Variants, race relations, and trend-setters: postwar Dortmund, Bristol, and Malmö in national migration histories
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Variants, Race Relations, and Trend-Setters

Postwar Dortmund, Bristol, and Malmö in National Migration Histories

1 Introduction

This contribution presents three case studies of municipal policies and reactions to migration in postwar Europe: Bristol, Dortmund and Malmö¹. It explores how local approaches cast new light on national historiographies that remain dominant in twentieth-century migration history. National historiographies help identify policies and patterns in our city cases that reflect national and regional influences, but we find the reverse to be true as well. Malmö was a trend-setter in moving Sweden to formulate new migrant integration policies. Bristol shows how both national direction, and its absence, spurred local civic society and municipal officials to craft local policies and practices, and local developments likely influenced national legislation. Dortmund, by contrast, provides a case in which a locality diverged in significant ways from national trends. Our city histories, we argue, enrich our understanding of European migration history by (1) revealing the relationship between national- and local-level migration and integration policies and (2) highlighting local actors’ ability to pursue their own policies when they varied from, or ran counter to, trends in national contexts.

Dortmund’s postwar migration history demonstrates the rewards of investigating local agency within larger contexts of regional variation. North-Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) was shielded from the first major settlements of expellees in the 1940s and Dortmund, like other cities in the Ruhr, was able to exert some control over expellee resettlements until the early 1950s. The Ruhr’s self-identity as a “melting-pot”, expellees’ belated arrival, and carefully targeted labor-recruitment strategies combined to make Dortmund among the better places for expellee and refugee settlement in postwar Germany. Scholars have emphasized the deep contributions expellees, refugees and guest workers made to Germany’s “economic miracle”, as well as difficulties in economic integration, though guest workers’ uncertain status and lack of citizenship


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made them more vulnerable². Dortmund shows the potential for exploring local links between expellee/refugee and guest-worker migration. The generous response to expellees and refugees in the 1950s influenced local responses to guest workers in the 1960s, especially during the 1966/67 economic downturn. Local officials presented their city as a migration city in which guest workers were welcome to stay despite Germany being, in Klaus Bade’s famous formulation, an “unwilling immigration country”³.

Bristol’s response to Commonwealth immigrant communities during the post-war period reinforces the wider historiographical argument that migration and race politics have long been local issues in Britain. As in other cities, non-white colonial immigrants quickly captured the attention of both state and non-state actors. Local community, voluntary and religious associations, city police, and eventually the municipality, devised and implemented policies and practices that were frequently driven by local anxieties, concerns and pressures with regards to West Indians in the inner-city especially, and that at times preceded any clear national-level mandate. Indeed, as Ken Young argues for Britain as a whole, though central government acted as an “effective gatekeeper” by implementing immigration controls, “it fell to local authorities and to voluntary bodies to ease the transition of the settlers at the local level”⁴. This contribution exposes how Bristol’s response to post-war Commonwealth immigrants reflects wider British historiographical narratives in some ways, yet was firmly rooted in its own distinct urban context in others. It touches upon a range of policy domains, including education, housing, race relations and welfare, and argues that, by the end of the 1960s, Bristol’s response to migrant integration and race relations reflects what John Solomos termed “a complex interaction between central government, local authorities and voluntary agencies”⁵.

Malmö’s post-war history demonstrates that Swedish migration policymaking has overlooked local origins. It supports Joacim Waara’s notion that Swedish policy was, in the 1940s, akin to a guest-worker system as seen in Italian labor migration to Malmö, but national policy abandoned this approach during the early 1950s, reflecting in part labor tensions that emerged in Malmö⁶. Existing scholarship highlights employer organizations’ and trade unions’ influence on local and national migration

⁴ K. Young, Approaches to Policy Development in the Field of Equal Opportunities, in W. Ball / J. Solomos (eds.), Race and local politics, Houndmills 1990, p. 23.
⁵ J. Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Houndmills 2003, p. 97.
policy⁷. This context explains why Malmö’s municipality initially took a “non-policy”-position, leaving decisions on migrant reception largely to local industries. In the 1960s it turned to an active policy stance in response to perceptions of “problematic” Yugoslav migration. Peter Billing and Mikael Stigendal emphasize how Malmö was a policy forerunner during the 1920s-1960s, yet Swedish migration historiography continues to focus on Stockholm⁸. This contribution argues that central government decisions can only be understood by analyzing Malmö’s formative role. Malmö provided the first drafts of a migrant reception policy in 1967 and served as a testing ground for institutions that emerged nationally during the 1970s. Thus, Malmö and other urban histories must be explored alongside national-level history to explain the paradigm shift in Swedish migrant reception policy.

What emerges from the three cases are variations that cannot be explained simply by different national contexts. The local propagation of an inclusive civic identity, coupled with a massive commitment of city resources, allowed Dortmund to go beyond advantages offered by its regional setting in fostering a welcoming environment for migrants. The inclusion strategies developed for expellee integration then created a path dependance in local policy. The Dortmund case demonstrates an overlooked promise of analyzing expellee and refugee migration together with the guest-worker period that followed. In Bristol, a local dimension to migration policymaking existed already from the 1950s, and was influenced by both top-down national-level direction and various local actors’ responses to the settlement of so-called “colored” immigrants. Amongst other features, it comprised anxieties and prejudices regarding West Indians, efforts to promote migrant integration and positive race relations, and municipal decisions about which policy domains to address and how, and indeed if, to implement national directives. Postwar Malmö resorted to a “non-policy” approach, leaving it to local companies to organize migrant reception, paralleling national-level policies in which trade unions and employer organizations had large influence. The city’s role as forerunner for national policies is underscored in its ground-breaking expert report on migrants and migrant reception in 1967 that formed the basis for expert knowledge and policy development by the national government. All three city cases therefore present important contributions to their respective national historiography. Taken together, urban histories capture greater diversity in migration policymaking than is possible in national histories, while also opening doors to more multidirectional, rather than top-down, narratives of local, regional, and national history.

