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Leiden
The Netherlands

Boekbespreking van: Free movement: Ethical issues in the transnational migration of people and of money

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Citation

Wissenburg, M. L. J. (1993). Boekbespreking van: Free movement: Ethical issues in the transnational migration of people and of money. *Acta Politica*, 28: 1993(1), 101-105. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3450111>

Version: Publisher's Version

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Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

plomatieke banden aan te brengen: hij kan slechts uitspraken doen over de hoeveelheid van deze banden. Terlouw constateert dat er tussen de landen van het Sovjet- en het VS-blok nauwe diplomatieke betrekkingen bestaan (p. 129). Juist in de periode van de Koude Oorlog gold dat de betekenis van diverse relaties zo verschillend was dat simpele optelling van de aantallen relaties tot verkeerde conclusies kan leiden.

In het achtste hoofdstuk combineert Terlouw de data over handels- en diplomatieke betrekkingen om een beeld te krijgen van de landen die zich in de 'external arena' van het wereldsysteem bevinden. Te dien einde combineert hij de tien indicatoren, die hij eerder gebruikte om de handels- en diplomatieke netwerken in kaart te brengen, tot één score. Hij verkrijgt een score op de 'degree of externality'-variabele door per land de som van de gekwadraterde verschillen tussen de standaardcores (z-scores) op de indicatoren en de minimale standaardcore te berekenen, dit te delen door het aantal voor het land beschikbare indicatoren en ten slotte de vierkantswortel uit het verkregen getal te trekken. Het resultaat van deze exercitie is dat negen landen tot het 'echte' externe gebied kunnen worden gerekend en dat dertien landen zich in de daarboven gelegen klasse bevinden.

Ter bepaling van de mate van 'coreness' ontwikkelt Terlouw in het slothoofdstuk, naar analogie van de 'degree of externality'-maat, een schaal op basis van zes indicatoren: de relatieve welvaart, het aandeel in de wereldhandel, de stabiliteit van handelsrelaties, het aantal uitgezonden en ontvangen diplomaten, respectievelijk ambassadeurs, en de militaire macht. Uit de afgedrukte wereldkaarten blijkt – voor zover door mij kon worden vastgesteld met hulp van de Times Atlas – de volgende indeling: 12 'echte' en 11 bijna-perifere landen, 10 'echte' en 12 bijna-semiperifere landen, en 7 'echte' en 8 bijna-kernlanden. Rekening houdend met het feit dat Gabon zowel in de groep van bijna-perifere als in die van de bijna-semiperifere landen is ingedeeld, kan Terlouw 50 van de in totaal 127 opgenomen landen in één van de drie door Wallerstein onderscheiden categorieën indelen. Terlouws conclusie luidt dat '[w]ithin this world-system, one can find a regional differentiation that corresponds to Wallerstein's ideas' (p. 193).

Aangezien de indeling van landen in categorieën het *pièce de résistance* is van Terlouws onderzoek, past het hierbij iets langer stil te blijven staan. Is het nu zo dat op grond van het hier behandelde onderzoek geoordeeld kan worden dat een goede indeling van landen in kern, semiperiferie, periferie en extern gebied voorhanden is? Terlouws studie is zeker een zeer zorgvuldig uitgevoerde stap op weg naar een indeling. Zijn wereldkaart blijkt evenwel nog vele witte plekken te bevatten: van het totaal van 127 landen is van 68 min of meer nauwkeurig een plaats bepaald. Van deze 68 landen is 14 landen een tweetal plaatsen toebedeeld, doorgaans zowel in het extern gebied als in de periferie. De effectieve score van het onderzoek is derhalve 54%.

