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Emotions in Bargaining

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Negotiations are often heated and highly emotional. This may be attributed to the fact that negotiations are mixed-motive situations, in which negotiators can be in competition with each other for certain resources, but at the same time need to cooperate to get to an agreement (Komorita & Parks, 1995). The tension between competition and cooperation elicits a wide variety of emotional experiences and emotional expressions. For example, when negotiating a new contract, employees may feel angry after being offered a poor deal, but also disappointed. Or, when negotiations are going well, they may feel happy or relieved. These emotions may affect their standing in the negotiation, but when communicated, also affect their negotiation partner. How emotions

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affect negotiations becomes even more complicated if one realizes that negotiators may try to regulate their emotions, or even misrepresent their emotions. Emotions that negotiators experience or express may lead negotiations to become more competitive or cooperative, depending on the interests that lie at the heart of the negotiation (Van Kleef & Côté, 2018). Insight into the dynamics of emotions is therefore critical to understand the trajectory of negotiations and to discover ways to make negotiations more successful.

In this chapter, we provide an overview of research on how emotions shape negotiations. Before doing so, however, it is important to discuss what we mean by emotions. Most theorists agree that emotions are the result of an evaluation of some event relevant to a particular concern or goal. Emotions differ from moods in that they are always about something, whereas moods “simply are” (Frijda, 1994). Emotions are directed toward a specific person, object, or event—people can feel happy after receiving a high offer, or angry at their opponent for withdrawing from the negotiation. Moods are less specific and not necessarily directed at anything. Furthermore, emotions are characterized by distinct subjective experiences, physiological reactions, and action tendencies (Elkman, 1993). Discrete emotions are therefore often more informative than diffuse moods, both to the individual experiencing them and to observers. Most of the empirical studies described in the current chapter discuss the effects of discrete emotions like anger, happiness, disappointment, and sadness, but some involve more diffuse positive and negative moods.

It is also useful to distinguish between integral emotions and incidental emotions (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). *Integral* emotions arise during the social interaction of interest and are relevant to the present judgments and/or decisions. For example, bargainers may experience increased levels of anger after receiving a low offer from their opponent. *Incidental* emotions can be considered spillovers from other situations which should be irrelevant to the present judgments and/or decisions. Bargainers may for example feel happy because someone else treated them nicely, which can make them act more cooperatively during the negotiation. In this review, we will discuss both types of emotions. We, for instance, describe studies on the effects of expressing (integral)

anger over other's negotiation offers, but also the effects of (incidental) anxiety elicited by watching a movie prior.

Having defined the key concepts, we will now provide an overview of theory and research on the effects of emotions in bargaining. Section 20.1 focuses on how the experience of one's own emotions influences the bargaining process (i.e., intrapersonal effects). Section 20.2 reviews how emotional expressions influence the other party in negotiations (i.e., interpersonal effects). In Section 20.3 we focus on how emotions influence deceptive strategies in negotiations and how negotiators use their emotions to deceive their opponents. We conclude with suggestions for future research and a brief discussion of the practical implications.

20.1 The intrapersonal effects of emotions in bargaining

Intrapersonal effects of emotions describe how the experience of emotions affects one's own feelings, cognitions, and/or behavior. In negotiations, this involves how the experience of anger affects one's own concessions or how the experience of happiness influences one's own cooperativeness.

20.1.1 Relevant theories

One of the main theoretical models for intrapersonal effects of emotions is the mood-as-information model (also referred to as affect-as-information or feelings-as-information model; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). This model posits that people attend to their moods as a source of information, with different moods providing different types of information. For instance, an individual's liking for a person is partly based on the positive feelings when this person is around. The impact of feelings as a source of information increases when they are perceived to be relevant to the task at hand. Relevance is a broad concept, however, as misattribution may make even unrelated information seem relevant. For

example, applied to the negotiation context, the mood-as-information model would posit that incidental moods can influence the negotiation process, if people misattribute their mood to the negotiation process or negotiation partner.

