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Citation

Cohen, B. C. (1990). Political parties and foreign policy in the United States and the Netherlands. *Acta Politica*, 25: 1990(4), 451-466. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3449795>

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Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

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[vervolg zie p. 466]

Political parties and foreign policy in the United States and the Netherlands

Bernard C. Cohen

This article examines the role of political parties as 'public participants' in foreign policy making in the Netherlands and the United States, and some of the consequences that flow from that role.¹ Since the reasons for such a comparison are not intuitively obvious, however, some initial words of explanation are required. Why this subject? Why the US and the Netherlands? Why political parties?

A generation of work on the foreign policy process in the United States, to which I have contributed², has been concerned specifically with the impact of public opinion and public-opinion institutions on foreign policy making. This work was explicitly motivated in the immediate post-World War II years by a normative public policy concern: how to avoid a recurrence of post-World War I isolationism in America? How to ensure the capacity of the American democracy to sustain an active foreign policy committed to the defense of Western values and institutions? As the US became fully committed (some would argue overcommitted) to international participation, that public policy interest yielded to a political science interest, namely, understanding our own political behavior in the foreign policy field.

We learned a lot over a quarter of a century about American foreign policy institutions and processes. But the political upheavals of the Vietnam War years and beyond have made it clear that at least some of the things we learned about the relationships among the President, the Congress, the media, interest groups, and other agencies of public opinion were in fact bounded by time and circumstance. The question then becomes: how do we discover what is fundamental and what is ephemeral in our foreign policy processes?

In the field of international relations, we have learned to look explicitly at the characteristics of international regimes or international political systems, universal and regional, and over time, to discover the way these shape the behavior of states and those who act in the name of states. We

now need to make comparable analyses in our foreign policy studies. Specifically, we need to look more systematically at the way *domestic* political systems constrain the behavior of domestic actors and institutions in the foreign policy field.³

To make such a study within the framework of simply one political system – the American or any other – which is the traditional way, is to run the risk of missing the significance of what one sees. One's sensitivity to the constraining effects of any political system is greatly enhanced by the comparative analysis of the public dimensions of foreign policy making in more than one political system. 'Comparative foreign policy' thus involves not the comparison of *outputs*, but of systems, structures, functions and processes.

Why should an American, however, use the Netherlands as a basis for comparison? One could as well ask: Why should a political scientist use the *United States* as the basis of comparison? Let me turn the question around and ask, 'Why *not* the Netherlands?' It is, above all, a democratic system, with a history of vigorous public participation in international affairs. Yet it offers many important points of contrast: it is a parliamentary democracy, with a multi-party system that compels coalition government; it is a 'smaller' country, with fewer and 'simpler' foreign policy problems. I find no theory of comparative study that offers better grounds for choice, especially since one typically has to complete a comparison before one knows whether the conditions exist which satisfy selection criteria! My ultimate purpose is to gain a new intellectual purchase on the foreign policy processes in my own political system; and for that purpose, a comparison with the Netherlands is as promising as any other that one can propose.

Why, in this instance, compare political parties? My proximate purpose is to enlarge our understanding of public participation in foreign policy by studying the interrelationships between the structure of a national political system and the patterns of public participation in foreign policy making that take place in that system. In other words, how does the system shape incentives for participation? Thus, in addition to the Dutch and American political systems themselves, I am interested in the behavior, in the foreign policy arena, of political parties; national legislative bodies; the media of communication; mass opinion as expressed, e.g., in polls, demonstrations, etc.; organized interest and action groups; and specialized advisory bodies. But it is not possible to encompass all of this in the confines of a single article; and so I focus here on political parties because they are so central to democratic political systems, and yet so different in the two political systems.

In his wide-ranging and perceptive study of American political parties, Leon D. Epstein cautiously notes that most scholars regard political parties as 'organizationally desirable and probably essential in a democratic nation'.⁴ Parties are variously defined as aggregators of interests and demands, mobilizers of preference and support, representatives of organized opinions, and organizers of policy and of electoral choice. Especially in the last of these functions, parties have a semi-official role that has been likened to that of a public utility.⁵ But in their other functions, parties perform essentially as non-governmental participants. The question at hand is this: To what extent do they perform these aggregating and mobilizing and representing functions in the foreign policy field, in the US and the Netherlands? and with what consequences for other participants, and for the foreign policy process itself?

