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A quantitative analysis of support for the National-Socialist Movement (NSB) from 1935 to 1940 in the City of Amsterdam

Otto Schmidt

1 Introduction

The behavioural revolution in political science has strongly impressed upon political science research techniques. Even when political scientists do not use a large-scale sample survey, they are inclined to treat their data as if they were neatly ordered in a data matrix with n individuals as rows and k variables as columns. Often enough, structuring the data in this way is a good starting-point for the subsequent analysis, which will be facilitated by the availability of appropriate statistical packages. However, sometimes a researcher risks a loss of useful information by indiscriminately applying survey methods to his data. Such an information loss is especially detrimental to the analysis in historical research, as the following considerations will show.

Historical data may be classified according to the degree to which they are structured. One extreme is exemplified by the content of autobiographies, diplomatic documents, witness reports, etc., the other by official statistical publications (e.g. election results). Within this last category a distinction can be made between data on (aggregated) individual behaviour and data on other relevant topics (e.g. steel output, administrative structures, coalition formation). Historians and social scientists are alike in their interest in the behaviour of individuals. An explanation of indvidual behaviour may take various forms depending on the theoretical specification of the model and on the available measurements. In standard survey research, the researcher is focused on the explanation of individual-level variables by other individual-level variables. One aspect of these dependent and independent variables is nearly always treated as if it were of no consequence, viz. their spatial distribution. To be sure, respondents are classified according to the degree of urbanization of their dwelling place, to their electoral district, even to the wealth of their neighbourhood (useful in a contextual analysis), but the areal distribution of respondents is not measured. Very often the information which is needed to represent the respondents on a geographical map is available, but this information is not very suitable for incorporating in a standard data

matrix, and even less suitable for applying standard statistical techniques. However, as the survey researcher normally has an abundance of variables to work with, this loss of information does not seem too serious.

On the other hand, the situation of the empirically-oriented historian is completely different. No data redundancy, but data paucity is the cause of his ordeal. The omission in the analysis of any relevant information is therefore much more serious. Historical data often contain information on their areal distribution and one might try and use this information to obtain a better understanding of the research problem.

In this paper I try to explain three phenomena:

1 The election results for the Dutch fascist party (NSB) in the elections for the Provincial Council in 1935.
2 *Idem* for 1939.
3 The decrease in NSB-voting from 1935 to 1939.

Each of these explanations will consist of two parts: first, a regression analysis in which the spatial aspect is ignored of necessity and, secondly, an analysis of choropeth maps which show the spatial distribution of regression residuals. Finally, I shall go into a discussion of the usefulness of the spatial statistical analysis, which is virtually *terra incognita* for present-day political scientists.

2 The elections of 1935

In 1935, the Provincial Council Elections were very successful for the NSB party in the city of Amsterdam and in the Netherlands in general. It obtained 10.80 per cent of the vote (as against a nation-wide result of 7.94 per cent), a remarkable performance for a newcomer on the Dutch political scene. How might this success be explained? Until now, only two publications offer a quantitative analysis of the NSB voting pattern in the Netherlands, and no detailed study of the fascist vote in a large city is available. First, Kooy (1964) examines the 61 municipalities where the NSB obtained more than 15 per cent of the vote in 1935. These municipalities were exclusively agrarian and surburban, which is regrettable because the NSB tapped the majority of its voters from large towns and cities. Kooy's analysis does not lead to any clearcut conclusion. Local factors (e.g. the presence of a charismatic local leader) seem often to influence the NSB vote. Depending on the region, the NSB draws its voters from agrarian parties (in the Eastern and Northern provinces), from the agrarian, protestant, conservative and labour parties (in the Western provinces) and from the catholic, labour and small local parties (in the Southern provinces). It is therefore clear that the explanations of the agrarian and suburban NSB vote is not easy. Secondly, Passchier and van

der Wusten (1979), after criticizing Kooy for his neglect of the urban character of the NSB vote, analyse all Dutch municipalities. They assess the influence of five independent variables on the NSB vote, viz.

- degree of urbanization,
- degree of pillarization *(verzuiling)*,
- affluence,
- unemployment,
- small-party vote in 1933.

They conclude that all five predictors are related to the NSB vote, but that in large urban centres the degree of pillarization has almost no influence.

2.1 *The data*

In our analysis, the data are taken from the official Amsterdam Statistical Bureau and defined on 51 districts in which the city of Amsterdam has been divided by this bureau. It must be noted that this division has no direct political relevance, as the Netherlands have an electoral system of proportional representation. The statistical bureau has defined the districts in such a way that they are fairly homogeneous in their socio-economic characteristics.

I will use the following variables in the analysis:

NSB35	the proportion of the total valid vote in the provincial elections of 1935 which was cast for the NSB (value for the whole city of Amsterdam: 0.106)
NSB39	the proportion of the total valid vote in the provincial elections of 1939 which was cast for the NSB (Amsterdam value: 0.060)
WEALTH	the proportion of the total municipal tax impositions in 1935/1936, taken from salaries above Dfl. 3,000,—.
CATH	the proportion of roman-catholics (source: Census of 1930)
PROT	the proportion of protestants (source: Census of 1930)
JEWS	the proportion of jews (source: Census of 1930)
NOREL	the proportion of people without religious affiliation (source: Census of 1930)
AGE	the estimated mean age of the registered voters (source: Census of 1930)
RKSP	the proportion of the total valid vote in the provincial elections of 1935 which was cast for the catholic party RKSP (Amsterdam value: 0.143)
ARP	*idem* for the calvinist party (Anti-Revolutionaire Partij) (Amsterdam value: 0.066)
CHU	*idem* for the reformed party (Christelijk-Historische Unie) (Amsterdam value: 0.061)
LIB	*idem* for the liberal-conservative party (Liberale Staats Partij) (Amsterdam value 0.086)
SDAP	*idem* for the socialist party (Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiders-Partij) (Amsterdam value: 0.305)

