The political dimension of American political science

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hebben omsingeld komt het op 14 december tot een overeenstemming. Deze gebeurtenis is als een vorm van geweld beschouwd en geklassificeerd als een I-1 type geweld.
In India breekt in 1954 de langdurige guerrilla van de Naga's uit. Gedurende zijn gehele ontwikkeling is deze guerrilla geklassificeerd als een kleine guerrilla (III) aangezien het ging om een guerrilla van een stam van slechts een half miljoen leden, hij plaats vond in een deelstaat van een zeer groot land en de stabiliteit van de centrale regering, gedurende de periode die door het onderzoek werd gedekt, niet ernstig bedreigde. Desalniettemin kan men ook argumenten aanvoeren ten gunste van de kwalificatie 'endemische guerrilla" (V). Toch lijkt de guerrilla van de Naga's van een andere politieke orde van grootte dan die welke jarenlang woedde in Colombië, en die het gewelddadig symptoom was van een ernstige machtsstrijd tussen de aan het bewind zijnde Conservatieve Partij en de via een staatsgreep van haar macht beroofde Liberale Partij. Ook lijkt hij niet van dezelfde orde als de guerrilla's in de jaren vijftig in Malakka die aanleiding gaf tot de instelling van een oorlogskabinet of de Mau Mau opstand in Kenia, waarbij op een gegeven moment een aanval op de hoofdstad Nairobi werd verwacht en men in ieder geval termen aanwezig achtte om een kwart van de inheemse bevolking van deze stad in een razzia te arresteren. Een van de moeilijkheden bij de evaluatie van de opstand van de Naga's was het ontbreken van exacte gegevens over b.v. aantallen gedode Naga's, ambtenaren, regeringssoldaten etc.
Een naar mijn mening achteraf onjuist geklassificeerd item betrof de vestiging in november 1964 van een autonome regering door de Koerden in Irak. In 1961 kwamen de Koerden in opstand, een opstand die in 1961, 1962 en 1963 resp. in de III, V en III categorie werd geplaatst. In 1964 werden de gevechten gestaakt, de regeringstroepen trokken zich (min of meer als de verliezende partij) terug en onderhandelingen volgden. Aangezien deze op niets uitliepen werd eind 1964 een autonome Koerdenregering gevormd. In 1965 werden de gevechten hervat en waren ze van die omvang dat ze in de V-categorie werden geplaatst. De vorming van de autonome Koerdenregering werd als een II-2 actie aangemerkt, een tamelijk dubieuze zaak gezien de aard van de gebeurtenissen die in deze categorie vallen. De vorming van deze regering kon als een (tijdelijke) overwinning van de Koerden worden beschouwd en er was veel meer aanleiding om deze gebeurtenis (ondanks het feit dat er niet gevochten werd) in de III- (of zelfs de V)categorie te plaatsen. De moeilijkheid waarop men bij de klassificatie van een item als dit stuit, lijkt op een zwakheid in de typologie te wijzen.
Moeilijkheden als gevolg van onvoldoende informatie vloeiden voort uit aankondigingen die geen aanwijzingen gaven over de ernst van de gebeurtenissen zoals 'bloedige rellen', 'tribale onlusten' in die en die streek, 'ernstig treffen met de politie' etc. Dergelijke gebeurtenissen werden op tamelijk impressionistische manier ingedeeld.

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE

by Marvin Surkin and Alan Wolfe

It is not surprising that major professional associations in the United States, especially those in the social sciences like the American Political Science Association (APSA), have come under attack recently in the wake of public discontent over Vietnam, the Peace Movement, and the student and black rebellions. The rise of critical groups within these associations is part of a general moral and political crisis of established institutions in America. To one degree or another, governmental institutions, corporations, universities and professional associations are being indicted for the country's policies in Vietnam and for civil violence and unmet social demands at home. Radical caucuses that have emerged in the social sciences, such as the Caucus for a New Political Science (CNPS), have indicted their disciplines, their academic departments, and their colleagues for their role in the expansion of cold war-oriented research and the new alliance between the military-industrial complex and academia. They have also called into question the trend toward the over-specialization and professionalization of research, its uncritical and compliant nature, and its general irrelevance to the major social and political problems of the day.
Moreover, it is more a commentary on his subject matter than on himself that Irwin Unger, in a recent account of 'New Left' inroads into various disciplines, could find few into political science.[1] The void he found is an affirmation of what many in the field already know, that in the roll call of academic disciplines, political science will contest any other for the prize of most irrelevant, most uninteresting, most conservative and most defensive. While it is not the primary purpose of this essay to prove this conservatism, the development of the CNPS cannot be understood apart from the intellectual milieu out of which it grew. The purpose of this paper is to consider the intellectual and political role of American political science from the perspective of criticism and change now developing in the form of the movement evoked by the establishment of the CNPS. The paper will consist of four parts: (1) the background and development of the CNPS as a new, critical

[1] Unger lists C. Wright Mills for sociology and Robert Theobold and Ben Seligman for economics. With respect to political science, however, he can only suggest a book review by Walter Batya and an essay in the Marxist (and old left) journal *Science and Society* by James Petras (incorrectly identified by Unger as Peters) as a sign of New Left criticism. See Irwin Unger, 'The 'New Left' and American History: Some Recent Trends in United States Historiography', *American Historical Review*, LXXII (July 1967), 1237–38.

movement in American political science; (2) the intellectual milieu of American political science from 1950–1965; (3) the question of social and political relevance of American political schience; and (4) problems and prospects of a critical or radical political science.

