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Beyond the Apocalypse: Reframing Migration History

Leo Lucassen

MIGRANTS AS TROUBLE

As the editors of this volume have explained in their introduction, current public debates on migration and integration in Western Europe are fraught with misunderstandings, selective perceptions, and deliberate misrepresentations. Whether it regards the Brexit discussion¹ or the so-called ‘refugee crisis’, the tone is often outright apocalyptic. Not only among politicians and journalists, but in some cases also among serious commentators and scholars, like David Goodhart, Paul Collier and David Miller.² But mainstream migration scholars, often unintentionally, contribute to this alarmist atmosphere as well, by too uncritically reproducing the frame that migrants constitute a problem that should be solved. Or that we should look at the ‘root causes’ of migration and prevent people from leaving the global South in the first place. This perspective treats migration not only as a predicament, but also

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as an anomaly for modern sedentary states, who therefore should stop unwanted migrants wherever possible. More recently climate change and the high fertility in the Arab world and Sub-Saharan Africa are added to this pool of negative associations and root causes.³

From a broader historical perspective, there are two major problems with this framing. First of all, it reflects a myopic view of what migration as a human phenomenon constitutes, by only concentrating on those forms of migration that are—believed to be—negative: both for receiving societies (cultural and financial costs),⁴ the migrants themselves (who would be uprooted and disoriented), and for sending regions, often portrayed as suffering from ‘brain drain’. Hence, the search for ‘root causes’ in order to stop migration. The second problem is that migration is often perceived as a natural phenomenon like earthquakes and hurricanes, devoid of human agency, leading poor regions of the world to ‘empty out’ (Collier) and set in motion mass migrations, unless harsh measures and tight migration controls are put in place. It is no coincidence that ‘water speak’ (i.e. talk of streams, flows or tsunamis) is so popular in the current discussions on migration.

When it comes to the current, politicised discussion on migration in Europe and North America, historians are often lured into narrow debates on the alleged failed integration of specific low-skilled groups of migrants and their descendants, like the former guest workers in Western Europe or Mexican labour migrants in the United States. Within these confines, which leave out the majority of migrants who are not seen as a problem, the most common reflex of migration scholars is to bring nuance into the discussion by pointing out differences between groups and generations. They rightfully stress that integration processes take time, can only be judged properly over several generations, and draw parallels with previous clashes between immigrants and natives that in the end led to incorporation and the blurring or disappearance of ethnic boundaries.⁵

Comparing then and now is not undisputed. Especially when it comes to current political debates on immigration, historians who draw on earlier experiences to nuance or debunk ideas about uniqueness and unprecedentedness are often accused of being naïve, activist or both. And sometimes rightly so. German immigrants to Great Britain and the Netherlands in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, arrived in another context and were differently selected than Turkish and Moroccan labour migrants a century later. Scholars therefore have to be

cautious in drawing parallels, and should also have an eye for dissimilarities and ‘newness’, especially where it regards the opportunity structure of the society. For the post-war period, this regards among other things the rise of the welfare state, secularisation, and the accelerating process of globalisation.⁶ In short, we have to be explicit about our assumptions, the specific historical context, and about the variables we measure in the past and the present.

Another problem that we confront when making comparisons in time is that the past often assumes a different guise and adopts the sepia colour of the documents that are left to study. This easily leads to nostalgia and may unduly soften experiences of people in the past. Or in the words of Perlmann and Waldinger, we tend to be too optimistic about the past and too pessimistic about the present.⁷ Of course, not all past occurrences are wrapped in nostalgia. Think more broadly about the Holocaust and other traumatic episodes, such as the Vietnam War, the mass killings of so-called communists in Indonesia in 1965/1966, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, or state terrorism in Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s. And also earlier events, like American slavery, can still incite deeply felt emotions and outrage. When it comes to most recollections of Europe’s migratory past, however—as far as people are aware of it—nostalgia tends to dominate. It is as if the layers of time polish and smoothen its sharp and ugly edges.