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2 Dortmund

Postwar expellee historiography depicts widespread tensions between expellees/refugees and natives at local levels. As in most migration historiography, explanations range from the economic to the cultural. Ian Connor emphasizes competition for limited resources and complaints that expellees were ungrateful and unwilling to work⁹. Helga Grebing portrays a mix of xenophobia, insecurity, and open-minded socialist and Christian humanism in her history of expellee integration in Niedersachsen¹⁰. Peter Zeitler finds that natives in Oberfranken showed “distance and egoism” towards migrants with “strange dialects, confessional upbringings and cultural practices”¹¹. Mark Jakob presents a Hessen district where mundane problems arising from lack of space and shared-living intersected with cultural prejudices, as natives regularly referred to expellees as “Polacks”¹². Initial impressions proved durable in Rainer Schulze’s famous study of expellees in Celle in Hessen. Decades later, interviewees bitterly recalled feeling excluded and unworthy after their arrival¹³.

Interviews with expellees in the Ruhr by Alexander von Plato present a stark contrast. He writes that most “emphasized friendly acceptance by natives and considered quips towards ‘foreigners’ as back-slapping teasing”. Moreover, they explained local “tolerance” through the region’s “migration experiences and the war years that encouraged understanding among the suffering”. One interviewee invoked the Ruhr’s history as “the only melting pot for all people”¹⁴. Supporting von Plato’s first-hand accounts, this section argues that postwar Dortmund was a propitious setting for welcoming migrants. First, cities were generally more welcoming than rural areas, though a Displaced Persons (DP) settlement in Eving, Dortmund’s northern suburb, dubbed “Korea-Town”, bore the brunt of neighbors’ prejudice in 1950/51¹⁵. Like elsewhere in Germany, expellees and refugees experienced greater unemployment in rural North-Rhine-Westphalia than natives but less in cities because urban

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expellees were disproportionately younger and male\textsuperscript{16}. NRW was a favorable setting for labor market integration, as expellee and refugee unemployment in 1950 was similar to natives\textsuperscript{'}, while several factors higher in Schleswig-Holstein and Niedersachsen. As for Eving’s DP settlement, it effectively dissolved within a few years as its inhabitants found employment and moved out of the area.

Secondly, that NRW and the Ruhr mostly received a second wave of migrants resettled after the severe hardship of the 1940s offered better conditions for migrant integration than was the case elsewhere. Bernhard Parisius argues that entry bans in the 1940s afforded “cities their own refugee policy”\textsuperscript{17}. Dortmund’s Labor Office sent scouts to the major refugee camp in Siegen to channel laborers towards coal-mining, construction, and steel\textsuperscript{18}. Expellees often experienced de-classing, with over 50\% working outside of their prewar profession. Uwe Kleinert’s economic history of North-Rhine-Westphalian refugees describes a completed integration process by the late 1950s as a “myth” because expellees and refugees were overrepresented in lower-skilled employment; status improvements came with the second generation and for the more highly-educated Soviet-Zone-Refugees\textsuperscript{19}. Expellees were also underrepresented among Dortmund’s business owners\textsuperscript{20}. Nonetheless, the economic boom and full employment in Dortmund in the 1950s benefited expellees and natives alike. Expellees were employed at slightly higher rates than natives\textsuperscript{21}.

Housing integration was harder. Urban and rural areas experienced major housing shortages but conditions were especially dismal in the Ruhr and frustratingly durable in Dortmund. Expellees’ delayed arrival allowed a reduction in acute shortages by the early 1950s, but the city returned to crisis conditions when it received the largest proportion of Soviet-Zone-Refugees in NRW in the mid-1950s. Though conditions were often worse in surrounding areas, homelessness and slum-living were highest in Dortmund, a population that was rather neglected throughout reconstruction-era West Germany\textsuperscript{22}. Dortmund’s Expellee Council was overloaded with expellee complaints about conditions in camps and shelters, and was concerned that So-

\textsuperscript{16} A. von Plato, \textit{Fremde Heimat}, pp. 175f.
\textsuperscript{17} B. Parisius, “...und ahnten, dass hier die Welt zu Ende ist”, \textit{Aufnahme und Integration von Flüchtlingen und Vetriebenen im Westen Niedersachsens}, in K.J. Bade / J. Oltmer, \textit{Zuwanderung und Integration}, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{18} Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Abteilung Westfalen, N-100 Arbeitsämter, Agenturen für Arbeit, Nr. 4475, Arbeitsamt Dortmund, Abschrift, 18. Dezember 1947.
\textsuperscript{21} Unverändert gute Beschäftigung, in “Verwaltungsbericht”, July 12, 1957.
viet-Zone-Refugees would encumber expellee housing integration. Federal, state and municipal funding were key to housing reconstruction throughout Germany, but especially in Dortmund, where the municipality saw the housing struggle as synonymous with reconstruction and migrant integration. It devoted enormous resources: public funds financed 34.7% of North-Rhine-Westphalian housing units in 1952–1960, while in Dortmund the 1957 figure reached 71.9%.

Thirdly, Dortmund officials valorized local “melting-pot” identities to present expellee and refugee arrivals as natural progressions in the city’s history. Local political attitudes mattered. Historiography presents a wide range in municipal attitudes from outright hostility to genuine concern for migrants’ welfare. Connor stresses how local politicians in Bavaria “frequently displayed antipathy” towards refugees. Bad Homburg’s mayor was especially hostile in Hessen. Particularly impactful was the housing discrimination local Mannheim officials exhibited towards “homeless foreigners”, i.e., DPs who remained in Germany in the 1950s. An ambiguous picture emerges from Stuttgart’s reception of guest workers in the 1960s, where “officials emphasized the incorporation of the guest workers into Stuttgart’s economic life, but not into its larger social and cultural life.” Finally, Sarah Hackett finds more generous attitudes in Bremen, where the “local authority portrayed a clear commitment to cater for its guest-worker community’s employment, housing and education needs”, leading to better education outcomes and lower residential segregation.