The mood-as-information model focuses on general feelings and mood states and bases its predictions on the valence of affect (i.e., whether the mood or emotion is positive or negative). Such valence-based approaches cannot explain why different emotions with the same valence (e.g., anger and disappointment) may influence judgments and decisions differently. The appraisal-tendency framework (Lerner & Keltner, 2000) does allow for such effects. The framework distinguishes between a set of different appraisal dimensions like certainty, pleasantness, and control and posits that each emotion can be defined by a combination of these dimensions. Under this framework, any emotion, whether it is an incidental or integral emotion, can influence the negotiation, and each specific emotion has its own unique effect on the negotiation. The negative emotion anger may for instance affect the negotiation process differently than other negative emotions, like disappointment. This way, the framework can make more specific predictions about how emotions influence negotiations.

20.1.2 Empirical work

General affect. In line with the mood-as-information model, the early studies on intrapersonal emotion effects in negotiations focused mostly on general affect. Carnevale and Isen (1986) studied the influence of positive affect on negotiation strategies and outcomes. Prior to a negotiation (incidental) positive affect was induced in some participants by having them sort cartoons into a funny pile and a not as funny pile, and by giving them a gift. Results showed that positive affect increased the joint outcomes in the negotiation and reduced the use of contentious tactics. Anderson and Thompson (2004) also studied the intrapersonal effects of positive affect, by measuring negotiators' trait positive affect with the Positive And Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Positive affect increased trust and

facilitated joint gains, but more so for powerful negotiators than for less powerful negotiators. These studies thus demonstrate that positive affect increases cooperation in negotiations.

Baron et al. (1990) focused on the intrapersonal effects of negative affect. Participants first interacted with a confederate who expressed disagreement in a calm and non-provocative way or in an arrogant and provoking way. Subsequently, they engaged in a negotiation task with the confederate. Participants who were provoked made lower initial offers in the negotiation than those who had not been provoked. Interestingly, when participants were exposed to one of several treatments designed to induce positive affect (e.g., mild flattery or a small gift) this increased participants' preference for cooperation.

The findings above suggest that positive affect increases negotiators' willingness to cooperate while negative affect decreases cooperation. A later study that directly compared positive to negative affect supported this conclusion. Forgas (1998) manipulated affect using false feedback on a test of verbal abilities. Participants either learned that they performed well on the test or not. Participants in a positive mood (who received positive feedback) used more cooperative and integrative negotiation strategies than those in a neutral (who received no feedback) or negative mood (who received negative feedback).

Discrete emotions. In line with the appraisal-tendency framework, several studies have studied the effects of the experience of discrete emotions. Pillutla and Murnighan (1996) studied the effects of experienced anger in ultimatum bargaining. They showed that the reception of small and unfair offers evoked integral anger which, in turn, led participants to reject these unfair offers. Anger thus reduced cooperation. Follow-up research indicated that these detrimental effects are attenuated if bargainers can regulate their anger via reappraisal or distraction (Fabiansson & Denson, 2012), or by formulating an if-then plan about how to negotiate (Jäger, Loschelder, & Friese, 2017).

Allred et al. (1997) compared the intrapersonal effects of anger to the effects of compassion. In a job contract negotiation task, participants either learned that their opponent was responsible for behavior that affected them negatively (which induced anger) or that their opponent had no choice (which induced compassion). Angry participants

(compared to compassionate ones) had less desire to work with their opponent in the future and achieved lower joint outcomes.

Other negative emotions have also been studied. Brooks and Schweitzer (2011) showed that incidental anxiety—induced by music and movie clips—harms negotiator behavior, such that it induces negotiators to expect lower outcomes, make lower first offers, exit the negotiation earlier, and as a result also obtain worse outcomes. They also found that these negative effects were less pronounced for individuals with high negotiator self-efficacy (i.e., those having the belief that they could succeed in the negotiation).

