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12 Colonial and postcolonial transatlantic migrations in the British, Dutch and French Caribbean

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In the decades after 1945, over a million migrants crossed the Atlantic from the Caribbean to Europe (Guengant 1993). In the centuries before that, millions had crossed the Atlantic to the Caribbean. The region discussed in this chapter, currently has a population of about nine million (see Table 12.1). In the 1990s, it was estimated that there were over one million people of Caribbean origin in Europe, mainly in France, the UK and the Netherlands (Peach 1991). An additional five million people migrated from the Caribbean to North America (Foner 1979). This figure also includes migrants from parts of the Caribbean not discussed in this chapter. More important than the absolute numbers, are the percentages of outmigration: 10% of the population from the British West Indies migrated to the UK, 40% of the population of French Guadeloupe and Martinique migrated to France, and half the population of Surinam migrated to the Netherlands (Oostindie & Klinkers 2003). These large percentages make migration from the region unique, leading journalists and others to talk about in terms of an Exodus or hemorrhage.

The Caribbean is larger than the area discussed in this chapter (Figure 12.1), and has a population of 37 million (Oostindie & Klinkers 2003). This chapter does not deal with migrations to and from the former Danish West Indies (currently the US Virgin Islands) nor with that to and from Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Cuba and Haiti. The reason is that colonial ties to Europe were severed at a much earlier date than those with the islands described here, or because migrations to and from these regions are covered in other chapters of this volume. The chapter does include migration to and from the three Guiana's: British, French and Dutch Guiana (or Surinam). The three Guiana's, located on South America's northern coast, geographically do not belong to the Caribbean. However, transatlantic migration to and from the three Guiana's is frequently discussed within the same context as migration to and from the Caribbean proper (Baver 1995). In publications, the number of migrants from the three Guiana's and the numbers from the Caribbean are frequently taken together. Geographic proximity (and bordering on the Caribbean Sea) as well as shared colonial rule explain this grouping. There was and is large scale migration between the three Guiana's and the other French,

Table 12.1 Current population of the (former) French, Dutch and British possessions in the Caribbean, plus the three Guiana's

	<i>Current population</i>
Currently French	
Guadeloupe	403,750
Martinique	386,486
Saint Martin	36,286
Saint-Barthélemy	9035
Les Saintes	3418
Marie-Galante	11,528
La Désirade	1595
French Guiana	250,109
Currently Dutch	
Aruba	103,400
Curacao	154,843
Bonaire	17,408
Sint Maarten	33,609
Sint Eustatius	4020
Saba	1991
Currently British	
Cayman Islands	57,000
UK Virgin Islands: Tortola, Virgin Gorda, Anegada, Jost Van Dyke	28,054
Montserrat	4900
Turks and Caicos Islands	49,000
Former British	
Trinidad and Tobago (independent 1962)	1,943,223
Jamaica (independent 1962)	2,950,210
Barbados (independent 1966)	277,821
The Bahamas (independent 1973)	321,834
Grenada (independent 1974)	109,590
Dominica (independent 1978)	72,660
Saint Lucia ((independent 1979)	183,600
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (independent 1979)	103,000
Antigua and Barbuda (independent 1981)	91,295
Saint Kitts and Nevis (independent 1983)	54,961
British Guiana (independent 1966)	735,554
Belize (British Honduras, independent 1981)	347,369
Former Dutch	
Suriname (Dutch Guiana) (independent 1975)	573,311
Total	9,284,574

Calculated by the authors based on a variety of sources.

English and Dutch (former) possessions in the region. The southern borders of the three Guiana's are of little relevance to the people in the region. They move frequently across the southern borders, have family ties across borders and perceive the area as one entity, rather than as three separate states. The borders between the three Guiana's are difficult to control, as are the borders with Brazil, and authorities put little effort in attempts to control the frontiers. Belize (former British Honduras)—although geographically belonging to Central America and not the



Figure 12.1 The Caribbean.

Caribbean—is sometimes also included in studies on the British Caribbean for similar reasons as the three Guiana's: bordering on the Caribbean Sea, frequent migrations to and from other British possessions and a shared system of rule.

The French, British and Dutch colonies in the greater Caribbean were initially regarded as of little importance to the colonizers. The Dutch East Indies (current Indonesia), British India and French Indochina were considered far more important (and more profitable) than the West Indies, as were colonial possessions in Africa. Policies for the Caribbean were developed in the shadow of the primary concerns with the more profitable colonial possessions in the East. Oostindie and Klinkers (2003) labeled the system of rule that developed as a result “careless colonialism.”

Postcolonial transatlantic migration' as a phrase only partially applies to the Caribbean for the simple reason that colonialism has not come to an end for the whole of the Caribbean, although the word “colony” is no longer used. The Caribbean parts of Britain, France and the Netherlands are called British Overseas Territories, French Overseas Departments (*départements d'outre-mer* (DOMs)), and Dutch special municipalities. There are some differences in how these regions are ruled and in the rights its population has. The Dutch special municipalities are not part of the European Union, but its inhabitants do hold Dutch nationality and can travel to and from the Netherlands without restriction. The French overseas departments are an integral part of France, and part of the European Union.

