



Universiteit  
Leiden  
The Netherlands

## Refugees, perceived threat & domestic terrorism

Klein, G.R.

### Citation


Klein, G. R. (2021). Refugees, perceived threat & domestic terrorism. *Studies In Conflict And Terrorism*, 1-26. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2021.1995940

Version: Publisher's Version

License: [Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3280983>

**Note:** To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).



## Refugees, Perceived Threat & Domestic Terrorism

Graig R. Klein

To cite this article: Graig R. Klein (2021): Refugees, Perceived Threat & Domestic Terrorism, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, DOI: [10.1080/1057610X.2021.1995940](https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1995940)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1995940>



© 2021 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC



[View supplementary material](#)



Published online: 31 Oct 2021.



[Submit your article to this journal](#)



Article views: 245




[View related articles](#)



[View Crossmark data](#)

## Refugees, Perceived Threat & Domestic Terrorism

Graig R. Klein 

Institute of Security & Global Affairs, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands

### ABSTRACT

Refugees' effect on domestic terrorism is conditioned by host-country social perception (attitude about living next-door to foreigners) and economic competition. These hypotheses are tested cross-nationally from 1995-2014 leveraging data from the World Values Survey. The results show social perception matters. When refugee flow to a country increases from the mean to 75<sup>th</sup> percentile, it does not statistically alter domestic terrorism risk. But when a host-country's preference to *not* live next-door to foreigners is accounted for and changes from the mean (20.9%) to 75<sup>th</sup> percentile (30.3%), the change in refugee flow increases the risk of domestic terrorism by 40%.

### ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 3 December 2020

Accepted 12 October 2021

Refugees are increasingly viewed as threats to national security instead of as vulnerable populations.<sup>1</sup> This connection is heightened by governments' repeated scapegoating of refugees following terror attacks.<sup>2</sup> Research probing connections between refugees and violence or conflict has focused on "linear relationship(s)"<sup>3</sup> of increased refugee flows to increased political violence, but newer research shows there are important conditioning factors – such as state capacity – disrupting a linear process.<sup>4</sup> This article contributes to the growing focus on non-linear processes by analyzing how refugees' effect on political violence in the host-country is conditioned by host-countries' attitudes about living near foreigners and job market conditions. These two important societal conditions can lead to an increased number of refugees in the host-country being perceived as a threat and competition, which sometimes culminates in violence. The argument is tested on a specific type of political violence – domestic terrorism.

Focusing on domestic terrorism presents a fascinating puzzle to analyze because refugees themselves cannot commit domestic terror attacks as their nationality differs from the host-country and its population; therefore, any effect refugees have on domestic terrorism, and likely all forms of domestic political violence, must be through a conditioning relationship measuring host-country nationals' perceptions of threat and competition.

Conditioning factors are expected to increase the likelihood of domestic terrorism because some domestic political forces – parties, non-state actors, and ideologues – cater in painting foreigners, in this case refugees, as threats to national identity. These perceived threats have had significant influence on recent elections in western countries and therefore the examples in the article are restricted to Europe and the United

**CONTACT** Graig R. Klein  [g.r.e.klein@fgga.leidenuniv.nl](mailto:g.r.e.klein@fgga.leidenuniv.nl)  Institute of Security & Global Affairs, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands

© 2021 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

States, though these motivators of violence are common in other regions.<sup>5</sup> For example, some European far-right parties – Fidesz in Hungary and Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands – and U.S. far-right ideology depict foreigners as threats to Euro-centric ethno-nationalism and challenges to traditional societal structures.<sup>6</sup> As a consequence of this rhetoric, towns like Garden City, Kansas, a melting pot of refugees and non-white immigrants for decades, became the target of a white-nationalist militia terror plot.<sup>7</sup>

The remainder of the article begins with working definitions of refugees and domestic terrorism. It then reviews literature analyzing relationships between refugees and political violence in host countries. I then argue that the effect of refugees on domestic terrorism is conditioned by perceived threat in the host-country, which is operationalized along two dimensions: social perception and economic competition. The resulting hypotheses are tested cross-nationally from 1995-2014 leveraging longitudinal data from the World Values Survey (WVS) to measure social perception.<sup>8</sup> The results provide empirical evidence that the combination of refugee flows and host-countries' social perception increases the risk of domestic terrorism, but economic competition does not statistically impact the risk of domestic terrorism. The article concludes with implications for future research. In sum, when refugees enter host-countries where society's "acceptance" of foreigners is low, increases in refugee populations result in a heightened risk of domestic terrorism.

The findings supplement others' research on processes by which refugees can transmit violence across borders, by orienting the analytical lens to domestic political violence. With regard to domestic terrorism, the focus of this study, social perception as measured by host-country nationals' preference to *not* have foreigners for neighbors is shown to be a critical determinant of the effect refugees have on domestic terrorism. Refugees themselves do not increase the risk of domestic terrorism, rather the xenophobic or nativist environment refugees enter defines the tinderbox of violence refugee flows can ignite.

## ***Defining Refugees***

Under international law a refugee is a person who credibly fears "being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."<sup>9</sup> Over time, some have argued that flight from economic, food, and climate insecurity or natural disasters should be included as legitimate reasons for seeking refuge and thus for many relief agencies and analysts, the definition of refugee has broadened and is articulated as forced migrant.<sup>10</sup> Yet, the term refugee is often accompanied by stereotypes of destitute, poor, and the "other," making their threat to in-groups and national identity particularly poignant,<sup>11</sup> but also making them seem most deserving of help and sanctuary.<sup>12</sup>

Political and media rhetoric have increasingly framed refugees as a threat, rather than deserving of help by connecting refugees, criminal activity, and terrorism.<sup>13</sup> The recent airlift of Afghan refugees following the Taliban's take-over bluntly highlights the political rhetoric connecting refugees to threat and terror risk as U.S. politicians

criticize the military withdrawal while also rebutting hosting refugees in their home states because of inconsistent vetting, processing, and fears they could be linked to militant or terror threats. These connections between refugees and perception are a critical mechanism linking refugees to an increased risk of terrorism. I apply the traditional definition of refugee and use UNHCR's measure of refugees under UNHCR's mandate to capture this specific demographic that has been painted as a threat.

Refugees traditionally flee to neighboring countries.<sup>14</sup> Yet, in the ever-increasing inter-connected world, refugees access host-countries beyond bordering countries. Historically, refugees were often contained within conflict regions and isolated in host-countries, but now refugees find themselves less isolated and able to maintain social networks in their home-countries.<sup>15</sup> The critical theoretical and analytical role of geography and shared borders for studying the impact of refugees on violence<sup>16</sup> may be changing as refugees can flee further.

### ***Defining Domestic Terrorism***

Many definitions of terrorism exist and are applied in research. For the purposes of this article, terrorism is defined using the Global Terrorism Database's (GTD) definition: "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation."<sup>17</sup>

This study specifically focuses on domestic terrorism aligning with an increasing trend in terrorism studies to place domestic terrorism at the center of empirical studies because, in part, it is more common than often studied trans-national terrorism.<sup>18</sup> Domestic terror attacks are denoted by commonalities between the nationality of perpetrator(s) and location of the attack, the nationality of the perpetrator(s) and the target(s) or victim(s), or the location of the attack and the target(s) or victim(s). If any of these three paired attributes are the same, the attack is domestic.<sup>19</sup> This means domestic terrorism is not violence perpetrated by refugees as they are a different nationality of the attack location, target, or victims. By focusing on domestic terrorism, any growth in the rate of violence can be attributed to national actors and not directly to refugees who are framed as the source of terror threat and violence.

The effect of refugees on domestic terrorism is likely to reflect reactionary or right-wing violence, but it can also capture violence perpetrated by supporters of refugees or pro-migrant/immigrant policies against nativist symbols, activists, or state institutions in anti-integration or anti-refugee countries. In other words, analyzing domestic terrorism captures the effects of refugee flow on both nationalist/nativist reactionary violence and anti-nativist violence.

Analyzing all domestic terror attacks avoids restricting the findings to right-wing violence and potential pitfalls and bias of placing *all* the blame of increased terrorism on right-wing groups. Although the combined effect of refugee flows and social perception or economic competition is expected to more likely impact nativist/right-wing violence than other ideological motivations, a more encompassing whole-of-domestic terrorism analysis is applied. Further discussion of the implications of ideology are confined to the Discussion section.

## **Refugees & Political Violence**

Extent scholarship finds positive correlations between refugee populations and increased risk of violence in the host-country. While the causal mechanisms differ, they largely build from the proximity of social, demographic, rebel and resource networks that cross international borders from conflict zones. Stockpiles of resources and humanitarian supplies that often accompany refugee flows and camps can increase the risk of cross-border raids as conflict actors exploit and loot them.<sup>20</sup> Critical to these findings is the geographic closeness of refugees to their home-country because it makes maintaining and using ethnic kin and networks far easier for conflict actors.<sup>21</sup> Ethnic ties in the host-country can also lead to violence as they risk upsetting the balance of power among the host populace.<sup>22</sup>

The effect of ethnic ties and heightened ethnic tensions or apprehension in the host-country are more likely to explode into armed conflict between non-state actor groups than generate civil war because the grievances are at the community level rather than against the government.<sup>23</sup> But this heightened risk of non-state actor armed conflict only occurs in low-capacity countries where the government is unable to mitigate the perceived threat or competition.<sup>24</sup> While this adds important nuance to the scholarship, the measurement of non-state armed conflict pivots on the violence occurring between “two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state” and “results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year.”<sup>25</sup> These definitional boundaries prevent making conclusions about the effects of refugees on other forms of political violence, such as terrorism where the violence targets civilians and does not necessarily result in death.

## **Refugees & Terrorism**

Research on connections between refugees and terrorism builds from similar mechanisms of refugees spreading conflict. In addition, congregating refugees in camps creates opportunities for radicalization and recruitment and the spread of violence into host-countries.<sup>26</sup> The risks of radicalization and terrorism originating in refugee camps are heightened if divisions in the camps emerge along sectarian lines.<sup>27</sup> But empirical, in particular, large-N cross national analyses, have struggled to find a consistent relationship between refugees and terrorism. Choi and Salehyan (2013) find that countries with larger refugee population experience more terror attacks and higher casualties, whereas Eybergen and Andresen (2020) find no effect on the frequency of terrorism, but that the size of displaced populations increases casualty levels. Milton et al. (2013) find that as the number of refugees from country A increases in country B, so too does the frequency of trans-national terrorism by people from country A inside country B. Others find no statistical relationships.<sup>28</sup>

The mixed evidence could be the result of the geographic proximity between home and host countries being less important for terrorism because terrorism requires only one individual instead of a network of fighters like armed conflict. The increasingly apparent geographic spread of refugee flows, for example, Syrians' flight to Europe or Afghans airlifted to Qatar, Germany, and the U.S., highlight the changing centrality

of geographically proximate networks in the correlation between refugees and political violence. We can theorize how ties and networks between Somali refugees in Ethiopia and Somali militants in Somalia can increase the risk of civil war in Ethiopia, but Somali refugees are likely to have no direct effect on the risk of civil war in the U.S.<sup>29</sup> Somali refugees, and their progeny, though, can impact the U.S.'s terror risk by pledging support or joining foreign terror groups, which some have done.<sup>30</sup>

Such concerns have led to the securitization of migration and border control policies intended to reduce terror risk although relevant analyses routinely cannot confirm a direct link between migration and terrorism.<sup>31</sup> This perceived threat has led some to fear refugee "militarization" and "weaponization" by a variety of actors before and during migration.<sup>32</sup> The Islamic State heightened fears of refugee "weaponization" when coordinating the Paris attacks in November 2015 as at least one perpetrator carried a falsified Syrian passport.<sup>33</sup> Such "weaponization" claims extend beyond ISIS (or Islamist terrorism) as seen in former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Breedlove's warning that Russia was "weaponizing" refugees against Europe.<sup>34</sup>

A growing body of research focuses on a "refugee as victim" framework whereby the increase in terrorism results from violence taken against refugees or supportive state institutions.<sup>35</sup> Others have shifted the burden of explanation from population movement to the conditions refugees enter. In general, when there are preexisting tensions between foreigners and native-born populations the risk of terrorism is expected to be higher.<sup>36</sup> When tensions are institutionalized by laws that make integration harder for refugees, the frequency of trans-national terrorism increases.<sup>37</sup> And when marginalized in their host-country, refugees become the target of state violence and repression when security crises or threats present regardless of whether the refugees, or their co-nationals abroad, are the actual source of threat.<sup>38</sup> The importance of population movement on the spread of conflict risk has led to an over-emphasis on studying trans-national terrorism. As such, research suffers from the inherent assumption that either refugees commit terror attacks, aid foreign actors' attacks on/in host-countries, or are the target/victims of attacks.