For many reasons, some of which we will examine closely below, the national political parties in the United States are not policy organizations, and they are not effective aggregators, mobilizers or representatives in any policy area, including foreign policy. And as a result, all government institutions, including the Congress itself, are subject to outside pressures of all kinds. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, political parties *are* policy organizations; and it is often said that the multiparty system, with proportional representation, an effective 'threshold' for a seat in parliament of only two-thirds of one percent of the turnout, and parties which have considerable organizational strength and lots of internal democracy, provides every significant viewpoint with representation throughout the policy making process. Yet recent history suggests that Dutch parties, too, are not always effective agents of foreign policy opinion, leaving the Dutch governmental institutions vulnerable to outside, non-party pressures also.

The political system and political parties in the US – The American political system was *designed* to function without political parties, which were not held in high regard by Founding Fathers whose specific intention it was to prevent concentrations of political power, whether in an executive or in the people. In his absorbing book on political life in Washington at the start of the 19th century, James Sterling Young describes a national politics without parties, activity being centered among state delegations who tended to live together in rooming houses.⁶ Anti-party attitudes abound to the present day, although, as Pomper points out, 'we have continued to employ' parties, 'and even to cherish them, in practice.'⁷

Other elements in the architecture of the dispersal of power in the new republic included federalism, the separation of powers and the specifica-

tion of fixed and overlapping terms of office.⁸ The consequences of all this for the exercise of national power in the US are not casual. Two hundred years later, the way that the national government has finally been able to impose its own standards on equality and non-discrimination in higher education in the United States has been by the threat of withholding federal dollars from university-level research. Similarly, the way the federal authorities were able to change the legal drinking age in the US was by the threat of withholding federal dollars from state highway construction!

The US Constitution imposes significant and effective limits on a national party system by locating the sources of political power in geographical constituencies in the American states, and by explicitly granting political authority – i.e., the power to govern – to those who win elections. The parties are thus rooted in these constituencies, and they are, accordingly, a congeries of state and local political organizations, reflecting local history and tradition, culture, candidates, and a considerable measure of local law.⁹ And whoever obtains a majority – even a majority of one vote – is empowered to participate in governance, no matter what party leaders in other constituencies, including the President, think about him or her. The result is a national system of two parties, each of which is in some respects an ‘umbrella’ organization, covering tremendous diversity among those state and local organizations that call themselves by the same name.

In this system, the national party organizations have, and can have, only a limited role. They have no formal membership rosters, although the Republican Party has set a high standard of organization in recent years, maintaining ‘sustaining membership’ lists of Republicans as a basis for very effective fund-raising. Every four years the parties nominate a presidential candidate; but with the rapid spread of the presidential preference primaries, the party conventions have become the *place* where party nominations are formalized, rather than the *machinery* for selecting the nominees. The party organizations help to elect the nominees, but the major effort is made by the candidates themselves who, together with their campaign organizations, construct their own electoral coalitions. And if they are successful, they subsequently reward their supporters with policies, and faithful service to the party with appointments. The party organizations help with the process of appointments, because there are so many positions at stake in the American government; but they do not have any responsibility, or even ability, to help the new president govern.

A significant consequence of these characteristics of the American party system is the frequent presence of what some have called ‘divided govern-

ment¹⁰,’ and Jones has called ‘the separated presidency¹¹’, in which the Executive Branch is controlled by one political party, and at least one of the two houses of Congress is controlled by the other party. Divided government may be seen as a form of coalition government¹², although there is no design, no advance planning, no agreement – merely a need to work together at least for the minimal requirements of government.

The programs of the national political parties are to be found in their platforms, which are drawn up and adopted at the quadrennial conventions of the parties, when they choose their presidential candidates. Platforms serve a number of functions for the parties: they can be vehicles of compromise among candidates, or statements of position by the victorious candidate; and they are calls to the faithful, as well as appeals to those who are looking for a candidate to support. Contemporary culture has rarely been kind to party platforms. They are generally regarded as irrelevant to policy; and they are generally ignored by voters – as well as by political scientists who study voters.¹³ But they are not always ignored by politicians, and hence are not ignored by political scientists who study parties: Pomper pointed out some years ago that the ‘fulfillment of platform pledges is common, but it is not required’. And politicians, he added, ‘appear to take them seriously.’¹⁴ In the twenty war and post-war years (1944-1964) covered by Pomper’s analysis, however, only 6% of the total number of foreign policy pledges in the platforms of the two parties were in conflict – i.e., representing competing visions about the purposes and directions of foreign policy: 47% were bipartisan – i.e., were in both party platforms; and 47% were one-party pledges – i.e., different promises, appealing to different and distinct groups of voters.¹⁵

