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Political representation and quotas: Hannah Pitkin's concept(s) of representation in the context of feminist politics

Rian Voet

Introduction

In 1825, William Thompson and Anna Wheeler wrote a furious pamphlet against James Mill's Article on Government of 1820.¹ In this pamphlet, they argue that James Mill's statement that no separate representation of women would be necessary because women's interests were already virtually represented in those of their fathers or husbands, is utterly false. Instead, Thompson and Wheeler point out that there exists no identity of interests between men and women in the present state of affairs. Even if it existed, it would not be enough reason to exclude women from political rights. They conclude that there is no security for equality of enjoyments except by means of civil rights, and that there is no security for equal civil rights, except by means of equal political rights.

In 1990, another type of feminist pamphlet appeared, called *Quotas now: Women in the Labour Party*.² According to this pamphlet, the 'equality of enjoyments' will only then be secure, if women and men have equal rights and if women and men occupy an equal number of power positions in parliament and in political parties. This pamphlet does not stand on its own. According to the pamphlet, the declaration on women's representation at the Labour Party's conference of 1989 was that 'the introduction of quotas throughout the party structure was the only way of ensuring that women would finally take their rightful place alongside their male colleagues at all levels'.³ It has to be remarked here that the quotas are not only used internally throughout the party-structure, and – and this is of particular interest to the voting public – as a selection principle for candidates for parliament. Quota programmes are carried out or discussed in many European socialist and left-wing parties. Although not all feminists back a quota-system⁴, at the moment it is conceived as the most important political feminist strategy. Therefore, it deserves attention and serious theoretical reflection. The legitimization behind a quota-system is simply that exhortation (meaning the

passing of resolutions supporting equality and encouraging women to come forward), offering special training, education and advice, have not worked. Quotas, on the other hand, are, according to the pamphlet, 'a proven mechanism for guaranteeing fair representation for women'.⁵

The differences between the two pamphlets illustrate, in my opinion, three major changes within feminism. First, the two pamphlets mark a move from a liberal demand for equal political opportunity to a demand for equal representation. Secondly, many feminists have become less reluctant to use coercive methods in politics. From the right to representation, they have shifted to the right to fair representation in order to achieve finally the right to equal representation.⁶ And finally, they have turned, in the terms of Hannah Pitkin⁷, from a concept of representation as accountability to a concept of descriptive representation. Instead of proclaiming that women should have a right to hold representatives to account by choosing whether or not to elect them again and the right to take on the responsibility of being a representative themselves, many feminists nowadays argue that the representative bodies should reflect the differences in society. In affirmative action campaigns, the argument is that representation of women by a parliament or party-leadership, which consists mainly of men, is not real representation.

The question that I would like to raise here, is not about the use of coercive methods in politics. Instead, I want to ask whether the concept of descriptive representation, which underlies the quota-system, is a desirable concept of representation for feminists and if it is not, whether we only have 'representation as accountability' as its alternative. In more political terms, does representation for feminists mean either quotas for women in politics or just women's political rights? My argument will be that neither of these concepts of representation is satisfactory as the ideal type of representation at every level.

What is descriptive representation?

In her book *The Concept of Representation*, Hannah Pitkin explains the idea of descriptive representation by quoting the words that John Adams used in the American Revolutionary Period. 'A representative legislature', he said, 'should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel, reason and act like them'.⁸ The reason why it should be such a portrait, is given most explicitly by John Stuart Mill. As the proper function of a representative assembly is to throw the light of publicity on the acts of the government, John Stuart Mill argued, 'then all opinions and interests

must be represented accurately: so that all possible views and criticism will come into light!⁹ I think this is also the thought that lies behind the demand of quotas for women in political parties. How convincing this idea is, particularly to feminists! Has not the time come for the silenced voices of women to be heard? Is it not about time that the evils of patriarchy became at least partly corrected by a fierce force of women in the leadership of political parties and in parliament? Will it not be a tremendous step forward for feminism, if the so-called representative bodies became really representative by becoming more 'like us'?