An exclusive analysis of domestic terrorism, as conducted in this article, is a critical missing piece for unlocking the refugee-terrorism nexus as state institutions and domestic populations advocating for or supporting refugees *and/or* refugees' co-ethnic host-country nationals, or other supportive populations could be the target of violence. This heightened risk of nativist violence targeting the state in response to perceived demographic changes was clearly observed in the 2011 Utøya Norway terror attack. The perpetrator – Anders Behring Breivik – portrayed himself as a protector of Norwegian ethnic identity and national security fighting against foreigner criminality, competition, welfare abuse, and an Islamic take-over, but "protected" Norway by bombing the Prime Minister and murdering 69 people, mostly children, at the Workers' Youth League summer camp and not directly attacking refugees or his perceived threatening immigrant.<sup>39</sup>

Those who have analyzed the impact of refugees on domestic-level violence emphasize the importance of socio-political conditions in the host-country. Greater disparities in ethnic power politics between refugees' co-ethnics and other groups in a host-country are an important confounding factor to how refugees' impact domestic tensions; if refugee flows impact – whether real or perceived – preexisting political inequalities,

instability is expected to follow and thus the risk of violence increases.<sup>40</sup> Opposite conditions, like integrative policies and provision of livelihood resources are important tools for mitigating potential threat of violence stimulated by refugee flows.<sup>41</sup>

While important in shifting research attention to domestic political violence, these studies focus on the effect of formal or institutionalized conditions in the host-country and do not directly examine the impact of informal conditions such as social perception of foreigners on the refugee-terrorism nexus. This is a critical missing piece because social perceptions construct the environment refugees enter. Like state capacity mitigating refugees' impact on non-state actor armed conflict,<sup>42</sup> social perceptions could heighten or dampen perceived threats to security and resources and thus impact domestic terrorism in host-countries.

### ***Conditioning Effect of Social Perception***

Refugees are perceived as threatening to the ethno-nationalist identity, potentially having the impact to alter a country's ethnic or religious profile.<sup>43</sup> They may increase concern for safety<sup>44</sup> and prompt fear of job or welfare benefits competition.<sup>45</sup> Describing refugees as deceptive and violent to manipulate fear, ethno-nationalist sentiment, and scapegoating for domestic societal problems<sup>46</sup> is seen throughout history and is geographically agnostic.

For example, in the 1890s, the influx of Eastern European Jewish refugees to London coupled with the rise of anarchism in the city led to a confluence of perceived threat and fear of refugees.<sup>47</sup> Populist rhetoric propelled the debate over migration control as protecting national security.<sup>48</sup> The Great Migration in the 1920s-1930s spurred a similar dynamic in the United States; Ku Klux Klan (KKK) membership skyrocketed outside the South in response to changing racial demographics and employment competition.<sup>49</sup> By the 1970s support for far-right and anti-immigrant extremism had grown in Europe as a result of the demographic changes caused by post-WWII labor migration.<sup>50</sup> In the U.S., the immigration debate in the 2000s spurred membership in far-right militant groups and the KKK.<sup>51</sup>

Cross-national empirical verification, or rejection, of populist suspicion and fear of refugees' terrorism and threat to national security remains relatively scarce.<sup>52</sup> Case studies suggest that perceived threat is exaggerated.<sup>53</sup> Since 1975, in the U.S., the risk of dying in a terror attack by a refugee is 1 in 3.64 billion per year.<sup>54</sup> And, only five of the 800,000 refugees vetted through the resettlement program in the United States between 2001 and 2016 were later arrested on terrorism charges.<sup>55</sup> In Germany 600,000 Iraqis and Syrians arrived in 2015, 17 have been investigated for terrorism.<sup>56</sup>

Although the evidence tends not to support the rhetoric, a survey of 10 European countries,<sup>57</sup> shows the majority (52% to 76%) of respondents in eight countries<sup>58</sup> think refugees increase the likelihood of terrorism in their country and 50% of respondents believe refugees are a burden due to job and social benefit competition.<sup>59</sup> This perceived threat to national security, social welfare, and economic security can evoke the preponderance of xenophobic, non-compromising, and even violent narratives, which influence political preferences and behavior.<sup>60</sup>



When the presence or growth of refugees becomes a politically salient issue, even though the debate over refugee policies focuses on the threat from outside, there is a credible threat for domestic terrorism. Fear mongering and nativist rhetoric could encourage some to protect their interests through terrorism.

A common complaint from host-communities is that refugees increase competition for, and consumption of, resources ranging from employment to land to welfare benefits.<sup>61</sup> Sometimes this competition is perceived, and sometimes it is real. Regardless of the factual evidence, it can breed frustration, hate and scapegoating which can manifest in violence and terror attacks. Terrorism and political violence can be “competitive backlash” against gains made by out-groups.<sup>62</sup> Individuals feeling victimized by economic conditions and searching for short-term problem-solving solutions sometimes express outrage through membership in violent or extremist hate groups.<sup>63</sup> This is not restricted to majority group vs. refugee violence. Other out-groups or minority communities in a host-country may perceive threat from refugees diluting their stranglehold on minority status or upsetting the status-quo distribution of identity politics.<sup>64</sup>

Perceived threat is an important predictor of prejudice, hostility, and political xenophobia.<sup>65</sup> While rapid growth refugee communities are likely necessary to stimulate widespread frustration and competition that mobilizes collective action, any competition, real or perceived, generated by the growth or presence of refugees, risks increasing the terror threat because terrorism does not rely on mass mobilized collective action. Threatened individuals or communities may lash out against refugee populations, supportive public or private institutions, or pro-refugee citizens. The combination of a large refugee population and negative social perceptions leads some host-community members to terrorism. When apprehension about “the other” is heightened and there is a large distinguishable out-group, animosity toward the out-group sometimes explodes in violence.

**Hypothesis 1:** The larger the refugee population when there are negative social perceptions of foreigners, domestic terrorism in a host-country is more likely.

**Hypothesis 2:** The larger the refugee population when there are negative social perceptions of foreigners, the frequency of domestic terrorism in a host-country increases.

The intensity of perceived threat is expected to heighten when there are significant negative economic changes in host-countries. Violent behavior and activities increase in the wake of negative economic changes, in particular, xenophobic and racial motivated violence increases in communities affected by high unemployment and widespread layoffs.<sup>66</sup> Some recently unemployed individuals turn to nativists and xenophobic groups that preach blame on an out-group as a method for immediate gratification of displacing grief, fault, or channeling anger. Membership in these types of groups often quickly increases in the wake of increasing unemployment and decreases almost as rapidly because the gratification is not met or because extreme violence was only a successful short-term problem-solving tool.<sup>67</sup> While membership does not guarantee kinetic violence, it increases the support network for violent outbursts of frustration and hate. When there are negative changes to socio-economic conditions and a refugee population to blame, threat narratives are easier to propagate, which increases the risk of terrorism in host-countries.

**Hypothesis 3:** The larger the refugee population when there are negative changes to economic conditions, domestic terrorism in a host-country is more likely.

**Hypothesis 4:** The larger the refugee population when there are negative changes to economic conditions, the frequency of domestic terrorism in a host-country increases.

The effect of refugee flows on domestic terrorism may be conditioned by the socio-economic conditions in host-countries. Hostile environment in host-countries, as measured by changes in unemployment rate and preference for foreigners as neighbors, frames the perceived threat generated by refugees and thus results in an increase in domestic terrorism.

### **Research Design**

The hypotheses are tested using domestic terror attack data from GTD,<sup>68</sup> refugee population data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),<sup>69</sup> survey data from WVS,<sup>70</sup> and unemployment data from the World Bank.<sup>71</sup> The four datasets share a temporal domain from 1990-2014, but because of documented inconsistencies in GTD's 1993 data and changes in WVS wave 2 (1990-1994) and waves 3-6 (1995-2014), the hypotheses are tested from 1995-2014. GTD event data are aggregated to a host-country-year unit of analysis to test how the size of the refugee population, negative changes to economic conditions, and host countries' social perception of foreign out-groups impact domestic terrorism in host-countries.

### **Dependent Variables & Estimation Techniques**

The study measures domestic terrorism using GTD's variable INT\_ANY to distinguish domestic terrorism from other types of terrorism. INT\_ANY uses information on the target, location and perpetrator(s), which aligns with the definition of domestic terrorism introduced earlier in the article, to distinguish trans-national and domestic terror attacks.<sup>72</sup> GTD records 83,858 terror attacks from 1995-2014. INT\_ANY creates a sample of 21,340 domestic terror attacks, approximately 25.5% of all terror attacks during the timeframe. By comparison there are 11,286 trans-national attacks and 51,232 unknown attacks because at least one of the dimensions is unknown.<sup>73</sup> I aggregate the event data into country-year measures of the number of domestic terror attacks per country-year, which range from 0 to 884.<sup>74</sup> [Table 1](#) illustrates the distribution of domestic terror attacks per country-year.

I operationalize domestic terrorism two ways. First, Domestic Terror Attack is a binary measure equal to 0 if there were no attacks in a country-year and equal to 1 if there was at least one attack. Domestic Terror Attack has a mean of 0.213. Using logit regression models with robust standard errors clustered by host-country, the binary operationalization tests H1 (social perception) and H3 (economic competition) on the likelihood of domestic terrorism in host-countries.

Second, Domestic Terror Frequency is an event count measure of the number of domestic terror attacks per country-year. Domestic Terror Frequency ranges from 0-884

**Table 1.** Distribution of domestic terror attacks per country-year, 1995-2014.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
0 Attacks	2650	78.73	78.73
1 Attack	180	5.35	84.08
2 Attacks	91	2.70	86.78
3 Attacks	47	1.40	88.18
4 Attacks	44	1.31	89.48
5 Attacks	37	1.10	90.58
>5 Attacks	317	9.42	100.00

with a mean of 6.34 and has a skewed distribution, where the conditional variance is greater than the conditional mean. Negative binomial regression models (NBREG) with robust standard errors clustered by host-country are used to test H2 (social perception) and H4 (economic competition).<sup>75</sup> The estimation technique accounts for spatial and temporal independence between terror attacks.<sup>76</sup> It also is a standard analysis in terrorism studies.<sup>77</sup>

### *Independent Variables*

The hypotheses are tested using interactive independent variables. All hypotheses share the constituent variable *Refugee Population*, which is a count of the refugee population per host-country-year based on UNHCR data.<sup>78</sup> Similar to others' research, to correct the positive skew of the counts, I add 1 and take the natural log.<sup>79</sup>

To test H1 and H2 (social perception) the second constituent term in the interaction is *Neighbors* measures host-country social perception of foreigners. *Neighbors* is constructed using waves 3-6 of WVS.<sup>80</sup> Respondents were asked: "On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?" Respondents could select immigrants/foreign workers with responses recorded as either Not Mentioned or Mentioned. Using this binary coding, if immigrants or immigrants/foreign workers was sorted as a group not wanted as a neighbor, WVS coded the respondent as 1, otherwise it is coded as 0. To calculate *Neighbors*, I aggregate the individual responses to generate the mean value per survey-wave and multiply it by 100 to proxy the percentage of country population adverse to having foreign neighbors.

