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GORDENKER, LEON, *The UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace*. New York etc. (Columbia University Press), 1967 —xvii, 380 p., 63 sh.

Onderzoekers die zich toelagen op het analyseren van de verrichtingen van organen van de Verenigde Naties, hebben nu materiaal van meer dan twintig jaar geschiedenis der VN tot hun beschikking om uit te putten. Naarmate de VN langer bestaan, vergroot dit de mogelijkheden tot analyse en vergelijking. In deze studie heeft Leon Gordenker, van 1946 tot 1953 voorlichtingsambtenaar van de VN en thans hoogleraar in de politicologie aan de universiteit van Princeton, op voortreffelijke wijze gebruik gemaakt van het hem ten dienste staande materiaal om de rol van de Secretaris-Generaal op het gebied van de handhaving van de vrede te analyseren. Achtereenvolgens behandelt hij de opvattingen over het ambt zoals die geleidelijk zijn gegroeid, de routine- en representatie-functies, de politieke functies en de bestuursfuncties van de Secretaris-Generaal. Zeer goed laat hij daarbij zowel de mogelijkheden naar voren komen die het ambt de Secretaris-Generaal biedt als de problemen die zich bij de uitoefening van het ambt hebben voorgedaan.

Gordenker is er zich van bewust dat een analyse van de invloed die de hoogste ambtenaar van de wereldorganisatie kan uitoefenen op het gebied van vredeshandhaving, niet alleen afhangt van politieke en organisatorische factoren maar ook sterk van de persoonlijkheid van de man die het ambt uitoefent. Hoewel de schrijver zijn best doet de drie figuren die deze post tot nu toe hebben bekleed, allen het volle pond te geven, kon deze lezer zich toch niet aan de indruk onttrekken dat zijn voorkeur sterk uitgaat naar de figuur Dag Hammarskjöld. Deze heeft, aldus Gordenker, het meest bijgedragen aan een vastleggen en uitbreiden van de bevoegdheden van de Secretaris-Generaal doordat hij het meeste inzicht had in de mogelijkheden van het ambt: 'It seems likely that his close reasoning and generalizations have helped to give lasting definition to the office of Secretary-General'. (p. 85) Gordenker is, evenals Hammarskjöld, een verklaard voorstander van de *persoonlijke* aanpak van het ambt, waarbij de Secretaris-Generaal aan het hoofd staat van een werkelijk internationaal ambtenaren-apparaat, los van enig blok, politieke groep of combinatie daarvan. Het is dan ook niet verwonderlijk dat hij zich keert tegen het door de Russen gelanceerde 'troika' voorstel waarbij het Secretariaat geleid zou worden door één vertegenwoordiger van het Westen, één van de communistische wereld en één van de niet-gebonden landen. Wellicht ware het mogelijk geweest de van Russische zijde naar voren gebrachte argumenten ten gunste van dit voorstel iets uitvoeriger te belichten dan Gordenker heeft gedaan. Hij sluit m.i. nu iets te gemakkelijk aan bij op dit punt in het Westen gangbare opvatting, terwijl hij toch anderszins de noodzaak van een goede verstandhouding van de Secretaris-Generaal met *beide* supermogendheden beklemtoont, wil hij enige kans van slagen hebben in zijn activiteiten. Zowel Lie als Hammarskjöld verloren gaandeweg de steun van de Sowjet-Unie en werden daardoor minder bruikbaar in de uitoefening van hun ambt. In de inleiding tot zijn meest recente jaarverslag keert U Thant zich gelijkelijk tegen Russen (Tsjechoslowakije!) en Amerikanen (Vietnam!). Dit zou zijn effectiviteit als Secretaris-Generaal wel eens nadelig kunnen beïnvloeden.

Deze laatste opmerkingen zijn overigens bepaald niet bedoeld als kritiek op Gordenker die zelf de eerste zal zijn om de wankle basis waarop de positie van de Secretaris-Generaal rust, te erkennen. Voor wie enig inzicht wil verwerven in de wijze waarop de Secretaris-Generaal zijn functie als vredeshandhaver uitoefent, is dit degelijke werk een onmisbare steun.

P. R. Baehr

SUMMARIES

DUTCH POLITICS IN TRANSITION

by A. Lijphart

From about 1917 to 1967, Dutch politics closely resembled the model of consociational democracy (*pacificatie-democratie*), characterized by a fragmented political culture, overarching cooperation among the subcultural elites, and a high degree of political stability. Dutch democracy is now in a period of transition from the consociational pattern to the depoliticized pattern of democracy (*kartel-democratie*), characterized by a homogeneous political culture and, like the consociational system, cooperation rather than competition among the elites. There are several reasons why this transition is not proceeding smoothly: (1) The homogenization of the political culture is a multidimensional process, in which the different variables (the decline of ideology and religion as politically relevant factors, the decrease of social segregation, and the declining cohesion of the organizations within each subculture) are developing unevenly. As a result, the party system tends toward fragmentation instead of the growth of large catch-all parties. (2) A neo-democratic ideology is developing as a reaction against the insufficiently democratic quality of the depoliticized system. Because the 'undemocratic' cartel of elites is also characteristic of consociational democracy, this neo-democratic opposition appears in an early stage of the political transition in the Netherlands. (3) The elites, accustomed to the relatively easy tasks of political accommodation and to the deference of their followers in consociational democracy, react indecisively to the sudden political unrest. (4) The extreme form of proportional representation in the Netherlands tends to reinforce disproportionately the effects of fragmentation and neo-democratic demands. The recent controversies over the royal house have also added to the political unrest, but this factor is a purely coincidental one. Dutch politics will probably keep moving toward the depoliticized pattern, and will remain relatively unstable because of the neo-democratic opposition inherent in this type of democracy. A deliberate decartellization and re-politicization by the ruling elites, which would mean a return to competitive politics and greater stability, is possible but not very probable.

