors	.89			
Drunk arrests	.51			
Traffic tickets	.90			
Welfare exp.	.69			
Policemen	.83			
Library cards		.55		
Library circul.		.89		
Library bks.		.90		
Health centers			.76	
Center MDs.			.88	
Soccer fields			.58	
Real estate (municipal)				.78
Spending				.61
Debt				.86
Homeownership				-.65
Bureaucracy				.70

* Factor loadings below .5 have been omitted.

three cases: general bureaucratization levels (municipal employees per resident); public housing (a tie); and municipal bureaucratization in public education (municipal education staff per resident). If we look at the four output factors, in only one out of four cases ('secular culture') is a political variable of greater importance than a non-political variable.

This would seem to confirm the results of previous studies showing that political variables are rarely the most crucial determinants of outputs. In the major previous study of Dutch local outputs by Cornelis van den Berg, *De Structuur van de Gemeentelijke Uitgaven* (a doctoral dissertation at the Netherlands Economic Institute, Rotterdam, 1956), population size was found to be the most predictive of per capita city spending, explaining by itself 31% of the variance for the 73 communes over 20,000 in population (excluding Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and the Hague).³⁴ He found that size, retailing importance, industrialization, and building costs together accounted for 67% of the variance in spending in 1952 and 1954. Van den Berg also tested for the influence of politics on municipal outputs and found a positive (but unspecified) correlation between the percentage of Labor party members on the city council and spending levels. He considered this an unsatisfactory indicator of the political differentiation among Dutch city councils and attempted to find measures of the position and strength of the other

political parties. Failing to do so, he dropped politics as an explanatory variable from the analysis. Thus the relative importance of party as opposed to sociological variables on municipal policy was not tested.³⁵

In several studies of municipal outputs, particularly those in polyreligious countries like West Germany, Switzerland, and the U.S., religion is taken to be a non-political variable, although, in the case of U.S. cities, one of considerable, if not well understood, power to predict governmental behavior.³⁶ In the Dutch context, the distinction between 'political variables' (such as voting) and 'non-political', 'sociological', or 'ecological' variables, such as community religious structure, becomes difficult to sustain. The normal Dutch assumption is that politics and religion express the same subcultural orientation. Dutch statistics almost invariably include a chapter on 'politics and religion', considered together and inseparable.

Table 7: The Extent of Party Impact

	Strongest political	Strongest non political
1. General Activism		
Municipal Real Estate	.31 Labor burgomaster	.36 City size
Per capita spending	.51 Comm. vote	.63 Baths
Per capita debt	.39 Dur. of Labor power	.43 City size
Municipal employees per 1000 residents	1.66 Comm. + Labor vote	-.65 Baths
2. Law & Order		
Drunk arrests	-.32 Prot. vote	.44 Birth in city
Traffic citations	.35 Competition	-.65 Baths
Ordinance violations	-.31 Prot. vote	.44 Building density
Misdemeanors	-.37 Prot. vote	.59 Density; .53 size -.54 baths
Public Safety employees per 1000 res.	-.33 Prot. vote	.71 Crime rate; -.59 baths .54 white collar
3. Secular Culture		
Public Library usage	—	.46 tech.-prof. resid.
Public Library circulation rate	.40 Comm. + Labor vote	.44 Secularization
4. Recreation		
Tenniscourts per 1000 residents	-.35 Avg. Labor rep. on B&W	.46 Income
Gyms per 1000 res.	-.48 Avg. Labor resp. on B&W	-.59 Birth in city (city age)
Soccer fields per 1000 residents	.27 Labor Burgomaster	.46% youths
5. Health		
Child health centers/ 100 residents	none	-.41 Income -.39 Educ. level .36 Agric. occ.

Doctors in health ctrs./ 1000 residents	.36 Groups in B&W -.45 Time Labor in B&W .32 Prot. vote	.62 Agric. occ. -.35% high inc. -.55 tech. prof. -.51 white collar -.46 educ. level
Infants treated/ 1000 residents	.33 Liberal vote	-.61 Manag. occ. -.31% over 65 -.42% high inc.
Children treated/ 100 residents	.35 Groups in B&W .43 Liberal vote	-.41% high income -.48 tech. prof. occ.
6. Welfare		
Welfare expend. per capita	-.41 Prot. vote	.58 City size -.65% Youths
7. Public Housing		
% of dwelling held by public hous. tenants	-.55 Electoral compet.	-.55% over 65 -.48 Income
% public house of new housing, 1955-70	.52 Avg. Labor rep. on B&W	.53 Born in city -.53 Housing quality
8. Taxation		
Per capita local taxation	.34 Electoral compet. .33 Duration Labor pow.	.51 City size
9. Public Education		
Municipal education staff/1000 residents	-.70 Confessional vote	.68 Secularization
10. Policy Output Factors		
a. 'Law enforcement/ welfare'	-.34 Prot. vote .28 ≠ of lists	.53 City pop. .59 Pop. density -.54% youths .42 White coll. occ. -.57 Housing quality
b. 'Secular culture'	.41 Provin. leftism .41 Socialist aldermen -.43 Confessional vote	-.34% Catholics .42% no church
c. 'Health/recreation'	.31 Groups on B&W .31 Provin. leftism	.39 Agric. oc.. -.36 tech.-prof.
d. 'General activism'	.49 Time Labor on B&W .48 Labor Burgomaster .44 Labor aldermen .47 Comm. + Labor vote	.50 City size .40 Subst. housing .34 White collar .34 Randstad

One of the reasons for the close connection between religion and politics in the Netherlands is the distinctive nature of religious affiliation as compared to ethnicity, language, race, age, education, or other sources of social cleavage. Religious affiliation, like political affiliation, is, particularly in the context of Calvinistic self-determination, a matter of individual choice and declaration. At any time, Protestants or Catholics or free-thinkers can chan-

ge the way they are officially registered with the civil authorities and cross over into a different category, much as the voters can change registration in the U.S. Thus the 'pillarization' of Dutch society represents as Val Lorwin has noted, a set of voluntary decisions as compared to the racial, ethnic, linguistic, and caste cleavages in other societies.³⁷

Table 8 correlates religion and politics with municipal performance. In several cases, controlling for the impact of either variable wipes out the output correlation of the other; in other words, political and religious variables are so closely intertwined that one cannot establish which is the stronger, more independent set of variables.

Even more interesting is the suggestion that in the case of the Catholics, Catholic voting and Catholic political leadership have positive impact on performance (in spite of conservative Catholic religious attitudes), while in the case of the Protestants, just the opposite seems to occur: Protestant politicians seem to depress the level of municipal activity in spite of rather more activist attitudes in Protestant communities. (This suggestion arises from the way correlation signs change direction in the case of public housing and recreation for Catholics, and in the case of welfare, educational bureaucracy, activism, and bureaucracy for the Protestants.) Since the correlations are rather low, these indications remain only indications.

2. The Direction of Party Impact

In general, the expectations based on normal Left-Right party spectrum in Dutch politics are not disappointed. Leftist cities have larger public sectors, more city workers, more public school employees, higher taxes, more public housing effort, more active public libraries, higher spending, more welfare spending, more borrowing, and larger real estate holdings. They have fewer tennis courts and more soccer fields. Contrary to predictions, they have less active child health programs.