Restricting responses to the year the fieldwork was conducted results in 190 country-years of *Neighbors* responses. To alleviate this analytical restriction, if a country was included in a wave, I extend the average response per country-year during that wave. If a country was surveyed after the first year of a wave, the responses were backdated to the beginning of the wave. This results in 787 country-years of *Neighbors* responses and assumes consistency in preferences within the waves, but improves empirical power in an imperfect data world. *Neighbors* ranges from 17-67.13 with a median of 18.45; higher values correspond to host-country-years where a higher rate of respondents opposed immigrants or foreign workers for neighbors. Higher values of *Neighbors* indicate *more negative* social perception.

To test H3 and H4 (economic competition) the second constituent term in the interaction is *Unemployment Rate Change* to measure negative changes in economic conditions. *Unemployment Rate Change* measures the difference in unemployment rate at time t from time t-1.<sup>81</sup> Positive values of *Unemployment Rate Change* correspond to a worsening, or more competitive, job market.

The multiplicative interaction *Refugee Population* \* *Neighbors* tests the combined effect of refugees and social perception [H1 and H2]. *Refugee Population* \* *Unemployment Rate Change* tests the effect of refugees and economic competition [H3 and H4].

### Control Variables

A battery of control variables – *Democracy*, *GDP per Capita*, *Total Population*, *State Failure*, and *State Capacity* – are included accounting for alternative determinants of terrorism.<sup>82</sup> I add a *September 11* marker and a *Youth Bulge* variable.

Democracy plays an integral role in terrorism. The precise mechanism is unclear. Some research finds democracy to have a positive effect, while other research reports a negative effect.<sup>83</sup> I recode Polity's 21-point scale to range from 0 to 20 to simplify interpretation; democracies are represented by higher values. GDP per Capita [natural log]<sup>84</sup> measures a country's level of economic development, which is shown to impact the rate of terrorism.<sup>85</sup> A country's population also plays a role. Total Population [natural log]<sup>86</sup> is included because larger populations are harder to secure, provide more targets and thus greater opportunity to attack, and larger populations may contain more terrorists.

If a government is struggling to maintain authority, then there may be lapses in security that provide opportunities for terror attacks.<sup>87</sup> State Failure is a scale ranging from 0-17 combining the Political Instability Task Force's measures of the severity of ethnic war (0-4), revolutionary war (0-4), adverse regime change (0-4), and genocides and politicides (0-5).<sup>88</sup> Changes in the rate of terrorism could result from political unrest or conflict in a country.<sup>89</sup> If there is a mobilized opposition movement that engages in terrorism, then changes in the frequency of attacks could be the result of the conflict rather than refugee related.

State capacity could mitigate the effect of social perception and economic competition. Strong administrative capabilities function as conduits for the distribution of resources and public goods, information, security, and other services that can counter xenophobic narratives, resources competition, and perceived threat.<sup>90</sup> To account for this possible dampening effect, *State Capacity* is included using Böhmelt et al.'s (2019) interpolated measure of perceptions of government effectiveness and bureaucratic. Although State Capacity can condition the likelihood and veracity of state failure, both variables are included having a correlation of  $-0.24$ .<sup>91</sup>

September 11<sup>th</sup> was a watershed in terrorism and counterterrorism; September 11 is set to equal 1 after 2001 and coded 0 otherwise. Youth Bulge, is the ratio of the 15-24years olds to the adult population and accounts for youth being more likely to participate in violence against the political system because they have the most to gain from change and upheaval of the status quo.<sup>92</sup>

In the logit regression models temporal dependence in the rate and likelihood of domestic terrorism is accounted for with a cubic polynomial of time, *No Attack Years*, *No Attack Years Squared* and *No Attack Years Cubed*.<sup>93</sup> The cubic polynomials function like time-period fixed effects and provide a more nuanced modeling of the influence of temporal dependence than a one-time period lagged binary dependent variable.<sup>94</sup> In the NBREG models, a one-year lag of the dependent variable – *Domestic Terror Frequency*<sub>(t-1)</sub> – and a binary measure indicating any domestic terrorism recorded the

year before – *Terror History* (equal to 1 is there was at least one domestic terror attack the year prior) – are included to account for temporal dependence. The two variables are correlated at 0.34. Descriptive statistics for all variables are in Appendix [Table A1](#).

## Results

Refugee flows alone do not cause an increase in domestic terrorism in host-countries. Social perception matters and conditions the effect refugees have on domestic terrorism. Preference to *not* have foreigners as neighbors helps define the combustible environment refugees enter. When refugee flows into a host-country increase, the larger the host-country's population with negative social perceptions of foreigners is, the greater the likelihood of domestic terrorism. The results support H1.

This should not be surprising, but nonetheless it adds important nuance as much of the politicized debate surrounding refugees paints the refugee as the terror threat and does not acknowledge a country's nationals as a domestic terror threat.

Important to note, the combined effect of refugees and social perception only increases the predicted probability a domestic terror attack occurs. It does not have a statistically significant effect on the frequency of domestic terrorism. H2 is rejected.

The presence of refugees under the shadow of economic decline or competition does not appear to significantly shape the threat of domestic terrorism. The theorized combined effect of negative economic changes and the size of the refugee population does not produce statistically significant effects and thus, H3 and H4 are rejected.

The results are presented through a series of models. [Table 2](#) contains baseline models where only refugee flow is tested. The results of testing the conditioning effects of social perception and economic competition on the likelihood of domestic terrorism (H1 and H3) are presented in [Table 3](#) and on the frequency of domestic terrorism (H2 and H4) are presented in [Table 4](#). Because the hypotheses are tested through an interaction term, the results cannot be directly evaluated and require marginal effect estimates to be applied. [Figure 1](#) visualizes the statistically significant marginal effect of refugees and social perception on the predicted probability of domestic terrorism (H1).

In [Table 2](#) refugees have no statistical effect on the likelihood or frequency of domestic terrorism, but only considering the independent effect refugees have on domestic terrorism is an incomplete lens. Focusing causal explanatory power or analysis only on the size of the refugee flow into the host-country misses the conditioning effect of negative social perceptions on the risk of domestic terrorism, as shown in [Table 3](#).

It is evident from [Table 3](#) that the environment refugees enter conditions the effect they have on domestic terrorism. The combination of refugee flows and social perception (measured as host-country preference to not have foreigners as neighbors), increases the risk of domestic terrorism. To accurately interpret the effect, which is measured through an interaction term, marginal effects are calculated from Models 4 and 6 and visualized in [Figure 1](#). The interaction term exerts a statistically significant, but substantively small, positive effect on the likelihood of domestic terrorism. It does not have a statistically significant effect on the frequency.

**Table 2.** Effect of refugee flow on domestic terrorism in host-countries, 1995-2014.

	Logit		NBREG	
	Model 1		Model 2	
Refugee Population [ln]	.000 (.034)		.044 (.038)	
Democracy	.051*** (.016)		.028 (.024)	
GDP per Capita [ln]	.241* (.107)		.015 (.128)	
Total Population [ln]	.484*** (.080)		.498*** (.081)	
State Failure	.373*** (.112)		.371*** (.089)	
September 11	.385* (.182)		-.005 (.173)	
Youth Bulge	.038* (.018)		.016 (.016)	
State Capacity	-.224 (.177)		.003 (.174)	
No Attack Years	-1.07*** (.120)			
No Attack Years Squared	.094*** (.019)			
No Attack Years Cubed	-.003*** (.001)			
Domestic Terror Frequency <sub>(t-1)</sub>			.019*** (.004)	
Terror History			2.76*** (.246)	
Constant	-9.01*** (1.61)		-8.08*** (1.83)	
N	2672		2569	
Wald $\chi^2$ (Prob. > $\chi^2$ )	387.39 (0.0000)		456.52 (0.0000)	
Log Pseudolikelihood	-775.95		-2713.29	
ln alpha			1.21 (.124)	
Country Clusters	152		152	

Two-tailed significance test.

\* $p \leq 0.05$ .\*\* $p \leq 0.01$ .\*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$ .

Robust Std. Errors Clustered by Country.

**Table 3.** Effect of refugees & social perception on domestic terrorism in host-country, 1995-2014.

	Logit		NBREG	
	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Refugee Population [ln]	.076 (.056)	-.118 (.107)	.021 (.058)	-.124 (.105)
Neighbors	.012 (.011)	-.066* (.034)	.010 (.011)	-.050 (.035)
Refugees * Neighbors		.008** (.003)		.006* (.004)
Democracy	.030 (.032)	.021 (.035)	-.020 (.031)	.030 (.033)
GDP per Capita [ln]	.398* (.191)	.422* (.205)	.193 (.183)	.229 (.194)
Total Population [ln]	.310** (.107)	.380*** (.121)	.309** (.110)	.336** (.119)
State Failure	.833** (.342)	.796* (.355)	.806*** (.166)	.788*** (.162)
September 11	-.293 (.315)	-.421 (.317)	-.299 (.234)	-.371 (.231)
Youth Bulge	.070** (.026)	.070*** (.028)	.025 (.023)	.027 (.024)
State Capacity	-.295 (.276)	-.190 (.296)	-.171 (.210)	-.134 (.210)
No Attack Years	-.736*** (.186)	-.705*** (.185)		
No Attack Years Squared	.052* (.031)	.047 (.031)		
No Attack Years Cubed	-.01 (.001)	-.001 (.001)		
Domestic Terror Frequency <sub>(t-1)</sub>			.017*** (.005)	.015*** (.005)
Terror History			1.87*** (.277)	1.83*** (.273)
Constant	-10.22*** (2.30)	-9.14*** (2.42)	-6.77** (2.82)	-5.84** (2.77)
N	722	722	700	700
Wald $\chi^2$ (Prob. > $\chi^2$ )	174.38 (0.0000)	161.67 (0.0000)	274.92 (0.0000)	303.55 (0.0000)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-250.40	-247.25	-1016.59	-1013.63
ln alpha			0.955 (.188)	0.931 (.192)
Country Clusters	84	84	84	84

Two-tailed significance test.

\* $p \leq 0.05$ .\*\* $p \leq 0.01$ .\*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$ .

Robust Std. Errors Clustered by Country.

As seen from the marginal effects plots, social perception plays a significant role on a host country's risk of domestic terrorism. In host-countries that prefer to *not* have foreign neighbors, the predicted probability of domestic terrorism increases as the refugee population increases. To substantively interpret the effect, based on Model 4, in a post-September 11<sup>th</sup> country-year, when Refugees and Neighbors are held constant at their mean and combined in the multiplicative interaction applied in the analysis, and all other variables are held constant at their means (the temporal dependence variables are held constant at the values calculated based on the mean of No Attack Years), the predicted probability of domestic terrorism is 7.2%. When Refugee Population and Neighbors are both increased to the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile values (from approximately 6700 to 86588 refugees and 20.85 to 30.34 on the neighbor scale), the predicted probability of domestic terrorism increases to 10.1%, a 40.3% increase.

While the combined effect of social perception and the size of the refugee flow do not have a statistically significant effect on the frequency of domestic terrorism, the substantive effect should not be ignored. Based on Model 6, in a post-September 11<sup>th</sup> country-year, when Refugees and Neighbors are held constant at their mean and combined in the multiplicative interaction, Domestic Terror Attack<sub>(t-1)</sub> and Terror History held constant at the median (both equal 0 translating to no domestic terror attacks the previous year), and all other variables held constant at the mean, the model predicts 0.33 domestic terror attacks per year. The predicted count increases

**Table 4.** Effect of refugees & economic environment on domestic terrorism in host-country, 1995-2014.

	Logit		NBREG	
	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Refugee Population [ln]	.001 (.035)	.001 (.035)	.045 (.039)	.043 (.039)
Unemployment Rate Change	.039 (.056)	.046 (.148)	.072 (.063)	.204 (.194)
Refugees * Unemployment		-.001 (.019)		-.015 (.019)
Democracy	.051*** (.016)	.051*** (.016)	.028 (.024)	.028 (.024)
GDP per Capita [ln]	.240* (.107)	.240* (.106)	.021 (.127)	.017 (.127)
Total Population [ln]	.481*** (.081)	.481*** (.080)	.497*** (.081)	.498*** (.081)
State Failure	.374*** (.112)	.374*** (.112)	.369*** (.089)	.372*** (.089)
September 11	.387* (.184)	.387* (.184)	.007 (.174)	.007 (.174)
Youth Bulge	.038* (.018)	.038* (.018)	.017 (.016)	.017 (.016)
State Capacity	-.220 (.177)	-.220 (.177)	.002 (.174)	.005 (.174)
No Attack Years	-1.07*** (.120)	-1.07*** (.120)		
No Attack Years Squared	.094*** (.019)	.094*** (.019)		
No Attack Years Cubed	-.003*** (.001)	-.003*** (.001)		
Domestic Terror Frequency <sub>(t-1)</sub>			.020*** (.005)	.020*** (.005)
Terror History			2.76*** (.244)	2.76*** (.243)
Constant	-8.99*** (1.61)	-8.99*** (1.61)	-8.19*** (1.79)	-8.15*** (1.80)
N	2656	2656	2553	2553
Wald X <sup>2</sup> (Prob. > X <sup>2</sup> )	384.55 (0.0000)	386.46 (0.0000)	493.34 (0.0000)	495.85 (0.0000)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-775.52	-775.52	-2711.36	-2710.94
ln alpha				
Country Clusters	151	151	151	151


Two-tailed significance test.