CPN *idem* for the communist party (Communistische Partij Nederland) (Amsterdam value: 0.124)

NATHER the proportion of the total valid vote in the municipal elections of 1935 which was cast for the ultraconservative party (Verbond voor Nationaal Herstel) (Amsterdam value: 0.036)
(Note: This party did not take part in the 1935 provincial elections)

NSBDECR decrease in NSB voting from 1935 to 1939, defined as:

$$\text{NSBDECR} = \frac{\text{NSB35} - \text{NSB39}}{\text{NSB35}}$$

As we may safely assume that the NSB party received only an infinitesimal number of votes from the jewish part of the electorate, it is useful to compute for each of the 51 districts the number of non-jewish voters and to define the following variables:

NSB35/nj the proportion of the total non-jewish valid vote in the provincial elections of 1935 which was cast for the NSB

NSB39/nj *idem* for 1939

Remark: Of course, the number of jewish and non-jewish voters is not officially registered. Therefore the jewish and the non-jewish valid vote have been estimated by multiplying the proportion of jews in each of the 51 districts (source: Census of 1930) with the valid vote of that district.

In this enumeration of variables two factors which might be considerable interest for our purpose are missing: first, data on unemployment and, secondly, the election results before 1935. Strangely enough, neither set of data is available from official sources, and until now we have not found an expedient way of estimating these data from other sources.

2.2 The analysis

First we try to explain the 1935 NSB vote by the relative affluence of the districts. As most students of the NSB (especially of he earlier period of the party) describe it as succesful in the well-to-do suburbs and city districts, this seems a reasonable starting point. We will also use this simple two-variable case as a device to elucidate the research methods which are used in this paper. Linear regression of the 1935 NSB-vote on district wealth gives the following results:

NSB35 = 0.063 + 0.535 WEALTH $R^2 = 0.514$ (eq.1)
(0.008) (0.074)

(Note: standard deviations in parentheses. All regression analyses have been carried out by SPSS at the Computer Centre of the University of Amsterdam (SARA)).

The regression shows that the supposition of a close relationship between affluence and NSB voting is borne out by the data, as more than 50 per cent of the variance in the NSB vote is explained by the relative affluence of the districts. Only for two other parties the dependency on relative affluence is higher, as the following correlation coefficients show:

WEALTH x NATH	0.876
WEALTH x LIB	0.872
WEALTH x NSB35	0.717
WEALTH x SDAP	–0.424
WEALTH x CPN	–0.647

Thus, the NSB is even more class-bound than the communist party, and we might even conclude (somewhat rashly, given the problem of the ecological fallacy), that an interpretation of the NSB relying exclusively on the petty bourgeoisie is not correct.

We now proceed to an analysis of the residuals in order to see whether there is a systematic relationship between them. First, we test for a systematic pattern in the sequence of positive and negative residuals. For 51 observations, the expected number of runs of signs is 26. The observed number is 14, and we learn from the computer output that the probability of obtaining 14 runs out of 51 observations by chance alone is 0.00036. Therefore we may safely conclude that the residuals are systematically grouped and that there are series of positive and series of negative residuals. This means that if the districts are ordered by their sequence number (which in many cases means that contiguous districts are close in the ordering, see Map 1) there are clusters of districts in which the relative affluence of the district predicts a higher NSB-vote than actually obtains, and clusters where the NSB vote is underestimated.

Secondly, we use the Durbin-Watson statistic to test for autocorrelation in the residuals. The Durbin-Watson statistic equals 1.085, and at the 0.05 significance level the hypothesis that successive residuals are not correlated is rejected. This means that if we overestimate (or, for that matter, underestimate) the NSB vote in a district by its affluence, it is probable that the NSB vote of its neighbours in the sequence ordering (and, to a certain extent, of its geopraphical neighbours as well) is also overestimated (or underestimated). Having demonstrated that the regression residuals are clustered, we now look for the correlates of

1. The 10 districts with the largest negative residuals
2. The 10 districts with the largest positive residuals.

By comparing these two sets we hope to find other factors (apart from relative affluence) which influence the NSB voting. This comparison can be

carried out in two ways: either we ignore the geographical component and treat the underestimated and overestimated districts as if they were observations in a standard survey, or we consider the geographical location of these outlying districts and try to interpret their configuration. We now proceed with these two analyses. As we do not know what variables are connected with the property of being overestimated or underestimated, we simply compare the mean values for a large variety of variables for the 10 most overestimated districts, for the 31 correctly estimated districts and for the 10 most underestimated ones. Of course, the 10-31-10 trichotomy is rather arbitrary, but it seems doubtful whether a different partitioning would give completely different results. Table 1.a gives the mean values for all considered variables, and in table 1.b we present the same information in a more convenient way, by standardizing the total mean for each variable on 100. (in subsequent tables, we will give only the first three rows of a 1.b-type table.)

