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Bijlage V

Chronologische staafdiagram van de aantallen geslaagde en mislukte initiatiefvoorstellen van wet van april 1888 tot april 1971 per kabinetsperiode



Partisan Commitment and Electoral Behavior in The Netherlands
by M. Kent Jennings

A prominent feature of many electoral studies is the concept of varying degrees of party attachment in the electorate. Some people have strong loyalties, others very weak ones, while still others have no visible ties to a party. Similarly, political systems may be characterized by differing aggregate distributions of party attachments. At the macro level, these varying degrees of commitment provide a reliable barometer of the electorate's predisposition to support one party of another, thereby supplying a clue as to the kind of governmental policies which will be pursued. Varying levels of attachment also seem to contribute to or at least reflect the stability of the party and electorate systems and hence, at a further remove, the equilibrium of the larger political system.[1]

Underlying these macro level implications and consequences are two processes going on at the micro level. First, the greater the degree of party adherence the more active is the person in the electoral process. This includes voting as well as campaign activity, and applies to a variety of nation-states.[2] Second, the more intense the person's adherence the more steadfast is his actual voting behavior and the more likely he is to embody the ideological posture of the party or a wing of the party.[3] When aggregated into overall patterns and movements one can see how these two micro-level processes imply the two macro-level manifestations noted above.

Implicit — indeed necessary — to the arguments just advanced is that party identification is more than just a transitory thing. A variety of studies indicate that a partisan self image tends to develop among large numbers of people in a variety of systems. These images do not simply reflect how the individual cast his ballot in the last election — although the two pieces of information

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1 On this point see, especially, Philip E. Converse, 'Of Time and Partisan Stability', *Comparative Political Studies*, 2 (July, 1969), pp. 140-71.

2 Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim, *The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Comparison* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 48-49.

3 This is best demonstrated in the American studies. See, in particular, various chapters in Angus Campbell, et al., *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960) and *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: John Wiley, 1966); Peter B. Natchez and Irwin C. Bupp, 'Candidates, Issues, and Voters', in Edward C. Dreyer and Walter A. Rosenbaum (eds.), *Political Opinion and Behavior* (2nd. ed., Belmont: Wadsworth, 1970), pp. 427-50; and in the same book, Dreyer and Rosenbaum, 'The Psychological Context', pp. 243-53.

are invariably highly related. Rather, as Butler and Stokes remark of the British situation:

— The values which the individual sees in supporting a party usually extend to more than one general election. There may be strong continuity in the outputs of government, such as the welfare of a class, which provide the individual with the same basis for his choice over successive contests. Moreover, the values involved in party support of the intrinsic [i.e., non-output] sort tend by their very nature to be enduring ones. As a result, most [British] electors think of themselves as supporters of a given party in a lasting sense, developing what may be called a partisan self-image.[4]

While it may be true only in the United States do partisan loyalties persist even in the fase of frequent deviation from the expressed identification, this does nothing to weaken the essential argument that varying degrees of party attachments emerge in many democratic systems and that these attachments condition mightily the behavior of the electorate over time.

In what follows we explore the utility and importance of partisan attachment in The Netherlands. During the course of this exploration we make both conventional and unconventional applications of the concept and take advantage of some unique properties of the Dutch political system.

Especially when compared with the Anglo-American systems, Holland provides a rather unusual setting for testing propositions involving party commitment.[5] First, it is a nation with a long tradition of strong, multiple parties and a generous method of proportional representation. Given this, it might be supposed that what is important as far as the direction of the vote is concerned is simply some sort of underlying preference, and that the strength of that preference is a trivial matter. Or, granting that intensity makes a difference, one could question whether it applies equally to the diverse parties in the many-splendored party system.

Second, Holland is a nation with an elaborate 'pillar' system *(verzuiling)*, wherein primary and secondary ties and even mass media behavior have *tended* to be congruent with each other, to be tied together under one of the three or four commonly described pillars. This segmented pluralism[6] embraces to some extent both the religious and the party systems. Granting such

[4] David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain* (New York: St. Martin's, 1969), p. 37.

[5] My characterization of Dutch politics throughout this paper leans heavily on Hans Daalder, 'The Netherlands: Opposition in a Segmented Society', in Robert A. Dahl (ed.) *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University, 1966), chapter 6; and on Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accomodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif., 1968).

segmentation one might well wonder if the degree of party attachment will stand out as of any singular importance.

Third, it is well known by now that Holland has recently been undergoing internal strains. The system of accomodation and consociational democracy so aptly portrayed by Lijphart appears to be floundering somewhat, as explicated by Lijphart himself.[7] One of the symtoms of the mild crisis has been a proliferation of new parties with a parallel diminution in some of the older, established ones. What, if anything, can the concept of party intensity tell us in such a time of flux?

Finally, Holland has just moved from a system in which voting was virtually obligatory (technically, one had to present oneself at the polls) to a voluntary system. The materials with which we shall work deal with the first nation-wide elections under the new system. We have, therefore, a fortuitous opportunity to see if one of the key propositions regarding party preference intensity, *viz.* voting turnout, can be verified under very exceptional circumstances.

To explore the operation of party intensity in the Dutch mass public we utilize data from a national survey conducted shortly after the 1970 provincial elections. Probability methods were used to generate an eventual total sample of 1838 interviewed respondents.[8] The basic measure of party adherence to be used throught this paper comes from a sequence of questions[9] and has four heavily populated categories:

Strong Adherents	18.0 %
Weak Adherents	26.8
Leaners	32.2
Independents	23.0
N = 1838	100 %

[6] For a comprehensive essay on segmentation see Val Lorwin, 'Segmented Pluralism Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies', *Comparative Politics,* 3 (January, 1971), pp. 141-75.

[7] Arend Lijphart, 'Kentering in de Nederlandse Politiek', *Acta Politika,* 4 (April, 1969), pp. 231-247; and chapter 9 in *The Politics of Accomodation.*

[8] This study was carried out under the auspices of the Sociologisch Instituut of the Katholieke Hogeschool, Tilburg. More details on the nature of the study are found in Philip C. Stouthard, 'De verkiezingen van maart 1970', *Acta Politica* 6 (January, 1971), pp. 18-28.

[9] 'Many people think of themselves as adherent of a certain party, but there are also people who do not. Do you usually think of yourself as an adherent of a certain party? (If yes) Which party do you like best? Some people are strong convinced adherents of their party. Others are not so strongly convinced. Do you belong to the strongly convinced adherents of your party or do you not? (If not an adherent). Is there any party that you are closer to than the others? (If yes) Which?

Both types of Adherents freely associate themselves with a political party; they differ only in terms of the strength of the attachment. 'Leaners' do not consider themselves adherents but they do feel 'closer' to one party over another. Independents form a residual category, claiming neither adherence nor closeness to any party. We shall think of this distribution as constituting at least an ordinal scale, running from a 'high' of Strong Adherents to a 'low' of Independents.