The arrangement of the parties in terms of policy impact is displayed in Table 9, which gives average correlations between voting and outputs, and Table 10, which locates each political force on the policy spectrum using the mean output in each set of party strongholds. Table 10 shows that the Left is generally where it is supposed to be on most outputs, except for deficit spending, welfare spending, and public housing tenancy (but not building effort). While one might have expected leftist cities to have fewer regulatory violations, less policing, less use of ordinance power to regulate public mores, a more easy-going attitude towards law enforcement, this does not emerge in any clear fashion. If the lack of misdemeanors, arrests for drunkenness, ordinance violations, traffic citations, and policemen is taken for a sign of relative *laissez-faire* (i.e. leftism) in the realm of 'law and

R. C. Fried Party politics and performance: the case of Dutch cities

Table 8: Religion vs. Politics: Which counts more?

Output	Correlation with Cath. vote	Controlling for % Cath.	Correlation with % Cath.	Controlling for Cath. vote
Secular cult.	-.33	-.01	-.34	-.07
Library circ.	-.32	+.05	-.34	-.12
Bureaucracy	-.42	-.15	-.39	+.06
Educ. bureau.	-.64	-.03	-.65	-.15
Public hous. tenancy	.41	.41	+.33	-.33
Gyms	.13	.38	+.05	-.36
Soccer fields	.07	.37	-.01	-.36
Drunk arrests	+.20	-.38	.29	+.43
Ordin. violations	+.26	-.09	.28	.15
	Correlation with Prot. vote	Controlling for % Prot.	Correlation with % Prot.	Controlling for Prot. vote
Welfare exp.	-.41	-.46	-.28	+.35
Public hous. eff.	-.10	-.32	.01	+.31
Public hous. ten.	-.33	-.15	-.30	+.05
'Law/welfare'	-.34	+.02	-.37	-.15
'Activism'	-.14	-.32	-.04	+.29
Bureaucracy	+.02	-.35	.14	.37
Ed. bureau.	+.34	-.35	.47	.47
Ordin. violations	-.30	-.01	-.32	-.09
Drunk arrests	-.32	-.17	-.33	-.11
Traffic tickets	-.31	-.37	-.32	-.06
Owner-occ.	.42	.34	+.34	-.21

order', the most 'leftist' are the Protestant cities, with the Labor cities somewhere in the center of the policy spectrum.

Locating the Left (Labor and Communists) on the political or policy spectrum seldom poses difficulty for Dutch analysts or voters. Locating the non-leftist parties is quite another matter. Table 11 shows how one expert (Dr. I. Lipschits) ranged the major parties on the basis of their programs (nationally) and how Dutch voters ranged the parties according to leftism in recent opinion surveys. Quite obviously, there is no clearcut rank order among the parties of the center and right in the Netherlands, mostly because of the ambiguities of religion as the primary basis for party allegiance, but also because of the multiplicity of the parties, and the shift of the spectrum from issue to issue.

Apart from the subtleties involved in ranking each of the dozen or more splinter parties, which is the most conservative political tendency: the Protestant, the Catholic, or the secular Liberal?

The Liberals of the VVD have frequently denied being a conservative

Table 9: Average Correlations between Outputs and Party Vote

Communist + Labor	Labor vote	Comm. vote	Liberal vote	Prot. vote	Cath. vote	Confes. vote*
0.32	0.29	0.24	0.04	+0.00	-0.26	-0.28
0.47**	0.41	0.44	-0.08	-0.14	-0.12	-0.29

* Confessional = Protestant + Catholic vote

** In brackets are the correlations between voting and the 'Activism Factor':

Table 10: Location of the Major Dutch Political Forces on Municipal Policy Spectrum

	LEFT	RIGHT
1. General Scope of Government		
Municipal bureau.	LABOR	PROTESTANTS
Spending	LABOR	PROTESTANTS
Borrowing	LABOR	PROTESTANTS
Years of op. defic.	LIBERALS	PROTESTANTS
2. Law & Order (regulatory policy) (minimal activity-Left)		
Ordinance enforce.	CATHOLICS	LABOR
Drunk arrests	PROTESTANTS	LABOR
Misdemeanors	PROTESTANTS	LABOR
Public safety employees	PROTESTANTS	LIBERALS
Traffic citat.	PROTESTANTS	LIBERALS
3. Secular Culture		
Library circul.	LABOR	LIBERALS
Library collec.	LABOR	LIBERALS

Library cards	LIBERALS	PROTESTANTS	LABOR	CATHOLICS
4. Land Policy				
City real state	LABOR	CATHOLICS	LIBERALS	PROTESTANTS
5. Taxation Policy				
Per capita local taxation	LABOR	LIBERALS	CATHOLICS	PROTESTANTS
6. Welfare Policy				
Welfare exp. per capita	CATHOLICS	LABOR	LIBERALS	PROTESTANTS
7. Recreation Policy				
Gyms	LIBERALS	PROTESTANTS	LABOR	CATHOLICS
Soccer fields	LABOR	PROTESTANTS	LIBERALS	CATHOLICS
Tennis courts (lack of)	LABOR	PROTESTANTS	CATHOLICS	LIBERALS
8. Health Policy				
Welfare centers for child./resid.	PROTESTANTS	CATHOLICS	LABOR	LIBERALS
Welfare center drs./resident	PROTESTANTS	CATHOLICS	LABOR	LIBERALS
Infants treated	LIBERALS	PROTESTANTS	CATHOLICS	LABOR
Children treated	PROTESTANTS	CATHOLICS	LIBERALS	LABOR
9. Public Housing				
Public housing tenancy	CATHOLICS	LABOR	PROTESTANTS	LIBERALS
Public housing eff.	LABOR	PROTESTANTS	CATHOLICS	LIBERALS
10. Public Education				
Public educ. staff (city only)	LIBERALS	LABOR	PROTESTANTS	CATHOLICS
11. Summary Factors				
Law enforcement/welfare	LABOR	PROTESTANTS	LIBERALS	CATHOLICS
Health/recreation	PROTESTANTS	LIBERALS	LABOR	CATHOLICS
Secular culture	LABOR	PROTESTANTS	LIBERALS	CATHOLICS
General activism	LABOR	PROTESTANTS	LIBERALS	CATHOLICS

to have the same amount of impact on the scope of government as the combined forces of the Left (Labor and Communists), if in the opposite direction. Confessional voting depresses municipal activity in almost every sector — from housing to education, health to libraries, spending to general activism.

3. *The Forms of Party Impact*

The party share of the vote is not the only, or perhaps even most important predictor of party impact on policy. Also important is the degree to which a party gains allies and control over the levers of government. Various forms of party power can be assessed in terms of their policy impact. Focusing in this study on the Left, we have examined the following forms of leftist power:

- (1) Labor party vote in 1966 as percentage of the total vote;
- (2) combined Labor and Communist vote percentage in 1966 (alliance power);
- (3) average percentage of Labor aldermen on the College of B&W, 1958-74;
- (4) length of time in years of Labor representation in the College of B&W;
- (5) presence of Labor burgomaster in 1974; and
- (6) leftism in the provincial council.

