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Boekbespreking van: The end of the Cold War: Evaluating theories of international relations

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59. Zie Francis Fukuyama, *Het Einde van de Geschiedenis en de Laatste Mens*, Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Contact, 1992, p. 52.
60. Mario Benetti, *Met en Zonder Heimwee*, Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1984, p. 36
61. Molm, 'Punishment Power', p. 1396.
62. Omdat krachtens de definitie een systeem als een geïntegreerd geheel wordt beschouwd, is het evident dat in het systeemdenken, zoals dat zich vanaf het midden van de jaren 50 heeft ontwikkeld, van meet af aan interdependentie gold als het criterium waaraan juistheid en zinvolheid van systeemdefinities werd bepaald. Zie ook James E. Dougherty & Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, New York: Harper & Row, 1981, p. 135.
63. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 (oorspr. 1651), p. 62.
64. Johan K. De Vree, *Order and Disorder in the Human Universe: The Foundations of Behavioral and Social Science*, 3 vols., Bilthoven: Prime Press, 1990.

Boekbesprekingen

Pierre Allan and Kjell Goldmann (red.), **The End of the Cold War: Evaluating Theories of International Relations**, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1992

The problem that has formed the starting point of this book is an interesting one: what are the implications of the end of the Cold War for theories of international relations? One could think of several ways of dealing with this problem. A first option would be to have authors discuss the implications of the end of the Cold War for specific theoretical perspectives in the study of international relations, such as realism and neo-realism, interdependence, transnational and regime theories, centre-periphery and world system theories, et cetera. Another option would be to study the characteristics of the demise of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of the communist bloc and the end of superpower rivalry and formulate conclusions that could be confronted with widely held beliefs among international relations scholars. The Allan/Goldmann reader follows neither of these two obvious approaches. It is a collection of articles, loosely connected by the general topic of the end of the Cold War. It is not evident that the editors have invested much time in coordinating the contributions and avoiding duplications. Because of its lack of consistency the book is rather disappointing – and I fail to see the reason why the chapters have not been published separately in journals instead of together in a very expensive hardback. From an editorial point of view, Pierre Allan's 'conclusion' is the most disappointing of all contributions: instead of sketching the implications of the discussions in the book for theory-formation in the study of international relations, he presents at least twenty-five quotations from the previous seven chapters in order to 'summarize' the gist of the contributions.

Generally speaking, the book suffers from a lack of consistency, which is especially damaging where the concept of *theory* is concerned. Some authors – with Philip Everts as the most obvious representative – consider the loosely held conceptions and expectations of policy-oriented analysts and policy-makers as 'theory', while others – for instance, Isabelle Grunberg and Thomas Risse-Kappen and Heikki Patomäki – discuss the fundamental assumptions of authors writing about the structure of the international order. Although some authors suggest the appli-

cation of general metatheoretical principles, most do no more than mention testing (Kjell Goldmann, Everts), falsification (Goldmann), paradigms and auxiliary hypotheses (Grunberg and Risse-Kappen), research traditions and anomalies (Håkan Wiberg) and paradigms and theory-families (Patomäki).

A related problem concerns the role of *prediction* in the study of international relations. Some authors (for instance, Øyvind Østerud, Everts, Goldmann, Grunberg and Risse-Kappen) seem to hold the opinion that theories of international relations should have predicted the end of the Cold War in 1989. By stressing this need to predict specific events, the authors overestimate the ability of a theory of international politics. In *Theory of international politics* – a book that is mentioned by nearly all contributors, but seems to have affected only few – Waltz has argued that such a theory 'can tell us what pressures are exerted and what possibilities are posed by systems of different structure, but it cannot tell us just how, and how effectively, the units of a system will respond to those pressures and possibilities'. (p. 71) It might be useful to draw an analogy with the limits of seismological theories, which predict that earthquakes will occur in certain areas, but are unable to predict the exact moment of their occurrence. In the same vein, one can argue that international theory could be expected to analyse the consequences of the increased pressure on the Soviet Union – it is, however, a matter of historical contingency whether this former superpower would react by giving up its sphere of influence or by increasing its internal and external repression in order to retain its power position. Fortunately, Allan's final chapter is more in line with this insight. Allan argues that 'international relations are partly contingent' and that 'our present theoretical yardsticks are too demanding' since they imply a deterministic interpretation of history. (p. 239-40)

The fact that the present reader could have benefited from additional editing does not, of course, imply that the contributions are uninteresting in themselves. Several chapters are worth reading and provide food for thought. Some others, however, are ill-composed and lack a section that adequately sums up the conclusion. The latter criticism applies, in particular, to Wiberg's essay on 'Peace research and Eastern Europe' and Patomäki's contribution, titled 'What is it that changed with the end of the Cold War?'. The two chapters are disappointing because their conceptual structure remains unclear. Wiberg tries to interpret the end of the Cold War by applying Johan Galtung's centre-periphery approach to peace research. His contribution suggests a number of auxiliary hypotheses intending to save Galtung's structural theory; a more critical attitude would have been more appropriate. Patomäki argues that the end of the Cold War and the ensuing changes in Europe cannot be understood in terms of neo-realist, world-system and functionalist theories. Instead he advocates the construction of a 'concrete iconic model' of the 'Velvet Revolutions' that took place in Eastern Europe. What such an 'iconic model' would imply for the theory of international relations is not, however, clearly specified.