In Dortmund, municipal officials welcomed expellees with an inclusive discourse of city-citizenship, promoted universal concepts of belonging, and refused the local Communist Party’s stigmatization of Soviet-Zone-Refugees as not “real” refugees in the 1950s. In 1965, social democrat and future mayor Günter Samtlebe rejected Christian-democratic concerns of an “Überfremdung in certain occupations in Dortmund”, a reference to guest-worker migration. Samtlebe countered that, “in his view there is no problem [because] the Ruhr has proven itself in the past to be the melting pot of all European peoples”. This represented continuity with social-democratic discourses from the 1950s. “Melting-pot” discourses highlighted a particular migration of nineteenth-century coal miners from Waldenburg, origin of Dortmund’s

25 I. Connor, Refugees and Expellees, pp. 67 f.
29 S. Hackett, Foreigners, Minorities and Integration. The Muslim Immigrant Experience in Britain and Germany, Manchester 2013, p. 19.
30 Staatsarchiv Dortmund (SD), 90/01 2/3, Niederschrift über die öffentliche Sitzung der Ratsversammlung am 16.6.1953.
largest postwar expellee community, but was generalized to include Soviet-Zone Refugees and later guest workers. They were not strictly assimilationist and were adaptable to different groups. For Eving’s DP settlement, for instance, the city gazette declared: “It is self-understood that the once so-loved ‘Germanization’ will not be attempted by German authorities or the German people either. Much more we are ready to allow foreign families their own life if they peacefully go to work and also integrate themselves into German civic life.”

Dortmund’s refugee and migrant policies had a social-democratic hue with a regional flavor. The national SPD gained a reputation as the “party of the refugees” after the war. Its dedication to expellee social needs attracted refugee support in early recipient states of Hessen, Niedersachsen and Schleswig-Holstein, but support fell dramatically in 1949–1951. Dortmund’s social-democratic leadership promoted migrants’ civic and social integration, but maintained distance from refugee organizations and initiatives, as Patrick Ireland finds later in neighboring Essen as well. The NRW-SPD resisted legalizing refugee organizations in 1945–1947 and opposed CDU proposals to reserve Landtag seats for refugees. At the same time, NRW Economics Minister Erik Nölting, a social democrat, promoted social and economic equality for expellees. Dortmund officials engaged especially with the official local Expellee Council, led by Paul Klambt, expellee and former SPD head on Waldenburg’s city council, in addition to cross-community religious and charity groups like Caritas and the SPD-aligned Arbeiterwohlfahrt.

Underlying social-democratic thinking were concerns about refugee radicalization. Connor writes that it was “a major challenge for all parties because, at a time of acute material deprivation, they were likely to alienate the more numerous indigenous voters if they were perceived to be promoting the refugees’ concerns at the expense of those of the native population.” SPD ministers in Niedersachsen regularly attended expellee conferences which served, in Grebing’s view, “to maintain a central control over the emerging radicalism of the refugees.” Dortmund’s mayor exercised similar social control when welcoming refugee groups, warning against “hate and revenge” and urging expellees to “brother [yourselves] with natives.” In 1950/51, a new refugee party, the Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (BHE) shook national politics with notable victories in Schleswig-Holstein, Hessen.

31 H.O. Swientek, 18 000 Waldenburger kamen neu in die Bundesrepublik, in “Verwaltungsbericht”, August 29, 1958.
32 Ausländer finden neue Heimat, in “Verwaltungsbericht”, October 5, 1951.
36 I. Connor, German Refugees.
37 H. Grebing, Flüchtlinge und Parteien, p. 114.
and Niedersachsen, often at social democrats’ expense. By contrast the BHE won a measly 3.2% in Arnsberg in 1953, Dortmund’s electoral district. Support was probably lower in Dortmund, as the BHE underperformed in cities.

Dortmund largely bypassed the stormy early period of social-democratic engagement with refugees. Whereas social democrats in other states struggled to find the right formula, Dortmund’s insistence that natives, expellees and refugees were all equally deserving appears to have hit the right note. Official discourses exhorted natives to show solidarity with expellees but also asked expellees to sympathize with natives in a war-devastated city and with evacuees who could not return under Dortmund’s entry ban. Connor remarks how tenuous the SPD’s hold on refugee support was in Schleswig-Holstein because relatively few had voted for the SPD before. Von Plato’s interviewees also mostly began to vote for the SPD after they moved to the Ruhr, but then became loyal to the party. He concludes that expellees and refugees played important roles in the Ruhr’s postwar “social-democratization”, which “served again as a melting pot for natives and diverse ethnic and social groups”.

As social democrats comfortably won election after election in postwar Dortmund, they without doubt received substantial support from expellees and refugees who made up 20–25% of Dortmund’s population by the late 1950s.

Recent historiography calls for fully integrating expellees and postwar refugees into German migration history. Few histories, though, explore links with the “guest-worker” migration that followed. No doubt there were fundamental differences: expellees had a greater sense of permanence, were citizens with voting and welfare rights, and were less likely to encounter racism than were guest workers. Klaus Tenfelde draws parallels between Turkish guest workers and the Ruhr’s pre-WWI Polish population, emphasizing religious tensions. For expellees, Klaus Bade posits a “negative integration” because “the consolidation of a [new] majority [came] at the cost of excluded minorities”. Gaëlle Fischer comments similarly in light of asylum-seeker and migrant arrivals in 2015/16 that “[...] expellees helped shape the West German debate on migration and belonging in postwar West Germany as a whole [because] the centrality of Germanness to belong to West Germany was reaffirmed rather than challenged”. In rural localities,

39 SD, Niederschrift über die Ratsversammlung am 28. und 29. Mai 1951.
40 I. Connor, German Refugees, p. 182.
Schulze argues that expellees and refugees reacted to guest-worker arrivals by showing solidarity with natives\textsuperscript{46}.