There are reasons to be cautious about attaching great significance to a party’s platform in general, and especially to its foreign policy platform. In general, the weight to be attached to a platform pledge depends largely on judgments made by the Presidents (or presidential candidate) and his staff, both at the time of drafting and during the subsequent years of an administration. A contemporary example is found in the determination by President Bush, first to continue the Reagan pledge against any new taxes, and second that this pledge would have to yield to the economic necessities of higher-than-expected deficits. There are no *systematic* mechanisms in either party to develop platforms or programs by aggregating preferences, since the parties themselves are loose coalitions of quite disparate state and local organizations. The Republican Party has an on-going opinion-polling mechanism which provides some broad understanding of the distribution of preferences at a moment in time, but there is no direct thread between that and aggregation. Political platforms

develop more out of the ideologies of leading candidates, or out of their recent political experiences – successes, failures, vulnerabilities, the results of mid-term elections, etc. – than out of organized policy preferences within an organized party structure.

A further reason to be cautious about the significance of a national party platform is that, in the American political system, there are no mechanisms that can ensure compliance with the platform by legislators – or presidents. Since members of Congress draw their political power from their constituencies and their political authority from the Constitution, there are not many important ways in which even members of the President's party can be disciplined for failure to support the President's program. Usually, when a president needs support, he offers carrots to those who might help, rather than sticks to those who don't. Congressional leadership can deprive a wayward colleague of choice committee assignments or other advantages of office, but those are extreme penalties that are applied only very rarely and then only to the most persistent, egregious and offensive failures to follow party leadership.

These general limitations of political parties in the US should tell us that we cannot expect parties to play an important role as participants in the debates specifically on foreign policy issues. In fact, the parties as such can fairly be described as non-participants in those debates. There are several reasons why the foreign policy positions of the two parties are rarely in conflict, and are often not even sharply differentiated:

1. Foreign policy is rarely the breadwinner of American politics. Popular indifference to non-threatening issues of foreign policy is well established both in voting studies¹⁶ and in public opinion surveys.¹⁷ To the extent that voters pay any attention to foreign policy in their choice of candidates, they are more likely to pass judgment on the perceived ability or competence of the candidates to carry on an effective foreign policy than on the merits of proposed policies themselves.¹⁸ Recall that Richard Nixon won the presidency in 1968, in the supercharged atmosphere of the Viet Nam War, even though he specifically and repeatedly refused to give any details on how he planned to end that war.
2. There remains a heavy layer of bipartisanship on the central issues of American foreign policy, despite some of the interesting battles of the past generation. NATO has been the symbol of the commitment of both political parties to America's active leadership in international affairs. The differences between the parties have been differences of degree and of style much oftener than they have been differences of direction or of commitment.
3. The electoral strategy of major candidates and of the parties they lead,

which is usually to move to the center rather than to the extremes in order to pick up the margin of victory, is for the above reasons even more pronounced in the foreign policy area than in other policy areas. In the unusual case, where positions have been sharply differentiated – for example, the Republican Party's emphasis on spending for defense in the 1980s – the losers tend subsequently to move closer to the winners, effectively shifting the 'center'.

The political system and political parties in the Netherlands – Unlike American parties, Dutch parties are the central political voices in the Netherlands. The Netherlands have a multi-party, parliamentary system that is based on proportional representation. Governance is organized around the parties that are represented in the Parliament, and political authority is exercised by the parties that are represented in the Cabinet. The number of electoral lists that have competed in the national elections since 1918 ranges from a low of 10 to a high of 54, but power is more concentrated than these figures suggest: the five largest parties have won over 70% of the popular vote and over 75% of the seats in Parliament in each of those elections.

There are three centers of Dutch party power: The largest is the party organizations themselves. The major parties have complex structures with local, regional and national sections, strong bureaucracies and equally strong traditions of internal democracy. The second center, smaller in scope, is in the party organizations – the *fracties* – within the Second Chamber, which is the lower house of the Dutch Parliament. The third and obviously the smallest center is the party representation in the Cabinet (and the Ministerial Council) at any given time.¹⁹ Each of these, as we shall see, has interests and perspectives that are not always shared by the others.

