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The Budget Approach: Political distance measured in kroner

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The Budget Approach: political distance measured in kroner

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1. Introduction

Together with the election campaigns and the coalition forming process, the annual political activities surrounding the composition of the government budget probably belong to the most important activities of political parties. The climax of the budgetary process is normally the presentation of the first draft budget by the government. This presentation has typically been preceded by an intense struggle between, as well as within, the bureaucracy and the cabinet (Wildavsky 1976). It is mostly after this presentation that the parliamentary parties start to express their ideas about next year's budget. In most cases the budget will be more or less supported by the parties which are in government, while the position of the opposition parties can vary from modestly supportive to vehemently opposing.

In the subsequent debate Scandinavian opposition parties often present an alternative budget in which they state their aims for the following fiscal year. The right-wing opposition parties will typically demand lower expenditures, along with lower taxes, while left-wing opposition parties will state that the government should take a more active stance, which results in more expenditures and higher taxes. This pattern is clearly recognisable in the Scandinavian countries, and also outside the Scandinavian context we can find the same division between leftist and rightist parties. But what does this mean? Is it indeed inherent to a rightist party that it demands lower expenditures and lower taxes? Does a rightist party demand lower expenditures on each and every item? If not, what are typical items on which a rightist party wants to increase expenditures? These and many other questions are very important if one truly wants to understand the party competition surrounding the budgetary process.

It is important to realise that there are some intrinsic differences between alternative budgets and government budgets. Alternative budgets are nearly always the ideal budget according to one single party², while government budgets often are the result of inter-party negotiations. If there is a one party

government supported by the majority in parliament, a party could of course construct a budget completely to its own liking. But even then there is an important difference between alternative and government budgets. This is the fact that the government parties are under much greater pressure from the outside world. Bureaucratic organisations might for example demand higher wages and interest groups may demand more subsidies.³ The government controls the actual allocation of the expenditures while the alternatives of the opposition parties are only theoretical exercises. The opposition parties can construct their alternative proposals in relative isolation. Below I will return to this important difference.

It is surprising that government budgets and alternative budgets submitted by opposition parties never have been used in the comparative study of political parties.⁴ Together with the party manifestos (alternative) budgets are the most important documents produced by (opposition) parties in the Scandinavian countries. Compared to the party manifestos the alternative budgets have the obvious advantage that the quantitative nature of much of its content makes it easier to make comparisons. In this article I will try to develop a new method to construct unidimensional, as well as multidimensional policy spaces on the bases of the figures put forward in (alternative) budgets. This method will be called the Budget Approach.

Policy spaces are a major concept in political science literature. Coalition formation, party system change and electoral behaviour are all important subfields of political science in which policy spaces play a crucial role for the understanding of the political reality. Unfortunately, however, the theoretical understanding of policy spaces is much better developed than the actual operationalization of these spaces (Laver and Hunt 1992). Mass surveys (e.g., Sani and Sartori 1983), expert judgments (e.g., Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1992), roll-call voting (e.g., Shaffer 1991) and manifestos (Laver and Budge 1992) are the traditional sources that have been used to operationalize the concept of policy space. Below I will discuss several of the validity and reliability problems that are connected with these approaches. It is my contention that it is very well possible to use the expenditure figures put forward by the government and the opposition parties to construct meaningful policy spaces. The Budget Approach might therefore in certain cases give additional insights into party competition.

The structure of this article is as follows. In the second section I will briefly introduce the two *Fremskridtspartier* of Norway and Denmark and *Ny Demokrati* of Sweden, the guinea pigs of the Budget Approach. In the third section I will discuss the Expert Judgment Approach and the Manifesto Approach. In the fourth section I will give a theoretical account of the Budget Approach, and I will analyze the problems that arise when the Budget Approach is put to test in Scandinavia. In the fifth section the Budget Approach

is applied to the extreme right-wing parties in Scandinavia. In the final section I will discuss the outcome of the analysis and draw some conclusions.

2. The *Fremskridtspartier* and *Ny Demokrati*

Right-wing extremism is on the rise in Western Europe. *Le Front National* in France, *het Vlaamse Blok* in Belgium and *die Republikaner* in Germany have been scoring 7% or more in the latest national or European elections (Ignazi 1992: 17). It is therefore not surprising that these parties have received a good deal of attention. In the meanwhile, the political situation in the Scandinavian countries has often escaped notice in these discussions. As it happens Norway and Denmark have known right-wing extremist parties since the early seventies, the so-called *Fremskridtsparti* (FRPd) in Denmark and the *Fremskrittsparti* (FRPn) in Norway.

The Danish *Fremskridtsparti* was until recently indissolubly connected with its founder Mogens Glistrup. Glistrup got national prominence in 1972 during a television feature which only lasted 112 seconds. In this program he said that paying taxes was damaging the country and he compared people who cheated on taxes with freedom fighters in World War II. A year later he established the *Fremskridtsparti*, and in the 1973 elections FRPd received not less than 15.9 per cent of the votes. This enormous breakthrough is the main reason why this particular election is often referred to as the 'earthquake'

Table 1: The election results of the Three Parties (Percentage of total votes and amount of seats).

	FRPd	FRPn	NyD
1973	15.9 (28)	5.0 (4)	
1975	13.6 (24)		
1977	14.6 (26)	1.9 (0)	
1979	11.0 (20)		
1981	8.9 (16)	4.5 (4)	
1984	3.6 (6)		
1985		3.7 (2)	
1987	4.8 (9)		
1988	9.0 (16)		
1989		13.0 (22)	
1990	6.4 (12)		
1991			6.7 (25)
1993		6.3 (10)	

Note: Between brackets I have given the amount of seats.

Sources: For Denmark various issues of the *Statistisk årbog Danmark*, for Norway various publications by the *Statistisk sentralbyrå* and for Sweden *Statistiska meddelanden* (Be 30 SM 9101).

election (Pedersen 1988: 257-261). Although the party was never able to repeat their first electoral success (see table 1) the FRPd very often was able to occupy a potentially powerful position in parliament, since the other bourgeois parties often were unable to form a majority government without the help of FRPd. This powerful position was however not only beneficiary to the party. FRPd was constantly torn apart by members who were striving for cooperation with the other bourgeois parties, the so-called *slappere* (soft liners), and those who refused to moderate their positions, the *strammere* (hard liners). During the party congress of 1991 this continuous internal struggle reached its climax; the *strammere*, including Glistrup, were excluded from the party.

In Norway it was Anders Lange who, inspired by the successes of Glistrup, established the *Fremskrittsparti* in 1973.⁵ In the first few years the two parties held a close relationship and the ideological content of FRPn was at least as radical as its Danish sisterparty. After the death of Anders Lange in 1976, Carl I. Hagen firmly took over the helm of the party. The ideological stance of the party became more moderated and all official ties with the Danish *Fremskridtsparti* were broken. In table 1 we can see that FRPn in the first fifteen years or so certainly was less successful than FRPd. The real breakthrough took place in the 1989 elections when the party managed to win 13 per cent of the total vote. In 1991, after the exclusion of Glistrup, the two *Fremskridtspartier* resurrected some form of official cooperation.

It was not until the 1991 *Riksdag* elections before, in the form of *Ny Demokrati* (NyD) we could witness the breakthrough of yet another *Fremskridt*-like party in Scandinavia (Fryklund and Peterson 1992: 1). I have consciously chosen to use the term *Fremskridt*-like, because I still consider it open to debate whether or not *Ny Demokrati* indeed belongs to the same *famille spirituelle* as the two *Fremskridtspartier*. For the sake of discussion I will use the noncommittal term 'Three Parties' when I compare FRPd, FRPn and NyD as a group with other parties or party groups.⁶ The party and its two leaders, Ian Wachtmeister and Bent Karlsson, entered the *Riksdag* with a party program that included innumerable ways to cut the influence of bureaucrats, to lower taxes, to streamline the welfare state and especially to impose tougher policies on the refugee/immigrants issue. Like FRPd and FRPn, NyD has taken a pivotal position in parliament – i.e., no bourgeois majority government without the support of NyD – but contrary to the two *Fremskridtspartier*, the Swedish party has shown much more willingness to cooperate with the bourgeois minority government led by prime minister Bildt.

Although both *Fremskridtspartier* are usually placed on the extreme right of the political left/right scales, and can therefore be called right-wing extremist parties (Castles and Mair 1984), it is important to realize that in the Scandinavian context this term lacks some of the connotations which it of-

ten has in the southern countries. The Three Parties do not elaborate on fascist, anti-semitic or nationalistic themes of the past. Instead, they propose ultra-liberal solutions to solve the problems of the welfare state. It was only in the early eighties that these ultra-liberal parties adopted their policies to the relatively new issue of refugees, proposing very severe restrictions. The Three Parties do not have a very strong dislike of the political system in their respective countries either (Ignazi 1992: 11-16). However, some of their drastic proposals for reform, their fierce attacks on other parties and politicians and their very negative attitude towards immigrants and refugees are enough reason to call them right-wing extremist. In this article I hope to discover how extreme these parties precisely are on the dimensions which are used by the Budget Approach.