In passing, it might be noted that the proportion of self-confessed adherents in Holland is considerably lower than in the United States, Britain and West Germany. Using very similar wording, a 1970 American survey showed that 68 % of the sample was either Strong or Weak Adherents; similar questions in Britain usually show that about 90 % of the sample accept a party label; and the proportions run from 80—90 % in West Germany.[10] Contrary to what might be expected, the strong Dutch multi-party system has not necessarily bred a nation of more dedicated partisans than the essentially two-party systems of the other three countries. Rather, the Dutch configuration resembles that of such lively multiparty systems as the French and the Italian. Perhaps the very multiplicity of alternatives represented by the multiparty states forestalls the widespread feelings of intense loyalties which seem to emerge when two major parties serve as the focus of attention. In the Dutch case there is also everylikelihood that the proportion of self-defined adherents was substantially higher before the splinterings and new parties.[11]

Age of Elector and Age of Party

Our first task is to plot the relationship between party intensity and electoral experience. Although several studies have demonstrated that pre-adults often acquire a party attachment well before leaving the family hearth,[12] the overall strength of that attachment seldom matches that of older cohorts.

[10] The American data come from the University of Michigan's 1970 election study; the British data are reported in Butler and Stokes, p. 38; and the German data come from Derek W. Urwin, 'Continuity and Change in German Electoral Politics', in Richard Rose (ed.), *Comparative Electoral Behavior* (New York: Free Press, forthcoming).

[11] Utilizing data from a 1956 survey, Lijphart reports that only 9 % of a national sample failed to express a party preference. Even allowing for differences in question wording across studies, it seems undeniable that adherence levels have decreased since then. See Lijphart, 'The Netherlands', in Rose, *Comparative Electoral Behavior.*

[12] This is perhaps best documented in Jack Dennis and Donald J. McCrone, 'Preadult Development of Political party Identification in Western Democracies,' *Comparative Political Studies,* 3 (July, 1970), pp. 243-63.

During the first few encounters with elections the voters are in a stage of learning and conditioning. They are more easily impressed by what are called short term forces and they are more likely to switch their votes from one election to another and, correspondingly, to switch their professed party allegiance, or deny they have any allegiance. Consequently one usually observes a positive relationship between age and partisan intensity.

Yet it is patent that this relationship is not a function of age, per se, but rather experience. As Converse as well as Butler and Stokes have demonstrated,[13] individuals entering the electorate later in life tend to behave in a fashion similar to that of young people just entering the electorate. If anything, older people just entering the electorate acquire loyalites at a slower rate than do younger ones. Where the population remains relatively constant in composition and the system does not undergo any prolonged unstable periods (such as a disctatorship or occupation), the sheer age-party intensity relationship may be said to stand as a reliable proxy for the experience-intensity association; but it should always be remembered that it is the experience, not age itself, which is the crucial factor.

For two reasons age may be used as a direct surrogate for experience in the case of Holland. First, the former obligatory voting rules mean that people in the same age cohort will nearly always have had the same number of voting experiences, since immigration into Holland has been scant. Second, aside from the German occupation during World War II the Dutch have had

Table 1, Age Related to Partisan Intensity

	Years of Age					
	21/24	*25/34*	*35/44*	*45/54*	*55/64*	*65+*
Strong Adherents	0.8 %	11 %	14 %	21 %	28 %	32 %
Weak Adherents	19	30	20	25	23	32
Subtotal	(27)	(41)	(43)	(46)	(51)	(64)
Leaners	40	36	35	33	30	17
Independents	33	24	23	21	20	19
Subtotal	(73)	(60)	(58)	(54)	(50)	(36)
Total	100 %	101 %	101 %	100 %	101 %	100 %
N =	186	436	365	342	261	238
$\overline{X}$	.94*	1.16	1.20	1.25	1.30	1.44
Overall $\overline{X}$ = 1.22						

* These means are calculated from integer scoring applied to the four categories: Strong Adherents = 3, Weak = 2, Leaners = 1, and Independents = 0.

[13] Converse, pp. 143-44; Butler and Stokes, pp. 55-58.

a substained period of universal suffrage and free elections for five decades. According to the hypothesis, the older the person the more intense should be the partisanship. This is decidedly the case in Holland (Table 1). The contrast becomes clearer if the table is dichotomized into the adherents on the one hand and the leaners and independents on the other (figures in parentheses). When this is done the proportion of adherents increases regularly from age bracket to age bracket; conversely the proportion of non-adherents decreases without exception. The mean scores shown at the bottom of the table convey the same message.

Having said this, it is also apparent that the relationship is not an overwhelming one. True, the electorate does become 'immunized' to some extent over time. This immunization stems from having usually rejected the alternative of other parties in favor of the traditional choice. The more often the voter reaffirms his conviction by supporting the party at the polls, and the more accustomed his perceptual and coding devices become to handling information about the parties in a standard fashion, the more entrenched becomes his attachment to the party. Still, this hardening sets in quite early for some people and hardly at all for others. Only in the very oldest Dutch cohort do a large majority consider themselves outright adherents.

In addition to age of person is it also likely that age of party constitutes a condition of attachment certainty? If we view the degree of attachment as a function of learning behavior, then it would follow that more recent parties have had less time to develop a 'taught' cadre of supporters than the older parties. Certainly it is possible that an exiciting new party might immediately mobilize a durable, enthusiastic following. Yet the phenomena of flash parties, as in the French case, suggest that it takes prolonged visibility of the party as well as repeated acts of support before partisan loyalties begin to firm up in the conventional sense. Just as the consumer develops a greater commitment to a product on the basis of more than just one or two experiences, so too the voter with respect to political parties.

Fortunately for analytic purposes, the turn of events since 1959 has provided Holland with a number of new parties. As of 1970, no less than five new arrivals had formed sufficient strength to gain representation in the dominant Second Chamber of Parliament. These included the Pacifistic Socialistic Party (PSP), the Farmers Party (BP), Reformed Political Alliance (GPV), Democrats '66 (D'66), and the Radical Party (PPR). Of these, D'66 was the only major one. In the 1970 survey study there were people who claimed varying degrees of allegiance to each of these new parties.

To test our hypothesis about age of party as a condition of partisan attachment we have grouped together all those identifying with these new parties. Similarly all those identifying with the old parties have been combined. Now we

may simply look at the distribution of party intensity for each group, as below:

	Old parties	New parties
Strong adherents	27 %	08 %
Weak adherents	37	25
Leaners	36	67
	100 %	100 %
N =	(1169)	(247)

There is little doubt that the old, established parties do indeed have the more committed followers. On a party by party basis this holds quite strongly for all except the supporters of the Liberal Party (VVD). The latter are the least committed of the established party followers and have the lowest margin over the new party identifiers. Similarly, all the new parties, with one exception, have far less intense followings than do the the established parties. The exception is the Reformed Party (GPV), a splinter Calvinist party on the right. Unfortunately, the number of cases involved (N = 7) is too small to allow firm statements about even this exception.[14] Coupled with some other symptoms, however, the GPV exception suggests that religious splinter parties — being almost by definition parties of high ideological heat — stand to command a more intense rank and file than do neophyte parties seeking a broad base of support. Especially in the case of new mass parties such as D'66, aiming at a more variegated clientele, it probably take longer to establish firm commitments.