Gert Oostindie (2010) coined the term “post-colonial bonus” to indicate that migrants from the former colonies had advantages over other migrants,

when they migrated to the so-called mother country or the metropole. They have the nationality of the (former) colonizing country (French, Dutch or British), speak the language, grew up in the same school system and know the culture of the mother country. There was however, according to Laarman (2013), also a post-colonial *malus* (see also Banton 1983; Ellis 2001; Beriss 1991; 2018): colonization built on and was justified by othering the colonized people. The colonizers stereotyped the colonized people as lazy, undisciplined, infantile and inferior, among others. Centuries of othering had negative consequences when people from the (former) colonies moved to the metropole (Blakely 1998; Dubois 2000; Germain 2010; McDermott Thompson 2012). Or, as other authors have phrased it: current European modes of exclusion possess a genealogy that includes the racial divides of the colonial past (Walsum, Jones & Legêne 2013).

The literature on transatlantic migration to and from the Caribbean is large, although it is much smaller than the literature on the (former) colonies in Asia. This chapter focusses on transatlantic movement. It discusses first the migrations to and from the Caribbean before 1945, and then those after 1945. It seeks to explain both similarities and differences between parts of the Caribbean (Grosfoguel 1997), as well as continuities and discontinuities over time. Figure 12.1

Migrations before 1945

Migration to and from the Caribbean in the last century can only be understood in the light of—and resulted from—earlier migrations to, from and within the region. Among authors, there is consensus (Chaney 1987) that high mobility distinguishes this region from other regions, and that this mobility goes back centuries. Before the arrival of Columbus in 1492, the mobility between the islands was already large. Migration continued to be important in later centuries, and it led to societies in which migration was an intrinsic part of life (Duval 2004). No other region in the world was more deeply and more continuously affected by migration than the Caribbean (Thomas-Hope 2000).

During the period of colonial rule, almost all islands changed hands frequently: islands were alternately ruled by the Dutch, the French, the British, the Spanish, the Portuguese and to a lesser extent by the Danes and the Swedes. Wars between England, France and the Netherlands were fought out in the Caribbean, resulting in plunder and colonial possessions changing hands (Barbados was an exception because it stayed British throughout the colonial period). Frequent changes in rule only partly affected the language the population spoke. The Dutch Virgin Islands, for instance, became the British Virgin Islands after the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672–1674), but the enslaved population continued to speak Dutch after the transition to British rule. Travel between the islands was frequent, cheap and easy, and for many travelers, state barriers and state control had little relevance. The Europeans who came to the Caribbean were not settlers *per se*. Many drifted between the islands, looking for quick gains. The pirates of

the Caribbean were men with Dutch, Spanish, French and English roots, who spoke a joint language containing elements from all languages. The Caribbean was difficult to govern since it consists of a large number of islands. The Bahamas, for instance, consists of 700 islands, cays and islets. The British, Dutch and French possessions were not geographically coherent entities: islands were far apart. In the early days of colonialism mostly men (and not women) migrated from England, France, the Netherlands and other European countries to the Caribbean.

The Caribbean colonies were initially not very profitable. In the seventeenth century; however, sugar and tobacco, grown on plantations started to generate profit. The West Indies proved not attractive to European settlers, and the death rate amongst the Europeans was high. As in other colonies, there were fears that the few white settlers who managed to survive would “go native.” The white settlers changed under the influence of living together with slaves in conditions characterized by violence, intimacy and inequality. Greed and corruption was rampant among the slave-owners, some of whom came from humble origins, had grown rich rapidly and combined lack of moderation with bad taste (Petley 2009; De Barros 2014).

Despite the disadvantages, the European population in the Caribbean grew over time, mostly because of continued immigration. In 1650, there were, for instance, already 44,000 English settlers in the British West Indies. Overall, authorities tried to stimulate migrations from Europe. The region offered opportunities for Europeans seeking religious freedom. The Dutch possessions may serve as an example. When the Dutch conquered Northern Brazil from the Portuguese in 1630, there was a European community of about 40,000 people (Van der Straaten 1988). The Dutch West Indian Company (WIC) established its headquarters there, and encouraged the growth of the European community by providing cheap land and favorable shipping conditions. In 1630, the WIC already had 10,000 employees in Dutch Brazil. The community grew when many Jews moved to Dutch Brazil because they could freely exercise their religion there: the first synagogue in the America’s was built in Recife. In 1644, there were 1500 Sephardic Jews in Dutch Brazil. When the WIC lost Dutch Brazil to the Portuguese in 1654, most of its population left for other parts of the Caribbean and North America. Jewish migrants from Brazil joined Jews in Surinam, who had left earlier from England, and Jews who fled the Spanish Inquisition (Roitman 2014). In Surinam, they set up sugar plantations in *Jodensavanne* (Jewish Savannah). In 1694, this community consisted of 570 Jewish planters on 40 plantations, and 9000 slaves (Bakker et al. 1998). From 1683 onwards, the Dutch governor of Surinam very actively encouraged migration to Surinam. He stimulated a group of Labadist, a religious sect, to move to Surinam (Knappert 1927), as well as a group of Huguenots (Bakker et al. 1998). In the eighteenth century, the Jewish community of Surinam grew because Jews from Germany and Russia moved to Surinam. At the end of the eighteenth century, 25% of the white population in Surinam was Jewish. In the beginning of the nineteenth

