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Socratic Economics and the Psychology of Money*

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Introduction

It is no secret that Socrates had a profound distaste for the sophists’ habit of teaching for pay. He seems to have had a variety of reasons to disapprove of this practice.¹ Some of these reasons are only conditional: the sophist’s practice of charging fees for lessons in virtue raises questions about the nature of virtue (e.g., no one seems to know what virtue is) or its teach ability (does charging money for lessons in virtue imply that it can in fact be taught?) (See Corey 2002: 191–195).

Occasionally, Socrates’ objections to fees imply particular preconceptions and ideas about the effects that money itself has on teaching practices. For instance, Socrates argues that money changes the economics of education in a fundamental way: fees make teachers select their students on grounds that are not relevant for education in virtue; i.e., fees make teachers not available enough (only available to the rich)² or too available (instead of only to those susceptible for the inculcation of virtue; Pl. Euthyd. 304c1–5; cf. Corey 2002: 196–203). In this paper, I shall attempt to reconstruct these seemingly contradictory preconceptions and to see whether Socrates’ refusal of pay is based on a coherent set of economic assumptions, i.e., on an understanding of the phenomenon of money, its workings on the human soul, and its effects on interpersonal relationships. I shall bring out some similarities and differences

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¹ See Blank 1985 for an overview of sources; Corey 2002 for an evaluation for various objections raised by the Socratic authors against teaching for pay; Tell 2009 for an assessment about the historical reality and ideology behind the Socratics’ hostile representation of sophistic practice (the Platonic representation is largely slander); Fredal 2008 for a hypothesis about the sophists’ motivation to charge fees (to demystify the economics of gift-giving in which wisdom and rhetoric used to circulate among aristocrats).

between Plato’s and Xenophon’s treatment of the topic and attempt to account for them in the context of other motives in their respective oeuvres. I shall do so on systematic terms, without making any claims as to chronology or the precise relation between Plato and Xenophon.3

The discussion will proceed in three steps. First, I will briefly sketch the outlines of both Xenophon’s and Plato’s attitude toward riches, wealth, possessions, and money (Section 2) and articulate the systematic differences between the two (Section 3; for more elaborate treatment, see Leshem 2013, Figueira 2012, Desmond 2006, Perrotta 2004, Danzig 2003, Danzig & Schaps 2001, Lowry 1987, Trever 1916). Next, the economic ideas underlying Plato’s rejection of fee-taking will be discussed (Section 4) and Xenophon’s monetary theory behind his rejection of fee-taking will be scrutinized (Section 5). It will be argued that while Plato’s problematization of fee-taking centers around the ontological status of money and the things that can be exchanged for money, Xenophon’s rejection of fee-taking concentrates more on the way money affects the dynamics of interpersonal bonds and, hence, the very substance of Socrates’ teaching.

Some Principles of Economics: Common Ground

When it comes to monetary theory and reflection on economic phenomena, commentators have traditionally admired Xenophon’s grasp of economic principles4 and thought little of Plato’s understanding of money and economic processes. Xenophon is credited with an understanding of the principle of supply and demand and hence with a contribution to the theory of value,5 the connection between the size of the market and the degree of division of labor,6 the law of diminishing utility (Hiero 1.17–19, Cyr. 8.2.20; Lowry 1987: 45–82), marginal gains (Oec. 8.11–23, 9.11–17, 11.16, 12.19–20; Symp. 7.1–5; Hiero 9.6–11; cf. Figueira

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3 For discussion of the precise relation between Xenophon and Plato and the problems related to this kind of enquiry (the issues of cross-reference, mutual intertextuality and direction of influence, and the Socratic Question) see, among others, in this volume, Danzig in the Introduction, Johnson, and Dorion.

4 Sedlacek (2011, 102): “In many ways, Xenophon was ahead of his time and its greatest thinkers.”

5 Vect. 4.6–10: the exchange value of goods varies with supply and demand. Vect. 3.2: supply and demand have direct effect on the stability of silver. Cf. Trever 1916: 64.

6 Cyr. 8.2.5–6. See Figueira (2012: 671) for an argument that in the Cyr.-passage task specialization not only produces qualitative improvement (as Finley (1970) had it), but also enhances productivity in the quantitative sense.
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2012: 678), principles of sharing risk to lower risk level (Perrotta 2004: 19), and the importance of stability of value in a currency.7

Plato’s understanding of money and economic processes has been deemed naïve and shallow.8 His concept of value seems essentialist: in discussing the topic of “just prices”, he merely stipulates that one ought to sell goods according to their “real worth” (ἀξία),9 without offering any theory of value;10 he regarded money merely as a “token of exchange” (hence not itself a commodity to be trafficked in)11 that functions as a medium of exchange and as a measure of value;12 he did not appreciate the productive function of money as representative capital;13 his theory of interest was superficial.14 This contrastive image seems valid when it comes to such technical issues.15 However, when it comes to ideas about the morality of money and the market, there is considerable common ground in the Socratic works of both authors.

8 But see Danzig & Schaps 2001 for a more nuanced account of Plato’s monetary theory and economic thought.
9 Laws 11.921a–b. Moreover, a seller may only mention one price for his goods, not two (Laws 11.917b); the idea seems to be that just as objects can only have one real name, a product can also have only one real price.
11 Resp. 2.371b. In Plato’s market trade means “exchanging this for money or money for things.” Laws 8.849e.
12 Laws 5.742a–b, 11.918b (money makes thing commensurable and even).
13 Trever 1916: 39. Contrast the Aristarchus episode in Xenophon’s Mem. 2.7 where Socrates does seem to appreciate the productive function of money.
14 Laws 5.743d; Resp. 8.555e. Trever (1916: 39). See Laws 5.742c, 8.849e, 11.915d–e, 11.921a–d for proposed regulations about money-lending. Cf. Morrow (1963: 138–139). Cf. Xen. Vect. 4.6 where it is at least described how citizens with resources turned away from investment in agriculture toward other economic sectors, such as τοκισμός, in which their capital was put to work. See Figueira (2012) on this passage.
15 It should be noted that this contrastive image works best for the non-Socratic works of both authors: Xenophon’s Vect. and Plato’s Laws.
Central to both thinkers is, first of all, a relative definition of πλοῦτος (ploutos, "being rich") and πενία (penia, poverty). Both are defined relative to what one needs (ἐξ αὐτοῦ διαίρεσθαι, prodeisthai): according to Xenophon's Socrates, being rich (πλουτεῖν, ploutein) is having an excess of goods over wants; to Plato poverty consists not in decreasing property but in increasing insatiability (ἀπληστία, aplestia; Pl. Laws 5.736e).

Hence, when Critoboulus repeatedly tries to direct the conversation to the topic of increasing his estate in Xenophon’s Oeconomicus (Xen. Oec. 2.1), he jokingly asks Socrates whether he believes that they are rich enough already (ἰκανῶς πλουτεῖν, hikanos ploutein). As a matter of fact, Socrates does believe so and Critoboulus is made to agree that on Socrates’ relative definition, Socrates, with his humble possessions, is indeed wealthier than Critoboulus with his vast fortune (Xen. Oec. 2.9): Socrates’ needs and desires are limited, hence his wealth is enough (ἰκανά), but Critoboulus’ lifestyle renders him poor (cf. Xen. Oec. 2.2: πένεσθαι, penesthai). If wealth is the total of things that are useful for satisfying one’s needs, it is by implication finite. This finite notion of wealth and need presupposes a conceptual distinction between the objective requirements of

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16 It is difficult to translate the relevant terminology consistently throughout both authors’ oeuvre. Henceforth, I shall render πλοῦτος (ploutos, and related words from the same root) as “riches,” “richness,” or “being rich”; τὰ χρήματα (ta chremata) as “wealth” or “commodities”; τὰ κτήματα (ta ktemata) as “possessions.” See Gernet (1981) for the argument that the term κτήμα (ktema), in contrast to the noun χρῆμα (chrema), always contains reference to the object’s mode of acquisition. Cf. Gottesman 2010.

17 Xen. Hiero 4.6–10; Mem. 4.2.37; 1.6.1–10. On the latter passages, see Chernyakhovskaya in this volume 318–339.

18 Pomeroy (1994: ad loc.): “With five minae, or 500 dr., Socrates would belong to the class of 322 thetes. Socrates’ poverty is attested by Plato, Xenophon, Aristophanes, and Diogenes Laertius. But see Ch. 3, sec. c, for the deterioration in Socrates’ finances so that he fell from hoplite status to thete. (…). With more than 8 tal. 2,000 dr. Critobulus is a member of the liturgical class.”

19 The subjective and relative definition of wealth casts an interesting light on the meaning of economic growth in the Oeconomicus. Throughout the dialogue, Critoboulus insists that the οἰκονομικός (oikonomikos), a person versed in the skill of estate management, is someone who knows how “to increase the estate by making a surplus” (1.5: περιουσίαν ποιών αὔξειν τὸν οἶκον, periousian poion auxein ton oikon). This has led commentators to infer that “the thrust of much of the Oeconomicus is to apply purposive, opportunizing behavior to increase the oikos” (Figueira 2012: 677) and that “[a]ccording to the Oeconomicus, profit is the chief goal of estate management” (Pomeroy 1994: 52). However, as the discussion in Oec. 2.1–2 makes clear, the objective of growth is never wholeheartedly endorsed by
a good life (“needs” in modern terminology), which are finite in quantity, and desires that are psychologically defined (“wants”, i.e. “things that I want”) and infinitely expandable.21

Similarly, in Plato's oeuvre too we find a relative notion of poverty, where poverty (πενία, penia) is said to consist not in decreasing property, but in increasing insatiability (Pl. Laws 5.736e): the fewer wants the better. This presupposes the notion that wealth consists in an excess of goods over wants. Poverty is psychologically defined in terms of insatiable wants. This insatiabil-

20 Skidelsky (2012: 25–26). προσδεῖσθαι (prosdeisthai, and in general cognates of δεῖ [dei]) tends to refer to external objective constraints or causal necessity as opposed to ΧΡΗ-terminology that refers to “subjective, internally based needs, requirements, and constraints” Mourelatos 1970: 652.

21 It has been pointed out (e.g., Perrotta 2004) that Socrates' idea that wealth is a finite concept contradicts Xenophon's famous statement in De Vectigalibus 4.7 about the need for silver in the Athenian polis. He states that silver is qualitatively different from other possessions, because of silver “no one ever yet possessed so much as to want no more; if a man finds himself with a huge amount of it, he takes as much pleasure in burying the surplus as in using it” (ἀργύριον δὲ οὐδείς πω οὕτω πολύ ἐκτήσατο ὥστε μηκέτι προσδεῖσθαι· ἀλλ' ἴν τις γένηται παμπληθές, τὸ περιττεῦον κατορύττοντες οὐδὲν ἤττον ἦδον ἥδονοι ἢ χρώμενοι αὐτῷ). However, the tension may only be apparent. In de Vectigalibus, Xenophon merely makes an observation about the psychological effects of money without evaluating it. In Aristotelian vein, he claims that there is no natural limit to the amount of money or silver that people wish to acquire (Cf. Arist. Pol. 1). This is a general observation about the insatiability of human wants that does not necessarily contradict the Socratic wisdom that needs, the objective requirements of the good life, are finite. Moreover, the topic here is silver (ἀργύριον, argurion), not genuine wealth (χρήματα, chremata), as becomes evident in the psychological observation that people, insatiable for silver, take as much pleasure in burying the surplus as in using it (χρώμενοι αὐτῷ, chromenoi autōi)—implying that in such situations silver is being used improperly (by an owner who does not know how to use it correctly), and hence is not wealth at all. In his observation that human desire for money or silver lacks a limit, Xenophon is drawing on an archaic tradition. Cf. Solon 13.71–73, Thgn. 227–232, 595–602, 1157–1158, Bacchyl. 1–160, Pind. Nem. 11.44–48. See also Figueira (2012, 681).
ity of wants is rooted in the lowest part of the soul,\textsuperscript{22} which is "most insatiable by nature of wealth."\textsuperscript{23} Furthermore, Plato's notion that unlimited acquisition should be prevented (\textit{Laws} 5.736e, 5.741e) presupposes a conception of wealth that is limited, and hence also an implicit distinction between needs and wants.