DIPLOMACY: AN ORGANISATION IN TRANSITION. SOME STATISTICAL DATA RELATING TO THE NETHERLANDS FOREIGN SERVICE

by J. Niezing

On the basis of governmental publications a mainly statistical analysis is given of changes in the Foreign Service of the Netherlands.

The diplomatic organisation can be divided into the following categories: 'consular service', 'foreign service officers', 'bilateral representation' and 'multilateral representation'. The growth of the diplomatic organization in the post-war years can be traced back to the growth of representation, mainly multilateral representation (Figures 1, 2 and 3). Comparison with Norwegian data reveals that the same trend appears in the Norwegian diplomatic organization.

In the third section an analysis is made of the effects of tensions in the formal hierarchy of the diplomacy. A Dutch diplomat can formally be forwarded with a 'personal title' belonging to one rank higher in the hierarchy than he actually

occupies. Table 4 shows that this practice was more and more applied in post-war years and that it centers around rank level III. There also are some formal possibilities to appoint foreign service officers in another than the officially prescribed way. These 'irregular' appointments occurred mainly during the first ten post-war years (table 5) and include about 1/3 of all appointments in the entire post-war period (table 6). The 'irregulars' leave the diplomatic service sooner than the 'regulars' (table 7), the ratio for the whole post-war period being 3:1 (table 8).

In section 4 comparisons are made between formal and actual progress of the diplomatic career of the 'regulars' (figure 6). Also the relation between career speed and preparatory training is analyzed (table 13).

ON THEORY FORMATION

by J. K. de Vree

1 — It is assumed that it is the purpose of a theory to *explain* something. An explanation is an answer to a question of the linguistic form 'why?'; its logical structure is of the following form:

$$\begin{array}{c} L_1, \dots, L_n \\ C_1, \dots, C_n \\ \hline E \end{array}$$

That is, on the basis of a certain set of postulates, or 'laws', $\{L_1, \dots, L_n\}$, and a set of given, observed 'circumstances', $\{C_1, \dots, C_n\}$, 'E', the conclusion, is deduced. Accordingly, the character of an explanation and, consequently, of a theory, is *deductive*.

2 — As regards the structure of a theory several elements should be distinguished. (1) The logical mathematical, or probablistic system in which the theory is formulated. (2) The *calculus* which may be conceived as the axiomatic nucleus of the theory and which consists of a set of primitive concepts and postulates governing the use of the primitives. On the basis of primitives and postulates new concepts and theorems are deduced. It is to be noted, that the content of the primitives (their 'meaning') consists of the way they are used *within* the relational structure of the calculus; that is, they are defined *implicitly*. (3) An *interpretative system* of rules connecting the 'abstract' calculus with other structures of knowledge. In this way the calculus can be given different *interpretations*, which constitute *models* of the initial calculus. In order to explain empirical reality, there should at least be an *empirical model* of the calculus, that is, the calculus has to be connected with observable reality. In this case the interpretation is given by a set of 'operational definitions' as they are commonly called. It is shown that these definitions can be conceived as 'quickly decidable sentences' by means of which the empirical model can be falsified.

3 — The role which theory construction plays with regard to the formation of reality is indicated. Making explicit its logical structure and its empirical interpretation, theory formation leads to 'intersubjectively transmissible knowledge'. It results in the construction of a reality which transcends individual and parochial idiosyncracies and which is accessible to everybody. Of the conditions a theory should fulfill, two stand out: (a) it should be *consistent*, and (b) it should be *falsifiable*. Finally, it is shown that there is some ground to assume theory formation to be possible — even in the social sciences, difficult though it may be.

SIMULATION: THE ANATOMY OF A FAD

by Charles A. Powell

Simulation studies in all areas are considered to be somewhat of a fad. Substantial reconstruction of a root and branch nature are required, especially with respect to simulations which utilize a model-controlled environment for experimental purposes. It is suggested that validity criteria for model construction have been characterized by a pervasive error in the concern for 'isomorphic' realism, which reproduced in sophisticated model form the simplism and cognitive rigidity of the war game umpire. Even as this error has been gradually recognized and partially corrected, the basic orientation and concern for environmental model aspects has remained and continues to divert interest away from the micro-political nexus. The author's own suggestion, the Prisoner's Dilemma Simulation, is an attempt to focus upon this core element in the larger system and to develop a technique for complex experimental research into conflict behavior.

The author suggests that simulation can be seen in four ways:

- 1 As a means of macro-political analysis: in which the output is new research directions, i.e., 'the next most plausible model.' It is a means of summarizing research and getting on with the business of further research instead of leaving locked rooms packed with data to be analyzed 'some day'.
- 2 Educationally: here one wants to 'tell how it is' and make people aware of it in a way that sells history.
- 3 Complex experimentation: in which theories can be generated which are valid at least for some people, and which may therefore have an improved survival rate when tested in the real world.
- 4 As a fad: which can be used effectively for a while to get money from people who have not yet been told that it is *passé* until the next fad comes along.