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Denial of coevalness: charges of dogmatism in the nineteenth-century humanities

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Abstract

Since the seventeenth century, scholars have been accusing each other of ‘dogmatism’. But what exactly did this mean? In exploring this question, this article focuses on philosophy and Biblical scholarship in nineteenth-century Germany. Scholars in both of these fields habitually contrasted Dogmatismus with Kritik, to the point of emplotting the history of their field as a gradual triumph of critical thinking over dogmatic belief. The article shows that charges of dogmatism derived much of their rhetorical force from such progressive narratives. Especially neo-Kantian philosophers and Biblical scholars of liberal Protestant persuasion liked to depict their opponents as clinging to long-superseded modes of thought, thereby implying that these colleagues harked back to a past from which modern Wissenschaft had emancipated itself. This ‘denial of coevalness’, as Johannes Fabian calls it, demonstrates to what extent the vice of dogmatism was imbued with normative visions of how the field or, more broadly, German intellectual life should develop.

Keywords

Dogmatism; scholarly virtues and vices; denial of coevalness; history of the humanities; David Friedrich Strauss; Pessimism Controversy

Introduction

Few key concepts in the humanities’ vocabulary have received as much historical attention as the German Kritik and its English equivalents, ‘criticism’ and ‘critique’. In unravelling what Kritik meant to, for instance, Immanuel Kant and his contemporaries in eighteenth-century Europe, historians have distinguished between philological criticism, literary criticism, critique of taste, logical critique, and, of course, Kant’s critique of pure reason.1 Whereas some of these variants reached no further back than the sixteenth or seventeenth century,2 work by René Nünlist and others shows that philological criticism in particular had much older roots.3 Also, for the nineteenth century, historians of the humanities have repeatedly pointed out how much weight the adjective ‘critical’ carried for historians and philologists in a time of academic discipline formation.4 Ever since Reinhart Koselleck’s Kritik und Krise (Critique and Crisis, 1959), historians have also been attentive to how critique related to real or hoped-for political transformations in an age of revolutions.5 On top of that, there is a growing number of studies on more recent transmutations of Kritik, from Frankfurt School-style ideology critique in the mid-twentieth century to the emergence of critical gender studies, the challenges of postcolonial critique in an era of decolonization, or the still ongoing controversy over postcritique as propagated by Rita Felski and others.6 If anything, this body of literature shows that critique is not a timeless ideal, but an essentially contested concept that could, and can, be enlisted for a variety of intellectual and political purposes.
Yet if critique must be historicized, sensitive to contexts in which it was performed, then why have historians so little to say about ‘dogmatism’, one of the most frequently invoked negative counterparts of Kritik? Kant was not alone in contrasting his critical project with the dogmatism of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Wolff, or with the ‘dogmatic slumber’ of his own pre-critical period. In his footsteps, many nineteenth-century humanities scholars dissociated themselves in the name of critique from ‘dogmatic’ ideas, assumptions, or beliefs. This habit, moreover, was not limited to authors versed in Kantian thinking or familiar with philosophical treatises like Friedrich von Schelling’s Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kritizismus (Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, 1795). Philological and historical criticism, too, were routinely contrasted with ‘dogmatic’ attitudes towards Scripture, literary texts, or the national past. Still, despite its prominence as criticism’s principal other, the term Dogmatismus has not nearly received as much historical attention as Kritik. The few studies that do exist largely limit themselves to tracing the emergence and development of ‘dogmatic’ (systematic) medicine, law, and theology in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, well before dogmatisch acquired the pejorative connotations that it has retained ever since Kant.

This lack of attention would be understandable as long as dogmatism would be nothing other than a lack or absence of critique. If ‘dogmatic’ were synonymous to ‘uncritical’, the term would hardly require special attention. However, as this article will show, the range of meanings and connotations that nineteenth-century scholars associated with dogmatism was much broader. Although ‘uncritical’ was a prominent layer of meaning, the term could convey a variety of other messages, too. Depending on the issues at stake, it could denote unfounded reasoning, stubborn adherence to contested or one-sided theories, unwarranted loyalty to superseded modes of thinking, or a constraining of independent thought (e.g. by church authorities). This semantic flexibility of the term, paired to its clearly dismissive connotations, suggests that defenders of Kritik did something more than stating the obvious in juxtaposing critical and dogmatic reasoning. If dogmatism was not merely a negative counter-image of critique, but a pejorative accusation of intellectually vicious conduct that could take on a variety of forms, then at least three questions present themselves: (1) Why were advocates of critique so eager to dissociate themselves from dogmatism? (2) Were they alone in charging others with dogmatism, or did the term also find acceptance among scholars who did not identify unreservedly with Kritik (e.g. theologically conservative Biblical scholars who looked with suspicion at the advances of Biblical criticism)? (3) What was rhetorically effective about charges of dogmatism – and to what extent can this rhetorical power help explain the term’s ubiquity in nineteenth-century scholarly discourse?