This distortion is related to a bias that posits earlier migrants as the opposite of the current ones. The argument then runs as follows: back then, they were Europeans, (Judeo) Christians, frugal, entrepreneurial, skilled, and willing to adapt, whereas nowadays, they threaten our culture, refuse to integrate, and are primarily drawn by our welfare state. Such juxtapositions not only belie historical facts, but also are a recurring phenomenon in the history of immigration. In his 1897 book *Alien Immigrants to England*, the economic historian William Cunningham, for example, warned against the dangerous and parasitic Jewish migrants from Eastern Europe, whom he deemed ‘incomparable’ with the thrifty Walloons and French who found refuge in England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁸ Nowadays, many argue that the post-war immigration of (non-white) people from the colonies and labour migrants from Islamic countries has changed the game fundamentally. Western Europeans, and their so-called ‘Judeo-Christian’ civilisation, are believed to have never been exposed to such high numbers of people with a fundamentally different culture and physical

appearance. If we look at the numbers and regions of origin, this seems a truism. Whereas in the first half of the twentieth century the three million immigrants from other continents barely constituted 1% of the European population, after the Second World War, this number rose to almost 25 million, or on average 5%. As we know, these immigrants were not evenly spread over Europe, but concentrated in the (North) West. Added to intra-European migrants, this pushed percentages of foreign-born people up to more than 10% in countries like France, Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands.⁹

The main aim of this chapter is not to repeat the well-known ‘then and now’ discussion, but to put the spectacular increase of immigrants from Asia and Africa in the second half of the twentieth century in a much broader conceptual perspective, thus counterbalancing the rather narrow view of migration that dominates the media and politics and that limits ‘immigrants’ to those newcomers who for whatever reason are seen as a problem. As will be shown, the most recent groups of immigrants are part of a much larger and structural phenomenon that has characterized human history from its very first beginnings.¹⁰ In order to really appreciate and understand the function of migrations for human societies, a long-term perspective is therefore key. Mobility, both local, regional and over longer distances, was (and still is) the rule, and largely determined not by anonymous climatic or economic push and pull forces, but by conscious decisions within households, throughout the world. Only with this vantage point can historians use the full potential of their discipline and leave their imposed, but also self-chosen, ghetto.

THE DEFINITION GHOST

To understand the role of migration in human societies, scholars are—to borrow Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ imagery from the *Communist Manifesto*—haunted by the spectre of state definitions.¹¹ This gaze not only ignores internal and temporary migrants, but focuses only on foreign immigrants who are perceived as a problem by contemporaries. The result is a self-fulfilling prophecy that defines migrants as a burden, threat or nuisance, or a combination of the three. In itself, limiting ourselves to groups that fit this definition, as I did in my book *The Immigrant Threat*, can be legitimate and produce interesting conclusions, but often such

choices are not explicitly motivated and easily strengthen the prevailing negative framing of migration. Moreover, this trap is difficult to avoid, because we are highly dependent on sources and national and racial categories produced by states, like ‘non-Western migrants’.

With these reminders and possible pitfalls in mind, this chapter will offer a much broader perspective of people on the move, which goes beyond current political and societal obsessions and media frames. As Leslie Moch did in her excellent overview of European migrations (at least until the twentieth century),¹² I will transcend conventional definitions of migrants as those coming from other states with the intention to stay, and include internal and temporary migrants as far as they crossed cultural boundaries. In the cross-cultural migration rate (CCMR) approach, we distinguish four core types of migration: (1) people moving from the countryside to cities, either within states or coming from abroad (to cities); (2) people who move within the countryside to culturally and ecologically different settings (colonisation); (3) people who move temporarily as seasonal workers from peasant areas to much more commercial farming regions; and (4) people who migrate temporarily and stay away for several years (temporary multi-annual migrants), like soldiers, sailors, skilled workers, and missionaries. In order to arrive at the total number of cross-cultural migrants in Europe, we finally have to add all those who entered the continent (immigrants) and those who left with the aim to stay away for good (emigrants).¹³