Under what conditions is Labor most effective in shaping policy? (a) when it wins most votes; (b) when it has powerful Communist allies; (c) when it shares executive power for a long period of time; (d) when it gets the largest share of executive power; (e) when it controls the burgomaster's office; or (f) when it controls the province.

Using the 'activism' factor as a general measure of leftist impact on policy, we obtain the results shown in Table 12.

Table 12: Correlation between Forms of Leftist Power and Municipal Activism

	Correlation with Activism
Communist/Labor vote	.43
Labor burgomaster	.40
Labor vote	.36
Labor aldermen	.36
Labor time on the B&W	.33
Provincial Leftism	.28

Table 12 suggests that most crucial are allies (or fellow travelers), then control over the burgomaster's office, followed by share of the vote and of the

B&W, with length of time on the B&W and provincial leftism of least importance. Again, differences in the size of the correlations are not of a magnitude to make this comparison more than suggestive.

Table 12 does suggest that burgomaster influence — *to the extent that it is uniform nationwide and party-related* — is no more predictive than other measures of party strength, including representation on the council and the B&W. Burgomaster domination of the B&W might mean that burgomaster politics was more predictive of outputs than B&W council composition (since the three variables are only intercorrelated at the .6 level). However, burgomaster control does not seem to be appreciably weaker or stronger than these other party variables in predicting outputs. This evidence does not preclude burgomaster domination of municipal decisionmaking, which may be unrelated to party ideology and not uniform nationally. If burgomasters act on the basis of idiosyncratic response to particular circumstances, then their impact on policy will not show up in this test.

Somewhat the same applies to the influence of the most immediate supervisory authority over the communes — the Province. The political orientation of the Province, while of some discernible impact on performance, is not decisive.³⁹ Performance diversities within the same province are considerable. In North Holland, 'Activism' scores range from +244 in Amsterdam to -117 in Hilversum. South Holland province has the most activist cities in Holland (in terms of the number of activist cities and the mean provincial activism score), but even there the cities range from 319 in Rotterdam down to -017 in Delft. Provincial supervision may have an impact on municipal policy but that impact does not take the form of imposing uniform levels of performance.

4. *The Impact of Party System Characteristics*

In a line of thought stemming from V.O. Key's famous research on the American states, it has been suggested that greater competitiveness in a party system makes for higher outputs: outputs are raised in the effort to outbid the competition.⁴⁰ Others have suggested, however, that competition reduces outputs. Johan Goudsblom, for example, suggests that diversification in the form of pillarization fragments efforts. 'Each denomination', he writes, 'tends to have its own schools, community centers, and health facilities. The duplication or triplication of local services may lead to waste; in small towns it sometimes results in a virtual void. For want of cooperation, very little can be accomplished'.⁴¹ Does competition increase or diminish the scope of municipal effort?

Three measures of competition have been used:

- (1) the index of fractionalization in municipal voting (1970);

- (2) the average number of party lists in elections, 1949-1970; and
 (3) the average number of parties on the B&W, 1953-74.

The fractionalization index varies from 613 in Leeuwarden to 926 in Ede. Average lists varies from 5 in Kerkrade and Venlo to 9.7 in Rotterdam. Average number of parties in the B&W varies from 1.2 in Venlo to 4.2 in Apeldoorn. Fragmentation of all three kinds is lowest in the Catholic strongholds, highest in the Protestant cities.

Contrary to expectations, fractionalized voting does not have the same correlation with outputs in Dutch cities as in Belgian cities.⁴² But the number of lists presented (as opposed to those receiving votes) does have an impact on outputs: the more lists, the greater the level of municipal activism. Though the correlations between fractionalization measures and output measures are weak (at best), they tend to link diversity with activism rather than with paralysis.

Table 13: Party System Characteristics in the Political Strongholds

	Comm. Labor	Labor	Catholic	Liberal	Protestant
Fractionaliz. index	787	774	720	792	797
Average \neq lists	7.9	7.8	6.1	7.8	7.9
Average \neq parties on B&W	3.2	3.0	1.9	3.5	3.4

5. Interaction among Political Variables

A statistical technique (stepwise multiple digression) may give us some idea of the ways in which political variables *interact* to help produce policy outcomes.⁴³ In stepwise regression, the independent variable most closely associated with the dependent output variable is introduced first into the regression formula; it is followed by the independent variable which has the highest partial correlation with the output, holding the first independent variable constant. Successive independent variables are introduced in the same way, on the basis of partial correlations, provided that, each step of the regression, certain tests of statistical reliability are met.

Table 14 shows the regression formulas to predict city factor scores for 'activism', 'health/recreation', 'law enforcement/welfare', and 'secular culture'. Political variables alone account for 60% of the variance in 'activism', and 28% of the variance in 'secular culture'.

Half the variance in 'activism' (the factor score summarizing municipal performance on a number of dimensions, such as taxes, spending, and bureaucratic employment) is accounted for by (1) the length of time the Labor party has been represented on the College of Burgomaster and Aldermen

since World War II; (2) the presence or absence of a Labor burgomaster in recent years; (3) the extent of Protestant party voting; (4) the extent of electoral competition (average number of lists, 1953-70). Activism is promoted by Labor representation in the B&W over a period of time, by Labor occupancy of the burgomaster's post, and by electoral competition; it is diminished by the extent of Protestant party voting. Protestant voting is the single greatest determinant as measured by the size of the beta weight.

Protestant voting is also associated with low levels of law enforcement and welfare. Confessional voting (voting for Protestant and Catholic groups combined) depresses, as well as it might, municipal promotion of secular culture through public libraries, but it tends to raise the level of activism with regard to health and recreation for the working classes.

The 'provincial leftism' that is positively associated with health/recreation performance probably represents more a Protestant non-Catholicism than a genuine leftism, because of the way in which the scale for provincial political orientation was constructed. Provincial leftism correlates positively with Communist-Labor voting (.75), Labor voting (.74), but also Liberal voting (.58) and Protestant voting (.54); it correlates with Catholic voting negatively (-.77) and confessional voting (-.77). Conceivably performance may be higher in more leftist provinces than in more leftist cities as such. From other figures we know that leftist cities tend to play down health and recreation in favor of other forms of municipal activism.

Electoral competition promotes activism, vigorous law enforcement, and welfare, but, because of its association with Protestant voting, it tends to depress the promotion of secular culture. Fragmentation on the College of B&W seems to go with higher health and recreation performance (again probably because its connection with Protestant voting).

Stepwise regression was also used to explain a few of the most interesting individual outputs: municipal bureaucracy, public housing effort, and welfare spending. Municipal employees per 1000 residents can be predicted using the following formula:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Municipal} \\ \text{employees/} &= .34 (\text{Labor vote}) -.35 (\text{Protestant vote}) + 30 (\neq \text{party lists}) \\ \text{resident} &\quad -107 (\text{constant}) \end{aligned}$$

This formula, which explains 61% of the variance, shows that bureaucratization is increased by Labor voting and electoral competition, but decreased by Protestant voting.