Focusing on the humanities in nineteenth-century Germany, the article explores these three questions in two fields that, each in their own way, tried to come to terms with Kritik: the field of philosophy, in which critique had strong Kantian connotations, and that of Biblical scholarship, in which philological Kritik defined the intellectual agenda. These two fields, then, allow us to examine how dogmatism was positioned vis-à-vis the two most dominant concepts of critique available in the nineteenth century. For each of the two fields, we will study the uses of dogmatism in a selection of influential textbooks as well as in controversies in which accusations of Dogmatismus went back and forth. The philosophical debate is the so-called ‘Pessimism Controversy’ (Pessimismusstreit) that occupied German philosophers from the 1860s onwards, but gained momentum with the publication of Eduard von Hartmann’s Philosophie des Unbewußten (Philosophy of the Unconscious, 1869). Around the same time, in the early 1870s, Biblical scholars from across the theological spectrum responded, often with less than full approval, to David Friedrich Strauss’s book, Der alte und der neue Glaube (The Old and the New Faith, 1872). As in the Pessimismusstreit, a flood of brochures and articles appeared in which both ‘critique’ and ‘dogmatism’ served as markers of intellectual orientation. Both of these debates therefore give us ample occasion to examine: What did Dogmatismus mean to nineteenth-century German humanities scholars and why did they use the term so often?
Beyond the past: textbook narratives of progress

Judging by some of the most widely used German history of philosophy textbooks, such as Friedrich Ueberweg’s *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* (Outline of the History of Philosophy, 3 vols., 1863–6), Kant’s critical legacy determined to no small extent what dogmatism was understood to mean. Just as Kant had used the term to denounce philosophers who dared to make metaphysical claims without prior ‘critical’ reflection on the epistemological limits of this enterprise, so Ueberweg defined dogmatism as the vice of ignoring what Kant’s critique had so convincingly pointed out, namely that speculation about the existence of God and the immortality of the soul is epistemologically unwarranted. Dogmatism thereby betrayed a lack of respect for the ‘limitations of human knowledge’. Likewise, in his *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie* (History of Modern Philosophy, 8 vols., 1852–93), Kuno Fischer defined the difference between *Kritik* and *Dogmatismus* in truly Kantian terms:

To see things as given, regardless of the conditions of their knowability, means to look at them dogmatically; not to regard it as given, but to derive it from the conditions of knowability (that is, from the same conditions from which knowledge follows), is to consider it critically.

A second way in which Kant helped define dogmatism is that his definition of Enlightenment as ‘human being’s emancipation from its self-incurred immaturity’ was invoked as a standard that dogmatists were unable to meet. Fischer, most notably, argued that dogmatic thinkers ‘were held captive’ or, in an alternative phrasing, had ‘not freed themselves’ from a legacy of pre-Kantian rationalism. Wilhelm Windelband also varied on this theme in portraying Kant as a teacher who had forced his students ‘to think for themselves’ instead of satisfying themselves with ‘dead dogmatic lectures’.

Yet the most important way in which Kant marked the difference between critique and dogmatism was that textbook authors presented him as having inaugurated a new, critical phase in modern philosophy. According to Ueberweg, ‘the time of empiricism, dogmatism, and scepticism’, had lasted from Francis Bacon and René Descartes in the seventeenth century to David Hume in the eighteenth. Given that it had since been surpassed by ‘the time of Kantian criticism’, dogmatism for Ueberweg was clearly a thing of the past. Similarly, Fischer distinguished between a ‘dogmatic’ and a ‘critical’ phase in modern philosophy, telling his readers that philosophy had ‘ascended’ from the one to the other. In this scheme of things, therefore, Kantian criticism had not only been a force of progress, but also was allowed to define what was ‘new’ and what was ‘old’.

In histories of Biblical scholarship published in about the same years – usually no separate publications, but historical surveys that appeared as opening chapters in broadly conceived *Einleitungen* (‘Introductions’) to the field – the name of Kant appeared less often. Also, in marked contrast to their colleagues in philosophy, Biblical scholars spent little time reflecting on epistemological issues. The themes of independent thinking and emancipation from outmoded ways of thinking, however, were as important to Adolf Hilgenfeld and Heinrich Julius Holtzmann as to Ueberweg, Fischer, and Windelband. Hilgenfeld, for instance, depicted the emergence and development of Biblical criticism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a story of light conquering darkness. Darkness had ruled as long as Scripture had been approached ‘dogmatically’, as an authoritative canon of divinely inspired books. In seventeenth-century Lutheranism, dominated by ‘the strict dogmatism of orthodoxy’, as well as in the Catholic Church of those days, ‘all free inquiry was bound by the strict ban of the dogma of inspiration’. Light had only emerged with figures like Johann Salomo Semler, an Enlightenment theologian in eighteen-century Halle who ‘broke the ban of the old-Protestant dogma of inspiration’ by exploring historical questions regarding the origins of Biblical texts. ‘From the supra-historical height of dogmatics, the collection of holy scriptures was brought down to historical ground’. In Hilgenfeld’s teleological account, dogmatism thus denoted an attitude of reverence for the ‘authority’ of Scripture, which hampered ‘free’ historical inquiry by holding to a doctrine of divine inspiration that left little room for human authorship. Notably,
Hilgenfeld referred to this ‘attitude’ in the past tense, as characteristic of Lutheran orthodoxy in early modern Germany, from which Semler and subsequent generations of Biblical scholars had managed to ‘free’ themselves. Accordingly, in Hilgenfeld’s narrative, dogmatism appeared as a thing of the past – as a form of coercion from which scientific theology had successfully escaped.22