Naar aanleiding van deze score kan de vraag gesteld worden of Terlouw, gelet op de aard van Wallersteins wereldsysteemtheorie, wel een redelijke kans heeft gehad zijn onderzoek met succes af te ronden. Immers, Wallersteins driedeling (kern-semiperiferie-periferie) is in hoofdzakelijk functionele termen gesteld. Wallersteins eigen omschrijving van de semiperiferie – als het gedeelte van het wereldsysteem dat 'partially deflect[s] the political pressures which groups primarily located in periph-

ral areas might otherwise direct against core-states and the groups which operate within and through their state machineries' (*The modern world-system*, 1974, p. 350) – biedt de onderzoeker onvoldoende operationele aanknopingspunten. Gelet op de cruciale rol die de semiperiferie in de wereldsysteemtheorie speelt, zou de overvloed aan analyses beter deels ingeruild kunnen worden voor theoretische reflectie. Bij de aanpak van het probleem hoe de uitkomsten van de bewerkingen, op theoretisch coherente wijze, gerelateerd kunnen worden aan de theorie van het wereldsysteem komt Terlouw vaak niet verder dan uitspraken als: 'This agrees with the Wallersteinian notion that some states in the periphery profit from economic stagnation' (p. 181).

Mijn eendoordeel over de studie van C.P. Terlouw is dat hij, ondanks alle bezwaren die kleven aan de aanpak, een verdienstelijk boek heeft geschreven, dat voor politologen lezenswaard, ofschoon niet steeds gemakkelijk leesbaar, is. Vooral de vele zijpaden die de auteur bewandelt, verzwakken soms de grote lijn. Wat mij betreft had Terlouw bij voorbeeld zijn analyses van economische cycli in hoofdstuk 10 kunnen weglaten. Terlouws behandeling van de wereldsysteemtheorie van Immanuel Wallerstein maakt duidelijk, ofschoon dit niet de directe opzet van de auteur is, waar zich een aantal zwakke punten in de theorie bevindt. De uitgebreide literatuurlijst is zeer nuttig voor diegenen die geïnteresseerd zijn in de wereldsysteemtheorie en het onderzoek dat in relatie tot de variant van Wallerstein is verricht.

W. Hout

Brian Barry, Robert E. Goodin (red.), **Free movement. Ethical issues in the transnational migration of people and of money.** Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York/Londen etc. 1992.

Good books are hard to come by. *Free Movement*, edited by Brian Barry and Robert Goodin, is one of those rare books worth their price. It is an inspiring collection of, for the greater part, excellent articles on a hot issue: the ethical aspects of the migration of people and money. The collection resulted from a conference in 1989 at Mont Saint Michel, organized by the Ethikon Institute and the California Institute of Technology. Three years and thousands of anti-immigrant incidents later, the contributions have not lost a bit of their relevancy. Political scientists, politicians, and in fact every worried citizen will want to read them.

One of the virtues of the book is its orderly organization. It starts with two introductory essays respectively by Barry and Goodin, followed by five sections representing major ethical stances, and it closes with two more summary chapters. The five sections, devoted to liberal egalitarianism, libertarianism, marxism, natural law, and political realism, are each made up of three articles, the first one discussing the migration of people, the second one dealing with the migration of money, and the last one commenting on both. Barry's first essay (chapter 1) introduces the organization of the book.

Bob Goodin opens the debate in chapter 2 with a firm and provocative defence of free movement, and an attack on any kind of excuse for closing a country's borders. If people were money, he observes, they would be warmly welcomed by any state. Poverty and lack of opportunity are the major causes of migration, but as both depend upon nationality, and nationality is accidental, such inequalities are undeserved. Of course, financial aid (i.e. redistribution of wealth) would be the most efficient way to contribute to the relief of poverty, but as the efforts of the rich countries are inadequate, people should be allowed to go where the opportunities are – at least from a moral point of view. Thus, there is a presumption in favour of open borders.

Goodin subsequently considers a list of common arguments for restricting the freedom of movement. He concludes that most of these should be rejected as lacking an empirical foundation (the 'brain drain' caused by emigration, for instance, is not necessarily harmful to the poorer countries), or for not satisfying the demand for consistency, by invoking an irrelevant difference between people and money, or between citizens and immigrants. The last objection seems to imply, among other things, that migration rules ought to be symmetrical. A country allowing emigration or supporting the principle of free movement while at the same time restricting the right to immigration probably violates this demand. The right to free movement would be voided if there was nowhere to emigrate to.