What conclusions might be drawn from this data-exploring table? First we note the most conspicuous characteristic of the overestimated districts: their jewish population is disproportionally high. (index value: 363). Substantially this means that if we had to predict the NSB vote from relative affluence alone, in districts with a large jewish population our expected amount of NSB vote would be much higher than the observed NSB vote. Of course, this is not a startling finding but it is a certain validation of our method. Secondly we see that in the overestimated districts the liberal and socialist parties are relatively strong, with indices of 187 and 134 respectively. When we look at the index values of the indicator of relative affluence (the independent variable in the regression) we discover that the fit of the relationship between NSB vote and affluence grows weaker as affluence is higher, because large negative and positive residuals correspond with high affluence indices (141 and 118 respectively). We conclude that the simple regression of NSB vote on wealth must be improved by including the proportion of jews in the analysis. As will be seen, this inclusion can be carried out in two different ways.

We now go on with a cartographical analysis of our first regression. To this end we have drawn a choropleth map of the city of Amsterdam and its 51 districts.* (See Map II). The three sets of districts (overestimated, correctly estimated and underestimated ones) are designated by different cross-hatchings. We could compare this residuals map with a map which shows the spatial distribution of some relevant variable (e.g. proportion of jews) and

* The computer program for this graphical analysis was written bij Drs. M. Deurlo (Department of Geography, Free University, Amsterdam) to whom I am very grateful for his permission to use it.

Table 1.a : Mean values of 14 variables. Regression equation: eq. (1). All mean values have been multiplied by 1000

	ARP	CHU	LIB	NSB35	SDAP	CPN	RKSP	NATHER	WEALTH	PROT	CATH	NOREL	JEWS	AGE
10 overestimated districts	045	049	161	077	410	078	097	035	110	274	167	239	385	42424
31 correctly estimated districts	075	064	054	094	303	150	136	030	063	395	220	375	027	40867
10 underestimated districts	063	065	101	167	206	092	209	055	092	372	301	316	054	41633
all 51 districts	066	061	086	106	305	124	143	036	078	366	226	335	106	41341

Table 1.b: See table 1.a. All values are standardized on the total mean value (= 100)

	ARP	CHU	LIB	NSB35	SDAP	CPN	RKSP	NATHER	WEALTH	PROT	CATH	NOREL	JEWS	AGE
10 overestimated districts	68	80	187	73	134	63	68	97	141	75	74	71	362	103
31 correctly estimated districts	114	105	63	89	99	121	95	83	81	108	97	112	25	99
10 underestimated districts	127	128	105	83	89	74	146	153	118	102	133	94	51	101
all 51 districts	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

see whether these two maps look approximately the same. This procedure is followed by traditional electoral geographers (e.g. A. Siegried, F. Goguel) when they compare the spatial distributions of two variables (e.g. proportion of manual workers and communist vote). Our method will be different. First, we do not compare two variables in a *direct* way, but we regress one variable on another and try to interpret the configuration of the residuals. Secondly, this residuals map is not visually compared with a map showing the distribution of a different variable. We rather look for the correlates of the residuals as we have explained above (tables 1.a and 1.b) by disregarding their geographical location. Instead of comparing the residuals with (an)other variable(s), we will look at the configuration of the residuals and test for their *spatial autocorrelation*.



Figure 1: A fictitious example of 11 districts

In order to illustrate our procedure we consider figure 1 (taken from D. Ebdon, 1978, p. 129).

When we compare various configurations of districts, as in figure 1 (a), (b) and (c), these distributional patterns may be explained in two different ways: First, they might be caused by the distribution of a second variable which is explicitly included in the analysis. For instance, if a 'black' district indicates a conservative one, and if the five districts on the left of the clustered arrangement (a) were disproportionally rich, we might conclude that the clustering of the political variable is explained by the distribution of the economic variable. In this case, the same conclusion will be reached when we disregard the spatial arrangements and correlate the political and economic variables. Thus, when we apply the standard survey research methods to this problem we reach the same conclusion as when we compare different maps, and we may do even better by computing the degree of the relationship between the two variables. But one is not always so fortunate as to know what specific additional variable (or variables) must be included in the analysis. For instance, the spatially skewed distribution of arrangement (a) may be caused by contagion from one district in which the conservative party organization was exceptionally active, or by a special 'tradition' or 'political culture' or some other influence which does (as yet) not correspond to any measured variable. Therefore, when we do not discover any meaningful correlates of the residuals it is worthwhile to test for their spatial autocorrelation.

A simple test for autocorrelation may be found in Ebdon (1978, pp. 128-141) and we will use the so-called joint counts method. From figure 1.d, it follows that the total number of joins for the 11 districts in this fictitious example is 19. When it is given that there are five black districts and six white districts, the expected number of black-and-white joins may be calculated under the assumption that each district has a probability of 5/11 of becoming black (i.e. there is a random assignment of colour to the districts). In our fictitious example, this expected number of joins is 10.3636. (See Ebdon, p. 132 for details and the appropriate formulae). Examination of figure 1 will show that the assumption of random assignment may prove to be wrong in two different ways: either the black districts are systematically clustered and the number of observed black-and-white joins is too small to be random, or the number of observed black-and-white joins is too large to be random and we conclude that the black districts are systematically dispersed. (Of course, expressions like 'too small to be random' horrify the

mathematically-inclined reader. They are used because they convey the gist of the argument). As the standard deviation of the distribution of the number of black-and-white joins can also be calculated, a test statistic

$$z = \frac{\text{(Observed B\&W Joins) - (Expected B\&W Joins)}}{\text{S.D. of B\&W Joins}}$$

can be defined and it can be shown that z is a standard normal variate if the hypothesis of random assignment is correct.