The foregoing analysis was carried out without the benefit of data pertaining to the 1971 Second Chamber election. In that balloting Democratic Socialists '70 (DS '70) emerged as another new mass party. Focussing its campaign on the tax issue, DS '70 managed to capture 5.3 % of the vote, good enough for eight seats in the Chamber. Based on panel data presented by Bijnen and Hagenaars, DS'70 cut an especially wide swath among those people inclined six months before the election to support VVD or D'66, and among those uncertain about their voting intentions.[15] We shall return to a consideration of the DS'70 vote in a later section. A second new party also penetrated the Second Chamber in the wake of the 1971 balloting. The Netherlands Middle

[14] An anlysis of data from a much larger sample interviewed in 1967 also revealed exceptionally high intensity among GPV adherents. See A. Hoogerwerf, 'De Nederlandse Kiezers en het Partijstelsel', *Acta Politica,* 2 (No. 4, 1967-67), p. 299.

[15] E. J. Bijnen and J. A. P. Hagenaars, De Tweede Kamer Verkiezingen van 1971', *Sociale Wetenschappen,* 14 (No. 4, 1971), pp. 239-39.

Class Party (NMP) garnered 1.5 % of the vote, giving it two seats. Subsequently the two MPs went their separate ways. This new party made direct appeals to small businessmen and small shop owners.

If our previous discussion about the strength of attachments to old versus new parties has merit, these two new parties should be saturated with fragile supporters. They should, in fact, have no more solid backing than the older 'new' parties. This hypothesis can be tested in direct fashion by utilizing survey data gathered after the 1971 election.[16] Casting the net widely, we first consider those people who voted for the two new parties. Among DS '70 voters (N = 50) 78 % were either Independents or Leaners; the comparable figure among the NMP voters (N = 11) is 91 %.

These figures are quite similar to those for the other 'new' parties but exceed those of the traditional parties anywhere from 20 % to 50 %. Thus the election-day supporters of the two new parties consisted overwhelmingly of people with little or no sense of psychological identification with the parties. It is little wonder that observers regarded the future of each as problematic.

Underscoring this point, the distribution of the rank and file in terms of declared adherence (rather than voting behavior) also reflects extremely weak ties. Not surprisingly, the two new parties received more votes than declarations of attachment. So few respondents declared themselves either adherents of or leaning toward the NMP that we cannot retain them in the analysis. Within DS '70 the distribution is very much like that for the preexisting 'new' parties, with 14 % saying they were Strong Adherents, 21 % Weak Adherents, and 64 % Leaners. In fact, these percentages are virtually identical with the 1971 figures for the only other new *large* party to have emerged in the last decade — D'66.

The great similarity between D'66 and DS '70 in terms of their supporters' degree of identification suggests that several elections are necessary before a party matures at the mass level. Even though D'66 had already experienced the 1967 parliamentary election, the 1970 provincial elections, and the 1970 municipal elections, it had no greater hold on its supporters (either in terms of actual voting behavior or identification) than did DS' 70 — which made its first outing in 1971. Based on this admittedly small 'sample' one would conjecture that a new, broadly-based party can rather quickly achieve a minimal degree of more or less committed followers. But it takes more than one turn of the election cycle to move beyond that minimal quantity and reach

[16] The respondents in this study will comprise a 1970-71 panel, N = 1282. Like the 1970 data being employed in this paper, the 1971 data were collected under the auspices of the Sociologisch Instituut at Tilburg. I would like to thank Philip Stouthard and Jacques Thomassen for facilitating early acces to these data.

the quantities which the traditional parties have achieved.

How many more turns are needed? The answer to such a difficult question depends on a host of factors, not the least of which is the nation's stage of socio-political development. Restricting ourselves to the Western democracies, however, it would seem that at least a generation is necessary. Only with the passing of time can a cohort develop which has repeated chances to be reinforced in its attraction toward the party. This occurs not only through the act of voting but also through observing, in however a casual fashion, the behavior of the party and its spokesman. An older person has less time to learn in this manner than does a younger one, and in any event the older one will pass out of the electorate in a relatively short time. Beyond the attachments which must form in a current electorate, there is also the all-important question of the upcoming cohorts. Young parties have little opportunity to benefit from the socialization process going on in the family in particular. The longer the party can stay alive and achieve some stability in its following, the more likely that this following will produce children with at least some minimal level of attachment to the party.[17] A party with pre-socialized adherents obviously has a big advantage.

Taking into account both the learning time necessary for the existing electorate and the time needed for socialization of the young to be set in motion, it would appear that a full generation might have to pass before a new popular party could command the level of commitment contained within existing popular parties. If this is so, it means that new parties have an exceedingly long period of vulnerability, since their weakly attached supporters are prey to the lures of other parties *and* non-participation. Bearing these processes in mind, one can understand more easily the relatively static party systems of the Western nations since 1920. As Lipset and Rokkan say: 'To most of the citizens of the West the currently active parties have been part of the landscape since their childhood or at least since they were faced with the choice between alternative 'packages' on election day'.[18] It remains to be seen whether this static situation will continue. Certainly there were sufficient tremblings on both sides of the Atlantic by the late 1960's and early 1970's to suggest a

[17] The intergenerational transmission of party identification in The Netherlands is by no means neglible. When both respondent and father hold a party preference, the gamma correlation between the two is .50 and the product moment correlation is .48.

[18] Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structure, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', in Lipset and Rokkan (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 50.

dissolving of old patterns. In this sense the fate of the new parties in Holland bears particular watching.

Intensity and Participation

A signal finding of the American studies is that the greater the psychological attachment of people to a political party, the more these people participate in the affairs of partisan politics. That this is not peculair to the United States has been demonstrated most recently in a five nation comparison involving India, Austria, Japan, Nigeria, as well as the United States.[19] This latter study is especially significant because culturally equivalent, standard measurements were used in the various countries and the level of statistical analysis placed severe demands on the staying strength of partisanship.

It may safely be said, however, that none of the five afore-mentioned countries has a party system, to say nothing of the larger socio-political system, approaching that of The Netherlands. In particular the lively multiparty system, the segmentation or pillarization of the society, and the recent introduction of voluntary voting provide a matrix setting Holland apart from these other countries. Considering this matrix, how viable is the party intensity-participation nexus?

The way to answer this question is, of course, to look at the data. Voting turnout is one of the commonly used indicators of political participation, even though elections offer a relatively infrequent opportunity to participate, especially in Holland.[20] Not surprisingly, Holland's voting turnout declined precipitously once obligatory voting was cancelled. Compared with the 68.9 % turnout in the voluntary 1970 provincial elections stands the 94.9 % record in the 1967 parliamentary balloting, and the 94.6 % in the 1966 provincial balloting.[21] The 1970 turnout rate as reported by respondents in the survey was 74.3 %, predictably but not greatley higher than the official figure. A first approach to the data is to look at the direct relationship between party intensity and reported voting (Table 2). The pattern is unequivocal in direction and magnitude: the stronger the attachment, the greater the turnout or, conversely, the weaker the attachment the greater the non-turnout. At the extremes nearly six times as many Independents as Strong Adherents failed to vote. Nor does this relationship suffer by cross-national comparisons. Taking the functionally-equivalent, low stimulus American case — the 1970 con-

[19] Verba, Nie, and Kim, pp. 48-49.

[20] Barring a governmental crisis, the Dutch citizen votes only three times over a four-year period: once each at the municipal, provincial, and parliamentary levels.

[21] These figures include invalid ballots.