This view of things was hardly original. When Hilgenfeld, back in the early 1840s, had attended Wilhelm Vatke’s theology classes in Berlin, he had heard a similar story about ‘criticism’ emancipating itself from the ‘old perspective’, with Semler playing a key role in expelling the ‘darkness’ that had long prevented Biblical criticism from seeing the light of day.23 Around the same time, Eduard Reuss’s textbook on New Testament criticism had postulated a centuries-long ‘period of the reign of tradition’, followed by a ‘period of the reign of criticism’ launched by Semler and other critics committed to breaking the power of ‘scholastic dogmatism’.24 By the 1870s, this schematic juxtaposition of ‘old’ dogmatism and ‘new’ criticism had become a standard template for textbooks in Biblical scholarship. Holtzmann was only one among others who depicted Reformed theology in the Reformation era as a blend of ‘Scriptural doctrinalism and traditionalism’, taught with ‘doctrinaire strictness’. Only in the late seventeenth century, figures like Richard Simon had paved the way for the ‘critical school’ inaugurated by Semler, Baur, and Strauss.25

Textbook authors in both philosophy and Biblical scholarship thus associated dogmatism with a superseded stage in the development of their field. Although they defined the vice in different ways, they broadly agreed that dogmatism had been most influential prior to the rise of Kritik – be it Kantian critique or Biblical criticism. This, however, prompts a follow up question: If dogmatism belonged to the past more than to the present, why did textbook authors continue to fight it?

The relapse motif: denial of coevalness

The short answer is that scholars in both fields were concerned about perceived comebacks of dogmatic modes of thinking. Dogmatism was not safely buried in the past; it could make unexpected or at least unwelcome reappearances. This is most apparent in the case of Biblical scholarship, where Holtzmann and his liberal colleagues kept insisting on the need for liberation from dogmatism precisely because they worried about a ‘dogmatically operating restauration’ that they associated with conservative figures like Johann von Hofmann and Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg.26 In the 1830s, the threat posed by these conservative theologians had been real enough: Hengstenberg’s political influence in Prussia had been such that liberal critics like W. M. L. de Wette had been forced to leave the University of Berlin.27 By the 1870s, much of this conservative political influence had waned. Nonetheless, a book like David Friedrich Strauss’s Das Leben Jesu für das deutsche Volk bearbeitet (The Life of Jesus for the German People, 1864) still met with opposition from theologians who valued doctrinal orthodoxy over the advancement of Biblical Wissenschaft.28 It was such opposition to liberal Biblical criticism that Holtzmann had in mind when he complained about a revitalization of ‘seventeenth-century orthodoxy’. Recognizable from afar by the ‘conservative instinct of traditionalism’, this theology, in Holtzmann’s view of things, was not ‘free’, but ‘bound’ to traditional church doctrine and as such at odds with the liberation agenda of Strauss and his followers.29

Philosophers, too, observed that pre-Kantian dogmatism could make undesirable comebacks. Ueberweg, for instance, criticized Johann Gottlieb Fichte for granting dogmatic concepts like ‘the absolute I’ a prominent place in what he himself dared to call a critical philosophy.30 As Fischer’s textbook recalled, Fichte himself had denounced the German Naturphilosophie of his day for revitalizing ‘an older dogmatic mode of thinking’.31 Likewise, Windelband pointed out that even Kantians like the Halle professor Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk had become dogmatic to the extent that they had ‘diverted from Kant’s spirit’.32

Against the background of textbook narratives about the progressive development of Kritik, this ‘relapse’ motif can be interpreted as a rhetorical strategy that denied dogmatic modes of thinking a place in the present. It depicted conservative theologians and uncritical philosophers not merely as mistaken, but as representatives of a bygone era. Whereas the textbook authors stylized themselves
as men of progress, they portrayed their opponents as men of the past, who as such did not deserve a hearing in the present. Rhetorically, this amounted to what anthropologist Johannes Fabian calls a ‘denial of coevalness’ or a refusal to accept certain voices into the present on the ground that they are not sufficiently ‘up to date’. Coevalness is denied if such voices are relegated to a past or represented as belonging to a foregone era. This is exactly what advocates of Kritik did in their textbooks: they located ‘dogmatic’ colleagues in a time different from their own.

