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Leiden
The Netherlands

Boekbespreking van: Partisan Politics in the Global Economy

Anderson, K.M.

Citation

Anderson, K. M. (2000). Boekbespreking van: Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. *Acta Politica*, 35: 2000(1), 107-109. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3450729>

Version: Publisher's Version
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Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

continuities', the author rejects dividing it into different periods and argues that "the unlikely combination of racism, antistatism, and civic republicanism" constituted the 'Jeffersonian Epoch' (p. 162). Resembling modern Republicans rather than contemporary Democrats, "(n)ineteenth-century Democrats were radical preservationists" (p. 163). However, their dislike of the state was not accompanied by a liking of the market (or of religion). In the words of the author, "(t)he animating purpose behind the party's national ideology was the prevention of tyranny, rather than the achievement of anything in particular" (p. 177).

The Populist Epoch (1896-1948) was characterized by "the ideal of majority rule and (in) the populist narrative in which the people fought for their rights against an economic and political elite" (p. 189). Despite the fact that certain Democratic presidential candidates in this period did not fit the populist ideology, Gerring sees 'compelling reasons' to argue that this period does in fact constitute one ideological epoch. Most notably, the 'conservatives' (e.g., Parker, Cox and Davis) were far less important within the party and successful in elections than the 'populists' (most notably Bryan, Wilson and Roosevelt). The 'Populist Epoch' not only introduced a new ideology, but also brought a new style of politics, laying the foundations of modern-day well-organized, candidate-centred, interactive campaigns.

The change to the 'Universalist Epoch (1952-1992)' was clearly the least radical in the history of the two parties. Instead of displaying complete turnarounds, so typical of earlier shifts of epochs, this time the Democratic party kept most of its ideology (i.e., support for both the state and the market, while aiming at greater equality and social welfare). The main change was that the Universalist Democrats no longer focused on equal opportunity for all Americans, but rather became the voice of American minorities (ethnic, racial, sexual and issue-based). Inclusion became the name, multiculturalism the game. Moreover, the party changed its rhetoric from resentment to reconciliation. In other words, "(a)genda and rhetoric shifted from majority rule to minority rights" (p. 244).

The conclusion addresses the question: what drives ideological change? Rejecting the constituent-centred theories of party conflict in America – i.e., the classical, social-class, ethnocultural and realignment theories, Gerring argues that "(p)arty constituencies should be thought of as a *constraint*, not a deciding factor, in the creation and re-creation of party ideology" (p. 271). Party leaders have always been the deciding factor. Unfortunately, their behaviour, the author claims, cannot be explained by one general theory. Different combinations of different factors explain different ideological changes.

The book ends with an epilogue with a short discussion of the 1996 presidential campaigns. Here the author argues that Dole's campaign was a continuation of the Neoliberal Republican Epoch and Clinton's of the Universalist Democratic Epoch. The appendix, finally, discusses the methodological issues of the study in a concise manner. Most interesting for students of political parties in general, and party ideology in particular, is the discussion of the how and why of studying party ideologies.

Though somewhat overstating the importance of the quantitative part of his analysis, it provides a useful discussion of the problems involved in studying party ideology, as well as offering some (admittedly imperfect) solutions.

There is no doubt that Gerring has successfully mastered the daunting task he set himself. As a study of American politics, and as a (comparative) study of party ideology, it provides a welcome and original contribution. As is rightfully claimed in the cover text, "this book challenges traditional notions of American party politics and political culture." Most notably, it convincingly shows the importance of ideology in American party politics of the past, present, and future. Moreover, it refutes some of the popular myths of American party ideology. For example, Gerring convincingly argues that Whigs and Republicans had actually rather similar position on slavery (pp. 110-1); the New Deal was neither the beginning of a new ideological era of the Democrats (pp. 227-30), nor the reason for the Republicans' shift to an anti-big government position (pp. 140-1); William Jennings Bryan has been "a major creative force in the fashioning of twentieth-century Democratic ideology" (p. 224).

The one serious point of critique I could bring forward, is directed not so much at the book as a study of American politics but rather as a study of party ideology in the classical sense. This is most visible when Gerring claims that "the place of social issues within the contemporary Republican party is easily exaggerated" (p. 150). At first rather surprising, the statement makes more sense after Gerring's clarification that "social issues have never constituted more than a small fraction of the party's general election rhetoric" (pp. 150-1). Because of his exclusive focus on the "party in campaign" (p. 22), Gerring describes party *propaganda* rather than party *ideology*. In some cases, the author also seems to admit this (e.g., p. 201).

This said, one can only praise this formidable study. Although this book might not become *the* definitive study of American party ideology, it will definitely become *one of the* (few) seminal studies on the topic.

Cas Mudde

Geoffrey Garrett, *Partisan Politics in the Global Economy*. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998. ISBN 0-521-44690-2. USD 17.95.