Table 2, Partisan Intensity and Provincial Election Turnout

	Strong adherents	*Weak adherents*	*Leaners*	*Independents*
'70 Vote?				
Yes a	92 %	83	70	54
No b	08	17	30	46
Total	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %
N =	331	493	592	422
gamma correlation = .51				

a Includes six people reporting that they cast invalid ballots.
b Includes five respondents not replying to the question.

gressional elections — the corresponding gamma correlation is .30.[22] What is all the more remarkable about this Dutch pattern is that it occurs in the first election after five decades of universal and compulsory voting. Aside from the new voters, the Dutch electorate need not have learned the habit of voting in order to go to the polls in 1970. Quite the contrary — they had to *unlearn* the habit of voting. These data lead to the almost inevitable conclusion that the weaker the attachment to a party the faster this 'unlearning' occurred. Without the motivation of party loyalty and the accompanying receptivity to party stimuli, the incentive for voting tailed off dramatically.

These processes are partly implicit in Table 2 but are resoundingly confirmed by comparting turnout rates for the 1967 and 1970 elections across the four categories of intensity. Setting aside those who were ineligible to vote in 1967 because of age, the proportions voting in 1967 but not in 1970 were as follows: Strong Adherents = 6 %; Weak Adherents = 16 %; Leaners = 27 %; and Independents = 40 %.

Can a relationship of the magnitude shown in Table 2 be disguising the play of other forces? From previous analysis with the same study materials we know that age, education, social class, and religiosity were related to turnout.[23]

[22] As with many cross-national comparisons, this one is not straightforward. Compared with U.S. Congressional elections, the Dutch provincial elections are much less important in the political life of the nation. Provincial governments are by no means the counterparts of state governments in het U.S.; nor are representatives to a national assembly being elected in the provincial balloting (except very indirectly through the mechanism of provincial councils selecting members of the relatively powerless First Chamber of Parliament).

[23] Stouthard, pp. 26-28; and J. M. A. M. Janssens, Niet-stemmers: Causal Model en Path-Analyse', *Sociale Wetenschappen,* 14 (No. 4, 1971), p. 247. Janssen in-

It is also known that a general interest in and attention to public affairs increases the likelihood of a specific act such as voting. Perhaps, then, the party adherence measure simply masks the operation of other, more determinative variables. This might be especially likely if, as in the case of age, the other variable is positively related to both turnout and intensity. We will take a number of other such variables and ascertain if party intensity maintains its positive relationship to turnout within separate categories of these other variables. If so, the case for the indenpendent power of party attachment will be much enhaced.

The results of controlling in this fashion leave little doubt about the unique contribution of intensity to turnout. An overview of Table 3 reveals no instance in which the relationship is neglible; in fact, virtually all the correlations are quite substantial. Despite an interesting curvilinear pattern by age, the most important message of the age figures is the staying power of intensity. Similarly with education, which has a slightly positive (though ragged) relationship with turnout. Within each education category intensity articulates strongly with turnout. Subjective social class has a stronger initial relationship to voting than does education, but within class categories the effect of intensity continues unabated.

These control variables are more descriptive rather than behavioral. More specifically, they say nothing about one's psychological involvement in politics. While degree of party attachment represents a psychological linkage with the party, this does not necessarily mean greater psychological involvement with politics and the electoral process in general. Indeed, there is a counter argument that the 'independent — the person without blind, habitual ties to party — is the more involved because he predicates his behavior on the basis of greater information seeking, 'objective' study of the parties, and careful evaluation of their candidates. In the aggregate, however, that image is no truer of the Dutch actuality than the American. The greater the attachment to party the greater the attention paid to politics in general (.27), the greater the interest in the provincial elections (.42), and the more frequent are political discussions with others (.27). Faced with these connections, we must consider whether partisan attachment operates over and above psychological involvement in pushing people to the polls.

Let us take the general salience of politics as the indicator of psychological involvement. Not unexpectedly, salience is related to turnout (.41). It would not be surprising if this relationship acted to undercut somewhat the importance of party intensity in determining turnout. While there is some evidence

cludes the party identification measure in a composite variable called 'perception of political alternatives'.

Table 3, Correlations between Party Intensity and Provincial Election Turnout, by Various Controls

Overall gamma correlation = .51					
Age					
21/25	25/34	35/44	45/54	55/64	65+
.41	.50	.56	.59	.57	.25
Years Education					
0/6	7/8	9/10	11+		
.49	.51	.53	.55		
Subjective Social Class					
Working	Middle				
.50	.51				
Follow Government and Politics					
Most of time	Fairly often	Occasionally	Hardly never		
.25	.38	.49	.47		
Religiosity					
Active members	Non-members, non-active members				
.43	.58				

of this at all levels, intensity continues to have a unique impact (Table 3). Even among the most psychologically involved the connection is by no means obliterated. The answer to our question is clear: strength of adherence operates over and above a general sensitivity to matters of the body politic.

There is one additional characteristic which might dampen the intensity-turnout nexus. As indicated already, Dutch politics cannot properly be understood without appreciating the linkage between religion and party. This linkage results not only in a religious vs. secular dimension, but also in a division of party loyalties between Catholics and Protestants and in a division within the secular parties more or less along class lines. Since religious persons are likely to have more moral fervour and spiritually-inspired imperatives guiding their political behavior than are non-religious persons, partisan intensity may be less decisive in pushing the religious to the polls. That is, assuming that the presence of a religious motif supplies an extra incentive, the incentive generated by strength of party adherence may be correspondingly vitiated.

Like most countries, Holland has a large proportion of people more religious in name than in practice. Preliminary work with the data, however, revealed scarcely any difference in turnout between the nonbelievers and the non-practicing believers; therefore they have been combined for most analysis.

Altogether 42 % of the sample is classified as practicing members, and 58 % as non-members or non-practitioners.

Religious intensity varies modestly with partisan intensity (.23). The Calvinists are especially strong in their partisanship. Religiosity has an even greater tie with voting turnout (.36). In percentage terms, 82 % of the religious versus 69 % of the non-religious cast ballots. It is conceivable, then, that the underlying relationship between religious intensity and turnout will reshape the strong associations observed between turnout and intensity. The difference in the correlations between each type of intensity and turnout suggests that party intensity will not completely disappear as an explanatory variable, since it is larger to begin with. Nevertheless, its power may be much eroded by the presence of religious intensity.

Partisan intensity does work in a less powerful fashion on the religiously committed compared with those not so committed (Table 3). Much as we expected, the degree of partisan commitment supplies a greater boost to the non-religious people. Statistically speaking, we have some interaction effects, with party intensity affecting the non-religious more than the religious.