Before I raise doubts about this concept of descriptive representation, it is necessary to have a closer look at it, and the manner in which the arguments in favour of this concept are repeated in the affirmative action campaigns.

Hannah Pitkin distinguishes the concept of descriptive representation from other ideas of representation. Descriptive representation does not suggest, unlike other concepts of representation, that in order to be a representative, it is necessary to have authority over others, as in the case of somebody who represents a child in court, for instance a parent, trustee or guardian. Descriptive representation does also not suggest that the legitimacy of the representatives lies in the fact that they can be held-to-account. It does furthermore not suggest that to be really representative, people have to believe in the fact that they are represented. In conclusion, descriptive representation does not suggest anything about what the representative should do when she represents. It only gives a description of the backgrounds of the represented and the degree to which the representatives resemble the represented.¹⁰

Descriptive representation may develop in one of two different ways, depending on the accuracy of the description. I shall illustrate this by referring to different versions of quota-systems.

The first version of descriptive representation is the one Hannah Pitkin describes. Here, the aim is to secure a very accurate map of the nation. The representative assembly should not only reflect that there are different sexes, but also that there exist different classes, races, sexualities, religions and regions. In the past, the mistake has often been made, that if the different regions were represented, and if each full citizen were given one vote, then, this would automatically lead to a parliament that would reflect the nation. The idea behind quota-systems is that this *spontaneous* development of an accurate portrait is a myth. This belief needs to be embodied in policy. The question is where to stop. Is it enough to enforce the representation of 50% of women in parliament and in the leadership of political parties? Is it enough to say that those 50% of women should represent women from dif-

ferent classes? Or do we have to go further than that? In this respect, it is significant that, although the pamphlet *Quotas Now* argues simply for quotas for women, it also remarks that the Labour Party 'particularly needs more working-class women and those who are black or from other ethnic minorities'.

The second version of descriptive representation is satisfied with only a rough description of 'the people'. A quota-system that would guarantee that the percentages of men and women in parliaments and parties are the same as the percentages of men and women in society, is sufficient. In this case, descriptive representation would tend towards symbolic representation. All women in the representative assembly will stand for all women in society, simply because of their womanhood, for that is the only thing we know about them. If the most important fact about them were not that they represented women, then there would be no need for a quota-system. In that case, women could just as easily be represented by men or by a representative assembly which consists of a majority of men. This second version of descriptive representation should not even be called representation, according to Gerhard Leibholz, who wrote a book *Das Wesen der Repräsentation* in 1928. In his terms it would be identification instead of representation. Identification means singleness, a string of identities. For example, the electorate, the candidates of political parties and the government are identified with the political unity of the people. An act of parliament is seen as identical with the will of the people, the 'volonté générale'.¹² This concept of identification sounds very much like Marie Swabey's idea of a sample, to which Hannah Pitkin refers when she explains what descriptive representation is. According to Marie Swabey, the principle of sampling is displayed on no less than three levels in a modern representative government. First, the votes are to be considered a sample of all the people. Secondly, the majority of the votes are to be taken as a sample of all the votes. And thirdly, the public officials who are elected are to be regarded as a sample of the nation.¹³ However, while Pitkin conceives this as to be a form of representation (which is undesirable), Leibholz conceives this as the opposite of representation. This difference can easily be explained by their different views on the essence of representation. Pitkin's ideal of representation draws upon an idea of defending interests of those who are absent. This idea can also be found in the idea of sampling, although Pitkin thinks that it is done in a too simplistic way. Leibholz, on the other hand, thinks that to represent is the opposite of 'Vertreten' or, in English, the opposite of defending the interests of a particular group. While both authors presume that there should be some distance between representative and the represented, in Leibholz's case this distance is much more substantial. I shall return to the reasons for

this later. At this point, I shall review the arguments for descriptive representation, as they are offered in the campaigns for quotas for women.