\* $p \leq 0.05$ .

\*\* $p \leq 0.01$ .

\*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$ .

Robust Std. Errors Clustered by Country.



**Figure 1.** Marginal effect of refugees and social perception on domestic terrorism, 95% confidence intervals. *Panel A: Likelihood of Attack. Panel B: Number of Attacks.*

to 0.40, a 21.2% increase, when Refugees and Neighbors are increased to the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile. If there was 1 domestic terror attack in the previous year, all else calculated consistent with the previous predictions, then moving from the mean to 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of Refugees and Neighbors results in the predicted number of domestic terror attacks increasing from 2.11 to 2.57, a 21.8% increase.

The models cannot explicate whether the increased likelihood of domestic terrorism is related to ethno-nationalist or nativist violence, refugees' co-ethnic host-country residents reacting to xenophobic forces, or refugee sympathizers engaging in direct action. The results suggest the former is the significant driver because it is the combination of "un-neighborliness" and refugee populations that increases the probability of domestic terrorism. Future research can work to untangle the causal arrows with better cross-national data on domestic terror group and/or perpetrator ideology.

Changes in host-country economic conditions are also expected to influence how refugees effect terrorism. The results suggest that economic competition, when measured by unemployment rate change, does not increase domestic terrorism even when there is a large refugee inflow. The results in [Table 4](#) do not support the expectations.

While economic decline and competition motivate nativist extremism and terrorism at the individual level, empirical studies do not consistently find support at the country level of analysis.<sup>95</sup> The results in [Table 4](#) confirm these previous findings. Terror groups may use negative changes to a country's economic environment to recruit and mobilize support, but not engage in direct acts of violence in an effort to maximize their



constituency through appealing to grievances without sacrificing potential blowback and loss of support or increasing government counter-radicalization of counterterrorism efforts when a country is already under economic, and therefore likely political, duress. Further research is warranted to untangle the micro-level causal mechanism from the macro-level mixed empirical evidence.

When both interactive terms are included in the models, the results are consistent, see Appendix [Table A3](#). Together, the results in [Tables 3](#) and [4](#), based on cross-national analyses, demonstrate that there is a complex web of causation connecting changes in refugee populations to changes in domestic terrorism. As hypothesized, social perception is a critical filter for how domestic terrorism in host-countries is related to increases in refugee populations. A complete assessment of how refugees impact domestic terror risk must include both the number of refugees and how host communities perceive change in the demographic, socio-economic, and political environments. It is important to remember that domestic terrorism in a vast majority of countries is rare, so any statistically significant effect in the models is meaningful even if substantively small.

The WVS data used to measure social perception is only available through 2014 resulting in the analysis ending before the politically controversial Syrian refugee exodus and continued migration from Africa across the Mediterranean into Europe and the refugee and Muslim entry ban in the U.S. The national security-oriented policies venerated and institutionalized nativist sentiment and bolstered political rhetoric and framing of refugees as security, criminal, and terror threats. As a result, the effects measured and identified in this analysis likely grew in substantive size. WVS is in the process of completing wave 7 covering 2017-2020 and has released some preliminary data, which allows this study to be extended in the future as complete data becomes available. Assessing the theorized effects of social perception and refugees on domestic terrorism will be particularly interesting in this period because of the notable rise in far-right, nativist, and anti-immigrant sentiment and violence. Unfortunately, data is not available for 2015 during the height of the Syrian refugee flow into Europe.

### **Robustness Checks**

The first robustness check changes the interaction variables to contain a one-year lag of each constituent term because propagating threat or competition in host-countries may take time. The interactions become  $\text{Refugees}_{(t-1)} * \text{Neighbors}_{(t-1)}$  and  $\text{Refugees}_{(t-1)} * \text{Unemployment Rate Change}_{(t-1)}$ . The results, Appendix [Tables A4-A6](#), support the main analysis.

Second, because approximately 79% of the country-years in the sample do not record a domestic terror attack, I redo the analysis using rare events logit regression models with robust standard errors clustered by host-country. What constitutes a rare event is debatable and although an 21% rate of occurrence is typically outside the bounds necessitating a rare event specification, these models are further evidence of the importance of the interactive effect of refugee populations and host-country social perception on the likelihood of domestic terrorism and demonstrate the strength of the original findings. Full results are in Appendix [Table A7](#).

Third, because the relationship between refugees and terrorism is constructed by social perception, ethnic, religious, or racial differences between host and refugee populations could be of critical importance. Refugees' can impact conflict if the refugee flow is perceived as helping their co-ethnics disrupt the status-quo ethnic balances in society.<sup>96</sup> Religion is another dimension by which refugees can blend in or stand out. When refugees arrive in a community with a different religion, blending in may be challenging as refugees establish new or "foreign" religious institutions and networks. When religion is shared, the use of institutions and networks could either alleviate or perpetuate perceived threat; this shared identity is complex – it could either promote assimilation or may increase tensions if sharing the same networks and resources increase competition over goods and benefits.

And religion occupies a critical place in contemporary policy debate, which makes it a salient cleavage. For example, Muslim refugees are thought to be trying to Islamify "the West" rather than flee insecurity.<sup>97</sup> And, millennialist extremist interpretations of religion, particularly Islam, are a primary motivation for terrorism since the late 1980s.<sup>98</sup>

To assess the potential for religious cleavages to heighten the effect of social perception in the primary analysis, the refugee population variable is split into two explanatory variables – *Same Religion* and *Different Religion*. First, using the original UNHCR data, I establish dyadic refugee flows from Country A (home-country) to Country B (host-country). Second, I use the Cline Center's Composition of Religious and Ethnic Groups Data<sup>99</sup> to identify each country's majority religion. The Cline Center classifies religions as Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, Traditional Belief, Non-Religious, Orthodox, or Other.<sup>100</sup> Third, I label the dyad as same or different religions between Country A and Country B. For example, refugee flow from Iraq (Muslim) to the U.S. (Christian) would be coded as different. Whereas refugee flow from Mexico (Catholic) to the U.S. (Christian) would be classified as same. Fourth, I aggregate the respective same religion and different religion dyads by host-country year to generate a total count of Same Religion refugees and Different Religion refugees per host-country year. Identical to the main analysis, these measures are operationalized as the natural log after adding 1 to the base and replace the refugee population variables in the interaction terms.

To simplify the measures, branches, sects, or beliefs systems (e.g. Shi'a and Sunni) are categorized into their broader religious family (e.g. Islam) when classifying the refugee flow. While recognized that Catholicism and Christianity are quite different with a long and embattled history, the measure assumes these differences are perceived as less threatening than Muslim refugees entering a Christian or Catholic country. By using the home-country's majority religion, the measure also overlooks some caveats such as the U.S.'s attempt to give preferential treatment to Syrian Christian refugees. But, as a proxy of perceived threat and apprehension, these imperfections in the measure are not prohibitive for analysis.

The results, summarized here (complete results in Appendix [Tables A8-A10](#)), suggest that religious differences between refugees and host-communities do not present a particularly salient threat along both social perception and economic competition dimensions. None of the new interaction terms produce a statistically significant effect. The results suggest that domestic terrorism is more influenced by the total number of refugees in a host-country and not how religiously different or similar the refugees

are to the host-country population. Perhaps this would change if data post-2014 was available as the securitized debate regarding refugees centered on inflows from Muslim countries to European countries and the U.S.

Religion is just one cleavage. It is *a* means for identifying differences, but it appears to not be *the* critical one, at least from 1995-2014. It may be more relevant for ethno-nationalist domestic terrorism because the threat from out-groups different than the ethnic, nationalist, or religious homogeneity of the host-country is a standard motivator of far-right extremist violence,<sup>101</sup> but empirical analysis requires improved group identity or ideology data to test in a large-N sample.

The extent of domestic terrorism in a country could create an inverse effect where it influences how the populace feels about having foreigners or immigrants as neighbors. If increases in domestic terrorism, violence, or crime are linked to immigrant or refugee communities through political rhetoric or the media, then it could frame threat and social perception through a different process. For example, over-reporting (or over-covering) Islamist terrorism in the U.S. media heightens the public's sense of fear of Islamist terrorism compared to other ideological motivations.<sup>102</sup>

To parse this potential effect out from the main analysis, regression models are re-specified and turn the domestic terrorism dependent variables into explanatory variables at time *t* and time *t*-1, refugee measures are operationalized as a one-year lag, and the Neighbors variable becomes the dependent variable. Neighbors is treated as a continuous variable and OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered by host-country are applied. The models test whether domestic terrorism, measured at either time *t* or time *t*-1, influences preferences for having foreign neighbors. The results in Appendix Table A11 do not indicate a statistically significant relationship of increased domestic terrorism leading to more antipathy to immigrant or foreign neighbors.

Summary statistics for the additional variables applied in the robustness checks are in Appendix Table A12.

## Discussion

The study finds empirical evidence in a cross-national sample of countries that, the larger a host country's refugee population, the more likely it is to suffer domestic terrorism when negative social perception is high. When host-country nationals prefer not to have foreigners for neighbors, increased refugee flows increase the risk of domestic terrorism in the host-country. Unsurprisingly, xenophobia conditions the effect refugee flows have on the risk of domestic terrorism. The relationship unequivocally attests to a complex web of causation rather than a simplified argument that increased terror threat is strictly from refugees committing terrorism. When host-communities are not accepting of foreigners for neighbors, an increase in the refugee population increases the risk of domestic terrorism. Social perception plays a critical role in domestic terror risk.

To pacify nativist sentiment and avoid violence, host-country governments can enact restrictions on refugee populations that inhibit assimilation, integration, or political representation.<sup>103</sup> If restrictions and concessions appear to be in response to violence,

it could legitimize violence and encourage future incidents. When governments frame refugee policy as a national security concern, rather than a humanitarian one,<sup>104</sup> it substantiates individuals with a similar mindset as Breivik and justifies acts of violence.

The results advance and clarify our understanding of domestic terrorism by showing that underlying or preexisting animosity toward foreigners can explode in violence when refugee populations grow. They also corroborate previous studies, which find that theorized economic motivators for ethno-nationalist terrorism are weak predictors of the observed frequency of attacks.<sup>105</sup>

The role of social perception in motivating domestic terrorism in response to increased refugee flows underscores the importance political rhetoric can have in creating, magnifying, and tempering fear and perceived threat. If nativist rhetoric or policies regarding refugees provoke violence, the increased violence could be framed by these same voices as refugees' fault and threats to national security, which in turn, could motivate additional violence. In short, nativists rhetoric and policies could create a violent feedback loop resulting in steadily increasing levels of violence and terrorism. Governments therefore have a vested interest in shifting the framing and discussion of refugees away from securitization narratives and toward vulnerable populations and human suffering narratives.