When we apply this method of testing for spatial autocorrelation to our first residuals map (Map II), we must realize that the trichotomy of figure 1, clustered/random/dispersed, is not applicable to our problem. No substantial meaning can be given to the phenomenon of 'systematically dispersed residuals' and therefore we must use the dichotomy clustered/random and use only one tail of the normal distribution. For our Amsterdam map of 51 districts of which 10 are overestimated or underestimated, the total number of joins is 129, the expected number of joins between 10 and 41 districts equals 41.4824 and the standard deviation of the distribution equals 4.5347. We observe for the 10 overestimated districts in Map II a total of 31 joins with other districts and compute

$$z = \frac{31 - 41.4824}{4.5347} = -2.3116$$

As $P(z \leqslant -2.3116) = 0.0104$, we conclude that the low probability of a random assignment producing the observed configuration makes the hypothesis of randomness untenable. In this paper, we will follow the rule that a z-probability of 0.05 is the upper limit of accepting a systematic clustering of residuals. As for the underestimated districts, we observe a total of 34 joins with other districts, giving a z-value of −1.6500, and because $P(z \leqslant -1.6500) = 0.0495$ we conclude that the underestimated districts are also significantly clustered.

Looking again at Map II, we see that a clear North-South boundary line separates the cluster of underestimated districts in the centre from the central overestimated districts. This line can readily be interpreted, as it represents the border of the 'jewish quarter' as it was known to every inhabitant of Amsterdam before the Second World War. Our conclusion from tables 1.a and 1.b about the importance of the proportion of jewish people for the explanation of the NSB vote is therefore corroborated by the spatial analysis. We now turn to the problem of including this proportion in the analysis.

First, we straightforwardly include the variable JEWS in the regression analysis. This gives the following results:

(eq. 2) NSB35 = 0.071 + 0.567 WEALTH - 0.095 JEWS $R^2 = 0.629$
(0.007) (0.066) (0.024)

Durbin-Watson statistic: 1.048, indicating significant autocorrelation at the 5 per cent level

Number of runs of signs: 18

Probability of observing 18 runs of signs: 0.013, indicating significant departure from randomness at the 5 per cent level.

Table 2 shows the means of various variables, in the same way as table 1.b. How do we interpret these results? We first note that the influence of the relative affluence is almost unchanged after the inclusion of the second explanatory variable. Districts where the NSB vote is overestimated or underestimated are still more affluent than other districts. Unfortunately we have not included data on the occupational structure in the analysis — these might explain the differences in the wealthy districts. Secondly, we see that in the overestimated districts *and* in the underestimated ones the proportion of jews is rather small (index values of 33 and 58), and the predictive power of the regression increases with the proportion of jews. This is understandable, because it is highly improbable that the NSB party got any support from jewish voters and therefore its potential electorate becomes less numerous when the proportion of jews increases. We also see that in the underestimated districts (i.e. the districts where the NSB vote is unexpectedly large):

— the proportion of Roman-Catholics is high (index value 132)
— the proportion of socialist and communist voters is low (index values 69 and 74 respectively)

The first findings moves us to include the variable CATH in the regression (see below); the second indicates that it is possible that the leftist parties lost a part of their voters to the NSB.

When we look at the residuals map for this regression equation (Map III), we observe for the 10 overestimated districts a total of 32 joins with other districts, and we calculate that the probability of these districts being grouped by chance alone is 0.0183. We conclude that they are significantly clustered. As for the underestimated districts, the number of joins is 31 and these districts are significantly clustered too. When we compare maps II and III, we see that the inclusion of the proportion of jewish voters has changed the traditional jewish districts (the eastern-central districts) from overestimated into correctly estimated ones, but we may also note that the boundary-line between the jewish quarter and the other central districts still exists, because these other districts remain underestimated. The explanation of this underestimated cluster is not easy and we wonder whether the inclusion of the proportion of Roman-Catholics, to which we now turn, will throw some light on this problem.

Table 2: Mean values of 14 variables. Regression equation (2). All values are standardized on the total mean value of the variable (= 100)

	ARP	CHU	LIB	NSB35	SDAP	CPN	RKSP	NATHER	WEALTH	PROT	CATH	NOREL	JEWS	AGE
10 overestimated districts	127	128	105	83	82	112	82	97	133	118	86	104	33	98
31 correctly estimated districts	94	88	91	86	115	104	91	83	83	94	94	100	137	100
10 underestimated districts	92	107	121	157	69	74	145	153	117	100	132	95	58	101

Table 3: Mean values of 14 variables. Regression equation (3). All values are standardized on the total mean value of the variable (= 100)

	ARP	CHU	LIB	NSB35	SDAP	CPN	RKSP	NATHER	WEALTH	PROT	CATH	NOREL	JEWS	AGE
10 overestimated districts	100	102	120	74	89	136	86	89	115	100	101	104	83	100
31 correctly estimated districts	98	97	91	92	112	98	92	89	91	98	95	99	122	100
10 underestimated districts	106	108	106	150	77	68	136	147	112	104	114	99	52	101

The regression equation gives the following results:

(eq. 3) NSB35 = 0.022 + 0.542 WEALTH - 0.060 JEWS + 0.214 CATH
(0.014) (0.058) (0.023) (0.053)

$R^2 = 0.726$.
Durbin-Watson statistic: 1.514, and as
$d_L = 1.42 < d = 1.514 < d_U = 1.67$
this test for autocorrelation is inconclusive at the 5 per cent level.
Number of runs of signs: 19.
Probability of observing 19 runs: 0.025, indicating a significant departure from randomness at the 5 per cent level.