These interaction effects as well as the twin functions of the variables may be more directly observed by calculating the voting percentages for the various combinations involved, as is done below:

	Strong adherents	*Weak adherents*	*Leaners*	*Independents*
Religious	94 %	85 %	78 %	69 %
Non-religious	90 %	82 %	66 %	48 %

Here it becomes manifest that there is an incremental effect of religiosity at each level of partisanship, but it is sizeable only among the Leaners and Independents. By the same token, greater party intensity raises the turnout for both religious and non-religious people, but the effect is patently greater among the non-religious. Put another way, the strong and weak partisans receive only a slight extra push if they are religious versus non-religious, whereas the Leaners and Independents benefit immensely from the incentive of religious conviction and practice. While each factor affects turnout, the net effects of party intensity are obviously greater.[24]

To round out our picture of how party intensity affects voting turnout let us

[24] In addition to the type of analyses reported in the text, we also performed partial correlational analyses. Controlling simultaneously for psychological involvement, religiosity, social class, and age, the Pearsonian partial correlation between intensity and turnout is .23, far exceeding the magnitude of the other independent variables. Since there are some know interaction effects, this is but a gross indicator of intensity's effects.

consider whether the relationship holds across parties. Holland provides a superb laboratory for such a test because of its complex party system. The nation has religious parties and secular parties; old parties and new parties; left parties and right parties; major parties and minor ones; parties with regional concentrations and those with broader bases; and parties leaning toward a newer, more participative style of politics versus parties preferring the older, more restricticted style. If party intensity functions in a similar fashion across such a broad spectrum of parties, then its utility as an explanatory variable will be even more substantiated.

For this portion of the analysis we must discard the Independents, since by definition they neither adhere to nor feel closer to any party. This means that we now have a three-fold measure of intensity. Even after dropping the Independents, however, the relationship between intensity and turnout is impressive, .45. Now the question is, does this connection hold within each of the diverse parties. Since their numbers are so small we must eliminate from the analysis those people affiliated with the very smallest parties. Proceeding by size of party, as measured by respondents' preferences, here are the gamma coefficients between degree of attachment and vote turnout within each party:

Labour[25] (PvdA)	Catholic (KVP)	Liberal (VVD)	Democ. '66 (D'66)	Revol. (ARP)	Communists/ Pacifists (CPN/PSP)	Christ Hist. (CHU)
.46	.47	.68	.18	.40	.54	.27

The positive and generally robust relationships are important in two respects. First, they demonstrate that the overall relationship is not just a function of some parties having extremely high relationships and others having low or negative ones. Second, they show that no type of party is immune to the consequences of differential attachment. Strictly in terms of whether their supporters go to the polls, each party profits by having lager proportions of the more attached in its ranks. Hence, the principe of intensity has wide applicability across the parties.

Nevertheless two parties lag considerably behind the others in demonstrating the operation of the principle. Why this should be true of CHU is not at all transparent, and we do not even have any speculations. Less mystery surrounds the lag of D'66. Even though the pattern within the party is perfectly monotonic it is weak: turnout for Strong Adherents is 70 %, for Weak Adherents 67 %, and Leaners 59 %. We observed earlier that as a new party D'66 had a much lower level of commitment than the older parties; furthermore, its composition of support has been turning over fairly quickly during its first

[25] Includes a small number of PPR adherents.

few years of existence. These factors are supplemented by the fact that even intense supporters of D'66 have still not had many opportunities to become habituated to turning out in support of the party. In short, D'66 has not yet been in existence long enough to develop a rank and file with characteristic properties. There is too much flux and not enough learning represented in its supporters as of 1970. With the passing of time, *ceterus paribus,* we would expect the D'66 profile to resemble more closely that of the older parties.

Voting is a relatively painless task, but even so partisan commitment makes a decided difference in whether one casts a ballot. Since other forms of participation usually involve more 'pain', and the opportunity costs are higher, we should expect party attachment to make a sizeable difference there also. And that is very much the case. For instance, the more attached the individual the more likely that he has tried to persuade someone to vote like him (.37), to have attended a campaign meeting (.43), to have worked for a party or candidate (.51), and to be a paying member of a political party or other political organization (.68). Combining these four activities into a cumulative index yields these results: 73 % of the sample has done none of these activities; 14 % one; 6 % two; 3 % three; and only 1 % all four. Although the absolute rates of participation campaign are rather low, it is fully consistent with our expectations that they vary dramatically by level of party adherence. Considering those who have performed one or more activities the following breakdown emerges: Strong Adherents = 53 %; Weak Adherents = 30 %; Leaners = 23 %; and Independents = 09 %. To know a person's commitment to party is to know a good deal about his campaign efforts.

Again, these patterns hold in the face of a variety of controls, although their strength is occasionally diminished. The most crucial controls are indicators of psychological involvement in politics, because these signify a separate source of motivation to participate. It is also true (as noted previously) that party attachment is related to these indicators. Perhaps, then, the relationship between intensity and campaigning is spurious, due to the common effects of psychological involvement on both intensity and campaigning. Appealing as such an explanation might be, it must be rejected. Controlling for general attention to politics, for interest in the provincial elections, or for rates of discussion with other people the initial relationship continues to hold: the more intense the attachment the more campaign activites one performs.

While the idependent strength of attachment is not to be denied, it is clear that the indicators of psychological involvement also contribute to campaign participation. Thus it would be too much to say that it is exclusively the degree of partisan intensity which prompts varying degrees of participation. Nor would increasing the number of more strongly committed and involved partisans automatically elevate participation levels. There are too many other

aspects of Dutch politics to allow for such facile interpretations. Nevertheless, the evidence points toward more than a coincidental configuration. When people identify with and become attached to particular parties, they come to care about what happens to the party and its candidates. Having an emotional commitment, they experience 'suffering' and 'pleasure' according to the fortunes of the party. To decrease the suffering and increase the pleasure efforts are made to help the party, as in campaign activity.

Intensity and Political Preferences

Thus far we have established the temporal aspects of party attachment and the pronounced effects of attachment on political participation. But nothing has yet been said about political affect, whether intensity makes any difference in terms of political values and the consistency with which those values are expressed. If it turned out that people make about the same choices and have about the same regularity of choices over time regardless of how strongly committed they are to a party, then the utility of the concept lessens considerably. Conversely, if there are corollaries of intensity such that the more intense people are more constrained (consistent) in their behaviour and express preferences in accord with theoretical expectations then the utility of the concept is enhanced.

We begin with three simple, yet telling pieces of evidence. If partisan intensity means anything at all, it should mean that at any given point in time the certainty of electoral choice will vary directly with strength of party attachment. The more committed individuals should, for example, have experienced less trouble making up their minds about how to vote in an election. Such was emphatically the case with our respondents. Whereas 94 % of the Strong Adherents and 79 % of the Weak Adherents had decided at least six months prior to the election, the same was true of only 63 % of the Leaners and 54 % of the Independents. By the same token, the certainty of how one would vote in a hypothetical Second Chamber election 'tomorrow' declines by degree of attachment: Strong Adherents = 98 %, Weak Adherents = 91 %, Leaners = 81 %, and Independents = 41 %. Finally, the estimated likelihood of supporting for the next ten years the same party favored in this hypothetical election ranges from 76 % among the Strong Adherents to less than 40 % among the Leaners and Independents. Based on subjective experiences, the element of party attachment reduces the labors of decision-making and provides a sizeable pool of supporters upon which the parties can rely with near certainty. In contrast to this contribution to 'stability', stands the sizeable body of the less committed who not only must be convinced to vote at all but who are also much more malleable.

Strength of commitment should also be reflected in the fidelity of actual voting

behavior. Regularity in the direction of the vote over time should respond to varying degrees of attachment. To test this hypothesis we need voting data for at least two elections and some device for measuring inconsistency.