3. The Expert Judgment Approach and the Manifesto Approach

Before the Budget Approach is outlined I first have to discuss why the Expert Judgment Approach and the Manifesto Approach might have severe shortcomings for cross-national comparisons of political parties. I hope to show that the Expert Judgment Approach mainly has a serious reliability problem, while the shortcomings of the Manifesto Approach consist in validity problems.

First the Expert Judgment Approach. What is occupying the mind of a Norwegian country specialist when he is asked to place the Norwegian parties on the traditional, 0 to 10, left-right scale? Ideally, he first will have to establish how the Norwegian party space is to be compared with the party space of all the other countries included in the research. In order to do so he will have to find the most extreme left-wing party and the most extreme right-wing party of all the parties included in that research. The space between these two poles could for example be called the Western democratic party space. Having done that, the expert will have to determine the party space for each individual country by determining the most extreme left and right-wing party for that individual country and the space between them. These national party spaces then have to be fitted in the Western democratic party space at the right distances from the two poles. Finally, the remaining parties can be filled in on the right place of the appropriate national party space. This is the process that has to take place if the expert judgments are to be used for cross-national comparisons. Is this exercitation not beyond the power of a country specialist?

To underpin my concerns we will look at a few examples from an expert judgment study by Castles and Mair (1984). In the second column of table 2,

Table 2: The Castles/Mair index and the manifesto index on Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the United States.

Denmark		
	Experts	Manifestos
Venstre Socialisterne	0.8	-
Kommunistiske Parti	1	-51
Socialistisk Folkeparti	1.9	-43
Socialdemokratiet	3.8	-11
Radikale Venstre	4.8	-11
Centrumdemokraterne	5.7	50
Kristeligt Folkeparti	6.2	32
Venstre	6.7	51
Konservative Folkeparti	7.3	36
Fremskridtspartiet	8.7	45
Norway		
	Experts	Manifestos
Sosialistisk Venstreparti	1.2	-37
Det Norske Arbeiderparti	3	-32
Venstre	4	-
Senterpartiet	5.8	-19
Kristelig Folkeparti	6.1	-6
Høyre	7.7	-10
Fremskrittsparti	9.4	22
Sweden		
	Experts	Manifestos
Vansterpartiet Kommunisterna	1.2	-47
Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartiet	2.9	-15
Folkpartiet	5.5	-15
Centerpartiet	5.9	-8
Moderata Samlingspartiet	7.7	23
United States		
	Experts	Manifestos
Democrats	4.8	-
Republicans	6.8	-

Note 1. Although the authors were not clear on this subject, we can divert from their article that the survey has taken place around 1981 (Castles and Mair 1985).

Note 2. The manifesto data are based on the manifestos which were meant for the election just prior to 1981.

I have presented some of their results. First I would like to compare the Republicans in the USA with the *Moderaterna* in Sweden. The American conservatives got 6.8 as a score and the Swedish conservatives got 7.7. Is there

not clearly a misfit between the right poles of these two party spaces? In their own countries they might have the right score, but is it not far beyond the truth to say that the Swedish conservatives are more to the right than the American Republicans? Capital punishment, unemployment benefits, the National Health Service and defence activities are examples of issues on which the American conservatives clearly have a more rightist position than their Swedish counterpart. In my opinion there clearly went something wrong in the process described above. I therefore think we are dealing with a serious reliability problem.

If we look at another comparison, between Norway and Denmark, the shortcomings of the expert judgments become less clear because the political situations in the two countries are so much more alike. The *familles spirituelle* in these countries have the same genesis, they often have the same names and they maintain close formal and informal relationships (Rustow 1968; Berglund and Lindström 1978; von Beyme 1985). But how are the national party spaces of these three countries to be compared? Judging on the basis of the expert results in table 2, we might conclude that the situation around 1981 was such that the Danish party space, which runs from 0.8 to 8.7, was more to the left than the Norwegian party space, ranging from 1.2 to 9.4. Although the differences between the two countries should not be exaggerated, I think that it would be a more fair judgment to say that the positions should be reversed. That is, the Danish party space should be somewhat more to the right of the Norwegian. Again this is one opinion versus the other. It would therefore be interesting to find less subjective methods to support my contentions.

A promising method in this regard has been worked out by Budge, Robertson and Hearl (1987) and Laver and Budge (1992), the so-called Manifesto Approach. The approach is explicitly based on the assumptions of the *saliency theory*, which holds that the amount of attention given to certain issues serves as the measure of its relative importance for the ideology of parties. Parties on the left for example stress social services, but not the consequential tax increase, whereas rightist parties emphasize tax relief, but keep silent on its consequences for social programmes (Robertson 1974; Budge and Farlie 1983). This approach has been adopted in a content analysis on the party manifestos produced in 20 Western countries during the postwar period.⁷ In the manifesto research program, each manifesto was broken down into quasi-sentences, which subsequently were assigned to one of 54 standard categories. Each of these categories, or a combination of these categories can be considered a policy space. After systematic comparison a common left-right scale was constructed. The right-hand end of the scale was constructed by adding together the frequency counts for references to 'Capitalist economics', 'Social conservatism', 'Freedom and domestic human rights'

and 'Military: positive'. The left-hand end of the scale was constructed by adding the frequency counts for 'State intervention', 'Peace and co-operation', 'Democracy', 'Social services; positive', 'Education: positive' and 'Labour groups: positive'. The final left-right scale was computed as the total proportion of the manifesto devoted to right-wing references minus the total proportion devoted to left-wing references.⁸

The results for some of the countries are shown in the third column of table 2. In order to keep the time variable constant I have used the manifesto figures from the election just prior to the period that the expert judgments were collected, that is 1981. How are the results of the two approaches to be compared? We can see that the positions of the left poles, -51 for Denmark, -47 for Sweden and -37 for Norway, are somewhat related to the expert judgements, 0.8 for Denmark, 1.2 for Norway and 1.2 for Sweden. The Danish left pole is indeed more to the left, and, very importantly, the two indices agree on which parties are to occupy the left poles. In this article I am however more concerned with the rightist parties and here we can see some very remarkable differences between the Castles/Mair index and the manifesto index. According to the Manifesto index the right poles should be 51 for Denmark, 23 for Sweden and 22 for Norway, compared to 9.4 for Norway, 8.7 for Denmark and 7.7 for Sweden by the experts. The two indexes clearly disagree on the rightness of the party spaces. Moreover, for the Danish case there is an enormous disagreement on which party should occupy the right pole. The FRPd occupies this position according to the Castles/Mair index, but according to the manifesto index two other parties are considered to be more rightist than FRPd, *Venstre* and *Centrum-Demokraterne*. However, these two parties get a relatively low score on the Castles/Mair index, respectively 6.7 and 5.7. If we compare some other parties in the manifesto index we can see some more remarkable differences. The Norwegian *Høyre* is with -10 very far removed from their conservative allies in Sweden and Denmark, which have 36 and 23. But what is more, there are as much as five bourgeois parties in Denmark which are more rightist than the *Moderaterna* in Sweden. Finally, the manifesto scores for the two *Fremskridtspartier*, 22 for FRPn and 45 for FRPd, are not very much in line with the expert judgments, 9.4 for FRPn and 8.7 for FRPd. The two indices clearly disagree on which party is the most extreme.

It is very hard to interpret the findings from this comparison. The manifesto data seem to support my contention that the Danish party space around 1981 was more to the right than the party spaces of other Scandinavian countries. In addition, the high rightist score for most Danish bourgeois parties also indicates that the centre of gravity of the Danish party space seems to be more to the right than in Norway and Sweden. However, there are two concerns that makes this a hazardous comparison. Firstly, the left-right di-

mensions of the two approaches are incompatible. The great advantage of the Manifesto Approach is that the operationalization used in this research project appears to be more reliable, that is, less dependent on individual judgments, than the operationalization applied in the Castle/Mair study. Castles and Mair have not at all indicated what they mean with the left/right dimension. The experts probably not only based their judgment on policy positions laid out in the party manifestos, but also on the media performance of the parties⁹, their extra-parliamentarian activities, their coalition behaviour and on government policies. The results of the two approaches can therefore never be the same.