I THE CAUCUS FOR A NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE

The CNPS is one of several radical caucuses and organizations which have been formed in the last few years to challenge the dominant trends of their associations and academic disciplines as well as their social and political purposes and direction. For instance, psychologists have organized a social action group – American Psychologists for Social Action –devoted to researchaction projects in various locales around the country. Their efforts were highlighted by a series of teach-ins on the social and psychological effects of the Vietnam war, many of which coincided with the March 4 anti-ABM meetings of dissident scientists. A group of economists have also established an independent Union for Radical Political Economics. They have held several meetings in the last year and published an impressive array of papers calling for a 'New Left Economics', and studies of imperialism, the political economy of the ghetto and so on. There have also been murmurings among sociologists, historians and anthropologists.

In regard to the history of the CNPS, it emerged from a meeting called by a couple of graduate students at the 1967 political science convention to discuss their grievances about the typically dull, meaningless convention. After several meetings, the CNPS was established with over two hunderd members, committed to a 'radically critical spirit'. The group resolved to 'promote a concern ... for our great social crises and a new and broader opportunity for us all to fulfill, as scholars, our obligations to society and to science', and 'to stimulate research in areas of political science that are of critical importance and that have been thus far ignored'. By the time of the 1968 annual convention, the Caucus had introduced a constitutional amendment in the APSA, which was approved by the convention, encouraging the study of controversial political issues. It also set up its own program, 'American Democracy in Crisis'. The CNPS panels drew large turnouts and there were discussed such issues as race and politics, the maldistribution of knowledge, the hierarchical nature of our society, and special panels on Chicago, Czechoslovakia and Columbia University. The success of these events demonstrated that there were many political scientists ready to move in the direction initiated by the CNPS. The CNPS was responding to, not itself creating, a new mood among political scientists. The week ended with the membership list of the Caucus swelled to over five hundred and the election of an expanded executive committee of twenty-one mandated to set up study commissions on the role of non-whites and women in the profession, graduate education, and renewed efforts to offer challenging programs and look into the publication of its own journal. Caucus activity has expanded during the past year by setting up panels and holding membership drives at regional and state political science association meetings and the organization of an ambitious program of ten panels to be held at the APSA convention in September in New York under the general title: Political Science and Radical Change. Several CNPS members have also participated in a two-day conference on the CNPS at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. From its inception, the CNPS movement was based, not on a call for political activism or a new counter-ideology, but rather on a demand for a 'new' relevance in political science. For, as was to be expected, the APSA came under attack for its general lack of critical analysis of the major problems facing the country; the APSA and many of its members were accused of being 'irrelevant' either to the resolution of these problems or because of an inordinant compliance with existing institutional priorities and established policies. When the CNPS demanded 'relevance', this meant a political science addressed to broad moral and political questions, scholarly activity in the service of truth and humanity instead of in the service of power and social status, and a renewed effort to channel the knowledge and skills of political scientists in the direction of progressive social development and change rather than in the direction of the power interests of the *status quo*.

By virtue of the CNPS's presence as a splinter group within the APSA these issues were given a new focus for academic political scientists. Not only was it necessary for political scientists to recognize that the APSA executive director and treasurer were simultaneously connected with the CIA, but that a rather broad spectrum of the discipline was engaged in what Ithiel de Sola Pool called training 'the new mandarins' of the American Establishment. American policies and priorities at home and abroad required critical analysis and its social problems demanded answers, and political scientists were now being asked to recognize their own failures or limitations in providing either-or even asking the right questions.

II THE INTELLECTUAL MILIEU

In order to fully understand the reasons for the development of the CNPS it is necessary to assay the intellectual milieu of American political science.

The political science of 1950–1965 was both mood and behavior. A certain world view dominated the profession, and specific behavioral

consequences followed therefrom. The spirit of the times may perhaps be captured by sketching the intellectual content of the discipline and the departmental and Associational results which grew out of it.

The rise to power of Conservative political science coincided with the reaction against the Committee on Political Parties in the APSA's report, *Toward a More Responsible Two Party System.*[2] This report, published in 1950, found fault with the non-ideological and non-programatic character of the American political parties, a tendency which required little understanding of American politics to perceive. The recommendations of *the Report,* a series of technical proposals designed to make party leaders more responsible to their followers by encouraging party unity along British lines, met with scathing denunciation by a group of 'Young Turk' political scientists led by Austin Ranney, current editor of the *American Political Science Review.* Ranney was not so much concerned with the details of the recommendations as he was with the making of the recommendations. He warned political scientists that 'they cannot avoid being modelmakers', and before they tell the American public how things should be, Ranney added, they had better make sure their models were in order.[3] The thrust of Ranney's books is to show that the model used by the Committee on Political Parties was not in order because it failed to take account of some particular features of the American political system.

The Young Turks instilled their revolution — some would call it a counter-revolution — around the issues which *The Report* raised. Specifically, two aspects of Ranney's thought came to dominate the field: (1) political scientists were better off theorizing about American politics than trying to change it; and (2) the American political system is really much 'better' than most people give it credit for. It has peculiarities which make it work, clumsy as it may seem, better than any other imported or constructed system could work. The result, and in fairness to Ranney it has often been noted that revolutions devour their own children, has been the institutionalization of a political science which justifies everything in the American political system as unique and workable and condemns any attempts to change it.