The Pessimism Controversy

To what extent did scholars use this rhetorical strategy also in contexts of controversy? An insightful case study is the German Pessimismusstreit, in which several participants accused each other of dogmatic habits of mind. As Frederick C. Beiser has shown, the debate covered a range of topics, went on for decades, and is therefore not easily summarized. At bottom, however, the controversy was a response to Arthur Schopenhauer’s grim message of human life not being worth living (the first phase of the controversy, in the 1860s) and to Eduard von Hartmann’s hardly less pessimistic view that suffering is more typical of human existence than happiness (the second phase, in the 1870s). While part of the debate focused on the relative truth of these gloomy messages, Schopenhauer’s and Hartmann’s critics also questioned whether happiness was an appropriate standard for measuring the worth of human life (didn’t this worth depend instead on the morality of someone’s life, as Kant had said?). Neo-Kantian critics also worried about the ‘quietist’ implications of pessimist philosophy and about its blurring of the boundaries between philosophy and worldview. Whereas the neo-Kantians preferred to see philosophy as a Wissenschaft, central to which was logical analysis, Schopenhauer and Hartmann seemed to turn it into a Weltanschauung.

This helps explain why, in the Pessimism Controversy, ‘dogmatism’ first of all referred to inappropriate transgressions of epistemological limits. This becomes apparent as we zoom in on three philosophers whom Beiser identifies as key players in the second phase of the controversy: Eugen Dühring, ‘the first thinker to mount a systematic response to Schopenhauer’s pessimism’, Eduard von Hartmann, ‘the most famous pessimist’ in early Wilhelmine Germany, and Hans Vaihinger, a prominent voice among Hartmann’s ‘most persistent’ neo-Kantian critics. Characteristically, the latter called both Hartmann and Dühring ‘systematic dogmatists’ because of their attempts ‘to prove against Kant that knowledge and truth are possible’. To the extent that they ‘want to know something, and if that is not possible, at least want to claim something’, they show themselves ‘infected by the disease of dogmatism’. Although Hartmann preferred to disagree – ‘nobody who knows my writings will believe Vaihinger that his tag of dogmatism fits me’ – his own take on dogmatism was rather similar. He, too, equated dogmatism with knowledge that ‘considers itself to be absolute’, thereby mistaking probability for certainty and hypothesis for unquestionable truth.

Other connotations of the term, however, quickly interfered with this Kantian one. Hartmann, for instance, spoke in one and the same breath about ‘dogmatism’, ‘naïve belief’, and ‘unfounded prejudice’. Also, writing less than a decade after the First Vatican Council (1869–70) that had famously defined the dogma of papal infallibility, he dissociated himself from philosophers who, ‘in their dogmatic narrow-mindedness, are far more sure of their own infallibility than the Pope of his’. Varying on this theme, Vaihinger claimed that dogmatists do whatever they can – ‘at any price’, ‘fearing no means’, to the point of ‘sacrificing logic on the altar of their dogmas’ – to keep their systems intact. Apart from denoting transgressions of epistemic limits, dogmatism could thus refer to a stubborn refusal to subject one’s own ideas to critical scrutiny.

As in the textbooks, however, most important were the temporal connotations of the term. To the extent that philosophy was supposed to have left its dogmatic past behind, charging someone with a ‘relapse’ into dogmatism was a serious accusation. In a book-length critique of Die Philosophie des Unbewußten, one of Hartmann’s critics put it unequivocally: ‘What was forgivable before Kant, vain dogmatizing, is unforgivable after Kant. May all the Hartmanns at long last learn as
much from the clear words of the clear Königsberg thinker. Hartmann, in turn, saw Vaihinger 'still clinging to certain remnants of positive dogmatism, which in his case too have evaded critical disintegration and destruction.' On other occasions, too, Hartmann spoke about a 'relapse into the dogmatic narrow-mindedness of belief in an absolute knowledge', 'a relapse into positive dogma', or a 'falling back into dogmatic narrow-mindedness'. Even Kant’s philosophy, according to Hartmann, contained 'remnants of a naive dogmatic realism' or, 'a remnant of the old metaphysical dogmatism' – all phrases with clear temporal connotations. Although modern philosophy, in Hartmann’s assessment, had made 'decisive progress over the earlier dogmatic self-certainty', this move beyond dogmatism had 'so far stopped halfway'.

Vaihinger also interpreted the history of modern philosophy as a gradual triumph of Kritik over Dogmatismus:

Day after day the dogmatic opponents recede, and more and more critique conquers the field. And it is that alone which feeds into the great international stream of scientific development, while those dogmatic twin directions [of idealism and materialism] lose or get bogged down in the sand.

Against this background, Vaihinger could depict Hartmann’s pessimism as a 'last flare-up of idealistic dogmatism and a regrettable relapse into a mythological period which modern thought believed to have long since overcome'. Clearly, then, for Vaihinger, 'dogmatic idealism’ belonged to the past more than to the present: ‘Hartmann’s system is not for the future.’ Dühring, too, fitted the pattern: he framed dogmatic reasoning as 'a setback' (Rückschlag) to the days of Kant’s bête noire, Spinoza.

