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Tabel 2: Stijging CD/CP-percentage 1986-1990

variabele	coëfficiënt:					Utrecht:
	alle gemeenten:	de vier grote:	overige ¹ :	Amsterdam:	Rotterdam:	
PvdA-verlies 1990	.05	.05	-.00	.01	.07	-.06
opkomstdaling	.04	-.05	.03	.84*	.02	.46*
toename percentage allochtonen	.23*	.22*	.32	.68**	.07	.25**
percentage allochtonen	-.00	-.01	.13	-.10	-.06	-.19*
werkloosheidspercentage	-.06**	-.07*	.05	-.06	.11	-.02
PvdA-percentage 1986	.11*	.10*	.08**	.25	.15*	.22*
Constante	-.11	-.66	-6.99	1.31	-3.66	4.03
R=	0.5202	0.5529	0.6142	0.8196	0.7793	0.9044

* significante factor op .05 niveau

** significante factor op .10 niveau

¹ Bij de stapsgewijze uitvoering van de multiële regressie-analyse in het geval van de 'overige gemeenten' is ook de variabele 'opkomst 1990' meegenomen. Deze variabele kent een coëfficiëntswaarde van .09 en bezit geen significantie.

European development aid: a cross-national analysis of competing explanations¹

W. Hout

1. Introduction

In the context of North-South relations so-called development assistance, given by the rich to the poor countries of the world, takes in a special place. In the framework of the United Nations' Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) the developed countries have even agreed, in 1968, that 0.7 percent of the GNPs should be devoted to development aid. In doing this, they seem to have acknowledged the developing countries' claim that they are partly responsible for furthering Third World development.

The provision of development assistance is often regarded as an ideologically influenced act of policy. It involves considerations of distributive justice and, as Stanley Hoffmann has written, 'it is over questions of distributive justice that the conflict of value systems is most acute' (Hoffmann 1981: 142). As a consequence of the highly controversial nature of development aid policies, political parties tend to hold widely different, and not seldom opposite, views of the usefulness, desirability and justification of development assistance. Some parties, in particular those from the leftist part of the political spectrum, look upon development aid as an act of justice, which is meant to correct the uneven distribution of wealth across the nations of the world. A corollary of this view is that economic fluctuations in the rich countries should not have adverse effects on the level of development aid.

The argumentation presented in the preceding paragraphs notwithstanding, it is evident that only a few countries have complied with the self-imposed UNCTAD norm. Moreover, the expenditures on develop-

¹ This article is a revised version of the paper which has been presented at the workshop 'Recent developments of North-South relations', ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Colchester, March 22-28, 1991. The author wishes to thank the participants in the Workshop for their comments on the first version.

ment assistance show considerable fluctuations through time. The purpose of this article is to analyse the differences in development aid given by the developed countries. The intention is to see whether these differences can be attributed to, broadly speaking, political or economic factors. In order to establish the contribution of potential explanatory variables a quantitative-empirical research design will be set up.

Most research dealing with development assistance – or with foreign aid in general – has been ‘output oriented’: it has focused on the reasons why, given a certain quantity of development aid, some countries receive more aid than others (for instance, Kato 1969; Wittkopf 1972; McKinlay and Little 1977, 1979; Lebovic 1988). The problem as to why some countries *provide* more development assistance than others has been, in my reading of the literature, largely neglected. The latter question differs from the former in its research orientation: instead of focusing on the output it pays attention to input variables determining relative development assistance efforts.

Apart from its focus on output factors, a characteristic of most quantitative research on development assistance is the neglect of European countries. Most research focuses on United States’ foreign aid (see for an exception: Nelson 1988). As the European endeavour to provide Third World countries with development assistance is often contrasted to that of the United States – especially where the motives for aid are concerned – the emphasis on US aid is not justified from a political scientific point of view.

The outline of this article is as follows. In the following section, several explanations of the level of development assistance will be presented. In section 3 the research design will be outlined. Section 4 will contain the main results of the analysis performed. In the final section of this article some conclusions will be formulated about the level of development aid and the contribution of the explanatory variables.

2. Explanations of the level of development assistance

The literature on development assistance does not show a consensus about the fundamental reasons why this form of assistance is provided to Third World countries. On the contrary, several clearly incompatible explanations of the level of development aid are provided. This section serves to identify the most prominent explanatory factors.