As time went by, political scientists found great advantages in each of the following American institutions: the political system of Chicago

[2] American Political Science Association, Committee on Political Parties, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System* (New York: Rinehart, 1950). The decision to locate the publication of this report as a key turning point in the history of the discipline came about after discussions with professor David Kettler.

[3] Austin Ranney, *The Doctrine of More Responsible Party Government* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), p. 161.

under Mayor Daley,[4] the system of nominating the major party candidates for President,[5] patronage,[6] the internal structure of oligarchic interest groups,[7] the committee system in Congress,[8] the seniority system in Congress,[9] the electoral college,[10] the Central Intelligence Agency,[11] low voter turnout in elections,[12] the nature of the discussion in American political campaigns,[13] malapportionment,[14] and decision-making by large bureaucracies.[15] As for the converse, political scientists have taken it upon themselves to criticize as destructive and unrealistic a variety of movements toward change in American politics, whether they be as ameliorative as the more responsible political parties mentioned above,[16] as moderate as reform clubs in local areas,[17] or as radical as movements designed to change the system.[18]

Reflect on all this for a moment. In order to help you, recall some events of the summer and fall of 1968. A non-American, non-political scientist might have perceived some of these events as follows. A group of about a thousand political leaders chosen under fifty separate practices, some legal, some illegal, assembled to nominate someone to run against one other man for the Presidency of the United States. They declared themselves a nominating convention, an institution never recognized by law, and spoke for over thirty million of their followers who had almost no voice in choosing them. They met after their followers, in the only available means open to them, and clearly indicated their preference for one of two major rivals. They immediately proceeded

[4] Edward Banfield, *Political Influence* (New York: Free Press, 1961).

[5] Aaron Wildavsky, 'On the Superiority of National Conventions,' *Review of Politics,* 24 (July 1962), 307—319.

[6] Daniel P. Moynihan and James Q. Wilson, 'Patronage in New York State, 1955—59,' *American Political Science Review,* 58 (June 1964), 286—301.

[7] David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951), p. 140.

[8] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., 'The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System,' *American Political Science Review,* 56 (June 1962), 310—324.

[9] George Goodwin, 'The Seniority System in Congress,' *American Political Science Review,* 53 (June 1959), 412—436.

[10] Alexander M. Bickel, 'The Case of the Electoral College,' *New Republic,* 56 (January 28, 1967), 15—16.

[11] Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (Garden Citv N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 65—68.

[12] Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago, Phoenix Books, 1966).

[13] Pendleton Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* (New York: Norton 1965), pp. 251—260.

[14] Alfred deGrazia, *Apportionment and Representative Government* (New York: Praeger, 1963).

[15] Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little Brown, 1967).

[16] Ranney, *op.cit.*

[17] James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat* (Chicago: Phoenix Books, 1966).

[18] John H. Bunzel, *Anti-Politics in America* (New York: Knopf, 1967).

to nominate the more unpopular rival. All of this took place in a city which, through police violence and the near dictatorial powers of its mayor, prevented the defeated candidate's followers from demonstrating their opinions. The nominated candidate proceeded to run against his opponent, chosen in a similar manner. Neither of them said anything particularly significant; both were cautious and spoke in vague slogans. One of them was declared the winner by a body of about six hundred men, for whom the voters really voted, although they undoubtedly thought they were voting for one of the two presidential candidates. That might be your view if you were a non-American, non-political scientist. But if you were trained in the milieu of American political science between 1950–1965, you observed the following:

(1) on the conventions –'... the superiority of national conventions to the available alternatives is clearly demonstrable.... We get good candidates but not extremists who would threaten our liberties or convert our parties into exclusive clubs for party ideologists. Leaders are motivated to choose popular candidates, who will help maintain vigorous competition between the parties but who are unlikely to split them into warring factions. The element of popular participation is strong enough to impress itself upon party leaders but not sufficiently powerful to take the choice out of their hands. The convention is sufficiently open to excite great national interest but it is not led into perpetual stalemate by pseudo bargaining in public.[19]

(2) on Chicago – In our opinion, believers in traditional democracy, both the conservatives and the liberals among them, in their criticism have neglected the advantages of effective machines in Chicago. The machines not only give the mass of the people, with their limited interest in politics (what some would call 'apathy')the kind of government they seem to want – or least object to – but they also insulate traditional democratic values and institutions from the forces which unscrupulous demagogues using mass communications media can so easily unloose in a society deeply divided by ethnic, economic and other conflicts.[20]

(3) on Mayor Daley – Mayor Daley, whose slogan is 'good government is good politics and good politics is good government', has made it clear that he will not tolerate corruption in office and has kept a very tight rein on gambling, prostitution, and organized crime. At the same time, he has inaugurated many reforms.... In his campaign for

[19] Wildavsky, *op.cit.*, p. 319.
[20] Edward Banfield and Martin Meyerson, *Politics, Planning and the Public Interest* (New York: Free Press, 1962), 292.

re-election in 1958, the Mayor presented himself as an efficient and non-partisan administrator. His principal piece of campaign literature did not so much as mention the Democratic party or the Democratic slate.[21]

(4) on the campaign –... The ideal that candidates in campaigns should debate alternative policies and that voters should listen, consider all sides, and then choose among the candidates rationally, is not only a hopeless ideal in that it does not square with the empirical facts as seen through the eyes of the candidates and voters, but it is not even a useful ideal in that it does not take into account either the limitations under which candidates and electorates operate or the necessities of the situation.[22]