Such insights should be explored further because the universalism promoted by Dortmund’s municipality suggests regional variations in the shift from expellee/refugee to guest-worker migration. In Dortmund, there was a path dependence in municipal strategies for expellee/refugees and guest workers. A reluctance to permit guest-worker family settlement in the context of housing shortages mixed with the local Labor Office’s liberalism in granting work permits to migrants on tourist visas\textsuperscript{47}. This was in line with the liberalism the city displayed towards “illegal border-crossers” in 1949–1953 while opposing expellee family resettlement. Mark Spicka argues that Stuttgart’s cultural center served to keep guest workers segregated from city life\textsuperscript{48}. By contrast, local officials declared at the opening of Dortmund’s first Turkish center that it should “serve as a meeting spot for all communities”. Further, the local Arbeiterwohlfahrt representative said that, “it is necessary to bring the guests closer to German lifestyles. They should become citizens of Dortmund City. There is great willingness for this among the Turks [...] The rooms should serve to build contacts with one another but also with German work colleagues [...]”\textsuperscript{49}. Such inclusive rhetoric closely matched the integration strategies of Dortmund officials in the 1950s.

When the first severe postwar recession hit Germany in 1966/67, the Federal Government at first responded by introducing an employment priority for natives, in effect encouraging employers to treat guest workers as employment buffers\textsuperscript{50}. The recession hit Dortmund and the Ruhr especially hard due to structural crises in coal and steel. Nonetheless, a Ruhr conference of employers, trade unions, and labor and welfare officials rejected “administrative force” in denying workpaper renewals and promoted “humane contacts with foreigners through social care and help of every type”. It “appealed to the public to also treat foreign workers with understanding during this hard period of transition”\textsuperscript{51}. The next month Dortmund’s Labor Office Director warned against “too lightly gambling away” guest workers’ potential. “We have the intention”, he said, “to maintain a feeling of security for foreigners who

\textsuperscript{46} R. Schulze, “\textit{W}ir leben ja nun hier”, p. 73.
\textsuperscript{48} M. E. Spicka, \textit{City Policy}, pp. 351f.
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Begegnungsstätte für Türken und Dortmunder}, in “Verwaltungsbericht”, December 24, 1965.
stay here as long as they have their family here, participate in vocational training, or have suffered a work accident [...]”

In this trying moment in local history, officials portrayed guest workers less as laborers than as human beings deserving of solidarity. Postwar Dortmund embraced its identity as a migrant city despite Germany being an “unwilling immigration country”. Favorable structural and temporal factors combined with local political agency and concepts of regional identity to produce a particular variant of postwar German migration history in which municipal attitudes and policies transcended specific migrant groups. Most striking is the inclusive and universalist basis upon which migrants were welcomed. Local officials’ presentation of postwar Dortmund as a community of suffering in the 1950s and their use of the melting-pot metaphor to promote fraternal inter-community relations fostered a concept of belonging based on local rather than ethnic identities that continued into the 1960s.

3 Bristol

There exists a bountiful national historiography on migration policy in post-war Britain. It was non-white colonial immigrants, largely from the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent, who soon captured the attention of British policymakers, and policy responses almost immediately assumed an urban dimension. This was due to the residential concentration of immigrants in inner-cities, local authorities being responsible for policy areas like public housing, education and social services, and the national government increasingly placing responsibility for addressing racial discrimination and promoting positive race relations on the local level. The consequence was a plethora of city-level policies and practices implemented across the post-war decades, which often preceded top-down mandate and lacked clear national-level direction, and which were soon reflected in the academic scholarship. Often written by sociologists and political scientists, a number of studies emerged across the 1960s and 1970s, and were frequently critical of these local responses. Whilst

studies continued to surface during the 1980s, and retrospectively addressed the post-war decades to varying extents, they have since been fewer in number. Furthermore, despite it being recognized that urban political debates on migration and ethnic minorities by no means simply reflected national ones, historians have been somewhat hesitant to address the post-war local politics of race. It is within these historical and historiographical contexts that migration policymaking in Bristol during the 1950s and 1960s must be analyzed.

There were numerous ways Bristol’s response to post-war migrant communities reflected the wider British historical and historiographical narrative. Indeed, there existed a clear racialized discourse in the city. Despite the arrival of some DPs, and the presence of Irish, Hungarian and Polish communities, it was non-white Commonwealth immigrants in particular, and West Indians especially, who sparked a vibrant reaction from local authorities. Although Bristol was home to only a very small number of British Caribbean migrants, with figures standing at circa 150, 700 and 2,000 in 1952, 1957 and 1960 respectively, the West Indian community in the inner-city area of St. Paul’s quickly became the unrivalled focus of the local response to migrant populations. Not only was St. Paul’s a hub for the city’s West Indians but, in the eyes of many, it was also synonymous with social decay, low-quality housing, crime, disease and violence. Furthermore, consistent with what transpired in some other cities, the consequence of these city-level concerns and developments was that issues of race with regards to service and welfare provision and community relations especially became local issues before they did national ones. Indeed, during the 1950s, as witnessed in Birmingham, Bradford and London, Bristol’s response to ethnic minorities was frequently led by local voluntary associations and churches, and often developed independently from central government mandate. Additionally, as per the Home Office’s perception that Commonwealth immigration was an issue of law and order and its call for local police forces to supply information about black immigrants during the 1950s, like many around the country, Bristol’s force complied and investigated, and reported on, the assimilation of West Indians.