The formation (and proliferation) of political parties in the Netherlands is encouraged by the comparative ease with which a party can gain representation in Parliament. Given the size of the population, the average turnout, and the number of seats in the Second Chamber, proportional representation in the Netherlands means that a seat may be secured by between 55,000 and 60,000 votes. While there is a long history in the country of dissidents splitting off from large parties and forming new ones, there have in fact been as many aggregations or consolidations as there have been defections in the past 25 years, and the aggregations, on the whole, have had more significance for national politics.²⁰

Dutch political parties have varying ties with religious and cultural streams in Dutch society and history²¹, but they are all 'ideological' in the sense that their programs develop from long debated and well articulated

principles. Prior to elections, the party programs are published individually by the parties as an appeal for votes, and later collectively by the government as an historical record of the event. While the pressures for ideological distinctiveness and consistency are strong, the ever-present prospect for all of the major parties of participating in a governing coalition creates counterpressures for pragmatism among them. So, too, do occasional candid reflections on past electoral defeats.

In the Dutch multi-party system, cabinet government is by necessity coalition government. But coalitions often – some might say inescapably – stand between voters and their wishes. In effect, the political structure for carrying out the diverse preferences of the voters becomes a vehicle for side-tracking many of those preferences; and in the process the role of the parties as voices of public opinion becomes attenuated. For one thing, becoming a coalition partner does not necessarily follow from a party's electoral success. In the last quarter of a century the Dutch have developed a tradition of majority coalitions, but one can put together a coalition of parties representing a majority in the Parliament without including the largest single party – as the Labor Party discovered in 1971 and again, to its chagrin, in 1977. The process of cabinet formation is a work of art as well as of politics; it starts with a canvass of the political judgment of senior 'players' – including the leadership of the different levels of party power²² – and it does not necessarily reflect the distribution of preferences of the electorate as reflected in their votes for the Second Chamber.

Secondly, the governing accord – the formal agreement, or compromise, among the coalition partners on the policies they will pursue in the new government – is necessarily different from the program with which each party fought the election, which means that the participating parties and politicians (again, at the different levels of party power) are committed to a 'different', compromise program for the life of the government.

Thirdly, the division of governmental positions – the ministers and the *staatssecretarissen* or under-secretaries – among the parties in the coalition usually means that otherwise competitive and even antagonistic parties share the practical responsibility for governing, even within ministries. In the current cabinet (Lubbers III), the Minister and the *Staatssecretaris* were from the same political party in only three ministries; they were from different parties in six ministries; and there was no *Staatssecretaris* in four ministries. And in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there are two persons with the rank of Minister (the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development Cooperation) who come from different parties.²³

Fourthly, once the Cabinet is installed, its survival becomes an important value in itself, taking precedence over many issues. Except for a brief

period in the early 1980s, when Dutch nuclear weapons policy was under active political challenge, foreign policy issues have not been deemed important enough in postwar Dutch political life to form the basis for a challenge to the Government. That is reinforced by the fact that the major political parties – especially the party fractions in Parliament – behave 'responsibly' in foreign policy, which is to say that they share in and help to develop foreign policies that are 'reasonable' enough so that there is little advantage for anyone in contesting them.²⁴ While it is not an iron law of Dutch politics that 'you don't bring down a government on a foreign policy issue', the circumstances in which that might happen are severely limited.

Participation in governing coalitions is only one reason why Dutch political parties may lack a powerful foreign policy voice. Another is the changing nature of political party membership and support in the Netherlands, and the role of foreign policy in generating that support. Membership in Dutch political parties – achieved by declaration followed by the regular payment of a contribution – is small, and it has been declining steadily in recent years: from 15% in 1946, it dropped to 8% by 1967, and to 4% by 1986. The drop has affected all except the small orthodox parties.²⁵ If informal estimates that only about 1% of the membership participates in discussions of foreign policy are correct, those numbers are very small: about 1,250 in the Christian Democratic Party (CDA), 1,000 in the Labor Party (PvdA), 750 in the Liberal Party (VVD).