So although the quarrelling parties held opposite views on the persuasiveness or epistemological legitimacy of Hartmann-style pessimism, they broadly agreed, not only on dogmatism being a vice that philosophers should avoid, but also on dogmatism being a historically superseded way of thinking. In the heat of controversy, Hartmann, Vaihinger, and Dühring all drew on textbook narratives of philosophical progress to depict each other’s work as untimely, old-fashioned, or not in accordance with the ‘critical’ spirit of the age. To the extent that this rhetorical practice relegated opponents to a superseded stage of history – a dogmatic past, sharply distinguished from the critical present – it was a showcase example of what Fabian calls ‘denial of coevalness’. Charges of dogmatism were therefore potentially more disturbing in their implications than charges of error or inaccuracy. Calling someone a dogmatist implied exclusion from the present, or at least an unwillingness on the part of the accusing party to accept the other as a conversation partner in the here and now. Dogmatism, in other words, was not only a deadly sin, but also a deadly allegation.

The Old Faith and the New

If the rhetorical power of this 'vice-charging' was premised on the belief that modern, critical philosophy had dissociated itself from its dogmatic past, or was at least in the process of doing so, then to what extent were charges of dogmatism also made by authors with different views on how history had developed since the early modern period? In the context of the Pessimism Controversy, this question is hard to answer, given that Hartmann, Vaihinger and Dühring, not unlike Ueberweg, Fischer, and Windelband, all interpreted the history of modern philosophy as a story of steady progress. In the field of Biblical scholarship, however, not everyone shared the textbook narrative of critical ‘light’ having conquered the ‘darkness’ of dogmatic theology. Germany’s theological faculties at the time were divided between ‘liberals’, who almost without exception supported the further advancement of Biblical criticism, and various kinds of more conservatively inclined theologians, whose concerns for doctrinal orthodoxy were greater than their commitment to unravelling the sources of the Pentateuch. By the 1870s, most influential had become the so-called *Vermittlungstheologe*: scholars who did not reject the project of Biblical criticism as such, but tried to bring its results into accordance with classical Christian doctrine. Although much remains to be
researched about the historical views held by these groups, it is clear that the liberal story of progress only appealed to a segment of the academic theological population. Those interpreting the rise of Biblical criticism as a threat to Christian faith held less rose-coloured views of history than those believing that *Kritik* in the realm of Biblical scholarship would eventually wash away all *Dogmatismus*.

Given that Biblical scholars from across the theological spectrum contributed to the controversy unleashed by David Friedrich Strauss’s 1872 book, *Der alte und der neue Glaube* (The Old Faith and the New), this debate is a suitable case study for examining how closely charges of dogmatism were tied to progressive historical narratives. Strauss himself minced no words in contrasting his ‘new’ ideas with ‘the old church faith’. The first part of his book in particular was one long argument, in often bitingly ironic prose, against supernatural events (miracles) and speculative constructions like the Trinity. Although Strauss claimed that ‘we moderns can no longer either excite or even interest ourselves about such a dogma’, his fierce criticism of theologians ‘petrifying’ the Genesis creation narratives into the dogma of a six day creation suggested something else. ‘For it [the dogma] becomes then at once a barrier, an obstructive rampart, against which the whole onset of progressive reason and all the battering rams of criticism now strike with passionate antipathy’.

By way of alternative to such outmoded dogmatism, Strauss sketched the contours of a ‘modern’ worldview, which drew heavily on Darwin’s biology, rejected both transcendence and teleology in the evolution of nature, and granted humankind the task of ennobling nature through culture – which Strauss came close to identifying with German educated middle class life, judging by his extensive praise for ‘our great poets and musicians’ (Goethe, Schiller, Mozart, and Beethoven).

As Peter Schrembs and others have shown, Strauss’s provocative book resonated widely among the German *Bildungsbürgertum*. The book sold in great numbers, went through multiple reprints in a couple of weeks, and elicited a spirited debate to which dozens of scholars, pastors, and publicists contributed. With brochures and articles appearing on an weekly basis, the church historian Friedrich Nippold claimed as early as 1874 that the debate put the Pessimism Controversy in the shadow. Clearly, the cause of these polemics did not lay in Strauss adopting unexpected positions. As many commentators pointed out, the ideas behind *Der alte und der neue Glaube* could already be found in Strauss’s theological work of the 1840s and to some extent even in *Das Leben Jesu*, Strauss’s work of Biblical criticism that had established his reputation as a radical liberal. Still, *Der alte und der neue Glaube* was sufficiently different to provoke protest from many quarters: Strauss no longer expressed himself in Hegelian terminology, but wrote in plain, accessible language; he did not limit himself to criticizing ‘old church doctrine’, but also sketched a modern alternative; he admitted that this alternative could no longer be called Christian; he presented it as a ‘faith’ (Glaube) rather than as a form of ‘science’ (Wissenschaft); and he explained at some length how this new faith related to social democracy, the labour question, and the monarchy, thereby touching on a range of sensitive issues. (In the last sections of the book, Strauss even took a stance on universal suffrage and the death penalty.)