Public housing effort — the percentage of dwellings completed under the Housing Act — between 1955 and 1970, can be predicted using the following formula:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Public housing as \% of} &= 4.02 \text{ (Average Labor represent. on B\&W)} \\ \text{new housing, 1955-1970} &\quad -0.28 \text{ (Protestant vote)} \\ &\quad +400.9 \text{ (constant)} \end{aligned}$$

This formula accounts for 35% of the variance in public housing effort and shows again the positive impact of Labor power and the negative impact of Protestant party power on the scope of public activity.

Welfare spending in Dutch cities can be predicted fairly successfully using only political variables. The following formula accounts for 71% of per capita welfare spending:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Per capita welfare} &= -0.026 \text{ (Protestant vote)} \\ \text{spending} &\quad +2.9 \text{ (\neq of party lists)} \\ &\quad -0.02 \text{ (Liberal vote)} \\ &\quad -6.4 \text{ (constant)} \end{aligned}$$

Table 14: Using Political Variables to Predict City Outputs (Factor Scores)

1. Predicting 'Activism'				
	(B)		(S.E.)	(Beta)
Activism Score =	6.719	Labor time in B&W	2.364	.381
	+73.855	Labor burgomaster	31.580	.326
		(2 = Labor; 1 = non-Labor)		
	-0.480	Protestant vote	0.167	-.465
	+33.753	Av. \neq of lists	16.843	.343
	-298.915	Constant		
R ² = .50				
2. Predicting 'Health/Recreation'				
Health/Rec. =	+26.697	Provincial Leftism	7.186	+.696
Score	0.673	Confessional vote	0.139	1.087
	127.179	Av. \neq parties on B&W	26.661	1.118
	-1.212	Liberal vote	0.3901	-.571
	-414.466	Constant		
R ² = .57				
3. Predicting 'Law enforcement/Welfare'				
Law Enforcement/ =	-.849	Protestant vote	.145	-.843
Welfare Score	84.341	Av. \neq lists	14.0877	.871
	-5.308	Labor time in B&W	2.001	-.306
	-447.482	Constant		
R ² = .60				
4. Predicting 'Secular Culture'				
Secular Culture =	-0.539	Confessional vote	.156	-.771
Score	-44.255	Av. \neq lists	21.599	-.458
	583.262	Constant		
R ² = .28				

Welfare spending in Dutch cities is increased by interparty competition but decreased by Protestant and Liberal voting strength.

Prospects and Conclusions

In recent years, important changes have been occurring in Dutch urban politics. Since about 1970, there have been four major trends: (a) an apparent reversal of fissiparous tendencies within the party system and the emergence of interbloc coalitions; (b) a growing movement to encourage greater citizen participation in local government; (c) a drop in voting for traditionally strong 'establishment' parties, particularly for the Catholic party; and (d) an attempt to switch from consensus multipartisan decision-making to a pattern of majority-minority (government vs. opposition) confrontation.⁴⁴

Tables 15 and 16 show the trend in Dutch cities of all political types towards increasing fragmentation in the party system that occurred between 1949 and 1970 and the apparent reversal of that trend between 1970 and 1974. Between 1949 and 1970, the average number of lists contending for seats on municipal councils in Dutch cities rose from about six to more than nine. There was a slight decline in the 1974 elections in all types of city. The same years saw an increasing fragmentation on the Colleges of Burgomaster and Aldermen. The Colleges in 1953 contained on an average representatives of 2.9 parties in 1953, 3.2 in 1970. There was a dramatic drop to 2.6 in 1974, mostly as the result of the emergence of coalitions among the confessional parties and among the leftist parties (exclusive of the Communists). A Christian Democratic Appeal, grouping Protestant and Catholic partisans, ran with some success in 31 cities in the 1974 elections; a secular bloc — the Progressive Accord, grouping Labor, the Progressive Radicals, Pacifist Socialists, and Democrats — ran successfully in six cities.⁴⁵

Interparty coalition was sought and achieved particularly by the religious parties faced by a steady decline in their share of the vote. The 'deconfessionalising' — a decline in the tendency of Dutch voters to project their religious attachments into the electoral arena — challenged the ability of (Protestant) Anti-Revolutionaries, and the (Protestant) Christian-Historicals to maintain their traditionally strong role in Dutch national and local politics. The high point in confessional parties took nearly half the total vote in towns with 20,000 or more people. During the 1960's, confessional voting began to decline. By 1970, the major confessional parties received only 31% of the vote in the fifteen largest cities; in the most recent elections, this dropped to 24%.

Deconfessionalization can be seen in the declining vote for traditionally

Table 15: Average Number of Party Lists Presented at Municipal Elections, 1949-1974

	1949	1953	1958	1962	1966	1970	1974
All cities (n = 38)	6.1	6.6	6.7	7.2	8.3	9.4	9.2
Strong Cath.	4.7	5.4	5.2	5.7	7.1	8.7	8.0
Strong Labor	6.9	6.7	7.7	7.8	8.1	9.9	9.6
Strong Comm. + Labor	6.7	6.7	7.8	8.0	8.6	10.0	9.4
Strong Prot.	6.8	7.3	7.6	7.4	8.6	9.8	9.4
Strong Lib.	6.9	7.1	7.1	7.6	8.4	9.8	9.6

Table 16: Average Number of Parties or Groups on the Board of Aldermen

	1953	1958	1962	1966	1970	1974
All cities	2.92	2.97	2.95	3.18	3.21	2.63
Strong Cath.	1.67	1.56	1.78	2.00	2.56	2.33
Strong Labor	3.00	3.11	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.33
Strong Comm. + Labor	3.11	3.22	3.22	3.44	3.33	2.67
Strong Prot.	3.44	3.44	3.33	3.56	3.44	2.89
Strong Liber.	3.63	3.75	3.75	3.78	3.33	2.89

important Protestant and Catholic parties. It can also be measured in the declining correlation between religion and voting, at both the community and individual levels. In 1962, percentage Catholic explained 98% of the variance percentage in Catholic voting at the community level; by 1970, it explained only 72% of the variance. In the 1967 national elections, 67% of Dutch Catholics voted for the KVP; in 1972 national elections, only 38%. Eighty-two percent of the Strict Calvinists voted for the Anti-Revolutionaries in 1967; only 56% in 1972. Twenty-four percent of the Dutch Reformed voted for the Christian-Historicals in 1967; only 18% in 1972.⁴⁶

Democratisering is another important recent trend in Dutch urban politics, involving the attempt to broaden the responsiveness of municipal government to ordinary members of the public. Proposals sponsored by the parties of the Left to have direct popular elections of the burgomaster enjoy the strong or moderate support of two-thirds of the electorate.⁴⁷ Increasing numbers of people have become involved in community politics by participating in a so-called *aktiegroep* or civic action group. Action groups have become very prominent in neighbourhood improvement, housing, recreation facilities, and assistance to youth and the aged. They have become particularly newsworthy in campaigns against urban renewal projects.⁴⁸

A fourth major development has been the shift from consensus decision-

making to majoritarianism in municipal decisionmaking. Traditional colleges — *'afspiegelingscolleges'* or 'mirror colleges' — represented all major political forces on the city council and gave each a share of executive power. The leftist parties consider this type of College to have favored the conservatives and have attempted to replace mirror colleges with so-called *'programcolleges'* — colleges elected on the basis of common party affiliation or common electoral program. The Left has sought to change a 'harmony model' of decisionmaking to a 'conflict model' — one that pits a government party or coalition against an opposition. *'Polarisatie'* is seen by the Left as favoring greater innovation and clarifying the responsibility for action or inaction.⁴⁹

One other major development should be mentioned here: the creation of regional (metropolitan area) governments between the communes and the provinces.