century this was true for half of the white population (1258 Jews on a population of 2547 whites).

In the seventeenth century, Huguenots from France migrated to the Caribbean. The French crown used Martinique as a dumping ground for Huguenots, and shipped 1000 Huguenots there under bad conditions. These new arrivals joined Huguenots who had migrated to Martinique earlier from their own free will. In 1688 the new Huguenots, who were not free to leave, escaped to British colonies. Later, France for a while also used its possessions in the West Indies (including French Guiana) as a penal colony. They also stimulated and financially facilitated free migration from Europe to the West Indies (Hartkopf Schloss 2014).

Other groups in a similar fashion sought religious freedom in the West Indies. Mennonites, who originated from the Netherlands, but later moved to Prussia, and from there to Russia, came to Belize, partly via Canada, hoping they could live in isolation. There still is a rather large Mennonite community in Belize. The Moravian Brotherhood (Hernhutters)—an originally marginal and persecuted Protestant group in Europe—send missions to the Caribbean in the eighteenth century and later and established communities in, amongst other, Surinam, Belize, French Guiana, Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad, Tobago, Barbados, Antigua, St. Kitts and the Virgin Islands (St. Croix, St. John, St. Thomas, Tortola and Grenada). In Surinam, 50% of the Afro-Surinamese population belongs to the Moravian Brotherhood. The Moravian Brothers tried to get permission from the colonial authorities to conclude marriages among the enslaved population—which were forbidden because slaves were considered goods, not people—and for the recognition and baptism of the children of enslaved mothers. The Moravian Brotherhood, however, did not object to or protest against slavery (Stipriaan 2004).

The original population of the Caribbean was decimated shortly after the arrival of the Europeans (Dalhuisen et al. 1997). European traders, and especially the WIC, brought large numbers of slaves into the Caribbean: 40% of the 11 to 14 million slaves (Van Welie 2008) that were shipped across the Atlantic to the America's, were shipped to the Caribbean, 40% was shipped to Brazil and 5% to North America. Slave transports to Brazil at that time mainly meant shipment to the Northern part of Brazil, which was ruled by the Dutch between 1630 and 1654 and where the WIC had its headquarters. Overall, the region described in this chapter was the largest receiver of slaves shipped across the Atlantic. There was movement of slaves from the Caribbean to North America. British planters, for instance, moved with their slaves from the Caribbean to the US south. Curacao was an important redistribution center of slaves to North and South America. Movement also went in the opposite direction: after the American Independence, the British resettled 7300 Loyalists with their slaves to the Bahamas. French authorities resettled white planters and their slaves from New Orleans to French Guiana (Hartkopf Schloss 2014). In the 1820s, hundreds of American slaves escaped from Florida to the Bahamas with a flotilla of small boats.

A third of the slaves are estimated not to have survived the Atlantic crossing. Slave-traders insured their “cargoes” of slaves against losses at sea, as they did with other cargo. This led to Zong massacre in 1781, when 133 of the 442 slaves on a ship, which was originally called *Zorg* in Dutch (Care), were thrown overboard alive in Caribbean waters near the ship’s destination, because the ship had taken too many slaves, and too little water. The slave traders preferred to cash in on the insurance money rather than bringing half-starved slaves into the port (who might die before being sold), or risking the death of all slaves rather than the weak only. Most slaves as a rule did not live longer than 15 years after arrival in the West Indies. Fertility was extremely low, and this led to constant additional “imports” of slaves. In the three Guiana’s and on the larger islands slaves escaped from the plantations and formed isolated communities of “Maroons.” On the smaller islands there were less possibilities to do so, although “Maroon” communities did exist.