In this important book, Geoffrey Garrett enters the scholarly debate about the impact of international economic integration on domestic politics. The current state of the debate is characterized by the polarization of viewpoints into two camps. One group of scholars argues that internationalization has very little impact on domestic political processes, while a second group emphasizes the constraints of increased trade and capital mobility on national autonomy, especially social democratic social and economic policies. Garrett forcefully argues a case for the former viewpoint, challenging the gloomy predictions of Fritz Scharpf, Paulette Kurzer, Jonathan Moses and other

proponents of the latter position. Garrett argues that globalization, defined as increasing levels of trade integration and capital mobility, *strengthens* the relationship between leftist political power and social democratic policies that address inequalities generated by the market. Garrett's analysis proceeds from an acceptance of the fact that the integration of markets for goods and capital has increased significantly in the past several decades. In contrast to the 'globalization thesis', however, Garrett's central argument is that leftist political strategies are still viable in the context of globalization, and that integrated markets increase the attractiveness of leftist policies as the number of citizens adversely affected by market integration increases. Thus, the process of globalization has not weakened the historical relationship between left-labour government and a large public economy.

Garrett takes aim at the implications of one of the central arguments of the globalization theorists: the ability of mobile asset holders to pick up and leave. According to this line of argument, asset holders will settle in countries with favourable business and investment climates, thereby reducing the ability of governments to pursue economic and social policies that are substantially different from other more capital-friendly regimes. Garrett disputes this claim, reasoning that capital will not always exit leftist-dominated regimes because left-labour regimes produce collective goods such as infrastructure, education, and stable wage growth that facilitate economic growth. In this sense, Garrett emphasizes that the 'positive externalities of big government', such as redistributive economic policies, are consistent with good economic performance in integrated markets.

For Garrett, the key to achieving strong economic performance and maintaining social democratic policies in the context of market integration is the smooth functioning of social democratic corporatism. In this sense, Garrett builds on a large body of existing research about the relationship between corporatist institutions and macroeconomic performance. In common with previous corporatism literature, Garrett argues that strong leftist parties allied with encompassing, cohesive labour unions, will pursue policies that enhance long-term economic performance. Because unions are encompassing and cohesive, they are able to overcome shortsighted, self-interested policies in favour of policies that promote long-term societal interests, such as wage restraint that promotes competitiveness. On the political side, leftist governments pursue economic growth policies accompanied by measures to protect those injured by market effects. However, the viability of this left-labour policy package depends on the existence of labour market institutions that are sufficiently encompassing so as to facilitate collective action.

To support his arguments about the continued viability of social democratic corporatism, Garrett relies on descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations from fourteen advanced industrial democracies for the period 1966 to 1990. One of the final chapters updates the empirical analysis through the mid-1990s. Garrett finds that there has been no significant decline in union power; leftist governments still rely on traditional redistributive policies; and this leftist policy profile has strengthened in

the wake of globalization. These findings call into question some of the central arguments of the 'conventional wisdom' concerning the impact of globalization. However, Garrett observes that the integration of markets did lead to some constraints on left-labour policies, although as noted, the effects of globalization have not been as dire as expected. In order to maintain their redistributive policy profile, left-labour governments resorted to deficit spending, were prone to higher than average inflation, and were subject to somewhat higher than average interest rates. For Garrett, the essential point is that left-labour governments continued to pursue redistributive, big government policies even as the pace of globalization increased.

Despite this optimistic account of the viability of left-labour policies in the era of globalization, Garrett identifies two specific threats to social democracy that are not related to globalization. First, left-labour governments face the challenge of aging. This demographic change strains the capacity of existing welfare state arrangements as the growth in the number of elderly persons threatens the viability of two expensive types of welfare programmes: old-age pensions and healthcare. Second, the growth of public sector unions makes it more difficult for encompassing labour market institutions to regulate wages across the entire economy.

Garrett provides a compelling analysis of left-labour strategies in the global economy, but it is open to criticism on several counts. The first weakness concerns data. Garrett's reliance on aggregate data for fourteen countries conceals as much as it reveals. For example, Garrett shows that the increased integration of markets resulted in higher public spending levels in left-labour regimes. However, increases in the size of the public economy in Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and elsewhere have often been accompanied by significant cuts in individual social programmes. Recent research on the Dutch and Danish 'miracles' demonstrate this clearly. Although the size of the public economy may have increased, left-labour governments have often cooperated in substantial welfare state restructuring that involves sizeable losses for large sectors of society.

A second weakness is Garrett's inattention to the impact of the European integration process. Most of the countries analysed in the book are EU members, and Garrett does little to link his discussion of globalization to the process of Europeanization. For example, is globalization a process distinct from European integration? Or, is Europeanization a process that unfolds within the context of globalization? Does Europeanization, like globalization, increase the relationship between left-labour government and the size of the public economy? Garrett offers no answers to these kinds of questions. Nor does Garrett address the fundamental issue of how European integration influences the capacity of member states to achieve what Garrett contends is still a viable option: *national* left-labour economic and social policies.

Despite these weaknesses, *Partisan Politics in the Global Economy* is essential reading not only for scholars specializing in international and comparative political economy, but also for those focusing on comparative welfare state politics and industrial relations.

Karen M. Anderson