Arguments for and against descriptive representation

In her article 'When are Interests Interesting?' Virginia Sapiro gives three reasons why an increase in the number of women in positions of power is a necessary, although an insufficient, condition for representing women.¹⁴ First, more women among public officeholders will make some difference in government's responsiveness to women's interests. Secondly, if we accept the democratic ideal that participation in governance is valuable, we cannot accept the systematic exclusion of a particular group. Thirdly, increased representation of people who 'look like' women will cause powerful symbolic changes in politics. It will increase the acceptability of women in government.¹⁵ All of these arguments are echoed in the *Quotas Now* pamphlet¹⁶ and all of these arguments are theoretically weak.

The first argument, that in practice women simply represent women's interests better than men do, seems to me the strongest of the three. If it were really true, then further theorizing would be mere sophistry.

However, it is only true in a very general sense. It is not always the case that women represent women better, sometimes it is quite the reverse. Not all women have the same opinions, and instead of complaining about this, we should be proud of it. The point is that the concept of descriptive representation on its own, does not say anything at all about what the representative should do. It offers no single standard about what good representation is. Therefore, although one perhaps might hope that women would represent women's interests, the representative need not feel herself obliged to do so. Descriptive representation only gives information about the public¹⁷, only tells how many people of group A are present in a parliament or in another political body. It does not require that the representatives of group A feel, think and behave like people of group A. The 50% of women in parliament or in a leadership of a political party could behave like men in our eyes. But we are not entitled to complain about this because the requirements of descriptive representation have been met. We have got what we asked for, that is 50% of the representatives is female.

Suppose, this time, that those 50% women in political bodies, indeed feel, think and behave like women. Suppose they proclaim exactly the same things that the majority of women wants them to do (according to the polls that are very regularly held). Is the best descriptive representative necessarily also the best representative for political activity or government? Hannah

Pitkin is ambivalent about this. She argues: 'while we might well wish to complain that there are not enough representative members of the working-class among Parliamentary representatives, we would not want to complain that the large class of stupid or maleficent people have too few representatives in parliament: rather the contrary.'¹⁸ True, but why would working-class people indeed be represented better by working-class people; and why should this be the case with women? If it were the case that most women wanted to stay at home, be a house-wife for the rest of their lives and did not care that they would in this way become economically and legally dependent on their husbands, would their interests be best represented if the government supported this? I think that there are many possible conflicts between a feminist policy and the actual wishes of the majority of women. Again, descriptive representation gives no guidelines or guarantees about what good representation should be.

The second argument suggests that if we accept the democratic ideal that participation in governance is valuable, we cannot accept the systematic exclusion of a particular group. Note, that this is a different argument from John Stuart Mill's argument that the liberal need for publicity requires the representation of all possible opinions and interests in parliament. Instead of the language of liberalism, we are now confronted with the language of democracy.¹⁹ Democracy, furthermore, is conceived here as having a share in governance. I cannot reconcile myself to this ideal of democracy, if what is meant by it is that all groups should always have a share in governance. Not only does this seem unrealistic to me, but it also seems undesirable. I rather put in its place the old Aristotelian idea of republican citizenship, namely to be ruled and to rule in turn. Of course, until recently women have almost only been among the ruled and not among the rulers. It seems at least plausible that there has been a systematic exclusion of women for leading political positions, which has everything to do with male concepts of leaders, politicians and even citizens. However, to require that women should always have a share in governance, would imply that the whole essence of politics is lost.²⁰ I refer here to the concept of politics as it is used by Hannah Arendt, in which politics as action together with others is perceived in the perspective of the common good. In Arendt's view action implies political judgment, pluralism and going beyond necessity and truth. This view attacks an idea of democracy as descriptive representation, because in the latter it would no longer be necessary to struggle for acceptance, to fight to get a place in governance, to persuade other people of the value of one's opinions and to prove one's capabilities in actions. Politics would become mere policy or the administration of interests. Instead of the beginning, it would be the end of feminist politics.