In the controversy that soon erupted, some commentators welcomed *Der alte und der neue Glaube* as yet another round in Strauss’s lifelong battle against old-fashioned church doctrine. The Munich philosopher Jakob Frohschammer, for instance, drew on textbook narratives of criticism overhauling dogmatism in hailing Strauss’s work as a remedy against ‘dogmatic’ forms of Christian theology that he believed to be ‘no longer tenable’. A much greater number of commentators, however, focused on what Strauss called his ‘new faith’. Catholics and orthodox Protestants in particular emphasized how right Strauss was in calling his modern ‘unbelief’ a form of faith. If they had often been accused of clinging to scientifically unsupported ideas, they could now return the compliment by saying that even Strauss admitted his ideas to rest, not on Wissenschaft, but on Glaube. Their often-made argument that Darwin’s evolutionary theory – one of the pillars of Strauss’s new faith – was still an unproven ‘hypothesis’ served a similar purpose: it was to highlight that Strauss had just as little ground under his feet ‘as we’ (as one Protestant author candidly confessed). To drive the point home, Strauss’s critics made ample use of religious imagery. They
described the ‘new faith’ as ‘new wisdom’, a ‘new gospel’, and a ‘new religious doctrine’, while depicting the ‘old, strict critic’ that Strauss once was as a believer, ‘as credulous as a young girl who has fallen in love for the first time’ and ‘as devout as one of those most orthodox church believers whom he persecutes because of their blind faith’. Heinrich Rotermund even dared to paraphrase Matthew 15,22: ‘O Str[auss], great is thy faith!’

In this context, charges of dogmatism were repeatedly made. ‘It is remarkable’, wrote a Berlin school teacher in 1874, ‘that Strauss, otherwise such a fierce opponent of blind faith’, now presents ‘infallible articles of faith’, to the point of ‘issuing dogmas himself’! Konstantin Schlottmann, a New Testament scholar from Halle, found Strauss’s work ‘dogmatic’ because of all the guesses, hypotheses, and conjectures that it presented as uncontested certainties. Likewise, the old-Catholic Johannes Huber, professor of philosophy in Munich, contrasted Strauss’s reputation as a ‘critic’ with his ‘dogmatic’ way of issuing bold statements with no other support than the author’s own authority. ‘Assertions like Strauss’s ... are simply dogmatic’, Huber concluded, as long as we have to take them ‘with blind faith in his authority’. More generally, commenting on Franz Overbeck’s contribution to the Strauss controversy, Heinrich Ewald, the grand old critic of the Tübingen School, sighed that critics most opposed to dogmatism were most likely to get caught in ‘the chains of their own already fully petrified dogmas’. It is worth noting that orthodox critics were not alone in making such charges of dogmatism. Even theologians broadly sympathetic with Strauss, such as Karl Schwarz, the co-founder of the liberal Protestantverein, noticed that Strauss’s argument would have been much stronger if the author hadn’t turned Darwin’s evolutionary hypothesis into ‘a fundamental article [of faith] and solid dogma’. Had Strauss but listened to Emil du Bois-Reymond, whose lecture on the limits of scientific knowledge Schwarz approvingly cited, instead of to Ernst Haeckel, the man who turned Darwinian biology into a quasi-religious monist worldview!

However, whereas the Pessimism Controversy showed that dogmatism, charged with temporal connotations, was often used to relegate opponents to a pre-critical past, most of Strauss’s critics avoided such suggestions of backwardness. Although Strauss’s own attacks on orthodox theology were a clear example of denying coevalness, his critics mainly used ‘dogmatic’ as synonymous with ‘biased’, ‘prejudiced’, or taking firm stances in the absence of proper evidence. Time and again, they criticized Strauss’s work for lacking ‘foundations’ and for ‘floating in the air’. ‘It’s just a big knot of false assumptions, erroneous conclusions, self-fabricated histories, and self-fabricated problems’. Strauss’s ‘most blatant dogmatism’, in other words, was perceived as manifesting itself in his lack of Voraussetzungslosigkeit or in his habit of mistaking ‘unproven assumptions’ for ‘the only true system’.

Why, then, did Strauss’s orthodox critics abstain from what liberal theologians did not hesitate to do – using dogmatism as a means for excluding others from the realm of the present? It would be wrong to assume that they were impressed by the ‘newness’ of Strauss’s heretical ideas. Several authors explicitly challenged the idea of Strauss being ‘modern’ by exposing his ideas as variations on old heresies. Along these lines, Willibald Beyschlag, a leading representative of Protestant Vermittlungstheologie, interpreted Strauss’s new faith as a blend of stoicism and epicureanism – the ancient Greek philosophies that the apostle Paul in his Areopagus sermon had already exposed as incompatible with Christian faith (Acts 17). A Catholic critic even spoke about a ‘trivial repetition of old, long-exhausted mockeries’, with Strauss resembling the prodigal son from Luke 15, eager to fill his stomach with the pods of the swine. What these arguments sought to achieve was not a denial of coevalness, but what one might call a denial of newness. Assuming that ‘there is no new thing under the sun’ (Ecclesiastes 1,9), they unmasked even the most recent, most radical liberal ideas as ‘nothing but’ (nichts Anderes als) heresies known already in Biblical times. This explains why an old-Catholic polemicist could read Strauss’s book as illustrating the truth of Proverbs 26,11: ‘As a dog returneth to his vomit, so a fool returneth to his folly’. What these examples suggest is that the meaning of dogmatism was tied, among other things, to how authors positioned themselves in history. Insofar as the term evoked the image of a long-
abandoned fortress, home only to ‘dogmatic night owls and rats’,