Voting studies confirm that Dutch political parties do not attract voters on the basis of their foreign policies, and that foreign policy plays no important role in Dutch parliamentary elections. Data from the 1970s suggest that on the 'big issues' of that time, like development assistance, defense expenditures and the Dutch role in the world, people who intended to vote for all the major parties had opinions all across the spectrum – i.e., these issues seemed to be unrelated to vote intention.²⁶ The 1986 parliamentary elections were held just six months after the Dutch parliament and government had made their definitive decision on one of the most volatile issues of the 1980s – to proceed with the placement of cruise missiles on Dutch territory. In the immediate post-election survey, when respondents were asked why they had voted for the party of their choice, no one gave as reasons the party's position on a foreign policy matter; and only 1.7% gave as their first reason – and 1.1% gave as the second reason – the party's position on defense and nuclear arms policy!²⁷ Reviewing the history of the anti-nuclear effort and the results of the 1986 elections, Jan van Putten observed, 'The impression was confirmed once again that matters of foreign policy or defense policy play only a minor role in the determination of voting behavior.'²⁸

One is obliged to conclude that the major Dutch political parties are more or less driven together by the same pressures that drive the US parties together: the quest for [participation in] a governing majority.²⁹ It is only the parties at the ideological edges – those with no current prospect of participation in a government – that have the clearest attraction for voters with strong foreign policy convictions. In the parties in the broad middle of Dutch politics, the average positions of voters on foreign policy issues have been closer together.³⁰

Overall, then, the major Dutch political parties nationally represent rather ambiguous bodies of opinion on foreign policy issues, and do not seem to be regarded by those who vote for them as vehicles for the unequivocal expression of their own foreign policy views. In the foreign policy 'issue area', these Dutch parties display a significant weakness: they cannot readily deal with strong demands in foreign policy, because they are not organized around these issues. One would therefore expect that party leaders in and out of Parliament would find it difficult to enforce foreign policy positions on *fractie* members. The CDA experience with its 'loyalists' in the early 1980s was a vivid, if unusual, illustration. In the face of this kind of weakness Dutch political parties, like American political parties, more or less 'invite' participation – and even leadership – in the foreign policy field by organizations and people outside of the parties who feel that the parties do not represent them on issues of fundamental importance to them.

Observations and Conclusions – The impact of political parties on the foreign policy process is a function not only of the performance of political parties themselves in the foreign policy field, but also of the consequences of party performance for other participants in the foreign policy process, and for the process itself. Yet it is very difficult to attribute consequences to parties alone, since they do not work alone in the foreign policy vineyards. Similarly, it is difficult to discuss consequences for other parts of the system without having had a discussion of those parts. With a full understanding, therefore, of the tentative and speculative character of these observations, let me nevertheless share a sense of where this comparison might lead us.

The United States in the 1960s and 1970s and the Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s had similar problems: In neither country were the established political parties able to accommodate strong currents of foreign policy opinion that wanted to change the direction of a major foreign policy. In both countries it led to 'outbursts' of non-party activism and action. This should have occasioned no surprise in the case of the United

States, where the two major parties are amalgams of diverse local organizations containing diverse opinions on specific issues, and have no institutional way to be responsive to such mixed pressures. It was less obviously understandable in the Netherlands, where parties are generally regarded as the vehicles for translating public opinions into new governmental policies and where new parties can readily be created in response to strong opinion if the established parties are not responsive.

What is common to both countries is first, that the desire to govern drives major parties closer together; and second, that foreign policy issues are, most of the time, not very important to most people, so they are rather easily wrapped up in the 'consensus' that is created when the parties do move toward each other. It doesn't matter, then, that Dutch parties are not well organized around foreign policy matters, or that American parties are not well organized around any policy matters, so long as there is no *need* for parties to take significant positions on foreign policy matters – that is, so long as foreign policy matters do not become domestic political issues. There is *always* a divergence of opinion on foreign policy matters, but they are not usually contested issues. It takes powerful motivation to contest such issues, to move them from the margins of politics toward the center, where the 'middle classes' can safely join in, as they did in the United States in the spring of 1970, for instance, and in the Netherlands in 1981 and 1983; it is not an every day – or even an every decade – event. *How* and *why* this happens, and under what circumstances, are questions worthy of further research. But *when* it happens, the parties are not able to deal with it constructively. Rather than providing leadership, they typically follow, taking cues from others and allying with non-party movements in an effort to find new sources of support.