\textbf{Wealth is Subjective}

The psychological construction of the notions of richness and poverty is related to a central feature common to both Plato's and Xenophon's understanding of wealth: wealth is subjective, i.e. defined subjectively, in relation to its subject. According to Xenophon's Socrates, the same thing can be wealth (\textit{χρηματα}, \textit{chremata}) for a person who knows how to use (\textit{χρῆσθαι}, \textit{chresthai}) it while not being wealth for the person who does not know how to use it (Xen. \textit{Oec.} 1.10–11); and for Plato's Socrates, the value of the possession of wealth (\textit{ἡ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσις}, \textit{hê ton chrematôn ktesis}) depends on the ability of the owner to use (\textit{χρῆσθαι}, \textit{chresthai}) goods rightly (E.g. Pl. \textit{Euthyd.} 28ob–e). In both authors, we see that the prime strategy in their reflection on the subjective nature of wealth consists in their analysis of \textit{ΧΡΗ}-terminology in terms of a subject who "uses" (\textit{χρῆσθαι}, \textit{chresthai}) possessions that are "useful" (\textit{χρησιμός}, \textit{chresimos}) to him.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{22} Pl. \textit{Resp.} 4.442a: δὴ πλεῖστον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐστὶ καὶ χρημάτων φύσει ἀπληστότατον. Or: "by nature most insatiable where money is concerned."

\textsuperscript{23} Cf. the notion of happiness as absence of wants: according to Socrates, those who want nothing (\textit{οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι}, \textit{hoi medenos deomenoi}) are happy (Pl. \textit{Grg.} 492e)—a position that Callicles, overtly attaching a positive value to appetitive needs, reacts to with disgust. Socrates attempts to make Callicles choose a life that is contented with what it happens to have (493c: τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς παροῦσι ἱκανῶς καὶ ἐξαρκούντως ἔχοντα βίον) over one of insatiate licentiousness (493c: ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλήστως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος), and compares the soul to a leaking jar (493b–d, 493e–494a)—clearly locating insatiability, and hence poverty, in the soul. See also Xen. \textit{Mem.} 1.6, discussed by Chernyakhovskaya in this volume, 322.

\textsuperscript{24} In modern conceptualizations, "useful" applies to something that is a means to an independently defined end as opposed to an "end in itself" Cf. Anderson 1993: 144–145. Graeber 2005. The Greek term \textit{χρῆσθαι} (\textit{chresthai}), however, displays a semantic pluriformity denoting states of affairs ranging from "being in want of" to "having," "using," "experiencing," and "dealing with" something; applied to persons the verb may denote "to treat x as," "to be intimate," or "to have intercourse with" x. This semantic range suggests a sense of "usage" that is broader than purely pragmatic and that implies an order of things that is not solely dependent on what subjects unilaterally decide to do with objects; \textit{χρῆσθαι} (\textit{chresthai}) implies an adaptation or accommodation of both subject and object to the requirements of a given context. Cf. Rédard 1953. I argue this in more detail in Van Berkel
For instance, at the outset of the *Oeconomicus*, Socrates and his conversation partner Critoboulus, in their attempts to define possessions (κτήματα, *ktemata*),25 the realm of οἰκονομία (*oikonomia*),26 establish a criterion of value: wealth, χρήματα (*chremata*), is defined in terms of usefulness.27 Using the example of a flute, Socrates redefines χρήματα (*chremata*) so as to cover anything beneficial (*Oec*. 1.9: τὰ ὠφελοῦντα χρήματα ἡγῇ, *ta ophelounta chremata hegei*), provided that the user in view knows how to use it (χρῆσθαι, *chresthai*; *Oec*. 1.10–11). This redefinition leads to the paradoxical observation that even money (ἀργύριον, *argurion*) is not wealth (χρήματα, *chremata*) to one who does not know how to use (χρῆσθαι, *chresthai*) it—obviously drawing on the polyvalence of χρήματα (*chremata*, also used for money; Xen. *Oec*. 1.10–12). Utility becomes a quality of an object that refers not primarily to its potential utility but rather to the ability of the owner to use it rightly. Knowledge is a crucial component of wealth, because it “transforms otherwise useless objects into tools which serve a good purpose” (Danzig 2003 rev. 2010: 59–60).

Moreover, in the example of the flute, Xenophon’s Socrates appears to make a rudimentary distinction between an object’s “value in use” (which is dependent upon the subject’s ability to use it) and its “value in exchange” (one can sell an object for money if one is not capable of using it oneself; Sedlacek 2011: 101; Lowry 1987: 77). However, this distinction between the purely individual subjective notion of value in use and a more objective concept of wealth is only apparent, as even exchangeability for money does not insure value in anything: the seller needs to know how to sell, i.e. how to exchange an object for something that he does know how to use.28 Hence, even money, wealth *par excellence*, is only real wealth in a conditional sense: only if its owner knows how to use it.29

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2010 and 2012. Hence, ΧΡΗ-terminology is underdetermined in comparison with modern conceptions of utility.


26 Critoboulus’ first definition of οἶκος is that it encompasses “everything a man possesses.” *Oec*. 1.5.

27 As Schaps (2003: 142) notes, Critoboulus here makes a shift from Socrates’ κτήματα (*ktemata*), which contains both wealth, χρήματα (*chremata*), as well as liabilities, ζημίαι (*zemiae*), such as enemies) toward χρήματα (*chremata*). Socrates leaves the shift unjustified, but takes the conceptual space to explore the etymology of χρήματα (*chremata*).

28 Note that in this analysis of exchange value the term to the *buyer* is left out of account.

29 This subjective knowledge-oriented definition of wealth has implications for Socrates’ take on the art of economics. Because wealth is by its very definition assumed to be
Similarly, in Plato’s Republic it is the soul that makes goods such as riches (πλοῦτος, ploutos) good and beneficial (ἀγαθά, agatha), or harmful (δλαβέρα, blabera).30 Here too, value is subjective, in the sense that it is defined with reference to the owner: the possession of wealth (τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν, ten ton chrematon ktesin) is of most value (πλειστου ἀξίαν, pleistou axian) to the good man (ἐπιεικεί, epieikei; Resp. 1.331a–b) and value depends upon the ability of the owner to use (χρῆται, chretai) goods rightly (Euthyd. 28ob–e, 28ib, 28id, 288e–289a. Cf. Meno 88d–e): in order to be happy, one must not only have acquired (κεκτῆσαι, kektesthai) goods (ἀγαθά, agatha) but use (χρῆσαι, chresthai) them too; moreover, one must use them correctly (ἀρθώς, orthos; Euthyd. 28od–e). Here, just as in Xenophon, it is knowledge (ἐπιστήμη, epistemê) that makes right use (ἀρθώς χρῆσαι, orthos chresthai) possible (Euthyd. 28ib): goods are not good or evil by themselves. It is right use, made possible by the prudence and wisdom (φρόνησις τε καὶ σοφία, phronesis te kai sophia) of the owner, that makes them good (Euthyd. 28id). Thus, the notion of the “proper use” of wealth seems to be a common theme among the Socratic authors.31

“good” (ἀγαθόν, agathon), “economics” is not confined to the realm of means (as is Xenophon’s De vectigalibus), but implies the realization of the good. If the function of economics is “to increase the oikos” (1.1–4) and if the oikos in turn consists of χρήματα (chremata) that are defined by reference to the good, real economics is not value-neutral but by its very definition oriented toward the good.

30 Cf. Pl. Meno 88d–e. A comparable position we find in Socrates’ famous statement in the Apology (30a7–b4): ‘Οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετή γίγνεται, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄγαθα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄπαντα καὶ θεία καὶ δημοσία.’ Following Burnyeat (2003), I reject the common translation “Virtue does not come from money, but from virtue money and all other things come to human being,” which would yield the (from a Socratic point of view) absurd position that virtue is a money-maker: The subject of the sentence is χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄπαντα; ἀγαθά τοῖς ἀνθρώποις is predicate. Hence, the interpretation by Desmond (2006) seems faulty (and also somewhat far-fetched): “the soul’s proper excellences lead to material advancement. Without the various virtues, one would not work (the unjust prefer not to), nor work intelligently, nor use wisely what one gains, nor be temperate enough to accept the natural limits of bodily need. Thus, the virtuous and just should profit, for they are the actual producers of wealth” (36). Rather the point is fairly tautological: it is on the basis of ἀρετή (ἐξ ἀρετῆς, ex aretes) that money and the other things become good. Virtue is what gives value; goodness is what makes things good.

31 Similarly, in the pseudo-Platonic Eryxias, the sophist Prodicus’ stance on wealth is remarkably reminiscent of Socrates’ take on wealth and money in the Oeconomicus. In Eryx. 397e, it is argued that being rich (τὸ πλουτεῖν, to ploutein) is good for καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ (kaloikagathoi, those of noble birth) and those who know how to use wealth (ἐπισταμένοι, ἐπισταμενοῖ, epistamenoi hopou dei chresthai tois chremas) but bad for the μοχθηροὶ
Some Principles of Economics: Differences

The most fundamental difference between Plato and Xenophon with respect to their moral economics is a difference in conceptual architecture. Central to Plato’s discussion of money and the proper use of wealth and money is the body-soul dichotomy. “Money” and “wealth” are relegated to the realm of the body and subordinated to other goods. Riches (πλοῦτος, ploutos) pervert the soul and gold, silver and coin money cause degeneration in state and individual.


Money is related to the lowest part of the soul (Resp. 9.581a); the concern for money ranks lowest, after concern for the body (Laws 5.743e). Cf. the ps.-Platonic Eryxias 401a–e where wealth (χρήματα, chremata) is predominantly described with reference to the body. See Plato, Phaedo 64d–67a for Plato’s little regard for the body. Cf. Sedlacek 2011: 109 ff.

Material wealth is inferior to other goods; e.g. Laws 3.697bl; Cf. Resp. 9.581 ff.: love for gain and money is the lowest of the different types of pleasure. Laws 9.870a2–c1: bodily goods should serve the body and the body should serve the soul. Cf. Laws 3.679a10–c3, 5.727c7–728a5, 5.743e1–8, 11.913b3–c1.

Laws 11.910c. However, in Pl. Meno 88d–e “wealth and the like” (πλοῦτος τε καὶ τὰ τοιχάτα, ploutos te kai ta toiauta) are characterized as being “sometimes good and sometimes harmful” (τοτὲ μὲν ἄγαθα τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ, tote men agatha tote de blabeira); it is the soul that, through right use and guidance (ὀρθὸς χρωμένη καὶ ἰγουμένη, orthos chremenē kai hegoumenē), makes wealth beneficial (ὠφέλιμα, ophelima).