it presupposed a philosophy of history in which progress in the sense of ongoing liberation of the free-thinking self was the leading motif. The liberal Protestant allergy to orthodox ‘dogmatism’ was, in other words, the flipside of a passionate commitment to what Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and others have identified as the liberation agenda underlying German liberal theology in Strauss’s generation.\(^79\) In its idealist view of history, freedom of conscience would progressively realize itself by challenging the authorities of church, tradition, and political conservatism alike. Widespread as this understanding of history might have been, most of Strauss’s orthodox critics did not share it. Their emplotment of history (to borrow a term from Hayden White)\(^81\) resembled tragedy more than romance insofar as they, in various ways, saw themselves engaged in often less than successful struggles to ‘preserve’ historic Christianity in an age of heresy, apostasy, and unbelief. Beyschlag, for instance, perceived himself as living in a ‘world of faith that seems to be perishing’ in the flames of Biblical criticism (with Strauss being the main arsonist).\(^82\) Depicting intellectual developments in nineteenth-century Germany in the darkest of colours, Beyschlag hoped for a revival of old Lutheran faith, which he assigned the task of countering ‘all of these powerful spirits that have been assaulting German Christian faith for more than a hundred years’.\(^83\) Although Beyschlag did not spell out his philosophy of history in much detail, his insistence on the church’s task to ‘withstand’ the powers of modern unbelief illustrates his total lack of affinity with the liberal narrative of criticism doing away with superseded dogmas.\(^84\)

This explains why Beyschlag and other non-liberal critics of Strauss could impossibly equate dogmatism with a refusal to bring theology in accord with the times. At the same time, it suggests that if these critics used the term, mainly in accusing Strauss of throwing around unfounded ideas, they did so with a certain irony – as if they wanted to return the compliment by demonstrating that liberal scholars were no less dogmatic than their orthodox colleagues.\(^85\)

**Conclusion**

Clearly, then, dogmatism was a derogatory term, used not only to paint stereotypical images of a pre-critical past, but also, more importantly, to delegitimize the work of colleagues of other philosophical or theological persuasions. In a context where both philosophy and Biblical scholarship found themselves divided between schools or approaches that could not resist fighting each other, dogmatism served a *Kampfbegriff* for scholars engaged in intellectual ‘boundary work’.\(^86\) It could fulfil this function, partly because dogmatism was almost universally dismissed as a vice that scholars should avoid, partly also because the term was flexible enough to be applicable to a variety of settings. A historicizing analysis as provided in this article therefore shows that dogmatism, instead of denoting a well-delineated philosophical or theological position, was an accusation thrown back and forth between quarrelling parties, in the service of different intellectual projects.

Although the meanings attached to dogmatism varied from uncritical, in the Kantian sense of epistemologically unreflective, to prejudiced and unfounded, the term’s potential for polemical use was perhaps most apparent from its temporal connotations. In textbooks and controversies alike, dogmatism often appeared as an long-superseded attitude, as a thing of the past, and therefore as an obstacle to intellectual progress. What neo-Kantian philosophers criticizing Schopenhauerian pessimism had in common with liberal Biblical scholars annoyed by orthodox doubts regarding the value of Biblical criticism was that they used *Dogmatismus* as a rhetorical means for relegating opponents to a pre-critical past, thereby denying them a legitimate place in the present. This amounted to what Fabian calls a denial of coevalness, or a refusal to accept that the advances of *Kritik* could be interpreted in different ways, as tragedy no less than as romance. At a time when scholarship was widely believed to be a force of progress, it was this denial of coevalness that made accusations of dogmatism more serious in their implications than, for instance, charges of inaccuracy or imprecision (notwithstanding the high regard in which precision was held).\(^87\) Unlike inaccuracy and imprecision, dogmatism was not merely seen as a vice impairing the reliability of
scholarly work; it was interpreted as an unpardonable sin, deserving expulsion from the ranks of present-day Wissenschaft.

The fact that Strauss’ orthodox critics did not accept these temporal connotations of the term, equating dogmatism instead with lack of proofs or lack of Voraussetzunglosigkeit, adds further credence to our conclusion that charges of dogmatism were coloured by normative visions of how the field should develop and what qualities or attitudes this demanded from scholars. In the field of Biblical scholarship, attempts to break the power of conservatism and worries over the advances of ‘unbelief’ alike even presupposed full-blown philosophies of history. At stake in them was not merely the future of the discipline, but the fate of Christianity or the cause of liberty. What this suggests is that Dogmatismus, not unlike Kritik, was a term imbued with visions of past, present, and future or, more specifically, with hopeful or fearful expectations of what the future would hold. It is not possible to understand scholarly virtues and vices without taking into account that these evaluative concepts were coloured by how scholars expected Wissenschaft to contribute to the future.