(5) on the electoral college – The monopoly of power enjoyed by the two major parties would not likely survive the demise of the electoral college. Now, the dominance of two major parties enables us to achieve a politics of coalition and accommodation, rather than of ideological or charismatic fragmentation, governments that are moderate and a regime that is stable.... The electoral college as it now operates deters challenges to the two major parties, because an effective challenge must have not merely some popular appeal, but support of sufficient regional concentration to garner an electoral vote.[23]

Things, in other words, really are not very bad, and we needn't overly concern outselves with them. Rather than continually harping on how bad things are, we should be positive. The resulting positivism has taken two forms: the attempt to build an accurate model of what politics is really like in Western societies and the attempt to build a scientific apparatus with which to study it.

As Conservative political science made its impact on the profession, it developed its own model of political reality. That model has come to be known as pluralism, and it is of interest to us both for the assumptions it makes and the questions it never asks.

Balance, as C. Wright Mills very early pointed out, was the key to the pluralistic world.[24] Viewed as pluralistic, American society was seen as being in a constant state of dynamic equilibrium. All groups vied for

[21] Banfield, *op.cit.*, p. 247.
[22] Lewis A. Froman, Jr., 'A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategy and Tactics,' in M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler (eds.), *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966), p. 19.
[23] Alexander M. Bickel, *The New Age of Political Reform* (New York: Harper, 1968).
[24] C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford, 1959), pp. 242—268.

the output which the system could provide. The dispenser of political rewards was neutral – he would give them out to whomever had the influence. All groups could gain influence, even unorganized ones, because they had a 'potential' membership which was very great. Politics, the process by which demands were made and rewards given, took place in an atmosphere which was neither too oligarchic or too demogogic. Each group intelligently resisted absurd appeals to massness or ideology, while the continual conflict among the groups prevented any one from exercising complete domination over the others. While certainly not a perfect system, the pluralistic structure was the best one could hope for in an imperfect, but not evil, world.

The pluralistic assumption that stability, rather than change, is of the highest value is now well understood, even by the foremost pluralist writers.[25] Another assumption, that although conflict may exist, it will be resolved peaceably and fairly, is still open to criticism, especially with respect to race in the United States. Early pluralism was embarrassingly optimistic about race in America. Dahl once declared that 'The full assimilation of Negroes into the normal system has occurred in many northern states and now seems to be slowly taking place even in the South',[26] while a colleague of his rivaled him as Pollyanna of the Decade:

> – . . . the struggle for equality by a deprived racial group will be facilitated by the expanding economy, the availability of governmental resources for special assistance, and the relative security of otherwise challenged and more hostile 'opposition' groups. These conflicts will be expressed by the increased militance of the deprived minority group, and the vacillating, often reluctant, sometimes idealistic acceptance of these claims by the more affluent majority.[27] –

The importance of statements like these is not that they were wrong, but that they could be said at all. It must be clear, even to their authors, that contrary to their beliefs when they wrote them, their predictions were based more on the ideological perspective out of which they were writing than the 'scientific' evidence they mustered in support of them. A question of scientific method is raised by these faulty predictions.

[25] Robert A. Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), p. 261: 'Thus stability and consensus became a sort of fetish, particularly among American political scientists and social theorists. By contrast, conflict and change were perceived not so much as offering the possibility of a better future (as democratic ideologues a century earlier would have said), but as menacing the foundations of existing democracy itself'.

[26] Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: Phoenix Books, 1967), pp. 138—39.

[27] Robert E. Lane, 'The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence,' *American Political Science Review,* LIX (December 1965), 890. Lane's original is in italics.

The development of a scientific political science has dovetailed to some extent with the rise of conservative political science. The early exponents of behavioralism were reacting against a legalistic and traditional approach to the discipline, which, whatever its faults, was strongly involved in the affairs of the day. Under the Presidence of Thomas H. Reed, the APSA's Committee on Policy issued a report suggesting a variety of activities designed to educate citizens in politics. Reed has been described as engaging in 'political activism' because of his proposals for public activity.[28] All of this was disturbing to the early behavioralists, and under the leadership of their most important member, Charles Merriam, they forced Reed's resignation and prepared the profession for its scientific period.[29] However, early behavioralism was not totally conservative and irrelevant. Merriam desired a scientific political science for very specific ends: the end of corruption, conflict, war, and deadlock, and the promotion of co-operation and efficiency.[30] Similarly, Merriam's most famous student carried on his tradition by urging a more scientific study of politics, while at the same time fearing the emergence of a possible Garrison state and continually defining a democratic vision.[31]

But the intellectual similarities between behavioralism and the New Conservatism were too overpowering to delay the marriage too long. Behavioralism emphasized the fact/value dichotomy, which fit in well with the New Conservative's desire to avoid value judgments which were critical of existing systems, although they conveniently overlooked value judgments in favor of existing systems. Behavioralism quickly became pre-occupied with the questions of method, supporting the new conservative's desire to avoid major issues in favor of trivialities, a tendency which Merriam had specifically warned against.[32] Finally, both behavioralists and new conservatives emphasized model building as a primary form of intellectual activitty, so long as the model were irrelevant to reality – the more irrelevant, the better the model. In other words, although the rise of a scientific political science did not necessarily have to become part of the new conservatism, there were too many reasons why it should.