The third argument – that increased representation of people who 'look like' women will cause powerful symbolic changes in politics and will increase the acceptability of women in government – is at its best tautological. If the entry of women in politics itself is seen as a major symbolic change, then the statement simply says that more women in politics will have as its result more women in politics. It does not say anything about whether this is desirable or not. If, on the other hand, the aim is the acceptability of women in politics, then it is obvious that this does not follow automatically from the fact that there are more women in politics. If these women entered politics via a quota-system or another form of positive discrimination, then there will be the possibility of resentment on the part of men. Furthermore, it is possible that feminists or anti-feminists will not be satisfied with how these women operate as politicians. Lastly, why is the acceptability of women in politics such a high aim? Does not acceptability imply harmlessness? Would it not be preferable to have 'unacceptable' feminists in politically important positions, feminists who are seen as a real danger to male-dominated society?

There are other objections to descriptive representation in general, and to quota-systems in particular. These objections depend on which type of descriptive representation we are talking about. Remember, one can distinguish the very accurate map from the rough description.

Let us take the case now of the very accurate map. The representative assembly should not just consist of 52% women, but also of the exact percentage of people from the working-class, ethnic minorities, different sexualities, invalids and so forth.²¹ There are several problems with this concept. First of all, not every difference, not even every social division, has a political meaning and if it has, it has not the same political meaning every moment and in every place.²² The most important question here seems to be: who is going to decide which social group deserves a special representation in political bodies? If it is to be the members of political bodies themselves, then this may lead to one of two situations. In the first situation they simply will not advocate quotas for women and other groups, because it is against their interests to do so. In this case the strategy has failed. In the second situation they will advocate quotas for women and other groups, members of the working-class and so on, and then this proves that they are not necessarily following their private interests. However, if they can choose the side of women in the decision for or against a quota-system, why should they not be able to do this in other decisions as well? Considered in this way, the strategy of the quota-systems seems to be simply unnecessary.²³ Suppose it were to be women's groups, who had to take care that total amount of elected women would be representative for working-class women, lesbians,

black women etcetera. Again, this would lead to a very peculiar situation. First of all, why should women have to do this when there is no similar system for men? After all, men do not call their groups men's groups. Secondly, there is no institution that coordinates women's groups. And lastly, what about the distinction between women's groups and feminist groups? Should all kinds of women have the right to separate political representation? I will consider the best possible case: one in which there is no need for an institution which takes care of really accurate descriptive representation. Imagine the following utopian situation: after feminists introduce quotas for women in politics, it happens that the final list of elected persons in political parties and in parliament reflects exactly the composition of society. Suppose that we have all kinds of political personalities, that everyone finds himself or herself represented by someone and that politicians are really 'like us'. Would this not lead to an incredible fragmentation? Would this not imply for feminism, that black political women only wanted to represent black women, while the lesbian M.P. only wanted to speak and act for lesbians? My worry is that this fragmentation would have a very negative effect on the impact of feminism as a political movement.

But perhaps there is no need to obtain this very accurate map. A rough description, and the statement that representative assemblies need eventually consist of equal amounts of men and women, would be enough. This is, anyway, the direction which the strategy of quota-systems seems to take in the first instance. Yet here again the problem arises that descriptive representation ends up in identification. Either, it is expected that the female representatives stand somehow for women and defend their interests, or there is little point in a quota-system as a feminist strategy. If that expectation exists, then there must be something wrong with that expectation, not only on the level of possibility, but also on the level of desirability. A representative should have a free mandate and not be bound to the wishes of the people who are represented.²⁴ The representative should be free to change her mind through the processes of the political debate and through the accessibility of specific information she gets in her position as a representative. Furthermore, she is not there to represent just particular interests, but to represent what she thinks is in the public interest, what she thinks is the common good.²⁵