Ketelaar and Au (2003) investigated the effects of experienced guilt. They reasoned that the experience of guilt signals a blameworthy violation of a social norm, which may motivate people to increase their level of cooperation. Guilt was induced by asking participants to write about an experience where they felt guilty (i.e., inducing incidental guilt), or letting them rate their feelings of (integral) guilt after making an initial offer in an ultimatum bargaining context. The results showed that guilt led to more generous offers. These effects were later replicated in the context of divorce negotiations (Wierzker, Buysse, Loeyts, & Brondeel, 2011).

In the domain of positive emotions, Shirako, Kilduff, and Kray (2015) studied the effects of sympathy in negotiations. Across five studies, negotiators responded to an opponent who was in a potentially vulnerable position (e.g., he/she had been working 18 hours per day for 5 years). The results showed that experiencing sympathy decreased value claiming and increased integrative bargaining.

Finally, Buttr, Choi, and Jaeger (2005) compared the effects of four different types of emotion in a negotiation task that resembled the job contract negotiation used by Allred et al. (1997). Participants engaged in two negotiation sessions. After completing the first session, they received feedback about their performance. This feedback was designed to manipulate one of four emotions: pride (i.e., success due to self), gratitude (i.e., success due to counterpart), shame (i.e., failure due to self), or anger (i.e., failure due to counterpart). The results showed that whereas gratitude increased yielding behavior and joint gain, pride decreased yielding behavior and joint gain. Of the two negative emotions, anger,

but not shame, led negotiators to take a more competitive and dominant stance.

20.2 The interpersonal effects of emotions in bargaining

Interpersonal effects of emotions refer to the influence of an individual's emotions on the feelings, cognitions, and/or behavior of others. In negotiations, one's anger may for instance inform observers how high one's subsequent offer will be or may elicit certain emotions in observers.

20.2.1 Relevant theory

Insights on the interpersonal effects of emotions highlight the social functions of emotional expressions. According to social-functional approaches of emotions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010), emotions contain valuable information about the feelings and intentions of the sender. The Emotion as Social Information (EASI) model by Van Kleef et al. (2010) specifies two processes through which emotions may influence the behavior of others. Emotions affect others by providing relevant information about the intentions and/or feelings of the sender (the inferential path of the model), but also by affecting the emotions of others (the affective path of the model).

The inferential path rests on the notion that expressed emotions have informational value. Happiness, for instance, may signal that one is satisfied with the current situation, which may lead others to continue their current course of action. Sadness on the other hand signals a loss, which may lead others to offer help.

Emotional expressions may also elicit affective reactions in others, which can influence subsequent behavior. One way emotions can affect the emotions of others, is via emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994), where emotions spread from expresser to observer. A person's happiness, for instance, can be "caught", which leads others to become happy themselves. Emotions can also influence

others by eliciting complementary emotions in them, which may influence subsequent behavior. Displays of anger, for instance, can elicit fear-related responses.

Whether inferential processes or affective reactions take precedence has been shown to depend on two factors (Van Kleef et al., 2010). One important factor is the observer's motivation and ability to process the information conveyed by the emotional expression. The more thorough the information processing, the stronger the predictive value of inferential processes; the shallower the information processing, the stronger the predictive value of affective processes.

The predictive strength of inferential versus affective reactions also depends on social-contextual factors that influence the perceived appropriateness of the emotional expression. When an emotional expression is perceived to be appropriate, the predictive value of inferential processes is stronger; when emotional expressions are perceived to be inappropriate, the predictive value of affective processes is stronger.

20.2.2 Empirical work

While the work on the interpersonal effects could be applied to general affect as well, most studies have concentrated on discrete emotions, which may be explained by the fact that others' discrete emotions have more informational value to negotiators.