When we compare these results with regression (2), we note that the explained variance has been increased to more than 72 per cent, a fairly high percentage. The residuals seem somewhat less autocorrelated now, and when we look at Map IV we discover that the spatial autocorrelation has almost disappeared. In fact, the overestimated districts now have 36 joins with other districts, which has a probability of 0.1133, and the underestimated ones have 39 joins, corresponding to a probability of 0.2921. There is no more systematic clustering of outlying districts, but Map IV still gives the impression that the underestimated districts (i.e. the ones with an unexplainable high proportion of NSB votes) are concentrated in the western part of the city.

Table 3 shows that the districts where the NSB obtains a smaller number of votes than might be expected from affluence and proportion of jews and catholics, have a high index of communist votes (136). In fact, it is interesting to note the different patterns of the socialist party (SDAP) and the communist party (CPN). The index values of the former (89-112-77) do not indicate any relationship with the NSB vote, but the CPN index (136-98-68) clearly suggests that the communists were more successful in opposing the NSB than were the socialists (or 'social fascists', as they were called by the communists before Dimitroff's report at the 7th Congress of the Comintern in 1935). It must be clear that this difference cannot be explained by the socio-economic factors which are included in the regression. The surmise that the difference between socialists and communists is based on political grounds is further corroborated by two arguments. First, if we include the variables CPN and SDAP as independent variables in the regression, we get the following results.

(eq. 3a) NSB35 = 0.064 + 0.359 WEALTH - 0.080 JEWS - 0.238 CATH - 0.254 CPN
(0.017) (0.069) (0.021) (0.050) (0.064)
(eq. 3b) NSB35 = 0.044 + 0.503 WEALTH - 0.048 JEWS+ 0.187 CATH - 0.047 SDAP
(0.034) (0.076) (0.028) (0.072) (0.061)

The respective coefficients of determination are 0.791 (eq. 3a) and 0.728. Inclusion of the CPN variable increases the percentage of the explained variance by 7 points, but inclusion of the SDAP leaves this percentage unaffected. Furthermore, the regression coefficient of CPN is significant, whereas the SDAP coefficient is even smaller than its standard deviation.
Secondly, when we look at map IV, and realize that the districts numbered 25 and 39 (cf. map I) are the most affluent districts of Amsterdam, we can be sure that the overestimation of the NSB vote in these well-to-do districts is not caused by the activities of the communist party. From a closer look at our data we learn that the residual of district 45 is very small — when we order the districts according to the values of their residuals, it occupies the 11th position, just falling outside our category of underestimated districts. When we include the 45th district in this category, we see that the traditional sronghold of the communist party in Amsterdam, the Northern workers' districts, (45, 46, 47, 48, excluding 49, 50 and 51 because these are agrarian outer districts) is voting even less for the NSB party than might be expected given their socio-economic characteristics. Once again, it is unfortunate that we do not have information on the occupational structure of the districts, as this might explain the difference between the socialists and the communists.

But a tentative political explanation might also be given. Both CPN and NSB were activists' parties, relying for their propaganda on canvassing and other face-to-face contacts. The SDAP, on the other hand, constituted one of the 'pillars' (zuilen) of Dutch society and was firmly entrenched in the mass media network. And although the communists had to consider the 'social fascist' SDAP as their main target, the struggle against the fascist NSB could be more direct. Therefore, NSB activists had a much harder time in a communist than in a socialist neighbourhood, as many incidents in the Northern districts of Amsterdam have shown.

A second method, and in our opinion an even better one to include the proportion of jews in the analysis consists of the following procedure. As we have said above, it is extremely unlikely that the NSB attracted any jewish voters. The variable NSB35/nj is in a certain way based on a reconstruction of the Amsterdam electorate without jewish voters. Two remarks must be made on this point. First, the distribution of the jewish people in Amsterdam was very uneven. Some districts in the jewish quarter had a jewish majority, some outer districts had no jewish inhabitants at all. We have been able to estimate the number of non-jewish voters in each district, and, trough this estimation, we have defined two additional political variables (viz. NSB35/nj, NSB39/nj). But as we do not have information on the income distribution over the jewish and non-jewish part of the population, our indicator of relative affluence will grow less reliable as the proportion of jewish inhabitants increases. For this reason the following analysis, and subsequent analyses on the above political variables, will not apply to those districts which have a jewish majority. In total, there are three of such districts (numbers 4, 9 and 19). Secondly, there is no good reason not to include the proportion of jews in this new analysis. However, the status of the variable JEWS has changed, as it represents now a contextual variable, a property of a district which might influence the behaviour of the non-jewish population.

We perform the following regression on the 48 remaining districts.

(eq. 4) $NSB35/nj = 0.016 + 0.612\ WEALTH + 0.159\ CATH + 0.090\ JEWS$
$(0.013)\ (0.056)\qquad (0.050)\qquad (0.038)$

$R^2 = 0.783$

Durbin-Watson statistic: 1.835, and as $d = 1.835 > d_u = 1{,}67$, we do not reject the hypothesis of non-autocorrelated residuals.

Number of runs of signs: 19.