But each of the major developments in Dutch local politics is offset by a contrary development. The trend towards coalition is offset by continued propensity towards sectarian schism. Religious parties may be attempting to merge forces, but this very effort has led to the secession of conservative Catholics into local Roman Catholic parties and the secession of more socially minded Catholics into the Progressive Radical party, willing and able to work with the secular parties left of center. The efforts of Labor to work with other leftist forces have led to the secession of that party's rightwing and the formation of the Democratic Socialists. Cooperation within the Christian Democratic Appeal, between Protestants and Catholics, has been difficult.

The trend towards greater citizen participation through civic action groups and eventually through direct election of city executives is offset by plunging figures on actual citizen participation in local elections. Voting became voluntary in Dutch elections for the first time in 1970 and electoral turnout fell drastically. Until 1970, turnout figures above 90% were the rule in Dutch cities. In the fifteen largest cities, average turnout in 1966 was 92%; it dropped to 58% in 1970 and 61% in 1974. Fall-off in voting was most drastic in the strong Catholic cities. Turnout dropped to 70% in the Protestant cities, 68% in the Liberal cities, 67% in the Labor cities, but 57% in the Catholic cities. In those same Catholic cities, average turnout in 1966 had been 95%!

Efforts to increase governmental responsiveness have been no more successful in the Netherlands than in other advanced democracies. Large numbers of people (39%) feel that city councilmen are not much interested in what people like themselves think. Fifty-four percent feel that people like themselves have little influence over city policy/politics (*gemeentepolitiek*). Forty percent feel that too many decisions are made in secret. A third of the

electorate feels that city civil servants are not much concerned with the problems of ordinary people (41% disagree).⁵⁰ (These expressions of opinion, however, should be considered together with rather more positive feelings about the performance of the burgomaster).

'Deconfessionalization' may have meant a decline in the vote for some religious parties, but religious parties as such remain unusually strong in Dutch national and local politics. Of the burgomasters of the 40 largest Dutch cities in 1974, half were affiliated either with Protestant or Catholic groups. In 1974, nine of the nineteen non-local groups presenting lists at election time were confessional in inspiration. While confessionalism has weakened as a force in Dutch politics, it is still a force to be reckoned with.

'Polarization' — the switch from consensus decisionmaking to majoritarianism — is still uncommon in Dutch cities. Most city executive boards represent the confessional and secular parties, Left and Right, rather than a homogeneous coalition or a single party. The switch from 'harmony models' to 'conflict models' of decisionmaking seems to have occurred in only eight major cities (Rotterdam, Groningen, Amsterdam, Leiden, Schiedam, Vlaardingen, Zaanstad, and Enschede) — all cities in which the Left is particularly strong. No attempt seems to have been made to set up homogeneous executives in the strongly confessional cities.

Regionalization has been fiercely and successfully resisted by the smaller Dutch communes, fearful of losing their autonomy to the larger centers within new metropolitan area councils.

Policy Consequences

Unfortunately, we lack data on the outputs for the period since 1970 with which to assess the consequences of these important changes for policy outcomes. It is thus not clear how the proliferation of new splinter parties, the decline in confessional voting, the sharp rise in nonvoting, and the development of '*polarisatie*' and 'program colleges' will affect performance. Extrapolating from the past, the net tendency of these developments should be increased activism due to increased interparty competition, weaker confessional parties, and the unleashing of leftists on the executive boards of cities with 'program colleges'. However, since much of the confessional clientele has shifted to the Liberals rather than to the Left and since these are times of acute financial stringency throughout the advanced world, there may not be much real increase in municipal activism. It is, in any event, too soon to tell.

There are, in any event, contradictory potentials within the new developments. Greater pressure for action from outside party organs on council and B&W may be countered by increasing activity from civic action groups — groups mostly activated by attempts to resist new planning schemes.

Conclusions

In this study of parties and policies in Dutch cities, we have found evidence that both fears and hopes about party competition for control over urban government are easily exaggerated. In most democratic systems, institutions and situations operate to dampen the impact of parties on government, or at least the uniform impact of party principles. Of course, what was feared around the turn of the century by the advocates of non-partianism was the use of party not so much to apply high-model ideological principles but rather to indulge in low-minded practices of partisan discrimination and corruption.

We have looked for party impact on outputs in the form of consistency between party principle and municipal outputs and found some. Had we looked for impact on policy that took the form of discrimination and corruption (e.g. the classic correlation or rumored correlation between tax assessment and party registration), we would probably have found much less. It is easier to test for the impact of high-minded partisanship than of the low-minded variety, if only because we have more data on one than the other. Nonetheless, even in the earnest climate of Dutch party politics, charges of discrimination and corruption seem to be traded rather less frequently than in the nonpartisan politics of most American cities. Ideological orientations to politics and principled discrimination on the basis of proportionalism tend to minimize corruption and petty discrimination.

Whether the Dutch party system is more responsive than a nonpartisan system would be to the less privileged groups in Dutch society, whether it helps to counteract the social and economic disabilities of the underprivileged is hard to say. The system gives the lower classes a number of options in political representation — such as between representation of class interests or of religious values. Whether what the elites in the various parties offer the voters in the way of programs and policies is what voters would favor if they directly participated in drafting programs and policies is another matter. 'Consociational democracy' — the linking of subcultures through rank and file passivity and accommodation among elites — may have purchased system stability at the expense of system responsiveness.⁵¹ A system in which 54% of the electorate feels powerless in local politics is not necessarily the fault of the Dutch cities, which seem to offer the voter a wide range of reasonably distinct options — the direct representation of rather refined nuances of interests and value — combined somehow successfully with sources of compromise, stability, and effective action.

Notes

* This research was made possible by a grant from the Ford Foundation. Those

who were helpful in providing materials on Dutch urban government and politics and explaining its operations include: Dr. J. Meerdinck, Chief of Statistics, City of Amsterdam, and Chairman, Association of Dutch Municipal Statisticians; Dr. H. Lunenberg, Executive Director, International Statistical Institute, the Hague, and his very able and helpful staff; the Library, Central Bureau of Statistics, the Hague; Dr. J. Schmitz, Central Bureau of Statistics; Robert P. Van den Helm, City of Rotterdam; P. R. Doornbos, Head of Foreign Relations Department, Association of Dutch Communes; Peter Nieuwenhuis, Communal and Provincial Section, Dutch Labor Party; Prof. Leo Klaassen, Netherlands Economic Institute; Prof. Arend Lijphart, University of Leiden; Prof. Robert Morlan, University of Redlands; Prof. Michael Aiken, University of Wisconsin; Prof. Martin Heisler, University of Maryland; and Prof. Leland Burns, UCLA. Translations were ably provided by Mrs. Anne Bodenheimer and Mr. Louis Baars. Special thanks go to a series of research assistants including Gary Kay, Douglas Fineberg, Jessica Wolfe, Qadir Mohiuddin, and Erik Krag. Finally, the excellent services of the Public Affairs Service, University Research Library, UCLA, and the Campus Computing Network, UCLA, must again be acknowledged.