The alliance between the two can best be seen in the so-called voting

[28] Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, *The Development of Political Science* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), pp. 99.

[29] *Ibid.,* p. 100.

[30] Charles Merriam, *New Aspects of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925).

[31] See Harold Lasswell's *Democracy through Public Opinion* (Menasha, Wis., Banta, 1941) for his earlier views on the relationship between social ends and political science.

[32] An entire chapter of *New Aspects of Politics,* called 'Politics and Numbers,' warns against a totally quantitative approach to political science.

studies. In fact, the second of those studies represents perhaps the best synthesis of scientific experimentation and conservative implications we have. The authors emphasize the 'research continuity' of their effort, '... one phase in a cumulative enterprise.'[33] Probability samples, panel data, trend tabulations, analysis of variables, time series, but no formal tests of significance – these are the behavioral techniques employed, an advance indeed for writings on politics at the time. Combined with the methodology is a statement of implications in which the author's commitment to the *status quo* becomes apparent: apathy performs very valuable social functions, adding cohesion to the system; stability is a crucial value to emphasize in a political system; some conformity among voters is needed in a democracy.[34] In such fashion, science was used to prove, not surprisingly, what the authors hoped would be proved, that mass democracy is unhealthy and undesirable.

At the present time, we can distinguish three approaches to behavioralism. One school continues the trend established by the authors of *Voting*. Its proponents address themselves to specific political institutions, studying them with whatever scientific tools they can use, but ending up by justifying the existence of these institutions as they presently operate. A good example are the writings on Congress, symbolized by Peabody and Polsby's *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives* and the APSA's Study of Congress project.[35] A second trend in the application of behavioralism is not addressed to specific political institutions. It is pure methodology, devising tools which could be applied with equal uncertainty to the Supreme Court, city councils, or the United Nations. Factor analysis is a good example, and almost any recent issue of the *American Political Science Review* will provide specific studies. Finally, the newest development has been a group of behavioralists who refuse to accept a conservative bias in their work. They recognize the fact/value dichotomy not as an Iron Law but simply as something to be aware of. Using scientific methods developed by the other two groups, they are quite explicit in their desire to prove hypotheses growing out of a commitment to social change. Michael Rogin's *The Intellectuals and McCarthy* is a perfect example.[36] Using factor analytic techniques Rogin statistically disproves the Shils-Lipset-Parsons hypothesis that McCarthyism was a product of lower class hysteria. The result is to support the concept of

[33] Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, *Voting*, pp. viii–ix.

[34] The chapter in *Ibid.* called 'Democratic Practice and Democratic Theory' contains all these propositions.

[35] Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *The Congressional Process* (Boston, Little Brown, 1967).

[36] Michael Paul Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967).

change coming about through mass political activity. Thus, there is a faint sign that the marriage between science and the new conservatism may be on the rocks.

What this discussion suggests is that too often in American political science the response to the development of behavioralism has been a practical one: does it work? is political science a contradiction in terms? can facts and values be distinguished? We feel that this series of debates, best characterized in the exchanges between Herbert Storing and Sheldon Wolin,[37] are no longer meaningful to our scholarship. Behavioral science has presented to the study of politics a paradox: while more and more sophisticated, or should we simply say complicated techniques are being developed, the ability to predict major events, like racial conflict and war, has remained low. Some of the reasons for this are inherent in behavioral methodology; some are not. To the extent that behavioralism focusses upon the accumulation of data about relatively insignificant events, like voting, its predictive ability will be insignificant. So long as a rigid adherence to the fact/value dichotomy is maintained, a false picture of reality will result. In this sense, the debate over the predictability of behavioralism is important.

But the same debate also obscures some important questions. Our feeling concerning the low predictive ability of social science as it now exists is that we should say 'Thank God' rather than 'I told you so'. For a vital question is not whether science can be made to work, but for whom it is made to work. The Rogin study has shown that, given a certain approach to statistics, science can be made to work in the direction of social change. For this reason, we are interested in all research, whatever its form, which promotes that concern and uninterested in any, whatever its form, which ignores it. It is true that there is no monopoly on either conservatism or escapism – the real world can be avoided by a retreat into traditional areas such as constitutional law as well as into the most advanced computer applications. We just feel that there will be a greater propensity to avoid reality when the bastardized form of scientism which passes for behavioral science today is employed.

A similar argument can be developed with respect to the debate over pluralism. Given the defects of pluralism's attempt to understand the racial situation in the United States, the question can be raised: is this a result of defects in the pluralistic view or products of it? In other words, does the concept of pluralism need revision or a proper burial? What we find failing in pluralism is not the content of the ideology

[37] Herbert J. Storing (ed.), *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962); Sheldon Wolin and John Schaar, 'Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics: A Critique,' *American Political Science Review*, 57 (March 1963), 128–150; and subsequent replies, pp. 131—160.

but the *status quo* which it served. So long as pluralism was conservative, we rejected it. If it were possible for pluralism to support social change – we doubt it, but it might be possible – we would accept it. Asking the question this way sensitizes the scholar to the ideological underpinnings of descriptive concepts, a task undertaken for pluralism by William Connolly in a recent book.[38]

This discussion of the intellectual milieu of American political science from 1952-1965 gives way naturally to a consideration of the 'relevance' of political science, the main question raised by the CNPS.