58 For a seminal study on life in St. Paul’s and Bristol’s West Indian community, see K. Pryce, Endless Pressure. A Study of West Indian Life-Styles in Bristol, Harmondsworth 1979.
60 S. Patterson, Immigration and Race Relations in Britain, 1960 – 1967, London 1969. As Paul Rich has argued, relying on local-level voluntary associations was often favored by national government, partly because it resulted in less responsibility and expenditure on its part; P. Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics, Cambridge 1990, p. 168.
especially. Furthermore, consistent with other cities, Bristol’s local government began to develop initiatives in an attempt to meet the needs of ethnic minority communities by the 1960s.

The attitudes, policies and practices adopted in Bristol towards local migrant communities also reflect the national British historiography in various ways. The racially prejudiced views that the police at times displayed during the 1950s and 1960s, which led it to often portray “colored” immigrants as “problem” communities that lacked moral character, as “too different” to achieve integration, and as not needing, and even being undeserving of, legislation that would offer protection against racial discrimination, were widespread amongst local police forces. Indeed, as James Whitfield has argued, in the absence of a positive message from central government about how West Indian labor was crucial for Britain’s post-war recovery, “traditional supremacist views associated with metropolitan cultural and national hegemony remained firmly in place.” Furthermore, it was commonly churches that, often under the coordination of the British Council of Churches, worked inter-denominationally at the local level to help immigrants settle and promote tolerance and understanding amongst the wider population by the 1950s. Those in Bristol were no exception and the Bristol Council of Christian Churches implemented measures that enabled research and welfare work amongst West Indians, brought together representatives from local statutory and voluntary organizations concerned with the settlement of “colored” workers, and called upon its congregations to help challenge racial prejudice. Furthermore, other voluntary and community-focused organizations, including the Bristol Council of Social Service, the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) and the Bristol West Indian Association, helped instigate a debate on race relations and immigrant needs in the city and addressed specific social issues like education and housing through grassroots community work. Like their counterparts in other cities, they frequently filled a void caused by the absence of clear national and municipal policy intervention.

62 J. Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, p. 98.
63 Bristol Archives (BA), Pol/LG/1/1, Police Liaison Officers with Coloured Populations. West Indians etc., 1953–1969, various.
64 J. Whitfield, Unhappy Dialogue, p. 38.
67 For example, see BA, 35510/Ass/28/1/43, Bristol Council of Social Service, annual report, 1967; BA, 21131/EC/Adm/M/a/36, (Series A) Minutes and Reports, 1968–1971, Finance and Policy Executive Sub-Committee, October 3, 1968; Bristol City Council Modern Records Unit (MRU), 3402c, Correspondence re the Welfare of Coloured People, various; M. Dresser / P. Fleming, Bristol, p. 168.
Similarly, the Bristol government’s response to issues of migration and integration are to some extent captured in the historiography of the politics of race in post-war Britain. At least partly spurred into action by local religious and voluntary groups, like its equivalents in London, Newcastle upon Tyne and Wolverhampton, it was during the 1960s that it began to truly engage with racial issues, and many of its political discussions and initiatives revolved around education, employment, housing and health⁶⁸. Furthermore, policies and practices developed and implemented by Bristol’s municipality were at times directly influenced by top-down national-level mandate. For example, its approach to the education of immigrant schoolchildren reflected the assimilationist approach prevalent in Britain at the time, which stemmed from the belief that they were disruptive to schools and should quickly adapt to the majority culture⁶⁹. Thus, Bristol’s municipality promoted English-language acquisition and social adjustment and, in accordance with the Department of Education and Science’s 1965 circular, which maintained that no school or classroom should be more than one-third immigrant, it chose to disperse some secondary school immigrant pupils from St. Paul’s to schools elsewhere in the city⁷⁰. Similarly, much of the work of Bristol’s Voluntary Liaison Committee (VLC) had its roots in the UK Labour government’s 1965 White Paper, which acknowledged the important part the local level had to play in British race relations⁷¹. Comprised of representatives of statutory, professional and voluntary organizations and migrant communities, the VLC worked across policy domains on a case-by-case basis and, amongst other initiatives, it investigated instances of labor-market discrimination and conflict between English and West Indian neighbors⁷². Although the extent to which the VLC and its successors, Community Relations Councils, were successful in facilitating migrant integration and positive community relations has been questioned, as has been argued regarding those across Britain, Bristols’ were central to the work of local race relations⁷³.

However, by no means were the city politics of race in post-war Britain simply national ones, and urban authorities were frequently influenced by their own particular challenges, concerns and objectives. Whilst Bristol’s response to “colored” Commonwealth immigrants during the 1950s and 1960s certainly shared characteristics

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with those of other cities, it was also rooted in its own distinct urban context. Indeed, regardless of their commitment and the policy issues they addressed, the deliberations, policies and practices of both the state and non-state actors that comprised Bristol’s urban policy arena were overwhelmingly reactions to West Indians in St. Paul’s and neighboring inner-city areas. For example, this was certainly the case regarding the constabulary’s concerns about what it perceived to be a lower standard of morality amongst immigrants, which it argued led to promiscuity, illegitimacy, the solicitation of prostitutes and general anti-social behavior, thus sparking fears about the development of a so-called “colored quarter” and justifying a strong police response. Similarly, local authority investigations into the housing, health and welfare of immigrants, and individual initiatives addressing neighborhood redevelopment and environmental improvement, carrying out medical examinations amongst immigrant schoolchildren, and residential multi-occupation and overcrowding, were predominantly developed with inner-city areas in mind. Furthermore, Bristol’s religious and voluntary organizations’ work amongst inner-city West Indians during the 1950s laid the foundation for, and played a part in prompting, subsequent local government action.