The chapters by Østerud, Everts and Goldmann do not provide many well-grounded new insights. Østerud discusses the shortcomings of the traditional, revisionist and post-revisionist perspectives on the origins of the Cold War. The central thesis of his contribution appears to be that the Cold War has to be interpreted

as a situation of 'intersystemic rivalry' and not as a separate system of conflict. Moreover, he argues that the Cold War may be over, but that the great powers still face a mutual security dilemma.

As indicated above, Everts mainly focuses on the expectations of policy-makers and policy-oriented analysts concerning the development of superpower antagonism. His argumentation is rather shallow, since he relies too heavily on a deterministic interpretation of prediction and explanation. Everts' plea for the development of applicable knowledge suggests that there is a difference between a type of knowledge that can be used in the development of policy and a type that cannot be used for that aim. Moreover, his expectations concerning a 'general theory of international relations' are pitched too high. Summing up what such a general theory should accomplish, Everts argues that all following processes and events should be explained by it: 'the decline of the United States as a world power, the shift in financial and economic power from the Atlantic to the Pacific basin, the debt burden which suffocates the South, the sinking of Africa in a morass of poverty and social disintegration, and the proliferation of weapons of all kinds.' (p. 78)

Goldmann has tried to analyse whether Gorbachev's 'new thinking' about international conflict can be explained by focusing on bargaining techniques, power relations, domestic constraints or features of the international system. His conclusion is that '[o]ur inability to anticipate the "new thinking" reflects both the weaknesses of the separate propositions and the lack of comprehensive theory'. (p. 102) Goldmann is caught in a 'policy-relevance trap' in the same way as Everts is, witness his conclusion that 'there is reason to question the validity of the predictive ambition, and hence of the objective of contributing to rational decision-making'. (p. 102-3)

The most useful contributions in the Allan/Goldmann reader are those written by Aggarwal and Allan and by Grunberg and Risse-Kappen. The chapter by Vinod K. Aggarwal and Pierre Allan discusses 'Cold War endgames'. Using the methodology of game theory, Aggarwal and Allan analyse the 'constrained preference orderings' of the two superpowers given three 'situational variables': an actor's overall power position, issue-specific power and the strength of an actor's domestic political coalition. On the basis of the three situational variables the authors derive a preference ordering of four possible outcomes of the interaction between the superpowers: mutual consensus, no consensus, United States' dominance and Soviet dominance. Aggarwal and Allan argue that the post-Cold War situation has implied a major change in the preference structure of the Soviet Union as a consequence of the erosion of the country's overall power position: 'the worst outcome is now no consensus, whereas in the previous period it was the US prevailing'. (p. 43) The most interesting implication of this contribution is that logical-deductive reasoning on the basis of several assumptions that are accepted by most international relations scholars leads to a structural explanation of the consequences of the end of the Cold War. An obvious weakness of the article is that the approach is *reductionist*, not *systemic*: an actor's preference is deduced from the three *internal* characteristics that have been mentioned above, while international circumstances – such as the nature of the relationship to the other actor in the game and the other actor's power position

– are left out of the analysis. The implication of this reductionist focus is that the preference structure of the United States is considered independent of its opponent in the 'game'; in Aggarwal and Allan's approach, the US ordering of the four outcomes is determined independent of whether the second actor is the Soviet Union, France or the Netherlands. Moreover, Aggarwal and Allan consider the relative ordering of 'consensus' and 'no consensus/confrontation' to be solely dependent on the existence of internally stable or unstable coalitions: if a stable political coalition exists, then a country will favour 'consensus'; if the coalition is unstable, it will favour 'confrontation'. Unfortunately, Aggarwal and Allan's contribution does not provide a convincing argumentation of why this specific postulate has been introduced.

Under the title 'A time of reckoning' Grunberg and Risse-Kappen present an analysis of international relations theory that fits the expectations voiced in the first paragraph of this review. In consecutive order, the authors provide a useful discussion of: classical and structural realism, rational choice and institutionalist approaches to international cooperation, as well as three 'unit-level approaches' (republican and commercial liberalism, domestic structure and coalition-building theory and the cognitive-psychological approach). The main conclusion of this chapter is that none of the theoretical perspectives provides a full explanation of the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, they argue that '[e]ach approach contributes something to our understanding of the transformation process'. (p. 144) The 'eclectic narrative of the end of the Cold War' as Grunberg and Risse-Kappen present it fails to convince me of the thesis that 'systemic and material factors are grossly underdetermining' and that 'this might be the end of "geopolitics" as we have known it for centuries'. (p. 146) In my view, a more correct interpretation of the end of the Cold War would have to focus on the interaction of international-systemic and internal factors: neither international superpower rivalry, nor the collapse of the communist system provide a sufficient explanation of the ending of the Cold War. Moreover, other events since 1989 (for instance, the Gulf War, the Yugoslav and Caucasian wars) have made it very clear that the use of force is still a central feature in international relations.