Although a simple measure like the proportion who voted for a different party in each election could be used to show inconsistency, the data can be exploited more fully to take account of how far any such defections went. Which is to say, we need to arrangs the parties along some sort of dimension. Two prominent dimensions in the Dutch party system are the left-right and the confessional-non-confessional. (On some occasions a government vs. opposition dimension might emerge also.) To do full justice to the data we could employ a multi-dimensional analysis, but for present purposes it seems sufficient to rely upon a traditional left-right dimension, much as other studies of multi-party systems do. Having said that, we still have to arrange the parties in on a left-right dimension; furthermore since some of the parties are exceptionally small, we shall need to employ a few combinations. The ordering arrived at stems from two sources: 1) rankings supplied by a number of knowledgeable Dutch social scientists;[26] 2) the Daalder and Rusk dimensional analysis of party preference orderings expressed by members of the second Chamber in 1968.[27] Eight position exist on our left-right continuum: 1) PSP and CPN; 2) PvdA and PPR; 3) D'66; 4) ARP; 5) KVP; 6) CHU; 7) VVD; 8) SGP, GPV, BP and BR.

To assess the consistency of voting behavior we first correlate the reported vote in the 1967 Second Chamber election with the expected vote in a Second Chamber election 'tomorrow'. This means including in the analysis only those respondents who voted in 1967 and knew how they would vote 'tomorrow' (N = 1271). Overall, the correlation between the two ballotings is high (top row, first column of Table 4). Inspection of the contingency tables associated with this correlation shows that it is built up in large part from people who voted for exactly the same party.

More to our interest, of course, is how this overall correlation fluctuates when we separate the respondents by their expressed degree of party attachment. The results are just short of spectacular. Among the Strong Adherents the consistency of voting is virtually perfect. From this zenith the correlations

[26] In addition to personal conversations, I have drawn on the work of J. Stapel, 'Wie en Wat Staan Waar tussen Links en Rechts," *Acta Politica,* 4 (October, 1968), pp. 32-40; in the same issue, A. A. J. Jacobs and W. Jacobs-Wessels, 'Duidelijkheid in de Nederlandse Politiek', pp. 41-54; and C. J. Lammers, 'Deconfessionalisering and Radicalisering bij Studenten?' *Acta Politica,* 3 (January, 1968), pp. 149-61.

[27] Hans Daalder and Jerry Rusk, 'Perceptions of Party in the Netherland', in John Wahlke and Samuel C. Patterson (eds.), *Comparative Legislative Behavior* (New York: John Wiley, 1972).

Table 4, Intercorrelations between Pairs of Votes, Controlling on Party Intensity

	1967 and 'Tomorrow Second Chamber Vote	*1967 Second Chamber and 1970 Provincial Vote*
All Voters	.83	.80
Strong Adherents	.98	.98
Weak Adherents	.86	.84
Leaners	.78	.71
Independents	.73	.65

descend in monotonic fashion down to the Independents. Moreover, the decline is particularly steep from Strong to Weak Adherents, and from the latter to the Leaners. While it is true that even for the Indepents the consistency of preferences between the two elections is strong by most standards of microlevel data, there is simply no question that the degree of attachment makes for a rather staggering difference in the uniformity of voting preferences over time.[28]

Much the same picture emerges if we consider the directionality of voting in the 1967 and 1970 elections among those balloting each time (N = 1128). While the grand correlation is high (top row, second column of Table 4), the variation by levels of adherence is striking. Unlike the previous set of correlations, this one involves two 'real' elections. The advantage of reality is offset somewhat by the fact that changes in adherence could have occurred along with changes in voting behavior during the period covered by the two elections. In contrast to the American situation, this is probably a frequent occurence in Holland, much as it is also in Britain.[29] Simultaneous changing is especially likely to have occured among people classifying themselves as Weak Adherents and Leaners. Full unravelling of this complication will have to await longitudinal analysis.

Even if alteration of identification often does accompany irregularity in voting, two important facts remain unchanged. First, at least among those voting in pairs of elections — both real or real plus hypothesized — the overall con-

[28] The Pearsonian correlations for the relationships examined in Table 4 are virtually the same in value as the gammas.

[29] Butler and Stokes, pp. 39-43. Even taking the most stringent test, however, shows some similarity between the Dutch and American situations. Dividing the Dutch respondents by level of adherence and then relating their expressed party preference to the actual 1970 vote it turns out that among the Strong Adherents the amount of defection was approximately 4 %, that among Weak Adherents 10 %, and that among Leaners 15 %. Thus even though the 'defection' rates might be lower in Holland than in the United States, the configuration of those rates is te same.

sistency is remarkably high. There are simply not that many people radically or even marginally changing their votes. Thus simultaneous shifting cannot be all that common. Second, regardless of the processes involved, it still remains true that instability of voting varies inversely with degree of attachment. At any point in time the greater the attachment the more stable the past voting record and the more stable the projection for the future. Thus the parties with proportionately more intense supporters would seem to be in far better shape for the future than those with weakly identifying ranks, other things being equal. At the larger level, the internal shifting in and among parties would seem to vary directly with the gross national distribution of party identification intensity, again with other things being equal.

Other implications flow from these findings. First is the cross-polity perspective. For all of the dissimilarities between multiparty and two party systems and for all of the contrasts between the political cultures of Holland versus the United States, the *patterning* of relationships found is fundamentally the same in the two countries. Taking the American functional equivalent of the 1967 and 1970 Dutch elections, and more or less holding time constant, means comparing voting choices in the 1968 presidential and 1970 congressional contests. When this is done the overall correlation in the United States is about the same: gamma = .85. Pary intensity makes sligthly more of a difference in the United States than in Holland but the patterning is very similar; gamma for Strong Adherents = 0.98; for Weak Adherents = 0.78; for Leaners = .56; and for Independents = .44. As noted above, party intensity may operate somewhat differently in Holland than in the United States when it comes to regularity of voting choices. Bearing that condition in mind, it is nevertheless patent that the vagaries of multi vs. two party systems and of cultural contrasts are not sufficient to erase the strong correspondence in the centrality of intensity.

A further implication has to do with changes in the party system, especially the ebbs and flows of party fortunes and the emergence of new parties. As in other countries, the Dutch data suggest very strongly that it is the less intensely committed partisans — whom we know also to be less participative and involved — who provide the grist for the mill of changing party fortunes. Not that some of the uncommitted who vary their voting behavior are necessarily less knowledgeable or less rational than their more committed brethern. Indeed, evidence from the Amsterdam municipal elections of 1966 and 1970 suggests that in special situations they are highly issue-oriented and know

[30] C. E. van der Maesen, 'Kiezers op Drift', *Acta Politica* 2 (No. 3, 1966/67), pp. 169-200; and H. Daudt and J. de Lange, 'Constante Kiezers, Wisselaars en Thuisblijvers bij de Gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 1970 in Amsterdam', *Acta Politica,* 6 (October, 1971), pp. 441-64.

exactly why they are switching their votes.[30] Rather, it is to argue that the less intense individuals form a natural pool of potential gains for existing parties and initial recruits for new parties. Thus they provide a flexibility, a form of slack in the system, which can be mobilized to meet new conditions. Sometimes this seems to work to the detriment of the centrist parties, and to the advantage of extremist parties on both the right and the left.