In the literature on this problem, development aid has predominantly been dealt with as an issue that is subjected to foreign policy considera-

tions. The reasons for the provision of aid have been found in the contribution of this aid toward certain foreign policy goals, such as the serving of specific national interests (for instance, the protection of foreign investments or of the properties of nationals abroad), the containment of Communism and the creation or maintenance of alliances (Griffin and Enos 1970: 315–316; Pakenham 1973: 109–110; Hofmeier 1986: 580; Lebovic 1988). Morgenthau has probably provided the archetypal ‘realist’ argumentation for providing aid:

[A] policy of foreign aid is no different from diplomatic or military policy or propaganda. They are all weapons in the political armory of the nation’ (Morgenthau 1962: 309).

National interest need not be understood too narrowly; Pakenham has pointed out that development assistance can also serve moral aims as part of the totality of national interests (Pakenham 1973: 323–333).

Foreign policy explanations of development aid flows are useful in order to highlight why some countries and areas do receive aid and others do not (for instance: Lebovic 1988), but they are not able to explain the fluctuations of aid through time and space. In the literature on the subject broadly three factors can be discerned which are said to account for these fluctuations.

Economic capabilities – The first factor which is mentioned as an explanation of the level of development aid is the economic situation in the donor countries. It is argued that countries are likely to provide more development assistance when their own economic situation is improving. A recession might, indirectly, affect the government budget as the basis for taxation is partially eroded. Moreover, governments would become subject to pressures by certain social groups to increase specific types of expenditure in order to alleviate the harmful effects of the recession. Trade unions, representing people who are threatened to lose their jobs, and firms going bankrupt are among the most likely actors trying to influence the government.

This view, which stresses the economic capabilities of the donor countries as a factor in providing development assistance, clearly sees development aid as a *residual*. The overall economic performance, and the development of government expenditures as a function thereof, are the basic parameters in determining the level of development assistance. Moral arguments might play a role in discussions about aid, but only insofar as the economic possibilities of the donor countries permit (cf. Obey and Lancaster 1988: 142–146; Nossal 1988: 53–54; Watzal 1985: 513; Hof-

meier 1986: 598; Bodemer 1985: 296-300; Stokke 1984, vol. 1: 12-15, 29).

Political orientation – A second factor which is mentioned by some authors who wish to explain the level of development assistance is the political colour of a government. This explanatory factor is derived from the idea that political parties are the representatives of specific ideologies, which contain views on the relationship between developed and developing countries, and on the best way for the latter to attain a higher level of development and wealth.

The main division in the thinking about development is considered to parallel the division in political ideologies. The explanation of the lack of development in terms of an internal failure in the countries of the Third World is often associated with political parties of the right. The assumption is that these parties are the most hesitant ones to support development aid programmes. The development strategies suggested by right-wing parties are to be found in export promotion policies and the integration of the developing countries into the world market. Parties of the left are generally considered to be supportive of development assistance. They tend to view the development problems of the Third World more in terms of unjust structures, and they tend to see the developing countries as victims of global economic development and of the policies of the rich countries.

On the basis of this reasoning it might be expected that the political composition of a government is an important factor in determining the level of development assistance, just as it is in determining the level of other public expenditures (for instance: Castles and McKinlay 1979; Castles 1982). Governments in which leftist parties are represented are assumed to spend more on development aid than governments in which such parties do not take part (cf. Watzal 1985: 513-515; Hofmeier 1986: 581, 600-601; Bodemer 1985: 295-300; Frühling 1986: 43-44, 62, 99-100; Stokke 1984, vol. 1: 23, 54).

Demand compensation – A third explanatory factor encountered in the literature on development assistance is linked to the importance which expenditures of this kind are presumed to have in countering negative economic trends. This kind of explanation can be found in two variants: a radical, almost neo-Marxist one and a more moderate one.

The radical variant sees 'aid as imperialism'. This view is partly based on the Leninist explanation of imperialism, which stressed the inherent tendencies toward overproduction and underconsumption in the capital-

ist world as a result of concentration and exploitation. In this interpretation, imperialism is defined as an attempt to counteract the negative tendencies of capitalism. Development assistance policies are seen as a modern instrument of imperialism: they serve as a means to counter overproduction in a way which is legitimized as a humanitarian act of policy (Hayter 1971: 10; Griffin and Enos 1970: 316; Schulz and Hansen 1984).