Moreover, the local dimension that has long been part of Britain’s post-war migration policymaking has resulted in urban variation that cannot be fully captured in the national policy narrative. For example, city officials arguably doing little to address migrant housing specifically, choosing instead to largely subject them to the same policies and opportunities as other residents, might have reflected a sense of naivety or a reluctance to act. Yet the discriminatory policies that likely led to ethnic minorities being excluded from council housing in Birmingham do not appear to have manifested in Bristol. Additionally, Bristol’s municipality established a language center for immigrant children in need of English-language tuition by the late 1960s, whilst Nottingham’s authorities were criticized for not having done so, and the concerns and initiatives addressing migrant welfare and race relations in the city were certainly fairly vibrant compared to those in more rural localities that scholars have accused of rejecting the need for integration policies until

74 BA, Pol/LG/1/1, various.  
77 MRU, 3402c, Notes of a meeting regarding the community development of West Indians in Bristol, May 14, 1959; House of Commons Home Affairs Committee Race Relations and Immigration Sub-Committee, Session 1979–80, Racial Disadvantage. Minutes of Evidence, Thursday 22 May 1980, Bristol, 14.  
78 J. Rex / R. Moore, Race, Community, and Conflict.  
79 BA, M/BCC/VLC/1/1, meeting of the Community Relations Council, May 20, 1970.
much later\textsuperscript{80}. However, there were also ways in which Bristol lagged behind other British localities. Birmingham’s government, for example, had begun to play a clear role in the city’s response to black immigration by the mid-1950s, and Bristol’s migrants almost certainly did not enjoy the political influence that their counterparts in the London borough of Brent achieved during the post-war decades\textsuperscript{81}.

The importance of the local level is also evident in the Bristol municipality’s relationship with the central government. Firstly, national-level mandate was at times rejected or tailored to suit the local urban context. For example, whilst the city’s government decided to disperse secondary school ethnic minority pupils from St. Paul’s in accordance with the 1965 circular, it maintained that younger pupils should remain close to their parents and home environments, and it advocated addressing their growing number in St. Paul’s by expanding primary school provision\textsuperscript{82}. Secondly, although local authorities were often expected to implement top-down national mandate, the Bristol case study offers one key example of local-level developments likely being uploaded to the national level. Indeed, the bus boycott that took place in the city in 1963 and which stemmed from a bus company’s refusal to employ Asian and black bus crews, engaged various local religious and voluntary groups and drew national attention to the prevalence of racism. Consequently, many argue that it influenced the passing of the 1965 Race Relations Act, Britain’s first piece of legislation to outlaw racial discrimination\textsuperscript{83}. Thirdly, as in some other cities, the Bristol government’s response to migrant welfare and integration preceded clear national-level policy, which began in earnest with the 1965 Act. Spurred on by interaction with various local stakeholders, it assumed the responsibility for providing an advisory service for so-called “colonial workers” in 1959\textsuperscript{84}, before going on to devise and implement an ever-increasing range of measures during the 1960s. Overall, the diverse state and non-state actors active in Bristol during the 1950s and 1960s, as well as their often-shifting and differing individual priorities, concerns and initiatives, dem-


\textsuperscript{82} MRU, 3525c, The education of immigrant children, report of the Chief Education Officer for consideration by the Primary Education and Secondary Education Committees at their meetings on March 21 and 22, 1966; BA, 21131/EC/Adm/M/A/35, Primary Education Committee, March 21, 1966; House of Commons Home Affairs Committee Race Relations and Immigration Sub-Committee, \textit{Racial Disadvantage}, 3. Some local authorities, such as Bradford, Leicester and Luton’s, implemented a dispersal policy, whilst many did not.

\textsuperscript{83} It was also supported by the local Labour politician Tony Benn. For an excellent insight into the boycott, see M. Dresser, \textit{Black and White on the Buses. The 1963 Colour Bar Dispute in Bristol}, Bristol 1986.

onstrate that it proves impossible to refer to one homogenous history or historiography of race and migration policymaking in post-war Britain.

4 Malmö

Malmö was in many respects a forerunner in Swedish politics in general both before and after World War II, and particularly in migrant reception policy during the period 1945–1970. Bordering Denmark and having regular boat traffic with nearby Germany, Malmö in the twentieth century was a place where many new impulses first landed in Sweden. Another distinguishing feature of Malmö was that the Social Democratic Workers Party (SAP) and the affiliated labor unions had strong organizations in the city from the late nineteenth century and already constituted a majority in the city government in 1919. After confrontations and strikes in the years around 1900, employers and trade unions in Malmö established a spirit of trust and cooperation in the 1910s (punctuated by intermittent sharp conflicts), antedating the same development at the national level by about 20 years (the Saltsjöbaden Agreement, emblematic of the Swedish model of industrial relations, was signed in 1938). Also in concrete policy initiatives Malmö was a forerunner and introduced city-level welfare programs well before such initiatives were taken by the national government.

Understanding the relationship between city- and national-level politics contributes new perspectives on Swedish policy history but Swedish historiography has three features obstructing such an understanding. First, it is to a large extent focused on the national level and local studies are lacking. Second, there is a general lack of research on migrant reception for the period 1945–1970, and especially the period before 1965. Third, there is a failure to understand and analyze the period 1945–1965 as a period of “non-policy”. As Michael Alexander points out in his typology of migrant reception policy in European cities, a non-policy position does not mean that migrant reception does not occur, only that the state and/or the local government ignore it, sometimes willfully. These three features in existing literature call for new research to which our comparative investigation of Malmö with other European cities can contribute.