In the Republic the guardians of the state are not allowed to possess money. In the constitution of the Laws, Magnesia, money is reduced to token-money that is useless beyond the boundaries of the state (5.742a), the citizens are restricted in the amount they may possess a lot of χρήματα (chremata). This begs the question what χρήματα (chremata) are, as some property (e.g., pieces of leather) are considered riches (πλοῦτος, ploutos) among some people (the Carthaginians), but not among others (the Greeks, Eryx. 400a–b). Similarly, whereas houses are χρήματα (chremata) among the Greeks, they are not χρήματα for the Scythians, because they have no use for houses (Eryx. 400e): Wealth (χρήματα) is what is useful (χρήσιμος, chresimos) for its owner. Carthaginian coinage (νόμισμα, nomisma) is not χρήματα among Greeks because it is useless (ἀχρεῖον, achreion) for them. This pseudo-Platonic notion of “usefulness” corresponds with the notion of proper usage in Xenophon’s Oeconomicus. Nestle (1936) suggests Prodicus as a common source of the idea of proper usage in both the Oeconomicus and the third century Eryxias. See also the dialogue Callias by Aeschines Socraticus (Fr. 17) for a paradoxical twist to the idea of ὀρθὴ χρῆσις (orthê chresis) of wealth: the correct use of poverty is even more admirable (because it is harder) than the correct use of wealth.
Whereas Plato embeds his criticism of material wealth in a hierarchy of goods,\textsuperscript{37} Xenophon’s discussion of money and wealth is shaped by an opposition between short-term and long-term goods, expanding the notion of the “proper use” of wealth to include interpersonal relationships.\textsuperscript{38} Hence, Xenophon’s Socrates unscrupulously talks about friends as being “useful” (\textit{χρησίμωτερος}, \textit{chresimoteros}) or “more useful” (\textit{χρησιμωτερος}, \textit{chresimoteros}) than servants.

This notion of the “utility” of friends should be understood in line with Socrates’ understanding of genuine wealth and its proper use (Xen. \textit{Oec.} 1.14): if one knows how to deal with (\textit{χρῆσθαι}, \textit{chresthai}) friends so as to benefit from them, friends may be called wealth (\textit{χρήματα}, \textit{chremata}) too—perhaps even more properly so than cattle or money (cf. Xen. \textit{Mem.} 2.3.1–3). “Using” friends (\textit{χρῆσθαι}, \textit{chresthai}, i.e. “dealing with” friends) implies knowing how to treat them (Xen. \textit{Mem.} 2.3.7); just as one has to know how to use something (\textit{χρησίμωτερος}, \textit{chrestimoteros}) in order to turn it into wealth (\textit{χρήματα}, \textit{chremata}), one has to know how to deal (\textit{χρῆσθαι}, \textit{chresthai}) with some person in order to make him more useful (\textit{χρησιμώτερος}, \textit{chrestimoteros}).

Contrary to what our own post-Enlightenment sensitivities may suggest,\textsuperscript{39} to Xenophon’s Socrates “knowing how to use” friends is not exploitative at all.\textsuperscript{40} In \textit{Mem.} 2.3 Socrates’ advise to Chaerecrates to make his brother Chaerephon an asset (\textit{χρήματα}, \textit{chremata}, wealth) instead of a liability consists in the uni-

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\textsuperscript{37} Whereas in the \textit{Republic}, Plato only issues the warning that in a society where wealth and the wealthy are honored, virtue and the virtuous tend to be neglected (8.551a), in the \textit{Leges} he plainly states that a very rich person cannot be a good one (5.742e–743c).

\textsuperscript{38} Therefore, it need not surprise us that in the \textit{Memorabilia} Socrates often uses economic imagery in developing ideas about friendship: friends are conceived of as wealth (\textit{Mem.} 2.3: friends as \textit{κτήματα}, \textit{ktemata}), possession (\textit{Mem.} 2.4: friends as \textit{κτήματα}, \textit{ktemata}), having a precise cash equivalent (\textit{Mem.} 2.5), and being objects of acquisition or even the fruit of rational investment (\textit{Mem.} 2.10).

\textsuperscript{39} As I argue in Van Berkel 2010 and 2012, this conflicts with our post-Enlightenment thinking, where there is a strong moral impediment against framing friendship in terminology of use: following Immanuel Kant we prefer to think that our fellow-humans should be valued as ends in themselves as opposed to means to our own ulterior ends. E.g. Anderson 1993: 144; Badhwar 1993.

\textsuperscript{40} In fact, in \textit{Mem.} 2.3 the dialogue closes with an analogy between the synergy of limbs and the relationship between brothers: they are designed for mutual benefit (\textit{ἐπ’ ὁφελείαν ἀλλήλων}, \textit{ep’ opheleiai alleloin}).
versal imperative of Active Partnership: to make the first move (2.3.14: πρότερος εὑ ὁ ποιεῖν, proteros eu poiein). Taking the initiative is an imperative in all kinds of reciprocal relationships. This ideal of Active Partnership, of outdoing the other in taking the initiative, is intertwined with the Socratic orientation toward the long-term good. The central concept in this dialectics of the long term is ἐγκράτεια, enkrateia, self-mastery, a repression of the impulses of short-term appetites that may yield satisfaction in the short run but that pose a threat to the realization of long-term goods. Enkrateia is not only the precondition for the development of virtue in an individual (Mem. 1.5.4–5; Dorion 2006), (as virtue is the result of practice (ἀσκησις, askesis; Mem. 1.2.19–23, 2.1.20, 2.1.28, 2.6.39, 3.3.6, 3.5.14, 3.9.1–3) requiring a complete mastery of body and soul), since enkrateia is the ability to suspend the desire for immediate gratification and to reflect upon what is really useful, it is also the prerequisite to initiating and sustaining relationships that are genuinely beneficial to both partners (see below in Section 5).

The broad application of the notion of “proper use” to interpersonal relationships is distinctly Xenophontic. This has implications for the way Xenophon's

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41 Gabriel Danzig has pointed out to me that a similar idea occurs in Aristotle's discussion of the sanctuary of the Charites on the agora (NE 5.5) as a reminder of the principle that one should always "pay it forward," i.e., take the initiative and be the first in benefactions. See also Danzig 2000.

42 For the political implications of Xenophon's conception of friendship and reciprocity, see Azoulay 2004 and Tamiolaki in this volume 433–460. The imperative of active partnership appears to be a motive under the Minor Socratics. E.g., DL mentions a conflict between Aristippus of Cyrene and his friend Aesches of Sphettus. Aristippus makes the first move toward reconciliation; (frg. 112b Mannebach) Cf. 112a (= Plut. Cohib. ira 14.462d–e), 112c (= Stob. 4.27.19). A similar story is attributed to Euclides of Megara who attempts to assuage a conflict with his brother Stob. 4.27.15.

43 The distinction between short- and long-term goods does not stipulate anything as to the precise identity or substance of this good and the vexed question whether to Xenophon virtue and the good are in the end instrumental in nature. For this discussion, see Danzig in this volume 340–364.

44 Mem. 1.2.14, 1.3.5–14, 1.5.1, 1.5.6, 1.6.8, 2.1, 3.14, 4.5.9, 4.8.11. According to Dorion (2006), ἐγκράτεια (enkrateia), together with the concepts of καρτερία (karteria) and αὐτάρκεια (autarkeia), forms the core of Socratic ethics in the Memorabilia. See however Edmunds in this volume 252–276 who argues that there is no such "triad": ἐγκράτεια (enkrateia) is primary; καρτερία (karteria) overlaps somewhat in meaning with enkrateia whereas αὐτάρκεια (autarkeia) is of a different order.

Socrates frames the sophistic phenomenon of charging fees for lessons: as I will argue in Section 5, Xenophon’s criticism of teaching for pay is more substantially integrated into Socratic ethics than Plato’s anecdotal banter about the sophists’ fees—Plato’s hostility towards money and wealth occurs consistently in political contexts (Schaps 2003: 147) and is rarely brought up in connection to Socrates’ poverty.\footnote{Exceptions mentioned by Schaps (2003) are Pl. Ap. 20b–c and Pl. Resp. 1.330b.} Therefore, the theoretical connection between Plato’s economic ideas and Socrates’ dismissal of sophistic fee-taking is never made explicitly. Plato’s Socrates teases and banters the sophists for charging fees, often in the prologue-parts of dialogues as a kind of philosophical “warming-up”, but it never seems to become programmatic. Because of his consistent disavowal of knowledge and of being a teacher, Plato’s Socrates does not need to defend his not charging fees; this may explain in part why he is less invested in pointing out explicitly what exactly is wrong about taking fees as a professional educator.\footnote{The closest Plato’s Socrates comes to making any programmatic statement about fee-taking is in Apology 19d8–e4, where the reason why Socrates refrains from taking pay is conditional: he only abstains from earning money by teaching (παιδεύειν, paideuein) people, because he does not know what virtue is, in contrast to sophists such as Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias who do. Cf. Corey 2002: 191–195. It is hard not to read this compliment to the sophists ironically, as in dialogues such as Protagoras and Meno Socrates eventually finds out that the sophists have no clue what the virtue they claim to teach entails (e.g., Pl. Meno 71a), or whether this virtue is teachable at all (Corey 2002: 191–195). However, it should be noted that in the context of the Apology, the teaching of virtue is not explicitly at stake; the point Socrates is making concerns a yet unspecified sort of paideia. Therefore, in the rhetorical context of the Apology, Socrates’ conditional reserve against charging a fee makes sense.} Whenever Plato’s Socrates does discuss the sophistic practice, the focus lies more on problems of ontology than on questions of social logic, as we will see in the Sections 4 and 5.

**Plato and the Ontology of Money**

What struck contemporary Athenians most about the sophistic practice of charging fees is the fact that they seemed to be outrageously hefty (See Blank 1985: 3–4 for sources). Plato’s depiction of sophistic fees is in line with this: whenever Socrates mentions sophists’ fees in passing, he never omits reference to the sheer size of the fees. Jibes about fee-taking are peppered with quantifiers: πολύ ἀργύριον (polu argurion; Pl. Tht. 178e8–179a3; [Pl.] Thg. 127e8–

This preoccupation with the quantity of the sophists’ wages, as I shall argue, implies two ideas about the nature of money: (1) the idea that money itself is a quantifier and the related, but distinct, idea that (2) money, far from being a neutral medium, entails its own standard and system of valuation. The first idea pertains to problems of quantification: if money is capable of expressing value in terms of quantity, does use of money imply that everything of value can be reduced to its quantitative dimensions? The second idea raises the question whether money can be the measure of everything. In the following section, both ideas will be discussed.

The Absurdity of Quantifying Wisdom

Plato credited the man who invented money (τὸ νόμισμα, ta nomisma) as a benefactor who made retail trading (καπηλεία, kapeleia) possible by providing a medium that makes items of wealth (χρήματα, chremata) “even and commensurable” (ὁμαλὴν τε καὶ σύμμετρον, homalen te kai summetron).48 This makes money a measure, the measure of all things. The idea that money is capable of quantifying heterogeneous entities is implicit in several of Plato’s jests about sophistic fee-charging. For instance, in the Cratylus, Socrates refers to Prodicus’ variously priced lectures:

48 Pl. Laws 11.918b–c. Plato assumes that money developed from barter and was invented to facilitate trade (Pl. Rep. 2.371d).