III THE QUESTION OF RELEVANCE

The question of relevance in political science can be examined in at least three ways. First, a dominant trend in the discipline, already noted above, is behavioralism which is committed to a natural science methodology and claims to be an objective and value-free social science. This approach espouses operational criteria and quantification techniques adopted from the natural sciences, and regards mathematical model-building, game theory and the like as scientific knowledge about society and politics. The result in many cases, however, tends to be a pseudo-or apolitical science of politics whose research is reduced to a sophisticated numerology. Moreover, as was recently noted by John Seeley, social 'sciencizing' is politics by other means. This view underscores the relationship between the super-rationalistic scientism of a good deal of contemporary political science and its predilection to avoid political issues in its research as well as its implicit conservative value biases. As an example, Heinz Eulau,[39] who espouses value neutrality in social science research, asserts that the policy science approach may still be value-free even if men pursue values through politics. This is achieved by distinguishing propositions of fact which are subject to scientific-empirical inquiry and propositions of value. But he is still led to conclude that, for the policy scientist, 'there is nothing in his science that prevents its being used for ends of which he disapproves'.[40] What must be emphasized here is that, despite these claims to value neutrality and scientific objectivity, the purity of knowledge is meaningless as long as the uses of knowledge are determined by social institutions or power interests for certain prescribed purposes. In that case which we believe holds for all social knowledge, knowledge is accorded a certain value by society and plays a social and political function as well.

[38] William E. Connolly, *Political Science and Ideology* (New York: Atherton Press, 1967).
[39] *The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics* (New York: Random House, 1963).
[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 136—137.

In other words, given the present state of politics and society in America, political science is irrelevant insofar as its criteria of the 'detached' scholar or the 'objective' researcher replace the quest for truth about politics and the struggle for human betterment; political science is irrelevant if it is uncritical of society and assumes the values and social priorities of corrupt bureaucracies, powerful elites or unjust social practices instead of using its skills and knowledge to rectify social ills or support alternative social priorities.

Second, another broad spectrum of political science has become entrenched in an alliance with the government and the military in the production of cold war-oriented research. Political scientists – and other social scientists – are involved in devising counterinsurgency strategies in such Defense Department sponsored research as Project Camelot, pacification programs and the like. The best example of this new role of the social sciences as the advocates and defenders of American power is given by Ithiel de Sola Pool, whose view it is that social scientists ought to train the 'new mandarins' of the twentieth century. He envisions 'the only hope for humane government in the future' in 'the extensive use of the social sciences by government'. He has recommended that, in order to fully carry out this new function, social scientists should work for the Central Intelligence Agency.[41]

Other political scientists share this general orientation. One case in point is presented by Samuel Huntington, chairman of the Harvard Government Department, in a recent *Foreign Affairs* article.[42] He believes that in the last couple of years the movement in South Vietnam from the countryside to the cities which its attendant increase in income and employment but also its increase in slum dwellers is a sign of 'progressive' urbanization and modernization. According to his analysis, this development suggests an answer to 'wars of national liberation' because, instead of conventional military victory or counterinsurgency tactics (both of which have proved difficult or futile), it employs a method of 'forced-draft urbanization and modernization which rapidly brings the country in question out of the phase in which a rural revolutionary movement can hope to generate sufficient strength to come to power'.[43] In short, this analysis is not only a strategy for reducing the influence of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, but for achieving American policy goals – anti-communism, pacification of the population, and propping up the Saigon regime. The objective or value-free nature of this sort of research analysis is dubious; its ideological function is obvious. Here the question of relevance remains pertinent. But it is now a question of relevance for

[41] 'Necessity for Social Scientists Doing Research for Governments,' *Background*, X (August 1966), 111.
[42] 'The Bases of Accommodation,' *Foreign Affairs*, XLVI (July 1968), 642—656.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 652.

whom or knowledge for what. The answer is clear: These political scientists have become house ideologues — masters of knowledge in the service of the masters of power.

Finally, the question of relevance in political science involves consideration of the institutionalization and professionalization of the discipline and the standards and values which determine modes of research as well as the nature of the reward structure. What is becoming most characteristic of large academic institutions like the APSA is the tendency to adhere to high standards of professionalism which are based more on established social determinants than on academic and social standards and responsibilities, and to implement these standards and values through rewards, status and privilege. For instance, an APSA special committee on professional standards and responsibilities had no apparent difficulty in deciding that it was 'ethical' for officers of the APSA to carry on research for the CIA as long as 'such activities do not interfere with their duties and responsibilities to the Association'. This report gave no consideration to the nature or purpose of such activities, but only to whether the financial support was overt or covert.

Moreover, the allocation of resources in the APSA, in wich the general practice is to hold uncontested elections for its officers, is carefully guarded by self-serving elites — 'top men in the field', 'well-known specialists' — with the high sense of civility and status entailed by this role. The determination of who rules is not made by democratic procedures but is arrived at by institutional demands which are generally in accordance with the demands of non-academic institutions in the society. In other words, professionalism and its rewards are determined less by the values and ethics of the discipline than by the values and ethics of the social and political *status quo*. Therefore, it is no wonder that- non-conventional, non-behavioralist, or radical political scientists rarely make it in the existing reward structure. This is also the case in considering who receives grants from research foundations such as the Social Science Research Council, to mention only one example, in that the APSA executive council makes appointments to that organization. In political science departments, as elsewhere in the academic community. similar procedures and standards are adhered to. The best known procedure for appointments and promotions is still the 'publish or perish' routine. Recognition requires publishing in the 'good' journals and teaching tends to be overlooked. The failure to perform in prescribed ways is a means of holding back or intimidating individuals whether it be for 'academic', 'political' or other reasons. The 'cult of stability' even goes as far as the attitudes of some political scientists toward recent student unrest. Several political scientists, for example, were among the first to resign at Cornell over the 'loss' of academic freedom resulting from the black student demands or protest the intrusion on research

time caused by the turmoil on the campus.