This cross-national empirical analysis suggests that while large refugee populations can pose a terrorism threat to host-countries, and potentially the global community, the destabilizing effects are multi-faceted and further complicated by the fact that there is too often a binary political perspective on how we perceive refugee populations. Political rhetoric and perceived threat too often frame refugees as *the* threat for increased terror and ignores the increased risk of domestic terrorism perpetrated by host-country nationals in response to refugee inflows. As Byman aptly summarizes, "Concerns about terrorism and the refugees are legitimate, but the fears being voiced are usually exaggerated and the concerns raised often the wrong ones."<sup>106</sup>

## Notes

1. Nizar Messari and Johannes van der Klaauw, "Counter-terrorism Measures & Refugee Protection in North Africa," *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (2010): 83–103, <https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdq034>.
2. Burcu Savun and Christian Gineste, "From Protection to Persecution: Threat Environment and Refugee Scapegoating," *Journal of Peace Research* 56, no. 1 (2019): 88–102, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318811432>.
3. Alex Braithwaite, Idean Salehyan, and Burcu Savun, "Refugees, Forced Migration, and Conflict: Introduction to the Special Issue," *Journal of Peace Research* 56, no. 1 (2019): 5–11, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318814128>.
4. Tobias Böhmelt, Vincenzo Bove, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Blame the Victims? Refugees, State Capacity, and Non-State Actor Violence," *Journal of Peace Research* 56, no. 1 (2019): 73–87, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318804592>.
5. Ato Kwamena Onoma, *Anti-Refugee Violence and African Politics* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
6. James A. Piazza, "The Determinants of Domestic Right-Wing Terrorism in the USA: Economic Grievance, Societal Change and Political Resentment," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 34, no. 1 (2017): 52–80, [10.1177/0738894215570429](https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894215570429); Pete Simi and Robert Futrell, *American Swastika: Inside the White Power Movement's Hidden Spaces of Hate* (Lanham,

- MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2015); Christopher Hewitt, *Understand Terrorism in America from the Klan to Al Qaeda* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003).
7. Jessica Pressler, "The Plot to Bomb Garden City, Kansas," *New York Magazine*, December 12, 2017, <https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/12/a-militias-plot-to-bomb-somali-refugees-in-garden-city-ks.html>
  8. Ronald Inglehart, Christian Haerpfer, Alejandro Moreno, Christian Welzel, Kseniya Kizilova, Jaime Díez-Medrano, Marta Lagos, Pippa Norris, Eduard Ponarin, and Bi Puranen et al. (eds.). 2014. *World Values Survey: All Rounds – Country-Pooled Datafile 1981-2014*. Madrid: JD Systems Institute, 2014, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>.
  9. United Nations, Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
  10. Seung-Whan Choi and Idean Salehyan, "No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Refugees, Humanitarian Aid, and Terrorism," *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 30, no. 1 (2013): 53–75, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894212456951>; Roger Zetter, "More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globalization," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 20, no. 2 (2007): 172–192, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fem011>; Messari and van der Klaauw, "Counter-terrorism Measures," 83–103.
  11. Zetter, "More Labels, Fewer Refugees" 172–192.
  12. Rosemary Sales, "The Deserving and The Undeserving? Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Welfare in Britain," *Critical Social Policy* 22, no. 3 (2002): 456–478, <https://doi.org/10.1177/026101830202200305>.
  13. Ilker Ataç, Kim Rygiel and Maurice Stierl, "Introduction: The Contentious Politics of Refugee and Migrant Protest and Solidarity Movements: Remaking Citizenship from the Margins," *Citizenship Studies* 20, no. 5 (2016): 527–544, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2016.1182681>.
  14. Daniel Milton, Megan Spencer and Michael Findley, "Radicalism of the Hopeless: Refugee Flows and Transnational Terrorism," *International Interactions* 39, no. 5 (2013): 621–645, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2013.834256>.
  15. Zetter, "More Labels, Fewer Refugees" 172–192.
  16. Milton, et al., "Radicalism of the Hopeless," 621–645
  17. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 2019. Global Terrorism Database (GTD) [Data File], <https://start.umd.edu/gtd/>.
  18. Seden Akcinaroglu and Efe Tokdemir, "To Instill Fear or Love: Terrorist Groups and the Strategy of Building Reputation," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 35, no. 4 (2018): 355–77, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894216634292>; Ryan Bakker, Daniel W. Hill Jr., and Will H. Moore, "How Much Terror? Dissidents, Governments, Institutions, and the Cross-National Study of Terror Attacks," *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 5 (2016): 711–726, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316655020>; Sambuddha Ghatak and Aaron Gold, "Development, Discrimination, and Domestic Terrorism: Looking Beyond a Linear Relationship," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 34, no. 6 (2017): 618–639, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894215608511>; Efe Tokdemir and Seden Akcinaroglu, "Reputation of Terror Groups Dataset: Measuring Popularity of Terror Groups," *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 2 (2016): 268–77, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343315626506>; James A. Piazza, "Poverty, Minority Economic Discrimination and Domestic Terrorism," *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 3 (2011): 339–353, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310397404>; James A. Piazza, "Types of Minority Discrimination and Terrorism," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 29, no. 5 (2012): 521–546, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894212456940>; Stephen Nemeth, "The Effect of Competition on Terrorist Group Operations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 2 (2014): 336–362, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712468717>; Sambuddha Ghatak and Brandon C. Prins, "The Homegrown Threat: State Strength, Grievance, and Domestic Terrorism," *International Interactions* 43, no. 2 (2017): 217–247, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2016.1128431>; Holley E. Hansen, Stephen C. Nemeth, & Jacob A. Mauslein, "Ethnic Political Exclusion and Terrorism: Analyzing the Local Conditions for Violence," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 37, no. 3 (2020): 280–300, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894218782160>; Andrew P. Davis and Yongjun Zhang, "Civil Society &

- Exposure to Domestic Terrorist Attacks: Evidence from a Cross-National Quantitative Analysis, 1970–2010,” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 60, no. 3 (2019): 173–189, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020715219837752>.
19. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 2019. Global Terrorism Database [Data File], <https://start.umd.edu/gtd/>.
  20. Choi and Salehyan, “No Good Deed Goes Unpunished,” 53–75.
  21. Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War.” *International Organization* 60, no. 2 (2006): 335–366.
  22. Seraina Rügger, “Refugees, ethnic power relations, and civil conflict in the country of asylum.” *Journal of Peace Research* 56, no. 1 (2019): 42–57, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318812935>
  23. Böhmelt et al., “Blame the Victim?”
  24. *ibid*
  25. *ibid*
  26. Choi and Salehyan, “No Good Deed Goes Unpunished;” Milton et al., “Radicalism of the Hopeless”; Karen Jacobsen, “Can Refugees Benefit the State? Refugee Resources and African Statebuilding.” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 40, no. 4 (2002): 577–596, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X02004081>.
  27. Sarah Lischer, “Security and Displacement in Iraq: Responding to the Forced Migration Crisis.” *International Security* 33, no. 2 (2008): 95–119.
  28. David Randahl, “Refugees and Terrorism.” *PAX et BELLUM Journal*, 3, no. 1 (2016): 46–55.
  29. Milton et al., “Radicalism of the Hopeless.”
  30. Adam Goldman, Jia Lynn Yang and John Muyskens, “The Islamic State’s suspected inroads into America.” *The Washington Post*, January 31, 2017, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/isis-suspects/>; Britt McCandless, “Somali Americans: Searching for Identity, Finding ISIS.” *CBS News: 60 Minutes Overtime*, October 30, 2016, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-somali-americans-searching-for-identity-finding-isis/>.
  31. Huseyin Cinoglu and Nurullah Altun, “Terrorism, International Migration, and Border Control.” *European Scientific Journal*, 9, no. 20, (2013): 100–114.
  32. Alex P. Schmid, “Links Between Terrorism and Migration,” *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague*, May, 2016, 1–63, <http://icct.nl/app/uploads/2016/05/Alex-P.-Schmid-Links-between-Terrorism-and-Migration.pdf>; Lischer, “Security and Displacement in Iraq,” 95–119.
  33. Anthony Faiola, “The mystery surrounding the Paris bomber with a fake Syrian passport.” *The Washington Post*, November 18, 2015, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/the-mystery-surrounding-the-paris-bomber-with-a-fake-syrian-passport/2015/11/17/88adf3f4-8d53-11e5-934c-a369c80822c2\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.8fb94bbbe35b](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/the-mystery-surrounding-the-paris-bomber-with-a-fake-syrian-passport/2015/11/17/88adf3f4-8d53-11e5-934c-a369c80822c2_story.html?utm_term=.8fb94bbbe35b).
  34. Schmid, “Links Between Terrorism and Migration.”
  35. Cory Eybergen and Martin A. Andresen, “Refugees of Conflict, Casualties of Conjecture: The Trojan Horse Theory of Terrorism and its Implications for Asylum.” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, online first (2020): 1–18.
  36. Michael G. Findley, James A. Piazza, and Joseph K. Young, “Games rivals play: Terrorism in international rivalries.” *Journal of Politics* 74, no. 1 (2012): 235–248, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381611001551>.
  37. Axel Dreher, Martin Gassebner & Paul Schaudt, “The effect of migration on terror: Made at home or imported from abroad?” *Canadian Journal of Economics* 20 (2020): 1703–1744.
  38. Savun and Gineste, “From protection to persecution,” 88–102.
  39. Mette Wiggen, “Rethinking Anti-Immigration Rhetoric after the Oslo and Utøya Terror Attack,” *New Political Science* 34, no. 4 (2012): 585–604, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07393148.2012.729744>.
  40. Rügger, “Refugees, ethnic power relations, and civil conflict in the country of asylum,” 42–57.

41. Karen Jacobsen, "Livelihoods in Conflict: The Pursuit of Livelihoods by Refugees and the Impact on the Human Security of Host Communities." *International Migration*, 40, no. 5: 95–123.
42. Böhmelt et al., "Blame the victims?" 73–87.
43. Salehyan and Gleditsch, "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War," 335–366.
44. Wiggen, "Rethinking Anti-Immigration Rhetoric after the Oslo and Utøya Terror Attack," 585–604.
45. Lee McGowan, "Right-Wing Violence in Germany: Assessing the Objectives, Personalities and Terror Trail of the National Socialist Underground and the State's Response to It," *German Politics* 23, no. 3 (2014): 196–212, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2014.967224>.
46. Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: The Free Press, 1956).
47. Michael Collyer, "Secret Agents: Anarchists, Islamists and Responses to Political Active Refugees in London," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 2 (2005): 278–303, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870420000315852>.
48. *ibid*
49. Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed.* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011); Chester L. Quarles, *The Ku Klux Klan and Related American Racialist and Antisemitic Organizations: A History and Analysis* (North Carolina: McFarland, 1999).
50. Pia Knigge, "The Ecological Correlates of Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe," *European Journal of Political Research* 34 (1998): 249–79, <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1006953714624>.
51. Julian Richards, "Reactive Community Mobilization in Europe: The Case of the English Defence League," *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 5, no. 3 (2013): 177–193, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2011.575624>.
52. Milton, et al., "Radicalism of the Hopeless," 621–645
53. Messari and van der Klaauw, "Counter-terrorism Measures," 83–103
54. Alex Nowrasteh, "Terrorism and Immigration," *Policy Analysis CATO Institute* 798, September 13, 2016, 1–26, <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/terrorism-immigration-risk-analysis>
55. Schmid, "Links Between Terrorism and Migration," 1–63.
56. *ibid*
57. Hungary, Poland, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Greece, UK, France, and Spain.
58. Hungary, Poland, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Greece, and UK.
59. Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes and Katie Simmons, "Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs," *PEW Research Center*, July 11, 2016, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-mean-more-terrorism-fewer-jobs/>.
60. Daphna Canetti, Julia Elad-Sternger, Iris Lavi, Dana Guy and Daniel Bar-Tal, "Exposure to Violence, Ethos of Conflict, and Support for Compromise: Surveys in Israel, East Jerusalem, West Bank, and Gaza," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no. 1 (2017): 84–113, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715569771>.
61. Karen Jacobsen, "Can Refugees Benefit the State?" 577–596; Adrian Martin, "Environmental Conflict Between Refugee and Host Communities," *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no. 3 (2005): 329–346, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343305052015>; Milton, et al., "Radicalism of the Hopeless," 621–645; Idean Salehyan, "Refugees and the Study of Civil War," *Civil Wars* 9, no. 2 (2007): 127–141, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698240701207286>; Knigge, "The Ecological Correlates of Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe," 249–79.
62. Piazza, "The Determinants of Domestic Right-Wing Terrorism in the USA," 52–80; Simi and Futrell, *American Swastika*; Rory McVeigh and David Sikkink, "God, Politics, and Protest: Religious Beliefs and the Legitimation of Contentious Tactics," *Social Forces* 79, no. 4 (2001): 1425–58, <https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2001.0049>.