49 [Pl.], Ar. 366c; Arist. Rh. 3.14.1415b12 for the anecdote that Prodicus, when the audience of his one-drachma course began to doze and look bored, threw some of the material of his fifty-drachma course in, just to keep his audience eager. Cf. Pl. Lach. 186c for Socrates’ claim that he cannot afford the teaching of the sophists.
Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying that knowledge of high things is hard to gain; and surely knowledge of names is no small matter. Now if I had attended Prodicus’s fifty-drachma course of lectures, after which, as he himself says, a man has a complete education on this subject, there would be nothing to hinder your learning the truth about the correctness of names at once; but I have heard only the one-drachma course, and so I do not know what the truth is about such matters.

PL. Cra. 384a8–c2; translation by Fowler 1926

The indirect (and more serious) criticism here is the recurring reproach that by raising fees sophists restrict the accessibility of their courses to those with money, as the doctrine about correctness of names here is framed in terms of truth (ἀλήθεια, aletheia), the question is raised whether access to truth should be mediated by money. The playful reasoning underlying this point of criticism is that differentiating courses in terms of different price categories presupposes that knowledge can be quantified and parcelled along the same lines as money or commodities with concrete extensions. The doctrine about the correctness of names is called “not small” (οὐ σμικρόν, ou smikron)—an everyday way to talk about knowledge, in terms of more or less, much or little, but here to be taken literally: a big doctrine costs a lot of money. Of course, this is only a jibe in

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50 E.g., Xen. Cyn. 13.9; Corey 2002: 195–196. See also Fredal 2008 for the interesting argument that the sophists’ practice of raising fees may also have been a way to “demystify” the economy of gift-giving and beneficence in which philosophical wisdom used to circulate; by putting a concrete price on their lessons in rhetoric, the sophists (1) pulled their education out of a closed aristocratic circuit of privilege and (2) demystified the veiled economics of gift-giving as not different from monetary pay.

51 A reverse joke, based on a similar “ontological” critique, is made in PL. Soph. 234a3–9 by the Eleatic Stranger who compares the sophist to a husbandman who “makes” animals quickly and sells them for little money (σμικροῦ νομίσματος ἀποδίδοται, smikrou nomismatos apodidotai). Similarly, the sophist is a man who claims to know all things (πάντα, panta) and to be able to teach them in a little time for a small price (ὀλίγου, oligou). Here too, the idea is that monetary economics assumes a correlation between quantity and quality: knowledge of everything is a big thing; small prices for big things are absurd. Of course, this is only a joke (a παιδία, paidia, as the Eleatic Stranger himself indicates).
passing; elsewhere, however, Plato problematizes this relation between quality and quantity in a more sustained, and philosophically interesting, manner when he addresses the problem of valuation.

**Money as a Measure of Value**

The idea that money is a measure of value raises the question whether money is the measure of *everything*. Aristotle famously states that “money is the measure of all things” ([Arist. *NE* 9.1.1664a1–2; *NE* 5.5.1133a20–23]), only to modify this claim in two important respects: on closer analysis, it is not money (χρήματα [chremata] or νόμισμα [nomisma]) that is the real measure of things, but need (χρεία, chreia) that is the commensurating property; moreover, neither need nor money are the measure of *all* things, because in contexts of virtue it is purposive choice (προαίρεσις, prohaeresis) that is the measure of value ([Arist. *NE* 9.1.1164a35–64b5]). Whereas the sophists make wisdom a commodity for sale, to Aristotle, wisdom, virtue and happiness are not possessions (κτήματα, ktemata) that can be objects of exchange, but activities that are realized in Virtue Friendships. Those who attempt to sell wisdom make a category mistake, for the “coin” of Virtue Friendships, the good, cannot be changed into the legal tender of utility: there is no common measure to the good (an activity) and the useful (an object). The goods of utility are fundamentally incommensurable with the goods of virtue.

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52 Arist. *NE* 5.5.1133a27–30. Here, I follow Judson (1997) (whose analysis is indebted to Meikle’s (1995)) in his interpretation of the *chreia*-proviso as a qualifier of the domain of commensurability: money (τὰ χρήματα, ta chremata) only makes things commensurable with respect to their dimension of need (χρεία, chreia), the logical counterpart of utility (τὸ χρησιμόν, to chresimon). As I argue elsewhere (Van Berkel 2012), Judson’s interpretation of *chreia* gains strength when read against discussion of non-uniform friendship (friendships between partners who operate with different measures of value and that lack a common measure) in *NE* 9. But see Danzig 2000: 414 for an alternative reading of this phrase.

53 In *NE* 1.8.1098b32–1099a7 it is argued that the chief good (τὸ ἄριστον, to ariston) is located not in the possession (κτήσις, ktesis) of excellence but in its use (χρήσις, chresis), i.e. in its ἐνεργεία (energeia): διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν ἐξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ. This suggests not only that dealing with property is an instance of excellence, but also that there is an analogy between property and virtue. Cf. Frank (2005: 79): “It is by understanding property as a verb and not strictly as a noun, as an activity of use and not strictly as a fungible thing, that we see that property is bound to, is indeed a site of, virtue. And it is by understanding virtue as a verb and not strictly as a noun, as an activity and not strictly as a thing, that we see virtue as a kind of property.”
Plato addresses similar questions about valuation. In the *Hippias Major*, Socrates (ironically) develops the *quid pro quo* notion implicit in sophistic practice into the explicit endorsement of money (ἐξιός, *exiosen*, ἄξιον, *axion*) as a measure of value:

τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν ἑκάτερος πωποτε ἡξίωσεν ἀργύριον μυσθόν πράξασθαι ὢδ’ ἐπιδείξεις ποιήσασθαι ἐν παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σοφίας· οὕτως ἦσαν εὐθείως καὶ ἐλελήθει αὐτούς ἀργύριον ὡς πολλοῦ ἄξιον εἴη, τούτων δ’ ἐκάτερος πλέον ἀργύριον ἀπὸ σοφίας εἰργασται ἄξιον ὡς πολλοῦ εἴη, δημιουργός τεχνῆς· καὶ ἐτι πρότερος τούτων Πρωταγόρας.

But none of these early thinkers thought fit to charge a monetary fee or give displays of his wisdom for all comers. They were so simple they didn’t realize the great value of money. But either Gorgias or Prodicus made more money out of his wisdom than any other craftsman made from any skill whatever. And Protagoras did the same even earlier.

*Plato, Hippias Major* 282c6–d2; translation by Woodruff 1982

In contrast to the present-day sophists, such as Gorgias and Prodicus, the seven sages, were, according to Socrates, too naïve to realize the value of money (ἀργύριον ὡς πολλοῦ ἄξιον εἴη, *argurion hos pollou axion eïê*). Clearly, the reader is invited to read this passage ironically:54 throughout the Platonic oeuvre, Socrates’ disdain and indifference towards money is persistent (Schaps 2003). Both Gorgias and Prodicus are known to have earned more money from their wisdom than any δημιουργός (*demiourgos*) has from his τέχνη (*techne*, 282d3–4). Still, Hippias may have made more money than any other two sophists together—as he himself boasts (282e).

Socrates ironically interprets Hippias’ commercial success as a strong testimony to his σοφία and to his superiority over the ancient thinkers, in particular Anaxagoras, who, though heir of substantial property (καταλειφθέντων αὐτῷ πολλῶν χρημάτων), lost his entire property through carelessness, “so senseless (ἀνόητα, *anoeta*) was his wisdom (σοφίζεσθαι, *sophizesthai*)” (282e9–283b1)—ἀνόητα (*anoeta*) clearly intended as a pun on νοῦς (*nous*).55 According to Socrates, it is popular sentiment that being σοφός (*sophos*) means being σοφός for oneself (αὑτῷ, *hautoi*):

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54 See Woodruff 1982: 35 for an argument that Hippias probably did recognize and appreciate Socrates’ irony, but made “the best of a bad situation by not responding to it.”

55 The pun is made quite parenthetically. The fact that Hippias is not represented as explicitly reacting to it cannot be taken as a sign that he does not understand the joke.
So this seems to me fine testimony that you adduce for the wisdom of the men of today as compared with the earlier men, and many people agree with me that the wise man must be wise for himself especially; and the test of this is, who makes the most money. Well, so much for that.

PLATO, *Hippias Major* 283b1–4; translation by LAMB 1925

Here, the criterion of wisdom is the ability to make the most money (*πλείστον ἀργύριον ἐργάσεται, pleiton argurion ergasetai*). Socrates makes a psychological observation about the way the majority of people understand wisdom and about the measure that most people apply when judging wisdom: money. The irony is evident—but not elaborated upon.

**“Merchandiser of Food for Soul”: Questions of Quality**

As we have seen, Plato’s objections against teaching for pay, though hardly systematic, hinge around the ontological status of knowledge, wisdom and virtue: he is preoccupied with the absurdity of quantifying wisdom (*Cra. 384a–c, Soph. 234a*), and he raises the question, by irony, whether money is really the measure of value (*Hp. mai. 282c–d*) and whether the capacity to earn as much money as possible is a measure of wisdom (*Hp. mai. 282e–283b*).

At one point we do find psychological concerns involved in Socrates’ criticism against the notion of paying a sophist for his teachings. This is in the prologue of the *Protagoras*, where Plato’s Socrates drives the idea of teaching for pay to an absurd extreme by developing an analogy between food for the body and food for the soul. Overtly, this analogy serves to point out the differences between buying food for the body and purchasing food for the soul; indirectly, it raises concerns about the realm of the soul being contaminated with money that is associated with the realm of the body.

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56 Cf. Philostratus who states that Protagoras’ fee-raising is “not to be criticized, since we esteem more highly that which is expensive than that which is free” (*VS 1.10.4*).
In the prologue of the *Protagoras*, the topic of sophists charging fees serves as an experimental garden for Socrates to explore the nature of knowledge transmission. In anticipation of their meet-and-greet with Protagoras, Socrates raises several questions about the nature of sophistic practice: what kind of person is the sophist to whom Hippocrates is willing to pay a fee (Pl. *Prt.* 311b1–c3)? Is the trade of the sophist analogous to that of the physician and the sculptor: does a sophist educate people to become sophists themselves? Or is it another kind of learning (*μάθησις*, *mathesis*) that one expects to receive from Protagoras, more analogous to the grammar-school teacher, the music teacher or the gym teacher who do not provide vocational instruction in order to master a particular craft (*ἐπί τέχνη*, *epi technê*) but education (ο*πιδέια*, *paideia*) for becoming a nonprofessional (τὸν ἰδιώτην, *ton idioten*) and a free citizen (τὸν ἐλεύθερον, *ton eleutheron*)? And if it is all *παιδεία* (*paideia*), will Hippocrates really entrust (*παρασχεῖν*, *paraschein*) his soul to the care of a man whose profession he does not sufficiently understand?

Socrates and Hippocrates proceed to establish a preliminary definition of the sophist as someone “who has knowledge about wise things” (α*τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμων*, *ton sophon epistemon*), being the master (ἐπιστάτης, *epistates*) of a specific subject area, i.e. of being a clever speaker (*δεινός λέγειν*, *deinos legin*). But this again raises the question of subject matter: being a clever speaker about what (312c–e)? At this point, when Hippocrates again fails to find an answer, the conversation reverts to the topic of concern about the soul. The analogy between body and soul is elaborated in closer detail: entrusting one’s body to an expert calls for careful thought and consideration beforehand; hence, the soul, which is valued more highly than the body, requires even more serious counsel and consultation. It is here that Socrates, in attempting to enforce his warning, embarks on an elaborate analogy between the sophist and the merchant:

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57 311c4–312a2. Hippocrates is uncomfortable about this suggestions, not because Protagoras, as a sophist, is a shameful person, but because it is shameful for Hippocrates, in his quality as gentleman, to become a professional (in any occupation) at all. Cf. Blank 1985: 13; Corey 2002: 191.