Secondly, the assumptions of the saliency theory often seem to prohibit a proper cross-national comparison. An important shortcoming of the saliency theory is the fact that newly approved policies, say position Y on issue i, will often no longer be presented in the manifestos of the parties that support this new status quo. In case all the political parties agree on Y, a unanimous status quo, the whole national party space would change in the direction of the new policies. When the Manifesto Approach is used these new policies can no longer be measured since a unanimous status quo becomes a non-issue in the manifestos. Two similar national party spaces A and B, can slowly drift away from each other when this process repeats itself over and over again in space A but not in space B. The Manifesto Approach would, in such a case, not be able to trace this movement. This is in my opinion the most important reason why the Manifesto Approach is less suitable for cross-national comparisons. One might of course argue that more often than not there are one or more opposition parties which oppose certain accepted policies, in which case we are dealing with a majority status quo instead of a unanimous status quo. But even in that case the Manifesto Approach does not give a proper indication of the situation. In space A, the parties which support the majority status quo will tend to consider the new situation a non-issue. Manifestos typically only talk about desired changes from the present status quo and they hardly elaborate on the successes a party achieved in the past period. For these reasons, the Manifesto Approach is unable to trace the supporters of a majority status quo. The opposition parties in space A will of course still discuss i in their manifesto because they want to return to X, the old status quo, or maybe to a whole new position Z. In space B, on the other hand the majority status quo on i is still at X. A minority of the parties is however striving to get Y accepted. Using the Manifesto Approach in this situation would show that there is more support for position Y in space B than there is in space A. This in spite of the fact that position Y has actually been implemented in party space A.

To recap my criticism of the saliency theory, it can be said that it pays too little attention to the issues on which there has been reached either a major-

ity or a unanimous decision. I hope that the Budget Approach can overcome this problem to a certain extent. Government budgets and alternative budgets are typically based on an enumeration of past decisions and they might therefore do more justice to the political situation of a country than the party manifestos.

4. The Budget Approach

As far as I know, alternative budgets submitted by opposition parties have never been used in the comparative study of political parties. The most likely reason for this negligence is probably the supposed non-existence of comprehensive alternative budgets. However, in Denmark, Sweden and especially Norway, the opposition parties regularly construct very comprehensive alternative budgets. These budgets will in the remainder of this article be used to construct policy spaces.

We will first give an example of how the Budget Approach will function in the foreign aid policy space: Imagine two parties, party A and party B. Party A has stated in its manifesto that it is sceptical about the effects of foreign aid, while party B has said it wants to cut foreign aid. Based on this material it is very difficult to decide what these two statements precisely mean for the political distance between party A and party B. However, when we look at their alternative budgets we can see the financial translation of these remarks. Party A wants to freeze the 10 billion given to foreign aid the year before, while party B wants to cut 2 billion from last year's budget. What is more clear than to estimate the political distance on foreign aid between party A and party B at 2 billion, or 20 per cent?

The Budget Approach comes very close to putting the Downsian social economic left/right scale into operation. Downs assumed that the desired degree of government intervention in the economy was the best indicator to see to what degree a party was rightist (low intervention) or leftist (high intervention) (Downs 1957: 116). I put his axiom into operation by *letting the proposed amount of government expenditures be the indicator of the political distance between political parties*. The total of an alternative budget will be compared with the total of another alternative budget or government budget. The relative distance between the total budgets will be used as an indicator for the political distance between the parties on a unidimensional left-right scale. The budgets for the various departments, or combinations of departments, will be used to construct multidimensional scales.

We only have to look at the total budget proposals of the Norwegian parties for fiscal year 1992 to see that this approach certainly has *prima facie* validity:

<i>Socialistisk Venstreparti</i>	411,370 (million kroner)
Labour minority government	400,770 (million kroner)
<i>Høyre</i>	394,770 (million kroner)
<i>Fremskrittsparti</i>	376,598 (million kroner)

It is important to note that the *Senterpartiet* and the *Kristelig Folkeparti* have not constructed an alternative budget since they were indirect supporters of the Labour minority government. The government budget does therefore not give much information on the policy position of the Labour party. The minority government had to take into account that they needed the support of the two small centre parties. The comparison between the government budget and the three alternative budgets is, however, very interesting. The rank orderings of the Budget Approach are the same as the rank orderings of the expert judgments and the party manifestos on these parties (see table 2), but important differences are to be found in the political distances between the parties. The relative distance between the budget of FRPn and the budget of *Høyre* is much larger than the distance between the expert scores for the two parties. The big gap between FRPn's and *Høyre*'s budget does interestingly enough confirm the results of the Manifesto Approach. After seeing the Norwegian example, we can therefore safely conclude that there is enough reason to venture on the new Budget Approach.

Comparing the various government budgets with the alternative budgets is however not so easy as might have been thought after seeing the Norwegian example. In order to discuss the accuracy of the Budget Approach I will discuss five important problems.

4.1. Year of comparison and available material

We need to have comparable and comprehensive alternative budgets both from the Three Parties and the other bourgeois parties.¹⁰ Since NyD has only recently entered the political arena and constructed its first complete alternative budget for fiscal year 1992/93, it was decided to use fiscal year 1992¹¹ as the year of comparison for the other two countries. This way we can keep the time dimension constant. However, there is an important problem attached to the decision of taking 1992 as the year of reference. In Norway, *Høyre* was in opposition to the Labour government, but both in Sweden and in Denmark most bourgeois parties were engaged in a coalition government and for understandable political reasons they have refrained from constructing their own alternative budget.

I considered two possible solutions to this difficult problem.¹² I could have used another year of reference for Sweden and Denmark, i.e., a year in which the Swedish and Danish bourgeois parties were in opposition. This

would however surely lead to time-dimensional problems. In Denmark for example we would have to go back as far as 1982 to find *Venstre* and the *Konservative Folkeparti* in opposition.¹³ The solution I have opted for is to treat the coalition parties in Sweden and Denmark as if they were one and the same party.¹⁴ As a result of this decision, the comparison between the Three Parties and the bourgeois parties in Sweden and Denmark will lose some of its interest. As a result I will concentrate more on the question of how the alternative budgets of the Three Parties are to be compared with each other. Of course I will make a comparison on how the alternative budgets of the Three Parties compare to the government budget as a whole, but only in the Norwegian case it will be possible to make a more accurate assessment of the relationship between *Høyre* and FRPn. I will now shortly discuss the available material for each individual country.

In Norway, both *Høyre* and FRPn took no part in the 1992 government and both parties have presented a very comprehensive alternative 1992 budget. Their alternative budgets are directed against the budget of the socialist minority government of Brundland. The first draft of the government budget¹⁵, popularly called the Yellow Book, was presented on 27 september 1991. The budget was approved, with some slight changes, by the parliamentary parties of Labour, the *Kristelig Folkeparti* and *Senterpartiet*¹⁶. Since Denmark had a bourgeois minority government in 1991, made up of *Venstre* and the *Konservative Folkeparti* it is not possible to present a separate alternative budget for each of the bourgeois parties and I will therefore have to work with the budget proposal of the Danish bourgeois government.¹⁷ The Swedish coalition led by prime minister Bildt, is very similar to the coalition in Denmark. Hence for Sweden too, I have to compare the alternative budget of NyD with the budget proposal of the Swedish bourgeois minority government. For the figures on the government budget I use an English summary.¹⁸ For NyD I will use a motion proposed to the *Riksdag* as the equivalent of an alternative budget.¹⁹ It needs to be stressed that the party did not present this motion as an alternative budget. The motion is, however, very extensive since it covers all the individual budgets of the ministries, and what is more, the motion is very much in line with the proposals as they were spelled out in NyD's party program.

4.2. Economic differences between the countries

The most difficult problem for a cross-national budget comparison concerns the economic differences between the three countries. It is unavoidable that these differences affect the orientation of the various budgets. The Norwegian budget for example clearly deviates from the Swedish and Danish bud-

gets on ground of the revenues coming from the Norwegian oil business. This problem does not have to be insurmountable because the Norwegian budget makes a clear distinction between expenditures and revenues that are related with the oil and shipping sector on the one hand and the economy of all the other sectors, so-called Mainland Norway, on the other. I refrained from leaving the oil business out, since this would clearly distort the comparison too much. Oil revenues in Norway are a political reality that cannot be left aside. The high rate of unemployment in Denmark and, consequently, the enormous amount of money spent on unemployment benefits is another example of such an economic dissimilarity.

We have unfortunately no real solution to this problem. It is important to remember, though, that the Scandinavian countries are a perfect target for a 'most similar systems design' and the differences should therefore not be exaggerated (Fritzmaurice 1986). Hence, the only thing I can do is to stay alert for significant economic differences between the three countries which might explain the different ideologies of the Three Parties.