Anger versus happiness. One of the first studies on the interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations was conducted by Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead (2004a), which focused on the emotional expressions of anger and happiness. Participants engaged with (simulated) opponents in a computer-mediated integrative negotiation task over a consignment of mobile phones. Over the course of six rounds, participants either received angry, happy, or neutral expressions. Negotiators with a happy opponent inferred that their opponent was lenient and easy to please. This led participants to make only minor concessions. Angry emotional expressions, however, signaled high limits, leading negotiators to conclude they were dealing with a tough opponent (see also Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). This led opponents to give in themselves,

to not let the negotiation end in impasse. This study thus showed that it is better to express anger than to express happiness in a negotiation.

Research has, however, also documented detrimental effects of communicating anger in negotiations. The aforementioned study by Van Kleef et al. (2004a), showed that bargainers develop a more negative impression of an opponent who expresses anger in the negotiation. Also, negotiators dealing with angry opponents are less satisfied with the negotiation and are less willing to engage in future interaction (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b). Moreover, negotiators with angry counterparts are more likely to exit the negotiation and choose an impasse because they consider their opponents to be selfish (Yip & Scheinberg, 2017). In the context of coalition formation, negotiators form negative impressions of those who communicate anger, and are more likely to exclude them from coalitions and from obtaining a share of the payoff (Van Beest, Van Kleef, & Van Dijk, 2008).

These results suggest that expressions of anger may be dependent on specific moderators. In the following, we first discuss moderators that are related to the ability and motivation to process the information conveyed by the angry expression and then moderators related to the appropriateness of the angry expression.

Information processing as moderator of angry expressions. In line with the EASI model, Van Kleef et al. (2004b) identified the ability and/or motivation to process the information as a moderator. In a negotiation setting, they manipulated how much time participants had to reach an agreement and showed that participants with an angry opponent made more concessions than did those with a happy opponent, but only under low rather than high time pressure.

Several other personal and situational factors have been shown to moderate the effects of anger by influencing negotiators' information processing. Two of those factors are the competitiveness of the negotiation and relative power differences. Adam and Brett (2015) compared the effects of angry expressions in negotiations that balance cooperative and competitive elements to those in negotiations that are predominantly cooperative or predominantly competitive. They reasoned that balanced negotiations provide a more uncertain and ambiguous situation that induces negotiators to engage in systematic information processing

and rely on diagnostic informational cues. In agreement with this, expressing anger elicited larger concessions than expressing no emotion, but only in balanced negotiations, and not in predominantly cooperative or competitive situations.

Relative power differences also influence information processing. Low-power negotiators may generally be more motivated to process the information conveyed by emotional expressions than high-power negotiators (Fiske, 1993). Using various operationalizations of power (e.g., the number of available alternatives), Van Kleef et al. (2006b) found that low-power negotiators were strongly affected by their opponents' emotions (i.e., they made more concessions to angry than to happy opponents), whereas those with high power were unaffected. Comparable effects were shown by other studies focusing on the moderating effects of power (Van Kleef et al., 2004b; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). Van Dijk et al. (2008) manipulated relative power in an ultimatum bargaining setting and showed that communicating anger may backfire for low-power bargainers. They explained this by showing that—similar to a process of emotion contagion—by communicating anger, low-power bargainers may fuel anger in their opponents (resulting in low offers).

Perceived appropriateness of the angry expression. Van Kleef and Côté (2007) directly manipulated the perceived appropriateness of the emotion. In a computer-mediated negotiation, participants either learned that an ethics committee had decided that it was not allowed to use pressure tactics or express negative emotions during the negotiation, or they did not receive this information. The results showed that negotiators who were confronted with angry opponents made fewer concessions when anger was considered inappropriate than when anger was considered appropriate, but only among those negotiators who were high in power.

Appropriateness of communicating anger is also dependent on the intensity with which anger is expressed. Adam and Brett (2018) manipulated high- versus moderate- versus low-intensity anger in one study by giving instructions to use aggressive sentences and raise their voice, and in another study by programming angry verbal reactions (high, moderate, or low in intensity) to negotiation offers. Results showed that

high-intensity anger was considered more inappropriate and decreased concession making compared to moderate- and low-intensity anger.