63. Randy Blazak, "White Boys to Terrorist Men: Targeting Recruitment of Nazi Skinheads," *American Behavioral Scientist* 44, no. 6 (2001): 982–1000, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00027640121956629>.
64. Salehyan and Gleditsch, "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War," 335–366.
65. Victoria M. Esses, John F. Dovidio, Lynne M. Jackson, and Tamara L. Armstrong, "The Immigration Dilemma: The Role of Perceived Group Competition, Ethnic Prejudice, and National Identity," *Journal of Social Issues* 57, no. 3 (2001): 389–412, <https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00220>; Lincoln Quillian, "Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe," *American Sociological Review* 60, no. 4 (1995): 586–611, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2096296>.
66. McGowan, "Right-Wing Violence in Germany," 196–212; Blazak, "White Boys to Terrorist Men," 982–1000; Joel Dyer, *Harvest of Rage: Why Oklahoma City is Only the Beginning* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).
67. Blazak, "White Boys to Terrorist Men," 982–1000.
68. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 2019. Global Terrorism Database [Data File], <https://start.umd.edu/gtd/>.
69. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Population Statistics Database, 2019, <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/>.
70. Inglehart, et al., World Values Survey, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>.
71. World Bank, Unemployment Rate, World Development Indicators, 2019.
72. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 2019. Global Terrorism Database [Data File], <https://start.umd.edu/gtd/>.
73. *ibid*
74. Afghanistan 2014.
75. A. Colin Cameron, and Pravin K. Trivedi, *Regression Analysis of Count Data* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Using Akaike's and Bayesian information criterion to compare negative binomial and zero-inflated negative binomial specifications shows the models are nearly equally valid for this analysis. Negative binomial regression models are appropriate for the main analysis and are preferred for post-estimation interpretations. Estimates produced by a zero-inflated specification support the main analysis (see Appendix Table A2 and support the main analysis).
76. Janet Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford S. Jones, *Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Science* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
77. Piazza, "The Determinants of Domestic Right-Wing Terrorism in the USA," 52–80; author 2015
78. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Population Statistics Database, 2019, <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/>.
79. Choi and Salehyan, "No Good Deed Goes Unpunished," 53–75.
80. Inglehart, et al., World Values Survey, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>
81. World Bank, Unemployment Rate, World Development Indicators, 2019.
82. Choi and Salehyan, "No Good Deed Goes Unpunished," 53–75.
83. See *ibid*; Susanne Martin and Arie Perliger, "Turning to and from Terror: Deciphering the Conditions Under Which Political Groups Choose Violence and Nonviolent Tactics," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 6, no. 4–5 (2012): 21–45, <https://doi.org/10.2307/26296875>; Erica Chenoweth, "Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity," *Journal of Politics* 72, no. 1 (2010): 16–30, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609990442>. Democracy is measured using the Polity dataset, Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers. 2015. Polity IV Project [Codebook and data files], <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2010.pdf>.
84. World Bank, GDP per Capita, World Development Indicators, 2019, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>.
85. Seung-Whan Choi, "Fighting terrorism through the rule of law?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54, no. 6 (2010): 940–966, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002710371666>; Piazza, "Poverty, Minority Economic Discrimination and Domestic Terrorism," 339–353; Alan B. Krueger,



- What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
86. United Nations, Population Division, World Population Prospects, 2019, <https://population.un.org/wpp/>.
  87. Robert I. Rotberg, "Failed States in a World of Terror," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 4 (2002): 127–40.
  88. Choi and Salehyan, "No Good Deed Goes Unpunished," 53–75; Marshall, M. G., Gurr, T. R., Harff, B. (2015). PITF—State failure problem set: Internal wars and failures of governance, 1955–2014 [Dataset and coding rules]. Political Instability (formerly, State Failure) Task Force (PITF). <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/PITFProbSetCodebook2014.pdf>.
  89. James A. Piazza, "Incubators of terror: Do failed states and failing states promote transnational terrorism?" *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 3 (2008): 469–88, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00511.x>.
  90. Cullen Hendrix, "Measuring state capacity: Theoretical and empirical implications for the study of civil conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 3 (2010): 273–285; Böhmelt et al., "Blame the victims?" 73–87.
  91. I conduct additional tests with only one of these control variables included. The results remain consistent and can be provided upon request.
  92. Henrik Urdal, "A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence," *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 3 (2006): 607–29, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00416.x>; United Nations, Population Division, World Population Prospects, 2019, <https://population.un.org/wpp/>.
  93. David B. Carter and Curtis S. Signorino, "Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data," *Political Analysis* 52, no. 2 (2010): 271–292, <https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpq013>.
  94. *ibid*
  95. Piazza, "The Determinants of Domestic Right-Wing Terrorism in the USA," 52–80; Rachel M. Durso and David Jacobs, "The Determinants of the Number of White Supremacist Groups: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis," *Social Problems* 60, no.1 (2013): 128–144, <https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2013.60.1.128>; Knigge, "The Ecological Correlates of Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe," 249–79; Arie Perliger, Gabriel Koehler-Derrick and Ami Pedahzur, "The Gap Between Participation and Violence: Why We Need to Disaggregate Terrorist Profiles," *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no. 2 (2016): 220–229, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqv010>.
  96. Rügger, "Refugees, Ethnic Power Relations, and Civil Conflict in the Country of Asylum," 42–57.
  97. Richards, "Reactive Community Mobilization in Europe," 177–193.
  98. Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2017); Mark Juergensmeyer, "Terror Mandated by God," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 2, (1997): 16–23, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546559708427400>; Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening? A Time-Series Investigation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, no. 3 (2000): 307–332, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002700044003002>.
  99. Peter F. Nardulli, Cara J. Wong, Ajay Singh, Buddy Peyton and Joseph Bajjalieh, "The Composition of Religious and Ethnic Groups (CREG) Project," White Paper: Cline Center for Democracy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2012, [https://data.nber.org/ens/feldstein/ENSA\\_Sources/Cline%20Center/Ethnic%20and%20Religious%20Groups/CREG-White\\_Paper.pdf](https://data.nber.org/ens/feldstein/ENSA_Sources/Cline%20Center/Ethnic%20and%20Religious%20Groups/CREG-White_Paper.pdf).
  100. The categorizations do not account for differences between sects or practices that could be important, but the measure is an approximation for identifying a refugee as different from the host community. Muslim includes Sunni, Shia and Ibadiyah and Christian includes Roman Catholic, Christian, Protestant and Coptic.

101. Piazza, “The Determinants of Domestic Right-Wing Terrorism in the USA,” 52–80; Simi and Futrell, *American Swastika*; Knigge, “The Ecological Correlates of Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe,” 249–79.
102. Erin M. Kearns, Allison E. Betus, and Anthony F. Lemieux, “Why Do Some Terrorists Attacks Receive More Media Attention than Others?” *Justice Quarterly* 36, no. 6 (2019): 985–1022, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2018.1524507>.
103. Milton, et al., “Radicalism of the Hopeless,” 621–645.
104. Howard Adelman, “Refugees and border security post-September 11,” *Refugee* 20, no. 4 (2002): 6–14, <https://doi.org/10.25071/1920-7336.21268>.
105. Piazza, “The Determinants of Domestic Right-Wing Terrorism in the USA,” 52–80; Simi and Futrell, *American Swastika*; Knigge, “The Ecological Correlates of Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe,” 249–79.
106. Daniel L. Byman, “Do Syrian refugees pose a terrorism threat?” *Markaz: Middle East Politics & Policy*, Brookings Institute, October 27, 2015, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/10/27/do-syrian-refugees-pose-a-terrorism-threat/>.
107. A. Colin Cameron, and Pravin K. Trivedi, *Regression Analysis of Count Data* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

## Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

## ORCID

Graig R. Klein  <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1745-6712>

## Appendix A

**Table A1.** Summary Statistics.

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
<b>Dependent Variables</b>					
Domestic Terror Attacks	3366	.213	.409	0	1
Domestic Terror Frequency	3366	6.34	37.98	0	884
<b>Independent Variables</b>					
Refugee Population [ln]	2885	8.34	3.08	0	14.60
Neighbors	787	20.97	13.79	1.7	67.13
Unemployment Rate Change	3188	-.040	1.34	-12	18.2
Refugee * Neighbors	749	185.85	156.78	0	872.69
Refugee * Unemployment Change	2861	-.287	11.54	-115.81	212.24
<b>Control Variables</b>					
Democracy	3243	13.36	6.50	0	20
GDP per Capita [ln]	3145	7.96	1.65	4.17	11.67
Total Population [ln]	3212	9.18	1.55	5.88	14.13
State Failure	3366	.458	1.34	0	16.5
September 11	3366	.650	.477	0	1
Youth Bulge	3212	39.09	10.20	17.22	56.96
Domestic Terrorism	3366	5.80	5.71	0	19
No Attack Years					
No Attack Years Squared	3366	66.23	94.40	0	361
No Attack Years Cubed	3366	897.30	1605.05	0	6859
Domestic Terror Attacks(t-1)	3191	5.51	31.66	0	662
Terror History	3366	.199	.399	0	1

As seen in [Table 1](#), Domestic Terror Attacks is an event count with a skewed distribution, where the conditional variance is greater than the conditional mean, and this over-dispersion could be the result of excess zeros. If there are excess zeros, i.e. count of host-country-years with no domestic terror attacks, they could be grouped into “certain zeros” and “non-certain zeros” by a latent process in how the zero-count is generated and the zero-inflation specification helps define these groupings.<sup>107</sup> In other words, two distinct processes result in zero counts. For example, “non-certain zeros” could be a host-country-year with a large refugee population that did not have any domestic terrorism in a given year or a host-country-year that meets conditions captured in the control variables that increase the risk of domestic terrorism, but no attacks occurred that year. In these scenarios the tested, and previously established theories, could have resulted in an attack, but did not; and it could be random that no attack occurred. “Certain zeros” could occur in host-country-years because the conditions associated with terrorism do not exist within the country-year; these cases are “certain zeros” because domestic terrorism could not have occurred.

If there is an over-dispersion of zero domestic terror attack observations, accounting for these different processes is important and is accomplished by implementing zero-inflated negative binomial regression models. A zero-inflated specification controls for spatial and temporal independence between terror attacks and thus helps account for any over-dispersion of zero counts. Even though descriptive statistics for Domestic Terror Attacks provide evidence of a skewed distribution by way of the conditional variance much larger than the condition mean, post-estimation diagnostics using Akaike’s information criteria (AIC) and Bayesian information criteria (BIC) suggest that the zero counts are not a significant source of error or mis-estimation. The AIC and BIC for negative binomial and zero-inflated

negative binomial specifications are nearly identical when comparing models. Still, to provide further affirmative evidence of the relationship between refugees and social perception uncovered in the main analysis, I re-estimate the models using a zero-inflated specification. All models use robust standard errors clustered by host-country.

The inflation stage of the models includes variables that help define “certain zero” from “non-certain zero.” A negative coefficient in the inflation stage means that higher values of the variable correspond to a greater probability of an observation, i.e. a host country-year, not being a “certain zero.” The models employ robust standard errors clustered by country.