4.3. Different jurisdictions

There are, however, also non-economic factors that complicate a cross-national budget analysis. The influence of these factors is somewhat easier to eliminate. The cross-national differences between the jurisdiction of the individual ministries are by far the most important factor in this respect. Payments on rent rebates, for example, are in Sweden under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance, in Norway under the Ministry of Local Affairs and in Denmark they are taken care of by a special Ministry of Housing.

As the most logical solution to this problem I have tried to rearrange all the items with the intention to create Standard Ministries, i.e., ministries with the same jurisdiction. The earlier mentioned rent rebates for example have been put under the Standard Ministry of Social Affairs. This way 13 Standard Ministries were created. In the appendix to this article I have presented an overview of the rearrangements.

4.4. Revenues and expenditures

Another complicating factor is the way in which the three national budgets account for revenues and expenditures. By revenues in this instance I do not mean the various taxes or the VAT, but instead the revenues which the individual ministries receive from various sources. These revenues can vary from fines for the Ministry of Justice, to surpluses from public enterprises, to inter-

est incomes. Each national budget has specified how big the expenditures for each ministry will be in the following fiscal year, together with the expected revenues.

As an example there can be mentioned the Danish budget for the Ministry of Industry. The Danish government has set the expenditures for this ministry at 2,615.1 million kroner, while the revenues for this department should be 813.3 million. That is, the 'customers' of the Ministry of Industry have to pay those 813.3 million out of their own pocket. In order to increase the comparability between the Norwegian, Danish and Swedish Ministry of Industry I have considered it justified to conduct the following computation:

$$\text{Ministerial Expenditures} - \text{Ministerial Revenues} = \text{Total Sum}$$

In the Danish case this would mean:

$$2,615.1 - 813.3 = 1,801.8$$

In the Budget Approach the Total Sum allocated by the government to the Ministry of Industry therefore amounts to 1,801.8 million.

On an alternative ministerial budget, however, the computation will be more complicated since an opposition party can propose to increase expenditures on some items and at the same time propose a decrease of expenditures on some other items. An opposition party can very well allocate more money to the item 'patent office' but at the same time allocate less money to the item 'technological infrastructure', while both items are part of the same ministerial budget. The same applies for the revenues. A party can at the same time propose more and less revenues. For example, an opposition party might want to increase the tariffs which the 'patent office' has to charge to its customers, while on the other hand the industry might have to contribute less to 'technological infrastructure'.

Continuing the example on the Danish Ministry of Industry, we can see that FRPd, compared with the government budget, proposed 1,641.4 million less expenditures, 1.7 million more expenditures, 483.7 million less revenues and 1.2 million more revenues. 'Less revenue' actually means that the government has to use more tax money on this ministry, hence, more spending from the governments perspective. It is the other way around for 'more revenue', i.e., less tax money has to be used. I have therefore decided on the following computation for the alternative budgets:

$$\begin{aligned} & (\text{More Ministerial Expenditures} + \text{Less Ministerial Revenues}) \\ & - (\text{Less Ministerial Expenditures} + \text{More Ministerial Revenues}) \\ & = \text{Total Change} \end{aligned}$$

For the Industry Budget this has the following consequences:

$$\begin{aligned} & (1.7 + 483.7) \\ & - (1,641.4 + 1.2) \\ & = -1,157.2 \end{aligned}$$

FRPd wants to have a Total Change of -1,157.2 million on the Industry Budget, i.e., a 64 per cent decrease compared to the Total Sum of the government, which was earlier calculated to be 1,801.8.

These computations have been performed on all the Standard Ministerial budgets except for the Swedish ones. The English summary on the Swedish budget has lumped together all ministerial revenues together under one item, which contributes 42,307 million, or 9 per cent, to the total revenues.²⁰ This is a considerable amount and it will therefore certainly distort the final results. But it needs to be stressed at the outset that the whole process has been a very complicated project and that some inconsistencies and mistakes are likely to be made. On the one hand this is caused by the very intricate nature of the budgets, and on the other hand by the fact that I often did not have the appropriate material at my disposal to make a proper assessment of the situation. There are therefore many other, minor, problems for which I have been unable to find satisfactory solutions. I can mention the different ways in which local authorities can levy taxes, the impact of so-called 'state banks' (*Statsbankene*) in Norway and the impact of various off-budget funds. In spite of these unsolved problems, I still think that the approach is worthwhile because it clearly has *prima facie* validity, and the analysis shows that the differences between the alternative budgets of the Three Parties are so significant that they cannot be argued away by referring to those unresolved problems. The earlier mentioned unresolved problems will have to be solved in future research.

4.5. Content validity

The question of validity – that is, in this case the question whether or not we are really measuring the political distance between the various parties – is a crucial problem. Earlier on I showed that the Budget Approach certainly has *prima facie* validity in the Norwegian situation, but there are also several other types of validity that can be tested. In this study I will only concentrate on the content validity (Babbie 1986: 112-114).

Content validity refers to the degree to which a measure covers the range of meanings included within a concept; in my case it is the concept of political distance. The content validity is concerned with the fact that the earlier mentioned 'translation' cannot be executed successfully on each and every

item. There are quite a lot of issues, such as abortion, refugees, capital punishment and the EU membership issue, which are certainly part of the concept political distance, but which cannot be 'translated' so easily in financial terms. Of course the alternative budgets can give some indication on the standpoint of the parties concerning these issues. A party can for instance withdraw money going to abortion clinics or allocate more funds to the judiciary so they can employ more executioners, but the essence of these issues is clearly not to be captured in financial terms. Although it is assumed in the Budget Approach that the immaterial dimension of issues will not stand in the way of a proper content validity, I have nevertheless thought it wise to analyze the issues with the highest immaterial profile under the relevant standard ministries. This way I might also find out for which standard ministries the Budget Approach is less suitable.

5. The thirteen standard ministries

We will proceed by analyzing the thirteen individual Standard Ministries expecting to get some useful insights into the way of thinking of the Three

Table 3: The Budget Approach applied on the two *Fremskridtspartier* for fiscal year 1992 and on *Ny Demokrati* for fiscal year 1992/93.

	Denmark		Norway		Sweden	
	Gov. (mil kroner)	FRPd (%)	Høyre (mil kroner)	FRPn (%)	Gov. (mil kroner)	NyD (%)
1. Foreign Affairs	8,535	-98	8,924	-50	17,360	-15
2. Defence	14,839	-3	21,308	+3	36,755	0
3. Health	1,313	+134	26,880	+1	23,869	-23
4. Social Affairs	120,537	-27	113,711	-3	148,049	-6
5. Cultural Affairs	4,151	-57	3,577	-36	3,899	0
6. Education and Research	20,327	-21	23,117	-7	59,672	0
7. Environment	35,000	-1459	2,224	0	1,914	0
8. Agriculture and Fisheries	2,325	-46	14,584	-40	6,966	0
9. Justice	5,125	-1	4,987	+8	17,849	0
10. Industry and Energy	1,618	-96	4,827	-15	4,304	0
11. Transport and Communications	4,461	-26	15,783	-3	17,548	0
12. Treasury	3,958	-60	11,774	-10	11,123	0
13. Home Office	34,186	-4	597	-653	31,888	-6

Note: I refer to section 4.1 for an overview of the sources and to the appendix for the jurisdictions of the Standard Ministries.

Parties, i.e., how they would like to mould society if they came to power. In some cases I have used the latest party manifestos to see how the alternative budgets correlate with the parties' more formal ideology, laid down in their party manifestos. At the end we will try to present an overall picture of the results.

Foreign Affairs. The figures of the desired reductions on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are clear. FRPd is the most extreme because it more or less wants to abolish the ministry, FRPn comes second because it wants to halve the budget and NyD comes last. Development aid to Third World countries is by far the most important item on this budget, and the two *Fremskridtspartier* have very similar views in this field. Both parties want to abolish development aid as soon as possible, regarding it as an instrument which causes more harm than good. It is also for this reason that they prefer not to give any aid to the former communist countries in Eastern Europe. According to them, the real causes of poverty are to be found in the domestic political situation of the Third World and the former communist countries. They are clearly not adherents of the *dependencia* perspective or supporters of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). They consider the establishment of a genuine free trade system as the only solution to poverty. Both parties consider donations to the Third World to be a private matter and in the end only want to keep the government sponsored emergency funds intact (FRPn1: 83-85; FRPd2: 16; FRPd1: 26-27; FRPd2: 4-10).²¹

With -15 per cent NyD proposes far less drastic reductions. NyD wants to reallocate various funds in such a way that the available money will be spent more in nearby countries (especially the Baltic countries) and is diverted more into foreign environmental projects that have a direct impact on the Swedish environment. In the long run they want to reduce foreign aid from the present 1.0 per cent to the internationally accepted 0.7 per cent of GNP (NyD1: 8; NyD3: 12-15), while the two *Fremskridtspartier* want to stop foreign aid completely.