58 312a7–b2. As has often been noted, Plato frequently emphasizes this distinction between professional and liberal education (e.g. *Laws* 1.643d); the term *παιδεία* (*paideia*) is reserved for the latter (*Grg*. 485a, *Resp*. 6.492c).

59 The term *παρέχω* (*parechô*) occurs often in the context of entrusting one’s body to the hands of a doctor (e.g., *Grg*. 456b; Xen. *Mem*. 1.2.54). Here in this context, the analogy is presumably with physical training (with the *παιδοτρίβης γυμναστική* [*paidotribes gumnatikê*] from 312b2): physical training requires entrusting one’s body to the expertise of the trainer.

60 Although for us this analogy is an intuitively plausible one, it is important to bear in
"And so, Hippocrates, the sophist turns out to be a merchandiser or hawker of the wares by which a soul is fed? It appears to me of course that he is someone of this sort." “Socrates, by what is the soul fed?” “By [the things] it learns, I do suppose,” I said. “And how, my friend, won’t the sophist, praising what he sells, in fact deceive us [about the food for our soul], just as the merchandiser and hawker do about the food for our body?”

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The “food for the soul” metaphor activates the notion of “intake” or “consumption,” which turns doctrines or knowledge into invasive forces that enter the soul and have immediate effects on its constitution. The point of the analogy is that merchandisers praise their wares irrespective of their quality (Pl. Prt. 313d). Just as food for the body requires experts who can inform you about the quality of the wares, so too one needs to be informed about the quality of the doctrine one buys from Protagoras (Pl. Prt. 313e–314b). In the process of buying foods and drinks for the body, one still has the opportunity to have those wares checked before intake, because one receives them in a separate vessel. With buying doctrines there is no such possibility: because doctrines cannot be transported in separate vessels, buying a μάθημα (mathema) implies immediate intake.62 Paying for teaching reveals a careless attitude towards the soul:

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61 Cf. Soph. 231e (ἐμπορός τις περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα, emporos tis peri ta tes psuches mathematata), Soph. 223c–224e.

62 It should be noted that whereas Xenophon’s Socrates expresses his concern over the fact that sophists, by accepting fees, place themselves under the obligation (ἀνάγκη, anankê) to deliver (e.g., Mem. 1.2.5–7. See also Section 5); here the threat lies at the other side of the
one should not approach food for the soul in the same way as food for the body (by buying it), because it simply does not work the same way for soul and body.

Hence, in the Protagoras, we first find the idea that paying a sophist for his teachings may have psychological repercussions. However, these concerns are not causally related to the nature of money or the workings of monetary economics: doctrines are not dangerous because they are to be paid for. Doctrines are dangerous if they are bad. The problem is that there is no way of checking doctrines before intake and the problem with the market is that merchandisers are not motivated to scrutinize the quality of their wares in the way that Socrates the midwife distinguishes his “real children” from mere wind-eggs.\footnote{Pl. Tht. 150c1–3. Cf. Blank 1985: 9.}

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Hence, it is the quality of the merchandise that is controversial. The elaborate analogy with merchandise merely serves to facilitate the metaphor “food for the soul” and to highlight the invasive quality (and hence, the danger) of sophistic doctrines.\footnote{This “mechanical model” of knowledge transmission recurs in Pl. Euth. 271d3 where Socrates notes that “whoever pays” (ἀλλον, ὃς ἂν διδῶ μισθόν, οἵω τε ποιῆσαι) is made skillful by Dionysodorus and Euthydemos.}

As we have seen, Plato’s objections against teaching for pay hinge around the ontological status of “knowledge”, “wisdom”, “virtue” and “doctrines”. His preoccupations with the absurdity of quantifying wisdom, his thematization of the popular opinion that money is the measure of wisdom and his elaborate analogy between food for the body and food for the soul seem to indicate that to his view money unduly reifies knowledge and virtue. Although it is never made explicit, Plato appears to agree with Aristotle that the metaphysical structure of money is incommensurable with the metaphysical properties of virtue or knowledge.

Xenophon and the Social Logic of Money

Xenophon’s Socrates expresses a critique of the practice of teaching for pay in terms more firmly integrated in a set of moral and social principles. The central point is not that there is any harm in money as such, but that money often entails a particular way of interacting with other people that is at odds with the aims of friendship and realizing virtue. Here two different types of objections can be distinguished: there is the formal objection, that accepting
pay presupposes a wrong interpretation of the teacher-student relationship and of the good realized in this context; and there is the substantive objection, that demanding pay is incompatible with the contents of Socrates’ moral-philosophical teaching that takes as its point of departure the principle of ἐγκράτεια, enkrateia.

The Formal Objection

The formal objection has its roots in the historical context of attitudes towards market trade. Although historically the connection between monetization and the rise of retail trade was problematic and complex, from quite early in the Classical period the phenomena of coinage, money, trade and credit formed a conceptual cluster. This cluster, symbolized by the agora, was imagined to dictate a rationality of its own and to impose its own norms: it was the place of weighing and calculating, boasting and bargaining, trickery and deceit,

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66 Aristotle and Plato assumed that money developed from barter and was invented to facilitate trade (Pl. Resp. 2.371d; Arist. Pol. 1257a19–40, NE 1133a17–20). Although historically this is not correct, it does tell us something about the way people in the fourth century had come to see money: as a medium of exchange and an important instrument for trade. Cf. Plato’s remark that the man who invented money made goods commensurable (Pl. Laws 11.918b–c; see n. 47 above). Herodotus, in ascribing paratactively the invention of both coinage and retail trade to the Lydians (they were the first κάπηλοι, kapeloi, Hdt. 1.94.1) closely associates money with retail trade. Money and trade were interrelated phenomena in Greek popular thinking. See Osborne 2007: 294 for the conceptual association of money with retail trade.


68 Standardized measures were only mandatory in retail trade. See Johnstone 2011: 54.


70 E.g., the trick of placing ripe figs on top of a basket to mask the bad ones: Alexis pCG 133. For framing of market activity as deceit, see e.g. Hdt. 1.153.1 where the Greek agora is misrepresented by the Persian king Cyrus as the scene of double-dealing. Cf. Xen. Mem. 3.7.6 where κάπηλοι (kapeloi) are represented as suspicious deceitful individuals who buy cheap and sell dear.
and fast information.\textsuperscript{71} In a market situation, overt pursuit of self-interest is not only accepted, but normative:\textsuperscript{72} giving something away for free is considered stupid\textsuperscript{73}—a mentality constructed as anti-social in other areas of life.\textsuperscript{74}

It is at the heart of this market that the sophist’s activity is situated. Hippias’ trade, for instance,\textsuperscript{75} is located in the agora “at the tables of the money changers” (ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις, epi tais trapezais)—an image suggestive of monetary transactions and haggling and deceit perhaps, but also the very location where Socrates conversed with Athenian youngsters (Pl. Ap. 17c).

The rationality of the market presupposes particular norms of interpersonal interaction. Hence, for Xenophon’s Socrates, the question whether economic relations are a suitable context for exchanging or disseminating wisdom and virtue becomes acute. A salient example is Socrates’ encounter with Antiphon the sophist in Xenophon’s Memorabilia.\textsuperscript{76} Antiphon disqualifies Socrates’ refusal of fees as irrational behavior:

Πάλιν δὲ ποτε ὁ Ἀντιφῶν διαλεγόμενος τῷ Σωκράτει εἶπεν ὩΣ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ τοῖς σὲ δίκαιοι μὲν νομίζω, σοφὸν δὲ οὐδ’ ὑπωστιοῦν· δοκεῖς δὲ μοι καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο γιγνώσκειν· οὐδένα γοῦν τῆς συνουσίας ἀργύριον πράττῃ, καίτοι τό γε ἵπατον ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο τι ἄν κέκτησαι νομίζων ἀργύριον ἀξίων εἶναι οὐδένι ἀν μὴ ὅτι προίκα δοθήσαι, ἄλλ’ οὖδ’ ἐλαττὼν τῆς ἀξίας λαβὼν. δὴ δὴ ὅτι εἰ καὶ τὴν συνουσίαν ᾤου τὸν ἀξίων εἶναι, καὶ ταύτης ἀν οὐκ ἐλαττῶν τῆς ἀξίας ἀργύριον ἐπράττου. δίκαιος μὲν οὖν ἄν εἶδη, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξαπατᾷς ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ, σοφὸς δὲ οὐκ ἄν, μηδενὸς γε ἀξίων ἀπομιμεῖται.


\textsuperscript{73} Cf. Hdt. 3.140.1: Syloson resents his own stupidity for giving away a beautiful cloak, regarding the gift as a “loss.” On the ideology of “business” that propagates norms to seek “value for money” and ridicule the “sucker” who pays over or undercharges, see Davis 1992: 7–8, 56–58. Cf. Polanyi 1968: 69.

\textsuperscript{74} E.g., Ar. Ach. 28 ff.. Harris (2002: 76): “An Athenian might think about politics in the Assembly, cultivate friendships in the gymnasia and at symposia, and at home try to avoid quarrels with family and neighbors. But when he set foot in the agora, the main thing he thought about was kerdos, getting a bargain.”


\textsuperscript{76} This section (the analysis of the Antiphon-episode) is based on, and quotes from, Van Berkel 2010.
On another occasion when Antiphon was talking to Socrates, he said, ‘You know, Socrates, I think that you are an honest man, but not at all a wise one. And it seems to me that you realize this yourself; at any rate, you don’t charge anyone for your company. But if you thought that your cloak or your house or any other item of your property was worth money, so far from giving it away, you wouldn’t even accept a price lower than its value. So obviously, if you thought that your company was worth anything, you would charge a fee for it no less than its value. Therefore, honest you may be, since you don’t deceive with a view to your own advantage; but wise you cannot be, if your knowledge is worthless.’

Xen. Mem. 1.6.11–12; Translation by Tredennick & Waterfield 1990

Antiphon interprets Socrates’ refusal of fees as giving away commodities for free. This, according to Antiphon, is indicative of the seller’s own low valuation of the goods he supplies: not charging a fee is tantamount to pricing the goods on offer (in this case Socratic conversation) as worthless—that is: if and only if one accepts Antiphon’s commercial framing of the exchange in question.

Antiphon’s world view is imbued with the language of the market. Like the merchant he only acknowledges one single standard of value, monetary currency, to which everything should be reduced; this entails a commodification of education, i.e. Socrates’ company is characterized as a possession (something one acquires, κτάομαι [ktaomai]) on the same line as a cloak or a house. The assumption that not charging a fee is tantamount to giving away services for free betrays a distinct sort of rationality, the rationality of the market that reduces σοφία (sophia) to the mercantile cleverness that enables one to sell one’s goods with profit (Cf. Pl. Hp. mai. 283b1–d2. See Section 4 above).

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77 Pl. Soph. 234a may be read as Plato’s answer to a similar sophistic challenge. See Section 4 above.

78 Commodities are commonly defined as entities that have use value and that can be exchanged in a discrete transaction for a counterpart that has, in the immediate context, an equivalent value. Cf. Kopytoff 1986: 68. Cf. Appadurai 1986: 3–16, for the argument that the distinction between gift and commodity lies in a distinction in modes of exchange. The same physical object can be both gift and commodity, its meaning shifting with the ideology attached to the situation of exchange. For a similar point, see Kopytoff 1986: 64.