The zero-inflated negative binomial models generate estimates in the inflation and count stages for the likelihood of an event, i.e. a zero-count, in the inflation stage and for the number of events in the count stage. To help differentiate the equations for estimating these stages, *Youth Bulge* and *Terror Attack Frequency(t-1)* are removed from the count stage and only included in the inflation stage. *Terror History* is a binary indicator of whether there were any terror attacks in the host country the previous year; a value of 1 indicates at least one attack, and a value of 0 indicates no attacks. *Terror History* reduces path dependent influences created by including lagged dependent variables of a rare event in the inflation stage.

**Table A2.** Effect of Refugees, Social Perception & Economic Environment on Domestic Terrorism in Host-Country, 1995-2014 (Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression).

	Model A1	Model A2	Model A3	Model A4	Model A5
<i>Count Stage</i>					
Refugee Population [ln]	-.055 (.051)	-.106 (.070)	-.287** (.119)	-.055 (.050)	-.057 (.051)
Neighbors		.001 (.011)	-.092* (.049)		
Unemployment Rate Change				-.084 (.062)	.212 (.271)
Refugee * Neighbors			.009* (.004)		
Refugees * Unemployment					-.030 (.024)
Democracy	.045 (.037)	.002 (.030)	-.013 (.036)	.048 (.035)	.047 (.036)
GDP per Capita [ln]	.093 (.117)	-.015 (.160)	.036 (.155)	.087 (.116)	.088 (.116)
Total Population [ln]	.407*** (.119)	.291* (.142)	.308* (.152)	.398*** (.117)	.401*** (.118)
State Failure	.564*** (.151)	.863*** (.174)	.858*** (.167)	.570*** (.146)	.583*** (.150)
September 11	.483 (.300)	.411 (.385)	.230 (.367)	.449 (.292)	.417 (.289)
State Capacity	-.431* (.209)	-.478* (.230)	-.497* (.229)	-.422* (.210)	-.431* (.210)
Terror History	2.24*** (.460)	1.87** (.640)	1.72** (.681)	2.19*** (.447)	2.20*** (.438)
Constant	-5.78*** (1.42)	-2.64 (2.25)	-.979 (2.55)	-5.63*** (1.43)	-5.65*** (1.44)
<i>Inflation Stage</i>					
Democracy	-.002 (.034)	-.043 (.045)	-.040 (.046)	.000 (.033)	-.001 (.033)
State Failure	-.197 (.126)	-48.90*** (2.02)	-41.60*** (2.02)	-.195 (.124)	-.193 (.122)
September 11	.504* (.280)	.768* (.448)	.763 (.466)	.493* (.277)	.473* (.277)
Youth Bulge	-.039* (.020)	-.062* (.032)	-.063* (.033)	-.038* (.020)	-.039* (.020)
State Capacity	-.379* (.195)	-.571* (.295)	-.658* (.298)	-.373* (.195)	-.380* (.196)
Domestic Terror Frequency(t-1)	-1.98*** (.363)	-1.29** (.509)	-1.38* (.645)	-1.99*** (.357)	-1.99*** (.355)
Constant	2.74** (1.00)	3.71** (1.42)	3.69** (1.42)	2.72** (.998)	2.75** (1.00)
N	2569	700	700	2553	2553
Non-Zero Obs.	559	214	214	559	559
Zero Obs.	2010	486	486	1994	1994
Wald X2 (Prob. > X2)	154.15 (0.0000)	168.32 (0.0000)	143.84 (0.0000)	158.27 (0.0000)	195.27 (0.0000)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-2718.95	-999.96	-996.37	-2716.73	-2715.48
ln alpha	.947 (.122)	.662 (.192)	.646 (.211)	.936 (.121)	.937 (.122)
Country Clusters	152	84	84	151	151
Non-Zero Obs.	559	214	214	559	559
Zero Obs.	2010	486	486	1994	1994
Wald X2 (Prob. > X2)	154.15 (0.0000)	168.32 (0.0000)	143.84 (0.0000)	158.27 (0.0000)	195.27 (0.0000)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-2718.95	-999.96	-996.37	-2716.73	-2715.48
ln alpha	.947 (.122)	.662 (.192)	.646 (.211)	.936 (.121)	.937 (.122)
Country Clusters	152	84	84	151	151

Two-tailed significance test.

\* $p \leq 0.05$ .\*\* $p \leq 0.01$ .\*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$ .

Robust Std. Errors Clustered by Country.

**Table A3.** Effect of Refugees with both Social Perception & Economic Environment on Domestic Terrorism in Host-Country, 1995-2014.

	Logit		NBREG	
	Model A6	Model A7	Model A8	Model A9
Refugee Population [ln]	.075 (.056)	-.115 (.107)	.012 (.062)	-.171 (.111)
Neighbors	.012 (.011)	-.064* (.034)	.017 (.010)	-.060* (.036)
Unemployment Rate Change	-.033 (.098)	-.241 (.236)	.096 (.169)	.822 (.823)
Refugee * Neighbors		.008** (.003)		.007* (.004)
Refugees * Unemployment		.025 (.032)		-.080 (.074)
Democracy	.030 (.032)	.020 (.035)	-.001 (.027)	-.018 (.030)
GDP per Capita [ln]	.399* (.191)	.427* (.204)	.273 (.174)	.304* (.179)
Total Population [ln]	.313** (.109)	.372** (.126)	.333** (.124)	.390*** (.120)
State Failure	.827** (.346)	.807* (.372)	.856*** (.199)	.866*** (.201)
September 11	-.296 (.317)	-.423 (.321)	-.389 (.263)	-.468* (.259)
Youth Bulge	.070** (.025)	.071** (.027)	.050* (.025)	.047* (.027)
State Capacity	-.299 (.279)	-.189 (.294)	-.200 (.220)	-.202 (.233)
No Attack Years	-.740*** (.190)	-.705*** (.189)		
No Attack Years Squared	.053* (.032)	.046 (.031)		
No Attack Years Cubed	-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.001)		
Domestic Terror Frequency(t-1)			.025** (.009)	.021** (.007)
Terror History			1.90*** (.551)	1.92*** (.475)
Constant	-10.26*** (2.30)	-9.17*** (2.42)	-9.64*** (3.06)	-8.26*** (2.87)
N	722	722	700	700
Wald X2 (Prob. > X2)	177.54 (0.0000)	171.58 (0.0000)	204.42 (0.0000)	285.92 (0.0000)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-250.34	-246.94	-1030.94	-1024.75
In alpha			1.10 (.202)	1.07 (.216)
Country Clusters	84	84	84	84

Two-tailed significance test.

\* $p \leq 0.10$ .\*\* $p \leq 0.05$ .\*\*\* $p \leq 0.01$ .

Robust Std. Errors Clustered by Country.

**Table A4.** Effect of Refugees(t-1) on Domestic Terrorism in Host-Country, 1995-2014.

	Logit		NBREG	
	Model A10		Model A11	
Refugee Population(t-1) [ln]	-.008 (.033)		.029 (.038)	
Democracy	.041** (.015)		.028 (.024)	
GDP per Capita [ln]	.196* (.103)		.016 (.128)	
Total Population [ln]	.452*** (.077)		.508*** (.081)	
State Failure	.356*** (.102)		.371*** (.088)	
September 11	.257 (.165)		-.002 (.173)	
Youth Bulge	.033* (.017)		.017 (.016)	
State Capacity	-.131 (.176)		.006 (.175)	
No Attack Years	-1.15*** (.124)			
No Attack Years Squared	.106*** (.020)			
No Attack Years Cubed	-.003*** (.001)			
Domestic Terror Frequency(t-1)			.019*** (.004)	
Terror History			2.76*** (.247)	
Constant	-7.69*** (1.53)		-8.07*** (1.83)	
N	2555		2555	
Wald X2 (Prob. > X2)	397.87 (0.0000)		454.88 (0.0000)	
Log Pseudolikelihood	-719.92		-2710.13	
In alpha				
Country Clusters	153		153	

Two-tailed significance test.

\* $p \leq 0.05$ .\*\* $p \leq 0.01$ .\*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$ .

Robust Std. Errors Clustered by Country.

**Table A5.** Effect of Refugees(t-1) & Social Perception(t-1) on Domestic Terrorism(t) in Host-Country, 1995-2014.

	Logit		NBREG	
	Model A12	Model A13	Model A14	Model A15
Refugee Population(t-1) [ln]	.085 (.053)	-.088 (.105)	.022 (.058)	-.093 (.095)
Neighbors(t-1)	.011 (.010)	-.061* (.033)	.010 (.010)	-.039 (.034)
Refugees(t-1) * Neighbors(t-1)		.007* (.003)		.005 (.003)
Democracy	.015 (.029)	.010 (.032)	.000 (.024)	-.005 (.025)
GDP per Capita [ln]	.288* (.143)	.300* (.150)	.184 (.143)	.220 (.152)
Total Population [ln]	.291*** (.092)	.350*** (.106)	.453*** (.084)	.477*** (.088)
State Failure	.967*** (.388)	.943** (.402)	.733*** (.158)	.724*** (.156)
September 11	-.349 (.315)	-.442 (.311)	-.263 (.245)	-.307 (.245)
Youth Bulge	.046* (.020)	.046* (.022)	.044* (.019)	.047** (.020)
State Capacity	-.278 (.254)	-.192 (.272)	-.268 (.194)	-.244 (.194)
No Attack Years	-.913*** (.169)	-.867*** (.168)		
No Attack Years Squared	.071* (.032)	.063* (.032)		
No Attack Years Cubed	-.002 (.002)	-.001 (.001)		
Domestic Terror Frequency(t-1)			.015** (.006)	.014** (.005)
Terror History			2.10*** (.278)	2.08*** (.280)
Constant	-7.82*** (1.77)	-6.80*** (1.92)	-9.42*** (1.87)	-8.86*** (1.98)
N	673	673	673	673
Wald X2 (Prob. > X2)	172.60 (0.0000)	170.28 (0.0000)	315.19 (0.0000)	329.22 (0.0000)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-212.56	-210.48	-937.55	-935.67
In alpha			.833 (.158)	.826 (.158)
Country Clusters	84	84	84	84

Two-tailed significance test.

\*  $p \leq 0.05$ .\*\*  $p \leq 0.01$ .\*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$ .

Robust Std. Errors Clustered by Country.

**Table A6.** Effect of Refugees(t-1) & Economic Environment(t-1) on Domestic Terrorism in Host-Country, 1995-2014.

	Logit		NBREG	
	Model A16	Model A17	Model A18	Model A19
Refugee Population(t-1) [ln]	-.007 (.033)	-.007 (.033)	.031 (.039)	.029 (.039)
Unemployment Rate Change(t-1)	-.030 (.054)	-.029 (.155)	.031 (.046)	.106 (.129)
Refugees(t-1) * Unemployment(t-1)		-.000 (.018)		-.009 (.017)
Democracy	.041** (.015)	.041** (.015)	.027 (.024)	.028 (.024)
GDP per Capita [ln]	.196* (.102)	.196* (.102)	.014 (.128)	.013 (.128)
Total Population [ln]	.450*** (.077)	.450*** (.077)	.505*** (.081)	.506*** (.081)
State Failure	.355*** (.101)	.355*** (.101)	.371*** (.088)	.373*** (.088)
September 11	.254 (.165)	.254 (.165)	.006 (.169)	.006 (.169)
Youth Bulge	.033* (.017)	.033* (.017)	.017 (.016)	.017 (.016)
State Capacity	-.137 (.175)	-.137 (.175)	.013 (.172)	.013 (.173)
No Attack Years	-1.15*** (.124)	-1.15*** (.124)		
No Attack Years Squared	.106*** (.019)	.106*** (.019)		
No Attack Years Cubed	-.003*** (.001)	-.003*** (.001)		
Domestic Terror Frequency(t-1)			.019*** (.004)	.019*** (.004)
Terror History			2.76*** (.245)	2.76*** (.243)
Constant	-7.66*** (1.53)	-7.66*** (1.54)	-8.05*** (1.83)	-8.03*** (1.83)
N	2539	2539	2539	2539
Wald X2 (Prob. > X2)	397.88 (0.0000)	399.78 (0.0000)	451.35 (0.0000)	501.84 (0.0000)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-719.57	-719.57	-2709.22	-2709.07
In alpha			1.21 (.125)	1.21 (.126)
Country Clusters	152	152	152	152

Two-tailed significance test \*  $p \leq 0.05$  \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$  \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$ .