We can therefore safely conclude that NyD is far less extreme on Foreign Affairs than the two *Fremskridtspartier*, of the two *Fremskridtspartier* FRPd is more extreme than FRPn.

It is very interesting that the above stated conclusion is more or less confirmed when we look at the most important immaterial issue in the field of Foreign Affairs, i.e., the EC membership issue. It is important to note that each of the Three Parties made their debut at a time when the membership issue was very high on the public agenda. In 1972, EC referenda were held in both Denmark and in Norway. In Denmark it was decided that the country should become a member, while the Norwegians (after an intense national debate) supported the 'No' option. At that time both *Fremskridtspartier*

tried to stay aloof from the discussions on the EC membership issue (the so-called neutral position). With the creation of the European single market in 1992 and the ratification of the Maastricht treaty, the parties were forced to take in a position. FRPd decided to oppose ratification of the Maastricht treaty and it advised its electorate to vote 'No' in the resultant referendum on 2 June 1992. Officially FRPd wants to remain a member of the EU, but there would be very little left of the present EU if all its reform proposals would be accepted. One of its most important demands is that the countries should get back their veto power in every single policy domain (FRPd5).

In Norway too, FRPn has a problem in assuming a convincing EU attitude. The party is torn apart by pro-marketeters and anti-marketeters and the EU issue is so politicized in Norway that every decision is likely to cost votes (*Aftenposten*, 10 February 1990; *Fremskritt*, February 1992: 4).

Again NyD takes in a completely different position. Its party manifesto and its alternative budget are interlaced with pro-EU rhetoric and the party can therefore be considered as a very outspoken supporter of a Swedish entrance into the EU.

Interestingly enough it can therefore be concluded that the positions taken on one of the most crucial immaterial issue, i.e., the EU issue, are very much in line with the positions taken on the alternative Foreign Affairs budgets. NyD is the most international-minded and FRPd the least. The Foreign Affairs Budget therefore seems to present a very realistic picture of the political distance between the three parties.

Defence. In sharp contrast to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Three Parties propose only slight changes in the Defence Budget. The positive sign for FRPn is very significant since the party clearly wants to put the message across that they are the Norwegian party that is the most concerned with the defence of Norway. NyD suggested no adjustments on the Defence Budget and has therefore been assigned 0 per cent.

All in all, it can be concluded that the Three Parties and the other bourgeois parties are very close on the defence dimension and there seem to be no immaterial issues that could distort the picture.

Health. The health sector of all the Scandinavian countries operates on the basis of a National Health Service. The health budget clearly underestimates the total costs of medical care in the three countries, since most spending on health takes place at the level of the counties. In recent years this sector has experienced huge financial problems because of increased costs caused by an ageing population and higher health standards. Changes and adaptation are therefore necessary. Together with the social security category, the *Fremskridtspartiers'* proposals to reform the health sector have always present-

ed the most important anomaly from their ultra-liberal ideology. The anomaly is to be found in the fact that they want to maintain the situation whereby the state ultimately should keep complete financial control over the health sector and that in some instances, like care for the handicapped and the elderly, the state should even increase spending. FRPd wants to spend almost an extra 2 billion on the Health Budget and FRPn 180 million.

More spending is not the *Fremskridtspartiers'* main solution to the crisis in the health sector. The real changes have to be found in drastically increasing competition in the health sector, especially among the hospitals. They hope to achieve this by permitting more private hospitals and especially by introducing *stykkeprisfinansiering* (piece-rates) for all surgery, treatments, controls, et cetera. Private and public hospitals should also be treated on an equal basis and the state should offer them therefore the same rates as public hospitals. These efficiency proposals cannot really be 'translated' in financial terms, but the positive changes for the two *Fremskridtspartier* clearly express their concern with proper medical care (FRPn1: 53-62; FRPn2: 17-19; FRPd2: 16-17; FRPd4: 18).

In sharp contrast with the two *Fremskridtspartier*, NyD is proposing very substantial savings in this sector, amounting to 5.5 billion. NyD wants to accomplish these savings by promoting competition through privatizations (1 billion), an increased capacity utilization of the available infrastructure (2.5 billion) and the abolition of the counties which are responsible for medical care (2 billion) (NyD2: 20-21).²² Interestingly enough, this is the only budget on which NyD wants to reduce expenditures, while the two *Fremskridtspartier* want to increase expenditures.

Social Affairs. Together with health, the social security issue forms the second important anomaly from the ultra-liberal ideology, because the two *Fremskridtspartier* do not want to cut the levels of allowances. Both parties want to keep the present system more or less intact and even want to increase spending on the national pension scheme. They, especially FRPd, predict that unemployment will decrease considerably if their proposals are implemented and they therefore do not consider it necessary to cut the levels of the benefits.

In sharp contrast to the two *Fremskridtspartier* the Swedish NyD proposes to cut the level and duration of various important allowances like sick leave, unemployment benefits and maternity allowances. This way they hope to save 7.8 billion, of which 1.8 billion will go to the employers (NyD3: 17-19).

Increasing the national pensions is an issue which plays a very important role in the ideology of FRPd and FRPn. The ever growing group of elderly people plays an increasingly important role in their electoral strategy. It has therefore been a very strategic decision of the two parties to demand increased spending on precisely those two issue that are of crucial importance to the elderly: health care and pensions.

In this regard NyD is again very different, since the party does not want to spend more on the pension scheme. Moreover, the party favours substantial cuts in spending on sheltered accommodation and health care. Their strategy is therefore diametrically opposed to that of the two *Fremskridtspartier*.

In the meanwhile it is clear that the important Social Affairs Budget might not be so suitable for the Budget Approach, since the figures get completely distorted by the two different methods to decrease spending on the unemployment benefits: volume measures (FRPd) and measures to decrease the duration and level of the allowances (NyD).

Cultural Affairs. Subsidization of culture has always guaranteed a fierce debate between the *Fremskridtspartier* and the other bourgeois parties. Both FRPd and FRPn want to abolish this ministry completely, because they consider culture to be a private matter. In Denmark, according to some people, this debate has even contributed substantially to the establishment and breakthrough of FRPd as part of a more comprehensive negative attitude towards intellectualism (*Fremskridt*: June 1991; FRPd3: 80; Pedersen 1988: 267-268).

Again, we see a completely different situation when we look at the policies of NyD. The party does not mention any cut in subsidies for cultural activities. According to NyD, the government should certainly not be economical, because it would send negative impulses and dampen creativity (NyD2: 27-28).

The Three Parties are on one line again when we look at another important item that falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture, that is, government support to the media and political parties. The Three Parties agree that all financial support going to these organizations should be abolished completely. The government should interfere as little as possible with the media and politics because it could undermine the freedom of speech (FRPd2: 20; FRPn2: 17; NyD2: 14-15).

On this budget the familiar pattern can again be discerned, i.e., very radical cuttings for FRPd (-21%), much less for its sister party FRPn (-7%) and none for NyD.

Education and Research. In general, the two *Fremskridtspartier* hold somewhat similar views about how to treat the educational sector. First, the parties want to give priority to education and research that is concerned with technical and economic subjects. They consider these subjects more important since they have a direct impact on the productivity of companies and can boost the export sector. Second, the Three Parties want a more stringent regime in the schools and want to reintroduce grading on a wider scale. Finally, as was the case with the social and health sector, the Three Parties want the state to remain responsible for the financial costs. This does not prevent

them from welcoming more private schools in order to increase competition. These private schools should however get the same financial support as the public schools.

NyD has, in some instances, used the same kind of rhetoric as the two *Fremskridtspartier*, but is far less drastic in its policy proposals.

Environment. Although calculations on the Danish figures are somewhat awkward (-1459%), they give some indication that FRPd is not very concerned about the environment. The other two more or less want to keep the Environment Budget intact. The various commentaries clearly support the differences between the parties. In FRPd's manifesto and magazine, there are numerous examples of proposals that are diametrically opposed to a healthy environment: no housing zones, free fishing, and no severe rules for the farmers and companies. FRPn is clearly somewhat less critical, but even this party is proposing to abolish the whole bureaucratic institute that has been built up around this issue and to transfer the protection of the environment completely to the judicial branch (FRPn1: 40-42).

Again, NyD takes a different stand. In its budget the party wants to spend as much as the government, and in addition even contributes positively to the discussion. For example it proposes several innovative methods for waste reduction (NyD1: 12). Moreover, it wants to increase spending on public transport (on the budget of the Ministry of Transportation and Communication) and give financial support to the East European countries (350 million) in order that these countries can be helped in solving their environmental problems (shown on the Foreign Affairs Budget) (NyD1: 14).