79 Cf. anecdotes about Protagoras who allowed pupils less than the standard fee if they were prepared to state on oath that they did not think his teaching worth so much. E.g., Pl. Prt. 328bc. Cf. Arist. NE 1.64a24–26, dl 9.36.

80 On sophia in the Memorabilia, see Chernyakhovskaya 2014, Dorion 2008b, and Morrison 2013.
The term συνουσία (sunousia: company, intercourse), with its obvious sexual connotations, paves the way for Socrates’ reaction:⁸¹

ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπεν· Ὡ Ἀντιφῶν, παρ’ ἡμῖν νομίζεται τὴν ὥραν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμοίως μὲν καλὸν, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρὸν διατίθεσθαι εἶναι. τὴν τε γὰρ ὥραν ἐὰν μὲν τις ἄργυρίου πωλῆ ὑμῖν κατοικίαν ἑάυτων ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ἡμῖν δὲ τις, ὃ ἐὰν γνῷ, καὶ κάγαθον ἀργυρίου πωλῆσθαι, ἂν δὲ τις, ὃ ἐὰν γνῷ ἐλαττὸν τῆς ἀξίας ἀργυρίου πωλῆσθαι, ὃς δὲ τις, ὃ ἐὰν γνῷ εὐφυῆ ὁπότεν διδάσκων ὁ δὲ τις ἐὰν ἐξή ἀγαθὸν φίλον ποιεῖται, τοῦτον νομίζομεν, ὃ τῷ καλῷ κἂν ἀγαθῷ πολίτῃ προσήκει, ταῦτα ποιεῖν.

To this Socrates replied, ‘In our society, Antiphon, the same rules with regard to what is creditable and what is not are thought to apply equally to the disposal of physical attractions and of wisdom. A man who sells his favors for a price to anyone who wants them is called a catamite; but if anyone forms a love-attachment with someone whom he knows to be truly good, we regard him as perfectly respectable. In just the same way, those who sell wisdom at a price to anyone who wants it are called sophists; but if anyone, by imparting any edifying knowledge that he possesses, makes a friend of one whom he knows to be naturally gifted, we consider that he is behaving as a truly good citizen should behave.’

Xen. Mem. 1.6.13

Socrates’ move consists in two conceptual steps: Socrates substitutes Antiphon’s more neutral terminology of wage-earning (of “exacting pay”: ἀργύριον πράττῃ [argurion prattêi], ἐλαττον τῆς ἀξίας λαβών [elatton tes axias labon], ἀργύριον ἐπράττου [argurion eprattou]) with the explicit vocabulary of selling (ἀργυρίου πωλῆ [arguriou polêi], ἀργυρίου πωλοῦτας [arguriou polountas]). Moreover, and more crucially, Socrates draws a systematic contrast between Antiphon’s commercial discourse and an alternative understanding of Socratic practice by means of an analogy with physical beauty and its exploitation.

According to Socrates’ analogy, there are two ways of dealing with beauty and wisdom. The shameful way, “the commercial way”, means selling it irre-
respectively to anybody (τῷ βουλομένῳ, τοῖ boulomenoi), thereby rendering oneself a prostitute (πόρνος, pornos) in the case of beauty and a sophist in the case of wisdom.\(^{82}\) The right way is selecting one’s partner on the basis of moral qualities and initiating honorable relations of reciprocity (φιλία, philia) with them: in the case of beauty sharing it with a gentleman-lover,\(^{83}\) in the case of wisdom bestowing it on a selected friend.\(^{84}\)

It is instructive to scrutinize Xenophon’s use of the distinction between body and soul that is implicitly present in this episode. Whereas to Plato the dichotomy serves to dismiss wealth and money by relegating them to the realm of the body,\(^{85}\) and hence as subordinated to other goods,\(^{86}\) it has a different function in Xenophon’s Socratic thought. The dichotomy does not construct an opposition between the economy of the body and a distinct economy of the soul. Rather, both body and soul are potentially involved in two different types of economies: a shameful one, oriented towards immediate gratification of short-term needs, as opposed to an honorable one, informed by moral concerns.\(^{87}\) This accords with the overall tenor of Xenophon’s Socratic work, where a soul-body distinction is acknowledged (e.g. Mem. 4.1.2), but rarely to the extent that the realm of the body and the physical is dismissed as secondary,

\(^{82}\) Xenophon is obviously drawing on the etymological derivation of πόρνος/πόρνη (pornos/pornê) from πέρνημι (pernemi), to sell. Cf. Chantraine 1977.

\(^{83}\) On the complication that in Symp. 8 Xenophon seems to oppose homoerotic long-term bonds, see Pentassuglio in this volume 365–390. Cf. Van Berkel 2012, chapter 5.

\(^{84}\) It is in line with Xenophon’s understanding of Socratic didactics, that this analogy, by implication, assigns the role of the ἐρώμενος (erômenos, the object of desire and seduction) to Socrates. The encounter with Antiphon can be read in close relation with Socrates’ conversation with the hetaera Theodote in Mem. 3.11, where Socrates attempts to teach Theodote, the self-proclaimed expert on φιλία (philia), the principle of Active Partnership. See Tamiolaki in this volume 433–460 and Van Berkel 2012, chapter five. On the motif of erotic role-reversal in the Socratic authors, see Pentassuglio in this volume 365–390.

\(^{85}\) Money is related to the lowest part of the soul (Resp. 9.581a); the concern for money comes last, after concern for the body (Laws 5.743e). Cf. the ps.-Platonic Eryxias 401a–e where wealth (χρήματα) is predominantly described with reference to the body. See Plato, Phaedo 64d–67a for Plato’s little regard for the body. Cf. Sedlacek 2011: 109 ff.

\(^{86}\) Material wealth is inferior to other goods; e.g. Laws 111.697bl; Cf. Resp. IX.581 ff.: love for gain and money is the lowest of the different types of pleasure.

\(^{87}\) Here I disagree with (the otherwise admirable and spot-on) analysis of Tell (2009), who reads in this episode “a thematic sequence consisting of wisdom, money, and prostitution, in which the interference of the intermediary phase—money—runs the danger of corrupting and even conflating the things of the mind with the sphere of the body” (16, my emphasis).
subservient or hostile to that of the soul. Xenophon’s Socrates insists just as much on caring for the body as for the soul (Xen. Mem. 1.2.4, 3.12; Cf. Dorion 2006: 96, 2011: 16).

Although not made explicit by means of terminology, Socrates’ reaction to Antiphon appeals to the idea of “proper use” in two ways. First of all, there seems to be a proper use to both physical beauty and wisdom: they can be wealth to their owner if he knows how to use them; but they are worthless for the prostitute and the sophist, who are incapable of proper use. Moreover, bearing in mind the *Oeconomicus*’ distinction between use value and exchange value (see Section 2 above), the implicit suggestion may be that just as the flute is only sold for money if one does not know how to use it oneself, one only sells wisdom if one does not know how to use it oneself.

The prostitute/sophist-analogy opposes erotic and didactic transactions on a commercial basis to the type of erotic and didactic exchange embedded in a long-term relationship. This long-term relationship is characterized by the economics of sharing:

> ἐγὼ δ’ οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὃ Άντιφών, ὡσπερ ἄλλος τις ἢ ἔπιφ ἀγαθῷ ἢ κυνὶ ἢ ὄρνιθι ἤδεται, οὕτω καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἔχομει φίλοις ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ εάν τι ἔχω ἄγαθόν, διδάσκω, καὶ καὶ ἄλλοις συνίστημι παρ’ ὃν ὃν ἂν ἰγίωμει ἡφιλήτσεθαι τι αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀρετήν καὶ τοὺς ἑθισμοὺς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, καὶ ὄντι ἄν καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἠδοκοῦμεν καὶ μέγα νομίζομεν κέρδος, ἐὰν ἄλλη λοις ἀγαθοῖς γιγνώμεθα.

“As for myself, Antiphon, I take as much pleasure in good friends as other people take in a good horse or dog or bird—in fact, I take more; and if I have anything good to teach them, I teach it, and I introduce them to any others from whom I think they will get help in the quest for goodness. And in company with my friends, I open and read from beginning to end the books in which the wise men of past times have written down and bequeathed to us their treasures; and when we see anything good, we take it for ourselves; and we regard our mutual friendship as great gain.”

Xen. Mem. 1.6.14

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88 With the possible exception of Socrates’ notorious speech in *Symp. 8.6–41*. On this speech, see Pentassuglio in this volume 367–374.

89 The opposition between φιλία and prostitution recurs in Xen. *Symp. 8.21* where Socrates asks the rhetorical question how there can be any more commitment (στέργειν) between a prostitute and customer than between a buyer and a seller.
Whenever Socrates has something good to teach his friends, he does so and when he expects a friend to profit from others who may help him, he introduces the friend to them too. Socratic “teaching” turns out to be: reading collectively (κοινῇ, koinêi), exploring the treasures (τοὺς θησαυρούς, tous thesaurous) of the wise men of old, and extracting the good things out of them.

Here we see Socrates dismissing Antiphon’s commercial framework by contrasting it with an alternative model in a series of oppositions. First, Socrates brings in the element of selection: selling means delivering to anyone, whereas within the friendship model one elects the receiver on basis of his moral qualities. Secondly, in contrast to Antiphon’s value monism, his propensity to value everything in monetary currency, Socrates propagates the sharing (i.e. reading κοινῇ, koinêi) of wisdom and virtue of the “treasures” of wise men (who, by implication, are sharing their wisdom too). This propagation of sharing reveals that the economy of intrinsic valuables is not a zero-sum game: their value structure promotes sharing without diminishing.

In Antiphon’s monistic universe, valuing something implies reducing it to a mere means, setting a price on it so as to sell it and to part from it—converting use value into exchange value; his worldview only allows for short-lived relationships which are immediately dissolved after the discrete transaction has taken place, where goods are valued irrespective of the relationship in which they figure and where relations are merely means for obtaining ulterior ends. Socrates’ interpretation of the same exchange event is radically different: his notion of value always contains reference to relationships; relationships are never merely a means, but also part of the end: wisdom and virtue are not commodities for sale, but goods that arise out of a process of friends sharing virtues and sharing friends becoming virtuous.

Finally, the opposition between being a prostitute, engaging in short-term exchanges, and practicing self-restraint (being σώφρων, sophron) suggests an analogous opposition between being a sophist and being a gentleman-citizen. Although the example of prostitution is obviously chosen for its moral

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90 The image of the horse, dog, and bird refer to gifts given to erômenoi. Cf. Pl. Lys. 211d and the horses that are exorbitantly expensive gifts to the Corinthian boys in Ar. Plut. 157.

91 Although the use of thesauros for treasuries of metaphorical, non-material, “wealth” such as wisdom and learning is quite common in Attic literature (e.g. S. Ant. 33, Pl. Phlb. 15e), in this context the term also underscores Socrates’ attempt to redefine wealth, making wisdom, not money, the real treasure. Further on in the Memorabilia (4.2.9), this line of thought is made explicit.

92 Interestingly, Xenophon elsewhere (1.2.60–61) apparently feels the urge to exonerate Socrates from the charge of being too “elitist.” Cf. Corey 2002 on this point.
The analogy is salient for what it presupposes: an understanding of prostitution and sophistry as incompatible with self-restraint—as we will see in the next section.