While the findings reported so far suggest that the plasticity of the Independents and Leaners is no less true of Holland than of other countries, can we marshall more specific evidence? The rise of D'66 and DS'70 provides an opportunity to say something about the sources of and stability of new party support. We have established that in 1970 the D'66 supporters had by far the lowest level of commitment of any major party, and that in 1971 the DS'70 supporters were also lukewarm. From this a number of things should follow.

First, the makeup of the D'66 vote in 1967 and 1970 should fluctuate more than that for the other major parties. This is patently the case: whereas only a third of the D'66 voters in the 1970 elections were also D'66 voters in 1967, the same was true for over four-fifths of each of the other major parties. Approaching the matrix from a different angle, whereas sligthly less than 60 % of the D'66 voters of 1967 were als D'66 voters in 1970, the comparable figures for the other major parties ran from about 70 to 90 %.[31]

Inferentially, the reason for these pronounced differences is the lack of rootedness to D'66. Indeed, an examination of the contingency tables by level of intensity shows that intensity has precisely the same effect on D'66 consistency as on the other parties; i.e., the more intense the person the more faithful he was to D'66. The problem for D'66 was that such a great bulk of their supporters were *not* strongly committed — hence the overall lower rates of inter-election consistency. Compounding the problem was the generally lower turnout of D'66 supporters at all levels of adherence.

Evidence from the data presented by Bijnen and Hagenaars buttresses the notion of instability in the D'66 voting bloc. Of people who expressed an intension of voting for D'66 in November, 1970 only 42 % eventually did so in the April, 1971 elections.[32] This is by far the lowest rate of following through on intentions among the major party voters. Again, this would follow from the low level of intensity shown by D'66 sympathizers.

Turning to the case of DS'70 the evidence is of a different sort, but fully compatible with our thinking. Since it was a new party, DS'70 should, according

[31] These figures are based on people voting in *both* elections.

[32] Bijnen and Hagenaars, p. 239. Comparisons of actual voting in the 1967 and 1971 Second Chamber elections also show that D'66 voters in 1967 defected or failed to vote in disproportionately large numbers in 1971. See H. Daudt, 'Constante Kiezers, Wisselaars en Thuisblijvers', *Acta Politica,* 7 (January, 1972), p. 32.

to the theory, draw disproportionately from the parties with the lowest levels of party commitment — as long as the ideological distance is not monumental. In addition to D'66, it turns out that the party with the lowest level of commitment from its followers is the VVD, only 14 % of whom put themselves in the Strong Adherents category.

Employing the Bijnen and Hagenaars data once more, we may compare desertions from intended vote six months before the 1971 elections. Those intending to vote for VVD and D'66 should show the highest rates of desertion to the new party, DS '70. This is precisely what happens: 13 % of the intended VVD vote and 9 % of the intended D'66 vote wound up in the DS'70 column. Comparable figures for the other parties are all well below these upper limits. Significantly, the two large parties with the highest rates of party attachment — KVP and ARP — had the least defection to DS'70, 1 % and 0 %, respectively.[33] Although we would need individual level data to verify that it was the weakest identifiers among the D'66 and VVD intended voters who defected the most, the 1967/1970 comparisons point very much in that direction.

What is especially telling about the movement to DS '70 is that it follows predictions based on profiles of party attachments as of 1970, sequentially prior to the rise of DS '70 and the 1971 balloting. The predictions do not hinge upon any adjustments of party preferences or intensity of preferences in the wake of the parliamentary election. Although we cannot undertake to do it here, it seems probable that analysis of the 1971 survey data would show the great idebtedness of DS '70 to the less intense people throughout the Dutch populace.

The fact that the less attached voters are more indecisive and votatile in their voting suggests that their political self-images may be less well integrated with the prominent characteristics associated with the various parties. Conversely, the fact that the more attached voters are decisive and steady suggests that their self-portraits ordinarily find a matching picture in the party system. Although it is well-known that voters may continue to subscribe to a party simply out of socialization and habit, there should be some visible elements which link the person's own political self-image with the party's image. That is, there should be more than simply blind, undirected attachment, especially in a vigorous multi-party system whose leaders talk at least occasionally in strong emotional terms to the party faithful. The closer one feels to a party the more likely he should be to see himself as fitting the image which the party projects on a popular basis.

[33] Bijnen and Hagenaars, p. 239.

Table 5, How PvdA and KVP Voters Characterized Themselves, by Intensity of Attachment

PvdA Voters	*Self-Characterization*	
	Socialistic	*Left*
Strong Adherents	95 %	65 %
Weak Adherents	86	55
Leaners	76	37
Independents	62	30
gamma correlation =	52	.38
KVP Voters	*Christian*	*Right*
Strong Adherents	94 %	68 %
Weak Adherents	87	59
Leaners	74	48
Independents	75	53
gamma correlation =	.42	.42

Given the sample size and the multiplicity of Dutch parties, it is not possible to match up self-image with voting preferences for all of the parties, especially if we wish to preserve the fourfold categorization of intensity. Two of the parties, however, are large enough to allow detailed examination. In order to maximize the number of cases available, let us take the PvdA and KVP voters in the 1967 elections. During the course of the interviews the respondents were asked to classify themselves according to a variety of political characteristics. Some of these characteristics are identified with either the PvdA or KVP parties by the mass media, by students of the Dutch party system, or by the respondents in our sample. Among the latter PvdA was most often characterized as Socialistic and Left, whereas KVP was most often viewed as Christian and Right.

Table 5 shows how the voters for the two parties distributed themselves according to their level of party adherence. Taking the PvdA voters first, it is quite apparent that the stronger the adherence to the party the more likely they called themselves Socialistic in nature. Similarly, they were more likely to refer to themselves as being Left. What these results show is that the correctness of the fit between a person's self-image and his voting PvdA varies directly with his level of attachment to that party.

Turning to the bottom portion of the table, we observe a similar process at work among KVP voters. While voters for the Catholic Party see themselves overwhelmingly as Christian, that self-characterization is more pronounced among the Strong and Weak Adherents. Opinion is roughly split among the

KVP voters as to wheter they are 'Right', but the likelihood of that self-image varies directly with degree of party attachment. As with the PvdA voters, so too with the KVP voters: the more attached they are to the party the more likely will they classify themselves in the proper fashion; the better is the correctness of fit between self-image and ballot behavior.

These results indicate that the intensity of adherence has an ideological strain over and above any habitual loyalties or blind allegiance. Indeed, one is inclined to use the word rationality. The more attached voters have, implicitly, more information about the nature of the parties and they match their own self-images with the parties more closely approximating that self-image.

Instead of viewing these data from the bottom up (i.e. from the mass level), we might want to view them from the top down — from the view of the party leaders. From this perspective the question of electoral strength composition becomes paramount. We know already that the more partisan people are more likely to vote and that they are more likely to be faithful in their voting. Thus a PvdA party leader - looking down on the make-up of his party's electoral strength - sees that the most regular and faithful voters are more likely to see themselves as Socialistic and Leftist than the *more numerous but less predictable* Leaners and Independents. Similarly, the KVP chief would see his consistent, dependable vote as more Christian and Rightist. The dilemmas posed for party leaders in this situation are of the classic kind. How far away from the political self-images predominant at the core of the mass party can the party range in seeking support? Alternatively, how can the party compete succesfully in a fiercely competitive multiparty system unless it moves out to attract the less 'ideological' and 'rational' voters?