With the CCMR approach, a rather different picture emerges of Europe’s migration history since 1800 than we get from the mainstream scholarship, which limits itself largely to those who cross international borders, or to migrants from the so-called ‘non-West’. Where Stephen Castles and Mark Miller in their well-known handbook on international migration write that the age of migration basically started after the Second World War, and particularly in the 1980s when international migration grew in volume and significance, they take a very contemporaneous perspective. Although they acknowledge that migration has been a structural part of human societies, it is clear that in their eyes, it is only in the last decades that this phenomenon has become *really* important. But even if we accept their predilection for international migrations, this account is fraught with an ahistorical bias.¹⁴ Historians, but also social scientists, like Nancy Foner, Caroline Brettell, Roger Waldinger,

and Joel Perlmann, have shown that especially during the period 1880–1920 North America witnessed similar levels of international migration as a century later.¹⁵ And also the problematization of migrants who are perceived as culturally different was equally strong in the past. The discrimination and racism endured by the Irish and by Eastern European Jews in the United Kingdom and the United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as Italians and Chinese worldwide, offer ample evidence.¹⁶ Like the present day low-skilled migrants from abroad, be they Mexicans in the United States, Moroccans in the Netherlands or Pakistanis in England, earlier examples ignited similar fears and opposition. Only, the sepia colourisation has done its job, so that now few people can still imagine that Catholicism, Judaism, or ‘Asian races’ once were considered insurmountable cultural barriers to integration. The current ‘Jewish-Christian roots of our civilization’ amalgamation, frequently used as the ultimate opposite of Islam, would have been inconceivable before the 1960s. The fault lines of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ ran very differently, not too long ago.

This chapter will not recall those earlier histories of frictions between immigrants and natives, but take a more radical departure from the dominant nation state paradigm and use the CCMR approach as a point of departure. The main idea is that this enables us to take a much broader look at how migrants with different cultural backgrounds change the places they go to, but often also the places they leave. Because most moves are not simply from A-to-B, but much more messy, involving (repetitive) return migrations—also after several generations—and circular and serial moves. So how do the long-term migration patterns for Europe look if we take the CCMR approach instead of the conventional, nation-state-driven, international-cum-problematisation angle? Well, quite different from the standard representation, as Table 3.1 shows.


What immediately catches the eye is the all time high in the first (instead of the second) half of the twentieth century. The reason is quite simple: war. The two world wars did not only uproot millions of civilians, as refugees and displaced persons, but also involved tens of millions of young men (and women) who were drafted as soldiers and sent to fight and occupy other countries, often far away from home. As the following paragraph will show, there are good reasons to consider such soldiers as cross-cultural migrants whose moves wrought fundamental and unexpected changes.

Table 3.1 Cross-cultural migration rates in Europe (without Russia) as a percentage of the average population per half century (1801–2000)

	1801–1850	1851–1900	1901–1950	1951–2000
To cities*	7.7	12.3	7.2	5.7
Colonisation	0	0	2.6	0
Seasonal	1	2.6	0.8	0.2
Temporary multi-annual	6.7	3.3	25.6	5
Immigration	0	0	0.8	4.8
Emigration	1.6	7.4	7.1	2.9
Total CCMR	17	25.6	44.1	18.6

Source Lucassen and Lucassen, *Globalizing Migration History*: Table 170 on p. 86

*For the twentieth century, we excluded internal moves to cities, assuming that the cultural differences between the countryside and cities due to the process of national homogenisation had become insignificant



SOLDIERS AND OTHER ORGANISATIONAL MIGRANTS

Only recently, we are beginning to grasp the cross-cultural influences of mass migrations of soldiers, temporary as they may have been and often resulting in ‘death by migration’. Not only for the soldiers themselves, but also for those they temporarily interacted with, violently or not, and for the societies those who survived returned to. To start with, armies,

also during peacetime, were places where young men were brought together and confronted with peers from very different class and religious and ethnic backgrounds. This was especially true for multicultural empires like Russia and China, but also in early modern states like France.¹⁷ In times of war, moreover, soldiers and the broader occupation forces they were part of often introduced new institutions and policies, from discrimination and genocide to obligatory health insurance, in the case of Nazi Germany.¹⁸ Furthermore, they were instrumental in massive deportations, and other types of social engineering, forcing millions to move (and work) elsewhere and deliberately killing millions of others. Let us take a brief look at the effects on European societies in the twentieth century, both at destination (where soldiers went to), and at origin (where soldiers came from).