The more moderate version of this explanation focuses on the possibly beneficial effects which the developed donor countries might derive from providing development assistance. It is assumed that developing countries that receive aid are inclined (or, as in the case of 'tied' aid, are required) to spend a significant portion of this aid in the donor country (for instance: Pratt 1988; Watzal 1985: 512; Bodemer 1985: 292; Jackson 1985; Lim 1985; Pakenham 1973: 330; Frühling 1986: 59-61, 95-98; Stokke 1984, vol. 1: 37-47). This means that the industries that produce commodities for external markets are 'subsidised' at the expense of the taxpayer who would rather have spent his money on consumption goods for his own benefit. The prediction following from what has been said here is that development assistance is likely to be increased in times when the export demand for consumption and/or investment goods is experiencing a downward trend.

Hypotheses – On the basis of the explanatory factors which have been outlined above the following three hypotheses can be formulated.

Hypothesis 1: The level of development assistance provided by a developed country will be decreased if, and to the extent that, the economic circumstances of that country worsen.

Hypothesis 2: The level of development assistance provided by a developed country will be decreased if political parties of the right dominate the political system of that country and will be increased if left-wing parties dominate the political system.

Hypothesis 3: The level of development assistance provided by a developed country will be increased if, and to the extent that, the export demand for commodities falls.

3. Research design

The hypotheses which have been formulated can be tested in two main research designs, the first one being *cross-sectional*, the second one *longitudinal*. In the first design, the possible differences and similarities among the countries will be highlighted. The second design will emphasize the

evolution of the level of development assistance in the respective countries through time. In this article, only the first of these designs will be applied.

The population of this study will consist of the European member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The twelve countries in this study are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.²

The period for which the data have been collected is that from 1965 until 1985. This period might be called the heyday of the debate about development assistance policy. The call for a New International Economic Order, the UN-declared Development Decades and the introduction of a target level for development assistance were all signs that Third World development and the contribution of the developed countries were placed high on the international political agenda. Moreover, the 1970s were the decade of the worst economic recession in the post-war era; in the context of the research purposes which have been formulated above this is an especially interesting period. The 1965-1985 period has, finally, witnessed remarkable political developments. The years until, roughly, 1975 were those of the construction of the welfare state and of Keynesian economic policy. Since then the Western world has experienced a political reaction in the form of a 'retreat' of government, coupled with the introduction of supply-side or monetarist economic policy.

The dependent variables – The amounts spent on development assistance by the above-mentioned OECD member countries will be the dependent variable in this study. The DAC has introduced the concept of *Official Development Assistance* (ODA) to indicate a form of aid which is fundamentally concessional and which is meant to further development, as opposed to, for instance, military aid. The ODA concept has proven to be a relatively clear and unequivocal means to measure levels of foreign aid.

In this study two alternative dependent variables will be used. First, the amount of Official Development Assistance as a percentage of the countries' Gross National Product (ODA/GNP) will be used. Secondly, the relative change in ODA, measured in percentage points of the GNP

2. The non-European members of the DAC are: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States. Ireland is not included in the present study because it has not been a member country until 1985.

has been chosen as an indicator of development aid (cf. Nelson 1988: 52-53). The data are derived from the OECD publications on development assistance (OECD 1970-1986).

The independent variables – In order to test the three hypotheses that predict the level of development assistance from, respectively, the economic capabilities, the political orientation and the need for demand compensation, three independent variables will be used.

A general indication of *economic capabilities* is provided by the quantity of domestic production. When the economic circumstances of a country deteriorate, this is usually reflected most clearly in a relative decline of the gross domestic product (GDP). The United Nations' *Statistical Yearbooks* provide a good source for the US dollar equivalents of the GDP (United Nations 1969-1985/86). The percentage change in the donor countries' GDP is used as an indicator for the relative economic capabilities to provide Third World countries with development assistance.

With respect to the *political orientation* of European parliamentary democracies, at least two aspects appear to be important. First of all, the relative strength of left-wing and right-wing political parties in the national parliament will influence the level of spending on development assistance, since it is generally the parliament which ultimately decides on the national budget. In the second place, the political orientation of the government is an important factor, because the executive will often exert considerable influence on the allocation of the budget.

The relative strength of the political parties will be measured by the percentage of seats obtained by the main right-wing party in the respective political systems. Castles' classification of the parties in democratic capitalist states will be used to determine which is the main political party of the right (Castles 1982: 59; cf. Castles and Mair 1984). The data for this variable are derived from Von Beyme (1985: 377-406) and from Keesing's *Contemporary Archives* (1982-1986). (See also: Nelson 1988: 55)

In order to establish the political colour of the government, a method similar to the one suggested by Castles and McKinlay (1979: 173) will be applied here. It will be assumed that the participation in government of the major leftist party will make a difference where the expenditure on development assistance is concerned. Governments will be classified according to the presence or absence of the major social democratic or labour party during the larger part of the period (Castles 1982: 59). The data on coalition governments are to be found in Browne and Dreijmanis (1982), Von Beyme (1985: 377-406) and Keesing's *Contemporary Archives* (1982-1986).