Probability of observing 19 runs: 0.054, and we do not reject the hypothesis of randomly distributed residuals.

We first note that our procedure of excluding the estimated number of jewish voters from the electorate leads to a regression which explains about 80 per cent of the variance in the NSB vote. When we compare equation (4) with equation (3) we note that affluence and the proportion of catholics still have the same positive effect on the NSB vote. Curiously enough, the influence of the proportion of jewish inhabitants is still there, but its impact has changed from negative (the more jews, the less NSB votes) to positive (the more jews in a district, the more NSB votes). As stated above, the substantive meaning of this variable has completely changed from eq. 3 to eq. 4. The positive relationship between the proportion of jews and the NSB vote now suggests that the voters in districts with a sizable jewish minority are more likely to vote for the NSB than other voters. This influence of a contextual variable is all the more remarkable since the ecological fallacy cannot be invoked to invalidate the conclusion. A characteristic of a district (in this case a global measure in the Lazarsfeld/Menzel terminology) influences individual behaviour. An explanation of this phenomenin by positing anti-Semitism as an intervening variable is obvious, but cannot be explored further now for lack of relevant data.

When we look at map V, we see that globally the pattern of map IV (where the proportion of jews is directly affecting the NSB vote) is reproduced on this new map. No attempt has been made to measure the spatial autocorrelation coefficients in this case, because the exclusion of three districts makes such a calculation hazardous. Apparently there is a clustering of underesti-

mated districts (nos. 24, 27, 40, 41, 42) in the southern part of the city. It might be interesting to combine this finding with data on the campaign activity of the NSB for the 1935 election, to see whether the unexpectedly high number of NSB votes in these districts could be attributed to such activity.

Table 4 shows once again the difference between the socialists and the communists in resisting the NSB. More interesting is the distribution of the mean values indices of the variable JEWS (136-79-174). When the proportion of jews increases, the prediction of the NSB vote by the three independent variables becomes less accurate: districts with an above-average proportion of jews polarize into either giving the NSB less support than might be expected or more of it.

3 The elections of 1939

The elections for the Second Chamber of Parliament of 1937 were disappointing for the NSB. After the success of 1935, its leaders were thinking of an even more remarkable result in 1937, but the nation-wide NSB vote went down from 7.94 per cent in 1935 to 4.22 per cent in 1937. In Amsterdam, the respective percentages were 10.8 and 6.16. The Provincial Council Elections of 1939 were even less successful for the Dutch fascists, as the nation-wide percentage went down to 3.89. In Amsterdam, the NSB obtained 6.0 per cent of the valid vote in 1939. We have opted for an analysis of the elections of 1939, because these provincial elections are more readily compared with the 1935 vote.

We first regress NSB39 on the three variables which explained about 70 per cent of the variance in the 1935 vote.

(eq. 5.a) NSB39 = 0.015 + 0.203 WEALTH + 0.134 CATH - 0.020 JEWS
(0.010) (0.040) (0.037) (0.016)
$R^2 = 0.503$.

We note that the regression coefficient of the variable JEWS is no longer significant, as its standard deviation is far too large. At first glance, this finding is rather startling. From 1935 to 1939 the anti-Semitic character of the NSB had become unmistakable, as the party followed more and more its German counterpart. However, there is one explanation for the vanishing of the proportion of jews as an explanatory variable: if anti-Semitism grows proportionally with the number of jews in a district and if anti-Semitism became more important from 1935 to 1939 as a motivation to vote for the fascist party, this disappearance is explained by the increased importance of anti-Semitism as a factor leading to the NSB vote. Of course, without individual survey data such an interpretation remains tentative, albeit plausible. When we omit the insignificant variable we obtain the following regression.

Table 4: Mean values of 1 4variables. Regression equa tion (4). All values are standardized on the total mean value of the variable (= 100)

	ARP	CHU	LIB	NSB35	SDAP	CPN	RKSP	NATHER	WEALTH	PROT	CATH	NOREL	JEWS	AGE
10 overestimated districts	90	94	123	75	115	107	72	89	110	95	88	94	136	99
28 correctly estimated districts	104	100	77	92	95	110	101	84	77	102	108	103	79	100
10 underestimated districts	96	90	119	117	108	69	97	132	122	88	85	94	174	98

Table 5: Mean values of 14 variables. Regression equation (5.b). All values are standardized on the total mean value of the variable (= 100)

	ARP	CHU	LIB	NSB35	SDAP	CPN	RKSP	NATHER	WEALTH	PROT	CATH	NOREL	JEWS	AGE
10 overestimated districts	108	102	95	70	105	106	98	75	88	100	111	92	104	99
31 correctly estimated districts	95	97	100	95	106	106	90	94	103	99	92	102	114	100
10 underestimated districts	108	107	103	142	78	73	133	139	109	103	110	103	54	101

(eq. 5.b.) NSB39 = 0.009 + 0.195 WEALTH + 0.150 CATH
(0.009) (0.040) (0.034)
$R^2 = 0.487$
Durbin-Watson statistic: d = 1.454 < d_L = 1.46, and we reject the hypothesis of non-autocorrelated residuals.
Observed number of runs of signs: 17, which has a probability of 0.006 if the residuals are randomly distributed. Therefore this test also indicates autocorrelated residuals.