Soldiers were instrumental in forcing millions of people to relocate, both during and after the two world wars, thus dramatically changing the demographic and cultural make-up of Europe,¹⁹ especially due to the ethnic cleansing in Eastern Europe. In this process, people were not only moved against their will but also deliberately killed. The genocide of the Jews, only possible by the military conquest of large parts of Europe, reduced the share of Jewish Europeans, and their culture, from roughly 10 million in 1939 to 4 million in 1979. The change in Eastern Europe was much greater. Before the war, 75% of Jewish Europeans lived in Eastern Europe, whereas nowadays, only a few hundred thousands are left. Poland is by far the most extreme case. At the outbreak of the war, in September 1939, almost 10% of the population was of Jewish faith, some three million citizens, of whom only 6000 were left after the Nazis surrendered six years later.²⁰ As a result, an entire culture was extinguished, which—combined with the resettlement of ‘national minorities’ directly after 1945 and the emigration to Israel of the survivors—resulted in much more homogenous nation states in Eastern Europe than ever before. This created and enhanced an ethno-national social and political climate in countries like Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Czechoslovakia which may partly explain the xenophobic attitudes towards African and Asian guest workers during the Communist era and more recently the Islamophobia directed against Muslim refugees from the Middle East.²¹

Two other demographic effects of war that deserve mentioning are first of all the mass emigration of Turkish-speaking Ottoman subjects from the Balkans. Due to the defeat of the Ottoman army in the Balkan

War of 1912–1913, the Ottomans lost 80% of their European territory, which at one point almost reached Vienna. Some 400,000 Muslims citizens fled to what was to become modern Turkey, with Anatolia as its new heartland. Under the leadership of the Young Turks, many of them—including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk—refugees from the Balkans, a programme of ethnic cleansing forced 20,000 Greek Orthodox Christians to leave for Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. After World War I, the former Ottoman empire had lost even more territory and a much larger ‘population exchange’ started, resulting in 1.2 million Greek Orthodox Christians from the Ottoman empire settling in Greece and 60,000 Muslims relocating from Greek territory to Turkey.²² Even more traumatic, but part of the same extreme nation-building process, were the deliberate mass killings of around one million Armenians and Syrian Christians in 1915.

The second example of a fundamental reshuffling of populations through social engineering with soldiers and police troops as executioners, was the millions of Russians forced to resettle in parts of the Soviet Union, as ordered by Stalin. Again, war not only uprooted millions of soldiers, many of whom had never left their home region, but also turned a considerable part of the population into forced migrants, who either died or were moved to Central Asia and Kazakhstan, thousands of kilometres away in culturally and ecologically entirely unknown terrains.²³

Soldiers as migrants not only influenced the empires they fought for and the states they occupied, but also the societies of origin. An interesting example concerns African-American GIs who liberated Europe and subsequently became part of a huge and floating mass of men—and a small minority of women—who fulfilled their (2-year) tour of duty on military bases in Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and foremost West Germany. In the latter country, their function was to safeguard the process of denazification, and more importantly, they acted as a physical and symbolic force in the fast developing Cold War. Although racial segregation also determined daily life at American military bases abroad, black soldiers soon realized that the surrounding German society, not long ago the racial state par excellence, offered much more freedom than the segregated US South where many of them originated from, or the ghettos in the North for that matter. Dating white women and being served without discrimination in bars and restaurants was a totally new experience and made them aware that the institutionalised racism back home was not normal. The impact of their tour of duty was immense and their experiences were transmitted through letters to their friends

and relatives at the other side of the Atlantic. Moreover, upon return, many of them became politically active, joined the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and thus infused their overseas experience as cultural and social capital in the emerging Civil Rights Movement.²⁴ If we want to understand the post-war social and political history of the United States, the foreign encounters of hundreds of thousands of black American soldiers are crucial, and therefore the often-neglected temporary migrations of these ‘organisational migrants’, defined as people whose migratory patterns are primarily defined by the organisation they work for, deserve serious study.²⁵

Other organisational migrants who crossed cultural borders were at least as important in forging social, cultural and political changes. Think of sailors, missionaries, aid workers, diplomats, high-skilled technicians, and expats working for large multinational corporations, like Shell or Philips. Often invested with power and status, their influence on the culture of the people they temporarily interact with is often overlooked and underrated. Yet, they are also an integral part of migration flows and thereby of migration history. Ignoring them not only uncritically adopts the myopic gaze of the state, which is primarily interested in migrants they consider as a (potential) problem, but also makes the impact of migration at large invisible and reproduces the idea that migration is the exception and—as Gérard Noiriel already noticed at the end of the 1980s—societies are determined by *longue durée* native structures.²⁶ Migration history offers a necessary antidote, but in order to deploy its full potential, it should not limit itself to the traditional low-skilled A-to-B migrants. Nancy Green’s recent study on the American business and diplomatic community in Paris, numbering around 60,000 in the interwar period, is an excellent example of questioning assumptions of fixed national (and local) traits, unimpaired by outside influences.²⁷