As it has been indicated above, the need for *demand compensation* can be derived from the level of exports. According to the arguments presented above, a reduction of the latter will lead to intensified demands for compensation. The level of exports will be operationalised by using a unit value index, from which the relative changes in the volume of exports can be calculated. The main source of data is the United Nations' trade statistics (United Nations 1989: 37, 68, 228, 289, 297, 325, 446, 595, 643, 828, 836, 906).

Research methods – In order to establish the relative influence of the independent variables on the dependent variables, various multiple regression analyses will be applied.

The research period of 1965–1985 will be divided into three seven-year periods (1965–1971, 1972–1978 and 1979–1985) in an attempt to analyse possible fluctuations through time. In addition to multiple regression analyses for these three separate periods, regression techniques will be applied to the entire period of 21 years. The analyses will be performed with both dependent variables: 1) the average level of ODA as a percentage of GNP and 2) the change of ODA as a percentage of GNP.

4. The analyses

Bivariate correlations – As can be seen in table 1, the bivariate correlations between the two political variables and the dependent variables are rather strong. Especially the correlations between PARTLEFT and ODAAVG (–.59) and between STRRIGHT and ODACHNG (–.63) are remarkable, although the first bears a negative rather than the expected positive sign. The independent variables appear to be only weakly correlated and this reduces the likelihood of multicollinearity in the regression analyses.

The results vary when the analyses are performed for the three distinct periods (1965–1971, 1972–1978, 1979–1985); the correlation matrices for these periods are presented in the Appendix. For the first period, a strong negative relationship is found between STRRIGHT and ODACHNG (–.77) and between the independent variables GDPCHNG and EXPORTCH (–.82). From the analysis of the second period it can be concluded that PARTLEFT and ODACHNG are strongly correlated (.51), that STRRIGHT is negatively related to both independent variables (–.48 to ODAAVG and –.51 to ODACHNG, respectively), that PARTLEFT and EXPORTCH show a moderately strong correlation (–.44), and that GDPCHNG and EXPORTCH are negatively correlated (–.71). During

Table 1: Bivariate correlations (1965–1985)

	ODAAVG	ODACHNG	PARTLEFT	STRRIGHT	GDPCHNG
ODACHNG	.43				
PARTLEFT	–.59	–.09			
STRRIGHT	–.39	–.63	–.06		
GDPCHNG	–.20	.49	–.09	–.09	
EXPORTCH	–.19	–.01	–.16	.08	–.17

ODAAVG: Average level of ODA/GNP

ODACHNG: Percentage points of change in ODA/GNP

PARTLEFT: Leftist participation in government

STRRIGHT: Average strength of rightist party

GDPCHNG: Average change of GDP (in US\$) per year

EXPORTCH: Average change of exports per year

the third period, PARTLEFT is strongly correlated to both ODAAVG (–.51) and ODACHNG (.62), while STRRIGHT shows a moderately negative correlation with ODAAVG (–.44).

Multiple regression analyses – Although the bivariate correlations which have been presented above point to some possibly interesting results, the analysis would be incomplete without a multivariate component. Multivariate analyses offer the opportunity of estimating the relative contribution of various independent variables. In this section, multiple regression techniques will be applied, since the variables in this study have been measured at a cardinal level. The main results from the multiple regression are presented in table 2 below.

In the multiple regression analyses two variables have alternately been considered as the dependent ones, namely the average level of ODA flows, relative to GNP, per period (ODAAVG), and the relative change of ODA, relative to GNP, per period (ODACHNG). The independent variables that have been entered are the same as in the bivariate correlations analyses: PARTLEFT, STRRIGHT, GDPCHNG and EXPORTCH.

When a multiple regression technique is applied, several possible variants can be chosen. The results that are presented in table 2 have been obtained with the so-called stepwise method. This means that the independent variables are entered into the equation in a stepwise manner and that only those variables are retained which exhibit more than a minimum correlation (cf. Pedhazur 1982: 160–164). For reasons of comparability, the full equations are presented in the Appendix.