**The Substantive Objection**

The formal objection that charging fees for lessons in wisdom presupposes a misguided understanding of the teacher-student-relationship shades into the substantive objection that demanding pay is incompatible with the very subject matter of teaching virtue. According to Xenophon’s Socrates, interacting with others with the mediation of pay (μισθός, misthos), yields a distinct type of relationship with its own dynamics. The effects of μισθός (misthos) on the quality of relationships is frequently thematized in Xenophon’s oeuvre:

- There is a tension between the logic of wage-earning and trust: paying guardians μισθός (misthos) does not optimally guarantee loyalty in them; giving gifts94 to friends is more effective because they are πιστοτέροι (pistoteroi) and prone to reciprocate.95
- Offering compensation by sale or wage discharges all parties from further obligations to one another; charis-exchanges and benefactions incite positive emotions in the recipients and make them be of service permanently.96

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93 For philosophers’ dismissive attitudes and proposed constraints on sex, see e.g. Pl. Resp. 4.458d–461b, Laws 8.840d–841e, Arist. Pol. 1334b29–35b37, 1335b38–36a2.

94 E.g., 8.2.17: δώρα (dora).

95 Cf. the wealth contest between Cyrus and Croesus in Cyp. 8.2.16–19 (Von Reden 1995: 87: “an experiment which proved the effect of gift-giving’) in the context of their conversation about the good life (Cyr. 8.2). The idea is that μισθός (misthos), typically belonging to the short-term conception of resources and wealth that Croesus embodies, does not guarantee loyalty in guardians. The wealth contest between Cyrus and Croesus has a Socratic analogue, when Socrates defends the counter-intuitive claim that he (owning a total sum of five minae) is wealthier than Critoboulus who owns a hundred times that sum (Oec. 2.2–9). In making the point that Socrates, with his limited needs and desires has enough wealth, whereas Critoboulus’ expensive lifestyle renders him poor, Socrates adduces an argument very similar to Cyrus’: Critoboulus’ friends only cost him money, whereas Socrates can be certain that should he be in dire need he will not have a lack of friends to help him out. (Cf. Hiero 4.6–10; Mem. 4.2.37, 1.6.1–10). For the Croesus episode as a literary reaction on Herodotus’ representation of the encounter between Croesus and Cyrus, see: Lefèvre 1971; Gray 2011: 151, 170 ff.

96 E.g., Xen. Ages. 4.4.1: doing free favors is preferable over taking payment for services,
charis-exchanges are a more effective model for forging, maintaining and legitimating a position of superiority.\textsuperscript{97}

- Accepting \textit{misthos} implies acting out of compulsion; actions performed out of compulsions cannot be qualified as acts of \textit{charis} and do not deserve to be reciprocated with \textit{charis}.\textsuperscript{98}

In Xenophon's non-Socratic works \textit{χάρις} (\textit{charis}) and \textit{εὐεργεσία} (\textit{euergesia}) are explicitly propagated as methods of governance that are more successful than coercion. There is some continuity between Xenophon's characterization of the ideal leader and his portrayal of Socrates, who is also prone to maintain "his position at the head of the benefaction chain".\textsuperscript{99} Moreover, Xenophon makes the incompatibility of \textit{μισθός} (\textit{misthos}), belonging to a short-term system of immediate compensation and gratification, with long-term moral relations shaped by \textit{χάρις} (\textit{charis}) and \textit{πίστις} (\textit{pistis}), philosophically productive: long-term moral economics not only constitutes a precondition for the trans-

\textsuperscript{97} On this mechanism, see also Azoulay 2004, a thorough study about the role of \textit{χάρις} (\textit{charis}) in Xenophon as a political tool that establishes moral relationships of indebtedness. See also Tamiolaki in this volume 433–460.

\textsuperscript{98} E.g. Xen. \textit{Cyr}. 4.2.12: Cyrus' followers join their leader not out of compulsion (\textit{οὐκ ἀνάγκῃ}, \textit{ouk ananke}), but willing (\textit{ἐθελοῦσι}, \textit{ethelousoi}) and "for \textit{χάρις} (\textit{charis})". Here \textit{charis} is ambiguous between prospective ("for the sake of future \textit{charis} from Cyrus," i.e., "in order to obtain \textit{charis} from Cyrus") and retrospective ("because of \textit{charis} toward Cyrus," i.e., "because they have received \textit{χάρις charis} from Cyrus"). Cyrus' reaction is in keeping with their \textit{charis}: he prays that he may be able to return the favor (\textit{χάριν ἀποδοῦναι}, \textit{charin apodounai}) of their readiness (\textit{προθυμία}, \textit{prothumia}). There is an effective contrast between ready and willing behavior that yields \textit{charis} and the idea of compulsion, a disjunction between moral obligations and enforceable obligations. Actions performed out of compulsion cannot be qualified as acts of \textit{charis} and do not deserve to be reciprocated with \textit{charis}. Cf. the opposition between compelling followers by means of coercion (\textit{ἀνάγκη}, \textit{anankê}) and "persuasion of the willing" (\textit{τὸ ἑκόντας πείθεσθαι}, \textit{ta hekontas peithesthai}) (Xen. \textit{Cyr}. 1.2.21); and the opposition between serving out of compulsion (\textit{ἀνάγκη}, \textit{anankê}) vs. out of goodwill and friendship (\textit{εὐνοία καὶ φιλία}, \textit{eunoiai kai philiai}) (Xen. \textit{Cyr}. 3.1.28). Cf. Empedocles fr. 116: Charis "στυγέει δύστλητον Ἀνάγκην" (\textit{stugeei dustleton Ananken}).

\textsuperscript{99} O’Connor (1994: 57). E.g., in Xen. \textit{Ap}. 17, Socrates defends his refusal to accept money for teaching, emphasizing that he is indebted to nobody (\textit{χάριτας ὀφείλειν}, \textit{charitas opheilein}).
mission of wisdom and virtue; it constitutes its very substance. In *Memorabilia* 1.2, dedicated to a systematic defense of Socrates’ life and teachings, Xenophon attempts to dismiss the charge that Socrates would have “corrupted the youth”. Among the accusations that Xenophon invalidates is the reproach that Socrates would have made his associates “money-lovers” (ἐρασιχρημάτους, erasichretatous).

Nor again did he make his associates money-lovers: he rid them of all other desires except for his company, and for that he charged no fee. In eschewing fees, he considered that he was protecting his own independence; those who accepted a fee in return for their services he nicknamed ‘self-enslavers’, because they were obliged to converse with *all from whom they could take a fee*. He expressed surprise that a man who offered to teach goodness should demand to be paid for it and, instead of anticipating the greatest possible gain through obtaining a good friend, should be afraid that the person who has become truly good will feel less than the deepest gratitude to his supreme benefactor. Socrates never made any such offer to anyone, but he believed that those of his associates who

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100 For love for money, philarguria, as a negative quality in Plato, see Pl. *Resp.* 1.347b, Grg. 515e, Ap. 29e, 30b. For the sophists’ reputation of being money-lovers, see, e.g., Plato Comicus, Peisander fr. 103 (Kock). Cf. Xen. *Symp.* 4.62.

101 This adjective is a neologism of Xenophon, coined by analogy with φιλαργυρία (philarguria), probably to bring out that love for money is on a par with other desires (τῶν ἄλλων ἑπιθυμιῶν, ton allon epithumion); it seems to highlight the compulsory aspects of money-driven behavior.

102 ‘ἄν’ is deleted by Dindorf (1910).
accepted the principles which he himself approved would be good friends all their life long to himself and to one another.\footnote{Translation by Tredennick & Waterfield (1990), adapted.}

\textit{Xen. Mem. 1.2.5–7}

Fee-taking is condemned by means of the imagery of being an “enslaver of oneself” (\textit{ἀνδραποδιστής ἑαυτῶν}, \textit{andrapodistes heauton}). In this case, the trouble with taking fees is not so much that it makes it impossible to choose one’s conversation partner on the basis of his moral quality,\footnote{\textit{Pace Corey 2002: 196–197: “Taking pay places constraints upon the free discretion that any conscientious teacher will want to exercise.”}} but that it yields a dynamics of its own, a dynamics hostile to the very substance of Socratic education.\footnote{It is on this passage that Blank (1985) bases his argument that the main problem with the fee-taking is that it is an infringement of the teacher’s freedom: submitting oneself to the necessity to “deliver the goods” after payment is effectively enslaving oneself. Cf. Gigon 1953: 34.}

Accepting payment not only puts one under the legal obligation to deliver;\footnote{Blank 1985. A similar objection is raised in \textit{Mem. 1.6.5}; once you take money, you are under an obligation (\textit{ἀναγκαῖον}, \textit{anankaion}) to carry out the task whereas when you refrain from it you can talk to whomever you like (\textit{οὐκ ἀνάγκη διαλέγεσθαι ᾧ ἂν μὴ βούλωμαι}, \textit{ouk Ananke dialegesthai hoi an mê boulomai}). Alternatively, in \textit{Mem. 1.5.6} the image of slavery recurs: whoever takes money makes himself a \textit{δοῦλος} (\textit{doulos}) of a \textit{δεσπότης} (\textit{despotes}).} it is even suggested that the very mediation of money makes one cultivate the wrong \textit{ἐπιθυμίαι} (\textit{epithumiai}) and hence causes compulsory behavior: one is under compulsion to \textit{diaλέγεσθαι} (\textit{dialegesthai}, to converse) with whomever one \textit{can} get money from.\footnote{This reading diverges from current interpretations of this passage. I read the optative \textit{ἂν λάβοιεν} as a potential optative instead of a secondary sequence replacing a distributive-iterative subjunctive. I argue this in more detail in Van Berkel 2010.}

Socratic economics strikingly stands out from this sophistic discourse ruled by compulsion (\textit{τὸ ἀναγκαῖον}, \textit{to anankaion}) and fear (\textit{φοβοῖτο}, \textit{phoboito}): for Socrates, the greatest gain is making friends and making one’s friends morally excellent; in light of this objective, fear turns into trust (\textit{ἐπίστευε}, \textit{episteue}), and obsession with gain (\textit{κέρδος}, \textit{kerdos}) is replaced by a belief in \textit{charis}, of generosity and gratitude. The practice of fee-taking flies in the face of the sophist’s claim of teaching virtue, for fee-taking is a symptom of distrusting one’s pupil—of which there is no need if one has succeeded in making the pupil virtuous!\footnote{This paradox recurs on several occasions in Socratic literature and other manifestations of criticism against the sophists. E.g. Pl. \textit{Grg. 519c, 460e}; Isoc. \textit{C. soph}. 5–6.} The bottom line is that \textit{charis}, virtue and trust pre-
suppose a time-frame that surpasses the short-term world of the businessman, sophist, and prostitute. By refraining from accepting fees Socrates contributes to the character formation of his followers: in the immediately preceding paragraphs it is explained that although Socrates never professed to teach people a desire for goodness (ἀρετῆς ἐπιθυμεῖν, aretes epithumein), he inspired his disciples to imitate him and hence attain excellence (Mem. 1.2.3). This goes for the entire repertory of Socrates’ behavior: by demonstrating his own enkrateia over his passions and appetites, his endurance of cold and heat and toil, and the way he trained himself to be moderate in his needs (τὸ μετρίων δεῖσθαι, to metrion deisthai) so as to be easily satisfied (ἀρκοῦντα, arkounta) with very few possessions (πάνυ μικρὰ κεκτημένος, panu mikra kektemenos), he (unwittingly) set an example and a standard to his students. His attitude towards fees fit in this picture. The judgment that the connection between refusing pay and criticizing love of money is a case of “sloppy causal reasoning” is unwarranted (pace Corey 2002: 209).