Slave revolts were common in the Caribbean, where in some regions slaves outnumbered slave-owners 10 to 1. Most of the revolts took place at the end of the eighteenth century, for instance in Antiqua (1701, 1831), Bahamas (1830, 1832–34), Barbados (1816), Curacao (1716, 1750, 1774, 1795), Dominica (1785–90, 1791, 1795, 1802, 1809–14), Grenada (1765, 1795) and Guadeloupe (1656, 1737, 1789, 1802). In 1795, Tula led a revolt in Curacao; 2000 of the 12,000 slaves on the island took part in it. The insurgents gathered on the St. Christoffel mountain, and slave-owners tried to starve them to death by laying a siege. Tula was willing to negotiate, but he was captured, clapper clawed, his faced burned, his head displayed on a stick, and his body thrown into the sea (Laarman 2013). In 1802, Louis Delgres led a revolt in Guadeloupe in a similar manner. He and 800 others chose to die rather than submit to the French army. All revolts were violently suppressed. The large number of revolts and the imbalance in the numbers and in power, as well as the fact that ex-slaves and escaped slaves traveled between the islands, led to wild and widespread theories about slavery revolt conspiracies. This created panics often used as excuses for extreme violence towards the enslaved populations. Severe repression and fears among the slaves about who was telling on whom, led to distrust and fed into the uncertainty created by the slave revolts panic. It shattered brittle social relations among the blacks, and empowered the whites. Stereotyping of the enslaved other carried over into later centuries (Sharples 2010). In the Caribbean there currently is growing interest in the revolts and the escapes of slaves, and they are presented as key to Caribbean identity.

In the colonies in Asia, there was a group of Eurasians, and in Africa, there were Euraficans. There was also extensive mixing in the Caribbean, but after the migrations to Europe in the twentieth century, the categorizations that were used in the colonial era disappeared, and people of mixed descent never formed political lobby groups similar to the Eurasians or the *Pieds Noirs*. Mixing was both cultural and biological, and both resulted in blurring of lines between groups (Roitman 2014). During colonialism, authorities in the

Caribbean were interested in the results of mixed sexual relationships. Like in Latin America, tables were drafted and illustrations made to categorize the outcomes of mixed relationships. The word *Casta* was used to refer both to the illustrations—consisting of 16 paintings, each depicting forms of mixing—and to the *Casta* system, used by the Spaniards to control their colonies. A variety of words were introduced to describe the outcomes of mixing. The word mulatto (derived from the word mule) defined the offspring of sexual relations between blacks and whites; quadroons, the children of mulattoes and whites; and octoroon, those of quadroons and whites. Mestizos were the children of whites and Amerindians, and Zambos those of Amerindians and blacks. Mulattoes and others of mixed origin were seen in the Caribbean as a problematic category, as was true for the people of mixed descent in other colonial settings. In 1685, French colonial authorities drafted their *Code Noir*, which defined status and rights according to race (Beriss 1991). Mixing undermined the colonial hierarchy because it undercut ideas about white superiority. Poor whites (or *petits blancs*) were seen as equally problematic when it came to maintaining colonial hierarchy. From the seventeenth century onwards, there were fears in the Caribbean that mulattoes and others of mixed origin might lead slave rebellions, as Louis Delgres did.

From the seventeenth century onwards, slaves were depicted as practicing witchcraft, superstitious and possessed by a belief in Zombies. Enslaved women were presented as sensual and calculating, and offering sex in return for favors. Masters were in this view not violating the enslaved women, but paying for sex with favors, putting the enslaved women in the role of prostitutes, and describing the acts of white men in terms of trade, and not as rape (Garraway 2000).

Few blacks migrated from the West Indies to Europe in the eighteenth century. Several hundred came to Europe yearly as servants, concubines, adopted children and objects of display on fairs (Oostindie, 2000). There was some return migration of whites, for instance when the Dutch colonies Berbice, Essequibo and Demerary were officially ceded to England in 1814 (they later became part of British Guiana). Its population partly moved to Surinam, and partly back to Europe. Some of these families later moved to the Dutch East Indies and other parts of Europe, mainly France and the UK, which shows that there was not only a migration circuit in the West Indies but also between West Indies, Europe and the East Indies. In the middle of the nineteenth century, some former slaves moved from the Caribbean to Liberia.

The UK abolished slavery in 1833, France did so in 1848 and the Netherlands in 1863. After the abolition of slavery, the size of the former slave population fell, mostly because of a high death rate. Former slave owners tried to force free black workers to continue to work on the plantations. In Guadeloupe, *ateliers de disciplines* were set up, in which the now free blacks worked under slavery-like conditions (Renard 1992). They were legally free, but in practice little changed. The Caribbean population, which was poor and underfed, was struck hard by the cholera epidemics of the second half the nineteenth century (De Barros 2014).