Joseph Caren (liberal egalitarianism, chapter 3), Hillel Steiner (libertarianism, chapter 6) and Ann Dummett (natural law, chapter 12) discuss free movement of persons on the basis of more or less the same individualistic premises. They also reach political conclusions similar to Goodin's. Caren's reasons for supporting free movement are the value of freedom in itself, its indispensability for equality of opportunity, and its possible contribution to the reduction of political, social and economic inequality (p. 26). Though this freedom can be restricted if necessary for the promotion of a greater freedom and equality in the future, most of the reasons governments currently come up with do not satisfy this demand.

Steiner's classical libertarian point of departure is the freedom of contract. In our second-best world, redistribution of resources may be demanded, few possessions being legitimately transferred in the past, but in a first-best world things look differently. As the state derives its authority from an agreement or several agreements among individuals to *protect* their freedom, neither the state nor any other third party has a say in any contract between free and consenting adults. Thus, if A sells part or all of his property to B, an outsider, no one can stop B from moving in (though B's country of origin may demand that B fulfils his contractual obligations before emigrating). Only trespassers may legitimately be stopped.

Dummett claims that the natural rights of citizens are not derived from their accidental status as citizens of a particular country, but from their nature as human beings. A natural right is therefore an equal right that cannot be restricted but for the protection of the rights of others or of other, more important rights. The freedom to migrate, Dummett asserts, is one of those natural human rights, acknowledged even by more restrictive modern governments. The reasons such governments give for deviating from this right are, however, seldom valid. A state's sovereignty is not in question or under threat when its human rights policy is criticized; nor is there a

direct relation between the opening or closing of borders, and the destruction or protection of a culture. All too often, restrictions on migration are inspired by 'particular concerns of some of the people, some of the time' (p. 178).

The contributions on the migration of money by I.M.D. Little (liberal egalitarianism, chapter 4), Deepak Lal (libertarianism, chapter 7), and Paul Weithman (natural law, chapter 13), reflect the diversity of opinions inside their respective political-philosophical traditions more than a diversity of opinion on free movement as such. Little describes himself as an adherent of a 'weighted and constrained utilitarianism'. He argues that governments should ideally allow money to go where it is most beneficial for all (utilitarianism), yet one's own society should come first. The existing rights of citizens (constraints), and the physical and emotional distance diminishing the marginal utility of for example poverty relief (weights), seriously limit transnational altruism. Deepak Lal, proclaiming Hayek to be his prophet, does argue against restrictions on international money transfers and against states interfering in the international market, as one might expect a libertarian to do, but he also defends foreign aid as a collective good benefitting the whole world, even the rich (p. 97). Weithman, finally, is more concerned about showing how nicely his transformation of John Rawls' Difference Principle into a principle of international justice fits in with the thomistic tradition and with recent episcopal and papal teachings (p. 182), than he is about comparing it with possible rivals within that same tradition. Weithman understandably advocates stringent state control on international transfers as a means of furthering just economic structures, which will in turn allow individuals to pursue the common good of society and realize their individual virtues (or moral duties, as he calls them).

The comments on liberal egalitarianism (James Woodward, chapter 5), libertarianism (Onora O'Neill, chapter 8), and the natural law tradition (John Finnis, chapter 14), are mostly predictable attacks on contradictions within and between essays. Woodward chooses Little's side against Caren's idealism, asserting that distance diminishes duties, and that, from an impartial point of view like John Rawls' original position, one cannot in reason accept the immense consequences of applying principles of justice designed for a fictitious international society to our second-best world. O'Neill concentrates on the discrepancies between ideal political and economic theory and the unpredictability of the real world where, of course, more state intervention in any matter (including migration) is needed to protect individual rights. Finnis argues against Dummett that not all rights are human rights (the right to asylum for the persecuted is a human right, the right to citizenship is not), and castigates Weithman by means of an almost ruthless critique of his (or catholicism's?) subjection of all human efforts and values to one unique ideal future end-state.