Arguably, this finding extends beyond the case studies examined in this article. Throughout the nineteenth-century Geisteswissenschaften, scholars accused each other of dogmatism. Many German humanities scholars saw dogmatism (‘antiquating dogmatism’, in the telling formulation of a Berlin philologist) as a relic from times past. They not only dissociated themselves from ‘old dogmatism’, but also complained about colleagues ‘returning’ to long-superseded dogmatic positions. Additionally, the adjective was used in historical surveys as a less than complimentary label for the thinking habits of pre-critical generations of scholars (‘Art scholarship until then had been dogmatic’). The word-pair Kritik and Dogmatismus was used indeed not only by philosophers and Biblical scholarship, but also by historians, literary scholars, and art historians. For most of them, criticism pars pro toto denoted a ‘philological ethos’ in which virtues of meticulousness, attentiveness, and openness to the distinctiveness of the past were seen as incompatible with prejudice and predisposition. To the extent that such criticism was understood as ‘modern’ and ‘scientific’, its negative counterpart that was dogmatism was typically framed as old-fashioned, superseded, or detrimental to scientific progress. As Karl Müllenhoff put it programmatically: in order to become a truly comparative branch of science, German philology must free itself from all ‘dogmatism and false idealism.’ Accordingly, virtues and vices as discussed in the nineteenth-century humanities were not just character traits believed to be conducive or harmful to academic research. They derived their meaning and significance, not to mention their emotional colouring, from normative visions of how the Geisteswissenschaften should develop and contribute to the future.

Notes


22. Ibid., 5, 22, 10.


26. Ibid., 196.
35. Beiser, *Weltgeschmertz*, 87, 122, 165. We have not included Julius Frauenstädt, because this Schopenhauer commentator contributed more to the first than to the second phase of the *Pessimismusstreit*. Nonetheless, as his *Schopenhauer-Lexikon: Ein philosophisches Wörterbuch, nach Arthur Schopenhauers sämmtliche Schriften und handschriftlichem Nachlaß bearbeitet*, vol. 1 (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1871) makes clear, Frauenstädt’s understanding of dogmatism drew largely on Kant (see esp. 129–30). He made a habit of calling it, with clear temporal connotations, ‘the old dogmatism that Kant has knocked over’, ‘the dogmatism that Kant has destroyed’, or simply ‘pre-Kantian dogmatism’. Ibid., 130; Julius Frauenstädt, *Neue Briefe über die Schopenhauerische Philosophie* (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1876), 145; Frauenstädt, *Blicke in die intellectualle, physische und moralische Welt, nebst Beiträgen zur Lebensphilosophie* (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1869), 12.
38. Ibid., 25.
39. Ibid., 55.
41. Vaihinger, Hartmann, Dühring und Lange, 48, 199.
42. Gustav Knauer, *Das Facit aus E. v. Hartmann’s Philosophie des Unbewussten* (Berlin: L. Heimann, 1873), 55. ‘Vain dogmatizing’ may be interpreted as a veiled reference to Joseph Glanvill’s *The Vanity of Dogmatizing* (1661).
44. Ibid., 58, 79, 103; Eduard von Hartmann, *Philosophie des Unbewussten*, 5th ed. (Berlin: Carl Duncker, 1873), 826.
47. Vaihinger, Hartmann, Dühring und Lange, 202–3.
55. Strauss, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, 295 (see also the appendices 1 and 2).
57. Beiser, David Friedrich Strauß, 253.
60. Strauss, Der alte und der neue Glaube, 281–90.
63. 'Der Kampf um dem Glauben', Historisch-politische Blätter für Deutschland 72 (1873): 448; H. Rotermund, Dr. David Fr. Strauß, der alte und der neue Glaube: Vortrag im evangelischen Verein zu Hannover (Hannover: Heinr. Fessche, 1875), 34.
66. Rotermund, Dr. David Fr. Strauß, 30.
78. Ibid.
79. 'Der alte und der neue Glaube von David Friedrich Strauss', Süddeutsches evangelisch-protestantisches Wochenblatt 14 (1873), as quoted in Schrems, 'David Friedrich Strauss', 87.
84. Ibid., 174.
85. This rhetorical strategy is evident in the case of Heinrich Ewald defending himself against Christian Hermann’s Weisse accusation of Dogmatismus by stating that Weisse himself smuggled ‘philosophical suppositions foreign to the Bible’ into his Biblical scholarship, or in that of Anton Stára, a Catholic Biblical scholar, who took Johann Heinrich Kurtz’s disdain for ‘dogmatic’ strands of scholarship as evidence of a ‘dogmatic prejudice’ on Kurtz’s part. See [Heinrich Ewald], review of Philosophische Dogmatik, vol. 2, by Christian...


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