All three colonizing countries brought in contract laborers from India to replace the former slaves. In 1852, France brought Indians from French India (geographically separated enclaves on the Indian subcontinent) to the West-Indies, as well as a group of workers called *Neg Congo* from their colonial possessions in Africa. In the next decade about 10,000 Indians arrived the French West Indies (Richardson 1989). In 1885, there were 87,000 Indians in Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guiana. The French also recruited *Syro-Libanaïs* as traders and shopkeepers (Beriss 1991). Between 1853 and 1893, 2600 Chinese were brought to Surinam. In 1870, the Dutch got permission from British authorities to contract laborers in the British colonies in Asia. In total 30,304 British Indians were brought to Surinam. This migration continued until 1916, when the British stopped this recruitment under the pressure of British nationalists. Between 1890 and 1939, the Dutch brought 33,000 workers from Java to Surinam. British contract laborers from neighboring British Guiana also moved to Surinam. The contract laborers from British India in Surinam were British subjects until 1927, when they became Dutch subjects (Hoeft 1998). The contract laborers were called coolies. Later this derogatory word was replaced by the word Hindustani, although 80% of the group was Muslim, not Hindu, as the name might suggest. Within the group of contract laborers, men outnumbered women 3 or 4 to 1.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, authorities again (like in earlier centuries) tried to lure more Europeans to the West Indies (Hartkopf Schloss 2014). Dutch farmers were encouraged to move to Surinam (Gemink 1980). In 1845, 50 families (202 persons) were selected for migration, but in Surinam they did not find housing, nor the fields or the cattle they had been promised. Within a few years, half of the group died of typhus. Currently, about 3500 persons self-identify as *Boeroes* (descendants of this mid-nineteenth century migration to Surinam), with 2500 of them residing in the Netherlands and 1000 in Surinam.

Around 1900, colonial authorities hoped that the West Indies would generate more profit if additional white Europeans migrated to the colony. Some administrators; however, scorned the idea arguing that although many Dutch wanted to escape unemployment and misery in the Netherlands, the “white race” was not suited to live on the equator and would not survive and thrive in Surinam (Van Drimmelen 1923). Thousands of Dutch, French, Germans and English people had settled in the Caribbean, and they had vanished, leaving only traces of mixed blood, according to this critic. Only those who had been willing to discard their Western European character, and accept a strong mixture with “negro blood” survived, according to his colleague Van Blom (1919). Interest for migration to the West Indies increased when the US introduced quota measures (Menkman 1928). Furthermore, in the first decades of the twentieth century, the construction of the Panama Canal and railroad attracted large numbers of migrants from the Caribbean. In 1914, 45,000 Barbadians and thousands of migrants from Martinique, Guadeloupe and the Dutch West Indies moved to Panama. Some 20,000 Caribbean workers died

in Panama due to malaria and yellow fever (Ferguson 2003). Panama continued to be a favored destination also in later years, as were Cuba and Costa Rica, which had more employment opportunities than the smaller islands.

In the 1920s, few people from the Caribbean crossed the Atlantic to Europe. Most were sailors, musicians, artists and students (Beriss 1991; Van Amersfoort & Niekerk 2006). Almost all were men. Musicians profited from the popularity of Jazz music, in which the migrants' skin color helped in their claims of authenticity.

The French and British Caribbean strongly depended on sugar production, which experienced a sharp downturn in the 1930s. The Dutch Caribbean processed crude oil, brought in by tankers from Venezuela. In the 1920s, the oil refineries on Aruba were a major attraction for foreign workers. Americans and Canadians moved to the island in large numbers, as did many Dutch, and migrants from other parts of the Caribbean. Most were men. In the late 1940s, the oil industry first automatized and later slumped, and the number of employees and workers in the oil industries sharply decreased. During the Second World War, the US controlled military bases across the Caribbean, result in the stationing of large numbers of US troops. This created ample employment opportunities for the local population: building runways, fortifying harbors, constructing barracks and working as cooks, messengers, servants and prostitutes (Richardson 1989). During the Second World War, the British government recruited in the West Indies 8000 men for the RAF, many foresters from British Honduras to work in the Scottish forests, and other workers for the British munition industry (Peach 1991).

Migrations after the Second World War

After the end of the Second World War, the number of migrants from the Caribbean to Europe increased. Authors used phrases such as "we are here, because you were there," "the empire strikes back," and "colonization in reverse" to describe this new transatlantic migration (Nederveen Pieterse 1991; Goulbourne 1999).

Post-war transatlantic migration from the Caribbean should be put in the context of other migrations. In the 1950s, migrants from the Caribbean entering the in the UK arrived in country that also contained some 160,000 Polish ex-service men as immigrants, 20,000 German ex-prisoners of war who decided to stay, and 80,000 DPs recruited from camps in Europe. Moreover, the UK recruited Italian workers and had a large population of Irish immigrants. The West-Indians had the advantage over some of these other migrants that they spoke English and were educated within the same school system.

France actively recruited workers in the Caribbean while they were at the same time recruiting workers in Italy and Portugal. Furthermore, about one million *Pieds Noirs* from Algeria, which became independent in 1962, migrated to France. Algeria was a department of France and its citizens had

French nationality, if they were non-Muslims. After their departure, the world the *Pieds Noirs* had created in Algeria ceased to exist. The *Pieds Noirs* had no intention or possibility to return. When Algeria became independent almost the entire non-Muslim population left for France, where they emphasized their Frenchness and made very strong claims for compensation. The West-Indians who arrived in France could return, and could travel back and forth between the Caribbean and France. They, like other migrants from the (former) colonies, had the advantage over other immigrants in France because French nationality was required for jobs in the public sector. The West Indians did not make the same claims as the *Pieds Noirs* did, nor did they develop into a comparable political force, although later they have become more visible and more politically active (Beriss 2018).