The results which are presented in table 2 provide the best possible solutions with respect to two criteria, the first one being a maximum proportion of explained variance (R^2) and the second a minimal number of variables in the equation (parsimony). The columns in table 2 contain

the so-called standardized beta coefficients or beta weights, which indicate the relative contribution of the independent variables to the explanation of the dependent ones. The first beta weight in each column has been the result of multiple regression analyses with ODAAVG dependent, the second of analyses with ODACHNG dependent. Where no coefficient is mentioned, this means that the respective variable has been removed from the equation in the stepwise routine.

Analyses of residuals show that the regression results are not likely to be disturbed by extreme residuals or 'outliers'. If Pedhazur's rule of thumb (i.e., standardized residuals greater than 2 are to be considered as extreme) is applied to the results of the residuals analyses, none of the regression results show extreme residuals (Pedhazur 1982: 37-38).

It has already been concluded from the bivariate correlations that the results are not stable through time. The regression analyses also exhibit considerable fluctuation from one period to another. When the solutions for the entire 1965-85 period are considered, there appear to be different patterns in the equations. The solution offered by the equation with ODAAVG dependent explains 71 percent of total variance; it includes all four independent variables, the political variables PARTLEFT and STRRIGHT being the most prominent ones. The sign of PARTLEFT is negative, however; this is a different result than would be expected on the basis of hypothesis 2. The conclusion which might be drawn on the basis of this solution is that the participation of leftist parties in government and the presence of strong right-wing parties both contribute negatively to the average level of ODA in the European countries. The changes in GDP and in export performance also contribute negatively, though much less strongly, to the level of ODA. The solution with ODACHNG dependent points into a slightly different direction: from this equation STRRIGHT appears to be the main contributing variable

Table 2: Multiple regression analyses

	1965-71	1972-78	1979-85	1965-85
<i>Independent variables</i>				
GDPCHNG	-/-	-.57/-	-.17	-.36/.45*
PARTLEFT	-.30/-	-/-	-.59**/.58*	-.70**/-
STRRIGHT	-/.76**	-.61*/-.51*	-.54**/-	-.44*/-.60**
EXPORTCH	-.11	-.49/-	-/-	-.32/.11
R ²	.09/.60	.38/.26	.54/.41	.71/.60

Note: * = significant at the .10 level

** = significant at the .05 level

(-.60 and significant at the .05 level), while GDPCHNG also contributes to the explanation in a positive way.

The analyses which have been performed with respect to the three successive periods lead to less clear solutions. The R² of each of these solutions is on the whole less than the R² of the solutions for the 1965-85 period. Only the political variables appear to offer significant contributions to the explanation of the dependent variables. In each period, STRRIGHT appears as a significant variable, though not in all solutions; PARTLEFT is only significant in the solutions which are obtained for the third period.

5. Conclusions

The analyses of which the results have been presented in the preceding section do not permit unequivocal conclusions as to the three hypotheses. On the whole, one of the three hypotheses has not been corroborated by the data; where the other two hypotheses are concerned, it would perhaps be more correct to speak of partial corroboration.

The first hypothesis, dealing with the relation between economic capabilities and the provision of development assistance, has been partially supported by the analyses. One of the multiple regression analyses performed with the 1965-85 data pointed at a significant contribution of economic capabilities toward the giving of ODA. The other analyses did either not result in a significant coefficient or in a coefficient which showed a different sign than had been hypothesized.

With respect to the second hypothesis, the results prove to be more supportive, although not unequivocally so. All regression analyses contain at least one significant coefficient for the political variables. Of the two political variables, the variable indicating the strength of the right-wing party is the most promising one in explaining the level or change of development assistance. In six out of eight analyses, this variable proves to offer a significant and rightly hypothesized contribution toward the explanation of the dependent variables. In order to explain the negative sign of the PARTLEFT coefficients a more disaggregated, country specific analysis would clearly be needed.

The third hypothesis, relating the level of development assistance to the need for demand compensation, has to be rejected. Although the variable has been retained in three of the eight regression analyses, its contribution appears to be limited and not significant.

The general conclusion of this article may be twofold. In the first place,

political variables (and of these especially the variable indicating the strength of the main right-wing party in parliament) appear to offer the best explanation of the level and change of development assistance. The economic strength of the donor country is a possible second explanatory variable.

In the second place, analyses of a longer period appear to offer more promising results than those of shorter periods. Although this is not a satisfactory result from a theoretical point of view, it seems to indicate that a quantitative cross-national approach of development assistance policies is especially suitable for research questions trying to generalize over longer periods of time.