Compared to the principled views, if not idealism, of the above-mentioned three traditions, the contributions of the marxist writers are a sorry sight to see. Chris Brown (on migration of people, chapter 9) states that marxism measures all things by their contribution to the victory of communism, including the migration of proletarians. In other words: it all depends. Engels, for instance, believed in the positive contribution of Irish migrant workers to the English class struggle, whereas Marx considered importing Irish labour to be just another capitalist trick to divide the

working classes among themselves. Karl Hübner's analysis of the international financial system (chapter 10) comes down to the same thing: circumstances decide whether and which restrictions on capital transfers are opportune.

Philippe van Parijs' answer (chapter 11) is far from compassionate. He refuses to comment in detail on both contributions, and instead opts for 'ruthless recycling. There is nothing wrong in (...) using the latest intellectual technology to reshape (...) discolored parts, nor in letting the rest rot into oblivion' (p. 155). He first proposes a more sophisticated understanding of exploitation based on John Roemer's work, which results in the thesis that there may be worse and more basic forms of exploitation than capitalist exploitation. Next, Van Parijs suggests that marxists are, in their hearts, perhaps more interested in popular sovereignty. Finally, he twists this to mean 'everyone's real freedom to lead her or his life as she or he wishes' (p. 163). One step further, and he would have reduced marxism to a misguided version of liberalism.

The political realists David Hendrickson (chapter 15, on people) and Susan Strange (chapter 16, on money) are least remarkable and least consistent. Both argue for the precedence of empirical considerations, of feasibility, over moral intentions. Thus, given the beliefs and interests of citizens and states as they currently are, immigration of people may be restricted for almost any *Raison d'État*, and the justification for restricting or furthering the migration of money, if possible at all, depends on the economic condition of the state. Hendrickson even goes as far as to defend segregation in the interest of public order and the unity of the state (p. 222). Yet, as both say, realism should not prevent us from promoting moral ideals – as long as we are prepared to settle for second-best solutions. Bob Goodin's comment (chapter 17) is anything but mild. Political realism cannot be taken seriously as a moral stance, even if it is assumed that the interest of the state is the interest of the people. Firstly, 'can not' does not directly imply 'ought not'; a moral demand does not lose its appeal merely because it is infeasible. Secondly, acting as morally as possible in an immoral or imperfect world cannot be justified unless it is clearly shown that perfect moral behavior is physically (not politically) impossible; all too often, claims of impossibility are made in bad faith. Thirdly, we should not settle too easily for second-best, third-best, or *n*th-best solutions; the role of politics and political philosophy is rather to persuade people 'that moral ideals are worth pursuing' (p. 254).

Terry Nardin (chapter 18) summarizes the previous contributions, criticizing their inflexible character, while observing that the judgements of most authors on actual policies need not differ too much. Notwithstanding the quality of his summary and critique, Nardin was probably too impressed by the aspirations of the organizing Ethikon Institute, 'established to promote mutual understanding and greater tolerance among peoples of different moral traditions' (p. xii). In the nineteenth and final chapter, Brian Barry tries to refute three central premises of (some of) the contributors: that there would be no legal impediments to migration in an ideal world, that it is hypocritical to promote emigration but restrict immigration, and that the migration of people and money should be treated according to the same rules.

Earlier I stated that one will want to read *Free Movement*. Disappointments are not excluded, though. Of course, the book ought to have been much longer. Perhaps

the question of the relevant differences between people and money should have been dealt with more clearly than the division of labour between the contributors allowed – though they did their best. Being published in 1992, the editors should perhaps also have included a short comment on the unforeseen revival of racism, fascism, nationalism, and so forth – though the position of most authors is quite clear. More serious than these 'flaws' (one has to draw a border somewhere) is the absence of efforts on the part of most contributors to leave the trenches of moral principles for an ideal world versus amoral excuses for the second-best world, and move on to what political philosophy is ultimately about: moral principles for the real world.

M.L.J. Wissenburg