Dutch authorities in the late 1940s felt that the Netherlands, with a population of ten million, was overpopulated and encouraged and financed the emigration of 400,000 Dutch nationals, mostly to Australia and Canada (Obdeijn and Schrover 2008). When the Dutch East Indies became independent, 300,000 migrants came to the Netherlands from Indonesia. These immigrants from the (former) Dutch East Indies were commonly referred to as repatriates, although the majority had been born in the Dutch East Indies and had never been to the Netherlands before. Most of the migrants from the Dutch East Indies were of mixed ancestry (with a European father, grandfather or great-grandfather, and a so-called indigenous mother). At the time of their migration, emphasis was put on their Dutchness and their home-coming. Like in the case of the *Pieds Noirs*, almost the entire non-Muslim population left for the Netherlands. Migrants from the Dutch West Indies were never referred to in similar terms, they were not called repatriates, their Dutchness was not emphasized and hardly any attention was paid to mixing in the colony (Laarman 2013). The decolonization processes of Algeria and The Dutch East Indies were violent and traumatic. Dutch and French authorities strove at all costs to avoid this scenario in the West Indies. The UK did not have similar feelings regarding the decolonization of India, and thus expressed fewer fears concerning the decolonization of the British West Indies.

These changes in transatlantic migration after the Second World War related to decolonization. In the 1950s, after the independence of Indonesia, the Dutch government's interest for the Dutch West Indies sharply increased. In 1954, a plan was presented to stimulate economic growth in Surinam. For Surinam, the bauxite industry was important, but the companies involved and the workers on the plants were mostly Americans. Authorities felt the need to stimulate alternative sources of income and growth. Dutch authorities hoped that 50,000 people from the Dutch East Indies, who were part of the about 300,000 migrants who came to the Netherlands, would be willing to move to Surinam. The plan failed (Bakker et al. 1998).

In the late 1940s, migrants from the Caribbean traveled to the UK with British shipping lines, as well as with Italian and Spanish shipping lines, which started to call on the islands on their return trips from Latin America when

interest in migration to Europe increased (Peach 1991). In later decades, migration by plane increased. Shortly before Surinam became independent, Dutch authorities bought up seats on KLM flights to restrict migration to the Netherlands. The planes left half-empty while many people were eager to leave (Laarman 2013).

Migrants from the Caribbean seldom claimed refugee status in the so-called mother country, since they could easily migrate within the (post) colonial systems, because they had Dutch, French or British citizenship. The large-scale migration from Surinam on the eve of its independence could be characterized as a politically motivated flight: the migrants feared political instability and repression after independence. After Surinam became independent and a civil war broke out, migrants from Surinam in the Netherlands did claim refugee status. This status was seldom granted, but many migrants were allowed to stay anyhow, as family migrants or on humanitarian grounds.

After the Second World War, people from the Caribbean could initially travel to Europe without much hindrance (Byron and Condon 1996). The arrival of 417 Jamaicans on the *Empire Windrush* in 1948 is seen as the start of post-war migration to the UK. Debates about curbing entries from the Caribbean actually stimulated migration to the UK. The migrants were in a rush to beat the ban. In the Netherlands and France these beat-the-ban type of migrations occurred a decade or more later. When in the 1970s, France, the Netherlands and the UK restricted migration from the Caribbean, Caribbean migration to the US and Canada increased, as it had done in the 1920s and 1930s. After 1975, immigrant regimes in Europe became more restrictive overall. Migration from the Caribbean, however, continued because people had rights regarding family reunification and formation. In the Netherlands, family reunification policies became less restrictive because of the migration from the West Indies: same sex couples (with or without children) and unmarried couples were treated the same as heterosexual or married partners. The underlying assumption was that family formation in the Caribbean might be different from that in the European part of the Netherlands (Van Walsum, Jones and Legêne 2013). This idea was dominant in the whole Caribbean, although it was seen as characteristic of the Afro-Caribbean population but not of the Indo-Caribbeans. The assumption held the existence of a large number of female-headed and matrifocal households, with women in a strong and men in a marginal position (Trotz 2003). In France these type of assumptions led to restrictions on family reunification options for people in and from the French Antilles (Stromberg Childers 2009). In the post-war period, French authorities saw Antillean women as overly fertile and as responsible for the overpopulation of the Antilles and therefore their poverty. The image builds on colonial stereotypes of Antillean women as sexually accessible and hypersexual. The organized and sponsored migration from the Antilles to France was meant to reduce population pressure, and to educate women about modern ways of family planning. This was highly surprising since French authorities as a rule stimulated populating France and feared under-population (Germain 2010).