This theoretical criticism of descriptive representation attacks quota-systems, before they have even had the chance to succeed. The theoretical approach eliminates women's only hope at the moment, and drives them back to the position where they have just political rights, but no power at all. Furthermore, it appears to restore a political vocabulary which glorifies the common good and, in this way, hinders the politicization of women's or

feminist issues. Those considerations create a personal dilemma. When I was thinking this week about the arguments against the assertion that women need to be represented by women, I saw the candidates for the student's union presenting themselves for a public of students. While the public was mixed, none of the members behind the table at the platform was female. I felt extremely irritated: Is it still like this? Is this what the so-called democratization of the universities was supposed to mean? Immediately after this, I became aware of my own contradictions. Why is it so disgusting that The Big Bosses still happen to be male, if it is the case that women do not necessarily have to be represented by women? I 'know' that in practice they will not represent women, not to mention feminists. This 'knowledge', though, is a knowledge of experience that automatically appears to be outweighed by theoretical counter-arguments. The very fact of writing, on its own, already favours the theoretical arguments in a way that does no justice to reality. Is it then better not to write about a subject like quota-systems? But to resist reflection, implies being blind to the possible consequences of this strategy! Therefore, I shall carry on by considering the alternative Thompson and Wheeler offered us, namely mere political rights for women, or a concept of 'representation as accountability'.

Back to mere political rights?

Back to representation as accountability?

If I concluded by saying that political rights for women is enough, then I would not have achieved enough. The concept of representation that underlies political rights for women, that is to say: 'representation as accountability', is too weak. The weakness of this concept lies in its formality, as Hannah Pitkin rightly argues. It says simply that elected representatives can be held-to-account at the moment of election. If we are not satisfied with a particular representative, all we have to do is choose another representative. The problem with this concept is that if the representative indeed gets removed, there is nothing further to complain about. Nevertheless, there is the feeling that they did something wrong during the term in which they were supposed to be representing the people. We may feel that it was not good representation. But the concept of 'representation as accountability' gives just as few guidelines for good representation as the concept of descriptive representation did. The other problem is that in a party system, such as the Dutch one, representatives have to be held-to-account on so many issues. They may have scored very badly on feminist issues, but very well on all others. In practice, the multiplicity of political items obscures the

fact that representatives have not kept their promises in all cases. Who remembers the acts and positions of all M.P.'s on every issue after four years when election time arrives again? In the case of members of the cabinet or members of the leadership of a political party, we might remember better what they promised us. However, in these cases too, representatives are more likely to be judged on their general capability or on their positions on the so-called 'core issues' of politics, that is on economic policy, than on their policy on feminist issues.²⁶

So far, I have argued that both the concept of descriptive representation, and the concept of representation as accountability cause problems for feminists. While the first concept offers only information about the public, the second offers only one moment, namely the moment of the election, to choose another representative. Neither proposal offers us a satisfactory ideal of representation. Should we then search for an alternative concept of representation which gives us these guidelines? The answer is yes and no. Yes, because a normative approach to this problem is inevitable and desirable. No, because it is dangerous to assume that one concept of representation might be used on each and every level of politics. In the concluding part of this paper, I propose a three-dimensional view of representation. My argument is that our attitudes towards representation must differ depending on whether we are speaking about individuals, group interests or the common good.

A three-dimensional view of representation

At the *individual level*, it is useful to go back to Thompson's and Wheeler's pamphlet, because behind their major concept of representation as accountability lies another idea. They not only demanded that women should have political rights, but they also appealed strongly to women to exercise those political rights. In the arguments for this actual exercising of political rights, they seem to switch to another concept of 'representation', namely 'self-representation'.