We note that the explained variance for 1939 is about 20 points lower than for 1935. Two considerations might be adduced to account for this difference. On the one hand, in 1935 the NSB was considered to be a party which had a position on the Dutch political spectrum as traditional, authoritarian, right-wing. There was a smooth transition from the policy proposals of other right-wing (but non-fascist) parties to the NSB platform. In 1939, however, the situation was different. As stated above, the NSB had identified itself more clearly with the NSDAP, and its anti-Semitism had become more virulent. On the other hand, its initial electoral successes and the developments abroad had mobilized a large variety of forces in Dutch society against it. Both factors contributed to the ostracism of the NSB in 1939, and to the fact that an explanation of the NSB vote by its social components becomes less feasible. Adopting Kooy's terminology (Kooy, p. 316) we might call the development from 1935 to 1939 as a course from non-deviant to deviant nazification.

Two interesting points emerge from table 5. First, the values for the socialist SDAP and the communist CPN are almost the same. But we will see below that this similarity disappears when the jewish electorate is excluded from the analysis. Secondly, in those districts where the NSB vote is unexpectedly high, the proportion of jews is below average (index value 54). This suggests that the proportion of jews still influences the NSB vote, although in a nonlinear way. When the proportion of jews increases, the potential NSB electorate decreases, but (by hypothesis) anti-Semitism grows.

The residuals map for equation (5.b), map VI, has the following features. Both the underestimated and the overestimated districts have 35 joins with their respective complementary districts. This has a probability of 0.076 of occurring when the spatial distribution is completely random, and we conclude that there is no systematic clustering of the outlying districts in this case. When we compare map VI with map IV (the corresponding map for 1935), the overall pattern looks much the same for the underestimated districts, with only one exception (districts 33 and 44). Thus, the geographical continuity of the districts with an unexpectedly high NSB vote is noticeable. Whatever the reasons for this high NSB vote, they must be more than an

ephemeral fad of the voters in these districts. The overestimated districts are rather less constant, but the continuing resistance to the NSB of the Northern part of the city is noteworthy.

We now exclude the estimated number of jewish voters from the analysis and investigate the influence of affluence, proportion of jews and the proportion of catholics once again, which leads to the following regression equation:

(eq. 6) NSB39/nj = 0.012 + 0.211 WEALTH + 0.113 CATH + 0.056 JEWS
(0.009) (0.038) (0.034) (0.026)
Durbin-Watson statistic: d = 1.700 > d_u = 1.67, and the hypothesis that the residuals are not autocorrelated is not rejected.
Number of runs of signs: 19, which has a probability of occuring by chance alone of 0.054, and therefore the residuals may well be not autocorrelated.

We see that the proportion of jews, constructed as a contextual variable, has a significant impact on the NSB vote in 1939. This is congruent with our assumption that anti-Semitism plays a part in the 1939 election results for the NSB. Table 6 offers a further corroboration of this, as the index values of the variable JEWS (44-127-220) clearly indicate that in those districts where the NSB scores unexpectedly low, the proportion of jews is far below average (44), whereas in the districts with a high NSB vote the proportion of jews is very high (220). In our view, only the two-step interpretation of first a correlation between anti-Semitism and proportion of jews and, secondly, a correlation between anti-Semitism and NSB vote agrees with these data. The difference between the communist and socialist party is noticeable again now that we investigate the non-jewish electorate. In districts where the NSB vote is unexpectedly low, the CPN vote is above average (index value 121), but the SDAP vote below average (index value 86). The disappearance of this difference in table 5 seems to have been an effect of the correlation between the proportion of jews and the SDAP vote (r = +0.50).
When we look at the residuals map for eq. 6, map VII, two clusters may be recognized. The overestimated districts are mainly in the northern part of the city, and the underestimated ones are in the central-south and south-west areas. Once again, the continuity of these patterns from 1935 to 1939 is remarkable.

4 The decrease in NSB voting from 1935 to 1939

The comparison between the elections of 1935 and 1939 can be carried out in a straightforward way if we regress the decrease in NSB voting on our three independent variables. This gives the following results:

Table 6: Mean values of 14 variables. Regression equattion (6). All values are standardized on the total mean value of the variable (= 100)

	ARP	CHU	LIB	NSB35	SDAP	CPN	RKSP	NATHER	WEALTH	PROT	CATH	NOREL	JEWS	AGE
10 overestimated districts	110	113	106	83	86	121	99	95	113	105	112	96	44	99
28 correctly estimated districts	96	92	87	88	115	106	86	86	87	98	89	104	127	100
10 underestimated districts	87	89	144	118	94	81	114	127	129	87	98	90	220	101

Table 7: Mean values of 14 variables. Regression equation (7.b). All values are standardized on the total mean value of the variable (= 100)

	ARP	CHU	LIB	NSB35	SDAP	CPN	RKSP	NATHER	WEALTH	PROT	CATH	NOREL	JEWS	AGE
10 overestimated districts	115	112	97	109	102	76	106	95	95	108	92	102	71	100
31 correctly estimated districts	94	99	110	100	95	112	99	108	110	100	103	100	108	101
10 underestimated districts	101	90	69	88	112	88	97	83	79	93	100	97	108	96

(eq. 7.a) NSBDECR = 0.390 + 0.678 WEALTH + 0.037 CATH - 0.210 JEWS
(0.032) (0.136) (0.124) (0.054)
$R^2 = 0.456$

The proportion of catholics does not seem to have affected the decrease in NSB voting in a significant way. This is interesting, because the Roman-Catholic church became more and more hostile to the NSB party during this period. The overall effect of this opposition apparently did not outweigh the oppositional forces of other social, religious and political groups.