As has been observed above, West Indians had been part of the RAF during the war. After the war, they returned to the West Indies, as planned. When the British recruitment for workers started in the Caribbean after the war, they were among the first to show interest. The British recruited mainly for British Rail, London Transport and the National Health Service. From Barbados, a quarter of the migrants in 1960 left on sponsorship schemes (Peach 1991). In France and the Netherlands—both occupied by the Nazis during the war—there was no similar connection between wartime and post-war employment.

In the 1950s to 1970s millions of migrants from the Caribbean moved to the UK, France and the Netherlands, as well as to the US and Canada. Since the migrants from the Caribbean held Dutch, French or British nationality, it is not possible to establish precisely the size of these flows since frequently the migrants were not listed separately in census data (Lafleur 2011). Between 1955 and 1962, 33,000 Commonwealth Caribbean citizens migrated to the UK per year, mostly as unskilled workers. In 1962, the UK removed the open entry regulation for Caribbean Commonwealth citizens. The number of migrants from the Caribbean fell after that. Nonetheless, policies continued to allow entry to specific categories of migrants such as family dependents, those with permits for specific occupations such as nurses and teachers, and recruited workers. In 1966, the number of migrants reached 15,000, but it had fallen to 5000 in 1971. By 1973, some 550,000 migrants from the Caribbean resided in the UK. After low annual numbers in the early 1980s, entries rose to 6000 in 1986 and fell to 4000 in 1987 (Thomas-Hope 2000).

In 1963, the French organization BUMIDOM (*Bureau pour le développement des migrations les départements d'outre Mer*) started to recruit and transport workers from the Caribbean to France. They placed the workers in vocational training, or directly into employment. The program was discontinued in 1981, when the economic recession set in and the need for labor fell. In 1982, the Caribbean population of France was estimated at 226,000.

In 1952, it became possible for Surinamese students to study in the Netherlands on a scholarship. Migration of students increased, and in 1957 350 Surinamese students studied in the Netherlands (mostly men, and mostly Afro-Surinamese) (Oostindie and Maduro 1986). Young men, who had studied in the Netherlands, largely did not return. Dutch, French and British hospitals all recruited nurses in the Caribbean (Cottaar 2003). The migration of students and nurses fed the authorities' fear of a Caribbean brain drain (Cooper 1985).

In 1964 there were 3000 Surinamese in the Netherlands, in 1966 13,000 and in 1970 22,000. Migration peaked in 1975, when in one year 40,000 Surinamese left (10% of the population at the time). In 1979 and 1980—the last two years when unrestricted migration to the Netherlands was still possible—18,000 people per year left. In the 1980s, military coups in Surinam ignited fears and encouraged further emigrations. Dutch authorities at the same time tried to encourage migrants from Surinam to return. Their travel expenses were paid, they got money to tie them over for a while, and they

could keep their social security benefits, and could settle their debts on favorable terms (Van Amersfoort 1987). The plan failed and very few people returned. On 1 September 1980, visa requirements were introduced and newspapers wrote that the door to paradise would close. After that date, migration to the Netherlands continued as family reunification; between 1980 and 1990, more than 30,000 Surinamese came to the Netherlands. In 2008, the population of Surinam was 494,000 while the number of Surinamese in the Netherlands was 327,000.

Migration from the Netherlands Antilles was similar to that from Surinam. In the 1950s, some students (almost all men) came to the Netherlands (Oostindie 2000). Between 1964 and 1970, 2500 men were recruited as workers (mainly for industry) and 500 women as nurses. People from the Netherlands Antilles currently travel on a Dutch passport (Sharpe 2005). In 2007, there were 129,000 Antilleans in the Netherlands, of whom 79,000 were born on the Netherlands Antilles, while the rest was born to Antillean parents in the Netherlands. Antilleans can travel back and forth between the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles: 60% of the Antilleans that came to the Netherlands between 1995 and 2005 had returned by 2005.

In the UK West-Indians settled in greater London and in the West-Midlands (Abenaty 2003), mainly in council housing (Peach & Byron 1994). Female-headed households were common among Caribbean migrants (Lawson 1998). In the Netherlands, the Afro-Surinamese settled mainly in the Amsterdam neighborhood *De Bijlmermeer*, while the Hindustani community concentrated in The Hague, and Antilleans in Rotterdam, with many households being female-headed. Migrants from the French Antilles mainly lived in Paris.