In short, we may say that to Xenophon’s Socrates, the problem with demanding and accepting pay for his conversations is twofold. The formal objection is that accepting pay presupposes a wrong interpretation of the teacher-student relationship, confusing friendly reciprocity premised on trust, generosity and gratitude with a commercial notion of exchange. The substantive problem is that demanding pay is in itself incompatible with the contents of Socratic moral-philosophical teaching that takes as its point of departure the principle of enkrateia.

**Pay and χάρις: Plato’s Demystification**

Plato’s oeuvre does not seem to offer a comparable reflection on the dynamics of personal relations. One possible exception could be Plato’s Gorgias that figures a trope very similar to the one in Mem. 1.2.5–7: that raising fees for lessons in virtue is somehow self-contradictory. In the Gorgias, Socrates constructs an alternative version of the paradox of charging fees:

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109 Cf. Dorion (2000), who, in articulating the thematic organization of Book 1, points out that the themes of enkrateia and Socrates’ indifference to money appear three times in Book 1 and every time in sequence: 1.2.1–4 (enkrateia) and 1.2.5–7 (indifference to money); 1.5.1–5 (enkrateia) and 1.5.6 (indifference to money); 1.6.1–10 (enkrateia) and 1.6.11–14 (indifference to money). A similar sequence occurs in Xen. Ap. 16.
καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφισταί, τάλλα σοφοὶ ὤντες, τοῦτο ἄτοπον ἐργάζονται πράγμα: φάσκοντες γάρ ἄρετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι πολλάκις κατηγοροῦσιν τῶν μαθητῶν ὡς ἀδικουσί σφᾶς [αὐτοῦς], τοὺς τε μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες, εὑ παθόντες ὑπ’ αὐτῶν. καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ λόγου τί ἀν ἄλογωτερον εἴη πράγμα, ἄνθρωποισιν ἀγαθοῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνῃς γεννομένοις, ἐξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου, σχόντα δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ ψ ως οὖκ ἔχουσιν; οὕ δοκεῖ οἰ τοῦτο ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὦ ἑταῖρε;

"The sophists, in fact, with all their other accomplishments, act absurdly in one point: claiming to be teachers of virtue, they often accuse their pupils of doing them an injury by cheating them of their fees and otherwise showing no recognition of the good they have done them. [519d] Now what can be more unreasonable than this plea? That men, after they have been made good and just, after all their injustice has been rooted out by their teacher and replaced by justice, should be unjust through something that they have not! Does not this seem to you absurd, my dear friend?"

Pl. Gorgias 519c3–d7; translation by Fowler 1926

Good teachers succeed in instilling their students with virtue. Virtuous students cannot fail to reciprocate charis. Hence, teachers of virtue who accuse their students of non-payment and ingratitude are being absurd: either they haven’t done their job well enough (in which case they do not deserve to be paid) or they have (in which case, the student’s education being successful, they will be paid). Although this paradox resembles the one in Mem. 1.2.5–7, there are some subtle differences that may be instructive for the differences between Plato and Xenophon as to their attitudes towards money and charis. First of all, here in the Gorgias-passage, the paradox is in complaining and accusing students of non-payment after the lessons have taken place—in which case, the very accusation proves to be an unwitting diagnosis of the teacher’s failure. In the Memorabilia-passage, the point is that the very act of asking a fee beforehand is a gesture of mistrust on the part of the teacher that is incompatible with the ethics of charis that is all about taking the leap of faith and paying it forward. The teacher’s complaints in the Gorgias-passage are not inherent to the workings of money; the analysis in the Memorabilia-passage concern the very logic of exchange.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ At first sight, anecdotes about Protagoras’ valuation practices do not seem to fit into either of the lines of thought. Protagoras famously let the customer fix the value of the education
Another, more subtle, difference is that here in the Gorgias-passage, the charis-economy is not imagined as an alternative for misthos-payment, but is presented in close juxtaposition with it (τούς τε μισθοὺς ἀποδειδόντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν ὡς ἀποδειδόντες), perhaps subsuming μισθός (καὶ ἄλλην χάριν). This points to a broader tendency in Plato’s work where sophists, despite the fact that they charge money for their lessons, are prone to represent their relations with their students as more than a purely commercial transaction. Above and beyond the objectifiable compensations, there is an “additional” charis, material or symbolical, that adds a moral or social dimension to the exchange at hand: sophists will help you if you pay money and put down χάριτες (charites), and they convince the young to pay money (χρήματα δидόντας, chremata didontas) for their associations and be grateful in addition (χάριν προσειδέναι, charin proseidenai).

These formulations seem to be ironical echoings on Socrates’ part of the sophists’ self-presentation in terms of civic service. Using the terminology

(NE 1164b23–34) and allowed pupils to pay less than the standard fee if they were willing to state on oath that they did not think his teaching worth much (Pl. Prt. 328bc; Cf. Di. 9.56, Arist. NE 1164a24–26). Aristotle frames Protagoras’ practice as one of the two sophistic solutions to the valuation problems implied in the exchange of wisdom (from the realm of the good) for money (the realm of utility); the other solution is the one presented in the Gorgias, i.e. fixing the price in advance when the customer is still unaware of the true value of the sophist’s wisdom. In general, these anecdotes seem not so much to vouch for Protagoras’ trust in the moral quality of his pupils, but in his confidence in the persuasive character of his own teachings. Demont (1993: 41–44) argues that this anecdote refers to “χρήματα (chremata)” in Protagoras’ Man/Measure-fragment (chremata in its narrow and specific sense as “money”). I am inclined to think this is an ad hominem-interpretation of the Man/Measure-fragment and a product of negative spin and hostile reception by Plato and later authors. Cf. Van Berkel 2013.

111 Pl. Cra. 391b1ο: χρήματα ἐκείνοις τελοῦντα καὶ χάριτας κατατιθέμενον. Here the plural suggests that χάριτες (charites) should be taken to be material manifestations of charis; however, material or not, the charites are mentioned separately from χρήματα (chremata), which suggests an additional reward outside a payment that is agreed upon in advance. Cf. Socrates on the appropriate response to those who try to help him escape: Pl. Cri. 48d (χρήματα τελοῦντα (…) καὶ χάριτας, chremata telountes … kai charitas).

112 Pl. Ap. 19e–20a. Cf. a passage in the Platonic Theages where the young men who are persuaded by sophists are said to “pay down beside a large sum of money as fee, and to be grateful in addition” (προσκατατιθέντας ἀργύριον πάνω πολύ μισθόν, καὶ χάριν πρὸς τούτος εἰδέ- ναι; 127a6–7).

113 Similarly Isocrates reports how the parents of his students not only pay him (χρήματα διδόσων, chremata didoasin), but also react very positively (χαίρουσι) to their children’s education. Is. 15.241. The verb χαίρειν (chairein) may evoke the charis-rhetoric in the rest of the speech where Isocrates consistently characterizes his education as a form of civic
of *charis*, some sophists may have attempted to cloak the mercenary nature of their practice, or to “upgrade” it: immaterial *charis* is an additional asset, above and beyond the payment of a teacher.\textsuperscript{114} A professional teacher is more than a business man, mercenary or prostitute—until Plato’s Socrates exposes this *charis*-talk as a mere euphemism\textsuperscript{115} for money.\textsuperscript{116}

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\textsuperscript{114} This may also be the background to the recurring idea that some sophists offer more than what they are paid for. Plato represents Hippias as the sophist who earns exorbitant amounts of money from his teachings. In *Hp. mai.* 281b–c, the sophist’s practice is emphatically not represented as a *quid pro quo*-matter. Rather, Hippias has the capacity to confer private (*ἰδίᾳ, idiai*) and public (*δημοσίᾳ, demosiai*) benefits (*ὡφελεῖν [ophelein], εὐεργετεῖν [euergetein]*) that exceed (*ἐτι πλείω, eti pleió*) the amount of money that he receives (*πολλά χρήματα, polla chremata*). Cf. also Pl. *Prt.* 328b. Although Blank (1985: 7) categorizes these remarks as an instance of the idea that “a sophist must give his customer his money’s worth” (cf. Xen. *Mem.* 3.1.11); this is, by implication, true, but the rhetorical gist of the passage is that Hippias’ practice is emphatically not represented as a *quid pro quo*-matter. Plato’s propensity to see *charis* merely as euphemism for *quid pro quo*-exchanges may also explain why he does not think of reciprocity as a viable alternative to market trade (as noted by Danzig & Schaps 2002): to him, personal reciprocity is in the end only an informal variety of market trade or barter—not a qualitatively and morally distinct one.

\textsuperscript{115} Or, as Fredal (2008), calls it: “mystification”. Interestingly, Fredal’s argument is that the sophists’ practice of charging fees is a practical analogue to their demystification of myth and religion: by putting a concrete and precise price on their teachings, the sophists would demystify the elite practice of gift-giving. Although I find this thesis attractive, Plato’s portrayal of the sophists seem rather to indicate that the sophists were prone to fashion themselves as participants in a *charis*-economy as opposed to wage-earners.

\textsuperscript{116} E.g. Pl. *Resp.* 1.338b1–9, where Thrasymachus complains that Socrates shows himself to be ungrateful in response to his teachings (*τούτων μηδὲ χάριν ἀποδιδόναι, touton mede charin apodidonai*). Socrates makes plain that his gratitude simply does not take a monetary form. He pays gratitude according to his means, in the alternative “coin” of praise, i.e. he gives praise to those who he thinks are speaking well—a more proper form of reciprocating in reaction to *λόγος, logos*.
Concluding Remarks

When it comes to ideas about money and economics, the contrast between Plato and Xenophon tends to be overstated. As we have seen, both Plato and Xenophon operate with relative notions of “rich” and “poor”, defining these categories in terms of wants: poverty consists in insatiability; being rich is having enough. Both conceptualize value and wealth as subjective, i.e. relative to its owner, as it depends upon the ability of the owner to use it correctly. Both authors share a consistent concern with the “proper use” of χρήματα (chremata), anticipating Aristotle’s clear articulation of the idea that money, although a mere means and not an end, yields the danger of confusing means with ends.

Rather than fundamental differences in understanding of economic processes, the differences in economic philosophy between Plato and Xenophon seem to be a matter of conceptual architecture. Whereas Plato shapes his theory of value around a body-soul dualism, associating the perverting effects of money with the realm of the body and making value dependent upon the soul, Xenophon embeds his theory of value systematically in the Socratic doctrine of “proper use”, organizing his economic ideas more around the opposition between the short and the long term.

This subtle difference recurs in the attitudes toward teaching for pay. Plato’s treatment of the topic of the fee centers around the ontological status of money, questioning the valuation of wisdom and problematizing its reification. Xenophon’s rejection of teaching for pay has two aspects. The formal objection holds that accepting pay presupposes a wrong interpretation of the teacher-student relationship; this objection is in line with the doctrine of proper use: accepting pay is an improper use of wisdom because it presupposes that the seller does not know how to use wisdom in ways other than selling it. The substantive objection claims that demanding pay is itself incompatible with the virtues of gratitude and trust, i.e. with the proper use of friends, and hence with the very contents of Socratic teaching that centers around enkrateia.

Works Cited