How anger is communicated can also determine its perceived appropriateness and interpersonal effects. Seinel, Harinck, and Van Kleef (2008) distinguished between expressions of anger and happiness directed toward the person (e.g., “this person makes me really angry”) and directed toward the negotiation offer (e.g., “this offer makes me really angry”). Their results showed that person-directed anger was considered less appropriate and elicited smaller concessions than offer-directed anger.

What is appropriate may also be culturally defined. Adam, Shirako, and Maddux (2010) studied the effects of angry expressions in negotiations across cultures. Focusing on the cultural background of the observer of the emotion, they showed that expressing anger elicited larger concessions from European American negotiators, but smaller concessions from Asian and Asian American negotiators, due to different cultural norms about the appropriateness of expressions of anger in negotiations. In later work, Adam and Shirako (2013) investigated the cultural background of the expresser of anger in negotiations. They showed that angry expressions elicited greater cooperative efforts when the expresser was East Asian than when the expresser was European American, because East Asian negotiators were perceived as tougher and more threatening. These findings indicate that emotional expressions of negotiators who are, based on stereotypes, considered less expressive (as is the case for East Asian negotiators), are more informative.

Moving beyond anger and happiness. While research on anger and happiness has received most attention, the field has also begun to explore the effects of other emotions. Van Kleef et al. (2006a) compared the interpersonal effects of the supplication emotions disappointment and worry (i.e., emotions communicating dependency and a need for support) to the appeasement emotions guilt and regret (i.e., emotions communicating that one has done something wrong). Their results showed that supplication emotions increased, and appeasement emotions decreased, concessions making in opponents, but only among those opponents high in dispositional trust.

Other studies compared the interpersonal effects of anger and disappointment. Both emotions can be used in negotiations to communicate dissatisfaction, but with markedly different effects on opponents. Lelieveld et al. (2012) showed that anger and disappointment evoke different affective reactions in others. In an ultimatum bargaining setting, anger either evoked reciprocal anger or complementary fear, depending on the relative power position of the expresser. Anger expressed by a high-power bargainer evoked complementary fear in opponents, which led opponents to make higher offers. In low-power positions, anger evoked reciprocal anger in opponents, which led opponents to make lower offers. In contrast, disappointment evoked complementary guilt in opponents, which elicited higher offers in opponents (see also Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008), regardless of the expresser's power position. In later work, Lelieveld et al. (2013) demonstrated that anger and disappointment differ in the extent to which they communicate power or weakness. In four studies, they showed that whereas anger communicates power, toughness, and high limits in negotiations, disappointment communicates weakness, lenience, and low limits. This weakness can elicit cooperativeness and a social responsibility to help others, but only when it evokes guilt (see also Lelieveld et al., 2011). When participants negotiated as representatives or when they negotiated with an out-group member, they felt less guilty and therefore made lower offers to disappointed opponents, than in individual negotiations and when they negotiated with an in-group. Anger elicited high offers in opponents regardless of the type of negotiation or the group membership of the expresser.

Other discrete emotional expressions that have been studied are sadness and gratitude. Similar to the aforementioned effects of disappointment, Sinaceur et al. (2015) showed that expressions of sadness elicit concessions in opponents because it increases opponents' concern for the expresser. Participants made more concessions to sad opponents but only when they had a reason to experience concern for the expresser (e.g., when the expresser had low power). Similarly, expressions of gratitude in negotiations elicit cooperative behavior and increase benevolence perceived by counterparts, but only when the expression of gratitude is accompanied with cooperative behavior (Kong & Belkin, 2019).