In the United States, research during the long years of the Cold War led many of us to believe that 'interest groups' were not very important in foreign policy – that their reputed impact over the years had been greatly exaggerated.³¹ To the extent that that was true, it was because the predominant concern with national security during those Cold-War years underlined the leadership role of the Executive Branch in foreign affairs, and relegated private interests to a subordinate position. When interest groups began to form around the Vietnam War issue, governmental unresponsiveness to them was owing to a combination of factors besides simple policy disagreement: to their political marginality (until they became respectably middle-class); to their 'selfishness' in asserting a claim to be better able than elected officials to define or determine the 'national interest'; to their incivilities; and, most interesting, to their failure to 'use the system'. In fact, however, there *was* no 'system' for them to use! Or,

put differently, in the absence of significant political institutions such as political parties to press their views within the governmental process, they were using the only system available to them for that purpose. The same thing was true in the Netherlands in the late 1970s and 1980s, when the opposition to cruise missiles coalesced around the IKV, which was then in a strong enough position to determine which political parties it would allow to share its programs.

There is a tendency on the part of people who seek to influence policy through the efforts of interest groups to evaluate their experiences in terms of winning or losing, of success or failure; and I have the impression that the organizations that were involved in both the American and Dutch peace movements saw themselves as having failed because they didn't 'win'.³² I would suggest an alternative way of looking at their experiences, one that reflects the view that they were in fact functioning 'within the system'. Like some beneficent after-effects of a heart attack, these groups were quite effective in terms of creating new 'capillaries', new routes for the blood, new opportunities for and new sensitivities to external opinion. In this sense the two movements were 'successes' because they did what political parties were not able to do – serve as agencies for the aggregation, mobilization and representation of opinion. They created new channels for opinion to be heard and to be considered in the foreign policy process.

Interest groups are not the only foreign policy institutions to have their roles shaped by the failure of political parties to give leadership and voice to public opinion in the foreign policy field. All other public participants in the foreign policy processes in each country, as parts of an integrated policy-making system, are inescapably affected by the behavior – or lack of it – of political parties. To take but one example: In both countries the media of communication have established routines for reporting the normal functioning of political institutions; and they have special sensitivities to the dramatic and the unusual.³³ As interest groups assumed the task of organizing and speaking for the antiwar movement in the US, and as they replaced political parties as activists for the antinuclear movement in the Netherlands, the media in both countries found something dramatic and unusual to report – not so much a political conflict over an aspect of foreign policy as a public challenge to the authority of the government. The result was a quite different public issue, and a continuing flood of publicity for the activities and the goals of the organizations that the groups could never have organized, or afforded, on their own. In the end, the achievements of the interest groups in both countries surely owed as much to the fascination of the media with their unusual activities as to their own

political efforts. Perversely, however, the sense of failure rather than accomplishment that pervaded these organizations was no doubt exacerbated if not in fact created by the gap between the sense of great power created by all the media attention, and the sense of frustration at the unwillingness of these governments to change their policy direction abruptly.

Finally, let me reassess the contribution that this comparison has made to our understanding of the public processes of foreign policy making in the US and the Netherlands. Looking at only one country, we tend to see only what is there, as well as what we have become accustomed to seeing there. A focussed comparison of the working of political parties – or of other institutions of public policy making – in both countries forces each of us to look back at our own national institutions from a new perspective, inquiring about the things that aren't there as well as those that are, and about the things they don't do as well as those they do, and asking what their presence or absence may signify for other participants in the process. Because political parties are ordinarily so central to the development of both opinion and policy in the Netherlands, and so peripheral in the United States, their juxtaposition offers particular insight into the public aspects of foreign policy development in the two countries.

Notes

1. This article is part of a larger comparison I have been making of public participation in foreign policy in the Netherlands and the United States. I have been aided immeasurably in this endeavor by the perceptive comments of P.R. Baehr, C. van der Eijk, Ph.P. Everts, and A. van Staden on the Dutch side, and L.D. Epstein and C.O. Jones on the American side.

2. See, e.g., B.C. Cohen, *The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1957; *The Press and Foreign Policy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1963; *The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy*, Little, Brown and Co., Boston 1973.

3. Cf. Donald Granberg and Soren Holmberg, *The Political System Matters: social psychology and voting behavior in Sweden and the United States*, Cambridge University Press, New York 1988.

4. Leon D. Epstein, *Political Parties in the American Mold*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Paperback edn., 1989, p. 3. See also Chap. 2, 'The Scholarly Commitment'.

5. Alan Ware, *The Logic of Party Democracy*, Macmillan, London 1979; Epstein, *op. cit.*, Chapter 6.

6. James Sterling Young, *The Washington Community 1800-1828*, Columbia University Press, New York 1966.

7. Gerald M. Pomper, 'The Contribution of Political Parties to American Democracy', in Gerald M. Pomper, ed., *Party Renewal in America: Theory and Practice*, Praeger Publishers, New York 1980, p. 4.