Agriculture and Fisheries. The two *Fremskridtspartier* have an extreme point of view on these matters, i.e., they want a drastic decrease of the subsidies going to the agricultural sector (FRPn: -40% and FRPd: -46%). The high reduction for FRPn is somewhat understandable, because Norway has the world's highest agricultural subsidies (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 1992: 42). The FRPd reductions would have been higher had the EU subsidies been included in the analyses.

NyD is again different. Sweden is giving subsidies which are substantially higher than the EU's, but this party has not one single reference to the agricultural sector, neither in its party program nor in its alternative budget.

Justice. The Three Parties clearly want to spare the Justice Budget. This is very clear for FRPn, which wants to increase spending by 8 per cent. These results confirm the tough stance of the Three Parties on the issue of Law and Order. Law and Order is, after the EC issue, the second immaterial subject which I will discuss in more detail. The Three Parties all want to introduce

tougher punishment and more control. The Three Parties however do not support the general introduction of the death penalty, although FRPn wants to introduce the death penalty in times of war. The proposed maximum penalty during peace time is highest for NyD which in some cases proposes a sentence until death (NyD1). FRPn wants to increase the maximum sentence to 30 years (FRPn1: 44). I have no precise information on FRPd.

Concerning narcotics it is interesting to note that the FPU, the influential youth organization of FRPn, wants to legalize the use of drugs. This is just one of many issues which brings FRPn's youth organization into conflict with its mother party. There are even people in FRPn who blame FPU for the bad results during the last communal elections in 1991, since, in their view, the extreme liberal viewpoints of FPU had harmed the populist appeal of the party (*Fremskritt*, March 1992). These differences cause severe internal problems, although it has to be said that a majority of FRPn is very concerned with Law and Order.

The Three Parties have a common concern for so-called overreaction of the police and the courts to small offenses. NyD for example is constantly attacking *lappisoma* (female traffic agents), arguing that the police should start chasing real criminals instead of people that have problems parking their car.

Industry and Energy. This budget chapter is a very good example to show that FRPd is not a 'business party' like, for example, NyD. FRPd even wants to abolish all ties that exist between the business sector and the state. FRPd is in this sense a genuine ultra-liberal party. NyD, on the other hand, wants to keep these ties more or less intact and has even suggested some additional arrangements in the economic field. Their most remarkable proposal in this respect is to set up a new investment bank for venture capital (*Investeringsaktiebolaget Sverige*), with a starting capital of about 10 billion. This money needs to be taken from the off-budget unemployment funds, and it is therefore not shown on the budget. The two *Fremskridtspartier*, too, want to withdraw money from various off-budget funds, but this money is to be used either to decrease the budget deficit or to increase pensions.

Transport and Communication. This budget chapter gives another good example of the 'business' orientation of NyD. The party wants to withdraw 2 billion from the off-budget wage earner funds and use it for investments in infrastructure, like railways and roads. According to NyD these investments are necessary in order to guarantee economic growth.

Treasury. Once more we can see the familiar pattern, i.e., very severe reductions for FRPd, no reductions for NyD and FRPn taking a middle position. FRPd expects that their tax reform will mean that the Ministry of Taxes can

be abolished in the long run. FRPn uses the same reasoning, but is far less optimistic about the effects.

Home Office. The Home Office Budget more or less has the function of a residual category. The Standard Home Office Budget is interesting because here we can see that the Three Parties have in common that they want to execute drastic cuts in money that is allocated to refugees/immigrants. On the Home Office Budget all of NyD's savings, 2 billion, are on 'Immigration, etc.' and 'Mother tongue education'; FRPd wants to save 1,350 million on refugees and FRPn 557 million. Hence, their strong anti-refugee standpoint clearly shows on the budget.

Refugees and immigrants are an important immaterial issue, and it is clear that the importance of the subject is much bigger than can be expressed in the budget figures. We will therefore have to look at the subject of refugees/immigrants, the third and last immaterial issue, in some more detail.

If we look at the genesis of the two *Fremskridtspartier* it is clear that xenophobia did not play any role at all in the breakthrough of the two parties in 1973. The immigration issue did not emerge for the Danish party until 1979, when a local representative, A.Th.Riemann, was charged and later fined for writing that immigrants 'multiplied like rats' (Andersen 1992). In the early eighties Glistrup tried to reopen the discussion but was far from successful. It was only in the mid-eighties that FRPd, aided by the enormous influx of asylum seekers, became successful in this respect. The extremity of FRPd on the issue of refugees/immigrants is hard to describe. At an official level the party does not want to expel refugees/immigrants that already have a legal status in Denmark, but the party is determined to stop the current influx of foreigners. Moreover, the party wants to make it more difficult for foreigners to obtain the Danish nationality, and favours expelling refugees/immigrants who have committed a crime. It also rejects special financial assistance for refugees/immigrants. However, the party still wants to accept some new 'real' refugees via the UN and the EC, the party is not anti-semitic, and there are no attempts to justify Germany's nazi-past (FRPd2: 27). At the more informal level, however, Glistrup has proposed at many occasions, for example in the party magazine, that Denmark should become a 'Muslim-free zone'. By 'Muslim free zone' Glistrup means that every muslim without Danish nationality should be expelled, and people from Muslim countries should in the future be forbidden to enter Denmark, even if they want to come for a short period (*Fremskridt*, November 1991: 6-7).

It is somewhat more complicated for FRPn. The majority of FRPn has more or less the same ideas as FRPd (although not as radical as Glistrup's), but the very influential youth organization of FRPn and some party officials have supported the viewpoint that immigration should be completely free in

Norway. This ultra-liberal viewpoint is diametrically opposed to that of the majority and therefore causes serious internal problems (*Fremskritt*, July 1991).

In contrast to the genesis of the two *Fremskridtspartier*, the genesis of NyD, as a more recent party, is clearly linked to the issue of refugees/immigrants. It is even doubtful whether NyD could have passed the electoral threshold without this issue. Compared to the other parties in Sweden, NyD is far more critical of the Swedish refugees/immigrants policies, although it is somewhat less critical when compared to FRPn and especially FRPd. In their manifesto and in a motion on this subject, NyD is proposing the following four changes: to give refugees loans instead of gifts, to put them to work instead of letting them bore themselves in refugee camps, to expel them when they commit a serious crime, and to cancel mother tongue education to immigrants (NyD1: 8; NyD4). These changes are quite severe, but are far less drastic than some of the proposals put forward by FRPd and FRPn. That is, NyD is not saying explicitly that the influx of refugees/immigrants should stop completely, and the whole tone of NyD's argument is far less aggressive. NyD is therefore the least extreme, FRPn somewhat more, and FRPd is the most extreme party on the issue of refugees/immigrants.

5.1. The overall picture

We have now seen how the Three Parties compare with each other and with the bourgeois parties on the thirteen Standard Ministries. When we look carefully at the thirteen different dimensions we can see that the parties have different priorities.

NyD wants to attack the heart of the Welfare State. Compared to the other budgets it hopes to achieve some drastic cuts on the Health and Social Affairs Budgets. The two other retrenchments, on Foreign Affairs and the Home Office, are both at the expense of non-Swedish nationals. All the other ministries are spared by NyD. FRPn on the other hand, proposes severe savings on every budget, apart from Defence and Justice, which are both seen as traditional responsibilities of the state, Health and, to a lesser extent, Social Affairs. FRPn's priorities are therefore diametrically opposed to NyD's since it was precisely Health and Social Affairs on which NyD was planning to cut most severely. To a somewhat lesser extent than FRPn, FRPd also wants to safeguard Defence, Justice and Health, but in sharp contrast to FRPn, FRPd hopes to reduce the Social Affairs Budget appreciably.

When we thus look at what priorities the Three Parties have on the various policy spaces, it can clearly be concluded that FRPn and FRPd are much

more alike than they resemble NyD. There are, however, two important policy proposals which all Three Parties have in common: reductions of spending on 'Foreign aid' and 'Refugees and immigrants'.