Thompson and Wheeler have a strong distrust of representatives.²⁷ The chance that representatives abuse their power is great. Therefore, it would be better if one represented oneself.²⁸ Further, they state that it is necessary to put an end to the 'mountebank jargon of a "public good" distinct from the good of the individual members of society'. In order to know what the happiness of individuals is, individuals should speak.²⁹ Thirdly, according to them, the exercise of political rights gives people more than just the protection of civil rights. Suppose that civil rights were protected by represen-

tatives, then there would still be the matter of the inherent worth of the exercise of political rights: 'the exercise of political rights affords the best opportunity for the exercise of the intellectual powers and the enlargement of the sympathies of human beings, leading their attention out of themselves, to matters in which numbers of their fellow creatures, to an indefinite extent, beside themselves are interested'.³⁰ Their last argument on women's exercise of political rights states: 'To obtain equal rights, the basis of equal happiness with men, you must be respected by them; not merely desired like rare meats, to pamper their sexual appetites. To be respected by them, you must be respectable in your own eyes; you must exert more power, you must be more useful. You must regard yourselves as having equal capabilities of contributing to the general happiness with men, and as therefore equally entitled with them to every enjoyment. You must exercise these capabilities, nor cease to remonstrate till no more than equal duties are exacted from you, till no more than equal punishments are inflicted upon you, till equal enjoyments and equal means of seeking happiness are permitted to you as to men'.³¹

Here, we are not offered another concept of representation, but rather an attitude, which is directed against representation. On an individual level, this seems to me the most sensible attitude if we want to rescue the aristotelian idea that citizenship is to be ruled and to rule in turn. It is extremely important to inform the representatives about your ideas and to control them, but it is equally important to prepare yourself for the moment of rule. Therefore, it is necessary to collect as much information as possible, to learn how to make decisions and to get experience in acting together with others for the same aim.

The level of *group interests* offers a limited but accurate means of rendering to Pitkin's ideal of representation as 'acting for'. According to Pitkin 'representation here means acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them. The representative must act independently; his action must involve discretion and judgment; he must be the one who acts. The represented must also be (conceived as) capable of independent action and judgment, not merely being taken care of. And, despite the resulting potential for conflict between representative and represented about what is to be done, that conflict must not normally take place. The representative must act in such a way that there is no conflict, or if it occurs an explanation is called for. He must not be found persistently at odds with the wishes of the represented without good reason in terms of their interest, without a good explanation of why their wishes are not in accord with their interest'.³²

Here, we enter the complicated sphere of interests. Indeed, as William Connolly argues, far from being a clear and steady foundation for politics,

interest is a fundamentally contested concept.³³ Interests as policy preferences, utilitarian interests and interests as need fulfilment would lead us in very different directions. Suppose, we accept Connolly's conclusion that the best idea of real interests is the choice one would make if one had alternatives and accurate information about these alternatives. Would it then be possible to say that there is something that we can call 'women's interests?' I think we could write a programme which professed to defend the interests of all women.³⁴ Of course not every single woman would agree with it, but neither Pitkin's idea of representation, nor Connolly's idea of interest requires this. What is required is simply that the women's representatives try to bridge the gap between what they think is in women's interests and the actual wishes of the majority of women.

Acting for particular groups and defending their interests would, however, only be appropriate in a kind of corporate democracy which would exist parallel to a parliamentary democracy. In the past, corporate democracy was conceived as representing functional interests, whereas parliamentary democracy was conceived as representing territorial interests.³⁵ This categorization does not seem helpful any more. I would rather see the corporate body as representing group interests and the parliament as representing opinions about *the common good*. In fact, in many states such corporate bodies already exist. One example is an 'economic chamber' in which employers organizations, unions and the state try to reconcile their interests. Another example is a corporate body in which producers and consumers are represented. In fact, kinds of corporate organizations have been developed in many sectors of state-policy. Whether it is in an advisory-board on education or in an advisory-board on environmental issues, the interests of women as a separate group are seldom represented. This is logical, if one takes sectorial or functional interests as one's perspective. Nevertheless, thinking from the perspective of women could lead to a different organization of a corporate democracy in which there would be room for a separate representation of women's interests. Furthermore, just like the interests of the working-class may be differentiated by members of different unions, so could women's interests be differentiated by representatives of the housewives' organization, of lesbians, older women and so on. The dangers of the fragmentation of feminism, to which I have tried to pay attention, will not disappear, but will only apply to a limited sphere. The representation of women as a group, and of specific groups of women, will only be one aim of feminism and will only be directed towards the corporate body.