Despite these conditions, it is interesting to note the ostensibly different response the official APSA has taken toward the CNPS. They have thus far assumed an extremely liberal and open approach, welcoming the CNPS as in important new development in the APSA. They have given the CNPS ample time and space at conventions to hold its own program, and encouraged its contribution to various prospective reforms and study commissions of the APSA. Furthermore, the CNPS demanded panels on Vietnam and the APSA responded by setting up the series of panels on 'Nations in Distress', and appointed the CNPS chairman to organize a section of six panels on 'The Political Scientist as Policy Scientist'. The CNPS asked for discussion of the political structure of the APSA and is promised for the coming convention a plenary session on 'The Governing of a Profession' with one CNPS member invited to face a group of political science notables including former presidents, the executive director, and the editor of the journal. Even in response to the CNPS effort to challenge the elections in the APSA, the approach has been consistent. The CNPS has received considerable cooperation for its efforts in this regard, showing the willingness of the APSA to recognize the need for open debate and democratic procedures. But, at the same time, the APSA has attempted to guard against any extreme or unpredictable outcome and has therefore sought to nominate CNPS members, which may function to avoid any serious confrontation or debate on issues and possibly to neutralize the CNPS faction.

But obviously what is at stake is not some programmatic changes dealing with politically relevant topics or the election of a few officers. The Establishment in political science envisages its role as the defenders of an important institutional superstructure in American society with all of the status and order, sense of propriety and social reward structure and dominant social and intellectual priorities that go with this role. This became evident when a conservative group was formed in the APSA recently to counter what they called 'the new left radicalism' of the CNPS. It was quickly received by the APSA and afforded equal time and space along with the CNPS for its own program at the annual convention. It was not opposed in the same way that the CNPS was not opposed, because what is at stake is not the inclusion or rejection of a different political or methodological perspective. A radical or conservative group can be equally accepted — integrated or co-opted — with no apparent shift in the major political or instituitonal orientation of the discipline. Change can be accommodated as long as it is not too extreme or too unorthodox; change is even encouraged and supported since it serves to reinforce the liberal, pluralistic image of political science and academic professionalism generally.

The test of the liberal paradigm – its politics and its institutional superstructure – will come when these new forces attempt to capitalize on the directions they have initiated. What we are suggesting is that as long as the CNPS restricts its concern for change to demands for inclusion of 'relevant' political science or greater representation, credit will probably continue to be extended. Buf if the CNPS raises the ante and calls for a more farreaching anti-establishment political science or encourages radical political activism, then this will most likely beckon foreclosure.

IV PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF A RADICAL POLITICAL SCIENCE

Finally, we turn to a consideration of the problems and prospects of a radical political science. A radical political science can be defined as an attempt to use the tools which the discipline has created in order to solve the problems which society has created. Stated in this way, a radical political science does not seem very different from some aspects of the discipline currently manifested in the work of 'policy scientists'. In actuality, however, what makes this approach revolutionary is the nature of the problems and the solutions; for a radical political science would seek not to adjust and to tinker with existing political systems in the hope of improving them, but to discover new political forms in an effort to replace them. Making extensive criticisms and creating radical alternatives is the core of a new, radical, political science.

The term 'radical' may conjure up some wrong images. We have used it intentionally to demonstrate our belief that the future questions facing the discipline will be different from past ones. Perhaps, then, the best way of describing what is new about the field we envision is to list certain things which a radical political science will not be. As suggested above, the debate over radicalizing political science should bury once and for all the behavioralist-traditionalist squable which has plagued good scholarship for a number of years, even though there obviously remain important questions of methodology.

Furthermore, the term 'radical political science' does not refer to a process of 'proving' what young radicals are saying, i.e., that there is a powerfull military-industrial complex, that ghetto residents have no power, that piecemeal reform is impossible in anti-Communist dominated America, etc. It calls rather for an examination of the truth or falsity of those hypotheses. What is puzzling about contemporary political science is not that the hypotheses advanced by New Left activists – some of whom are professionally trained political scientists – are refuted but that they are ignored.[44] Those questions of vital importance to the future of this country, questions involving power, political

change, foreign policy, are not discussed in Academe, or when discussed for purposes generally congenial to the *status quo*. A radical political science needs to examine these questions and find relevant answers, but also most importantly, to devise ways of relating the finding to political reality.

Finally, a radical political science will not be a panegyric for its subject matter. Pygmalion-like, some practitioners of a *status quo* political science have begun to worship their subject matter. Consider the recent adoration by John Bunzel. Politics, by which Bunzel means compromise, flexibility, expediency, is the key to a succesful democratic political system. Those who reject such bargaining for more clarity or political extremism are anti-political, and although Bunzel says that such activity is 'necessary to a free society', he castigates it severely throughout his book.[45] What the radical can contribute to a thesis such as Bunzel's is a broadened view of what politics means. There is an apparent paradox here. While Bunzel criticizes radical scholars for being anti-political, a group of scholars including Christian Bay have attacked Bunzel's type of scholarship as not being political enough.[46] In other words, a radical political science will define politics as any activity aimed toward social change (Bay) and not just activity which takes some arbitrarily established forms (Bunzel). Such a broadening is an important prerequisite if political science is going to meet the world on reasonably equal terms.