Consistent with European research on migration, Swedish historiography emphasizes the national level. However, there is some research on local migration and the migration history of Malmö. Arne Järtelius has written about migrant reception in the city during the period 1966–1990, Rolf Ohlsson wrote in 1978 about the economic effects of migration on salaries and company profits, and Harald Swedner made an early contribution in 1973 by charting migrant groups in the city. With Malmö as one example among others, sociologist Anna-Maria Sarstrand Marekovic explored the establishment of Immigrant Service institutions in Swedish cities in the mid-1960s, tracing important actors in their creation and their subsequent institutionalization and development up to the present. With the exception of her work, recent academic research on Malmö for the period 1945–1970 is lacking. Focusing on other Swedish cities, there is an emerging field investigating migrant experiences, notably through oral history but also using other sources. Important research has also been done on the reception of specific migrant groups, which also depicts migrant reception at local levels, for example Hungarian refugees after the Soviet invasion in 1956. These examples illustrate the fruitfulness of local perspectives, underscoring the need for more local-level research.

A striking feature is also that, as Mikael Byström and Pär Frohnert conclude, there is a general lack of historical research on migration and migrants for the period 1945–1970. They identify four periods of different migration regimes: firstly, 1933–1945 when Sweden received minor influxes of Jews and other refugees fleeing Nazi Germany, as well as major waves of refugees arriving from the Nordic countries during the latter part of the war. The second period 1945–1972 was dominated by labor migrants coming to Sweden, during an era of open borders and economic boom. Nordic migrants dominated, but also workers from southern Europe arrived. During the third period 1972–1994, the border closed for labor migrants outside the Nordic countries and migration was dominated by refugees from non-European countries. A fourth period is identified as starting in 1994 when Sweden joined the European

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Union, characterized by migration from other EU countries but also the reception of non-European refugees. In an ambitious synthesis first published in 1992 and re-edited several times, ethnologist Ingvar Svanberg and historian Mattias Tydén surveyed Swedish migration history over a thousand years. Although impressive in scope and detail, their work illustrates the lack of research on the period 1945–1970 as these sections only amount to a short chapter of a voluminous book.

However, some research on the period exists, mostly emphasizing the period after 1965 when policy on migrant reception took a more active turn, but generally ignoring the period 1945–1965 when the state and local government resorted to a “non-policy” position. Christina Johansson analyzes discourses on migration and migrants from the mid-1960s to late 1990s. Emphasizing the role of the government, Johansson discusses national actors such as trade unions and identifies important shifts and ruptures in the Swedish discourse on migration during the period. However, she also sees discursive continuities in discussions on migration and migrants. Other researchers emphasize the role of trade unions and employer organizations in influencing state policy on labor migration. Economic historian Joacim Waara identifies labor migration as a highly conflictual policy field, as employer organizations had a strong interest in increased labor supplies and hence labor migration, while trade unions had an interest in limiting competition that could lower wages despite their broader interest in promoting economic development. In Malmö, employers were important actors in local migrant reception in the absence of policy and praxis from the local and national government in the period 1945–1965.

Turning to the Malmö case, industries were running at full speed in 1945, as World War II was coming to an end. Because the city was untouched by the war, it had a flying start in the post-war economic boom. The main obstacle to growth was a lack of labor, especially skilled workers for the shipping company Kockums mekaniska verkstad (KMV), the city’s largest employer. Although the unions were

skeptical, the company began recruiting workers from Denmark and Germany\(^99\). However, recruitment was slow and KMV was looking for other options. To help KMV and recruitment to other large companies such as SKF in Gothenburg and ASEA in Västerås, the national Board of Foreign Labor (Beredningen för utländsk arbetskraft, BUA) and the Italian state signed an agreement to transfer workers from Italy to Sweden in 1947\(^100\).

The local Malmö government took a non-policy position on Italian workers’ arrival, consistent with other cases in Alexander’s typology, in which municipalities exercising a “non-policy” deferred major decisions and implementations to companies and labor market institutions\(^101\). The recruitment campaign, although in some respects planned and thoroughly prepared through the agreement signed by BUA, gives the impression of being probing and exploring, negotiating the rules of labor migration with different actors. As Sweden was an emigration country well into the 1930s, there was little knowledge or experience of migrant reception in either Malmö or the country as a whole. Sweden received large groups of refugees from neighboring Nordic countries during the war and minor groups from other countries, but they were seen as temporary residents and most of them returned soon after the war ended. Hence, problems arising in connection to labor migration were addressed in an ad hoc manner. For example, the KMV board identified a lack of housing in Malmö (stemming from rapid urbanization in the decades before the war) as an obstacle to labor recruitment. The company tried to remedy this by negotiating with local construction companies, but this did not generate sufficient housing to accommodate the influx of workers. As a second option, the company resorted to building and renting wooden barracks (some of them used to house soldiers and migrants during the war), often in peripheral positions in the city, which led to further problems organizing transportation for workers to commute to work\(^102\).

Another aspect of the recruitment campaign was that it was not clear how long the Italians were expected to stay, as discussed by Johan Svanberg. When the BUA agreement was signed, the leader of the metal workers union insisted that the recruitment of the Italian workers be only temporary and that they would return to Italy at the end of their two-year contracts\(^103\). This was never followed in praxis and many Italians remained in the country for many years. According to Tomas Hammar, Sweden never formed a guest-worker system akin to Germany’s, but Waara claims that

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\(^101\) M. Alexander, *Local Policies Towards Migrants*.

\(^102\) Malmö stadsarkiv, Kockumsmekaniska verkstad AB, Styrelseprotokoll 1 November 1946 §136.

the Italian workers’ recruitment represented a de facto guest-worker program\textsuperscript{104}. Our analysis is that when KMV’s recruitment campaign started in 1946 these issues were not yet decided and this highlights the probing and testing character of the campaign. As the Italians were housed in clearly temporary housing in the spatial, social and political margins of the city, and some of them were sent back to Italy after a labor dispute, the Malmö case strengthens Waara’s claim. At the same time, as Svanberg and Waara point out, trade union opposition to the recruitment, combined with fear of an economic downturn, drastically decreased the number of migrants who came during the late 1940s. In 1953/54, liberal migration laws were introduced, definitely ending the guest-worker aspects of Swedish migration policy\textsuperscript{105}.