In parliament, on the other hand, the aim should be the representation of opinions about the common good. Representatives in this body should be dedicated to the public interest. Here, feminist representatives may try to

include some feminist ideas in the consensus, to incorporate feminism into common sense. In parliament representation is sharply distinguished from identification. Representatives are not responsible for a specific group, but for the nation as a whole.

I started by asking whether the concept of descriptive representation, which underlies the demand for quota-systems, is a satisfactory concept. My argument has been that it is undesirable as an ideal concept of representation on every level. However, it may be useful in a corporate body if it is counterbalanced by self-representation on an individual level and the representation of opinions about the common good in parliament. We need not necessarily feel ourselves forced to choose between either 'Quotas for women Now' on all political levels, or mere political rights for women. In order to obtain Thompson's and Wheeler's goals of equal enjoyments and respect, it is necessary to think about how feminists would combine self-representation, corporate democracy and parliamentary democracy.

Notes

1. William Thompson and Anna Wheeler (1983, or. 1825), *Appeal of One Half the Human race, Women, against the Pretensions of the Other Half, Men, to retain them in political and thence in civil and domestic slavery*. Intro. by R. Pankhurst. Virago, London.
2. Rachel Brooks, Angela Eagle, Clare Short (1990), *Quotas now: Women in the Labour Party*, Fabian Tract 541. The Fabian Society, London.
3. *Idem*, p. 1.
4. Or other kinds of affirmative action with which this paper will not deal.
5. *Idem*, p. 9.
6. For these terms see Ronald Rogowski (Duke University), *Representation in political theory and in law: a (somewhat) formal analysis*. Unpublished mimeograph, Morell Library, York.
7. Hannah Fenichel Pitkin (1967), *The Concept of Representation*. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles.
8. Quoted in *The Concept of Representation*, p. 60.
9. Quoted in *The Concept of Representation*, p. 63-64.
10. In this way descriptive representation differs from 'representation as authorization', 'representation as accountability', symbolic representation and representation as 'acting for'. See *The Concept of Representation*.
11. *Quotas Now, Women in the Labour Party*, p. 16.
12. Gerhard Leibholz (1960 (1928)), *Das Wesen der Repräsentation und der Gestaltwandel der Demokratie im 20. Jahrhundert*, Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, p. 29. He is using here the distinction between Repräsentation and Identität in Carl Schmitt's *Verfassungslehre* and *Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus*.
13. Marie Swabey, quoted in *The Concept of Representation*, p. 74. See also Marie Collins Swabey 'The representative Sample: A Quantitative View' in *Representation*,

ed. by Hannah Fenichel Pitkin (1969), Atherton, New York, pp. 83-98.

14. Virginia Sapiro, 'When Are Interests Interesting? The Problem of Political Representation of Women', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 75, September 1981, Research Frontier Essay, p. 701-716.

15. Idem, p. 712. The increase of women in powerful positions in politics is a necessary, but not sufficient condition, because according to Sapiro, a government's responsiveness to women's demands also depends on the political economy, ideology and the power of interest organizations (including esp. feminist movements). Sapiro assumes however, that a government should try to formulate a policy directly on the basis of women's demands, whatever they are.

16. *Quotas Now, Women in the Labour Party*. About the first point, p. 5: women's 'absence from the political scene often means that their concerns are inadequately reflected'. Empowering women in our society and our party will end this imbalance'. About the second point, see all remarks about discrimination in the Labour Party and elsewhere and further p. 8: 'the exclusion of women is undesirable'. Finally, about the third point, p. 9: 'the more women become involved, the more the overwhelmingly male culture of the Party will be transformed and the more women will be attracted to the Party'.

17. *The Concept of Representation*, p. 81.