Robust Std. Errors Clustered by Country.

**Table A7.** Effect of Refugees, Social Perception & Economic Environment on Domestic Terrorism in Host-Country, 1995-2014 (Rare Events Logit Regression).

	Model A20	Model A21	Model A22	Model A23	Model A24
Refugee Population [ln]	.000 (.034)	.072 (.055)	-.114 (.105)	.001 (.035)	.001 (.035)
Neighbors		.012 (.011)	-.062* (.034)		
Refugees * Neighbors			.008** (.003)		
Unemployment Rate				.041 (.055)	.048 (.147)
Refugees * Unemployment					-.001 (.019)
Democracy	.050*** (.016)	.028 (.032)	.018 (.035)	.050*** (.016)	.050*** (.016)
GDP per Capita [ln]	.240* (.106)	.391* (.188)	.415* (.201)	.239* (.106)	.238* (.106)
Total Population [ln]	.479*** (.080)	.300** (.105)	.366*** (.119)	.477*** (.080)	.476*** (.080)
State Failure	.369*** (.111)	.786** (.336)	.748* (.349)	.369*** (.111)	.368*** (.111)
September 11	.382* (.181)	-.289 (.310)	-.413 (.311)	.385* (.183)	.384* (.183)
Youth Bulge	.038* (.018)	.068** (.025)	.068** (.027)	.038* (.018)	.038* (.018)
State Capacity	-.223 (.176)	-.288 (.272)	-.186 (.290)	-.219 (.176)	-.218 (.176)
No Attack Years	-1.06*** (.120)	-.715*** (.182)	-.684*** (.182)	-1.06*** (.119)	-1.06*** (.119)
No Attack Years Squared	.093*** (.019)	.051* (.031)	.045 (.031)	.092*** (.019)	.092*** (.019)
No Attack Years Cubed	-.002*** (.001)	-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.001)	-.002*** (.001)	-.002*** (.001)
Constant	-8.93*** (1.60)	-9.93*** (2.25)	-8.89*** (2.38)	-8.90*** (1.60)	-8.88*** (1.60)
N	2672	722	722	2656	2656
Country Clusters	152	84	84	151	151

Two-tailed significance test \*  $p \leq 0.05$  \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$  \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$ .

Robust Std. Errors Clustered by Country.

**Table A8.** Effect of Difference & Sameness Refugees on Domestic Terrorism in Host-Country, 1995-2014.

	Logit	NBREG
	Model A25	Model A26
Different Refugee Population [ln]	.008 (.025)	-.018 (.032)
Same Refugee Population [ln]	-.027 (.029)	.012 (.031)
Democracy	.050** (.016)	.028 (.023)
GDP per Capita [ln]	.277** (.117)	-.005 (.145)
Total Population [ln]	.502*** (.075)	.530*** (.082)
State Failure	.375*** (.106)	.366*** (.086)
September 11	.387* (.175)	.007 (.172)
Youth Bulge	.045** (.019)	.015 (.018)
State Capacity	-.241 (.175)	.046 (.182)
No Attack Years	-1.07*** (.118)	
No Attack Years Squared	.094*** (.019)	
No Attack Years Cubed	-.003*** (.001)	
Domestic Terror Frequency(t-1)		.018*** (.004)
Terror History		2.78*** (.241)
Constant	-9.60*** (1.66)	-7.78*** (204)
N	2672	2569
Wald X2 (Prob. > X2)	381.43 (0.0000)	534.48 (0.0000)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-774.81	-2714.69
ln alpha		1.21 (.132)
Country Clusters	152	152

Two-tailed significance test.

\*  $p \leq 0.10$ .

\*\*  $p \leq 0.05$ .

\*\*\*  $p \leq 0.01$ .

Robust Std. Errors Clustered by Country.



**Table A9.** Effect of Difference and Sameness Refugees & Social Perception on Domestic Terrorism in Host-Country, 1995-2014.

	Logit		NBREG	
	Model A27	Model A28	Model A29	Model A30
Different Refugee Population [ln]	.001 (.039)	.086 (.069)	-.062 (.041)	-.052 (.071)
Same Refugee Population [ln]	.054 (.036)	-.037 (.066)	.082* (.036)	.007 (.081)
Neighbors	.012 (.011)	.011 (.022)	.007 (.010)	-.012 (.017)
Different Refugees * Neighbors		-.004 (.003)		.000 (.003)
Same Refugees * Neighbors		.003 (.002)		.003 (.002)
Democracy	.017 (.030)	.029 (.033)	-.014 (.030)	-.015 (.032)
GDP per Capita [ln]	.342* (.198)	.310 (.208)	.090 (.196)	.105 (.208)
Total Population [ln]	.339*** (.097)	.379*** (.101)	.330*** (.101)	.333*** (.107)
State Failure	.847** (.338)	.826** (.335)	.822*** (.148)	.817*** (.144)
September 11	-.312 (.319)	-.276 (.310)	-.371 (.228)	-.364 (.229)
Youth Bulge	.056* (.029)	.062* (.030)	.007 (.026)	.013 (.028)
State Capacity	-.217 (.261)	-.221 (.267)	-.111 (.201)	-.077 (.195)
No Attack Years	-.730*** (.186)	-.702*** (.191)		
No Attack Years Squared	.052 (.031)	.047 (.033)		
No Attack Years Cubed	-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.001)		
Domestic Terror Frequency(t-1)			.018*** (.005)	.017*** (.005)
Terror History			1.85*** (.278)	1.86*** (.267)
Constant	-9.02*** (2.46)	-9.52*** (2.45)	-5.45* (2.99)	-5.39* (3.03)
N	722	722	700	700
Wald X2 (Prob. > X2)	191.49 (0.0000)	190.37 (0.0000)	346.06 (0.0000)	373.19 (0.0000)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-250.24	-248.47	-1010.90	-1009.41
ln alpha			.944 (.191)	.922 (.205)
Country Clusters	84	84	84	84

Two-tailed significance test.

\* $p \leq 0.05$ .\*\* $p \leq 0.01$ .\*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$ .

Robust Std. Errors Clustered by Country.

**Table A10.** Effect of Difference and Sameness Refugees & Economic Environment on Domestic Terrorism in Host-Country, 1995-2014.

	Logit		NBREG	
	Model A31	Model A32	Model A33	Model A34
Different Refugee Population [ln]	.008 (.025)	.007 (.025)	-.020 (.032)	-.020 (.032)
Same Refugee Population [ln]	-.026 (.029)	-.026 (.029)	.013 (.031)	.012 (.031)
Unemployment Rate Change	.036 (.055)	.016 (.120)	.074 (.063)	.108 (.155)
Different Refugees * Unemployment		.013 (.013)		.003 (.017)
Same Refugees * Unemployment		-.011 (.011)		-.008 (.010)
Democracy	.049** (.016)	.049** (.017)	.028 (.022)	.028 (.022)
GDP per Capita [ln]	.275** (.117)	.278** (.117)	-.001 (.142)	-.000 (.143)
Total Population [ln]	.500*** (.076)	.503*** (.075)	.531*** (.081)	.531*** (.081)
State Failure	.376*** (.106)	.377*** (.106)	.364*** (.086)	.367*** (.086)
September 11	.390* (.177)	.382* (.178)	.020 (.173)	.022 (.174)
Youth Bulge	.045** (.019)	.045** (.019)	.016 (.017)	.017 (.017)
State Capacity	-.237 (.174)	-.235 (.173)	.050 (.181)	.052 (.181)
No Attack Years	-1.07*** (.118)	-1.07*** (.118)		
No Attack Years Squared	.094*** (.019)	.094*** (.019)		
No Attack Years Cubed	-.003*** (.001)	-.003*** (.001)		
Domestic Terror Frequency(t-1)			.019*** (.004)	.019*** (.004)
Terror History			2.79*** (.240)	2.78*** (.236)
Constant	-9.57*** (1.67)	-9.62*** (1.67)	-7.86*** (1.98)	-7.88*** (1.99)
N	2656	2656	2553	2553
Wald X2 (Prob. > X2)	379.98 (0.0000)	406.47 (0.0000)	561.37 (0.0000)	600.63 (0.0000)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-774.43	-773.72	-2712.77	-2712.41
ln alpha			1.21 (.132)	1.21 (.134)
Country Clusters	151	151	151	151

Two-tailed significance test.

\* $p \leq 0.05$ .\*\* $p \leq 0.01$ .\*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$ .

Robust Std. Errors Clustered by Country.

**Table A11.** Testing Inverse Relationship (OLS Regression).

D.V. = Neighbors	Model A35	Model A36	Model A37	Model A38	Model A39	Model A40
Refugee Population(t-1) [ln]	-.190 (.651)	-.196 (.651)	-.203 (.657)	-.197 (.662)	-.206 (.650)	-.198 (.649)
Unemployment Rate(t-1)		.391 (.298)	.388 (.295)	.381 (.290)	.385 (.298)	.388 (.298)
Domestic Terror Attack			1.98 (2.91)			
Domestic Terror Frequency					-.017 (.016)	
Domestic Terror Attack(t-1)				2.30 (2.83)		
Domestic Terror Frequency(t-1)						-.020 (.024)
Democracy	-.602* (.259)	-.599* (.259)	-.605** (.256)	-.611** (.254)	-.588* (.260)	-.589* (.260)
GDP per Capita [ln]	.686 (1.47)	.683 (1.47)	.538 (1.51)	.547 (1.50)	.758 (1.49)	.778 (1.49)
Total Population [ln]	.524 (1.20)	.537 (1.20)	.375 (1.27)	.333 (1.28)	.571 (1.21)	.553 (1.20)
State Failure	1.45 (1.44)	1.44 (1.44)	1.09 (1.46)	1.06 (1.45)	1.84 (1.46)	1.84 (1.53)
September 11	3.37* (1.47)	3.35* (1.47)	3.72* (1.61)	3.78* (1.63)	3.43* (1.47)	3.38* (1.47)
Youth Bulge	.257 (.200)	.256 (.200)	.232 (.213)	.227 (.212)	.269 (.203)	.270 (.205)
State Capacity	-.553 (1.75)	-.553 (1.75)	-.451 (1.71)	-.461 (1.72)	-.633 (1.74)	-.662 (1.74)
Constant	8.95 (17.29)	8.94 (17.29)	12.03 (18.74)	12.44 (18.72)	7.38 (17.88)	7.39 (17.96)
N	696	696	696	696	696	696
F (Prob. > F)	3.17 (0.0036)	3.44 (0.0012)	3.22 (0.0015)	3.16 (0.0018)	3.13 (0.0020)	3.13 (0.0020)
Country Clusters	83	83	83	83	83	83

Two-tailed significance test.

\* $p \leq 0.05$ .\*\* $p \leq 0.01$ .\*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$ .

Robust Std. Errors Clustered by Country.

**Table A12.** Summary Statistics for Robustness Checks.

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Different Refugee Population [ln]	2929	5.25	3.89	0	13.24
Same Refugee Population [ln]	2929	5.40	4.10	0	14.60
Different Refugees * Neighbors	753	111.00	118.94	0	683.68
Same Refugees * Neighbors	753	116.06	146.30	0	872.67
Different Refugees * Unemployment	2866	-.110	8.77	-100.60	212.24
Same Refugees * Unemployment	2866	-.197	8.17	-109.37	160.60
Refugee Population(t-1) [ln]	2731	8.34	3.07	0	14.60
Neighbors(t-1)	728	20.71	13.64	1.7	67.13
Refugees(t-1) * Neighbors(t-1)	693	183.06	154.25	8.78	872.69
Unemployment Rate Change(t-1)	3027	-.036	1.37	-12	18.2
Refugees(t-1) * Unemployment(t-1)	2709	-.240	11.79	-115.81	212.24
Domestic Terror Attack(t-1)	3191	.210	.407	0	1