8. See, e.g., Austin Ranney and Wilmoore Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System*, Harcourt, Brace & World, New York 1956.

9. In the State of Wisconsin, for example, voters can decide, after they are in the polling booth, in which party's primary election they will participate. This means that people who have voted for the candidate of one party all their lives, and who intend to vote for the candidates of that party, can nevertheless participate in the candidate-selection of the other party.

10. E.g., James L. Sundquist, 'The New Era of Coalition Government in the United States', *Political Science Quarterly*, Winter, 1988-89.

11. Charles O. Jones, 'The Separated Presidency: Making it Work in Contemporary Politics', in A.S. King, ed., *The New Political System*, American Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C., Second Version, 1990.

12. See Sundquist, *op. cit.*

13. It is worth noting that the major studies of American voting behavior, while they deal extensively with the question of voters' perception of ideological and issue differences between the parties, do not once refer to party platforms. See Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter*, John Wiley & Sons, New York 1960; and Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1976.

14. Gerald M. Pomper, *Elections in America: Control and Influence in Democratic Politics*, Dodd, Mead & Co., New York 1968, p. 201, 203. I am grateful to Charles O. Jones and Leon D. Epstein who separately drew Pomper's work to my attention.

15. *Ibid.* p. 193-195.

16. E.g., A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller, and D. Stokes, *op. cit.*

17. See, e.g., the quadrennial surveys of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations: *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 1975, 1979, 1983, and 1987.

18. See, e.g., William Schneider on the 1980 election: 'The November 4 Vote for President: What Did it Mean?' in Austin Ranney, ed., *The American Elections of 1980*, The American Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C. 1981, p. 212-262. For a contrary view, however, see John H. Aldrich, John L. Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida, 'Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz Before a Blind Audience?', *American Political Science Review*, 83, 1, March 1989, p. 123-141.

19. See, e.g.: R.B. Andeweg, A. Hoogerwerf, and J.J.A. Thomassen, eds., *Politiek in Nederland*, Samsom, Alphen a.d. Rijn 1981; M.P.C.M. van Schendelen, J.J.A. Thomassen and H. Daudt, eds., 'Leden van de Staten-Generaal...': *Kamerleden over de werking van het Parlement*, VUGA-Uitgeverij, 's-Gravenhage 1981; and R.B. Andeweg, ed., *Ministers en Ministerraad*, SDU-Uitgeverij, Den Haag 1990.

20. In 1966, D'66 (now D66) was formed, followed in 1970 by DS'70. The former has done well enough at times to become a coalition partner; the latter has disappeared. In the meantime the Christian Democratic party, CDA, was created by the merger of the major religious parties, KVP, ARP and CHU; and more recently a left-leaning environmental party, Groen Links, was created by the merger of PSP, PPR and EVP.

21. See A. Lijphart, *Verzuiling, Pacificatie en Kentering in de Nederlandse Politiek*, H.J.W. Becht, Haarlem 1988 (1986 edn.).

22. See J.J. Vis, 'Kabinetsformatie', Chapter 9 in M.P.C.M. van Schendelen, J.J.A. Thomassen and H. Daudt, eds., 'Leden van de Staten-Generaal...': *Kamerleden over de werking van het Parlement*. VUGA-Uitgeverij, 's-Gravenhage 1981. See also the brief discussion prepared by the Information and Public Relations Department of the Second Chamber: *De Tweede Kamer: De Kabinetsformatie*, Staatsdrukkerij, Den Haag 1981.

23. This latter situation provides a good illustration of the problem at hand: The Foreign Minister (CDA) and the Development Minister (PvdA) have been publicly at odds over the relationship between development-assistance policy and human-rights policy. While the Development Minister controls the only interesting budget in the foreign affairs field, the Foreign Minister has been more or less successful in asserting his primacy in the human-rights area - to the public unhappiness of some PvdA members. *Het Parool*, April 13, 1990, quotes a PvdA member of the European Parliament: 'Ik heb wel eens twijfels of de PvdA zich genoeg profileert. We moeten de PvdA-bewindslieden op het linkerspoor houden. We zitten nu eenmaal in een andere partij dan het CDA'. ('I have doubts now and then about whether the PvdA has a high enough profile. We have to keep the PvdA-ministers on the left-hand track. We are simply in a different party from the CDA.')