De Bijlmermeer became a US type of ghetto, albeit less large-scale, with high-rise housing, isolated from the rest of Amsterdam, poverty, unemployment, single-parent households, and a bad reputation related to drugs and crime. In 1982, the Surinamese formed 20% of the *Bijlmer's* 50,000 residents. Migrants from Ghana and Nigeria also moved into the *Bijlmer*, and stressed shared ancestry; both groups spoke languages that contained words from Zwi (Van Dijk 2005). Some of the Surinamese however pointed out that if they were the decedents of former slaves, their new neighbors were decedents of their old neighbors in Africa who sold them into slavery. They share with their new neighbors an interest in Pentecostalism, which was not important for them before migration, but which became increasingly important for them as well as for Caribbean migrants in the UK (Chivallon 2001; Catron 2010). Hill (1971) called the change in religion of the Caribbean migrants in the UK, one of the most striking features of this migration. In his view, it resulted from racial discrimination of Caribbean migrants by other churches.

The Surinamese emphasized slavery as part of their collective history and lobbied for a monument commemorating the end of slavery, like migrants from the Caribbean did in France and the UK. They also explained drug use by pointing towards the slavery past: one form of dependency was replaced by

another form of dependency. Antilleans in France used a similar rhetoric of dependency to explain the lack of a distinct Antillean identity in France: the perversities of colonialism and slavery made them part French (biologically and politically) and thus frustrated the development of a separate identity (Beriss 1991). The Hindustani groups from the Caribbean, who were brought there as indentured workers by the Dutch, the French and the British, emphasized their ties with India. Bollywood films are part of this shared heritage with visits of movie stars and musicians (Verstappen 2005). There are also heritage trips to India, so as to re-orientate towards India roots (Bloemberg 1995; Hira 2000; Choenni & Adhin 2003). This identification with India unites 20 million people of Indian descent outside India, including those living in the Guiana's, Trinidad, Uganda, Mauritius, Fiji and the UK.

In recent decades, transatlantic migration to the Caribbean has again increased (Goulbourne 1999; Potter & Phillips 2006). People are returning to the French, Dutch and British overseas departments, although some of the returnees were not born in the Caribbean, but are the children, grandchildren or spouses of people that were. The Caribbean islands have developed into tax havens and holiday islands (in part for the hundreds of thousands annual Spring-breakers from the US who travel to the islands in February, March and April) (Guengant 1993). All islands experienced a rapid growth of the tourist and service industries. Aruba received 16,000 foreign settlers between 1987 and 1992. In 2000, a third of the islands population was born elsewhere (30,000 on a population of 90,000 at that time). Most came from other parts of the Caribbean and from Latin America, but about 14% came from Europe.

Conclusion

The Caribbean is unique when it comes to migration history. White Europeans migrated across the Atlantic to the West Indies, in part fleeing oppression and seeking religious freedom. They came to and created a society where bondage and repression (of the enslaved population) were the rule. Millions of people from Africa were transported across the Atlantic to the Caribbean and sold as slaves. The Caribbean was the most important destination for the slave ships. There was a lot migration within the Caribbean before, during and after the colonial period. After the abolition of slavery, contract laborers from Asia were brought in, and (unsuccessful) attempts were made to rekindle migration of Europeans. After the Second World War, large numbers of migrants from the Caribbean came to the Netherlands, France and the UK. In recent years, there is "return" migration from Europe to the Caribbean, partly of people who return to their roots, and partly of people who see possibilities on the tourist islands and tax havens, which are still part of Europe. Migrations within the Caribbean, the frequent change of hands of the colonial possessions, comparable systems of rule, and the continuing back and forth migration across the Atlantic, forged similarities. The large percentages of out-migration make the Caribbean unique: there are no other regions in the world in which the

percentage of out-migration is that large. Migrants from the Caribbean did profit from the post-colonial bonus: they had citizenship, spoke the language and had grown up in the same school system. It gave these migrants advantages over other migrants in Europe. They, however, were also affected by the post-colonial malus: colonization built on centuries of stereotyping the colonized other, and these stereotypes did travel with the migrants to Europe. Mixing and migrations in the colonies led to hybrid identities, and thus little and late organizational activity after migration in Europe. The Eurasians (from the European colonies in Asia) and the *Pieds Noirs* (from Algeria) formed distinct groups in the colonies and migrated as distinct groups to Europe. In the West Indies, there was no parallel to this migration. Furthermore, for the Eurasians and *Pieds Noirs* there was no way back, while the migrants from the West Indies continue to migrate back and forth across the Atlantic.

There were also differences when it comes to transatlantic Caribbean migration to and from Europe after the Second World War. In the first place, in the UK post-war recruitment built recruitment during the war, while in the Netherlands and France it did not. Secondly, in France and the Netherlands the traumatic and violent decolonization of Algeria and Indonesia strongly influenced the stand of France and the Netherlands towards its possessions in the West Indies, while for the UK there was no similar stand. Thirdly, France very actively recruited workers in the West Indies and facilitated and organized migrations, while the UK and the Netherlands were less active in recruitment and facilitation.

Overall, the similarities are more dominant than the differences, explained by the fact that the Caribbean is one region, and not the patchwork of possessions the colonizers imagined. Fragmented study of transatlantic migration to and from the Caribbean reflects ideas developed under colonialism.

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