Actually, the nucleus of a radical political science already exists in the professional literature, much of it contributed by members of the CNPS. As pluralism shaped a world view for the 1950-1965 political scientists, we must turn to the critics of pluralism – Murray Edelman, Theodore Lowi, Henry Kariel, and Grant McConnell[47] – for the early strains of a new political science. For example, as Edelman has

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[44] We recognize the major exception of Robert Dahl, whose pluralistic concepts are a direct answer to the power elite theories of Mills and Hunter. But in a sense he is not an exception, for his challenge came from professional colleagues rather than from activists working in urban areas.

[45] John H. Bunzel, *op.cit.*, p. 268.

[46] See Bunzel, pp. 283—286, for his attack on radical historian Theodore Roszak. The best radical critique of established political science research is Christian Bay, 'Politics and Pseudo-Politics,' *American Political Science Review*, LIX (March 1965), 39—51.

[47] Their major works which are relevant to this paragraphs are as follows: Kariel, *The Decline of American Pluralism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961) and *The Promise of Politics* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966); Lowi, 'How the Farmers Get What They Want,' *Reporter*, 30 (May 21, 1964), 34—47; Lowi, 'The Public Philosophy: Interest Group Liberalism,' *American Political Science Review*, LXI (March 1967), 5—24; and Lowi (ed.) *Private Life and Public Order* (New York: Norton, forthcoming); Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964);

early strains of a new political science. For example, as Edelman has noted, 'there is a good reason to suspect that wide agreement on a centrist or 'middle of the road' orientation offers a barrier to politically induced change.[48] Because the pluralist critics, even though they might not be described as political radicals, were nonetheless writing from somewhere other than the center, many of their findings can be used to support 'politically induced change'. For example, McConnell's search for a viable national constituency as an alternative to authoritarian private power is pregnant with implications for such New Left concepts as participatory democracy. In short, while a radical political science must take into account the fact that decentralization can be used by elites to insure their own centralized control, to develop a political theory which could reconcile the benefits of a non-authoritarian, decentralized constituency with problems of national scope and significance could be a major aim of a radical political science.

In conclusion, we may characterize three prospective lines of development for a radical political science, all of which have found expression in the CNPS: (1) the development of new paradigms for research and political analysis or new modes of inquiry; (2) the politization and democratization of the APSA and the reform of the discipline, teaching and curricula; (3) the creation of a research-action political science focusing on criticism of American institutions and analyses of alternative social priorities.

The first approach is primarily theoretical. It is founded on a critique of the established social science paradigms to deal with a changing world. Because of the narrowness of what Thomas Kuhn calls 'normal science' and the limitations of its social utility, what is sought is an alternative paradigm (or new modes of inquiry) to contend with today's social problems, new political subcultures, new modes of human experience and behavior, and so on. This approach differs from the latter two in that it is neither an organizational nor a political revolt against establishment political science, but rather an intellectual one. It is concerned with devising a new vision of man and new ways of analyzing the social order as an intellectual pursuit of knowledge and more satisfactory truths about man and society. There is a commitment to social change and an expectation that theory will be translated into action, but also a commitment to intellectual detachment and objectivity. An effort has been made in CNPS program this year to move in this direction. Panels on 'Towards a New Political Science', 'The Nature of Revolution', and 'Symbolic Use of Politics' have been organized.

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and McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1966).

[48] Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, p. 186.

A second perspective envisages the CNPS as the pinwheel for reform of the APSA and the discipline. The major concern here is to democratize institutions and existing practices. The CNPS, as has been mentioned, will contest the APSA elections by running its own slate of candidates and demanding that all candidates speak on issues. The CNPS has also appointed its own platform committee which will draft an 'election manifesto' to be discussed and approved at its business meeting, and anticipates nominating candidates to stand on the platform.

Other efforts include creating study commissions on discrimination of women and non-whites and repression of political activists in the discipline. There is also considerable interest in reforming political science curricula to meet changing student-teacher needs as well as debate over the meaning of the 'free scholar' in American education today and the proper role of the teacher of *political* science. In this direction, the CNPS has organized several workshop panels for the convention.

Lastly, there are those political scientists who believe that the future of the CNPS movement will depend on a critical evaluation of American institutions and a confrontation with prevailing social injustices — 'poverty, racism and imperialism'. What is needed, therefore, is analysis of alternative social priorities, devising models of social change and strategies for political action — action-research projects — and *political* commitment on the part of intellectual. There is expectation that the election of CNPS candidates as APSA officers will bring change in this direction, as well as the continuation of panel programs, study commissions and publications. But in addition to these efforts *within* the APSA, there may be alternative ways of achieving some of these goals in the social sciences. One prospect is that of uniting the various radical caucuses which may be done through new organizations like the New University Conference or 'radical institutes' which are beginning to emerge in several urban centers. This would provide for an interdissiplinary social science and suggests another method of extending and consolidating the contribution to social knowledge and change already begun. What is needed, according to this perspective, is a radical political science which will depend in the long run on the extent to which it can be put to the service of the most urgent social needs.