24. This is as close to a definition of 'consensus' as I have been able to come!

25. R.A. Koole, 'Political Parties going Dutch: Party Finances in The Netherlands', *Acta Politica*, 25, 1990, 1, p. 37-65. The *Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 1986* (C. van der Eijk, G.A. Irwin, and B. Niemöller, eds., Steinmetz-Archives, Amsterdam 1988) reports, however, that 8% of the first-wave sample claimed to be a member of a political party. p. 44.

26. *De Nederlandse Kiezer '73*, Samsom, Alphen aan den Rijn 1973; *De Nederlandse Kiezer '77*, VAM, Voorschoten 1977.

27. See C. van der Eijk, G.A. Irwin, and B. Niemöller, eds., *Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 1986*, Steinmetz Archives, Amsterdam 1988, Appendix 15, p. 269-277.

28. Jan van Putten, *Toekomst voor de Vredesbeweging*, De Horstink, Amersfoort 1986, p. 18. The relative insignificance even of nuclear weapons policy for political party preference is evident also in data summarized by Ph.P. Everts in *Public Opinion, the Churches and Foreign Policy: Studies of Domestic Factors in the Making of Dutch Foreign Policy*, Dissertation, Leiden University, 1983, esp. Chapter 8.

29. See Hans Daalder, 'The Mould of Dutch Politics: Themes for Comparative Inquiry', in Hans Daalder and Galen A. Irwin, eds., *Politics in the Netherlands: How Much Change?*, Frank Cass, London 1989, p. 14.

30. A. van Staden and C.P. van den Tempel, 'Buitenlands Beleid en Internationale Politiek', in *De Nederlandse Kiezer '77*, p. 118.

31. See, e.g., B.C. Cohen, *The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy*, Little, Brown & Co, Boston 1973.

32. See, e.g., Van Putten, *op. cit.*

33. For the U.S., see, e.g., B.C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1963. For the Netherlands, see, e.g., A. Kaiser, *Haagse journalistiek: Een empirisch onderzoek naar de relatie tussen journalisten en*

parlementariërs, VU-Uitgeverij, Amsterdam 1985; and R. Koole, red., *Binnenhof Binnenste Buiten: Slagen en falen van de Nederlandse parlementaire democratie*, De Haan, Weesp 1986.

[vervolg van p. 450]

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Onderzoek

Vrouwen in adviesraden

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'En overigens ben ik van mening, dat er in de adviesraden meer vrouwen moeten komen.' Zo eindigde het kamerlid De Grave zijn toespraak tot de in 1989 nieuw geïnstalleerde Emancipatieraad. Het gevoelen dat vrouwen ten onrechte ontbreken in het schemerige tussengebied tussen staat en maatschappij heerst kennelijk niet alleen onder vrouwen en/of feministen. Of, en in welke mate, vrouwen ook werkelijk ontbreken is echter niet eenvoudig te achterhalen in literatuur over de Nederlandse politiek. Ook de aandacht voor vrouwen en politiek van feministische zijde concentreert zich grotendeels op de gekozen vertegenwoordigers op lokaal en nationaal niveau.

In het onderstaande zal ik een aantal gegevens bespreken dat is gedestilleerd uit een overzicht van Nederlandse adviesraden. Een op de tien adviseurs van de overheid blijkt vrouw te zijn. Daarmee blijft het stelsel van adviesraden opmerkelijk achter vergeleken met de gekozen raden, waarvan op dit moment ongeveer een op de vier leden een vrouw is. Het aandeel van vrouwen wordt uitgesplitst per departement en per functiecategorie. Zo kan een aantal kwesties dat in de buitenlandse literatuur aan de orde is gesteld, worden belicht. Is het aandeel van vrouwen in het adviesraadsstelsel te vatten onder de term 'reproductie'? Zijn vrouwen alleen daar aanwezig waar politieke macht afwezig is? Hebben vrouwen minder kansen als raden worden samengesteld op basis van deskundigheid, dan in vertegenwoordigende raden?

Inleiding

Adviseren aan de overheid kent een lange geschiedenis van hoogte- en dieptepunten waarin zowel mannen als vrouwen figureren. Men kan illustere voorbeelden vinden in Plato en in Machiavelli, echter ook in Madame de Pompadour en haar pogingen kunst en architectuur in Frankrijk