SEASONAL MIGRANTS

The second category of temporary migrants in the CCMR model concerns those who move seasonally, determined by climatic cycles in agriculture, forestry and—in the past more than in the present—construction. Although nowadays Polish and Romanian seasonal migrants are a topic of debate in several member states of the European Union, they have largely been invisible in migration history, apart from specific cases like

the Bracero Program (1942–1964) to bring in Mexican manual workers on a temporal basis to the United States, or a similar scheme the Prussian state developed in the 1880s for Polish agricultural workers in the East of the German empire.²⁸ These examples are only the tip of the iceberg, especially when we look at the millions of seasonal workers who moved around in the past centuries.²⁹ Most seasonal workers were free to move, especially when they remained within their country (like in Spain, France and Italy), and alternated between their own small family farm, where wife and children remained, and the region where they temporarily earned money—a pattern that is still visible for the Eastern Europeans who come to Western Europe nowadays to harvest asparagus and strawberries.

The main reason to consider seasonal migrants as people who cross cultural boundaries is that they become familiar with more developed market economies than they are used to back home. From historical studies, we know that earning wages and being exposed to commercialisation and new consumption patterns, along with a range of other new cultural experiences, not only changed the migrants but also changed the home communities. Investment of money into home villages by those members who have the opportunity to earn extra wages stimulates conspicuous consumption, to use Torsten Veblen's term, and may very well increase social inequality, and the loosening of family bonds, leading to a loss of communal solidarity. Once again, this example shows that social changes through cross-cultural migrations (CCM) may have positive and negative effects, depending on one's perspective.

Another cross-cultural effect of seasonal migrations is illustrated by the experience of inhabitants of the Indian village of Ranapuram in Andhra Pradesh state who every year temporarily moved to the province of Karnataka for harvesting work. Not only did they earn wages and save money, but they also brought back knowledge and experience that changed agricultural patterns back home:

The knowledge gained by seasonal migrants from working elsewhere also increased the adoption of new varieties of grain that fit the local environmental conditions and provided additional income. In the process of managing crops according to the rainfall conditions, there is a shift from local variety of jowar to the Raichur jowar, which was brought by the seasonal migrants as part of their wage labour. The local variety of jowar is usually sown by the villagers as a substitute crop if there are no rains till the end of August to sow groundnut. The local variety of jowar is grown only for fodder at present.³⁰

CITY DWELLERS

For a long time, cities, both within and outside Europe, could only exist and grow through continuous immigration from the countryside. But when mortality levels declined in the course of the nineteenth century, cities remained a primary target for migrants. Many of them stayed only temporarily and either returned or moved onwards to other cities, but a considerable number of them stayed for good. Moving to cities brought villagers into a very different cultural and social environment. Apart from working opportunities and the possibility to earn one's own money, the much broader public space and institutions offered in general more possibilities for individuals to increase their autonomy from the family. In the countryside, they were more dependent on kin and subject to stricter social controls. For women, this often meant more possibilities to act on their own and reach a greater extent of agency, albeit within the prevailing gender norms.

Urban historians have recently argued along similar lines with respect to the greater public role of women in English and Dutch cities in the early modern period, leading to higher criminality rates,³¹ whereas economic historians stress the relationship between gender equality in urban areas and economic growth.³² Research on Western Europe, Korea, and Japan shows that there are causal links between gender relations, family systems, and economic development, illustrating that constraints on powerholders (men, parents) at the micro level advanced the motivations of women—and thus their agency—which positively impacted economic growth. These studies did not factor in migration, but it is clear that this was a crucial condition for cities in this period to exist, let alone grow.