Concluding Remarks

We began this essay by noting that Holland provided an interesting laboratory for exploring the operation of party attachments. The vigorous multiparty system, the segmatation of society, the apparent weakening in the traditional politics of accomodation, and the abolition of mandatory voting combine to form a far different matrix than that found in the Anglo-American or in the developing countries. At the same time the dynamics of the party system — with the rise of minor and major new parties encroaching upon the hegemony of the traditional 'big five' — offerred a fine opportunity to catch the play of partisan commitment in a milieu far different than, for exampde, the United States of the 1950's and 1960's.

Despite what might seem to be impediments, the principle of partisan intensity functions admirably in Holland when applied to the conventional subject areas. Thus voting turnout and other forms of electoral participation varied directly with the degree of adherence to party. By the same token, consistency

of voting, decisiveness of making electoral choices, and correctness of fit between self-image and party profile also reflected in very faithful fashion the varying levels of party attachment. And the customary affinity between advancing age and rising partisanship also appeared. Other evidence, not presented here, reveals that the greater the intensity the greater is one's confidence in the Dutch electoral and party system.

What is especially remarkable about virtually all of these findings is that they match or exceed in magnitude those found in the country wherein party identification has been most frequently used as an explanatory variable, *viz.*, the United States.[34] Although only a few specific comparisons were reported in this paper, point for point comparisons with materials from the 1970 congressional election study almost invariably show that party intensity is as lively or livelier in Holland as in the United States. Not that Dutchman feel more attached to their parties than do Americans. On the contrary, the sense of identification is considerably higher in the United States. Rather, given varying levels of attachment, they apparently make as much or more impact on behavior in Holland as in America.

The rather surprising strength of party adherence in the Dutch context can perhaps best be explained in terms of the lack of other powerful incentives governing participation and choices. The general passivity and deference of the mass electorate manifests itself in what, by the standards of many countries, would be considered dull, low-key, and almost issue-less partisan politics. Although *verzuiling* works to establish some broad parameters of choice and behavior, various motivational forces help determine the fine grains of preferences and action. In the political arena, partisan intensity is a prime motivational force partly because such common factors as ethnicity, class, 'ideology', and even religiosity are relatively impotent at this more refined level of behavior.

The Dutch setting also provided an opportunity to extend the more conventional applications of partisan intensity into more unorthodox situations. Since the 1970 elections were the first of the voluntary type, we had a chance to see whether the oft-observed direct relationship between intensity and turnout would manifest itself immediately. That it did so, and in a resounding manner, must surely be taken as signifying the intrinsic motivational character of differential attachment, because there was no 'history' upon which individuals could draw save that of universal balloting.

[34] For an analysis showing Swedish similarities to the Dutch materials for both participation and preference behavior see Bo Särlvik, 'Voting Behavior in Shifting Elections Winds: An Overview of the Swedish Elections, 1964-1968', *Scandinavian Political Studies,* 5 (1970), pp. 241-83.

Another unconventional application came about due to the fragmentation taking place within the Dutch party system. Here we presented at least circumstantial evidence that the parties with the least committed rank and file were suffering perhaps the most attrition. More significantly, we were able to suggest and partially demonstrate the extreme vulnerability of new parties as a consequence of their heavy complement of tepid enthusiasts. Virtually none of the new parties have managed to engender anything like the ranks of devoted followers characterizing the older, established parties.

From this perspective, one is moved to tread cautiously in predicting the fate of Holland's new parties — and the old ones too for that matter. If we are to understand more fully how new parties 'take hold' versus falling by the wayside, and how older parties maintain themselves versus atrophying, we must continually assess the psychological linkages between the mass publics and the parties. The argument of this paper has been that intensity of adherence forms a key element of such linkages.

Transnationale Konzerne im Urteil der Gewerkschaften

von Kurt P. Tudyka

Vorbemerkung

Die Analyse ökonomischer Prozesse und Institutionen ist für den 'mainstream' der Politischen Wissenschaft immer noch Anathema. Das gilt — wie die Durchsicht von Jahrgängen offizieller Politologenzeitschriften zeigt — selbst für Themen, wie Verbände und Integration, die die Dignität wiederholten Erkenntnisinteresses der etablierten Politikwissenschaft nur unter Vernachlässigung einer Untersuchung ihrer ökonomischen Voraussetzungen gefunden haben. Eine solche Ausklammerung musz jedoch für eine Wissenschaft, die sich der Erforschung und Erklärung von Herrschaftsstrukturen verschrieben hat, einen auf die Dauer untragbaren Realitätsverlust bedeuten.[1]

Es ist daher symptomatisch für den Zustand der Disziplin, wenn ein Vorgang, wie die zunehmende Zentralisation expandierenden Kapitals in der Organisationsform der 'Multinational Corporation', oder 'International Company', die hier Transnationaler Konzern genannt werden,[2] noch keine gründliche politologische Analyse gefunden hat, obwohl gerade in Westeuropa die Konzerne während der vergangenen Jahre wiederholt Thema politischer Publizistik waren.

Insbesondere ist die Ausbreitung der Transnationalen Konzerne und ihrer präsumtiven Folgen zu einer Herausforderung für die nationalen Gewerkschaften geworden, die sich inzwischen zum Ruf nach dem Aufbau einer transnationalen, gewerkschaftlichen Gegenkraft steigerte.[3] Das Verhältnis der Gewerkschaften zu den Konzernen bietet den Ansatz für eine Reihe politologischer Fragestellungen. Mehr kann im Rahmen dieses Beitrages nicht geleistet werden.

[1] Vgl. meinen Aufsatz, Politische Oekonomie — ein Desiderat der Politikwissenschaft, in: *PVS* H. 1, 10 jg. 1969.

[2] Es fehlt nicht an künstlichen Abgrenzungen zwischen international, transnational, multinational und supranational business. Vgl. Richard Robinsons Definitionen zit. von Sidney Rolfe, Updating Adam Smith, in: *Interplay*, Nov. 1968, S. 19. Den Terminus 'Transnational Corporation' verwandte die International Chamber of Commerce. Selbstverständlich lässt sich gegen diesen Ausdruck prinzipiell auch einwenden, was allerdings noch mit mehr Berechtigung gegen das Attribut 'multinational' gesagt wurde, nämlich, 'dasz er in einem Groszteil der Literatur in propagandistischem und apologetischem Sinn gebraucht wird, da er die Transzendenz nationaler Fehler und Rivalitäten suggeriert sowie das Auftauchen einer neuen Institution mit hoffnungsvollen Aussichten für die Zukunft'. So Paul M. Sweezy/ Harry Magdoff, Ammerkungen zur multinationalen Korporation, in: *Sozialistisches Jahrbuch* 2, Berlin 1970, S. 18. Vgl. auch John Thackray, Not so multinational after all, in: *Interplay*, Nov. 1968, S. 23 f. Für zusätzlich qualifizierende Kriterien s. A. J. N. Judge, Multinational Business Enterprise, in' *Yearbook of International Organizations* 12th ed. 1968/69, Bruxelles 1969, S. 1190 ff.

[3] Zuletzt auf dem 10. Weltkongresz des Internationalen Bundes Freier Gewerkschaften vom 10.-14.7.1972 in London.