1. Some discussion of the proper role of party politics in U.S. and West European urban government can be found in Dilys M. Hill, *Democratic Theory and Local Government* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974); J. G. Bulpitt, *Party Politics in English Local Government* (London: Longmans, 1967); William Bennet Munro, *Municipal Government and Administration* (New York: Macmillan, 1923), ch. XV, and *The Government of European Cities* (New York: Macmillan, 1917).

2. On the abolition of party politics in American municipal government, see Willis D. Hawley, *Nonpartisan Elections and the Case for Party Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1973).

3. Even where interparty competition was abolished by totalitarian regimes, as in Germany and Italy, tensions remained between values stressing the virtues of partisan fervor and idealism (represented by the local party leader) and the virtues of professional bureaucratic (anti-party) management (represented by prefects, mayors, and civilian government officials). After World War II, multipartisanship again became norm in West German and Italian city government.

4. For arguments that nonpartisanship favors middle and upper class interests, see Hawley, *op. cit.*; L. J. Sharpe, R. C. Fried, *Planning the Eternal City* (New Haven: YALE University Press, 1973); Robert L. Lineberry and Ira Sharkansky, *Urban Politics and Public Policy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), pp. 61-65.

5. Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, 'Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities', *American Political Science Review*, Sep. 1967, pp. 701-716; Robert Alford and Michael Aiken, 'Comparative Urban Research and Community Decisionmaking', *The New Atlantis*, Winter 1970, pp. 85-110. Terry N. Clark, 'Community Structures, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities', in Charles M. Bonjean, Terry N. Clark and Robert L. Lineberry, eds., *Community Politics: A Behavioral Approach* (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 293-313, 310-311.

6. References to a number of such studies can be found in R. Fried, 'Comparative Urban Policy and Performance', in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby, *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1975), vol. 6, ch. 6.

7. This study covers *not* a sample of Dutch cities, but all cities with at least

50,000 population in 1965. These were chosen because of the availability for them of a wide range of data published by the Association of Heads of City Statistical Bureaus (Vereniging van Hoofden van Gemeentelijke Bureaus voor Statistiek) in *Statistisch Stedenboek: Cijfers omtrent de Nederlandse Gemeenten met 50,000 en meer Inwoners*. The statistical books cover the periods 1955-1960 (henceforth, SS55), 1960-65 (SS60), and 1965-75 (SS65). Emphasis is placed on the politics and outputs of the mid and late 1960's since output data for the 1970-75 period are not yet available. For definitions and sources of the variables used in this study, see the appendices.

8. See Arend Lijphart, 'Class Voting and Religious Voting in the European Democracies: A Preliminary Report,' *Acta Politica*, April 1971, pp. 158-171, and 'The Netherlands: Continuity and Change in Voting Behavior', in Richard Rose, ed., *Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook* (New York: The Free Press, 1974), pp. 227-268.

9. Holland is used in this study synonymously with the Netherlands although strictly speaking, it refers only to the provinces of South Holland and North Holland.

10. Zaandam was merged with six other communes to form Zaanstad in 1974. The data refer to Zaandam except for the election data for 1974, which refer to Zaanstad.

11. The quality of Dutch housing may be compared to that in other advanced nations on the *World Handbook of Urban Performance* in preparation at the European Urban Research Project, UCLA.

11* The structure and operations of Dutch local government are described in the following: Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten (Dutch Municipal Association), 'The Position of the Municipalities within the General Structure of the State', (mimeo, The Hague, 1967); Robert L. Morlan, 'Cabinet Government at the Municipal Level: The Dutch Experience', *Western Political Quarterly*, March 1964, pp. 317-324; A. H. Marshall, 'Local Government Administration in the Netherlands', in Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Committee on the Management of Local Government, *Management of Local Government*, vol. 4 ('Local Government Administration Abroad'), (London: HMSO 1967), pp. 113-136; and Arne F. Leemans, 'Amsterdam', in William A. Robson and D. E. Regan, eds., *Great Cities of the World*, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1972), pp. 132-162.

Central controls are the focus of Robert L. Morlan, 'Central Government Control of Municipalities in the Netherlands', *Western Political Quarterly*, March-June, 1959, pp. 64-70.

12. The only possible exception to linguistic and ethnic uniformity is Leeuwarden, capital of Friesland province in the north, where Frisian is still used to some extent and where some sense of distinctive nationality exists. Cultural differences between Friesland and the rest of the Netherlands are less than those between the Catholic provinces in the south — Limburg and North Brabant — and the rest of the country. See Johan Goudsblom, *Dutch Society* (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 28-29. Some problems have occurred with the recent heavy influx of people from Surinam, but it is hard to say yet how this has affected the differentiation among Dutch cities.

12* Sytze Faber, *Burgemeester en Democratie* (Alphen: Samsom, 1974), particularly ch. 11.

13. Faber, *op. cit.*, ch. 7; Robert L. Moran, 'City Manager Contrasts: The

Netherlands Experience', *Public Administration Review*, Spring 1962, pp. 76-80; Marshall, 'Local Government', pp. 125-130, and A. A. H. Stolk et al., *Gemeentelijke Democratie* (Deventer: Kluwer, 1971), pp. 12-21.

14. Werkgroep nationaal verkiezingsonderzoek 1972, *De Nederlandse kiezer '72* (Alphen: Samsom, 1973), p. 69. The prestige of the burgomaster is undoubtedly enhanced (or reflected) by the fact that they make extremely high salaries. The burgomasters of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and the Hague earn 180,000 guilders (at 2.6 to the dollar), nearly \$ 70,000 a year — more than ministers in the national government.

15. In 1972, eight aldermen and fourteen burgomasters sat in Parliament. In the more powerful Second Chamber, nine of the 150 members were burgomasters or aldermen; in the First Chamber, they constituted thirteen of the 75 members. (*Statistical Yearbook of the Netherlands*, 1973, p. 80).

16. On Dutch municipal finance, see Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 'Municipal Finance in the Netherlands', (mimeo, n.d., 1967); J. G. Lambooy, 'Financiële verhouding Rijk-gemeenten en de ruimtelijke orde,' *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, Nov.-Dec. 1967, pp. 281-291; *Gemeente Financien*, Dec. 1971; and Carlos Bourgeois, 'Evolution des finances communales aux Pays-Bas', *Credit Communal de Belgique*, April 1975, pp. 71-78.

17. Faber, op. cit, particularly chs. 3, 5.

18. Stolk et al., *Gemeentelijke Democratie*, pp. 5-20.

19. On the attempted shift from proportional to majoritarian colleges, see the articles 'Programcollege', 'Polarisatie', and 'Rotterdam', in *Winkler Prins Encyclopedisch Supplement 1976* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1976). See also the special issue on 'Kollegievorming' (formation of the B&W) in the Labor party magazine, *De Gemeente*, April 1973.

20. Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor, *The Analysis of Political Cleavages* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 31-32.

21. Michael Aiken and Roger Depre, 'Politics and Party Outputs: A Study of City Expenditures among 196 Belgian Cities', paper presented to the VIII World Congress of Sociology, Montreal, August 1974.

22. On proportionalism as one of the principle rules of the game in Dutch politics, see Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 127-129. On its application in local government, see I. Gadourek, *A Dutch Community* (Leiden: Stenfert Kroese, 1956), p. 62.

23. An excellent discussion of the role of various political forces in the development of Dutch local government can be found in H. A. Brasz, *Veranderingen in het Nederlands Communalisme* (Arnhem: Vuga-Boekerij, 1960).

24. Marshall, 'Local Government Administration', p. 122.

25. Leemans, 'Amsterdam', pp. 142-143.

26. Adriaan J. Barnouw, *The Dutch* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), pp. 57-64.

27. On the development of Labor executive power, see Robert van den Helm and Jan Verhoef, 'Dutch Politics in Historical Perspective: A Research Note', paper presented to the Workshop on Indicators of Social and Political Change, Mannheim, West Germany, April 1973; and Galen A. Irwin, 'Socialism and Municipal Politics in the Netherlands', paper presented to the Conference on Parties, Politics

and the Quality of Urban Life, Bellagio, Italy, June 1975.

28. Data on burgomaster politics are derived from Irwin, 'Socialism and Municipal Politics'. Though Communists have been elected to the B&W in some cities (Amsterdam, Groningen, Enschede, and Zaanstad), it is unlikely that any will be appointed as a burgomaster, given the burgomaster's public security functions. (See the declaration of the Minister of the Interior in 1970, cited in S. Faber, *Burgemeester*, n. 15, p. 182). As of 1974, of the 11 Catholic party burgomasters in major cities, four governed rather secularized, leftist cities. Of the eleven cities with Left majorities in 1974, eight had Labor burgomasters, two had Liberals (Leiden and Utrecht), and one had a Protestant (Delft).

29. A. Stolk, *Gemeentelijke democratie*, p. 10.

30. Leemans, 'Amsterdam', pp. 143-144.

31. Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 'Municipal Finance', p. 2.

32. Factors were derived using principle factoring without iteration, and varimax rotation. Factor scores were calculated for cities with missing data using the mean. See Norman H. Nie, et al., *SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Science*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), (2nd Edition), ch. 24.

33. This resembles the situation in the U.S. where the working class people are highly opposed to increased governmental spending. See Lineberry and Sharkansky, *Urban Politics*, p. 208. Data on Dutch spending attitudes are from Werkgroep 1972, *De Nederlandse kiezer '72*, pp. 44-45. According to Professor Tasma, the hostility of the leftwing parties controlling the city of Groningen has discouraged private investment in that city. (R. Tasma, 'The Northern Netherlands', *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, May-June 1972, pp. 162-179 at p. 177). We do not know the trade-offs for the workers in Groningen as between the expression of anti-business ideology and the creation of employment.

34. Cornelis van den Berg, *De Structuur van de Gemeentelijke Uitgaven* (Leiden: Stenfert Kroese, 1957). I wish to thank Prof. Leo Klassen of the Netherlands Economics Institute for providing me with a copy of this dissertation. For a commentary on the dissertation, see H. A. Brasz, 'Veranderingen', ch. 6, and J. Lambooy, 'Financiële verhouding', pp. 284-285.

35. See Van den Berg, *De Structuur*, pp. 61-62.

36. Clark, 'Community Structure', pp. 308-310.

37. See Val R. Lorwin, 'Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies', *Comparative Politics*, Jan. 1971, pp. 141-175, particularly p. 143.

38. Calvinist attitudes towards municipal policy are sketched in I. Gadourek, *A Dutch Community*, ch. 14. 'The belief in the impossibility of improving human conditions appeared to be so strong in some Calvinist circles that the interviewer, trying to introduce his work by pointing out the necessity of learning to know the conditions of living in order to make an improvement and the prevention of social evils possible, was rebuked by the words that only God, and not man himself, is able to improve the conditions of mankind'. (N. 1, p. 379).

39. The ten provinces with cities were ranked from one to ten in order of the combined vote of the total Left (including Pacifist Socialists, Progressive Radicals, Democrats, and PAK) in 1970.

40. V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Vintage, 1949), pp. 307-308. More recently, Aiken and Depre, 'Politics and Policy Outputs', p. 5.

41. Goudsblom, *Dutch Society*, p. 142.
42. Aiken and Depre, p. 22.
43. For further discussion of stepwise progression, see Nie *et al.*, *SPSS*, ch. 20.
44. On these trends, see M. Kent Jennings, 'A Longitudinal Study of the Dutch Electorate,' *European Studies Newsletter*, Dec. 1973, pp. 6-9; J. Th. J. Van den Berg, 'Nederland: Binnenlandse politiek', in *Winkler Prins Encyclopedisch Supplement 1976* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1976), pp. 407-414; and Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation* (2nd Ed., 1975), ch. X.
45. Interbloc cooperation is also emerging in the field of labor relations. In January 1976, the Catholic and Socialist labor unions merged into a single federation.
46. Werkgroep 1972, *De Nederlandse kiezer '72*, p. 32.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
48. Galen, A. Irwin and Henk A. A. Molleman, 'Political Participation in The Netherlands', (mimeo, Dept. of Political Science, Leiden University), pp. 18-22; F. Bronner *et al.*, 'Aktiekomitees in Amsterdam,' *Acta Politica*, April 1971, pp. 125-157; Werkgroep 1972, *De Nederlandse kiezer '72*, pp. 73-76; and W. F. Heine-meyer and R. Van Engelsdorp Gastelaars, 'Conflicts in Land Use in Amsterdam', *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, May-June 1972, p. 190-199.
49. See the references in note 19.
50. Werkgroep 1972, *De Nederlandse kiezer '72*, pp. 69-70.
51. See Hans Daalder, 'The Netherlands: Oppositions in a Segmented Society', in Robert A. Dahl, ed., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); and Arend Lijphart, 'Consociational Democracy', *World Politics*, Jan. 1969, pp. 207-225.
52. See note 50.