Emotional inconsistency and ambivalence. So far, we discussed the interpersonal effects of single discrete emotions. It is, however, also possible to express more than one emotion during negotiations. Pietroni et al. (2008) studied the effects of anger and happy expressions in a two-issue negotiation, where participants had one high-priority issue and one low-priority issue. They received emotional expressions which were either angry or happy on the high-priority issue and angry or happy on the low-priority issue resulting in four different emotional response patterns. Results showed that happiness on the high-priority issue and anger on the low-priority issue reduced fixed-pie perceptions and increased integrative behavior. Anger on participant's high-priority issue and happiness on participant's low-priority issue, however, reduced integrative behavior.

Emotions may also differ over time. Sinaceur et al. (2013) studied the effects of emotional inconsistency, by manipulating emotions opponents expressed across several rounds of a negotiation. Across experimental conditions, opponents were either consistent in their expressions (e.g., always conveying anger) or inconsistent (e.g., sometimes communicating anger and sometimes happiness). Results showed that emotional inconsistency reduced feelings of control in counterparts and elicited greater concessions compared to a consistent communication of emotions. Filipowicz, Barsade, and Melwani (2011) studied the effects of emotional transitions, where bargainers either moved from anger to happiness or from happiness to anger during the negotiation. Three studies showed that expressing a transition from happiness to anger left a more positive impression on counterparts and, in turn, increased concessions in counterparts more than did express only anger during the negotiation.

Finally, Rothman (2011) studied the effects of expressing emotional ambivalence; the simultaneous experience of a positive and a negative emotion. She demonstrated that counterparts showed more dominant behavior toward ambivalent negotiators than toward happy, angry or non-emotional negotiators, because they perceived the ambivalent negotiator as more deliberative and submissive. In later work, Rothman and Northcraft (2015) showed that in negotiations that were more cooperative, this submissiveness led counterparts to come up with more integrative agreements, which increased value creation in the negotiation.

20.3 Emotion and deception in negotiation

20.3.1 Relevant theory

Negotiations offer many opportunities for deception. Emotions can play an important role here. Gaspar and Schweitzer (2013) proposed the Emotion Deception Model, which explains the willingness to deceive others on the basis of the emotions deceivers experience before making their decision as well as the emotions they anticipate to occur after having deceived their opponent. For example, the experience of anger can directly lead people to conceal information from their opponent (Yip & Schweitzer, 2016), and anticipated guilt or regret can lead people to refrain from using deception.

Methasani, Gaspar, and Barry (2017) extended the model by incorporating the influence of counterparts' emotional expressions on the decision to deceive in negotiations. In line with the EASI model, they proposed that emotional expressions of others may influence deception decisions via affective reactions (by evoking specific emotions in observers) or via inferential processes (by providing information that observers may use to guide their deception decision). Expressions of anger may for instance increase deceptive strategies in opponents, whereas expressions of happiness may decrease such strategies.

20.3.2 Empirical work

Intrapersonal effects. The research on the intrapersonal effects of emotions on deception has largely focused on three emotions: anger, anxiety, and envy. Olekalns and Smith (2009) used a negotiation task where participants negotiated about an employment contract. Using software that scanned text and categorized it in affective categories, they studied the relationship between anger and anxiety and the use of deception. They found that negotiators who expressed anger used more deception by misinforming their opponent (see also Yip & Schweitzer, 2016), whereas negotiators who expressed anxiety used more deception by concealing information.

Moran and Schweitzer (2008) found that the experience of envy also influences the use of deception. They manipulated envy by providing participants with upward social comparison information. Participants who experienced high levels of envy were more likely to lie to their opponent in the negotiation than participants who experienced low levels of envy.

Interpersonal effects. We are aware of only one study that investigated how bargainers' willingness to deceive may depend on the emotional expressions of their opponent. Van Dijk et al. (2008) studied the effects of anger expressions in an ultimatum bargaining setting where participants could misinform opponents about the value of the chips that were allocated. Results showed that participants were more deceptive toward angry bargainers than toward bargainers that expressed happiness. They reasoned that by deceiving the angry opponent, bargainers could make low offers without having to fear the consequences.