18. Idem, p. 89.

19. As Carl Schmitt points out in *Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus*, liberalism is more concerned with principles of publicity and pluralism, whereas democracy implies an identification between the rulers and the ruled. Liberalism and democracy do not have to be linked at all.

20. See especially Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future, On Human Condition and On Revolution*. I think nevertheless that her concept of politics needs some modification: 1. This kind of politics does not only take place in the official politics, not just in the public sphere. 2. Arendt's stress of harmony has to be balanced by a machiavellian stress of the meaning of conflict in politics.

21. This is not mere science fiction. In The Netherlands there are affirmative action programmes and quota-systems for women, ethnic minorities and invalids, which sometimes conflict. In job appointments one can find the same cumulation of demands in positive discrimination.

22. A.H. Birch (1972), *Representation*, in the series: Key Concepts in Political Science. MacMillan, London, p. 59, 60. Birch remarks here: 'In England divisions of class and occupation predominate in people's consciousness, whereas in Northern Ireland they are overshadowed by the issue of religion'.

23. Irene Diamond and Nancy Hartsock try to give a solution for this dilemma. Their hypothesis is that the ability of men to act for women varies considerably through the different phases of the policy process. Only women are able to make women's issues and problems 'visible' and to put them on the political agenda. Once issues have been defined and political coalitions have been mobilized, the votes of female and male legislators do not differ substantially. Men seem to be able in these circumstances, to represent and 'act for' women. However, if we accept that the definition of issues and the mobilizing of coalitions happen for the most part outside parliament, then at least there is no need for quotas for women in parliament. Irene Diamond and Nancy Hartsock, 'Beyond Interests in Politics: A Comment on Virginia Sapiro's "When are Interests Interesting?" The Problem of Political Representation of Women', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 75, (Sept. 1981), p.

717-721, p. 720.

24. I am talking here in an abstract sense and have primarily the parliament in mind as the example of a representative assembly. Later in the paper I will correct this view and I will state that in some representative bodies representatives have to be more bound than in others. In fact this difference already exists in practice. Compare the difference of a Senator in the U.S. with a M.P. in The Netherlands for instance. What is necessary is a comparison between several representative systems (district versus proportional) and representative bodies (federal or not, corporate or not, parliamentary or local).

25. See *Das Wesen der Repräsentation*.

26. See Anthony Arblaster (1987), *Democracy*, Open University Press, Milton Keynes.

27. They find the seeds of this mistrust in the very pamphlet by James Mill that they criticize. The utilitarianism of Mill leads to the opinion that representatives will follow their private interests (and therefore that they should have short terms in order to let them be members of the community instead of a separate stratum of M.P.'s). One of the problems in James Mill's pamphlet is that he has not the same consistent position where it concerns women and younger men (that is men under forty).

28. *Appeal of One half the Human Race*, etc., p. 47 and further.

29. Idem, p. 119 and further.

30. They carry on in their *Appeal of One half the Human Race* with: 'Women especially need this enlargement of their mind and the forming of this character, because the most "confined" sex has a greater tendency to attach too great relative importance to domestic and selfish over social and sympathetic affections, to immediate over remote objects and enjoyments' (p. 177). 'They are most isolated and stultified with their children' (p. 180). 'So this sex is most in need for the exercise of political rights as a counterbalance for their limitedness' (p. 178). These remarks contradict, however, other remarks about women in the text (equally peculiar). For instance on p. 132 women are praised because of their capability to sympathize with other people and to put aside their own private interests.

31. Idem, p. 196.

32. *The Concept of Representation*, p. 209.

33. William E. Connolly (1974), *The Terms of Political Discourse*, D.C. Heath and Co., Lexington etc., Esp. Ch.

34. For example: better education for girls, more and better reproductive rights, the need for sharing or paying house-hold labour, an individualized tax- and social security system, the preparation of girls for a life as wage-earners, more respect for women, more punishment for sexual violence, less objectification of woman as a lust-symbol, recognition of the value of care-work and so forth.

35. Compare the work of Beatrice and Sidney Webb.