There is another way to interpret the results, i.e., to look at the total amount of money which the Three Parties want to save compared to the other bourgeois parties. When we do this we get the following results:

NyD:	4.1%	(20,141 million kroner)
FRPn:	10.4%	(39,650 million kroner)
FRPd:	13.7%	(44,716 million kroner)

FRPd clearly wants to execute the most drastic reductions on the state budget, NyD is relatively reserved, while FRPn takes in a middle position. The extreme position of the Danish party becomes even more striking when we investigate the alternative budgets in more detail. The privatization of the petroleum industry is the dominating element in FRPn's alternative budget, making up 40 per cent of the savings. These savings should be realized by selling all the shares of *Statoil* (100% state owned) and *Norsk Hydro* (50% state owned). It can be justified to exclude these two major privatizations from the analysis, because one would normally place these kind of transactions on the real accounts. The nature of the oil industry guarantees that the privatizations could be executed relatively smoothly and Norway would still acquire a lot of revenues from the privatized companies via the special oil tax and the interest gained on the received capital. If the two Norwegian privatizations are excluded, FRPn would demand savings of only 6.3 per cent of the expenditures, which makes the extreme position of the Danish party even more obvious.

6. Conclusion

The Budget Approach can be used to construct a unidimensional Downsian left/right scale. The earlier mentioned percentages should then be used as an indicator for the political distance between the parties. At the moment it is not possible to construct a meaningful scale for each individual country. This is caused by the fact that for each country only the results from two (alternative) budgets have been analyzed; since we are dealing with an interval variable (a variable without an absolute zero point) it is necessary to have more than two points on a scale before one can make comparisons that are really meaningful. An alternative budget from for example a left-wing party or a social democratic party should therefore be incorporated.

It was my point of departure to assume that NyD probably would be very similar to FRPd and FRPn and I therefore called them the 'Three Parties' as

opposed to the other bourgeois parties. This assumption was based on discussions with political scientists in Scandinavia as well as on newspaper accounts. The analyses showed that the Three Parties indeed have a lot in common. Their style, their contempt of traditional parties and their antipathy towards refugees/immigrants are probably the most important. The Budget Approach, however, clearly showed that it is not possible to attribute ultra-liberal tendencies to NyD, i.e., NyD more or less wants to keep the intensive state involvement of the Swedish government intact. Of course NyD is proposing reductions that are significantly more extreme than those proposed by the *Moderaterna* and the other two bourgeois parties, but it is very important to realize that these extra reductions have to take place in the same policy areas and more or less in the same mode as those proposed by the *Moderaterna*. This difference becomes very clear when one compares the way NyD on the one hand and the two *Fremskridtspartier* on the other hand want to deal with social services. NyD wants to cut the *level* of social services while the two *Fremskridtspartier* hope to economize on the *amount* of social customers. Moreover, in sharp contrast to FRPd and FRPn, NyD is proposing to start up some new projects in the economical field (infrastructure and an investment bank) in order to guarantee economic growth. This kind of thinking is alien to the ultra-liberal FRPn and especially to FRPd. Therefore, NyD stays much closer to the ideas of the *Moderaterna*, and the other bourgeois parties. There are however two major exceptions, refugees/immigrants and foreign aid. On these two issues NyD clearly deviates from the *Moderaterna* and is very much in line with, although less extreme than, the two *Fremskridtspartier*.

When the basic assumptions of the Budget Approach are compared with those of the Expert Judgment Approach and the Manifesto Approach, it is clear that there are some very important differences between the three approaches. Each approach has its merits and demerits. The Manifesto Approach and the Budget Approach for example have a very different unit of analysis. The former uses sentences in manifestos and the latter uses currency units on (alternative) government budgets. It is probably because of this difference that the Budget Approach seems to give a more accurate picture of the social/economical position of the parties, while the Manifesto Approach probably gives a somewhat more realistic picture of some of the important immaterial issues. Another important difference between these two approaches is the fact that the Budget Approach implicitly assumes that the general level of government spending says something about the ideological position of a country as a whole, while the individual (alternative) budgets convey information on the ideological stance of the political parties. This is a very disputed assumption in the literature on government spending, but after several modifications, it can give an interesting yardstick on which to base

a cross national comparisons. It is important to note that the Manifesto Approach does not assume anything about the cross-national differences between the countries, and also the present expert judgments seems to be unreliable for cross-national comparisons.

This was only a first attempt to formulate the Budget Approach and it will be clear that there is a need for more sophisticated arithmetics, better developed categories and more in-depth case studies than I could offer in this article. But I hope that its application on the *Fremskridtspartier* and *Ny Demokrati* will have showed that the Budget Approach, in potential, can make an interesting contribution to the measuring of political distance.

Notes

1. This article is an adaptation of chapter 5 of my MA thesis, *How Extreme are the Extreme Right-wing Parties in Scandinavia? Three Approaches for Measuring Party Distance*. I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Peter Mair, an anonymous reviewer of this journal and my wife Charlotte for their comments on an earlier version of this text.
2. In Denmark, *Venstre* and the *Konservative Folkeparti* have presented a common alternative for fiscal year 1994. In Norway, the *Kristelig Folkeparti* and *Senterpartiet* sometimes also construct alternative budgets together, but in an appendix they always clearly state the items on which they have different opinions.
3. In the public choice literature, it is generally believed that it is precisely this kind of pressures that explain why the government expenditures have grown so enormously over the last 50 years. For a good review of this literature we refer to Mueller (1989: chapter 17).
4. There is a major effort going within the Manifesto Project Group to relate the findings on the manifestos to the actual government expenditures. For an example of this approach, see the article by Budge and Hofferbert (1990).
5. Originally the party was called 'Anders Lange's Party for a strong reduction of taxes, VAT and government interferences'. In 1976, after the death of Anders Lange, the party changed its name to *Fremskrittsparti*.
6. In case I refer to the two sister parties, FRPd and FRPn, I will use the Danish plural *Fremskridtspartier*. As yet, there are no official ties between the *Fremskridtspartier* and NyD.
7. The original study of Budge, Robertson and Hearl (1986) did not include Norway, but a follow-up study on this country was soon conducted (Strøm and Leipart 1989). NyD has unfortunately not been included in the country study on Sweden.
8. For two other operationalizations of the left-right scales based on the same manifesto material, I refer to Bartolini and Mair (1990) and to the second chapter of Gooskens (1993).
9. Budge *et al.* discuss the influence of the party manifestos on the public image of the political parties. They assert that although few voters actually read party manifestos, those documents constrain party candidates, guide campaigns, and engender media debate (Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987: chapter 2). A content analysis on the media performance of some of the Scandinavian parties shows, however, that on television the parties have an agenda that is remarkably different from the one set out in their manifestos. In 1987 and 1988 FRPd for example spent respectively 17% and 18% of their media time on

the issue of refugees, while the other Danish parties discussed it for less than 1%! In their Manifestos, FRPd discussed this subject for about 2% (Siune 1982 and 1989; Gooskens 1993).

10. In the Scandinavian world the term 'bourgeois' is used alternately with 'nonsocialist' by people from all kinds of political persuasions and is therefore not indicative of any class perspective.

11. A fiscal year in Sweden runs from 1 July until 30 June, while Denmark and Norway use a calendar year.

12. An important third possibility would be to survey parliamentarians about their ideal budget. This way all the parties could be included in the analysis. This option was however not viable for my MA thesis. An important shortcoming of this approach would be the decreasing reliability.

13. At the end of 1993, that is after I concluded my research, the Schlutter government had to step back because of the Tamil case. This made an end to 11 years of bourgeois coalitions. *Venstre* and the *Konservative Folkeparti* made a joint effort to construct an alternative budget for fiscal year 1994.

14. A third interesting possibility is to survey parliamentarians about their ideal budget for the next fiscal year. This was however outside the scope of my research.

15. *St.ppt.nr.1 (1991-92) Statsbudsjettet Medregnet Folketrygden for Budsjetterminen 1992*.

16. 852 million kroner more expenditures compensated by 852 million more revenues (*Budsjett-inst.S.I-1991-92: 75-77*).

17. The figures for FRPd and the Danish bourgeois government originate from *Fremskridtspartiets ændringsforslag til Finanslovsforslaget 1992*.

18. *The Swedish Budget 1992/1993*, published by the Swedish Ministry of Finance.

19. This motion is called *Sammenfattning av Ny Demokratis motion med anledning av regeringens kompletteringsproposition (1991/92: 150 Nyd 305)*.

20. The figures for Denmark were 15,669.3 million or 3.7 percent and Norway 27,569.3 million or 7.7 per cent of the total revenues.

21. These references refer to a list of party documents, which are specified in Appendix II.

22. It needs to be mentioned that Sweden is spending considerably more on the health care system than Norway and Denmark. In 1987, Sweden spent 9 per cent of GDP on public health care, Norway 7.5 per cent and Denmark 6 per cent.

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Appendix I: the jurisdictions of the Standard Ministries

3. *Health*. Since most spending in the health sector takes place at the level of the counties, this budget clearly underestimates the total costs of medical care. For Norway, I have been unable to split the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Affairs. Based on various indications I think it is acceptable to treat the Norwegian Ministry of Social Affairs as equal to the Ministry of Health. For Sweden, I have split the budget of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs in two, and only used the items 'Public health and medical care', 'Social therapy alcohol and drugs policy', 'Welfare of the aged and disabled', 'Health insurance', together with 'Miscellaneous'.