Emotion deception. The insights above all concentrate on the effects of own or other's emotions on the willingness to deceive others (e.g., by lying or concealing information). Note, however, that—given the interpersonal effects of emotions—it may also make sense to mislead others about one's own emotions. For example, one might deliberately exaggerate or downplay one's emotions. Emotional expressions can thus be used to deceive opponents in negotiations. This intriguing possibility was first addressed by Andrade and Ho (2009), who showed that bargainers may strategically modify the expression of anger to influence their opponent. Participants in their studies received an unfair offer from an opponent, after which participants were asked to indicate their level of anger. Subsequently, they learned that they would negotiate with the same person for another round. They were again asked to indicate their level of anger, but now learned that their reaction would be sent to the opponent. Results showed that participants then “gamed” their expression of anger by communicating higher levels of anger to their opponent than they had experienced.

Later work showed that when bargainers have more emotions to their disposal, this strategy changes. Van Dijk et al. (2018) demonstrated that when bargainers could also communicate disappointment (besides anger), participants chose to amplify their levels of disappointment, and

were more diverse in their communications of anger. Some chose to exaggerate, whereas others chose to downplay their anger. They concluded that having an alternative means to signal disapproval in negotiations tempered the willingness to (strategically) communicate anger.

Negotiators should, however, make sure that when they choose to "game" their emotions, these expressions come across as authentic. Côté, Hideg, and Van Kleef (2013) studied the consequences of faking anger in negotiations. Results showed that faking anger decreases concession making in counterparts, and this effect was explained by reduced trust.

20.4 Conclusions and future directions

It is clear from this chapter that the experience and expression of emotions have a pervasive impact on how people negotiate. These effects are visible at the intrapersonal level and at the interpersonal level. Emotions affect the offers negotiators make, their willingness to give in, and the use of strategies like deception. The recent years have shown tremendous progress in the understanding of the various ways in which emotion shapes negotiations. Nevertheless, several important issues remain to be addressed.

One of these issues is that most of the research on the role of emotions in negotiations has used laboratory experiments. Although findings obtained with computer-mediated interactions are often similar to findings obtained with different paradigms, including surveys involving full-time workers (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2006b), and face-to-face negotiations (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006), it may be important to study actual negotiators to see how the effects of emotions influence their decision-making and how they make use of emotional expressions. Such research may not only answer questions about the generalizability of the findings, but also can offer novel insights into the role of emotions in negotiation.

Our review reveals that most studies have focused on the effects of anger in negotiations. One positive aspect of this particular focus on anger is that the findings on the intrapersonal and interpersonal effects

have been replicated across different studies, using different manipulations of anger (experience and expression). A downside of this focus on anger is that other negative emotions, like disappointment and anxiety, have received less attention. More research is needed to investigate whether findings on the effects of these emotions replicate across different negotiation settings. Studies on some emotions even seem absent (e.g., disgust and contempt). For a more complete picture, future research may benefit from investigating a broader range of discrete emotions. Moreover, it may be worthwhile to also include more positive emotions. It would, for example, be interesting to see whether emotions that increase perceived power, like pride, may have different effects on bargaining behavior than positive emotions that decrease perceived power, like gratitude.

In addition, it may be worthwhile to broaden the cultural perspective and study emotion effects in non-Western cultures. The few studies that have examined culture show that there are important differences between cultures in the intra- and interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations (Adam & Shirako, 2013; Adam et al., 2010). Cultural norms may also determine which emotional expressions bargainers may (strategically) communicate in negotiations, which relates to the issue of appropriateness. For instance, bargainers in Eastern societies may prefer the less confrontational communication of disappointment over the expression (or exaggeration) of anger.

Taken together, this chapter clearly shows that emotional dynamics play a crucial role in negotiations, by influencing the cognitions and behavior of bargainers' own behavior and the behavior of counterparts. At the same time, the unanswered questions that remain stress the need for more research. Such research promises to enhance the understanding of the negotiation process, the factors that facilitate or hinder this process, and the (social) consequences of emotion in general.

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