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Appendix

Bivariate correlations (1965-1971)

	ODAAVG	ODACHNG	PARTLEFT	STRRIGHT	GDPCHNG
ODACHNG	-.14				
PARTLEFT	-.22	-.11			
STRRIGHT	.08	-.77	.10		
GDPCHNG	-.14	.21	-.25	-.28	
EXPORTCH	.19	.15	.14	-.05	-.82

Bivariate correlations (1972-1978)

	ODAAVG	ODACHNG	PARTLEFT	STRRIGHT	GDPCHNG
ODACHNG	.60				
PARTLEFT	.13	.51			
STRRIGHT	-.48	-.51	-.41		
GDPCHNG	.02	.21	.37	-.39	
EXPORTCH	-.20	-.25	-.44	.18	-.71

Bivariate correlations (1979-1985)

	ODAAVG	ODACHNG	PARTLEFT	STRRIGHT	GDPCHNG
ODACHNG	-.16				
PARTLEFT	-.51	.62			
STRRIGHT	-.44	-.13	-.16		
GDPCHNG	-.26	.31	.23	.21	
EXPORTCH	.24	.14	.02	-.16	.32

Multiple regression analyses (all variables included)

	1965-71	1972-78	1979-85	1965-85
<i>Independent variables</i>				
GDPCHNG	.15/.14	-.59/-.20	-.09/.17	-.36/.44
PARTLEFT	-.30/-.00	-.19/.34	-.57*/.57	-.70**/-.07
STRRIGHT	.24/-.63*	-.68*/-.42	-.48/-.07	-.44*/-.60**
EXPORTCH	.16/.46	-.58/-.17	.21/.06	-.32/.10
R ²	.13/.64	.40/.38	.58/.42	.71/.60

Note: * = significant at the .10 level

** = significant at the .05 level

Boekbesprekingen

J.W. van Deth en P.A. Schuszler (red.), **Nederlandse staatkunde. Een elementaire inleiding**. Coutinho, Muiderberg 1990.

Het is een aan Nederlandse universiteiten en andere instellingen van hoger onderwijs de laatste tijd veelgehoorde klacht, dat de kennis op het gebied van de staatsinrichting onder eerstejaars studenten te wensen overlaat. Voor enkele medewerkers van de vakgroepen politicologie en recht van de Universiteit Twente is deze situatie aanleiding geweest het hier te bespreken boek *Nederlandse staatkunde. Een elementaire inleiding* samen te stellen. Het boek vormt het eerste deel van een serie Nieuwe didactiek voor bestuur en politiek, onder redactie van J.W. van Deth, M.H. Leijenaar en J.C.P.M. Vis. Het is verkrijgbaar in combinatie met het zogeheten COO-programma staatkunde (de afkorting 'COO' staat voor computerondersteund onderwijs), dat studenten in de gelegenheid wil stellen de stof uit het boek zelfstandig te oefenen, te repeteren en toe te passen aan de hand van de gang van zaken rond de totstandkoming van de begin 1990 in werking getreden Tabakswet. Ook over dit COO-programma zullen hieronder enkele opmerkingen worden gemaakt.

Nederlandse staatkunde. Een elementaire inleiding heeft, zoals uit het bovenstaande reeds min of meer kan worden afgeleid, een betrekkelijk bescheiden doelstelling, te weten het behandelen van de meest elementaire beginselen van het Nederlandse politieke bestel. Het boek bestaat uit drie delen. In het eerste deel komen verschillende typering van dit bestel en zijn geschiedenis aan de orde en wordt een aantal belangrijke staatkundige begrippen geïntroduceerd. Dit deel bestaat uit twee hoofdstukken, beide van de hand van Van Deth. Het tweede deel van het boek belicht verschillende aspecten van de staatsinrichting op rijksniveau. Het bevat hoofdstukken van diverse auteurs, over achtereenvolgens de constitutionele monarchie, de parlementaire democratie, overige actoren (Raad van State, Algemene Rekenkamer, adviesorganen en maatschappelijke organisaties) en de gang van een wetsontwerp. In het derde en laatste deel wordt in twee afzonderlijke hoofdstukken informatie gegeven over het lokaal bestuur en de organisatie van de rechterlijke macht. Daarna volgen nog enkele bijlagen, waaronder een beknopte handleiding voor het zoeken naar kamerstukken, de kamerstukken be-