Although these examples concern the early modern period, the liberating effect of rural to urban migrations through the reduced role of patriarchy, possibilities for education and earning one's own money have been attested for many European regions for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Most recently, the massive migration of men and women to Chinese cities has attracted the interest of social scientists who observe similar cultural changes.³³ This relationship, however, is not straightforward and depends on the extent to which patriarchal family systems erode under the influence of city air and on the specific urban 'membership regime' that sets the (gendered) formal and informal rules pertaining to the access of migrants to urban institutions and public spaces.³⁴

The degree of ‘open access’ varies through time and space and—together with the extent of the homogenisation of national cultures—determines the salience of the rural–urban boundary. From the twentieth century onwards, in most parts of Europe, the process of nation-state building and the ensuing homogenisation through centralised education systems severely weakened cultural differences between the countryside and villages. In Table 3.1, internal migrations to cities after 1900 are therefore not considered as ‘cross-cultural’ anymore. For other parts of the world, however, especially in large states like India, Russia, and China with much greater internal ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity, there are good reasons to include internal moves. A good example is China. Not only are cultural differences between various parts of the country much bigger, but rural migrants have only limited access to urban institutions, such as schools and housing due to the discriminatory ‘hukou system’.³⁵

COLONISATION

In large empires like China, Russia, the Ottoman and the Habsburg empires, but also in overseas ‘plantations’ in the Americas and Oceania, people who moved as farmers to culturally and ecologically different (rural) areas were a recurrent phenomenon, both in the early modern and the modern periods. Such colonising migrations were often organised and supported by the state. Some of the migrants were coerced, such as French and British convicts and Russian dissenters,³⁶ whereas others saw no other option than leaving for unknown destinations as indentured migrants or redemptioners, often treated as virtual slaves at destination until they had repaid their debt (money borrowed for the journey). By far the largest group of forced colonists were some ten million Africans who were taken against their will to the Americas to work on plantations as hereditary chattel slaves. These examples show that, within this category, the full range of free to unfree migrations is represented, with ‘free’ migrants as the exception until the mid-nineteenth century. They have in common that they migrated not to cities but to land and that it was often institutions like states and commercial firms who organised their displacement and exploitation.

When we take a look at Western Europe in the modern period, at first glance, colonisation seems a more or less extinct phenomenon. By that time this region was so urbanised and densely populated that very little uncultivated or ‘empty’ land was left. Moreover, the

democratising nation-states did not have the intention and need to organise such migrations, except for stimulating their citizens to emigrate outside Europe. An exception is Hitler's Germany, not by coincidence a self-declared empire and dictatorship. In its 'Drang nach Osten' to create 'Lebensraum', starting in 1939, the Nazis resettled about 500,000 German citizens and co-ethnics from the Baltic, Bessarabia, Alpine Italy, Galicia, Wolhynia and Transylvania in formerly Polish and Russian territory, many of them as farmers or villagers. The prerequisite was that about 1.2 million Poles were expelled, half of whom were soon exterminated, because they were Jewish.³⁷

The Second World War and the horrific decision by the Nazi leadership to destroy all Jews in Europe brought about huge migrations, not only of soldiers—as we saw—but also a peculiar type of forced colonists: almost eight million coerced workers sent to labour camps and factories in Germany, where they mixed with companions from all over Europe. The cross-cultural effects of this experience for those who were lucky enough to return after the war, and for those to whom they returned, have not yet been systematically mapped and the topic begs for research. This leaves us with about three and a half million Jews and some 220,000 Roma and Sinti who were killed in concentration camps. Although many of them did not travel very far, they can be considered migrants, albeit not of the cross-cultural type, because the genocide prevented them from developing any contacts with others whatsoever.³⁸ The impact on Europe as a whole was nevertheless huge. Not only in cultural and demographic respects, as we discussed before, but also politically, as it created a deeply felt awareness, one could even say an ethical revolution, that started in the 1960s in Western Europe, that racism, discrimination, and stigmatisation represented the ultimate evil and should be discouraged and banned.³⁹ In recent decades, however, the force of this revolution is waning, due to the rise of radical and extreme right political parties that essentialise cultural features of migrants from Muslim countries and blame political correctness that ensued from the ethical revolution.⁴⁰

CONCLUSION

How does the CCM approach help us to put the current polarised debate about immigration and integration into perspective, and more generally when it comes to the relation between people on the move and social change in the long run? To start with, it may offer a more balanced view

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