4. *Social Affairs*. This budget mainly includes Pensions, Child allowances and Rent rebate. For Denmark, I have combined the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Housing and the separated items 'Pensions' and 'Child allowances'. For Norway, I have combined the Ministry of Family and Children, the separated Folketrygd (pensions), and the item 'Social purposes'. For Sweden, I have combined the items 'Family policy' and 'Pensions' from the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs together with the item 'Housing system' from the Ministry of Finance.

5. *Cultural Affairs*. For Sweden, the item 'Immigration, etc.' (6,655.5) has been transferred from the original Cultural Affairs Budget to the Home Office. Under the jurisdiction of this ministry there is included subsidization to newspapers, radio and television, art schools, and also support for ballet, painters etcetera.

6. *Education and Research*. For Sweden, the item 'Mother tongue education for immigrants' is transferred from the original Education Budget to the Home Office.

8. *Agriculture and Fisheries* Both in Denmark and in Norway, agriculture and fisheries are two separated ministries. It is somewhat difficult to compare the figures of Denmark with those of Norway and Sweden, because of the separated EC policies for Denmark, which are not accounted for in these figures.

9. *Justice* For Norway I have included the separate budget for the high court (*Høyesterett*). The Swedish budget deviates disproportionately because of the high amount allocated to the item 'Police administration' (10,254.0).

10. *Industry and Energy* For Denmark, I have combined the budgets of the Ministries of Economy, the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Energy. For Norway, I have combined the Ministry of Economy with the Ministry of Oil and Energy.

11. *Transport and Communications* For Denmark, I have combined the separate budget 'P&T' with the Ministry of Traffic Budget.

12. *Treasury* For Denmark, I have combined the Ministry of Finance with the Ministry of Taxes. For Sweden, I have transferred 'Housing system' (36,429.9) from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Social Affairs, and 'Local government grants' (21,747.2) from the Ministry of Finance to the Home Office.

13. *Home Office* For Denmark, the separate budgets 'Queen', 'Royal house' and 'Parliament', together with the separate budgets for the Prime Minister's Department and for the Ecclesiastical Affairs Department have been allocated under Home Office. For Norway, the separate budgets 'Royal household' and 'Parliament and auditing' together with the

separate Prime Minister's Department have been transferred to the Home Office. For Sweden, I have transferred the item 'Local government grants, etc.' (21,747.2) from the Ministry of Finance to the Home Office, the item 'Immigration, etc.' from the Ministry of Cultural Affairs and the item 'Mother tongue education' from the Education Budget to the Home Office.

Appendix II: Party Documents

FRPd1 *Fremskridtspartiets ændringsforslag til Finanslovsforslaget 1992* (December 1991).

FRPd2 *Det vil Fremskridtspartiet*. Party manifesto (January 1991).

FRPd3 *Folketingsgruppens dagbog, December 1973 - June 1976*.

FRPd4 *Fremskridtspartiets lovkatalog 1991-92* (September 1991).

FRPd5 *Fremskridt: EF - Politik 1992*.

FRPn1 *Fremtiden skapes - den vedtas ikke!* Party manifesto 1989-1993.

FRPn2 *Fremskrittspartiets alternative statsbudsjett 1992* (February 1992).

NyD1 *Ny Demokrati*. Party manifesto 1991.

NyD2 *Forslag till statsbudget for budgetåret 1992/93* (27 January 1992).

NyD3 *Sammenfatning av Ny Demokratis motion med anledning av regeringens kompletteringssproposition* (11 May 1992).

NyD4 *En åpen og ærlig flyktning- og invandrapolitikk for Sverige* (27 January 1992).

Juryrapport behorend bij de toekenning van de Daniël Heinsius-scriptieprijs 1993

Dit jaar is het de derde maal dat de redactie van *Acta Politica* de Daniël Heinsius-prijs toekent aan een student die een afstudeerscriptie heeft geschreven op het terrein van de politicologie. De redactie heeft in 1990 besloten tot instelling van de scriptieprijs omdat, naar haar mening, veel kwalitatief goed werk dat door studenten in het kader van hun afstuderen wordt verricht, nauwelijks buiten de kleine kring van beoordelaars bekend wordt. Publicatie van de kern van de bekroonde scriptie, tot een artikel omgewerkt, in *Acta Politica* is een goede manier om de waardering voor een relatief hoogwaardig werkstuk tot uitdrukking te brengen en de laureaat en andere studenten te stimuleren hun wetenschappelijk werk te publiceren.

De Daniël Heinsius-scriptieprijs wordt jaarlijks uitgereikt aan een student die, naar het oordeel van de kernredactie, in zijn of haar scriptie in het voorgaande academisch jaar op de meest aansprekende wijze met behulp van politicologische theorieën en/of methoden een antwoord heeft gegeven op een politicologisch relevante probleemstelling.

De scriptieprijs wordt dit jaar toegekend aan een politicoloog die onderzoek op het gebied van de vergelijkende politicologie heeft gedaan. De scriptie gaat in op politieke partijen met een extreem-rechtse oriëntatie en tracht de vraag te beantwoorden hoe de plaats van drie Scandinavische extreem-rechtse partijen, de Noorse *Fremskrittsparti*, de Deense *Fremskridtsparti* en de Zweedse *Ny Demokrati*, in het politieke spectrum kan worden bepaald. De winnaar van de Daniël Heinsius-scriptieprijs 1993 is drs. Mark Gooskens. Hij ontvangt de prijs voor de scriptie 'How extreme are the extreme right-wing parties in Scandinavia? Three approaches for measuring party distance', die hij onder begeleiding van Peter Mair geschreven heeft ter afronding van zijn studie politicologie aan de Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden.

De redactie van *Acta Politica* is van mening dat de heer Gooskens in zijn scriptie een interessante oplossing voor een moeilijk empirisch probleem – hoe de verschillen tussen politieke partijen te bepalen? – heeft gevonden. Vooral de door hem gebruikte Budget Approach, die de door politieke partijen voorgestelde verschuivingen in uitgaven voor verschillende beleidsge-

bieden of ministeries met elkaar en met die van de regering vergelekt, lijkt een goede aanzet voor de ontwikkeling van een kwantitatief instrument voor vergelijkend onderzoek naar politieke partijen te zijn. Deze aanpak, gekoppeld aan de kritiek op de methode waarbij experts gevraagd wordt de politieke partijen in een politiek stelsel te rangschikken, levert een scriptie op die uitdagend is en getuigt van een positief-kritische attitude. De scriptie is geschreven in zeer leesbaar en verzorgd Engels en is gespeend van al te technische formuleringen. Zowel voor de lezer die primair in de politieke verhoudingen in de Scandinavische landen is geïnteresseerd als voor de meer methodologisch of theoretisch belangstellende lezer biedt de scriptie van Mark Gooskens waardevolle informatie.

Motives, preferences and choices: a framework for testing their consistency in survey research

Robert J. van der Veen and Huib Pellikaan¹

1. Measuring attitudes towards voluntary cooperation in collective action problems

In this article, we present the method and results of an experimental survey among a population of about 500 first-year students in Political Science and Public Administration at six Dutch universities.² The purpose of this pilot study is to measure to what extent the attitudes of Dutch citizens reflect a willingness to cooperate voluntarily, in helping to achieve environmental goals in situations that are commonly thought to involve collective action problems. The survey deals with a simple case of chemical household waste-disposal.

The theoretical interest of our research project can be explained as follows. Over the last four years, we have been constructing a testable framework for assessing the extent to which people can be said to be caught in collective action problems concerning the environment.³ One reason for wanting to do this is the belief, held by many policy-makers in the Netherlands, that citizens' responses to environmental issues in which some kind of voluntary contribution on their part is expected, strongly conform to the model of the narrowly self-interested rational agent. The potential for voluntary cooperation of citizens is therefore assumed to be wasted by the 'free-rider' or collective action problem.

This empirical belief is rarely tested, even in the face of starkly conflicting evidence (notably the widespread success of household waste-disposal schemes). It seems that many policy-makers subscribe to the conception of attitude and agency that Sen has called the 'rational fool' (Sen 1977). On this conception individuals would single-mindedly try to maximize a narrowly self-interest of the following type: each wants the collective good of a waste-free environment to be available, but everybody wants to avoid the personal cost of expending time and effort in contributing to the good. As a consequence, environmental goals which depend on voluntary cooperation will tend to be frustrated, even though their attainment is desired by all con-