Appendix A: Input Variables

Population, 1970 (city size): SS65, Table 4; Substandard housing (dwellings without private bath or shower), 1971: SS65, Table 38; Percent Catholic, Dutch Reformed, Strict Reformed, non-church, 1960: SS60, Table 6; % of population born in city, 1960: SS60, Table 7; % of dwellings built before 1918, 1971: SS65, Table 36; Population density, persons per hectare of land, 1965: SS60, Table 1; Building density, 1960 (persons per built-up area): SS60, Table 1; Crime rate, 1964: SS60, Table 63; % of managerial occupational group of labor force 1960: SS60, Table 68; % of scientific and technical occupational group, 1960: *ibid.*; % of labor force in white collar positions ('administratief personeel'): *ibid.*; % of labor force with primary education only, 1971: SS65, Table 62c; % of commuters using bicycles, 1971: SS65, Table 64; % of labor force in craft and industrial group, 1960: SS60, Table 68; % of taxpayers earning less than 2000 guilders per year, 1965: SS65, Table 90; % of taxpayers earning more than, 30,000 guilders per year, 1965: *ibid.*; Taxable income per resident, 1965: SS65, Table 89; % of population, 5-14 years old, 1964: SS60, Table 4; % of population 65 and older, 1964: *ibid.*; City area, 1965: SS60, Table 2; % of labor force in agriculture, 1960: SS60, Table 67; % of workers in labor force, 1960: SS60, Table 69; Growth rate, 1960-70: SS65, Table 4; Randstad: Amersfoort, Amstelveen, Amsterdam, Delft, Dordrecht, The Hague, Haarlem, Haarlemmermeer, Hilversum, Leiden, Rotterdam, Schiedam,

Utrecht, Velsen, Vlaardingen, Zaandam (stad), Zeist (i.e., most of the cities in the provinces of North and South Holland, plus the province of Utrecht). Talen from D. T. Herbert and J. A. Edwards, 'Images of Randstad', *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, July-August 1972, pp. 239-243.

Appendix B: Political Variables

Labor vote, 1966; % of total votes for the PvdA in 1966: Central Bureau voor de Statistiek, *Statistiek der verkiezingen 1966: Gemeenteraden, 1 juni* (The Hague: 1976), pp. 62-69; Protestant vote, 1966: % of voters for the AR, CHU, GPV, SGP, PCG, PC: *ibid.*; Catholic vote, 1966: % voters for the KVP and RK lists: *ibid.*; Communist vote: % of total votes for the CPN: *ibid.*; Liberal vote: % of total: *ibid.*; Confessional vote: % of vote for Catholic and Protestant groups, 1966: *ibid.*; Average \neq of lists: average number of party or group lists which received share of the votes and separate recording, 1949-70: CBS, *Statistiek der verkiezingen*, 1953-1970; Average \neq of parties on B&W: average number of parties or groups on the College of B&W, excluding the burgomaster ('Verdeling van de Wethouderszetels'): CBS, *Statistiek der verkiezingen*, 1953-70; Fractionalization of the vote: calculated from 1966 voting shares, using the formula:

$$\text{Fractionalization} = 1 - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2}{n}$$

(where p=share of the vote of each party) See Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor, *The Analysis of Political Cleavages* (New Haven, 1970); *Statistiek der verkiezingen 1966*; Average Labor aldermen: average % of aldermen on B&W held by the Labor party, 1958-70: *Statistiek der verkiezingen*, 1958-70; Duration of Labor representation on the B&W: years between 1953-70 that Labor was represented on B&W (min = 0; max = 16): *Statistiek der verkiezingen*, 1953-70; Labor burgomaster: presence or absence of Labor burgomaster, 1974: Galen Irwin: 'Socialism and Municipal Politics in The Netherlands', paper presented to the Conference on Parties, Politics, and the Quality of Urban Life, Bellagio, Italy, June 1975; Provincial Leftism: % of provincial council seats held by Labor plus Communists, 1967: *Nederlands Staatsalmanak*, Secular vote: % won by Labor, Communists, and Liberals, 1966: *Statistiek der verkiezingen 1966*.

Appendix C: Output Variables: Definitions and Sources

Output Variables defined and sources

Activism measures: Vereniging van Hoofden van Gemeentelijke Statistisch Bureaus, *Statistisch Stedenboek*, 1955-1970 (SS55); *Statistisch Stedenboek* 1960-65 (SS60); *Statistisch Stedenboek*, 1965-70 (SS65); Per capita city real estate holdings (assessed value): S65; Per capita operating expenditures, 1955-1970 (averaged): SS55, SS60, SS65; Per capita municipal debt, 1970: SS65; Municipal employees per 1000 residents (non-education, non-public safety), 1964: SS60, p. 199; Per capita local taxation, 1970: SS65, Table 87; LAW ENFORCEMENT & ORDER MEASURES :Arrests for public drunkenness, 1970: SS65, Table 98; Traffic citation, 1970: *ibid.*; Ordinance violation, 1970: *ibid.*; Misdemeanors ('non-indictable' offenses), 1970: *ibid.*; Public safety employees, 1964 (police and fire): SS60,p. 199;

SECULAR CULTURE: Public library book collections, 1970: SS65, Table 59; Public library circulation rate, 1970: *ibid.*; Public library card holders, 1970: *ibid.*; RECREATION: Tennis courts, 1970: SS65, Table 60; Soccer fields, 1970: *ibid.*; Gyms, 1970: *ibid.*; HEALTH: Child health centers, 1970: SS65, Table 26; Doctors in child health centers, 1970: *ibid.*; Infants and children treated, 1970: *ibid.*; WELFARE: Welfare spending, 1970: SS65, Table 92; PUBLIC HOUSING: Households in public housing ('woningwet huurwoningen'), 1971: SS65, Table 33; Public housing effort: % of new dwellings completed under ('Woningwetbouw'), average 1960-70: SS60, Table 30; SS65, Table 41; TAXATION: Per capita local taxation, 1970: SS65, Table 87; PUBLIC EDUCATION: Municipal employees, 1964: SS60, Table 74.

Cybernetics: its dangers, real and imaginary

Aleksandr Lerner

*Professor Aleksandr Lerner is a highly respected Soviet scientist (a cyberneticist and mathematician) who, in 1971, applied for permission to emigrate to Israel with his family. He was refused — and continues to be refused — permission to emigrate on the grounds of 'state secrets', a judgement which Lerner challenges. Lerner earned his academic degree of 'Candidate' in 1939, his Doctor of Science in 1954, and his academic title of Professor in 1955. He has authored many scientific works, including twelve books, many of which have been translated abroad (e.g. 'A learning approach to the dynamic modeling of human planning and decision-making systems', in: Technological forecasting and social change (2) 1970 p. 125-132; 'A crisis in the theory of pattern recognition'; in *Frontiers of Pattern Recognition*, 1972). After submitting his family's application to emigrate, Lerner was dismissed from all his duties.*

Aleksandr Lerner was invited by Professor Hayward Alker of M.I.T. to serve as discussant on his panel on 'Quantitative and Mathematical Approaches to Politics', at the XIth IPSA World Congress in Moscow, August 1979. With his mathematical training and interest in political science, he was eminently qualified to serve comment on the papers being presented at that session of the IPSA World Congress. Lerner, consequently, agreed to participate and his name was included in the preliminary program of the Congress, adopted and published by the Program Committee of the IPSA. Since the Organizing Committee in Moscow refused to permit him to register as a delegate, Lerner — who holds dual citizenship, as an Israeli as well as a Soviet citizen — was certified as a member of the Israeli Political Science Association and had his application for registration forwarded, with the \$ 50,00 registration fee, to IPSA headquarters in Ottawa, Canada.

When the proofs for the final program were sent to Moscow for printing, Lerner's name was listed as discussant on Alker's panel. However, when the published program appeared, Lerner's name was expunged and a V. Gelovani of the Institute for Systems Research, Moscow, substituted in his stead. To the best of our knowledge, this arbitrary action by the Soviet Political Science Association was taken without consultation with, or informing, either