When we exclude this insignificant variable from the regression we get:

(eq. 7.b) NSBDECR = 0.398 + 0.682 WEALTH - 0.216 JEWS
(0.015) (0.134) (0.050)
$R^2 = 0.455$

The positive relationship between relative affluence and decrease of NSB voting is an additional indication of the increasingly peripheral position of the NSB party during this period. It is a sign of an ultraconservative party loosing its respectability. The negative influence of the proportion of jews on the NSB decrease has been explained above by a growing importance of anti-Semitism for the NSB vote.

Table 7 shows that those districts where the decrease in NSB voting has been larger than might be expected from affluence and proportion of jews alone, had a below-average proportion of jews (index value 71) and communists (index value 76). The first finding can be explained when it is assumed that anti-Semitism (which has a negative influence on the decrease in the NSB vote) comes into play only after a certain threshold in the proportion of jews has been passed, and the second one by the fact that already in 1935 the CPN strongholds were successfully defended against the newcoming NSB.

The residuals map for equation (7.b), map VIII, is not readily interpreted in geographical terms. The 10 overestimated districts have 36 joins with the complementary districts, which has a probability of 0.113 of occuring if the districts have a random spatial distribution. (Unfortunately, due to a technical error, there are 11 underestimated districts, and therefore the probability calculation has been omitted). We come to the negative conclusion that no distinct geographical factors play a part in the decrease in NSB voting from 1935 to 1939.

5 Conclusion

We have made an attempt to analyse the support for the Dutch fascist party (NSB) from 1935 to 1939 in two different ways. First we have tried an a-geographical approach, disregarding the location of the different districts.

This produced some interesting findings, especially on
- the strong dependence of the NSB vote on the relative affluence of the districts,
- the diminishing importance of structural factors in explaining the NSB vote from 1935 to 1939, which reflects the changing status of this party,
- the difference between the communist party and the socialist party in defending themselves against the NSB,
- the growing importance of anti-Semitism for the NSB support.

All of these conclusions have been made without making use of the geography of the city of Amsterdam. In some cases the choropleth residuals maps have proved useful in corroborating these results and in general they enable the researcher to be in 'close touch with his data'.

In the prewar period under investigation, the city of Amsterdam was rather homogeneous, with the possible exception of the jewish part of the population, although the position of the jews never had been an issue in Dutch politics. This homogeneity is not favourable to a succesful application of the statistical geographical techniques. We expect that their application to the Netherlands as a whole, with its much larger variety of religion, geographical location vis-à-vis Germany, and degree of urbanization, will be more successful and we hope to prove this in future research.

6 Literature

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

Map I: City of Amsterdam in the thirties; 51 districts



Map II: Residuals map; NSB35 on health



Map III: Residuals map; NSB35 on health, Jews



Map IV: Residuals map; NSB35 on health, Cath., Jews



Map V: Residuals map; NSB35/NJ on health, Cath., Jews (Jewish voters excl.)



Map VI: Residuals map; NSB39 on health, Cath.



Map VII: Residuals map; NSB 39/NJ on health, Cath., Jews (Jewish voters excl.)



Map VIII: Residuals plot; NSB-decrease on health, Jews

Bestuurlijke reorganisatie in Nederland; een spel zonder grenzen*

Jaap Breunese/Hein-Anton van der Heijden

Inleiding

In het jaar waarin de echte discussie over de bestuurlijke reorganisatie van Nederland een aanvang nam, herstelde Nederland zich van de gevolgen van de Duitse bezetting. De koude oorlog was nog niet uitgebroken en in brede kring heerste de verwachting dat alles anders zou worden op elk gebied, ook op dat van de bestuurlijke organisatie.

Inmiddels, 32 jaar na het verschijnen van het eerste rapport, is er van de algehele verandering, althans op dit terrein, nog weinig terecht gekomen. Nog steeds verschijnen voorstellen, rapporten en nota's, zij het dat de kwaliteit hiervan steeds minder lijkt te worden. Ondersteunend bestuurskundig onderzoek vond wel plaats, maar een beslissende bijdrage aan de oplossing van de bestuurlijke reorganisatieproblemen wist het niet te leveren. Het probleem is er ondertussen niet doorzichtiger op geworden. Inzichten van politieke machthebbers m.b.t. deze materie veranderen met de regelmaat van de klok, vaak zonder enige argumentatie.

Omdat velen van mening zijn dat in deze kabinetsperiode de echte reorganisatie dan eindelijk op gang zal komen, wordt in dit artikel de balans opgemaakt van 32 jaar praten over bestuurlijke reorganisatie: de balans van een gezelschapsspel dat maar geen ernst wilde worden.

De ontwikkeling van de bestuurlijke organisatie

De bestuurlijke organisatie zoals wij die kennen vindt haar wortels in de periode van de Franse overheersing, op het breukvlak van de 18e en de 19e eeuw. Voor die tijd was het gezag van het rijk ondergeschikt aan dat van de (zeven verenigde) provincies, die zich op hun beurt weer moesten onderwerpen aan de gemeenten; in de grondwet van 1814 werd de hiërarchie van deze bestuurslagen omgedraaid. Lering trekkende uit de traumatische ervaringen van voor 1795, kende men de provincies een bescheiden rol toe, de gemeenten kregen als samenstellende delen van de nieuwe staat grotere

* De tekst van dit artikel werd afgesloten op 1 juni 1979.