In the 1950s, Malmö retained its non-policy approach to migrant reception, leaving it to companies and other actors to manage the practical aspects of accommodating labor migrants and refugees arriving in the city. Only in 1966 did Malmö’s local government begin to formulate a policy approach to migrant reception, but once it did, it was a very ambitious project. As Christina Johansson has analyzed, this is the period when migration and migrant issues became problematized at the national level\textsuperscript{106}. In a context in which a new group of labor migrants from Yugoslavia came to be considered “problematic” by local authorities, Malmö commissioned sociologist Kristina Belfrage to write a report, titled Yugoslavs in Malmö\textsuperscript{107}.

The production of expert knowledge on migrants and migrant reception sets the Malmö case apart from other Swedish cities, and in this respect the city was a forerunner and had an important influence on national policy development. A key concept in the Belfrage report is “immigrant adaptation”, which was employed to analyze how migrants changed their habits and customs to adjust to Swedish society over time. The report provided recommendations as to how the city could facilitate this adaptation process. Migrant reception was constructed as a problem that could be managed by the city as an agent of the broader welfare state. When the Swedish government in 1968 appointed an expert group, the “Government Investigation on Immigrants”, it incorporated the Belfrage report\textsuperscript{108}. The expert group worked for several years in a series of investigations and published its recommendations on migrant reception policy during the mid-1970s. Up until then, Sweden lacked a cohesive national policy as well as expert knowledge on migrant reception. As Johansson notes, the framing of the field as “immigrant adaptation” became significant in shap-


\textsuperscript{105} J. Waara, \textit{Svenska arbetsgivareföreningen}, pp. 111–116; J. Svanberg, \textit{Arbetets relationer}.

\textsuperscript{106} C. Johansson, \textit{Välkomna till Sverige}.


\textsuperscript{108} The Belfrage report is the basis for one of the chapters in Swedner’s \textit{Invandrarna i Malmö}, which was written as a sub-report to the Government’s Investigation on Immigrants.
ing national-level policy, underscoring the importance of Malmö’s and Belfrage’s contribution.

Also, in establishing institutions to facilitate migrant reception, Malmö was a forerunner, but in a more interconnected process between the national and local level. As noted by Sarstrand Marekovic, migrant reception programs were set up in a number of Swedish cities at approximately the same time, with Malmö being among the first. The actors behind their creation differed: popular adult education associations, the municipality, and trade unions. In 1966, the local Malmö government organized a conference in collaboration with the Government’s Working Party on Immigration, one of the outcomes of which were meetings between Malmö politicians, city officials and teachers from the popular adult education association Folkuniversitetet, who were organizing courses in Swedish for migrants in Malmö. In response to questions and needs formulated by migrant students, the Folkuniversitetet teachers developed a voluntary community information program, and a similar program was organized by the local government in Malmö a year later.

Therefore, Malmö was in many senses a forerunner in migrant reception policy. Contrary to the national focus in Swedish historiography on migration history, the formulation of migrant reception policy occurred though interconnected processes at both local and national levels, with the local government in Malmö delivering the first elaborate articulation of expert knowledge, which would inform and influence national policy in the 1970s. Alexander’s concept of a “non-policy” position helps make visible the role of companies and industry in shaping local migrant reception for the period 1945–1965 before the municipality adopted an active role itself.

5 Conclusions

Historians of European migration have often shied away from addressing local-level migration and integration policymaking during the post-war period. Yet, as we have shown, local historical case studies are an ideal approach to breaking down methodological nationalism in migration history as by no means did local-level debates, policies and practices simply reflect national ones. They enhance, rather than detract from, a fuller appreciation of the complexity, diversity and nuances of national migration histories. In Dortmund, all three major groups of migrants were welcomed by municipal officials as potential city citizens rather than as outsiders. Dortmund points us to a localized or regionalized rather than national-level migrant integration paradigm because, while Ireland has come to similar conclusions about its neighbor,
Essen, in later decades, city histories elsewhere in Germany present more hostile accounts of municipal policies towards postwar migrants. Frequently guided by race politics and a focus on community relations and the inner-city, Bristol’s actors displayed many of the same responses to non-white colonial immigrants seen across Britain more broadly. Yet they were simultaneously driven by their immediate urban context, often leading to some degree of city-level divergence and particularism, thus reinforcing the notion that migration and integration policies and practices quickly assumed an urban dimension in post-war Britain. In Sweden, migration and migrant reception were policy fields still in their formative stages in the initial post-war period. Malmö became a local policy arena for testing policy pathways that were later uploaded to the national level. Swedish migration historiography emphasizes trade unions’ and employer organizations’ influences on national policy, which was initially the case in Malmö too, but the city government then shifted to an active role in the 1960s.

The benefits of exploring urban case studies extend beyond their national historiographies, the focus of this contribution. At the European level, a growing body of research recognizes that cities play increasingly crucial roles in the migration and integration policymaking process\textsuperscript{112}. Local approaches, policies and reactions to migration of a combined cross-country and cross-city nature during the post-war period no doubt have much to contribute to this scholarship. Rather than comprising a more recent development, our city case studies reveal that local actors have long been engaged, and indeed instrumental, in devising and implementing responses to migrant communities. Not only do they shed light on various state and non-state actors’ roles and interactions within localities, but also on why reactions vary between cities within a country—and between countries as well. Thus, comparative historical analyses go a considerable way towards furthering a “local turn” in the study of migration policy in Europe.