W. Hout

R. Hillebrand, **De antichambre van het parlement. Kandidaatstelling in Nederlandse politieke partijen**. DSWO Press, Leiden, 1992.

Er wordt al geruime tijd in verschillende media gesuggereerd dat politieke partijen in Nederland en elders in verval verkeren. Ze verliezen leden en raken vervreemd van hun achterban, profileren zich niet duidelijk meer, falen in het articuleren en aggregeren van belangen en brengen geen nieuwe ideeën meer voort. Hoewel deze kritiek zelden empirisch onderbouwd wordt – alleen het dalend aantal partijleden is een aantoonbaar feit – dient zij wel serieus genomen te worden. Wat de critici echter vaak over het hoofd zien is de meest wezenlijke functie van partijen, het stel-

len van kandidaten voor de Tweede Kamer en andere politieke lichamen. Partijen kunnen vele andere functies aan anderen overlaten, aan deze taak houden zij krampachtig vast.

Tot voor kort was de vervulling van deze taak een soort 'black box' waar politologen alleen over konden speculeren. Dank zij een groot opgezet onderzoek aan de Leidse universiteit in de jaren 1985–1988, dat uitmondde in het proefschrift van Hillebrand, kunnen we nu een blik in deze doos werpen. Het is natuurlijk een momentopname rond de verkiezingen van 1986, die op enkele punten intussen reeds achterhaald is door veranderingen in de kandidaatstellingsprocedure – met name bij de Partij van de Arbeid – maar het biedt toch ook enig algemeen inzicht.

In de eerste plaats valt op, hoe bescheiden de invloed en de participatie van de partijleden in de lokale afdelingen was – en waarschijnlijk nog is. Ondanks belangrijke verschillen in de procedures tussen CDA, VVD en PvdA werd de kandidatenlijst in deze partijen in feite vastgesteld door een handjevol mensen – in het CDA voornamelijk de voorzitter en de secretaris van de partij, in VVD en PvdA de voorzitters van de provinciale organisaties (kamercentrales resp. gewesten). De voorgenomen veranderingen bij de PvdA zullen er vermoedelijk toe leiden dat de partij in dit opzicht minder op de VVD en meer op het CDA gaat lijken. Bij D66 kunnen de leden in feite door een poststemming de kandidatenlijst geheel naar eigen keuze vaststellen, maar laten zich daarbij in sterke mate leiden door het advies van de Commissie Aandragen Stemadvies.

In de tweede plaats bleken bij de selectie van kandidaten politieke criteria nauwelijks een rol te spelen, maar ging het meestal om kenmerken als geslacht, leeftijd en – vooral – regionale herkomst. Vrouwen- en jongerenorganisaties voerden actie voor eigen kandidaten, terwijl kamercentrales en gewesten kandidaten uit de eigen provincie hoog op de lijst trachtten te plaatsen. Van strijd tussen facties of linker- en rechtervleugels was nagenoeg niets te merken in 1986. Hillebrand verwondert zich over dit regionalisme – overigens al eerder opgemerkt, zij het niet systematisch onderzocht, door Koole en Leijenaar. Als verklaring voert hij een algemene differentiatie tussen *in-* en *outgroups* aan. Het is een ad-hoc verklaring, die nader onderzocht zou moeten worden – liefst in een vergelijking met andere landen. Op het eerste gezicht lijken regionale tegenstellingen irrationeel en dysfunctioneel voor een partij. Met de Amerikaanse socioloog Lewis Coser kan men echter ook aan (beheerste) conflicten een integrerende werking toekennen. Juist regionale conflicten zouden kunnen bijdragen tot integratie van de partij, (a) door op regionaal niveau een gevoel van solidariteit te scheppen of te versterken en (b) door mogelijke andere ideologische of sociaal-economische tegenstellingen te door kruisen en te neutraliseren. Laatstgenoemde tegenstellingen zijn potentieel gevaarlijker, omdat ze tot afsplitsingen kunnen leiden; regionalistische afsplitsingen komen in Nederland echter niet voor.

Een derde belangwekkende uitkomst van Hillebrands onderzoek betreft de representativiteit van de volksvertegenwoordigers. Natuurlijk wisten we al dat Tweede Kamerleden overwegend hoog opgeleide heren van middelbare leeftijd uit het Westen des lands waren (en zijn). Niet bekend was echter of zij daarmee sterk verschilden van andere partijleden en of die verschillen in de loop van het se-